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CYRUS AGAINST TOMYRIS

by

KONSTANTINOS DELIGIORGIS

ABSTRACT: Cyrus, along with the Lydian Croesus, dominates the first book of Herodotus' *Histories*. At the end of this book the author describes the Persian king's campaign against the uncivilised tribe of the Massagetae – the campaign which cost him his life. Cyrus' confrontation with the barbarous queen Tomyris, first in the form of verbal exchange and then on the battlefield, offers an opportunity to observe and compare two different characters and mentalities. The main aim of this paper is to investigate this obvious contrast by the close reading of the Herodotean account.

Herodotus, who was studious and fond of learning, shows a special interest in the queen-warriors of the barbaric world, whose power and autonomy transformed them into objects of admiration and fear, primarily for his own male audience. Queen Tomyris of the Massagetae¹, a unique combination of wisdom and savagery about whom we read at the end of the first book of *Histories*, fits this description of the female figure while at the same time providing both the historian and us with enigmatic nuggets of knowledge which were commonly known within the borders of the Persian Empire². Nevertheless, she will be mostly remembered for her crucial involvement in the death of Cyrus³, a ruler who undeniably occupies a prominent position among the early and most glorious Persian monarchs⁴, and dominates, together with Croesus, the pages of Herodotus' first book.

¹ The Massagetae were a large and belligerent tribe living beyond the Araxes river, on the east coast of the Caspian sea, in today's Turkestan in Central Asia. See ASHERI, LLOYD, CORCELLA 2007: 212 f. (with additional bibliography); HOW, WELLS 1928: 172; MÜLLER 1997: 99.

² See PAYEN 1991: 254.

³ Strabo (XI 8, 6) states that Tomyris' story was immensely popular with ancient writers and many surviving sources dealing with her indicate the truth of his words. See also GERA 1997: 187.

⁴ Although the reign of Cyrus extends and covers almost three decades (559–530 BC), the historical value of the information available to us is highly questionable. For a more detailed elaboration on this subject, see especially PARKER, DUBBERSTEIN 1971: 14; BROSIUS 1996: 41–45; DE MIROSCHEJII 1985: 298–306. About the life and history of Cyrus, see VON FRITZ 1967: 282. As for his weddings, which offer measurable chronological footholds, see JUSTI 1963: 189 f.

We have already read about Cyrus' birth and about the legends associated with his youth⁵, about his successful uprising and ascent to the throne, as well as about the gradual spread of the Persian domination in Lydia, Ionia and the rest of Asia⁶ in a bold and direct manner, which underlines the reckless spirit of the mighty warrior-king. The highpoint of this unrestrained and victorious path is the capture of wealthy Babylon. The Massagetan *logos* starts from this point on⁷, with details regarding the last expedition and the death of this ambitious ruler⁸, but without any initial clue that anticipates his final tragic end.

After the necessary prior information on the geographical location of the remote nomadic tribe-target of Cyrus⁹, Herodotus indicates and justifies the will-igness – as well as the certainty – of the raider that his new mission will have a successful outcome (I 204, 2):

For there were many weighty reasons that impelled and encouraged him to do so: first, his birth, because of which he seemed to be something more than mortal; and next, his victories in his wars...¹⁰

The conceit that overpowers Cyrus while at the peak of his power reaches the limits of *hybris*¹¹ and prepares the reader who is familiar with Herodotean biotheory for the reversal of fate and the end of the monarch¹². The efforts undertaken by the historian to interpret this arrogance are carried out in psychological terms

⁵ See I 107–122.

⁶ See I 141–176.

⁷ See I 201–216.

⁸ In antiquity, there were various and contradictory versions about the last campaign and the circumstances surrounding the death of Cyrus. Herodotus chooses one of them, the most well-known, which he apparently trusts. In this unclear situation, the general historical value of this Herodotean *logos* weakens significantly. See ASHERI, LLOYD, CORCELLA 2007: 212, 216; SANCISI-WEERDENBURG 1985: 459–471; HIRSCH 1985: 81.

⁹ For the geography of the region, see CARY, WARMINGTON 1963: 163–167, 185 f. and 198 f.; BOSWORTH 1988: 129–132.

¹⁰ All translations from the *Histories* of Herodotus in this paper are by A.D. GODLEY.

¹¹ The most well-known Herodotean prototypes of *hybris* are Croesus, guilty of believing that he was the happiest human being in the world (I 34, 1), Pharaoh Apries, convinced that no god would end his reign (II 169, 2) and of course Xerxes, who truly personifies *hybris* and becomes the paradigm of the arrogant king who competes with the gods. He wishes Persia to have no other boundary but Zeus' ether, and he violates nature by linking Asia to Europe with a bridge, whipping the rebellious sea and digging a canal through Mount Athos (VII 22–24 and 33–36). In fact, Herodotus' last three books are dominated by the figure of Xerxes, who is punished sooner or later by the gods. *Hybris* is evil not so much in that it inspires hatred in other human beings, but because it provokes the “jealousy” of the gods, who are by nature “jealous and troublesome” (I 32, 1). They cannot bear the excessive success of human beings, their self-confidence, their boundless power and, worst of all, their inborn tendency to transgress the limits imposed to them by nature or law. For a comprehensive discussion of *hybris* in Herodotus, see FISHER 1992: 343–385.

¹² See ASHERI, LLOYD, CORCELLA 2007: 214.

and are enhanced by recalling the chain of previous Persian triumphs. The king's attack on the Massagetae is an act of *hybris* and any Greek would recognize him as ripe for destruction¹³, although he cannot have had the slightest hint of suspicion that he is moving not only to his defeat, but also to his death.

After the "supernatural" portrait of Cyrus, we are surprised at a sudden reference to a completely unknown woman: "Now at this time the Massagetae were ruled by a queen called Tomyris, whose husband was dead" (I 205, 1). The "decoding" of this first information about her character shows that Tomyris¹⁴ was proclaimed queen after the death of her husband and probably was not looking forward to a conflict with the undefeated ruler. However, Cyrus initially had no desire for a military confrontation and he was attempting – by means of a deceptive marriage proposal – to acquire her territory peaceably, to better conquer her kingdom rather than Tomyris herself. Up to this point, Cyrus is an active leader, the hyper-optimistic "pole", the raider teeming with an insatiable passion for new territories. Cyrus already has an "identity", while Tomyris – beyond her name and her status – essentially does not seem to have anything else to show who she really is. What kind of response could we expect from this woman and her nomadic tribe on the fringes of the civilised world?

These judgements will soon be proved to have been too hastily formed and they will be refuted as we observe the outset of Tomyris' action: in a move that reaffirms her power and her spiritual capacity, she will reject the insidious initiative of Cyrus¹⁵, being conscious that such a courageous choice will entail and also hasten his military response. Indeed, the bridging of the river Araxes¹⁶ as a prelude to invading the Massagetan territory launches an impressive Persian expedition, but it results in equally impressive response from Tomyris, which Herodotus formulates into direct speech (I 206, 1):

O king of the Medes, stop hurrying on what you are hurrying on, for you cannot know whether the completion of this work will be for your advantage. Stop, and be king of your own country; and endure seeing us ruling those whom we rule.

¹³ See REDFIELD 1985: 113.

¹⁴ Although it is difficult to determine the historicity of Tomyris, we can estimate that she was indeed the queen of Massagetae and their leader in the fierce battle against the invading Persians. This does not mean, of course, that Herodotus' narration does not simultaneously introduce a highly fictional character. See also ASHERI, LLOYD, CORCELLA 2007: 214.

¹⁵ See PAYEN 1991: 253.

¹⁶ The crossing of rivers or other waterways – as in the case of the Hellespont – is a constant Herodotean pattern which always highlights the *hybris* of the aggressor as a result of his stubbornness. By crossing the Araxes, Cyrus is crossing a moral as well as a physical limit and this "transgression" will be followed by dire consequences. See n. 10 above and also IMMERWAHR 1966: 292; TOURRAIX 1976: 377; GERA 1997: 190; and in particular PAYEN 1991: 255–257, who lists the corresponding movements of Darius, Xerxes, and Cyrus on his way to conquer Babylon.

The first words of the queen, contrary to the arrogant certainty of Cyrus, contain a warning that somehow prepares and predicts the upcoming death of the monarch. At the same time she utters her exhortations courageously, and the urgency of her tone is enhanced by the use of the imperative¹⁷. Certainly her attitude surprises us, not just because she is a woman of barbaric origins, but rather because she is addressing the undefeated and prosperous Persian king, the one who seeks to devour his “prey”. Indeed Tomyris, anticipating her opponent’s cruelty and the rejection of her pleas, goes as far as to let him choose the battle ground, warning him that he cannot know whether his campaign will turn out well. Essentially, this is the last scene of her first resounding intervention in the story related to Cyrus’ death. I have the feeling that this woman shouts as a “wise advisor” or “tragic warner” and that she speaks with the wisdom and the composure of a leader who has everything under control and is able to warn, to offer alternatives, to propose many solutions, and if necessary, to fearlessly provoke conflict.

So Cyrus must respond and react, which is what we expect at least from such a powerful and overweening ruler. However, the action is delayed, as the king remains surprisingly silent and we read about the convening of a council of the Persian notables where the final decision will be taken. Herodotus shows that all the counsellors ignore Tomyris’ initial exhortations as their recommendations focus exclusively on the dilemma of choosing the battlefield for the upcoming confrontation. At the military action itself, on the other hand, they all apparently agree: “They all spoke to the same end, urging him to let Tomyris and her army enter his country” (I 206, 3). However, the intervention of the elderly Croesus from Lydia is enough to change the situation.

Herodotus was obviously fascinated by Croesus, the arrogant despot whose prosperity ended up with captivity, his fabulous wealth giving way to poverty and – almost – to his death. Now, at the sunset of a life that ought to have transformed “sufferings” into “wise lessons”¹⁸, Croesus will prove incapable of recommending a positive plan to Cyrus and, by disagreeing with the rest of the counsellors, he will suggest the fatal continuation of the campaign¹⁹ and the crossing of the river Araxes. Indeed, the elderly Lydian, at the end of his lengthy speech, devises

¹⁷ For the particular semantic difference in the use of imperatives depending on the time when they occur, see especially SICKING 1991: 154–170; also RIJBSBARON 2002: 45.

¹⁸ See DÖRRIE 1956: 19 f.

¹⁹ The Lydian courtier backs up his advice with two arguments, one tactical and one psychological. Croesus’ first contention is that Cyrus has nothing to gain by accepting the Massagetæ on his home ground, putting in danger the future of his empire. If, on the other hand, he wins the battle on Massagetan territory, he will then be able to go to the heart of Tomyris’ power. The second argument turns upon male pride: it is intolerable that the great Cyrus should give way and withdraw before a woman (I 207, 5). Croesus now clearly abets Cyrus in his masculine pride by underestimating Tomyris’ sex, but soon his advice will prove tragically wrong. In analytical terms, see GERA 1997: 193–195.

a trick to assist the raiders and simplify their mission, but in effect he will activate the dynamic reappearance of Tomyris (I 207, 6 f.):

As I understand, the Massagetae have no experience of the good things of Persia, and have never fared well as to what is greatly desirable. Therefore, I advise you to cut up the meat of many of your sheep and goats into generous portions for these men, and to cook it and serve it as a feast in our camp, providing many bowls of unmixed wine and all kinds of food. Then let your army withdraw to the river again, leaving behind that part of it which is of least value. For if I am not mistaken in my judgment, when the Massagetae see so many good things they will give themselves over to feasting on them; and it will be up to us then to accomplish great things.

The first comfortable victory of the unsuspected Massagetae over a weak expeditionary corps would be followed by their participation in a rich and well-prepared “banquet”²⁰, unusual for their nomadic lifestyle, and this huge mistake would lead – according to Croesus’ thinking – to their easy entrapment inside the Persian camp.

Cyrus immediately changes his mind and adopts the plan of his Lydian advisor. Why? Perhaps he overestimated Croesus and his abilities, going as far as to overcome the unanimous demand of the courtiers. It is also possible that, apart from ambitious military campaigns, he was equally charmed by mysterious, obscure and cunning acts like those heard from the lips of Croesus. But, as the first “trick” of Cyrus’ deceptive marriage proposal failed, we have no reason to believe that the second one will eventually succeed. I have the impression that if Cyrus and Croesus finally take such a disastrous decision, this happens because through the *Histories* each ambitious conqueror is unable to acquire the Other’s, the Deferent’s minimum knowledge, before overcoming him. This is much more complex and complicated than the simple recognition of the “oddity” of the nation²¹ against whom he is going to turn his weapons. If someone really hopes to enter the “territory” of new and unknown people and tribes, he should first get access to the “codes” of their otherness and discover their authenticity. While Cyrus consents to “antiheroic” treachery, Tomyris stands heroically faithful to her words (I 208):

So these opinions clashed; and Cyrus set aside his former plan and chose that of Croesus; consequently, he told Tomyris to draw her army off, for he would cross (he said) and attack her; so she withdrew as she had promised before.

²⁰ For the vocabulary that is appropriate to feasts and other rituals in analytical terms, see CASABONA 1966: 155–195.

²¹ Herodotus, the ethnographer as well as the historian, notes points which distinguish people – especially the Greeks – from others. Oddity is an ethnocentric principle; from this point of view, other people are interesting because they wear odd clothes, eat odd foods, have odd customs and odd ideas. Every culture is worthy of respect as a functioning system; every culture in its own way makes full use of human capacities. In analytical terms, see REDFIELD 1985: 97–100.

Everything is foreshadowing a violent conflict. However, it must be preceded by the crucial episode with the young Spargapises.

Croesus' plan ends in success: the Massagetæ, the initial winners, are then defeated by themselves, being lured into drunkenness as they were inexperienced with such beverages. The exhausted and intoxicated warriors ultimately became easy prey for the Persian forces, who returned to their camp and killed and captured many of the sleeping Massagetæ²². Among the captives was Tomyris' son Spargapises, valuable "loot" in the invaders' hands. This new person, who intervenes in the story so unexpectedly, will remain silent until the end, and anything we learn about him is associated with his mother's acts and concern. Apparently the young man was capable of leading a group of infantrymen in their encounter with the Persians, although he was not the king of Massagetæ yet. Consequently, the next strategic move in this strange "chessboard" should be made by Tomyris.

Indeed, the powerful queen responds instantaneously and addresses Cyrus – through a herald – in a thunderous and predictive speech (I 212, 2):

Cyrus who can never get enough blood, do not be elated by what you have done; it is nothing to be proud of if, by the fruit of the vine – with which you Persians fill yourselves and rage so violently that evil words rise in a flood to your lips when the wine enters your bodies – if, by tricking him with this drug, you got the better of my son, and not by force of arms in battle.

Tomyris calls him not to celebrate a cunning victory which temporarily placed the monarch in an advantageous position. She would accept the defeat of her child only under the conditions of a real battle. While Cyrus did not satiate his blood thirst, the primitive milk drinkers²³, the Massagetæ and Spargapises, had forgotten their secure tribal habits and were tempted to taste the unprecedented and intoxicating wine²⁴, which pushed some to death and others into captivity.

But Tomyris' caution – contrary to her previous man-like attitude and her cultural identity – exceeds her anger, as maternal tenderness overcomes her heroism; she is ready to let the audacious attack against her own people go unpunished in order to save her son's life. Otherwise, she states emphatically (I 212, 3):

But if you will not, then I swear to you by the sun, lord of the Massagetæ, that I shall give even you who can never get enough of it your fill of blood.

So once again we read about the "motif" of blood and we might take for granted that this echoes the end of the story, the end of Cyrus himself. In a story with "innocent" and "guilty" protagonists, the latter temporarily appear as triumphant, although the former never actually give up hope. In any case, it is

²² See I 211, 2 f.

²³ See I 216, 4.

²⁴ For the connection between wine and blood, see IMMERWAHR 1966: 165–167.

remarkable that a barbarian queen fearlessly dares to threaten Cyrus, who until then had managed to terrify everyone!

The despot does not reply to Tomyris' requests, either because he underestimates a culturally subordinate and inferior woman, or because the first Persian victory, which was won by trickery, gave him the opportunity to expect the complete subjugation of the Massagetae. The obvious disinterest of the king turns our attention to the captive Spargapises, who (I 213):

after the wine wore off and he recognized his evil plight, asked Cyrus to be freed from his bonds; and this was granted him; but as soon as he was freed and had the use of his hands, he did away with himself.

The young man commits suicide, and this is not a "confession" of cowardice, but self-punishment for the evil that he had caused as a leader to his people, or at least to a part of the Massagetan army. Perhaps he judged himself too harshly, but the choice of such a death includes responsibility and heroism, as the son decided to free his anguished mother from caring for his welfare. This heroism will shortly "move" towards Tomyris.

Indeed, the tragic initiative of Spargapises has a direct effect on generating the reaction of the queen, who will collect all her available forces and organise the deadly attack against the Persians – or rather against Cyrus. The facts of the invasion itself now become secondary; instead of the huge imperialistic army, the great leader himself is the target, for he is responsible for the death of a beloved young man. The vivid description of the terrible bloodshed²⁵, the swarms of arrows being shot, the cruel melee of battle until the final victory of the Massagetae and the slaughter of Cyrus confirm once again the rare talent of the author, who gives the impression that he is clearly speaking, while he is actually writing.

We read about the end of Cyrus, and then it is time to read about the desecration of his lifeless corpse, a detail that Herodotus might find in oral tradition. The last "picture" of the story is completely dedicated to that odd queen of the North (I 214, 4 f.):

Tomyris filled a skin with human blood, and searched among the Persian dead for Cyrus' body; and when she found it, she pushed his head into the skin, and insulted the dead man in these words: "Though I am alive and have defeated you in battle, you have destroyed me, taking my son by guile; but just as I threatened, I give you your fill of blood".

The woman who had renounced her cultural primitivism recovered it in a way by desecrating a dead man. While proclaiming the fulfillment of her threatening words and declaring a noble, almost Achillean contempt for the deceitfulness of the enemy, she pushes his severed head inside a skin bag filled with human

²⁵ See I 214, 2.

blood²⁶. Straightforwardness and sincerity – main components of a primitive world – are mixed with ferocity²⁷ and brutality, and this mixture is mostly represented in a curious female figure, much more “male” than her rivals.

Finally, who exactly is Tomyris? In brief, is she an intelligent queen who defends and avenges²⁸, painted with colours that were sourced from epic tradition²⁹? I think that she is something more, that her story has various aspects, and this fact probably piqued Herodotus’ attention, “forcing” him to choose that particular version of Cyrus’ death. Her role in the last chapters of the first book of the *Histories* increases gradually and impressively as she transforms herself from an inconspicuous queen to a capable leader, from a “low hurdle” against the expectations of the great monarch to an unsurmountable wall which will finally destroy him.

We do not learn anything about her past; perhaps Herodotus himself does not possess any valid information. On the other hand, since she rules her people, she strongly experiences the enemy’s threat: she realises that her nomadic tribe is the target of a megalomaniac conqueror who feels that Persian cultural superiority, coupled with deceit and with innumerable previous military successes, is sufficient to ensure another imperialistic triumph. But this barbarian woman carries something of the glorious heroic world that always fascinated the ancient Greeks, and this “epic” side of her character would compel her to do what every hero knows doing better: Tomyris will fight.

The situation is further aggravated when she is informed of the first defeat of the Massagetae in a completely antiheroic battlefield, and of the simultaneous capture of her son. But the Herodotean heroine is portrayed as a proud, noble figure who would not stoop to deception; she is not the aggressor, neither is she daunted, although the circumstances are not favourable. She will not use tricks to gain the upper hand, because she is much more moral than her opponent. The queen will take the initiative to converse, to propose, to give to Cyrus the option of releasing Spargapises. But instead of receiving even a negative response, she will hear the news of her child’s suicide. And then punishment is the only “way out”; the Massagetan leader changes before our eyes, the defender now becomes the attacker, the hunter becomes the prey, and the Persians will suffer a defeat,

²⁶ See DEWALD 1981: 109; REDFIELD 1985: 112; HAZEWINDUS 2004: 175.

²⁷ Throughout the Herodotean *Histories* we can find many examples of ferocious queens: the Cyrenian Pheretime avenges the murder of her son after the conquest of the city of Barca by impaling some of its inhabitants and by cutting off the breasts of their wives (IV 202). Another queen who torments her victims is Xerxes’ wife, Amestris; she orders her guards to mutilate Masistes’ wife, the mother of her rival Artaynte (IX 112) and buries 14 Persians youngsters alive in an attempt to stave off her own death (VII 114).

²⁸ See FLORY 1987: 42, 95 f.

²⁹ See GOULD 1989: 102 f.

which means not just the failure of their invasion, but also marks the tragic end of their long-term reign.

I have the impression that Tomyris' face does not mirror David defeating Goliath, but a conscious, primitive creature with genuine feelings of protectionism for her people and of deep maternal love for her son, a woman who knows well how to warn and to defeat, but even better, knows how to avenge. Only at the very end is the queen bloodthirsty and vengeful: when she is looking impatiently for the corpse of Cyrus, when she mangles it and then plunges his severed head into a skin bag full of blood, we witness a shocking scene, not only because of the brutality of its content, but also because of the wrath of the savage woman who is the protagonist. If the story had suddenly stopped at the death of Cyrus, we would only have admired the attitude and the "path" of this special female figure from a forgotten world. Herodotus probably had in mind something more than that: he also wanted us not to forget completely about her barbaric idiosyncrasy and identity.

Lastly, it is tempting to go further and understand the tough conflict as a contrast between soft and hard peoples, a case of great importance in Herodotus. Soft peoples are characterised by luxury and by complexity of their *nomoi*, especially in the sphere of religion. They are organised, they centralise resources through taxation and their politics tend toward tyranny. On the contrary, hard peoples – like the Massagetae – are simple, harsh and fierce; their culture falls short of civility and they are unwelcoming and difficult to visit, situated as they are on the edges of the historical world. Herodotus presents the Persians as a people in the process of cultural change: they begin as a hard people and gradually become soft³⁰, and this softness is going to be proved tragically during the failed expedition against the uncivilised Massagetae. Besides, in the *Histories* there are no conquests of hard peoples by soft peoples; the best one can do is to inflict some damage on them and withdraw. In a strange way, Cyrus "exchanged" his own life for a temporary victory and the capture (and loss as well) of Spargapises, while Tomyris and the Massagetae continued to remain free and wild.

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³⁰ For further analysis and discussion about the role and the contrast between hard and soft peoples in Herodotus, see REDFIELD 1985: 109–114.

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READING THUCYDIDES WITH ARISTOTLE'S *RHETORIC*:
ARGUING FROM JUSTICE AND EXPEDIENCY
IN THE MELIAN DIALOGUE AND THE SPEECHES*

by

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ABSTRACT: In this paper certain prescriptions laid in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* are used to elucidate Thucydides' application of arguments from justice and expediency in the Melian Dialogue and in the speeches. Their mutual relation is tested in the perspective of rhetorical theory, and the meaning of τὸ συμφέρον in the Melian Dialogue and in the *Peloponnesian War* as a whole is discussed.

Nearly all studies on the Melian Dialogue have focused on the idea of the "law of the stronger" as propounded by the Athenian speakers in this arresting passage¹. Most critics closely relate this idea to one of the most vexing aspects of the Dialogue, namely that the Athenian speakers refuse to argue from justice (τὸ δίκαιον) and prefer to speak about expediency (τὸ συμφέρον)². For this reason, they are understood to oppose traditional morality, to despise values of any kind

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¹ Of the immense number of works treating this part of the *History* the most comprehensive are: FINLEY 1942: 202–212; WASSERMANN 1947: 18–36; DE ROMILLY 1951: 230–259; HERTER 1954: 316–343; STAHL 1966: 158–171; NESTLE 1968: 350–355; LIEBESCHUETZ 1968: 73–77; AMIT 1968: 216–235; VOLK 1970; MACLEOD 1974: 385–400; RENGAKOS 1984: 93–102; PRICE 2001: 195–204; SCARDINO 2007: 467–483.

² Thuc. V 89: δίκαια μὲν ἐν τῷ ἀνθρωπείῳ λόγῳ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης ἀνάγκης κρίνεται, δυνατὰ δὲ οἱ πρὸνχοντες πρᾶσσουσι καὶ οἱ ἀσθενεῖς ἐυγχωροῦσι [...what is just is arrived at in human arguments only when the necessity on both sides is equal, and that the powerful exact what they can, while the weak yield what they must']. In further argument this translation will be questioned. This and all translations of Thucydides are those of SMITH, Loeb edition, with minor alterations on my part where noted. Scholars are not in agreement as to the rendering of the word; most often it is translated as "expediency", "advantage", "benefit", "interest". In what follows I will rarely render the word into English, in order to avoid misconception involved in connotations of the "modern" terms, but if it is translated, I prefer "expediency".

but force, or to represent realism in inter-*polis* relations³. Hence, an interpretation which we may call “classical” identifies the argumentation of the Athenians with the concepts of power and self-interest, whereas the position of the Melians is associated with law, justice and honour⁴. Some scholars have tried to prove that “rejection of justice” is characteristic only of Athenian speakers⁵, thus the main theme of the Dialogue is sometimes defined as Athenian imperialism⁶. This apparent erasure of justice from the Dialogue and from other speeches in the *History* has been also considered a feature of Thucydides’ “disillusioned outlook” on politics⁷.

³ DEININGER (1939: 34 f.) considered “reine Machtdenken” the essence of the Dialogue; TOPITSCH 1948: 56: “...verkünden sie im Melierdialog das bare Recht des Stärkeren...”; similarly EBERHARDT 1959: 309 f.; SAXONHOUSE 1978: 479 f.; ERBSE 1989: 113; HEATH 1990: 388; DE ROMILLY 1992: 136; PRICE 2001: 198: “The weaker argument does turn out to be weaker, but the means for this demonstration are not dialectical – a superior *logos* – but brute force...”. Cf. KALLET 2001: 9–20; DEWALD 2005: 136; ZAGORIN 2005: 106; THOMAS 2006: 90; TRITLE 2006: 486; STADTER 2012: 60. STRASBURGER (1982: 799) applies the term *Realpolitik* to the Athenians’ stance; TRITLE 2006: 487: cynical *Realpolitik* as the main idea of the Dialogue. Cf. MACLEOD 1974: 388: “The Athenians thus represent a typically sophistic pragmatism”. GUTHRIE (1971: 85) labels the attitude of the Athenians in the Dialogue “amoral realism”; cf. WASSERMANN 1947: 20; HERTER 1954: 320. SCARDINO 2007: 479: “politischen Realismus und Pragmatismus”.

⁴ NESTLE 1968: 352, opposition of ἀδίκος λόγος and δίκαιος λόγος; HERTER 1954: 320, a clash of two outlooks: the idealistic and the realistic (“Agon zwischen Macht und Ideal”); WASSERMANN 1947: 21: “It is the inevitable clash not only of diverging interests, but of opposite political philosophies and ways of life”. Similarly SAXONHOUSE 1978: 479: the Melians as defending traditional notions of “justice and bravery”. See also STAHL 1966: 159; CONNOR 1985: 151 f. ORWIN (1994: 98) sets rather the ἀνάγκη-factor as characterizing the Athenians.

⁵ CONNOR 1985: 153; HEATH 1990: 391: “... this episode confirms that the exclusion of moral argumentation is not characteristic of non-Athenian speakers, and suggests that such arguments were (rightly or wrongly) perceived as genuinely influential”.

⁶ Here the classic work is DE ROMILLY 1951 (first edn. 1947), restated in DE ROMILLY 1990: 46, but it was also accepted by other scholars, e.g. WASSERMANN 1947: 19, 23 (“Athenians [...] as intelligent imperialists...”). Applying the notion of imperialism to antiquity raises doubts in my view, as it can cause serious misconceptions and distort our understanding of ancient authors. Nevertheless, it entered the canon of classical studies, and has been reproduced and reused by scholars, e.g. HAMMOND 1948: 105–161; MEIGGS 1949: 9–12; GREGOR 1953: 27–32; BAUSLAUGH 1991: 146 (“a newly evolved ethos of hegemonial, imperial Greek states that refused to accept any restraints on the pursuit of self-interest”); ORWIN 1994: 96: (“...political theology of imperialism – which achieves its zenith in the Melian Dialogue”); most recently LOW 2005: 93–111; FOSTER 2010.

⁷ I deliberately call the erasure “apparent”, as in this paper I hope to provide a more balanced view of this problem. It is enough to look it up in BEKKER’s *Index Thucydideus* (VON ESSEN 1964: 103 f.), where δίκη and τὸ δίκαιον feature over 110 times, to become alert to the doubtful veracity of overly hasty conclusions, e.g. those of STRASBURGER 1966: 60: “Fast völlig ausgelöscht sind die private Sphäre, das Rechtsdenken, der Glaube, die Tapferkeit, die Humanität, überhaupt die sittlichen Qualitäten”. VON FRITZ (1967: 631–635) asserts that in Thucydides’ view political deliberation need not be founded on law or morality in general. Cf. HOFFMANN 1997: 266: “Die Frage nach dem Recht und der Gerechtigkeit spielt keine Rolle”; SCHMITZ 2010: 55: “Thucydidean amoral view of politics”. Almost identically: PEARSON 1957: 23; GUTHRIE 1971: 85; MEISTER 1990: 47; SCHULLER 1991: 100 f.; HAWTHORN 2014: 162 f. HORNBLOWER (*Comm.* I: 435) poses the question

Brian BOSWORTH, in what is probably the most stimulating article on the Dialogue ever published, has put forward a contrary thesis that Athenian speculations about the law of the stronger were “highly traditional” in the cultural milieu of the *History*⁸. This contextualisation was particularly inspiring, yet it comprised only the narrow concept expressed in V 105, where the Athenians justify their dominance over other *poleis*. What remained is the stated refusal to discuss justice on the part of the Athenians (chiefly V 89), and here BOSWORTH followed the beaten track in operating with typical antitheses: the Athenians’ stand of preferring expediency is tantamount to immorality, however tainted with “humanitarian” appeals, whereas the Melians, however blindly and senselessly, represent justice and honour.

My aim in the present paper is twofold. Firstly, I want to demonstrate, by highlighting certain aspects of rhetorical theory, that the elimination of just arguments from the Dialogue is as “traditional” as the law of the stronger concept. I endeavour to prove that the principles behind it are simple, and were later known to Aristotle, who discusses them in the *Rhetoric*. Some scholars tend to conceive of Athenian suggestions of the necessity of focussing on expediency in the Dialogue as a resignation of “fine words of rhetoric”, as if what follows, the entire exchange with the Melians, was somehow beyond rhetorical theory or practice⁹. I would like to test this view by placing the argument of the Melian Dialogue within the framework of rhetorical theory. Given that this passage has been much discussed, it is remarkable that scholars have barely inquired into the rhetorical rules which may have directed Thucydides when he was writing it. Recently, Christopher PELLING used Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* and the *Rhetoric to Alexander* as a “lesson for interpretation of Thucydides”, and his findings, albeit restricted to several passages, are very promising¹⁰. Of course, it would be hazardous to apply Aristotle’s

whether Thucydides does at all regard legal regulations between *poleis* as valid. On Thucydides as the originator of realism in international relations: RUSTEN 2009b: 12–14; DUNNE, SCHMIDT 2011: 84–99; FORDE 2012: 178–196; LEBOW 2012: 197–211.

⁸ BOSWORTH 2009: 312–337 (first published in 1993). BOSWORTH has shifted emphasis from the Athenian perspective in the Dialogue to the situation of the Melians, and considered their senselessness a central theme. Athenians’ appeals to the Melians to avoid destruction of their *polis* were labelled as “humanitarian”. The stand of the Melian representatives is equally significant, as they firmly refuse to give away their independence, despite the fact that their chances are slight. Their attitude is a radical antithesis of behaviour oriented towards maximum expediency, understood as a maximisation of security and minimisation of detriment. STAHL (2012: 126) is close to such a perspective, as he regards the resistance of Melos a “possibly the most concentrated depiction the author provides of a blind decision”.

⁹ CONNOR 1985: 157: “These have been surgically detached from propaganda, moral justifications, and all ‘fair names’ of rhetoric”. A similar suggestion is recently found in HAWTHORN 2014: 161: “it [the exchange between the Athenians and the Melians, MK] certainly took a reasoned form and avoided what Thucydides has the Athenians call the ‘fine phrases’ of rhetoric and ‘long and unconvincing arguments’”. Cf. ORWIN 1994: 97.

¹⁰ PELLING 2012: 281–315.

precepts to Thucydides *tout court*¹¹, because of the obvious chronological gap between the two intellectuals. Still, it has been convincingly argued that there is a *continuum* between the late-fifth and fourth-century rhetorical theory and practice, and I regard it safe to assume a general level of connection between them¹². The chief advantage of using Aristotle's handbook as explanatory tool lays in the way it clarifies and conceptualises what would be otherwise hard to gauge from the extant sources from Thucydides' time. Nonetheless, my goal is not to prove that Thucydides slavishly follows rhetorical theory, with its rules as conceptualised in the *Rhetoric*. Handbooks from the fourth century are very likely to be informed also by Thucydides himself, and we shall not ignore the problem of the mutual influence of theory and practice¹³. Therefore, my sole aim is to make evident that the rhetorical rules written down by Aristotle shed some light on, and account for, the treatment of the themes of justice and expediency in Thucydides, treatment that has always been so discomfoting for modern readers. As COLIN MACLEOD has shown, "Thucydides' concerns are close to those of rhetorical theory"¹⁴, and I argue that to grasp the real meaning and context of the relation between τὸ δίκαιον and τὸ συμφέρον in the Dialogue, as it would possibly be understood by Thucydides' readers, it is rewarding to read it against the background of rhetorical theory. In my argument I make use chiefly of the *Rhetoric*, as it more comprehensively elaborates on the types of oratory and on the consequences for the choice of arguments in each of them.

¹¹ Methodological dangers are discussed by PELLING 2012: 282–286.

¹² On fifth-century background of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, see GRIMALDI 1996: 19–43 and KENNEDY 1963: 80, cf. KENNEDY 2007: 17–20. It has been restated recently by PEPE 2013: 134: "Aristotle reveals how his conceptual tripartition derives from the empirical observation of the contexts and conditions of Athenian oratorical practice in the 5th and 4th century. The novelty lies in the attempt to provide a theoretical justification of the number and nature of the genres and draw precise boundaries between them". On continuation in rhetorical theory in the Classical period, see also HEATH 1990: 385–400 (with ample criticism of the opposing view of KENNEDY 1959: 131–138, and extensive bibliography). Cf. TREVETT 1996: 371–379. As for the existence (or emergence) of these theoretical principles at the end of the fifth century BC, and Thucydides' knowledge of them, I shall agree with KENNEDY 1963: 48: "Thucydides' oratorical technique differs from that of Herodotus chiefly in degree and intensity, and this in turn suggests, what one might assume on chronological grounds, that he was quite aware of the theories of sophists and professional rhetoricians about oratory". Cf. also MORAUX 1954: 3 ff. The ever vexatious problem of speeches is most diligently analyzed by WOODMAN 1988: 1–69 and PELLING 2000: 112–122.

¹³ HORNBLOWER (1987: 47–52) discusses the relation between Thucydides and the precepts written down in handbooks, and is right to stress that the usefulness of handbooks for explaining Thucydides is limited: "The parallels are undeniable, and it is obviously right to use the Aristotelian term 'symbolleutic [i.e. deliberative] rhetoric' about Thucydides' speeches. The only question we might pose is about the implications of saying that 'Thucydides is well-versed in rhetorical theory and practice' as if we could be sure that the *Rhetoric to Alexander* were representative of what was available to Thucydides. The *Rhetoric* dates from the fourth century, and it is obvious and stultifying possibility that the influence worked the other way" (p. 49).

¹⁴ See MACLEOD 1975: 39–65; quotation from p. 41.

My second aim is to inquire into the semantics of τὸ συμφέρον in the Dialogue, because we can hardly find such an account in literature on the subject. Usually, negative connotations are ascribed to it, especially in studies on Thucydides¹⁵. As I try to prove, “expediency” is not basically antithetical to the notion of justice neither in rhetorical theory, nor in Thucydides’ speeches and lastly – it is not so in the Melian Dialogue. As was recently noted by scholars working on the reception of Thucydides, it is crucial to reflect upon the adequacy of the translation of some “key words” which feature in such condensed and meaningful passages, where interpretative stereotypes can be reproduced (to a degree unconsciously) by modern readers¹⁶. One of these notions is τὸ συμφέρον.

I want to state clearly that I have no ambition to cover all aspects of this notoriously complex part of Thucydides’ *History*, nor to attempt an entirely new reading. The Melian Dialogue has received a great deal of scholarly comment, and here I will only touch upon those details which are relevant to the discussion of justice and interest in political activity. Thus, my analysis of the Dialogue is selective, rather than systematic. I provide and defend several substantive interventions in interpretation where necessary. My focus is confined to the question of the “rejection of justice” as a subject for the discussion by the Athenians, and on the elucidation of their use of τὸ συμφέρον.

What does rhetorical theory say about the place of τὸ δίκαιον or τὸ συμφέρον in political deliberation? In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle draws a distinction between three types of oratory (τὰ γένη τῆς ῥητορικῆς): symbouleutic, epideictic, and forensic. This division rests on the three kinds of hearers: a mere spectator (θεωρὸν), a judge of things to come (τῶν μελλόντων), and a judge of things past (τῶν γεγενημένων). Correspondingly, a dicast will be a judge of things past, a member of an assembly of things to come, and a mere spectator a witness of the ability of the speaker¹⁷. They are different as to their aims and, consequently, to their proper themes. Aristotle states that the end (τὸ τέλος), and an adequate and most likely subject of symbouleutic speech is τὸ συμφέρον καὶ βλαβερόν (*Rhet.* 1358b 20–31)¹⁸:

¹⁵ In all relevant studies τὸ συμφέρον is translated without discussion on its sense, in a way “intuitively”, but always implying negative connotations of the word, see e.g. WASSERMANN 1947: 33; SCHMITZ 2010: 53; MANUWALD 1979: 413; PEARSON 1957: 232; VON FRITZ 1967: 634. POUNCEY 1980: 97: “Self-interest is the dominant motive behind most aggressive acts in Thucydides’ account”. Most recently STADTER (2012: 57) rendered συμφέρον/ὠφελία as the “profitable”, or the “profit” (ibidem, p. 62). SCARDINO (2012: 83) mentions συμφέρον/ὠφελία in the context of τελικά κεφάλαια, but gives no hint as to how it should be understood.

¹⁶ HARLOE, MORLEY 2012b: 15.

¹⁷ *Rhet.* 1358b 2–3. On this aspect of oratory in Aristotle’s theory, see GRIMALDI 1990: 65–81.

¹⁸ Aristotle uses συμβουλεύειν and βουλεύειν interchangeably, see his concluding sentence, 1359a 35: ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι περὶ ὅσων ἐστὶν τὸ βουλευέσθαι.

τέλος δὲ ἐκάστοις τούτων ἕτερόν ἐστι, καὶ τρισὶν οὔσι τρία, τῶ μὲν συμβουλευόντι τὸ συμφέρον καὶ βλαβερόν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ προτρέπων ὡς βέλτιον συμβουλεύει, ὁ δὲ ἀποτρέπων ὡς χείρονος ἀποτρέπει, τὰ δ' ἄλλα πρὸς τοῦτο συμπαραλαμβάνει, ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἀδικον, ἢ καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρόν· τὰ δ' ἄλλα καὶ οὔτοι πρὸς ταῦτα ἐπαναφέρουσιν. σημεῖον δ' ὅτι τὸ εἰρημένον ἐκάστοις τέλος· περὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων ἐνίοτε οὐκ ἂν ἀμφισβητήσαιεν.

Each of the three kinds has a different special end, and as there are three kinds of Rhetoric, so there are three special ends. The end of the deliberative speaker is the expedient or harmful; for he who exhorts recommends a course of action as better, and he who dissuades advises against it as worse; all other considerations, such as justice and injustice, honour and disgrace, are included as accessory in reference to this. The end of the forensic speaker is the just or the unjust; in this case also all other considerations are included as accessory. The end of those who praise or blame is the honourable and disgraceful; and they also refer all other considerations to these. A sign that what I have stated is the end which each has in view is the fact that sometimes the speakers will not dispute about other points¹⁹.

Aristotle continues by saying that no orator would admit that he discards τὸ συμφέρον/τὸ ὠφέλιμον, and further, the latter is defined as certain “good” (1362a 17–20):

ἐπεὶ δὲ πρόκειται τῶ συμβουλευόντι σκοπὸς τὸ συμφέρον (βουλεύονται γὰρ οὐ περὶ τοῦ τέλους, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ τὰ συμφέροντα κατὰ τὰς πράξεις, τὸ δὲ συμφέρον ἀγαθόν)...

But since the aim before the deliberative orator is that which is expedient, and men deliberate, not about the end, but about the means to the end, which are the things which are expedient in regard to our actions; and since, further, the expedient is good...²⁰

This “good” is anything that is desirable for its own sake (1362a 21–29)²¹. Therefore, from the first fully extant handbook of rhetoric we learn that expediency ought to be the main point of reference in symbouleutic oratory, whereas δίκαιον should be only ancillary, συμπαραλαμβάνων, and used only if credible²². Arguments focused on the righteousness are relegated to forensic oratory,

¹⁹ Translations of the *Rhetoric* are those of J.H. FREESE, Loeb edition. For a general commentary on this passage, see GRIMALDI 1980: 83.

²⁰ See GRIMALDI 1980: 122.

²¹ See GRIMALDI 1980: 123 *ad loc.*, on the practical character of further analyses and definitions of the “good” things (*Rhet.* 1362a 34–1362b 9).

²² Cf. GRIMALDI 1980: 83: “As we saw above, the kinds of rhetoric and their times can interchange. [...] A. also accepts this kind of interchange (e.g. 58b 24–25), but he insists that each *genus* has its own proper and peculiar τέλος (58b 29–59a 5). Thus his use of συμπαραλαμβάνειν = ‘to take in, along, as assistants’”.

and one of its important components is reminding the audience of one's (or one's *polis*'s) merits and services²³.

However, in a symbouleutic speech δίκαιον should be at least attempted as a theme, but where moral argument or motivation is incredible the orator must set out the reasoning if he is not to lose the goodwill of his audience: such reasons may be formulated in terms of expediency²⁴. In the *Rhetoric to Alexander* we are advised that in such situations one should place arguments from justice first in a speech, before proceeding to arguments from advantage (1439a 5–39)²⁵.

The emphasis on credibility and possibility to persuade the audience with the given type of argument is crucial, since this is the most obvious aim of every orator²⁶. He has to assess whether references to justice will have any influence on the decision he intends to be made; if not – the primary point of reference will be the τὸ συμφέρον of the right decision and the τὸ βλαβερὸν of the wrong decision. In other words, the aim of symbouleutic oratory is to persuade the audience to make a certain decision, and one can be persuaded only if the arguments

²³ On the tripartite division, see HINKS 1936: 170–176; KENNEDY 1963: 85–87; HELLWIG 1973: 120–136; LAUSBERG 1990: 52–69; RAPP 2002: 253. GARVER (2009: 1–18) shows that it covers sufficiently the political field. PEPE (2013: 133–166) aptly emphasises empirical observation (as opposed to pure speculation) as source of Aristotle's systematisation. KENNEDY (1959: 131–138) tried to describe an evolution in the mutual relation of expediency/justice arguments in practical oratory from Thucydides to Demosthenes, but he does not attach proper importance to the typology of speeches that (as I argue) largely determined this relation. COPE, SANDYS (1877: 51 f.), in the commentary to this passage of the *Rhetoric*, underlined that according to Quintilian (*Inst. or.* III 3 f.) Aristotle was first to put forward the triple division, which was subsequently accepted by almost all writers on the subject, due to the philosopher's authority ("utique summae apud antiquos auctoritatis"). Quintilian mentions, besides Aristotle's division, those adopted by Anaximenes, Protagoras, Plato (in the *Sophist*), and Isocrates. He decides in favour of Aristotle's, as the safest to follow, because it is the most reasonable. However, he raises doubts as to the exclusive pertinence of expediency to deliberation, justice to court speech and honour to panegyric. Still, Aristotle does not say that these themes have to be pursued exclusively, but only that it is reasonable to place greater emphasis on them according to the type of auditorium and the context. So it has been unconvincingly argued by HEATH (1990: 396) that Aristotle's division in the *Rhetoric* is "more artificial" than that of the author of the *Rhetoric to Alexander*; his objections are too weak to make Aristotle's precepts invalid. On differences between these two handbooks, see CHIRON 2004: 81–100; PEPE 2013: 118–120. On the *Rhetoric* in general, see GRIMALDI 1972; LORD 1981: 326–339; MONTANARI 1996: V–XXIV. A most concise survey is that of KENNEDY 2007: 16–26; cf. the excellent collections of essays in OKSENBERG-RORTY 1996 and GROSS, WALZER 2000. See also the Introduction in GRIMALDI 1980.

²⁴ Cf. PELLING 2012: 300; YATROMANOLAKI 1997: 33–36.

²⁵ Cf. also the relation between justice and expediency in *Rhet.* 1437a 28–29.

²⁶ As elucidated by GRIMALDI 1980: 82: "With the auditor in mind as the ultimate τέλος, the discourse under one of the formalities proper to its genus attempts to realize its proximate τέλος (later rhetoricians call these proximate τέλη the τελικὰ κεφάλαια). We can thus see how rhetoric as a δύναμις to perceive the possibly suasive (55b 25–26) must look at its subject matter and seek in those elements, the ὑπάρχοντα πιθανὰ (55b 10) – and they will be the entechnic πίστεις: *reason*, ἦθος, πάθος – which will speak to *this* auditor in his effort to make a judgment in terms of *this* proximate τέλος".

adduced are appropriate to the context, case, circumstances, and the audience's mindset. Only then do they sound sincere. Moreover, Aristotle emphasises that no symbouleutic orator would concede that he is *not* urging the advantageous or dissuading the disadvantageous²⁷ (*Rhet.* 1358b–1359a), for men unchangeably pursue their own interests (*Rhet.* 1417a). To neglect τὸ συμφέρον is in fact characteristic of immature minds (*Rhet.* 1389a 32–35):

καὶ μᾶλλον αἰροῦνται πράττειν τὰ καλὰ τῶν συμφερόντων· τῷ γὰρ ἦθει ζῶσι μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ λογισμῷ, ἔστι δὲ ὁ μὲν λογισμὸς τοῦ συμφέροντος ἢ δὲ ἀρετῆ τοῦ καλοῦ.

In their actions, they prefer the noble to the useful; their life is guided by their character rather than by calculation, for the latter aims at the useful, virtue at the noble²⁸.

For Aristotle, justice and expediency are not mutually exclusive, and an ideal state is when they are complementary. This is the case when the laws of the *polis* are concerned, and if they are constituted the right way, τὸ δίκαιον is συμφέρον, expedient for the community. Thus, τὸ συμφέρον is not inconsistent with justice, quite the contrary – Aristotle *defines* justice through (in terms of) τὸ συμφέρον, what is far from setting these notions in antithesis²⁹.

JUSTICE AND EXPEDIENCY IN THE SPEECHES

In Aristotle's treatise, to persuade the audience in an assembly that the decision one argues for is τὸ συμφέρον/τὸ ὠφέλιμον is natural, if the issue of justice is too weak to win the case. Nevertheless, both arguments can be, at least in theory, applied simultaneously, as complementary elements, and if the orator is able to combine them in his speech, it is most desirable for the audience. Before I turn to the Melian Dialogue, I want to examine the above general

²⁷ Arist. *Rhet.* 1358b 33–37: ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ συμβουλευόντες τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πολλάκις προίενται, ὡς δὲ ἀσύμφορα συμβουλεύουσιν ἢ ἀπ' ὠφελίμων ἀποτρέπουσιν οὐκ ἂν ὁμολογήσαιεν· ὡς δ' [οὐκ] ἄδικον τοὺς ἀστυγεῖτονας καταδουλοῦσθαι καὶ τοὺς μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντας, πολλάκις οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν [“Similarly, the deliberative orator, although he often sacrifices everything else, will never admit that he is recommending what is inexpedient or is dissuading from what is useful; but often he is quite indifferent about showing that the enslavement of neighbouring peoples, even if they have done no harm, is not an act of injustice”].

²⁸ See GRIMALDI 1988: 196.

²⁹ In the *Nicomachean Ethics* 1160a the philosopher states: καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ δὲ κοινωμία τοῦ συμφέροντος χάριν δοκεῖ καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς συνελθεῖν καὶ διαμένειν· τούτου γὰρ καὶ οἱ νομοθέται στοχάζονται, καὶ δίκαιόν φασι εἶναι τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον [“A political community, as it seems, comes to being and is maintained because of expediency; the latter is the aim of the lawgivers, who describe as just what is expedient for the community” (my translation)]. On the expedient aspect of constitution in Aristotle, see YATROMANOLAKI 1997: 24–28. On Aristotle's concept of justice and morality in general, see MILLER 1995; ROSEN 1975: 228–240; ROSLER 2005: 116–144.

prescriptions of Aristotle on three crucial pairs of speeches from Thucydides. It will not be a comprehensive analysis of all the speeches (that would require a separate study), but a test case with which I intend to show that in the *History* τὸ συμφέρον is not a “natural” or necessary opposite of τὸ δίκαιον, as is usually assumed in interpretations of Thucydides in general and of the Melian Dialogue in particular³⁰.

The first pair of speeches in Thucydides' narrative is the controversy of Corinth and Corcyra, a conflict between the metropolis and its colony, after which the critical decision of the Athenians to support Corcyra was taken³¹. The context is symbolueutic, as the antilogy takes place in front of the Athenian assembly. Some readings classified the Corcyrean argument as founded on justice and the Corinthian one as rooted in expediency and necessity, a dichotomy similar to the one detected in the Melian Dialogue. However, this seems to be detached from the text³², and on closer inspection, as we can see, both parties claim justice to be on their side, but at the same time they also insist on its expediency³³. Undeniably, in this dispute the idea of justice recurs regularly, but the very first words uttered by the allegedly maltreated colonists, the Corcyreans, evoke the argument of expediency. The situation is to some extent analogous to the one on Melos – the Corcyreans admit they cannot recall any former commitments to the Athenians, so the most probable means to convince them will be on the basis of expediency. Their first sentence conforms most precisely to the rules laid down in the *Rhetoric*, in that they say that their proposal is at least “not harmful”, if not visibly expedient³⁴. Moreover, they call such a line “just”, so

³⁰ A representative example of oversimplification is provided by FINLEY 1942: 51: “...the concept that men are primarily moved by their advantage forms the obvious antithesis to the ideals of justice and honor, τὸ δίκαιον and τὸ καλόν, which had been the wellspring of Greek literature since Homer's time, and is used to refute these”. Similarly WASSERMANN 1947: 18 and KENNEDY 1959: 131: “Particularly are expediency and justice regarded as mutually exclusive”.

³¹ Thuc. I 32–34. On this antilogy, see MORRISON 1999: 105–129 (with extensive bibliography). For a brief account of the relation between the notions of τὸ συμφέρον and τὸ δίκαιον in these speeches, see VON FRITZ 1967: 630 and STRASBURGER 1954: 416.

³² This relation could even be looked at as the opposite, for in the speech of the Corcyreans δίκ- words feature five times, and the chief argument is that the Athenians will not commit injustice by an alliance with them. The Corinthians appeal to justice fourteen times, and claim to be unjustly treated. HEATH (1990: 5 f.) argues against schematic interpretation of this antilogy presented by MACLEOD 1974: 385–400; COHEN 1984: 37–39 and HORNBLLOWER 1987: 47. CONNOR (1985: 34) remarks that the Corcyreans mention justice, but he regards their case weak (according to what criterion?).

³³ HEATH 1990: 389 f. Cf. PEARSON 1957: 231; ORWIN 1994: 38; STAHL 1966: 38 f. and COGAN 1981: 8–20; consider the concept of justice as completely irrelevant in this debate.

³⁴ Thuc. I 32, 1: Δίκαιον, ὧς Ἀθηναῖοι [...] μάλιστα μὲν ὡς καὶ εὐμφορα δέονται, εἰ δὲ μή, ὅτι γε οὐκ ἐπιζήμια [“It is but fair, citizens of Athens, that [...] should show in the first place, if possible, that what they ask is advantageous, or at least that it is not hurtful”]. The argument of the alleged expediency of the Corcyreans' proposal continues at I 34 f., and is summed up in the words: “many, as we suggested at the outset, are the advantages which we can show you”.

they evidently treat the two concepts as complementary. The τὸ συμφέρον in the immediate context seems to denote a means of self-preservation and maximum security guaranteed by the incorporation of the Corcyrean fleet into Athenian navy³⁵. The Corcyreans also endeavour to demonstrate that it will not be an injustice either for the Athenians or for themselves to support them, because Corinth, their metropolis, had committed an injustice against them much earlier. They are also not going to breach any contract. In the Corcyreans' argument justice has the usual sense of remaining faithful to mutual agreements, since the pact between colony and metropolis is definitely such an agreement³⁶. In the cultural and historical contexts of the age, the relation of metropolis and *apoikia* is very deep, multidimensional, comprising religious, legal and economic elements³⁷. From this vantage point, appeals to justice in the speech of the Corcyreans become truly honest and potentially very persuasive, and there is no reason to dismiss them as irrelevant or false³⁸. In sum, the Corcyrean speakers endeavour to combine the expediency and justice of their proposal, placing emphasis on justice only where it is plausible.

This applies to the Corinthians' response as well: they appeal to the unjust acts (τάδικήματα) on the part of their colony seven times (I 37–42), and charge them with exploiting the notion of justice, which turns into an empty slogan in their speech (I 39, 2: τὸ εὐπρεπὲς τῆς δίκης παρέσχοντο). Thus, the Corinthians are also trying their best to render their case just in the minds of the Athenians, arguing that Corcyra had encroached upon the unwritten right of the metropolis to receive proper religious worship, and, even more “unjustly”, it had violated the treaty between the *poleis* of the Delian League (a concrete συνθήκη)³⁹. The Corinthians have more to say about justice, since they have an agreement with the Athenians, whereas Corcyra has none⁴⁰. Therefore, they obviously argue from justice in their exhortation, but as the Corcyreans do at the beginning, they dedi-

³⁵ Thuc. I 36. Surprisingly, MORRISON (1999: 113 f.), who diligently analyses the role of τὸ συμφέρον in the passage in question, does not refer to the semantics of the word in this context, satisfying himself with its literal meaning.

³⁶ It stipulates, among other things, that the colony ought to be properly treated (Thuc. I 35). The Corcyreans call the Corinthians' deeds unjust, as they acted more through war than law (πολέμῳ μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ ἴσῳ) in the affair of Epidamnus. Cf. further arguments: I 35, 1 ff.

³⁷ CRANE 1992: 4–20. On the relation between the metropolis and colony, see especially p. 12.

³⁸ It was recently expressed by MORRISON (1999: 113), who conforms to the interpretation of WHITE 1984: 65 f. I would rather agree with PELLING (2012: 307) on this point.

³⁹ On this occasion, they introduce a specific interpretation of the treaty, underlining its defensive character (I 40): οὐ τοῖς ἐπὶ βλάβῃ ἑτέρων ἰοῦσιν ἡ ξυσθήκη ἐστίν [“...the provision is not intended for those who apply to one side for admission with a view to the injury of the other”].

⁴⁰ Thuc. I 40: Κορινθίοις μὲν γε ἔνσπονδοὶ ἐστε, Κερκυραίοις δὲ οὐδὲ δι' ἀνοκωχῆς πώποτ' ἐγένεσθε [“...you are under treaty with the Corinthians, but have never had with the Corcyreans even an arrangement to refrain from hostilities for a time...”].

cate what is in modern editions of Thucydides an entire paragraph to proving that their position is equally just and expedient, suggesting that expediency is a natural result of correct conduct⁴¹. The penultimate sentence stresses that the decision they are urging would be “the finest” (ἄριστα)⁴². Again, τὸ δίκαιον and τὸ συμφέρον are meant to form a unity: both sides claim their solutions equally just and expedient, and “the expedient” is, in the context, a decision that brings maximum security and minimum detriment in the future.

One of the crucial pieces of deliberative discourse in the *History* is undoubtedly the antilogy between Cleon and Diodotus, which takes place in front of the Athenian assembly⁴³. The day before, the Athenians had decreed to severely punish the Mytileneans for the uprising against them. Diodotus argues against the decision, and his line of reasoning, which operates strongly on the basis of τὸ συμφέρον, is in many interpretations evaluated as extremely immoral⁴⁴. By some scholars, the concept of τὸ συμφέρον, as exploited by Diodotus, was even associated with imperialism⁴⁵. This assessment of Diodotus' position seems to be so extreme because of the *a priori* negative sense attributed to the notion of τὸ συμφέρον, which affects the interpretation of the whole. It leads to a conclusion

⁴¹ Thuc. I 42: καὶ μὴ νομίση δίκαια μὲν τάδε λέγεσθαι, εὐμφορα δέ, εἰ πολεμήσει, ἄλλα εἶναι. τό τε γὰρ εὐμμέρον ἐν ᾧ ἂν τις ἐλάχιστα ἀμαρτάνη μάλιστα ἔπεται [“And do not think that this course is indeed equitable to urge in a speech, but that another course is advantageous if you come to war. For advantage is most likely to result when one errs least...”]. Cf. PEARSON 1957: 231. It is expedient due to the guarantee of optimal safety, whereas the war is still unsure.

⁴² Thuc. I 43: καὶ τάδε ποιοῦντες τὰ προσήκοντά τε δράσετε καὶ τὰ ἄριστα βουλευσέσθε ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς [“And if you do this, you will also be consulting your own best interests”].

⁴³ In his opening words Diodotus explicitly underlines the deliberative framework of his speech (III 42). On this debate, see *HCT* II: 297–324; FINLEY 1942: 59 f., 172–174; HORNBLLOWER, *Comm.* I: 420–438; MORAUX 1954: 3–22; ANDREWES 1962: 64–85; CAGAN 1975: 71–94; DE ROMILLY 1951: 137–167; RHODES 1994: 204–213; RENGAKOS 1984: 58–74; WASSERMANN 1956: 27–41; MACLEOD 1978: 64–78; HESK 2000: 248–258; SHANSKE 2007: 52–55. MANUWALD (1979: 407–422) intelligently deciphers Diodotus' paradoxical introduction.

⁴⁴ See COHEN 1984: 52. Similarly POUNCEY 1980: 86: “the tone he adopts in certain passages seems so relentlessly, and even inhumanly, businesslike and calculating”; Cf. HORNBLLOWER, *Comm.* I: 421: “Kleon is concerned with both justice and expediency, Diodotus with expediency alone...”; he pays too much attention on the passage 47, 3, a mistake already made by SCHWARTZ 1929: 275 f. STAHL (1966: 162) also detects an “Antithese zwischen Kleon und Diodotos”; similarly FINLEY 1942: 59. MANUWALD (1979: 419) notices that Diodotus contradicts himself in that he appeals later on to such ideas as αἰσχροῦν, καλόν, etc. However, this author admits that Diodotus has a convergence of τὸ συμφέρον and τὸ δίκαιον in mind, and only in order to persuade the audience he argues for *Staatsraison*. For WASSERMANN (1956: 29) Diodotus is an “advocate [...] of Realpolitik unadulterated by either emotion or moralizing” (cf. p. 34, where he asserts, without any argumentation, that Diodotus is the “mouthpiece” of Thucydides). I would rather refrain from ascribing any of Diodotus' statements to the historian himself, as their attribution to the historical Diodotus is equally doubtful (see HOFFMANN 1997: 253–255 and TRITTE 2006: 482–484).

⁴⁵ Cf. *HCT* II: 323: “for all Diodotos' realism and his argument for Athenian interests above everything, this is a remarkable doctrine of empire; a doctrine which would lead in practice to wide toleration”. For the most recent instance of such overstatement, see KONISHI 2008: 747 f.

that Diodotus argues solely against justice and for self-interest⁴⁶. Closer scrutiny of the text proves such reading to be flawed.

Diodotus advises the Athenians to inflict proper punishment on the guilty καθ' ἡσυχίαν ("calmly", "with composure", Thuc. III 48). He agrees with Cleon that justice shall be served, although in his opinion it is more convenient (συμφέρον) to punish only those guilty of mutiny, rather than the entire populace of Mytilene⁴⁷. This solution will be, Diodotus argues, equally just and expedient. The argument of τὸ δίκαιον plays an important part in his speech, as in Cleon's, but the latter is doing his best to convince the assembly that it is *severe* punishment (the opposite of Diodotus' thesis) that would be likewise just and expedient⁴⁸. Both speakers are in fact unanimous in asserting that the Athenians had been treated unjustly (they are ἀδικούμενοι), as well as in seeking to punish the guilty – the only controversy is aroused by the identification of the more expedient decision⁴⁹. Therefore, in the debate in question justice and expediency are not understood antithetically, because it would then be absurd to seriously persuade the assembly that the particular verdict has both qualities⁵⁰. Moreover, Cleon and Diodotus in their arguments make use of the notion of expediency, but the latter has to be properly understood. Otherwise, its negative semantics, in fact detached from the text, cause distortion in interpretation⁵¹. I think it would not be a mistake to suggest that in the immediate context that which is "expedient" is everything that contributes to the security of Athens and averts mortal danger to the *polis*⁵².

Some interpreters read the Plataean antilogy⁵³ as a counterpart to the Mytilenean one⁵⁴. The Plataeans, after a long siege laid by the Spartans, capitulate, and the Lacedaemonians send for the judges to punish (only) the guilty

⁴⁶ Cf. MORRISON 2000: 128, n. 31.

⁴⁷ Cf. HOFFMANN 1997: 254 (commenting on MOULTON 1972).

⁴⁸ Thuc. III 40, 4. See MACLEOD 1978: 68; PELLING 2012: 294.

⁴⁹ Thuc. III 44; 47. Cf. MANUWALD 1979: 415 f.

⁵⁰ Cf. Thuc. III 40, 4: τὰ τε δίκαια ἐς Μυτιληναίους καὶ τὰ εὐμόφορα ἅμα ποιήσετε.

⁵¹ E.g. SCHMITZ (2010: 53) concludes that "...both speakers argue from expediency; they do not refer to religious, ethical, or humanitarian values". This scholar attaches negative connotations to the idea of expediency, and refuses to attach any ethical value to it. COHEN (1984: 53) in analysing Diodotus' attitude writes about "self-interest which includes moderation and wise administration as necessary elements, and hence dictates against blind vengeance and harsh reprisal".

⁵² It is perceivable e.g. in Thuc. III 40, 7, where the phrase ἐπικρεμασθέντος ποτὲ δεινοῦ is of key significance. Cf. COHEN 1984: 49.

⁵³ Description of the military action around Plataea: Thuc. II 71–79. The Thebans *contra* the Plataeans antilogy: III 53–67. The most detailed and accurate analysis of the episode was presented by MACLEOD 1997: 103–122 and ORWIN 1994: 70–74, although the latter, in my view, combines commentary with overly detailed summary.

⁵⁴ WASSERMANN 1956: 34; FINLEY 1942: 178; DE ROMILLY 1951: 148. Cf. MACLEOD 1997: 118; COHEN 1984: 43.

from among the citizens⁵⁵. Although the judges pose only one simple question – “Have you rendered any good service to the Lacedaemonians and their allies in the present war?” – the entire episode becomes a regular court action with extensive speeches on both sides: the Plataeans vs. the Thebans. The procedure is explicitly referred to as a trial (ἡ δίκη)⁵⁶, both the setting and the language are forensic, and capital punishment is the expected outcome⁵⁷. The deliberative keyword, βουλευέσθαι, appears only once (III 63, 1) in this extensive part of the *History*, and it does not refer to the present situation, but to the former “counsel” of the Plataeans. All this, according to the *Rhetoric*, should make the speeches delivered focus more on justice, broadly speaking, than on expediency.

After the opening of the Plataeans’ speech, which is at least partly a κατηγορία (cf. III 51), there follows an appeal to sympathy of the audience and a long description of their former services rendered to both Hellas and Lacedaemonians which is meant to show that justice is on their side. They say that it will be the right way to persuade the judges of their case⁵⁸. Exactly such a claim will be touched upon by the Athenians in the Melian Dialogue, but only to be excluded, as not potentially persuasive in the discussion (see below). Further, in the arguments adduced the Plataeans concentrate on proving that they did not commit any injustice against the Lacedaemonians⁵⁹, and on the injustice they allegedly suffered from the Thebans⁶⁰. They refer to δίκη while speaking about lawful retaliation⁶¹ and about the obligation to spare those of the opponent’s soldiers who

⁵⁵ Thuc. III 52: καὶ δικασταῖς ἐκείνοις χρήσασθαι, τοὺς τε ἀδίκους κολάζειν, παρὰ δίκην δὲ οὐδένα [“...submit to their decisions they would punish the guilty, but none contrary to justice”].

⁵⁶ Thuc. III 53: τοιάνδε δίκην οἰόμενοι ὑφέξειν [“we should have to undergo a trial like this”].

⁵⁷ Thuc. III 57: κρινεῖτε τὴν δίκην [“the case you are deciding here”]; θανάτου δίκη κρίνεσθαι [“standing the trial of our lives”]; III 66: μὴ ἀντιδοῦναι δίκην [“exemption from punishment”]; III 67: ἐς δίκην σφᾶς αὐτοὺς παραδόντες [“delivered themselves up to justice”].

⁵⁸ Thuc. III 54: παρεχόμενοι δὲ ὅμως ἃ ἔχομεν δίκαια πρὸς τε τὰ Θηβαίων διάφορα καὶ ἐς ὑμᾶς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας, τῶν εὖ δεδραμένων ὑπόμνησιν ποιησόμεθα καὶ πείθειν πειρασόμεθα [“Nevertheless, we shall present whatever just claims we have, both as regards our quarrel with the Thebans and as touching you and the rest of the Hellenes, and thus, by reminding you of our public services, shall try to persuade you”]. Cf. III 58: ὥστε καὶ τῶν σωμάτων ἄδειαν ποιοῦντες ὅσια ἀνδικάζοιτε καὶ προνοοῦντες ὅτι ἐκόντας τε ἐλάβετε καὶ χεῖρας προῖσχομένους (ὁ δὲ νόμος τοῖς Ἕλλησι μὴ κτείνειν τούτους), ἔτι δὲ καὶ εὐεργέτας γεγεννημένους διὰ παντός [“You would, therefore, render a righteous judgement if you guaranteed us security of life and if you bore in mind, before it is too late, that it was voluntary surrender and with outstretched hands that you received us (and the usage of the Hellenes forbids the slaying of suppliants); and, moreover, that we have always been your benefactors”].

⁵⁹ Thuc. III 54: οὐκ ἀδικεῖσθαι ὑμᾶς; III 55: οὐκ ἠδικοῦμεν; III 59: ἀλλοτρίας ἔνεκα ἔχθρας μὴ αὐτοὺς ἀδικηθέντας διαφθεῖραι.

⁶⁰ Thuc. III 56: Ἐθηβαῖοι δὲ πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα ἡμᾶς ἠδίκησαν [“The Thebans committed injustice against us in many and various ways”].

⁶¹ MACLEOD (1997: 108) states that this is tantamount to the law of nature, but he seems to use this notion in a modern, pejorative sense.

surrendered during the lost battle. The latter duty is even categorized as the “law of the Hellenes”⁶². The Plataeans also dismiss the charges of the unjust treatment of the captives, stressing in their response that they did not make any oath concerning prisoners of war (making clear that they were acting *justly*). Yet at III 56, in the middle of the speech, the Plataeans attempt to combine their plea for justice with expediency, by saying that to spare them will be equally expedient for the present moment, as well as for the future, whereas to condemn them will prove expedient only for now⁶³. The rule that “no orator would admit he is not urging the expedient” is obeyed, and the expediency in question is defined as the everlasting gratitude of the allies. Thus, the Plataeans in their discourse focus almost entirely on the question of justice, what suits the setting and the type of oratory it entails, and the ratio of τὸ συμφέρον and τὸ δίκαιον arguments is fully consistent with rhetorical theory according to Aristotle.

The Thebans’ reply is very dense with “justice phraseology”, even up to six δίκ- words in a single paragraph, chiefly in response to the charges of medism and to the Plataeans’ claims of just conduct during the Persian Wars and of the righteousness of their alliance with Athens⁶⁴. They also defend themselves against the charge of unjust nature of their attack on Plataea (III 65 f.), and endeavour to convince the Lacedaemonians that the most severe punishment will be just. The argument of expediency is completely absent, and an explanation for this is that before the trial begins it is obvious that the Thebans are more useful to the Spartans in the present war⁶⁵. This accounts for the short question with which the judges begin, and the Thebans say that if the answer had been equally short, they would have had no need to speak at length (III 51).

To recapitulate, in the three pairs of speeches examined above, Thucydides’ practice parallels Aristotle’s theory. In the first pair, Corcyreans vs. Corinthians, the audience is the Athenians, who have to decide whether to help Corcyra in its conflict with Corinth; so, in Aristotle’s words, to *judge on things to come*. There is a great deal about injustices committed by the opponents, about formal

⁶² The law of Greeks was here substituted by a verbal agreement. Theban captives were killed, because the Plataeans had not sworn any oath not to do it (Thuc. II 5, 5–7).

⁶³ Thuc. III 56: καίτοι χρή ταῦτά περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὁμοίως φράεσθαι γινώσκοντας, καὶ τὸ συμφέρον μὴ ἄλλο τι νομίσει ἢ τῶν συμμάχων τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὅταν αἰεὶ βέβαιον τὴν χάριν τῆς ἀρετῆς ἔχῃ καὶ τὸ παραυτίκα που ὑμῖν ὠφέλιμον καθιστῆται [“And yet you ought to show yourselves consistent, giving the same judgement concerning the same things, and to consider your true advantage to be only this-to cherish an ever-enduring gratitude toward the best of your allies for their valour, while also securing what may be to your advantage at the present moment”].

⁶⁴ This density is especially evident in the middle and final paragraphs: Thuc. III 63 (justice/injustice invoked six times); III 67 (six times again). Cf. III 65 (three times), etc.

⁶⁵ Thuc. III 68, 4-5: οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὕτως ἀποτετραμμένοι ἐγένοντο Θηβαίων ἕνεκα, νομίζοντες ἐς τὸν πόλεμον αὐτούς ἄρτι τότε καθιστάμενον ὠφελίμους εἶναι [“They have done so because of the Thebans or, precisely, considering them useful for the war they have been waging”].

and informal obligations unfulfilled. The deliberative pattern is thus distorted because of the charges of injustice on both sides, but when the speakers focus on the decision to take, they strive to reveal its expediency in the first place. The audience's judgement entails serious consequences for the future, and that explains the speakers' equal stress on the expediency of their solution. The rule that the speaker ought to claim to the expediency of his proposal is most clearly obeyed by Diodotus and Cleon in their debate, where the deliberative framework of an assembly is evident (so, the hearers are to *judge on things to come*). Yet these speakers also combine expediency with justice. A contrast to the above is the Plataeans vs. the Thebans antilogy, which takes place in a "court-like" setting (with professional judges as an audience to *judge on the things past*; note their initial question). The context is in agreement with the arguments adduced. Still, expediency is touched upon, e.g. the Plataean speaker says he is "not urging anything inexpedient".

Apart from the above speeches, we find the Athenians' explicit statement that the rhetorical framework, determined by the circumstances, and in particular by the relation between the speakers and the audience marks the type of discourse that is most suitable, and the mode of argument as a consequence (I 73):

"Ἡ μὲν πρέσβευσις ἡμῶν οὐκ ἐς ἀντιλογίαν τοῖς ὑμετέροις ξυμμάχοις ἐγένετο, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὧν ἡ πόλις ἔπειμψεν· αἰσθανόμενοι δὲ καταβοῆν οὐκ ὀλίγην οὔσαν ἡμῶν παρήλθομεν οὐ τοῖς ἐγκλήμασι τῶν πόλεων ἀντεροῦντες (οὐ γὰρ παρὰ δικασταῖς ὑμῖν οὔτε ἡμῶν οὔτε τούτων οἱ λόγοι ἂν γίγνοιτο), ἀλλ' ὅπως μὴ ῥαδίως περὶ μεγάλων πραγμάτων τοῖς ξυμμάχοις πειθόμενοι χεῖρον βουλευέσθητε.

Our embassy did not come here to enter into dispute with your allies, but on the business for which our city sent us. Perceiving, however, that no small outcry is being made against us, we have come forward, not to answer the charges of the cities (for it can hardly be that either they or we are addressing you as judges), but in order that you may not, yielding to the persuasion of your allies, lightly make a wrong decision about matters of great importance⁶⁶.

Here the Athenians clearly distinguish between two types of oratory, deliberative and forensic, and point to the obvious fact that the Lacedaemonians are in no position to adjudicate, but solely to decide. As a consequence, they will focus on dissuading from the disadvantageous decision, χεῖρον βουλεύσθητε. This recalls Aristotle's definition of dissuasion in deliberative oratory: ὁ δὲ ἀποτρέπων ὡς χεῖρονος ἀποτρέπει ("the one dissuading dissuades what is worse"). Thucydides explains this in his own words in the preceding paragraph (I 72). The above instances show that the type of discourse undertaken to a great extent regulates the

⁶⁶ See the apt commentary of COHEN 1984: 40: "The Athenians put forward the view that the assembly is a purely deliberative body, and that, properly seen, deliberation consists in the careful calculation of interest, and not in the judging of good and evil, guilt and innocence".

type of arguments put forward by the speakers. This type is, in turn, determined by the context (assembly, court) and the particular circumstances in each case, which decide on what ratio of “justice to expediency” arguments will prove most effective (i.e. able to persuade the audience).

Moreover, τὸ δίκαιον and τὸ συμφέρον are not necessarily contradictory. It is remarkable that the speakers usually strive to persuade their audiences of the equal expediency and justice of their solutions. This does not imply that there is no tension between them; the constant possibility of a discrepancy between the two is noticeable. On this evidence, we cannot take the argument based on τὸ συμφέρον as immoral *per se*, especially when we take into account that in the above debates it denotes security and self-preservation. This potentially positive meaning of τὸ συμφέρον is to be found also in the fourth-century rhetorical practice. In one of Aeschines’ speeches this notion appears alongside τὸ δίκαιον as unequivocally positive, and, interestingly, it is opposed to κέρδος ἄδικον⁶⁷. Many similar instances in Isocrates’ corpus are remarkable⁶⁸. This can also be regarded as indirect proof of the connection between the rhetorical theory of Thucydides’ time and that of the fourth century, to which Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* belongs. I mean the connection in respect of the usage of τὸ συμφέρον arguments in deliberative contexts and the clearly positive overtones of arguments from expediency.

THE MELIAN DIALOGUE

Before focusing our attention on the Melian Dialogue, the question which needs to be addressed is one of the applicability of the Aristotelian typology to such a specific kind of discourse⁶⁹. Dialogue is a form remarkably unique to the *History*, whereas in the fifth century it was rather conventional and employed, apart from historiography (especially in Herodotus), in sophistic-philosophical discussions or in drama⁷⁰. Recent papers on the Dialogue have stressed the relationship between its dramatic form and the arguments advanced by each side. Dialogical formula is used, in one of these readings, to establish a direct connection with tragedy and, thereby, with “tragic morality”, allegedly represented by

⁶⁷ *In Timarchum* 178.

⁶⁸ E.g. *In Callimachum* 68, 8: ἅμα τὰ τε δίκαια καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα ψηφίζεσθαι; cf. *Plataicus* 25; *Ad Nicoclem* 17: Ζῆται νόμους τὸ μὲν σύμπαν δίκαιους καὶ συμφέροντας (virtually identical to *Panathenaiscus* 144); cf. *Antidosis* 79.

⁶⁹ I would like to express my gratitude to the anonymous reader of the initial version of this paper for his or her valuable suggestions on this issue.

⁷⁰ The connection of the Socratic or Platonic philosophical dialogues with the Melian Dialogue with its strictly political background is rather weak. Their chief aim was to discover the truth, not to persuade. See MOORS 1978: 77–93.

the Melians⁷¹. But this approach does not elucidate either the Athenians' stance in the Dialogue or the fact that the Melians themselves have something to say about expediency. Moreover, it has been shown that arguments from justice are not the only ones appearing in fifth-century tragedy; expediency is also likely to be evoked, and both types of arguments can be explained by the quasi-judicial or deliberative contexts in which they occur⁷². In other words, the dramatic framework is not decisive for the content; the key factor is still the overall setting and situation of the speakers.

That the Melian Dialogue can be treated as *ρήτορεία* is confirmed by later critics, particularly by the analysis of Dionysius of Halicarnassus in his treatise *On Thucydides*. The Dialogue is classified and examined as a *δημηγορία* – the Aristotelian term for deliberative speaking⁷³. The content of the Dialogue is assessed from exactly the same perspective as other speeches, especially whether it is in keeping with what was actually said⁷⁴. Dionysius' judgement of the Dialogue is highly negative⁷⁵, but its symbouleutic character seems to be undisputed. This is fully consistent with Aristotle's statement that the deliberative kind of oratory is not restricted to the popular assembly, and it extends also to discussions in more confined circles taking place "in private"⁷⁶. The Melian Dialogue is a per-

⁷¹ VON REDEN (2013: 215–220) believes that the application of dialogue within the sphere of political practice is a purposeful *Verfremdungseffekt*, and the very reason of the failure to reach an agreement. The dramatic form causes both sides to adduce arguments unsuitable for interstate politics. The Melians are supposed to represent "tragic morality" which, by its inappropriateness, hampers successful communication between the two sides. Cf. GREENWOOD 2008: 25: "The dialogue is 'dramatic' both in that it presents an *agôn* between personifications of the Athenian and the Melian positions, as well as being 'dramatic' in its evocations of the debates in extant Greek tragedies, both in terms of structure and language".

⁷² See KENNEDY 1959: 134 f., with examples from Euripides.

⁷³ Dionysius compares the Melian Dialogue to the exchange of the Plataeans with Archidamus (Thuc. II 71–75) in chaps. 36–41. In the introduction to this analysis he states (ch. 34): Ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν δημηγοριῶν αὐτοῦ τὰ δοκοῦντά μοι φανερά ποιήσῃν ὑπεσχόμην ["Since I have promised to state my opinion of his speeches..."]. Later he calls both conversations a *διάλογος* (ch. 37). Aristotle sets *δημηγορία* as symbouleutic speaking as opposed to judicial in *Rhet.* 1354b 28. In the biography of Thucydides ascribed to Marcellinus, we can also find indications that the Dialogue was subsumed by critics under the category of deliberative speeches (Marc. *Thuc. vit.* 42).

⁷⁴ At *Thuc.* 41 Dionysius recalls Thucydides' statement on his method in the composition of speeches (Thuc. I 22).

⁷⁵ WIATER (2011: 154–164), in his excellent examination of Dionysius' critique, shows how classicistic ideals determine the overall assessment of the Dialogue. Thucydides is supposed to purposefully misrepresent the Athenians because of the grudge harboured against them due to his exile. This depiction of the Athenians is in direct contradiction to classicistic self-definition and the "Athenian identity" (ibidem, pp. 131 f., 139 f.). Hence Dionysius' objections and demand for the reformulation of the Dialogue.

⁷⁶ Arist. *Rhet.* 1358b 9–10: αἰεὶ γὰρ καὶ οἱ ἰδίᾳ συμβουλευόντες καὶ οἱ κοινῇ δημηγοροῦντες τούτων θάτερον ποιοῦσιν ["For both those who give advice in private and those who speak in the assembly invariably either exhort or dissuade"].

fect candidate for this category⁷⁷, and below I endeavour to demonstrate that it is couched exactly in terms of symbouleutic speeches, where the argument of τὸ συμφέρον is, as far as Aristotle tells us, naturally in place.

The Athenians hint at the deliberative framework in their very first utterance: καθ' ἕκαστον γὰρ καὶ μηδ' ὑμεῖς ἐνὶ λόγῳ, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ μὴ δοκοῦν ἐπιτηδείως λέγεσθαι εὐθύς ὑπολαμβάνοντες κρίνετε⁷⁸, what is bitterly “thrown back” at them by the Melians in their reply: ὀρώμεν γὰρ αὐτούς τε κριτὰς ἤκοντας ὑμᾶς τῶν λεχθησομένων⁷⁹. Κρίνετε, which in Thucydides is the word used for sovereign people in an assembly, points to the aim of the exchange, which is to reach a (good) decision⁸⁰. It is consistent with the types of audiences described by Aristotle, where κριτής is a “judge of things to come” in an assembly and is in a position to decide on the future⁸¹, in contrast to a δικαστής, who is a “judge on things past”, as in the case of the Plataeans. In the dialogue the Athenians underline that this is exactly what will transpire during their meeting with the Melians: they admonish them not to make “suspicions” (“fancies” – HORNBLOWER) about the future, but to decide on it by what is at hand, i.e. the given circumstances. The Athenians refute “fancies” about the future⁸², but not considerations about the future as such, because much of the debate is precisely about “what might happen” (V 105–110).

After this preliminary arrangement, the interlocutors negotiate and pose the proper theme of the dispute. The Athenians do it by saying περὶ σωτηρίας βουλευσόντες τῇ πόλει, which is picked up and confirmed by the Melians: ἡ μέντοι ξύνοδος καὶ περὶ σωτηρίας ἦδε πάρεστι. These two sentences simultaneously approve the form, and establish the proper theme of the Dialogue: the

⁷⁷ Cf. HUDSON-WILLIAMS 1950: 164 f.

⁷⁸ Thuc. V 85: “Take up each point, and do not you either make a single speech, but conduct the inquiry by replying at once to any statement of ours that seems to be unsatisfactory”.

⁷⁹ Thuc. V 86: “For we see that you are come to be yourselves judges of what is to be said here”.

⁸⁰ MACLEOD 1974: 387 with n. 11 for examples of Thucydides’ use of the word.

⁸¹ Arist. *Rhet.* 1358b 13–15: τῷ μὲν συμβουλευόντι ὁ μέλλον (περὶ γὰρ τῶν ἐσομένων συμβουλεύει ἢ προτρέπων ἢ ἀποτρέπων).

⁸² Thuc. V 87: Εἰ μὲν τοίνυν ὑπονοίας τῶν μελλόντων λογιούμενοι ἢ ἄλλο τι ξυνήκετε ἢ ἐκ τῶν παρόντων καὶ ὧν ὀράτε περὶ σωτηρίας βουλευσόντες τῇ πόλει, παυοίμεθ' ἂν [“Well, if you have met to argue from suspicions about what may happen in the future, or for any other purpose than to consult for the safety of your city in the light of what is present and before your eyes, we may as well stop”]. In this phrase the rejection of the future has been often overemphasised; one should rather stress ὑπόνοια, the Athenians simply reject “guesses” as a weak basis upon which to decide, not the future in general. Cf. MORRISON 1999: 126, 134 f.: “The Athenians’ apparent rejection of discussing past and future is stated broadly”; cf. the Athenians’ ending appeal (V 113): τὰ μὲν μέλλοντα τῶν ὀρωμένων σαφέστερα κρίνετε [“you [...] regard future events as more certain than what lies before your eyes”].

formula will be deliberation, the subject: the survival of the *polis*⁸³. The type of discourse and its theme seem to be inextricably interwoven. The semantics of βουλευώ and ξύνοδος indicate the act of free consideration and choice. The Melians' choice is accentuated several times by the Athenians in the course of the discussion (most insistently in V 111). Deliberation is reaffirmed by the Athenians and set as an antithesis to ἀγών, as a reply to the Melians' reasoning, that it would be cowardice not to fight for their freedom (V 101):

Οὐκ, ἦν γε σωφρόνως βουλευήσθε· οὐ γὰρ περὶ ἀνδραγαθίας ὁ ἀγών ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου ὑμῖν, μὴ αἰσχύνῃν ὀφλεῖν, περὶ δὲ σωτηρίας μᾶλλον ἢ βουλῆ.

No, if you take a sensible view of the matter; for with you it is not a contest on equal terms to determine a point of manly honour, so as to avoid incurring disgrace; rather the question before you is one of self-preservation...

This combination of σωτηρία and βουλή is repeated almost literally in the Athenians' last utterance, where they say, that "although you said that you will take counsel concerning your deliverance (περὶ σωτηρίας βουλευέσθαι) etc."⁸⁴. It is striking that, apart from the last sentence, βουλή is stressed four times in this single passage, twice in the very last statement of the Athenians⁸⁵.

From the above it can be seen that the type of the discourse, apart from its external shape (the free exchange of arguments), is explicitly and emphatically defined, by both sides, as deliberative⁸⁶. It is even defined by negation, when opposed to ἀγών – a contest on equal terms – what can point also to the difference from forensic speeches⁸⁷. Essentially, a forensic framework for the dialogue between the Athenian envoys and the Melian representatives is impossible to imagine, as it is historically implausible. The first consequence of this symbouleutic framework ought to be, as the *Rhetoric* dictates, concentration on the arguments

⁸³ See HORNBLOWER, *Comm.* III: 232 on the emphatic role of καί here. The Melians are actually the first to explicitly invoke the deliberative framework by calling their meeting with the Athenians a ξύνοδος. For the meaning of ξύνοδος, see Hdt. IX 27 and 43; Eur. *Hec.* 107 (anap.); Ar. *Thes.* 301; and especially Thucydides' usage: I 97: ἀπὸ κοινῶν ξυνόδων βουλευόντων; cf. I 96. The primary sense is clearly an assembly, a conference, and the aim of reaching mutual consent is implied.

⁸⁴ Thuc. V 111: ἐνθυμούμεθα δὲ ὅτι φήσαντες περὶ σωτηρίας βουλευέσθαι οὐδὲν ἐν τοσοῦτῳ λόγῳ εἰρήκατε ᾧ ἄνθρωποι ἂν πιστεύσαντες νομίσειαν σωθήσεσθαι ["However, we cannot but reflect that, although you said that you would take counsel concerning your deliverance, you have not in this long discussion advanced a single argument that ordinary men would put their confidence in if they expected to be delivered"].

⁸⁵ Thuc. V 111: ὁ ὑμεῖς, ἦν εἴ βουλευήσθε, φυλάξεσθε [...] περὶ πατρίδος βουλευέσθε, ἧς μιᾶς πέρι καὶ ἐς μίαν βουλὴν τυχοῦσάν τε καὶ μὴ κατορθώσασαν ἔσται ["Such a course you will avoid, if you take wise counsel [...] in your deliberations that your fatherland is at stake, your one and only fatherland, and that upon one decision only will depend her fate for weal or woe"].

⁸⁶ Cf. MACLEOD 1974: 387.

⁸⁷ ἀγών as taking place at court, as a trial: Antiph. VI 21; Plat. *Rep.* 494E; Xen. *De rep. Lac.* VIII 4.

referring to τὸ συμφέρον and τὸ βλαβερὸν, on what is expedient and what is detrimental, rather than on τὸ δίκαιον. The latter can be used as ancillary.

Nevertheless, it has remained unnoticed that the Athenians in fact touch upon the theme of justice, in their third statement, which is the proper opening of the debate: ἀδικούμενοι νῦν ἐπεξερχόμεθα⁸⁸. They are suggesting to have *their own* potential charges against the Melians, something barely taken into consideration by scholars in their interpretations. The question is whether Melos was obliged, by a former agreement, to pay tribute to the Athenians, and after some time refused to do that – a plausible material for an accusation of injustice⁸⁹. Indeed, the Athenians approach the discussion with confidence, but it is not merely a confidence in the military power and the power of λόγοι: they are sure they are doing the right thing⁹⁰. In the same sentence, the Athenians also underline, although very concisely, justice of their ἀρχή, which is founded on their sacrifices made to Hellas in the Persian Wars: δικάίως τὸν Μῆδον καταλύσαντες ἄρχομεν. This is undoubtedly an argument from justice, and in another place in the *History* the

⁸⁸ Thuc. V 89. The full claim reads: Ἡμεῖς τοίνυν οὔτε αὐτοὶ μετ' ὀνομάτων καλῶν, ὡς ἢ δικάίως τὸν Μῆδον καταλύσαντες ἄρχομεν ἢ ἀδικούμενοι νῦν ἐπεξερχόμεθα, λόγων μῆκος ἄπιστον παρέξομεν, οὔθ' ὑμᾶς ἀξιούμεν ἢ ὅτι Λακεδαιμονίων ἀποικοὶ ὄντες οὐ ξυνεστρατεύσατε ἢ ὡς ἡμᾶς οὐδὲν ἠδικήκατε λέγοντας οἴεσθαι πείσειν... [“Well, then, we on our part will make use of no fair phrases, saying either that we hold sway justly because we overthrew the Persians, or that we now come against you because we are injured, offering in a lengthy speech arguments that would not be believed...”].

⁸⁹ TREU (1954: 256–262) tried to prove, on the basis of fragmentary epigraphic evidence, that Melos had been committed to pay the tribute to Athens. In TREU's view, Thucydides committed a bias against historical truth in order to develop philosophical, moral and political themes. DE ROMILLY (1958: 67 f.) approves of TREU's conception, and sees the alleged omission as a manifestation of Thucydides' intent to stress the inadequacy of the Athenians' action on Melos. VON FRITZ (1967: 70) agrees that Thucydides concealed the fact on purpose in order to highlight the Athenians' ruthlessness. Arguments put forward by TREU were inspected by EBERHARDT (1959: 284–314), who tried to demonstrate that the tributary list dated to the year 425 and drawn up by Cleon had, in fact, been a product of propaganda, and Melos had been *tributpflichtig* “on paper”, but never in reality. Consequently, there would be no justification (no legally binding agreement) to force Melos to become loyal, as it was remaining neutral. See particularly pp. 294–297, where he discusses the number of *poleis* that were likewise included in the list of 425, whilst their real submission to Athens was rather doubtful. On the grounds of the epigraphic material (the list cited) it is unfeasible to decide whether Melos had been paying or not, but it is equally impossible to rule this out. Moreover, RAUBITSCHKE (1963: 80–82) stresses the fact that in Ephorus' historical work the Melians were described as ἀποστάντες from Athens, not as a neutral *polis*. Even more, the author adduces the scholia to Aristophanes' *Aves* 186, where the reason of the revolt is explained in a phrase which unambiguously indicates an earlier agreement with the Athenians: διὰ τὸ ἀποστῆναι αὐτῶν, πρώην ὑποτελεῖν οὔσαν. It is still an unsolved problem why Thucydides completely omits Cleon's list, irrespective of its nature and real purpose. GOMME notes that it is “[t]he strangest of all omissions in Thucydides” (*HCT* III: 500). We cannot decide the case with any certainty, due to the gaps in the epigraphic material. However, the evidence of the scholia cannot be disregarded too hastily, and the fact that the Athenians name themselves ἀδικούμενοι at the very beginning of the exchange cannot be ignored.

⁹⁰ Thuc. V 89; HORNBLOWER, *Comm.* III: 220; MORRISON 2000: 124 f.

Athenians make this claim more explicitly⁹¹. Here it is given in the form of a specific *praeteritio*, but the claim is made, and the rule that justice should at least be attempted is obeyed. However, to refer to former merits or commitments was a regular practice and characteristic of forensic speeches, not of deliberative ones, and this also makes this brevity suitable here⁹². Subsequently, the Athenians make clear that it will not be an effective way to convince the Melians that they should join them, if they continued to appeal in terms of law and justice; that will simply not be a persuasive way to do it: λόγων μῆκος ἄπιστον [...] πείσειν. To do that, they have to use the argument that will prove most appropriate in the given circumstances, hence they choose to talk about expediency. Scholars have seemed not to attach proper importance to the fact that the Athenians overtly admit that in their speech arguments from justice will be equally implausible as in that of the Melians⁹³. This touches upon the fundamental aspect of Greek rhetoric: its core, utmost aim and constant point of reference was persuasion. As KENNEDY puts it: “Courses of action must be determined between alternatives presented in persuasive fashion”⁹⁴.

So far, the rejection of rightful claims is not dictated by the Athenian outlook or decision, but by the type of discourse upon which they both agree. However, the Athenians, in the same paragraph, state more openly why justice cannot be a persuasive argument in the discussion:

τὰ δυνατὰ δ' ἐξ ὧν ἐκάτεροι ἀληθῶς φρονοῦμεν διαπράσσεσθαι, ἐπισταμένους πρὸς εἰδότης ὅτι δίκαια μὲν ἐν τῷ ἀνθρωπείῳ λόγῳ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης ἀνάγκης κρίνεται, δυνατὰ δὲ οἱ προύχοντες πράσσουσι καὶ οἱ ἄσθενεῖς ξυγχωροῦσιν.

Rather we assume that you aim at accomplishing what is possible in accordance with the real thoughts of both of us, since you know as well as we know that in human discourse justice should be judged according to equal necessity, the one in the favourable position to exact what is possible, while the weaker make concessions⁹⁵.

⁹¹ Thuc. I 73. Here they also try to prove that they acted in the interests of the Lacedaemonians at the same time.

⁹² MACLEOD 1997: 103–105. See Lys. *In Nicomachum* 1: Ἦδη, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, τινὲς εἰς κρίσιν καταστάντες ἀδικεῖν μὲν ἔδοξαν, ἀποφαίνοντες δὲ τὰς τῶν προγόνων ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς σφετέρως αὐτῶν εὐεργεσίας συγγνώμης ἔτυχον παρ' ὑμῶν. ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν καὶ τῶν ἀπολογουμένων ἀποδέχεσθε, ἐάν τι ἀγαθὸν φαίνωνται τὴν πόλιν πεποιηκότες, ἄξιον καὶ τῶν κατηγορῶν ὑμᾶς ἀκροάσασθαι, ἐὰν ἀποφαίνωσι τοὺς φεύγοντας πάλαι πονηροὺς ὄντας [“There have been cases, gentlemen of the jury, of persons who, when brought to trial, have appeared to be guilty, but who on showing forth their ancestors' virtues and their own benefactions, have obtained your pardon. Since, therefore, you are satisfied with the plea of the defendants, if they are shown to have done some service to the State, it is fair that you should also listen to the accusers, if they show forth a long course of villainy in the accused” (transl. by W. LAMB)]. Similar argumentation is found in Dem. *In Aristogitonem* 1, 76.

⁹³ Thuc. V 89: οὕτε αὐτοὶ [...] οὕθ' ὑμᾶς [...] οἶεσθαι πείσειν; see the whole phrase with translation in n. 89.

⁹⁴ KENNEDY 1963: 14. See Arist. *Rhet.* 1355b 8 ff.

⁹⁵ Thuc. V 89, 1. The translation is my own.

This is probably the most notorious sentence from the Dialogue, and the one most stressed when the question of Athenians' "choice not to speak about justice and to prefer expediency" is addressed. HORNBLLOWER, following most scholars, makes a link between this sentence and V 105 (the "law of the stronger" formula)⁹⁶. "The powerful exact what they can, and the weak have to comply" is a translation representative for this reading. This "traditional" interpretation can be paraphrased: "justice does not apply here because of the imbalance of power, thus we do what we want, and you comply". This makes the Athenians say that "might excludes right", and thus connect V 89 with V 105. I would like to test this view.

Firstly, such a reading makes the whole sentence divided, as if the first part referred to "human discourse" (ἀνθρωπείῳ λόγῳ), whereas the second – to some political activity (δυνατὰ [...] πράσσοι). Especially misleading is πράσσοι in the second clause, since usually we understand it as the basic word for "doing", and most commentators follow this pattern. But this does not combine well with the rhetorical context of the whole statement, where δυνατὰ is the object of διαπράσσεσθαι. Here we are dealing with a basic misapprehension of what Thucydides makes the Athenians say. Scholars usually reflect solely on the second clause, where "justice is rejected". However, to understand the phrase correctly, one should in the first place take proper account of τὰ δυνατὰ [...] διαπράσσεσθαι from the preceding clause. This is an expression referring specifically to the process of deliberation, to what is achieved by persuasion. This is the sole example of such a cluster of words in Thucydides, and διαπράσσω itself is rare (6 instances in the whole *History*), but where it appears in the context of oratory, it means "to attain the goal set before entering the dispute"⁹⁷. Particularly close to the above is a locution relating to one of Cleon's famous manipulations in the assembly: πάντα διαπραξάμενος ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, "having arranged everything in the assembly". At this instant, we can surmise that the Athenians, in the paragraph in question, suggest that not everything (πάντα) can be "fixed" (διαπράσσεσθαι) in the dialogue with the Melians, only "what is possible", the δυνατὰ. They appeal to the Melians to negotiate on what can be attained.

What exactly is meant by τὰ δυνατὰ? It has gone heretofore unrecognised that this is a *terminus technicus* belonging to deliberative oratory. Aristotle tries to define the term in the context of things that people deliberately decide to do (*Rhet.* 1363a 19–24):

⁹⁶ HORNBLLOWER, *Comm.* III: 234; HEATH 1990: 388.

⁹⁷ Thuc. I 87, on the Corinthians who managed to persuade the Lacedaemonians that the peace agreement had been broken, and that Sparta should begin the war (οἱ μὲν ἀπεχώρησαν ἐπ' οἴκου διαπραξάμενοι ταῦτα); IV 29, on Cleon, that he convinced the Athenians to nominate him for the generalship on Pylos (καὶ πάντα διαπραξάμενος ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ); cf. I 131.

προαιροῦνται δὲ πράττειν τὰ τε εἰρημένα καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς κακὰ καὶ τὰ τοῖς φίλοις ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ δυνατὰ· ταῦτα δὲ διχῶς ἐστίν, τὰ τε γεγόμενα ἂν καὶ τὰ ῥαδίως γιγνόμενα· ῥάδια δὲ ὅσα ἢ ἄνευ λύπης ἢ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ· τὸ γὰρ χαλεπὸν ὀρίζεται ἢ λύπη ἢ πλήθει χρόνου.

Now, men deliberately choose to do the things just mentioned, and those which are harmful to their enemies, and advantageous to their friends, and things which are possible. The last are of two kinds: things which might happen, and things which easily happen; by the latter are meant things that happen without labour or in a short time, for difficulty is defined by labour or length of time.

Here τὰ δυνατὰ is described by Aristotle as everything that is chosen to be performed, because it is possible that it is executed, or it is *easily* executed. Such things are among those that humans choose to do, and all things which are chosen without restraint can be considered good (for the person making the choice). Good things, in turn, are those which are expedient, aimed at in deliberative oratory. On the other hand, deliberative oratory aims at taking expedient decisions, and as such they have to be good, also because they are voluntary, and these decisions can concern only things which are either bad for the enemies or good for friends, and δυνατὰ. The entire argument of Aristotle is quite difficult and long (1359a 30–1363b 4), but the connection between deliberation process and actions that are its consequence, where δυνατὰ belong, is clear (cf. also *Rhet.* 1392a). This has been brilliantly illuminated by William M.A. GRIMALDI⁹⁸: “These δυνατὰ, then, are actions that could be proposed as contributing to the advantage and therefore the good of the audience. In this way they help the auditors to make a determination about something else, which may in their minds be a disputable good (cf. 62b 30)”.

But how are we to understand τὰ δυνατὰ πράττειν from the second clause of the sentence cited above, if it is the only instance of its appearance in the *History*? This formula appears in the *Rhetoric*, also in the context of the adequate subjects in the deliberative type of oratory (*Rhet.* 1359a 30–b 1):

Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ληπτέον περὶ ποῖα ἀγαθὰ ἢ κακὰ ὁ συμβουλευέων συμβουλεύει, ἐπειδὴ οὐ περὶ ἅπαντα ἀλλ’ ὅσα ἐνδέχεται καὶ γενέσθαι καὶ μὴ, ὅσα δὲ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ ἔστιν ἢ ἔσται, ἢ ἀδύνατον ἢ εἶναι ἢ γενέσθαι, περὶ δὲ τούτων οὐκ ἔστι συμβουλή. οὐδὲ δὴ περὶ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ἀπάντων ἔστιν γὰρ καὶ φύσει ἕνια καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης γινόμενα ἀγαθὰ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ γίγνεσθαι καὶ μὴ, περὶ ὧν οὐδὲν πρὸ ἔργου τὸ συμβουλεύειν· ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι περὶ ὧν ἔστιν τὸ βουλευέσθαι. τοιαῦτα δ’ ἐστίν ὅσα πέφυκεν ἀνάγεσθαι εἰς ἡμᾶς, καὶ ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς γενέσεως ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ἐστίν· μέχρι γὰρ τούτου σκοποῦμεν, ἕως ἂν εὕρωμεν εἰ ἡμῖν δυνατὰ ἢ ἀδύνατα πράξαι.

We must first ascertain about what kind of good or bad things the deliberative orator advises, since he cannot do so about everything, but only about things which may

⁹⁸ GRIMALDI 1980: 138.

possibly happen or not. Everything which of necessity either is or will be, or which cannot possibly be or come to pass, is outside the scope of deliberation. Indeed, even in the case of things that are possible advice is not universally appropriate; for they include certain advantages, natural and accidental, about which it is not worthwhile to offer advice. But it is clear that advice is limited to those subjects about which we take counsel; and such are all those which can naturally be referred to ourselves and the first cause of whose origination is in our own power; for our examination is limited to finding out whether such things are possible or impossible for us to perform.

Accordingly, in Aristotle's theory τὰ δυνατὰ has to be the central feature of what is to be discussed in a deliberative framework⁹⁹. What has already happened, what cannot happen, and what is or will be existing of necessity, are all excluded from this type of discourse. Not even all possible things can constitute the subject, but solely those things that are in our power, and the deliberation should concern the question of what is likely or unlikely to take place (δυνατὰ ἢ ἀδύνατα πράξιαι)¹⁰⁰. This explanation of Aristotle should be of help for our understanding of Thucydides' Athenians in the passage in question. First of all, we can assume that to mention τὰ δυνατὰ in a symbouleutic framework can be regarded as natural, as the accurate theme of the discussion. The speakers have to persuade their audience that what they argue for is at all possible, and if so, that it can be done easily. It is because in a forensic speech a great deal is usually said about what has already happened, or what exists of necessity – things that cannot be actually debated on, because they cannot be chosen or rejected, only judged – κρίνεσθαι.

To understand this complex sentence it is important also to reflect on the subject of δυνατὰ πράττειν, the προύχοντες. Here Aristotle is of no help, but since in this instance translation has considerable bearing on interpretation, it is necessary to make some interventions in it. SMITH renders the epithets of the agents in question (πούχοντες – ἄσθενεῖς) as “the powerful”, and “the weak”, that refers us directly to the idea of power or force (military, physical, etc.)¹⁰¹. Interestingly, no record in the Liddell & Scott Lexicon registers any meaning of προέχειν which would have a straightforward connotation of force. In other texts we find the word bearing such senses as: “to be the first”, “to surpass”, “excel”, or “be superior to”¹⁰². My reservation regarding the translation of “the stronger” in the

⁹⁹ Cf. Arist. *Rhet.* 1362a 17–19. GRIMALDI (1980: 122) aptly refers this passage to that from *EN* 1112b 11–17, 33–34, and remarks “...to the effect that we deliberate about the means to the end determined upon and about those things which are in our power (1112a 19–31, 33–34; 1112b 3–6)”.

¹⁰⁰ See cross-references and commentary in GRIMALDI 1980: 90.

¹⁰¹ HORNBLLOWER follows this pattern in his commentary. Cf. DE ROMILLY 1992: 152: “the powerful [...] the weak”; WASSERMANN 1947: 25: “the strong [...] the weak”. ORWIN (1994: 99) renders προύχοντες as “those who have upper hand”, but he adduces no argument.

¹⁰² See LSJ (1996), s.v. προέχειν.

passage in question is confirmed by the manner in which Thucydides himself uses *προέχειν*; in the *History* it is associated with rather more neutral senses¹⁰³. In the *History*, when *δύναμις*, power of political or military nature is considered the thing that makes one *προύχων*, it is precisely and unequivocally indicated¹⁰⁴. In general, *προέχειν* in the *History* means to be in favourable conditions in comparison to the opponent, but it seems to be more neutral than is usually assumed. Particularly useful for the interpretation of the phrase in question is to reach beyond the immediate context of the Dialogue and recall a corresponding passage from the Corcyra–Corinth antilogy discussed above:

Καὶ φασὶ δὴ δίκη πρότερον ἐθελῆσαι κρίνεσθαι, ἦν γε οὐ τὸν προύχοντα καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς προκαλούμενον λέγειν τι δοκεῖν δεῖ κτλ.

They claim that they wanted to settle the matter in court, yet such procedure relates not to the party that already has advantage over the other and is in a secured position...¹⁰⁵.

It is a statement of the Corinthians from the debate discussed above. Its sense seems to be very similar to the Athenians' words from the Dialogue: settlement on the basis of justice (that is, in court) is impossible when one of the two parties is evidently in a favourable, safer position, in this case – when no actions had been taken prior to the proposal of settlement. It is not necessarily military power which determines the relation¹⁰⁶; relations based on justice could subsist between *poleis* of differing magnitude and power¹⁰⁷. Corcyra was in fact very weak; its resources were scarce. Yet it made certain preparations that were to its advantage, and only then proposed to go on trial. In the Corinthian statement, this disqualifies the forensic mode of discourse between the parties, and the deliberative enters as an alternative. This is stated by the Corinthians as a general

¹⁰³ The citations with the most adequate and probable translations in the given context are: Thuc. III 82, 7: εἰ προύχοιεν [“if they have had significant advantage”], likewise: VII 66: ᾧ ἀξιοῦσι προύχειν [“he counted on his advantage”]; III 84, 2: ἀνθρωπεῖα φύσις [...] πολεμία δὲ τοῦ προύχοντος [“human constitution, hostile towards every control”]; V 17, 1: τοὺς προύχοντας [“the eminent ones” (Pleistoanax about himself?)].

¹⁰⁴ See e.g. Thuc. I 18, 2: οἱ τε Λακεδαιμόνιοι τῶν ξυμπολεμησάντων Ἑλλήνων ἡγήσαντο δυνάμει προύχοντες [“Lacedaemonians, thought to be exceedingly powerful among the Greek allies”]; similarly VII 21, 3; cf. I 121, 2. However, the most remarkable passage is I 9, 1, where Agamemnon is described as “surpassing in *δύναμις* all his contemporaries”; cf. III 74, 1: πλῆθει προύχων [“outnumbering (*scil.* the enemy)”].

¹⁰⁵ Thuc. I 39, 1 f. This is a reply to a charge made by the Corcyreans that the Corinthians refused to settle the disagreement over Epidamnus by a court trial, I 34: προκληθέντες γὰρ *περὶ Ἐπιδάμνου ἐς κρίσιν*.

¹⁰⁶ HEATH 1990: 388: “Justice can only be in question where there is a balance of force. Consequently, justice is irrelevant to the present discussion; only advantage can be considered (90, 98)”.

¹⁰⁷ BOSWORTH 2009: 328 with n. 50.

truth, so Thucydides does not make the Athenians the only speakers that concede it. In the context of the Dialogue the Athenians are in a superior position; they have already begun military preparations and ravaged some land (V 84). Therefore, the phrase ἴση ἀνάγκη cannot be understood as “equal power”; this is a misconception. From another part of the *History* it can be inferred that it is closer to “mutual fear” or “sound anxiety” (δέος), based on rational analysis of circumstances¹⁰⁸.

The Athenians say that “the weaker concede”, ξυγχωροῦσιν. Again this should be interpreted in a deliberative context, where one side has to come to terms with the other. One should note that in Thucydides, when one side συγχωρεῖ, it is always because it is to its advantage and provides security for the given time. This is a standard word for concession made in negotiations or deliberations¹⁰⁹, making or accepting a specific condition¹¹⁰, or making an agreement in general¹¹¹.

All things considered, V 89 is far from stating that “might makes right”. It refers to what happens in deliberation, that the initial position before negotiation begins has serious bearing on what can be achieved by both parties during the dispute. The Athenians’ vocabulary is rich in terminology present in the *Rhetoric*, fitting the same context, the difference between deliberative and forensic oratory. In the former τὰ δυνατὰ is the proper subject, and the dispute concerns *praxis*; in the latter τὰ δίκαια is the object, not of *praxis*, but of judgement. As we have seen so far, in the *Rhetoric* this type of discourse, where τὰ δυνατὰ is the proper theme, is symbouleutic. It is because in a forensic speech much is usually said about what has already happened, or what exists of necessity – things that cannot actually be debated on, because they cannot be chosen or rejected, only judged – κρίνεσθαι. This is the most probable interpretation of this vexing passage. The

¹⁰⁸ HORNBLOWER (*Comm.* III: 232) renders ἀπὸ ἀνάγκης: “a corresponding power to enforce it”. Such a translation seems to equate ἀνάγκη with power, which seems to go too far beyond the text. In fact, most scholars identify ἴση ἀνάγκη with “equal power”, cf. SOLMSEN 1971: 405; SCARDINO 2007: 471: “...Recht (δίκαια) nur unter Gleichstarken (ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης ἀνάγκης) Bedeutung hat”. ORWIN (1994: 99) is more moderate. The formula ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης ἀνάγκης can be corroborated by a part of the speech of the Mytileneans (III 11, 2): τὸ δὲ ἀντίπαλον δέος μόνον πιστὸν ἐς ξυμμαχίαν· ὁ γὰρ παραβαίνειν τι βουλούμενος τῷ μὴ προύχων ἂν ἐπελθεῖν ἀποτρέπεται [“But only mutual fear is a guarantee of military alliance: the one, that intends to breach its terms, refrains from doing this, being aware of having no advantage”]. There is a great difference between φόβος and δέος: the latter is a more rational and justified attitude than the former; it refers to the possible future events. It is anxiety caused by an adequate assessment of the present circumstances and probable developments. See DE ROMILLY 1956: 124 f. She defines the relation of φόβος to δέος (p. 120). STRASBURGER (1966: 59 f.) reflects on the role of fear in Thucydides in general.

¹⁰⁹ Thuc. I 140, Pericles in his first speech: to concede means that the other party will regard the conceding as unequal; II 59; IV 21; IV 64.

¹¹⁰ Thuc. III 52; IV 118.

¹¹¹ Thuc. III 75; III 96; V 17.

Athenians' argument is sound, and it seems to stem from the rhetorical theory and practice of the time. It is not a peculiar attitude on the part of the Athenians, for we have at least one example from the *History* where it appears in nearly identical form.

To sum up, the rejection of arguments from justice by the Athenians is strictly related to the type of discourse set at the beginning of the exchange, and which is constantly recalled – a βουλή which is also inextricably connected with the proper subject of the debate – σωτηρία. The Athenians touch upon the theme of justice, as is dictated by the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, but in subsequent exchange it is marginal. The most important chapter in this respect, V 89, is couched in terms familiar to rhetorical theory as the *Rhetoric* conveys it, and it contrasts two types of discourse: forensic, where τὰ δίκαια are judged, and deliberative, where τὰ δυνατὰ are debated on. Because one of the two sides is in a favourable position, the proper mode will be a βουλή, and the subject should be expediency. I argue that the second part of V 89: δυνατὰ δὲ οἱ προύχοντες πράσσοι καὶ οἱ ἀσθενεῖς ξυγχωροῦσιν cannot be read as the “law of the stronger” idea. It is, as Aristotle's theory suggests, a reference to the process of deliberation.

The last question is the meaning of τὸ συμφέρον as discussed by the two sides in the Dialogue. I have tried to indicate above that the idea of τὸ συμφέρον is constantly, from the very beginning, linked to the subject set at the start: σωτηρία. The intensity and interplay of words and concepts connected to the idea of survival, safety, and expediency on the one hand, and death, danger, and detriment on the other in the Dialogue deserves particular attention. The Athenians allude to the need to provide optimal security even before the beginning of the dialogue proper (V 85), by saying ὑμεῖς οἱ καθήμενοι ἔτι ἀσφαλέστερον ποιήσατε¹¹². Security, or ἀσφάλεια, and its opposite, danger, recurs regularly in the dialogue: the Athenians state (V 97): ὥστε ἔξω καὶ τοῦ πλεόνων ἄρξαι καὶ τὸ ἀσφαλὲς ἡμῖν διὰ τὸ καταστραφῆναι ἂν παράσχοιτε¹¹³. This sentence aims at persuading the Melians that the security of the Athenians will be provided by their (the Melians') subjugation. The Melians reply by suggesting that it may as well be ensured by their neutrality. Security and expediency are thus connected¹¹⁴. Further, at V 107, the Athenians directly associate the συμφέρον with security: Οὐκουν

¹¹² “You who sit here adopt a still safer course”.

¹¹³ “So that, to say nothing of our enlarging our empire, you would afford us security by being subdued...”.

¹¹⁴ Thuc. V 98: Ἐν δ' ἐκείνῳ οὐ νομίζετε ἀσφάλειαν; δεῖ γὰρ αὖ καὶ ἐνταῦθα, ὥσπερ ὑμεῖς τῶν δίκαιων λόγων ἡμᾶς ἐκβιβάσαντες τῷ ὑμετέρῳ ξυμφόρῳ ὑπακούειν πείθετε, καὶ ἡμᾶς τὸ ἡμῖν χρήσιμον διδάσκοντας, εἰ τυγχάνει καὶ ὑμῖν τὸ αὐτὸ ξυμβαῖνον, πειρᾶσθαι πείθειν [“But do you not think there is security in the other course? For here also it is necessary, just as you force us to abandon all pleas of justice and seek to persuade us to give ear to what is to your own interests, that we, too, tell you what is to our advantage and try to persuade you to adopt it, if that happens to be to your advantage also”].

οἴεσθε τὸ συμφέρον μὲν μετ' ἀσφαλείας εἶναι, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον καὶ καλὸν μετὰ κινδύνου δρᾶσθαι¹¹⁵. This is expressed as a general truth, and is applied to the Melians' confidence in the Spartans' help. The Athenians are trying to show that the latter's συμφέρον lays in "staying safe", not in helping the Melians, as they believe. It is no accident that σωτηρία also denotes "way, means of safety"¹¹⁶. Finally (V 111), the Athenians fix the alternative as clearly as possible, "a choice is given to you of war or safety": αἰρέσεως πολέμου πέρι καὶ ἀσφαλείας. By explicit statements and implicit associations, we arrive at the deeper sense of τὸ συμφέρον, and it becomes clear why this idea actually has to be crucial here. The "interest" on which the Athenians (claim to) act, as well as the "interest" to which they try to persuade the Melians, their ultimate concern, is (mutual) security. Danger is also evoked regularly: by the Melians (V 90)¹¹⁷, which is addressed immediately by the Athenians (91)¹¹⁸, and recapitulated in their last pronouncement (V 111): οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐπὶ γε τὴν ἐν τοῖς αἰσχροῖς καὶ προύπτοις κινδύνοις πλεῖστα διαφθείρουσαν ἀνθρώπους αἰσχύνην τρέψεσθε¹¹⁹. Here we arrive at the counterpart of τὸ συμφέρον, posed by Aristotle: τὸ βλαβερὸν. Firstly, it is invoked expressly by the Athenians (V 95): Οὐ γὰρ τοσοῦτον ἡμᾶς βλάπτει ἢ ἔχθρα ὑμῶν ὅσον ἢ φιλία¹²⁰. They are concerned as to whether it is more detrimental to have the Melians as their enemies, or friends, in itself a central question for the decision. Detriment is also present in the Athenians' opinion of the harmful effect of hope in case of scarce resources (V 103): Ἐλπίς δὲ κινδύνῳ παραμύθιον οὔσα τοὺς μὲν ἀπὸ περιουσίας χρωμένους αὐτῇ, κἂν βλάβη, οὐ καθεῖλεν¹²¹. The weighing up of expedient (bringing safety) and inexpedient (harmful) aspects of future decisions takes place throughout the entire Dialogue. It perfectly fits the deliberative scheme of argumentation; it is concerned with both sides of the future decision: τὸ συμφέρον καὶ βλαβερὸν (Arist. *Rhet.* 1358b 20a–31). The last para-

¹¹⁵ "Do you not think, then, that self-interest goes hand in hand with security, while justice and honour are practised with danger...". ALBERTI in his edition prefers a different reading: κινδύνων, which makes little bearing on interpretation. JONES' version is a more abstract notion of τὸ κίνδυνον, whereas in the case of ALBERTI specified dangers are involved. Commentators in *HCTIV*: 176, draw attention to analogy with Thuc. II 63 f.

¹¹⁶ See LSJ, s.v. σωτηρία.

¹¹⁷ ἀλλὰ τῷ αἰεὶ ἐν κινδύνῳ γιγνομένῳ εἶναι τὰ εἰκότα καὶ δίκαια [...for him who is at the time in peril what is equitable should also be just...]; V 100: ἀπαλλαγῆναι τὴν παρακινδύνευσιν ποιοῦνται [...brave so great a risk].

¹¹⁸ καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτου ἡμῖν ἀφείσθω κινδυνεύεσθαι [...And as far as that is concerned, you must permit us to take the risk].

¹¹⁹ "For surely you will not take refuge in that feeling which most often brings men to ruin when they are confronted by dangers that are clearly foreseen and therefore disgraceful – the fear of such disgrace".

¹²⁰ "No; for your hostility does not injure us so much as your friendship...".

¹²¹ "Hope is indeed a solace in danger, and for those who have resources in abundance, though she may injure, she does not ruin them".

graph (V 111), which is the concluding appeal of the Athenians, is replete with the vocabulary of survival, safety, deliberation and good sense. Not only is σωτηρία, and the Melians' opportunity to choose, βουλευέσθαι, constantly emphasised¹²², the Athenians also appeal to their good sense: σωφρονέστερον γνώσεσθε. They had actually done the same earlier on (V 101): σωφρόνως βουλευήσθε, and even label the Melians' stand τὸ ἄφρον (V 105). Words etymologically linked with σώζω feature in the Dialogue nine times, and we should note that σώφρων is probably a derivative of the adjective σῶς ("healthy", "intact")¹²³. The interconnectedness of σώφρων, σωτηρία, ἀσφάλεια and the notion of τὸ συμφέρον thus becomes noticeable.

Such understanding of τὸ συμφέρον seems also to be valid in other parts of the *History*. In Thucydides' own commentary on the case of punishment of persons allegedly guilty of the profanation of the Herms (VI 60 f.) we read: ἄδηλον ἦν εἰ ἀδίκως ἐτετιμώρηντο, ἢ μέντοι ἄλλη πόλις ἐν τῷ παρόντι περιφανῶς ὠφέλητο¹²⁴. It is reasonable to infer from the immediate context that ὠφελεῖν means: "to contribute to the *polis*' safety, to avert peril". Thucydides evidently indicates that owing to their decision the Athenians avoided greater chaos in the *polis*, which would inevitably expose them to lethal blows from the outside. It is the only sense of the word consistent with the narrative section wherein it stands¹²⁵. In the cited statement the relation between justice and expediency is not antithetical; this also emerges from the very logic of the sentence¹²⁶. Moreover, from this logic it is evident that had the Athenians imprisoned or condemned those who were actually guilty, it would be just and ὠφέλιμον for themselves at the same time. Such a conclusion is to be drawn from another authorial passage of the *History* as well¹²⁷. We can find in the *History* further examples where speakers associate or identify

¹²² HORNBLLOWER (*Comm.* III: 240) accentuates the fact that word βουλευεῖν in its root (βου-) also indicates "prudence", "soundness", as well as σώφρων.

¹²³ FRISK 1960: 844.

¹²⁴ The sense of ὠφελεῖν here, in the immediate context, has surprisingly been of no interest to scholars and commentators, a curious fact when we bear in mind the infrequency of authorial voices in the *History*. Even HORNBLLOWER has overlooked it, stating that only within the Corcyrean episode does Thucydides reveal his personal outlook on ethics (HORNBLLOWER 1987: 185). In his *Commentary* HORNBLLOWER also leaves this unmarked.

¹²⁵ As a supporting argument we can recall the famous justification of Athenian ἀρχή placed in their mouths by Thucydides in I 75, 5: πᾶσι δὲ ἀνεπίφθονον τὰ ξυμφέροντα τῶν μεγίστων περί κινδύνων εὖ τίθεσθαι. In the next chapter (I 76) ὠφελία is linked to the concept of the security and self-preservation of the *polis* in exactly the same manner.

¹²⁶ It does not exclude either a possibility for the decision to be "simultaneously just and expedient" or the "unjust and inexpedient" version. The quality of being expedient is, in a sense, independent of the quality of being just or unjust.

¹²⁷ Thuc. III 82, 8: οὐ μέχρι τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τῇ πόλει ξυμφόρου προτιθέντες. Cf. MANUWALD 1979: 422.

συμφέρον with security¹²⁸. In Thucydides' speeches, as well as in his own words, acting in accordance with expediency is not conceived as an expression of immorality and a rejection of justice, but rather as the only likely behaviour of a community at serious risk¹²⁹.

Taking the above associations into account, it is not unreasonable to conclude that in the Dialogue the Athenians point to σωφροσύνη, the virtue of the σώφρων, who is able to properly recognise "the expedient and harmful", and whose main concern is with survival (σωτηρία). We can say that σωφροσύνη is the abstract idea that constantly "works in the background" in the Dialogue. This virtue is closely related to the idea of working to one's advantage, that is acting with the aim of maximum security and minimisation of harm¹³⁰. The Melians show deficiency of it, and their lack of σωφροσύνη can be considered an important theme of the Dialogue.

To sum up, we can see that on a general level Thucydides' speakers follow the patterns of three types of oratory, as is particularly visible in the difference in arguments used in the Cleon–Diodotus debate (deliberative) and the Plataean case (forensic). In the case of the former, expediency is much more heavily stressed; in the latter, justice (in a broad sense) is emphasised. Still, all speakers strive to persuade their audiences that what they propose has both qualities; it is at the same time right and expedient, or at least "not harmful" (in the case of the

¹²⁸ Thuc. III 37–40. In Cleon's speech, which is in a large part a commentary on the motives of the Mytileneans, the notions relating to safety appear with an intensity that cannot be accidental. It constitutes the sense of the "interest" in question, and the *Leitmotif* of this passage. Its counterpart, τὸ κίνδυνον, features in the speech (also in negative form) eleven times. The Mytileneans in their speech (III 9–15) attempt to justify their mutiny against Athens by emphasising the fact that it was an act aimed at self-preservation and optimal safety (Thuc. III 13, 1 f.). From their discourse emerges a suggestive picture of their fear of impending danger from the Athenians, and it is advocated as a sufficient reason to rebel against them. See Thuc. III 8 and 13. Fear seems to be the *Leitmotif* of this short speech, recurring five times at crucial moments (with a special emphasis at the beginning). In the Mytileneans' speech the concept of expediency is directly related to the considerations of fear and the need to guarantee self-preservation, and the antithesis βλάβη–ὠφέλεια is at work, as the Mytileneans affirm (III 14, 1 f.): "From our success shared expediency will come out, but a shared detriment, if, without you being persuaded, we fail". Cf. also a parallel passage of the *History*: VI 35, the speech of Hermocrates, where fearful and watchful behaviour is the most expedient. On this passage, see the excellent analysis by RENGAKOS 1984: 83–87, cf. MACLEOD 1978: 65. Analogous instances are found at: Thuc. II 40; VI 83; VI 87. Closest to this interpretation are SOLMSEN 1971: 406: "...the need for security being perhaps a gentler version of this principle [*scil.* the συμφέρον]", and DE ROMILLY 1992: 152: "the desire to be safe", although they only touched upon this meaning, among other connotations.

¹²⁹ PELLING 2012: 306, cf. p. 311: "...the concentration on one's city's or nation's interests can be laudable rather than uncomfortable, and one can overdo as well as underdo a preoccupation with 'justice'".

¹³⁰ RADEMAKER 2005: 203–208. It shall be regarded as a part of the couple expediency–security (συμφέρον–ἀσφάλεια). See e.g. Thuc. IV 18, 4: σωφρόνων δὲ ἀνδρῶν οἵτινες τὰγαθὰ ἐς ἀμφίβολον ἀσφαλῶς ἔθεντο. Particularly clear as to this connection are also Thuc. VI 11, 7; VI 87, 4; VII 63, 3.

Plataeans). There is tension, but no contradiction between these ideas. Aristotle and Thucydides' speakers seem to confirm that to argue from expediency is absolutely natural, even necessary, especially when the security of the *polis* is the main concern of the audience.

From the perspective of the *Rhetoric* the argumentation of the Athenians in the Melian Dialogue becomes clearer. Since, as I tried to demonstrate, the Dialogue is implicitly and explicitly couched in deliberative terms, and in other speeches Thucydides follows the rule of stressing certain arguments in particular types of oratory, we can assume that the focus on expediency in the Dialogue is exactly due to these rules. The Athenians' and the Melians' speeches are in agreement with the rhetorical precepts of deliberative oratory: they briefly touch upon the issue of justice, they discuss the expedient and the harmful, and they speak about what is possible. Furthermore, the *Rhetoric* shows that in the Dialogue the Athenians, by insisting on talking chiefly about expediency, do not oppose traditional morality in any sense, since τὸ συμφέρον is not only the accepted, but also the expected theme of every debate, particularly when the two sides do not have any formal agreement to refer to. Finally, τὸ συμφέρον from the Dialogue cannot be called an "immoral" category, or as set in direct opposition to justice, as it is directly linked to the σωτηρία of the *polis*. The safety of one's city is rather to be considered by the speakers as the highest good. We may accept such reasoning or not, but in the *world of the text*¹³¹ of the *History* it is an obvious thing – in the face of war, mortal danger and constant threat, the security and survival, the σωτηρία from the Melian Dialogue is the fundamental point of reference in political deliberation. Moreover, the focus on the survival of one's *polis* can hardly be considered immoral, despite the fact that it is sometimes at variance with previous agreements and obligations. The interest, and particularly the security of one's *polis* certainly exercised much emotive power in Greek thought, probably too much for modern readers to find arguments from expediency acceptable. I agree on this point with PELLING, who has suggested that "[p]erhaps we should start from the other end, and assume that 'expediency' is and should be the core of political arguments, not out of cynical, neo-conservative-before-its-time 'realism' but because of the moral claim that the city has on its citizens"¹³². In other words, to exclude τὸ συμφέρον from the field of ethics and morality is a modern

¹³¹ I prefer to seek the sense of the text or world of the text, rather than the "concept" or "attitude" of any ancient author. The intentions or goals of ancient authors are often obscure and nearly impossible to determine; the only thing that is accessible is *the text and its sense*. Scholarly understanding does not apply to the author and his circumstances. It is oriented towards the world-image opened by the reference of the text in question. The notion of *monde du texte* has been introduced by RICOEUR 1985: 228–263. See also RICOEUR's essays on the relations between history and hermeneutics: 1976; 2000; 2003.

¹³² PELLING 2012: 306.

invention¹³³, which has unfortunately dominated our interpretations of the Melian Dialogue, and distorted our understanding of other Thucydidean speeches.

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¹³³ See the revealing essay of MORRIS 2008: 15–30.

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THEBES AS THE “ANTI-ATHENS”?
SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE CITY’S TRAGIC FUNCTIONS

by

ITA HILTON

ABSTRACT: This article responds to the structuralist school of thought which posits the city of Thebes in Greek tragedy as negatively contrasted with the home city-state Athens. The author emphasises the mutability and diversity of Thebes’ depiction in the genre and explores the limitations of a schematic reading of tragic settings.

The staging in Attic tragedy of Thebes as *topos* for the most extreme of human experience – infanticide, incest, insanity, to name but a few examples – has given rise to a perception of the city as an anti-type of Athens which functions as an “other” place, a dysfunctional locale where those experiences may be explored at a comfortable distance from the home city-state where the plays were staged¹. The idealised city of Athens which prided itself on the political loyalty of its citizens and the advanced nature of its laws, with which we are familiar from the Funeral Oration² and which is in tragedy reflected most strongly in the suppliant plays, is contrasted implicitly and explicitly with its “shadow self”³ in Thebes as a place of civic discord, violence and transgression⁴. Thus the displacement to the “other” setting of the “irreconcilable, the inexpiable, and the unredeemable” negates any risk to Athens’ (self-) image⁵.

However, this schema implies a monolithic approach to tragic drama which is incompatible with the nuanced and shifting dramatic representations of Thebes (and Athens) across the genre. It is certainly true that the troubled history

¹ The seminal discussion is ZEITLIN 1990.

² The speech of Pericles at Thuc. II 35–46 is of course the most well-known example. On the funeral oration in general, see LORAUX 1986.

³ ZEITLIN 1990: 144.

⁴ See also VIDAL-NAQUET in VERNANT, VIDAL-NAQUET 1988: 334–338. His argument rests largely on ZEITLIN’s schema of Thebes vs. Athens.

⁵ ZEITLIN 1990: 144 f.

of mythical Thebes – particularly, of course, the Oedipus legend, that Theban myth *par excellence* – provided ample material for the epic poets and other early Greek writers⁶. This literary heritage was naturally exploited by the fifth-century tragedians in their exploration and re-shaping of the city's legends, working as they were within what was an already well-mined mythical repertoire and one by which they were conditioned to a significant extent. This innovation in the use of ancient myth was also propagated by the agonistic nature of tragic performance itself: originality and variety were essential to the individual poets' professional success. This is borne out on the tragic stage: the dramatic representations of Thebes and its legends vary considerably both across the genre and in the works of the individual tragedians.

This diversity and fluidity in Thebes' mythical representations is central to the fallibility of the "anti-Athens" thesis. The city cannot be reduced to a single "type" or model, and the audience is not invited to associate Thebes with specific and consistent patterns or themes, such as, for instance, intra-familial killings, or madness. This is true of both the tragic and pre-tragic genres. Homer indeed mentions the Labdacids, but he also alludes to other Theban myths which were to be explored on the fifth-century tragic stage – to Antiope, her twin sons, and to Alceme, mother of Heracles⁷. So too do Hesiod and Pindar⁸. The recurrence of these themes indicates their popularity and endurance within the epic and post-epic literary cultures. In tragedy, there is no denying the prominence of the Oedipus myth – we have the "Theban" plays of Sophocles, Aeschylus' *Seven against Thebes*, and the late *Phoenissae* of Euripides, as well as the related fragments; and indeed it is scarcely unlikely, given the evident popularity of the myth, that there were other plays written on the same theme which are now lost. Yet the extant material also provides many other variations on Theban themes: in *Phoenissae*, for instance, Euripides breaks with tradition in presenting a double civic legend which combines the well-known assault on Thebes by the Argive warriors with the city's troubled origins and complex history. The poet was to return to a different branch of the autochthonic legend a few years later in *Bacchae*. The same dramatist's *Heracles* concerns a different set of characters and events altogether; and his *Suppliants* – like the late *Oedipus at Colonus* of Sophocles – features a non-Theban setting but remains strongly focused on the city. Then there are the fragments – of Euripides' *Antiope*, or Sophocles' *Niobe*. Niobe's husband Amphion had provided inspiration for Aeschylus in a play of the same name. Sophocles himself had written an *Amphitryon*; Aeschylus wrote a Pentheus trilogy; and so it goes on. Again, there is no reason to exclude the possibility that

⁶ See e.g. Hes. *Op.* 161–163; Hom. *Il.* IV 378 and 406; *Od.* XI 271–280; Stesichorus' *Thebaid*, and in the fragments of the Theban epic cycle, frs. 2–3 of both the *Oedipodea* and the *Thebaid*.

⁷ Cf. *Od.* XI 260–270.

⁸ See Hes. *Th.* 975–978; and Pind. *Isth.* 7, 1–15.

many and various other plays on Theban subjects were written and performed, but which are no longer extant. Our perspective on Thebes as dramatic entity is irrevocably distorted by the accident of survival, which threatens to impose a reductive neatness on a set of phenomena which were no doubt a great deal more complex than the extant material suggests.

This diversity within the Theban mythical repertoire is matched by the diversity of the city’s very individual depictions in tragedy. Varying degrees of emphasis are placed on the city as physical or geographical “place”; so, for instance, Aeschylus in *Seven against Thebes* creates a consistent and highly realistic sense of the city as under immediate threat from the encroaching Argive army. The emphasis in the Parodos on what the Chorus can see and hear of the warriors outside the city⁹ maintains a high level of tension and anticipation of the final disaster. This is increased in Eteocles’ subsequent methodical organization of the defence, and reaches its peak at his conclusion: seven warriors at the city’s seven gates, with himself seventh and last¹⁰. The construction of the central part of the play – this defence strategy – around Thebes’ most recognizable landmarks sustains the audience’s impression of the city as an actual physical location surrounded and threatened from all angles: the dramatic effect also, of course, lends some irony to our perception that the real threat to the city in fact comes from within, in the *dusboulia* of Eteocles himself, who consciously and deliberately chooses to confront his brother in battle. Yet such focus on the city as physical entity is vastly reduced in a play such as *Oedipus Tyrannos*, which concentrates instead on the systematic and torturous process of (self-) discovery made by the lead character; aside from the thematic significance of the *miasma* which beleaguers the city as a result of Laius’ killing, Thebes itself does not feature heavily in the play. Then if we return to *Phoenissae* we find that this drama’s extended historical perspective allows for the development of the city’s physical identity in a manner unsuited to, and therefore not found in, the more concentrated and focused dramatic pace of, for example, *Antigone*. The latter play in its linear progression from the conference between Antigone and Ismene, the burial by the former of their brother Polynices, the confrontation between Antigone and Creon and her condemnation to death before Creon’s belated realization of his ill judgement, maintains a swiftness and intensity in the development of events which does not allow for the significant development of Thebes as an “actual” or recognizable place. *Phoenissae*, on the other hand, reveals an unusual level of interest

⁹ See esp. 78–85; 149–157: the whirling dust, the sounds of the horses’ hooves; the rattling and creaking of the enemies’ chariots.

¹⁰ ἐμοὶ σὺν ἐβδόμῳ, 283. His insistence on his own position at the seventh gate at an early point in the play heightens the audience’s expectation of the discovery that Eteocles’ own brother will confront him in direct combat. It also, of course, underlines Eteocles’ autonomous decision to fight, undermining his own conviction later in the play that it is the family curse alone which propels him to battle (see esp. 689–691; 709–711; 719).

in the characters' movements within and beyond the city (Antigone on the roof in the early *teichoskopia* scene, Polynices' arrival in Thebes, Menoikeus' exit to commit suicide on the spot of the city's foundation, the brothers' departures to the battlefield, followed by their mother and sister, Oedipus' late entry to the stage, and finally his departure with Antigone into exile) which corresponds with the dramatist's sustained focus on the city as individualized *topos* which is central to the thematic interest of the play's two inter-dependent myths of Theban autochthony and the Argive assault on the city¹¹. Furthermore, the individual dramatists did not present the same Thebes in each of their plays: the city in *Heracles*, for instance, is not the Thebes of *Bacchae*, which extends from that city's territory to the wilds of Mount Cithaeron in its exploration of Dionysiac cult and the contrast between civilization and wildness, madness and sanity. Thematic variety also abounds both across the genre and in individual plays: the interaction of men and women, for instance, and the conflicting concerns of *polis* and *oikos*, occupy a far more prominent position in *Seven against Thebes* than in a drama such as *Oedipus Tyrannos*, which, in turn, lacks the heavy political emphasis of *Antigone*.

The dangers of reductivism also caution against the isolation of Thebes as *the* "anti-Athens". It is true that tragedy does tend to avoid associating the negative with Athens, and that it often displaces to an "other" setting questions and problems relatable to the home *polis* yet which can be explored at a safe distance from it. Of course, the concept of an "other" place within the inherently "other" world that is heroic-age myth on the fifth-century tragic stage may be seen as problematic; but tragedy gains a further sense of dislocation – and thus greater distance – through the hybrid settings of the plays, neither fully in the world of the epic poems nor in that of contemporary reality. This is especially relevant to a play such as Aeschylus' *Eumenides*, which is partially set in Athens, and in which there is a clear tension between the "heroic vagueness"¹² of the play's mythical setting and its evident relatability to contemporary experience in developments on the Areopagus, the democratic reforms of 462, and to potential political instability in the home city-state. The chronological disjunction and mythical colouring allow the tragic poet to explore at a more comfortable distance experiences which were real-life concerns.

Yet mostly tragedy sought to implement an added dimension of comfortable distance in the relocation of political concerns relevant in contemporary

¹¹ See RAWSON 1970 for a discussion of the importance of the Theban land in the play. Caution must however be applied to her view that the conflict between "family and fatherland" is the "main preoccupation" (p. 112) of a drama which encompasses a variety of wide-reaching themes.

¹² See EASTERLING 1997: 26 on the representation of political institutions in this play in such a way as to preclude a simple correspondence between dramatic depiction and contemporary events or practice.

experience to a *non*-Athenian setting. The tragedians evidently exploited the centrality of many “other” places in the mythical repertoire within which they worked: it is clear that any non-Athenian setting may function as an “other” *topos*, be it Greek (Argos, Sparta, Corinth), or non-Greek (Troy, Thrace, Persian Susa). It is also important that, as with Thebes, all of these locations will not reveal a sustained and recognizable pattern of topographical or thematic characteristics: the Argos of Aeschylus’ *Suppliants*, for instance, is in many ways significantly different from that found in the same poet’s *Agamemnon* and *Choephoroi*, which equally do not reveal the same political – and in particular, democratic – emphasis of the earlier play. Thus Argos, as a consistently varied and varying dramatic entity, cannot be said to function as a “middle-term” between Thebes and Athens, as has been suggested¹³, since it performs widely differing functions across the genre. This essentially structuralist or semiotic reading of tragic geography again highlights the limitations of the “anti-Athens” thesis, since it fails to take into account, or to allow room for, the functional diversity of the “other” places. Moreover, we must also bear in mind that the examination of the “self” (i.e. Athens) through the agency of the “other” extends beyond the question of physical location and distance. Thebes, Argos, or any other tragic location serves as only one aspect of the home city’s perennial concern with its own image. The Athenian – and, by extension, Greek – identity is constructed upon a series of polarities between “self” and other: man versus god, male versus female, or Greek versus barbarian.

Closer examination exposes the tensions inherent in any of these schemas. Let us take the example of race and ethnicity; that is, Greek versus non-Greek. The *Persians* of Aeschylus creates a certain affinity between two ostensibly so different peoples in presenting the Persians not only as everything that the Athenians are not – but specifically, as everything that the Athenians strove not to be, and in turn, everything that they *could* be. Of particular importance for the breakdown of the “Greek versus barbarian” antithesis is the play’s theological framework, which is constructed upon the traditionally Greek precepts of surfeit, *koros*, insolence, *hubris*, and retribution, *nemesis*. The articulation of the play’s ethical and theological design through the part of the dead Persian king Darius suggests the ease with which the Greeks were able to transfer to “other” cultures the traditional Hellenic conception of religion. The play suggests in the Persians’ downfall and suffering a certain sympathy for the “barbarians” and an approach to human vulnerability (ultimately Homeric in inspiration) which elides the Greco-barbarian division and locates the root causes of self-destruction not in ethnicity but in human nature, individual and collective. Of course, that is not to preclude an element of triumphalism in the downfall of Athens’ enemies; but the play does reveal a balance between similarity and difference. Self and other are

¹³ ZEITLIN 1990: 146 f.

not mutually exclusive. The creation of this effect in an “other” territory – a non-Greek one for good measure – and through an ostensibly alien people cushions its impact on the sensibilities of a fifth-century Athenian audience, which is invited to perceive the existence of the self in the other, and *vice versa*¹⁴.

This question of audience perception reminds us that the ostensible dichotomy between Athens and any example of the “other” must be placed within its contemporary (political) context. The universal scope of tragic themes and the plays’ fundamentally Homeric approach to human nature, *to anthropinon*, did not preclude the fact that as a genre created and maintained by the Athenians, tragedy was rooted in the cultural perceptions and assumptions of its age. This would inevitably have shaped the manner in which a contemporary audience viewed the plays, and also reminds a modern audience that its response to those same dramas would naturally be different¹⁵. These “perceptual filters”¹⁶ conditioned to a significant extent the collective response¹⁷ of a contemporary audience which had lived through the political developments which inform the plays to a greater or lesser extent, and which also to a significant degree shared the same value system. Yet it is also the case that (contemporary) audience perception could be controlled (at least to some extent) by the playwright himself to suit an individual artistic purpose and/or in conformity with the limitations of the genre, which precluded a straightforward correspondence between dramatic representation and contemporary experience. To quote from the highly influential work of SOURVINOU-INWOOD, the tragedian employed “zooming” and “distancing” devices which encouraged the audience to reflect on the relation between the dramatic events and their own experiences (and perhaps in doing so to challenge their own assumptions)¹⁸, or which, conversely, created a sense of detachment from those events (and thus protected the contemporary audience from overly close associations which could potentially prove uncomfortable). If we look again at *Persians*, we can see how such a distancing effect is achieved through, for instance, the sustained contrast between Persian battle manoeuvres at night (with its connotation of stealth and slyness) and Greek

¹⁴ See further the discussion of PELLING 1997b.

¹⁵ See the classic argument (in specific relation to *Antigone*) of SOURVINOU-INWOOD 1989.

¹⁶ SOURVINOU-INWOOD 1989: 134.

¹⁷ This is not to preclude the possibility of a co-existent individual or personal response: tragedy provided a shared opportunity for the audience to reflect on common social and political questions and concerns, but it may also provoke a personal or emotional response which is not conditioned by the dramatic presentation *per se* but by the individual’s own perception of and response to that presentation. The audience response was not uniform.

¹⁸ This is not to suggest that tragedy inclines to subversion, as argued by, e.g., GOLDHILL 1990; rather, that the genre is an inherently exploratory and questioning one, especially in relation to political matters. This will be important to our discussion below of Eur.’s *Suppliants* and the *OC*.

movements during the day (implying openness and fair play)¹⁹. There are other ways in which Aeschylus draws a distinction between the two peoples, with the associated implication that the Greeks’ conduct is superior: the Persians exhibit disorderliness and chaos (e.g. 480 f.); the Greeks are methodical and considered (e.g. 374–376). Then of course we note reference to the typically luxurious material tastes of the Persians, with its connotations of self-indulgence, or the equally extravagant manner of their grieving their catastrophic losses at Salamis (e.g. 541–545; 834–836): all, of course, in direct contradistinction to the Greek ideal of moderation, *sōphrosune*²⁰. And yet the text also reminds the contemporary Athenian audience of the overriding will of the gods to which Greek and Persian alike are subject: it was a *daimōn*²¹, says the Messenger, which tipped the scale of battle and caused disaster to the Persians, not a deficiency in their numbers of ships; it was the gods who saved Athens (345–347). Xerxes had given instructions to his fleet (361 ff.), and although the implication of the Persians’ intellectual inferiority to the Greeks is present in the text²², it is also clear that the gods are in control, and the issue of battle is already determined: Xerxes was not to know what the gods intended, τὸ μέλλον ἐκ θεῶν (373). In Darius’ later observation on the general human condition of suffering and adversity²³ there lies a Homeric universality which implies, as the *Iliad* does, that in their ultimate fragility there is no fundamental distinction between Greek and non-Greek. Darius’ cautionary advice to the Persians against the dangers of overweening pride, the ineluctable will of Zeus and the necessity of *sōphrosune*²⁴ could remind a contemporary audience that it too was bound by those same moral and ethical conditions; and that it too was not invulnerable to the gods’ power, to chance, to human error. It is not such a far leap to imagine that the catastrophe which destroyed the Persian forces could occur at home, in Athens.

We now turn back to Thebes. In Euripides’ *Suppliants*, it would seem clear that at face value the city is persistently and negatively contrasted with Athens; and to be sure, the play’s production at around the time of the battle of Delium in 424²⁵ makes some degree of anti-Thebes bias within it plausible at a particularly low point in Athenian–Theban relations (and a readiness on Euripides’

¹⁹ See PELLING 1997b: 2–6.

²⁰ For a general study of *sōphrosune* in Greek literature, see NORTH 1966.

²¹ Note also Darius’ later comment at 725: it was a *daimōn* which impaired Xerxes’ judgement.

²² Xerxes failed to comprehend the *dolos* employed by the unidentified Greek, which lured the Persian fleet out into the Straits of Salamis, just as he was unaware of the gods’ grudge against his people: οὐ ξυνεῖς δόλον/ Ἕλληνας ἀνδρὸς οὐδὲ τὸν θεῶν φθόνον (361 f.).

²³ ἀνθρώπεια δ’ ἄν τοι πῆματ’ ἄν τύχοι, “human suffering is the lot of mortals” (706). (All translations of Greek texts in this paper are my own.)

²⁴ See esp. 820 ff.

²⁵ Thuc. IV 97. The general consensus is that the play post-dates Delium; see COLLARD 1975: 8 f.

part to exploit this), which were troubled throughout the second half of the fifth century²⁶. The intrusion into the play of the contemporary Athenian spirit towards Thebes is supported by the drama's concern with themes doubtlessly pressing in contemporary experience – particularly those of religion in war-time, the politics of lamentation, and the burial of the dead. Yet, as in the presentation of the defeated nation in *Persians*, clear tensions are revealed in the contrast drawn between Athens and Thebes. This contrast has of course a political aspect in the play's examination of democracy *vis-à-vis* autocracy. The distinction is immediately apparent in the violent heartlessness of the Theban herald as poised against the rationality and clemency of the Athenian king Theseus in his concession to the Argives' burial. But the championing by Theseus of the democratic cause is tempered by the underlying suggestion of a certain disjunction between the constitution in ideology and in practice. It is important that the play creates this effect without any simple tendency towards subversion; and equally important that in a contemporary context Theseus' concern with personal and political expediency (see 339 ff.) would not necessarily impact negatively on his and thus by proxy Athenian image: he does ultimately relent and appeal to the people. But at the same time, his initial imperviousness to Adrastus' pleas²⁷ and his persuasion of the people by means of the same rhetorical aptitude against which he had inveighed in the Theban herald²⁸ suggest not so much an outright alignment of democratic and autocratic rule – although some blurring of this antithesis perhaps cannot be wholly denied²⁹ – as a more nuanced and subtle

²⁶ During the Peloponnesian War the Thebans were firm allies of Sparta, which eventually in 427 helped them to defeat Plataea, which had been supported by Athens during Thebes' previous attempts to take the state. The battle of Delium in 424 saw Thebes wreak destruction on the Athenian forces.

²⁷ No sympathy is evident in his long harangue at 195–249; his hard-heartedness is highlighted by the deferential manner of Adrastus throughout the exchange, even and especially after Theseus' refusal, as well as the Chorus' gentle support of the former's position (see 193 f.; 250–252; 263 ff.). We are also reminded of Adrastus' own words at 253–256: he came not for judgement or punishment, ἀλλ' ὡς ὀναίμην, “so that I might be helped” (256).

²⁸ Theseus will win over the people, he says, λόγοισι πείθων, “persuading [them] with words” (347); his mind is already made up: δόξει δ' ἐμοῦ θέλοντος, “and my wish will ensure it” (350); but he needs to at least make a pretence of consulting the city at large, in keeping with its own principle of enjoying an “equal vote” (ἰσόψηφον πόλιν, 353), a privilege Theseus himself had bestowed. This will also make the people “better disposed”, εὐμενέστερον (351). Yet soon afterwards he will criticize the eloquence of the Theban herald: κομψός γ' ὁ κήρυξ καὶ παρεργάτης λόγων, “the herald is a clever chap and skilled with words” (426). The herald had himself hinted at Theseus' rhetorical manipulation of the people in contrasting it with the practices of autocratic Thebes, where οὐδ' ἔστιν αὐτήν [scil. Thebes] ὅστις ἐκχαυνῶν λόγοις / πρὸς κέρδος ἴδιον ἄλλοτ' ἄλλοσε στρέφει, / τὸ δ' αὐτίχ' ἠδὺς καὶ διδοὺς πολλήν χάριν, / ἑσαῦθις ἔβλαψ', “no one there puffs it [scil. Thebes] up with words, and for his own gain manipulates it every which way” (412–415). On Theseus' own rhetorical adeptness, see COLLARD 1975, esp. on 513–563.

²⁹ This is a concern explicitly mentioned in Pericles' famous words at Thuc. II 63, 2: ὡς τυραννίδα γὰρ ἦδη ἔχετε αὐτήν, ἣν λαβεῖν μὲν ἄδικον δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἀφεῖναι δὲ ἐπικίνδυνον, “... ”

exposure of contemporary recognition of the difficulties of making democracy work in practice. It is interesting that the play’s setting in Eleusis, here part of Athenian territory, allows for some element of distance from contemporary experience – but significantly less so than would be accorded were the play set over the borders in Boeotia, in Thebes itself. This implies the pressing nature of contemporary political concerns, emphasized to the audience by their exploration in a setting which might seem uncomfortably close to home. Yet that is not to say that civic ideology is directly challenged or contradicted. It is more that the superiority of Athenian democracy is established in a more questioning and complex manner. The historical background to the play implies that Thebes *is* deliberately selected as negative *exemplum* of the autocratic state – but there may also be a tension between Thebes’ dramatic role as reflective of contemporary Athenian attitudes towards the city, and its function in highlighting autocracy-related problems in general. In turn, these problems may or equally may not be problems specifically of *Theban* autocracy.

This is an interesting concern of *Oedipus at Colonus*. At 919 f. Theseus says to Creon: “It is not Thebes which has educated you to be evil; the city does not like to nurture unjust men” (ἄνδρας ἐκδικούς). This implies the separability of the behaviour of (some) Thebans from the Theban identity in general, especially as perceived by non-Thebans. It might also suggest a fault in autocracy as a constitution in its potential fostering of negative behaviour, and thus also suggest that it is the constitution at large (rather than the specific identity of the character representing it in this play) which is contrasted with Athens and Athenian democracy. The distinction between Thebes and the actions of its representative is confirmed in Theseus’ assertion that the city at large would not approve of Creon’s behaviour³⁰ and that that behaviour brings undeserved shame on Thebes³¹. The concession in this play to Thebes’ potential for good also reveals a certain disjunction between contemporary historical experience and dramatic theme. There is an illuminating contrast here with a play such as Euripides’ *Suppliants*; for although it may be difficult to pinpoint the exact nature of Athenian–Theban relations at the time of the Sophoclean play’s production, it is clear that they had not improved significantly since the staging of the

that it [*scil.* the city of Athens] is a tyranny which you now possess, which it was unjust to take command of, but which would be dangerous to let go of”. See also Aristophanes, *Knights* 1111–1114: ὦ Δῆμος καλήν γ’ ἔχεις/ ἀρχήν, ὅτε πάντες ἄνθρωποι/ δεδίασί σ’ ὥσπερ/ ἄνδρα τύραννον, “Demos, it is a fine rule you have, which everyone fears as they do a despot”.

³⁰ οὐδ’ ἂν σ’ ἐπαινέσειαν [*scil.* Thebes], εἰ πῦθοίατο/ συλῶντα τὰμὰ καὶ τὰ τῶν θεῶν, βία/ ἄγοντα φωτῶν ἀθλίων ἰκτήρια, “It [*scil.* Thebes] would not praise you, if it knew that you were forcibly driving off its wretched suppliants, and thus despoiling me and the gods” (921–923).

³¹ οὐ δ’ ἀξίαν οὐκ οὔσαν αἰσχύνεις πόλιν/ τὴν αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ, “But you are bringing shame on a city – your own city – which it does not deserve” (929 f.).

Euripidean play two decades earlier³². This respect for Thebes from a sympathetic character in a play which does present on one level, as *Suppliants* does, a favourable portrayal of the home city and its representatives as against their flawed and misguided Theban adversaries, ought not to puzzle the critic. Rather, it reveals the flexibility of the treatment (by the genre and individual authors) of this – as so many – aspects of the fictive (and through it the real) world, and in addition the fallibility of assuming a straightforward correspondence between contemporary experience and dramatic representation³³. Further, there is also the suggestion that Thebes at large is not beyond redemption. In implying that Creon's ill-counsel, *dusboulia*, is a personal fault³⁴ – even if it is also a fault of the constitution he represents – rather than a generic tendency of the Thebans, Theseus implies the city's potential for positive action.

Further tensions are revealed in the ostensible distinction between the two *po-leis*. Theseus in his generous evaluation of Creon's behaviour displays no naive trust in his antagonist³⁵, since this is the same man who is also quick to suspect an Athenian conspiracy with Creon (1028–1033)³⁶. Theseus' suspicion cannot have failed to bear some contemporary resonance when one considers the events of 411³⁷, with the oligarchic revolution and the culture of mistrust which pervaded Athens. This not only cautions against too idealized a view of Athens' presentation in the play, but may also point to the fragility of the *polis* in general in its vulnerability to internal threat – to destruction at the hands of its own inhabitants. When one considers also Theseus' earlier words to Creon in exonerating Thebes from its ruler's misjudgement, this may also hint at the possibility that what is happening at Thebes could happen to any city, Athens included. Again, as in *Persians*, an “other” place and an “other” people are used to expose indirectly the vulnerability of the “self”. There is no need to overstate this and view Thebes as the – or even a – negative paradigm from which an idealized Athens is to learn a cautionary lesson. If we take the Athens of the *Colonus* as the pre-war city and the Thebes as what war-time Athens could become without due care³⁸,

³² Following Athens' defeat in the war Thebes would in 404 propose the utter annihilation of the city, although in the following year it covertly supported the restoration of Athenian democracy in order to establish a supportive force against Sparta, from which Thebes had become detached at the end of the war.

³³ See also 606, where Theseus seems surprised at the possibility of enmity between the two cities: καὶ πῶς γένοιτ' ἄν τὰ μὲν κάκεινων πικρά; “But why should there be enmity between them and me?”.

³⁴ See 930 f., where Theseus rather sympathetically ascribes Creon's attitude to his old age.

³⁵ Thus ZEITLIN 1990: 167 in an attempt to explain Theseus' apparent sympathy for the Theban cause.

³⁶ As pointed out by EASTERLING 1989: 14.

³⁷ See also JEBB's (1928) n. on *OC* 1028.

³⁸ So BLUNDELL 1993: 304–306.

this comes dangerously close to allegory, and implies a one-dimensional subjectivity scarcely consistent with the systemic vagueness which EASTERLING has plausibly identified as being at the heart of tragedy’s success as a communicative medium³⁹. Instead, plays such as the *Colonus* or *Suppliants* engage in a civic discourse which exposes the nuances and tensions inherent in the Athens–Thebes antithesis and encourages the audience to consider political problems and questions which may be applicable to the power structures of any *polis*, as well as – if not necessarily or exclusively – to Thebes or Athens in particular.

This is important to our appreciation of recent responses to the “anti-Athens” school of thought. The dissociation in *Oedipus at Colonus* of Creon’s actions from Thebes and the Theban identity may lead to a conception of the city as a generic *polis* exploited in tragedy as convenient “other” territory for the safe exploration of political topics which may be pertinent to any city, including (and perhaps especially) Athens. It is true that in the broadest terms Thebes can be used thus, and true also that events at Thebes invite reflection on the problems and very nature of political life as an abstract whole. But – as we noted earlier – not only may any non-Athenian *topos* perform this function, the thesis that Thebes can function as any “other” *polis* also implies a view of tragedy’s political discourse as entirely generic, i.e. non-Athenian. Tragedy was, indeed, exported to other parts of Greece – although in fact during the fifth century it may have been the tragedians rather than tragedy which were exported⁴⁰. However, tragedy’s rooting in and centrality to the civic Dionysia equally presuppose a strong (though not necessarily exclusive) element of Athenocentrism. There is no reason to preclude the co-existence in tragedy of both general and specifically Athenian socio-political issues. Scholarly debate in recent years has tended to impose monolithic views of the genre as either political⁴¹ (in the sense that it engages with contemporary politics) or non-political (i.e. that tragedy functions purely as an art form which is entirely separable from its contemporary context)⁴². Equally polarized distinctions have been made between tragedy as overtly democratic⁴³ (as it was a genre which flourished in the developing democracy of classical Athens) or, conversely, as bearing no significant relation to that political institution⁴⁴. But this inclination to “label” the genre as a whole

³⁹ See EASTERLING 1997 (esp. pp. 24–26).

⁴⁰ There is not a great deal of evidence for the performance in the fifth century of Athenian plays outside Athens. See e.g. PICKARD-CAMBRIDGE 1968: 42–56 and part VII; WILSON 2000 (esp. pp. 279–302 and 309 f.); cf. also TAPLIN 1993 (esp. ch. 3).

⁴¹ See e.g. the essays of LONGO (1990) and WINKLER (1990); cf. also SEAFORD 1994.

⁴² See e.g. GRIFFIN 1998.

⁴³ See e.g. GOLDHILL 2000.

⁴⁴ See RHODES 2003, a response to GOLDHILL 2000; or the still more limiting view of CROALLY 1994: 3.

again results in a restrictiveness which fails to take into account the flexibility and multi-faceted nature of the plays, which would best be appreciated as individual works. The variety and fluidity of the dramas' political emphases – again, both on the generic and individual authorial levels – presuppose an interest in the political, the democratic, the Athenian, or the non-Athenian.

This variability is well illustrated in a play such as *Antigone*, that most political of “Theban” dramas. The play's concern with questions such as the burial of the dead in war-time and the conflict between state and individual (and by extension between *polis* and *oikos*) may be related to the *polis* as an abstract; those same issues (*inter alia*) may, as we saw earlier in relation to Euripides' *Suppliants*, also be relevant to the Athenian (democratic) *polis* in particular⁴⁵. Yet that is not to preclude their centrality to and rooting in the Theban and Labdacid myth on which the drama is based. *Antigone* taken as a whole may be viewed as at once, and to differing degrees, political, Athenian and “Theban”. This brings us back to the fallibility of the polarization between Thebes and Athens. It also reminds us of the individuality of Theban myth, which demands its own place in “political” appreciations of this play and indeed of “Theban” plays in general. This has been overlooked in recent responses to the “anti-Athens” school of thought. EASTERLING, for instance, in arguing against the Thebes versus Athens dichotomy relies heavily on the dissociation of the Theban identity from the political concerns of “Theban” plays. Thus of *Antigone* she writes that the heroine's arguments concerning divine and civic law are not “questions that have a special, specifically Theban setting”, just as Creon's edict regarding Polynices' burial implies the potential of any leader to make the wrong decision⁴⁶. Yet EASTERLING's emphasis on the suppression, as she sees it, of Thebes both in name and in physical feature in the play requires some qualification. Firstly, the implication that Thebes, as Greek city, cannot bear too close an association with serious or even insoluble religious and political problems⁴⁷, needs to be approached with some caution, since we cannot take it for granted that the Athenians would necessarily have refrained from presenting Thebes in a negative light on the tragic stage – or even from destroying it completely; after all, Athens had long experienced a troubled relationship with the city⁴⁸. A reading such as EASTERLING's seeks to impose a particular conception of panhellenism which overlooks the element

⁴⁵ See again SOURVINOU-INWOOD 1989.

⁴⁶ EASTERLING 2005: 62. It is worth noting, however, that the legal question of burial in the play corresponds in some respects to Athenian law on the subject; so, as Thebes becomes a type of hybrid in legal/ethical terms between the two cities, nor either can Athens be easily dismissed from the equation. On burial law at Athens in relation to treason, cf. MACDOWELL 1978: 176–178 and 255 f. See also GRIFFITH 1999: 5–8 and 29–33.

⁴⁷ EASTERLING 2005: 57 f. and n. 43; and 62 with n.54.

⁴⁸ A further point is equally important: the mythical heritage of the Athenians was a greater influence on the tragic poets than any common anxiety regarding the unpropitious dramatic treatment

of conflict and competition of which the Greeks were acutely aware, and which was especially prominent in the most overtly “panhellenic” locales or contexts such as Olympia or Delphi. EASTERLING’s emphasis on the importance of Theban topography, the separation of which from the political problems of *Antigone* forms the basis of her argument for Thebes as generic *polis*, may cause difficulty. We noted earlier the varying focus on the city’s geography from play to play; this fluidity hampers to a significant extent the use of Thebes’ physical features as a hermeneutic base for a general argument⁴⁹. EASTERLING’s thesis errs in countering the opposing view with one equally monolithic: she answers ZEITLIN in ZEITLIN’s own terms in offering a reading which is equally inflexible.

It is further important that for all that Thebes may function as a useful non-Athenian locale for the exploration and questioning of civic ideology and political problems, it is not to be grouped anonymously with Argos, or Susa, as merely *any polis* – just as Argos or Susa do not themselves solely fulfil this function. For equally, as we noted earlier, Thebes does bear an individual and widely varying political identity across the tragic genre. The city’s history and associated problems can be, and are, presented as specifically and uniquely Theban. Further, we may also say that this duality in the city’s dramatic identity highlights the complementary nature of the Theban role as “any” *polis* and as individual and individualized *topos*: the city may be seen as an ideal setting for general political problems because its troubled past and present breed such fertile ground for them. For, after all, Thebes *is* different; and the tragedians continually return to it. In the late *Phoenissae*, for instance, the two separable yet closely interdependent aspects of the city’s dramatic function(s) – as mythical Thebes with its own specific problems and as more anonymous or flexible political entity – co-exist in a finely-balanced relationship. Euripides indulges in the city’s wealth of myth by uniting the autochthonic and Labdacid legends in a massive Theban *tour de force*; yet he also looks beyond the mythical past to examine pressing contemporary political themes which can be related both to any city and/or to the home city of Athens⁵⁰. Thus the themes of usurpation and political loyalty,

of a city with which Athens had long been at war. Thebes in myth is not destroyed as Troy is; tragedy likewise must keep the city standing.

⁴⁹ For instance, on *Ant.* 1015 EASTERLING 2005: 62 comments that Teiresias “mentions no place names: it is ‘the *polis*’ that is sick”. She seems here and throughout her argument to over-emphasize the anonymity of Thebes: certainly the failure of burial is an important cultural concern, but within the scope of the play and of Theban myth it is also first and foremost a specifically Labdacid and Theban one. Furthermore, whenever anyone speaks of the *polis* in this play, the *polis* is Thebes.

⁵⁰ We ought, however, to qualify this by underlining the especial importance of Athenian politics in *Phoenissae*, as is evident in the relocation to the heroic-age autocratic Theban setting the pressing concerns of late fifth-century Athenian democracy, notwithstanding the fact that the Athenians had by this time seen all of these factors played out across the Greek world during the two decades of the Peloponnesian War.

of the use and abuse of human intelligence – questions especially apt in late fifth-century Athenian society – are given voice by the dramatic characters in their own individual mythical setting and are as central to the subject matter of the myth as they are to the contemporary world. A pertinent example of this is found in the case of Menoikeus' sacrifice, which is central to the (resolution of) the play's myth of autochthony, i.e. the atonement, through his own death, by a young unmarried male (Menoikeus) for the long-ago killing by Cadmus, a founder of Thebes, of Ares' dragon, which had guarded the spot where the city was established (see Teiresias' words at 930–952). This episode, a Euripidean innovation, is rooted in the complexities of specifically *Theban* concerns – especially the city's troubled history, difficult relationship with the gods, and more specifically in Menoikeus' own moral and emotional ties to his homeland. But it is equally applicable and relevant to contemporary political (Athenian) issues – as Euripides himself implies in the intertextual reference at 852–857 to his own earlier play *Erechtheus*, in which sacrifice on behalf of the *polis* (here Athens) is, of course, the central theme. This allusion has been taken by some scholars as supportive of the thesis that Thebes functions as an “anti-Athens”⁵¹, in that it implies a contrast between Athens as positive model of sacrifice made as a result of civic loyalty and Menoikeus at Thebes as negative *exemplum* of a ritual barely acknowledged and which will bear a questionable influence on the city's fortunes. But could not the ostensible polarity rather indicate the implications of sacrifice as a wider political theme, both within the mythical worlds of Athens and Thebes, and on a broader contemporary level in association with the problems of political loyalty in any *polis*? Moreover, it would be difficult for a contemporary audience to accept at face value this apparent element of Athenian triumphalism, since recent historical experience had revealed only too clearly the fragility of the *polis* and the impermanence of civic ties. Although such selflessness in response to the needs of the *polis* was lauded in the war years, the loss of Menoikeus, and the intense suffering of Praxithea in *Erechtheus* in offering up her children for the city, also imply from a heroic-world perspective the ruthlessness of the overriding claims made on the individual by the *polis*. The themes of grief and loss, of conflicting loyalties and the cost of war to non-combatants, are as pertinent to fifth-century Athens as they are to mythical Thebes.

We noted earlier in relation to Euripides' *Suppliants* that Thebes does reveal a potential for positive action. This is not an isolated *exemplum*. In the fragmentary *Antiope* Euripides looks back to the foundation of the city and goes beyond its troubled beginnings as delineated in *Phoenissae*⁵² to create a Theban identity

⁵¹ So again ZEITLIN 1990: 143; see also DE ROMILLY 1967: 134; and FOLEY 1985: 129.

⁵² See ARTHUR 1977 for a study of the play's choral odes and the impact of the city's past on subsequent events at Thebes.

from the external standpoint of the play’s setting at Eleutherae, on the borders of Thebes and Attica. The creation at the end of the play of an extra-dramatic future for Thebes – one of predicted concord and prosperity in the dispatch under Zeus’ orders of the twin brothers Amphion and Zethus to found the city⁵³ – now points to the city and its construction as signifying prospective good. This contrasts sharply with the characters’ suffering in the play’s main action. But here at the end, we have the promise of a Thebes which is quite different. In the mutually complementary integration within the city’s foundation of the separate powers as represented by Amphion and Zethus⁵⁴, there exists a newfound unity and coherence productive of positive action. This is focused on the constructive influence of the Dionysiac at Thebes, and the potential harmonious co-existence of martial activity and musical quietude⁵⁵. This may be contrasted with the discordant and destructive nature of these apparent opposites, represented in the gods Ares and Dionysus, elsewhere in a Theban context such as *Bacchae*. Here in *Antiope*, however, the positive nature of the Dionysiac at Thebes is emphasized by contrast with its ambivalent influence at Eleutherae, where it is associated with conciliation and ritual worship but is also seen as productive of violence and frenzy. That the Dionysiac may be presented with some ambivalence in a non-Theban context – one not too distant from Athens for good measure – and in association with integration and harmony in a Theban setting bears significant implications for a polarized antithesis for the Dionysiac at Thebes and outside it⁵⁶. The external focus on Thebes⁵⁷ as the locale for an extra-dramatic future implies its potential for resurrection and reconstruction in myth, and reaffirms

⁵³ Cf. fr. c col. II 86–103 (pp. 290–292 in CROPP, COLLARD, GILBERT 2004).

⁵⁴ Hermes at fr. c col. II 86–95 speaks of Amphion’s music as lightening the burden of the builders as Zethus directs the founding.

⁵⁵ The debate in the play on the respective virtues of activity and inactivity is recreated in the philosophical context of Plato’s *Gorgias* (485E–486D).

⁵⁶ This is the main direction of ZEITLIN 1993, a more recent paper in which she concedes some potential for good at Thebes, yet still seeks to apply a polarized schema to the Dionysiac at Thebes as generally negative, and as positive in non-Theban contexts. She may err primarily in basing her argument on the presentation of Dionysus and the Dionysiac influence, since these range widely across the scope of the tragic corpus, and as widely in the plays set in or directly concerned with Thebes.

⁵⁷ There is no reason why this should be problematic, or impact negatively on Thebes’ presentation in the play, as suggested by ZEITLIN 1993: 181 f. in arguing that the Dionysiac at Thebes – and indeed the city itself – can only be positively depicted from an extra-Theban viewpoint. She is still firmly inclined to the “anti-Athens” in further explaining the positive depiction of Thebes as due to its depiction from the vantage point (because in close proximity to Athens) of Eleutherae, p. 182. This not only passes over the dramatic conflicts of that location in the play, but also appears to overlook ZEITLIN’s own earlier concession to the possibility of Theban-type problems in relation to Athens (in the context of Eur. *Ion*, p. 170). This again undermines an unequivocally positive reading of Athens’ depiction in tragedy. On the problems of autochthony in *Ion*, see LORAUX 1990.

the diversity and mutability of the city's tragic identity⁵⁸. For after all, Thebes must remain standing; the city's survival in tragedy signifies the extent to which the genre was shaped by a longstanding mythical heritage in which the city does not fall as Troy did. Yet that in itself suggests also the durability and permanence of Thebes as dramatic locale. Tragedy ensures Thebes' survival so that the genre itself can continue to return to it and to propagate the city's myths. Thebes remains; and there is thus an ultimately life-affirming quality in its endurance despite – perhaps even because of – the suffering to which it was home, and to which the poets would always return, *καὶ ἔσσομένοισι πυθέσθαι*.

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⁵⁸ We must again bear in mind the sheer quantity of plays lost to us: it would be extremely unlikely that none of the non-extant dramas which in one way or another concerned Thebes reflected, as *Antiope* does, the city as a place for potential (or actual) positive action.

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DELPHIC MOST HONORIFIC PRIVILEGES

by

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ABSTRACT: The aim of this article is to examine the most honorific privileges attested in Delphic decrees. Moving from the mid-4th c. BC through the late-2nd c. AD, the paper explores heroic worship, statues and crowns, arguing for their actual value and honorific character, as well as confronting them with the Athenian μέγιστα τιμὰ.

The phenomenon of Delphic decrees dating from the Hellenistic period up to the end of the 2nd century AD lies in the number of decrees: these decrees number almost 1.000 in total. Such a vast amount of material provides extensive information on Delphic honorific culture, including information about the honours granted by the Delphic polis¹. In his article H. BOUVIER posted a list of twenty three privileges attested in Delphic decrees, mentioning: *proxenia*, *promanteia*, *proedria*, *prodikia*, *asylia*, *ateleia*, *theorodokia*, *euergesia*, *epitimia*, citizenship, *bouleuteia*, *asphaleia*, commendation, *enktesis*, crowning, *isopoliteia*, invitation for a public meal, the erection of a statue, sending *xenia*, *epinomia*, *propompeia*, *prothysia* and *pronomia*². Two other major privileges (heroic worship and inscribing a decree on a monument or on the walls of a building in Delphi), and several minor ones (e.g. τιμὴ) should be added to his list. Moreover, *epinomia* and *pronomia* seem to be two different names for the same privilege. BOUVIER distinguished *epinomia* from *pronomia*, providing us with a definition of only one of them: ἐπινομία – right of pasture (“droit de pâture”), leaving προνομία without further explanation³. According to LSJ⁹, *epinomia* and *pronomia* are synonyms and they both refer to a right of pasturage⁴. The precise meaning of *epinomia* has long been a matter of dispute. It is commonly used as

¹ Cf. MUSIELAK 1989: 68–72, 100–113.

² BOUVIER 1978: 101 f.

³ BOUVIER 1978: 102.

⁴ LSJ⁹ s.v. προνομία: right of pasturage (*IG IX 1*, 442 [Acarnania, 4th c. BC]); s.v. ἐπινομία: right of pasture (*Xen. Cyr.* III 2, 23 [pl., cf. *Poll.* VII 184]; *Berl. Sitzb.* 1927, 7 [Locris, 5th c. BC]; *IG IX 2*, 61, 7 [Lamia]; *IG V 2*, 511 [Arcadia, 3rd/2nd c. BC]).

a right of pasturage⁵. In Delphic honorific decrees, *epinomia* was granted in five documents, four of which are dated to the 3rd century BC and one which comes from the beginning of the 2nd century BC⁶. In only one document of AD 121 was a citizen of Nikopolis awarded *pronomia*⁷. *Pronomia* appeared much earlier in inscriptions from other regions, with one decree from Stratos in Acarnania dated to the 5th century BC which attests granting a right of pasturage⁸. Since both *epinomia* and *pronomia* are privileges which were very rarely granted in Delphi, it is impossible to state unequivocally that they covered the same rights and privileges, although BOUVIER's determined distinction seems to be misleading. *Pronomia* and *epinomia* concerned matters related to pasturage, so they should therefore be treated as one privilege whose name changed over time.

One of the characteristic features of Delphic decree culture is that only two out of 748 Delphic decrees were granted to Delphic citizens, while the rest were issued to foreigners. Moreover, the majority of inscribed decrees at Delphi were inscribed on buildings, either on the bases of monuments, on the monuments themselves or alternatively on the walls of the treasuries and sanctuary. Perhaps decrees granted to the citizens of Delphi were kept in the local archive, since inscribing all decrees would have been very expensive and would have taken too much space, while the decrees for foreigners were carved on the buildings as another privilege bestowed mainly to foreigners. Scholars agree that only a minority of all the decrees that were enacted were selected for inscription, and that those kept in the archives were written on papyrus, whitened boards or on wooden tablets, in other words on perishable materials⁹. The lack of preserved honorific decrees for the citizens of Delphi implies that the people of Delphi decided to honour foreigners with decrees, which they inscribed on buildings as another privilege, and that they honoured their own citizens using decrees that were kept in the local archive, due to both limited space and high expense.

On no occasion were all the above-mentioned privileges granted to one person. BOUVIER gives an example of a decree where Biaios, the son of Aristodamos from Nauapaktos, was honoured with thirteen privileges, and this is the highest number of privileges bestowed on one person¹⁰. The most often granted privileges in Delphi were *proxenia*, *promanteia*, *proedria* and *ateleia*, attested in over 70% of all decrees. Among the most rarely awarded privileges were *isopoliteia*,

⁵ WHITTAKER 1988: 51 f.; MIGEOTTE 2009: 74.

⁶ *FdD* IV 175 (end of the 3rd c. BC); *SGDI* 2672 (224–220 BC); *Syll.*³ 534 (218/217 BC); *FdD* IV 427 B IV (205/204–203/202 BC); *FdD* I 451 (200/199 BC).

⁷ *FdD* IV 84.

⁸ *IG* IX 1², 2, 390.

⁹ WILHELM 1909: 271–275; POSNER 1972: 92 f.; DAVIES 2003: 323–328; BRESSON 2005: 161 f.; NAWOTKA 2014: 2 f.

¹⁰ *FdD* I 152; BOUVIER 1978: 102.

epinomia, and sacrifices. The most rarely awarded, however, does not mean the most honorific ones.

Crowns (granted in 3.9% of all Delphic decrees) and statues (bestowed in only 2% of decrees) were some of the most honorific honours awarded not only in Delphi, but in the whole of Greece. Their honorific character depended on several factors. Apart from being awarded very rarely, the granting of crowns and statues were commonly announced during public festivals. Therefore lots of people were informed about the honorand's merits with regard to the city providing him with esteem and fame. Moreover, in contrast to many other privileges, crowns and statues had actual monetary value. Regardless of the size or the material, statues were a very expensive privilege, as the cost of the monument could reach even 3.000–4.000 drachmae¹¹. The most prized crowns were made of gold, and their cost sometimes reached 1.000 drachmae¹². Both crowns and especially statues made a visual impact. They were much more durable, “visible” and impressive than other honours, and therefore decrees for Roman emperors are all but unknown: honours for emperors took the form of statues and buildings due to their monumental and honorific character. Apart from the visual impact, statues and crowns also had a symbolic meaning. Wreaths were a prize in many contests and they became a symbol of royal power over time. Furthermore, in Athens statues were among “the highest honours” (μέγιστα τιμαί)¹³.

There was, however, one more honour granted in Delphi which deserves further investigation. Delphic decrees provide an example of *the most honorific* privilege awarded in post-classical times in Greece: Memmios Neikandros was honoured by the Delphic polis with heroic worship.

This article explores the most honorific privileges granted in Delphic decrees within post-classical Delphi: heroic worship, statues and crowns. The paper largely meets the challenge of answering the following questions: did the meaning and the value of the most honorific privileges issued in Delphi change over time; to whom were the most valuable honours given and what were the reasons for bestowing them.

HEROIC WORSHIP

The granting of heroic worship is attested in *only one* Delphic honorific decree from the second quarter of the 2nd century AD¹⁴. Due to its uniqueness, it deserves thorough analysis.

¹¹ Diog. Laert. VI 2, 35; MA 2013: 264.

¹² McLEAN 2002: 239.

¹³ GAUTHIER 1985; OLIVER 2007: 183–200.

¹⁴ *FdD* I 466 [2] (ca. 125–150 AD). Text after J. BOUSQUET, BCH XC 1966, pp. 443–446.

Inv. (195 + 1744) + (2268 + 5078). J. BOUSQUET; 40 x 65 x ± 18.

Letters: 1.8–2.2; interl.: 0.8–1.1.

Ed.: É. BOURGUET, *FdD* III 1, 466; L. ROBERT, *Rev. Phil.* XLII 1930, pp. 59 f. = 1969b: 1159 f.; J. BOUSQUET, *BCH XC* 1966, pp. 443–446 with photos figs. 7, 8 and 9.

- [θεός. ἐ]πεὶ Μ[έμμι]ος Νείκανδρος, ἀπό[γονος πολλῶν]
 [ιερέων], υἱὸς μὲν τοῦ ἱερέως Μεμμίου Εὐ[θυδ]ά[μου]
 [καὶ Με]μμίας Εὐθυδαμίλλης, ἔκγονος δὲ Με[μμι]ίας
 [Λούπα]ς τῆς ἀρχηΐδος, τὴν πόλιν ἡμῶν καὶ τὸ[ν ἀ]γῶνα
 5 [τ]ῶν Πυθίων ἐν τε γραμματείαις καὶ ξυστ[αρχ]ίαις
 καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις φιλοτειμαῖς κοσμήσας, εἰς [τ]ὸ χρε-
 ῶν <μ>ετήλαξεν, ἔδοξεν τῇ πόλει τιμᾶς τ[ε] αὐτῶ]
 ἠρωϊκᾶς ψηφίσασθα[ι, καὶ] κατεύχεσθαι α[ὐτῶ] ὡς]
 [ἦ]ρωϊ ἐν πρυτανείῳ, κα[ὶ] ἀναστῆ]σθαι αὐτ[οῦ] ἀνδριάν]-
 10 [τ]ας ἐν ταῖς ἐπισημοτά[ταις τῆς Ἀχαΐας πόλεσιν ἐν αἷς]
 [ο]ἱ ἱεροὶ ἀγῶνες ἐπιτελοῦνται, ἐν Δελ[φοῖς] καὶ ἐν Πίσση]
 [κ]αὶ ἐν Ἄργει καὶ ἐν Κορίνθῳ, ἐπιγρά[ψαι δὲ τόδε τὸ ψή]-
 [φισμα] τοῦς [ἐκείν]ων [ἄρ]χοντ[ας ἐπὶ τᾶς βάσεις].

God. Since Memmios Neikandros, descendant of many priests, son of Memmios Euthydamos the priest, and Memmia Euthydamilla, grandson of Memmia Lupa the *archeis*, while being a secretary and *xystarches* adorned our polis and the Pythian Games, and throughout all of his honorary pursuits, fulfilled his destiny, it is resolved by the polis to decree heroic worship to him, and to pray to him as to the hero in the *prytaneion*, and to erect statues of him in the most famous cities in Achaia, those, where the sacred contests are celebrated, in Delphi, Pisa, Argos and in Corinth, and the magistrates are to write the decree on the bases.

This decree can be divided into three main parts: the first part (lines 1–4) provides information about the honorand granted with heroic worship and about his ancestors. The second section (lines 4–7) contains a description of Memmios Neikandros' public functions and his contribution to the Delphic polis, which are the reasons for granting him heroic worship. The last part (lines 7–13) includes the polis decision about bestowing honours and privileges.

Memmios Neikandros and his family

From the first part of the honorific decree it is clear that Memmios Neikandros was a descendant of many priests and priestesses – ἀπόγονος πολλῶν ἱερέων. His father, Gaius Memmios Euthydamos, was a priest of Apollo¹⁵, who served in the sanctuary together with Plutarch¹⁶. Plutarch, in his *Quaestiones Convivales*,

¹⁵ *FdD* I 466 [2]; IV 78; VI 137, 138 and 139.

¹⁶ PUECH 1992: 4849 f.

speaks about Euthydamos referring to him as Εὐθύδημον τὸν συνιερέα¹⁷. Other inscriptions provide information about Gaius Memmios Euthydamos' public functions: between 79 and 95 AD he was an archon in Delphi three times¹⁸. Memmios Neikandros' mother, Memmia Euthydamilla, is known only from this particular inscription, and not much can be said about her, except for the fact that she might have been her husband's close relative – maybe a cousin – which is implicated by the identical names¹⁹.

Memmia Lupa, Memmios Neikandros' paternal grandmother, held the very important office of ἀρχηῖς, priestesses of Apollo²⁰. Some scholars²¹ identify ἀρχηῖς with ἱερεῖα. However, J. JANNORAY argues that the title of ἀρχηῖς had a somewhat broader meaning, and that it also applied to other duties²². Memmia Lupa is mentioned in another Delphic inscription, where P. Memmios Stasimos funded a statue for her, for τήν ἰδίαν εὐεργέτιν (her euergetism)²³. The phrase ψ(ηφίσματι) β(ουλή)ς at the end of the honorific inscription indicates that the permission of the council for erecting a statue in a public place in Delphi has been received. Therefore, Memmios Neikandros' grandmother had a statue in Delphi, just like her grandson would have in the future.

P. Memmios Stasimos, who contributed to Memmia Lupa's statue, also probably belonged to Memmios Neikandros' family; however their kinship is not known. The last person from the Memmii family is P. Memmios Soter, Memmia Lupa's father, a priest of Apollo²⁴.

The Roman names – Publius Memmius and Gaius Memmius – indicate that the Memmii family owed their *civitas* to Publius Memmius Regulus, who was pro-consul of Achaia in 35–44 AD, or to his son Gaius Memmius Regulus. Therefore the emperor who granted the *civitas* to Memmii family was Claudius²⁵.

Reasons for granting heroic worship to Memmios Neikandros

Τὴν πόλιν ἡμῶν καὶ τὸ[ν ἄ]γῶνα [τ]ῶν Πυθίων ἔν τε γραμματείαις καὶ ξυστ[αρχ]ίαις καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις φιλοτειμίαις κοσμήσας – Memmios Neikandros

¹⁷ Plut. *Quaest. conv.* VII 2 (= *Mor.* 700E).

¹⁸ *FdD* VI 132 and 133. The first archonship in ca. 75 AD; the second archonship ca. 80–90; *FdD* III 233; IV 100 and 113; the third archonship ca. 95.

¹⁹ PUECH 1992: 4849 f. This is not the only example in Delphi of a marriage being arranged within a family. M. Aurelius Foibianus, a priest of Apollo, married his niece Theoneike, cf. LA COSTE-MESSELIÈRE 1925: 83; *FdD* II 118; JAY-ROBERT 1997: 30 f.

²⁰ *FdD* I 466 [2]; VI 2 and 3a.

²¹ BCH XX 1896, p. 720, n. 2; BOURGUET 1905: 18, n. 3.

²² BCH LXX 1946, pp. 257–259.

²³ BOURGUET 1905: 13.

²⁴ BOURGUET 1905: 13; PUECH 1992: 4849 f.

²⁵ *FdD* I 532; BCH XC 1966, p. 122.

beautified the Delphic polis and the Pythian Games while he served as the secretary and as *xystarches*, and he embellished it with other lavish outlays for public purposes. This short passage provides three important pieces of information: Memmios Neikadros was a secretary, although it is not known from the decree whether he was a secretary of the Amphictyony²⁶, a secretary of the *boule*, or maybe a secretary of some other association. The plural form γραμματείας suggests only that he held this office more than once. As a *xystarches*, Neikandros was a president of an athletic association²⁷. The phrase ταῖς ἄλλαις φιλοτειμίαις shows him as a city-benefactor, who did a lot for the Delphic polis.

The motive for granting Memmios Neikandros with honours and privileges by the Delphic polis was his euergetism towards the city and its citizens. Through his offices, Neikandros adorned not only the Delphic polis, but also the Pythian Games. Though it is hard to state clearly what κοσμήσας means exactly, any adornment must have been quite expensive. Memmios Neikadros was a prominent Delphic citizen who held two important offices and who had been generous in outlaying his money for public purposes, following the example given by his grandmother.

Most likely Neikandros did a lot more for the Delphic polis than has been inscribed, because this decree is relatively short (13 lines) and provides only the most important information and motives.

Honours and privileges granted to Memmios Neikandros

For his euergetism, Memmios Neikandros was awarded with the most honourific privileges. The erection of one statue was a great privilege in itself, but Neikandros got four statues “in the most famous cities” in Greece where the Panhellenic Games were celebrated, so in cities to which lots of people travelled²⁸. Using statues and inscriptions carved on their bases, the Delphic polis spread the information about Memmios Neikandros’ heroic worship in many Greek cities. Because of this, Neikandros, a great Delphic benefactor, became an example to follow throughout Greece.

The establishment of Memmios Neikandros’ cult in the *prytaneion*, which was the centre of the polis civic life, proves that Neikandros was something more than just a deceased benefactor, and that his heroic worship meant more than just a *posthumous* privilege²⁹. In Athens, the *prytaneion* contained the statues of Miltiades, Demosthenes and Themistocles; at Ptolemais there was a statue of Lysimachos. The graves of eponymous heroes were in the *prytaneion* at

²⁶ About the Amphictyony and its officials see e.g. SÁNCHEZ 2001; LEFÈVRE 1998.

²⁷ GLOTZ 1914; ROBERT 1969b: 1120 f.; *Choix* 2012: n. 227.

²⁸ Pisa is a different name for Olympia, see Stesich. 90; Pind. *Ol.* 1, 18; Hdt. II 7.

²⁹ Quite often the word *heros* used in inscriptions meant simply that a person was dead; see JONES 2010: 49; ROBERT 1969a: 265, 351–357.

Megara, and there is a hero cult attested in the *prytaneion* at Sikyon³⁰. It is not known from the content of the decree where the statue of Memmios Neikandros was situated, but it is possible that the statue was located in the *prytaneion*, so that they could “pray there to him as to the hero”.

Heroic worship was an extremely rarely granted privilege. J. BOUSQUET presents one parallel example, when a citizen of Megalopolis was awarded with heroic worship and with the erection of statues in Olympia, Nemea, Isthmos and Megalopolis³¹. Heroic worship bestowed on prominent citizens for their merits toward the polis can be compared with worshipping athletes, ancestors³², poets³³, and private heroes³⁴, therefore with groups of people commended very rarely, for special merits or actions. Although these types of heroes seem to be far below the pre-Hellenistic heroes, the granting of heroic worship was a desirable, valuable and very honorific privilege.

STATUES

The earliest evidence of erecting statues in Greece comes from the 6th century BC. They were more frequently chosen starting from the late 3rd century onwards and reached the height of their popularity in the Early Empire, when streets and squares were filled with statues³⁵. As J. MA writes, “these statues are almost entirely lost; there is no identified original public honorific statue from the Hellenistic period, let alone an honorific statue *in situ*”³⁶. And: “Delphi, Olympia, and Delos, after decades of excavation, are extremely complex and do not allow us easily to understand the general working of the statue landscape”³⁷. Unfortunately it is impossible to examine honorific statues in Delphi because none of them, apart from several fragments, has survived to our times *in situ*; we cannot establish the visual impact of the honorific images or the hierarchy between them. Still, preserved statue bases provide us with some information. The size of a preserved statue base gives us an idea of a size of the image (if we are dealing with a tiny statue, or with a life-sized monument); from the statue

³⁰ MILLER 1978: 17.

³¹ BCH XC 1966, p. 466.

³² On the cult of ancestors see FARNELL 1920: 343–360; MORRIS 1991: 147–169; ANTONACCIO 1993: 46–70; AUFFARTH 1999: 39–48.

³³ CLAY 2004. CLAY examined the cults of poets in Greece, primarily that of Archilochus on Paros.

³⁴ JONES 2010: 38–65; HUGHES 1999: 171–175.

³⁵ MA 2007: 203; SHEAR 2007: 221; GAUTHIER 1985: 77–128.

³⁶ MA 2007: 204. Cf. SMITH 1999: 155–189. On reusing inscriptions on statue bases in Athens see SHEAR 2007: 221–246.

³⁷ MA 2013: 68 f.

base we can trace whether we are studying an equestrian group; further we can analyse those statues through the information provided by the honorific inscriptions carved on their bases or through the decrees that demonstrate that a statue was awarded.

Sixteen Delphic honorific decrees, three of which are abbreviated and thirteen with their full pattern, provide us with information on the statues that were granted as an honour in Delphi. Five decrees are dated to the 2nd century BC honouring the following people:

- Pherias³⁸, son of Aristion from Pherai (Thessaly)³⁹,
- a daughter of Aristokrates from Kyme (Aeolis), a harpist⁴⁰,
- Isagoras son of Pherekrates from Larisa (Thessaly), one of the five *tagoi*⁴¹,
- Menekrates, son of Pherekrates from Larisa (Thessaly), the secretary of the council of the Thessalian League⁴²,
- Aristodamos, son of Lykinos from Patrai (Achaia)⁴³.

Three out of these five honoured people came from Thessaly, proving the Thessalian domination over Amphictyony and Delphi gained by the Thessalians over the Aetolians soon after the battle of Magnesia⁴⁴.

Three decrees came from the 1st century BC, bestowing statues on:

- king Nikomedes and queen Laodike from Bithynia⁴⁵,
- Kriton, son of Patron from Drymos (Phocis)⁴⁶,
- an unknown honorand⁴⁷.

The largest number (eight decrees) is dated to the Imperial times⁴⁸, when statues were voted for:

- M. Aurelius Tarsos, a *neaniskarches*⁴⁹,

³⁸ DAUX reads Phrikas (BCH CVIII 1984, p. 405).

³⁹ Klio XV 1918, p. 24, n. 47 (134 BC).

⁴⁰ *SGDI* 2727 (134 BC). The fragment concerning the grant of statue is reconstructed.

⁴¹ *FdD* IV 49 (106 BC). As *tagos*, Isagoras was a member of the college of magistrates in Thessaly (cf. *IG* IX 2, 516). *Tagos* was an important eponimic office whose competence evolved over time. See SHERK 1990: 258.

⁴² *FdD* IV 50 (106 BC). Cf. *IG* IX 2, 507.

⁴³ *FdD* IV 52 (ca. 104 BC).

⁴⁴ When Antiochos III was defeated in the battle of Magnesia, the Aetolian League had to sign a peace treaty with Rome. Although the League continued to exist, its power was broken whereby they lost their supremacy in Delphi to the Thessalians. See Plb. XX 9 f. and XXI 32; *Syll.*³ 613A. Cf. GRUEN 1986: 611–672; GRAINGER 1999: 407–499; GRAINGER 2002: 275–278; AUSTIN 2006: 69 f., 72; SHIPLEY 2000: 377; GRANINGER 2011: 124; SÁNCHEZ 2001: 371.

⁴⁵ *FdD* IV 77 (94 BC).

⁴⁶ *FdD* IV 54 (ca. 91 BC).

⁴⁷ *FdD* III 384 (1st c. BC).

⁴⁸ Cf. SMITH 1998: 56–93.

⁴⁹ *FdD* I 238 (Imp.).

- Leukios Likinios Eukleides from Athens and from an unknown polis, a grammarian⁵⁰,
- C. Caristianus Iulianus, proconsul of Achaia⁵¹,
- Auphria, a public speaker⁵²
- an unknown honorand from Athens, a *bouleutes* and actor⁵³,
- Memmios Neikandros from Delphi⁵⁴,
- Sosandros, son of Pleistarchos from Hypata Sebastos (Dolopia), an *agonothetes* and *epimeletes* of the Amphictyony⁵⁵,
- Aurelius Phil[...] Byblios, a sophist⁵⁶.

The first issues under examination concern those people granted statues in Delphi and the reasons for bestowing privileges on them. Among the most prominent honorands are C. Caristianus Iulianus, king Nikomedes with queen Laodike, two brothers from Larisa, and Memmios Neikandros. However, the most interesting people are two women: Auphria, who was a public speaker, and a daughter of Aristokrates. It is known from the decrees that they both came to Delphi to participate in the Pythian Games. C. Caristianus Iulianus was proconsul of Achaia in AD 100/101 and 101/102⁵⁷. There is no specific information in a decree regarding the reason for granting him privileges in Delphi, except that he was praised for fulfilling his duties in a noble way. King Nikomedes and his wife were awarded for sending thirty slaves to Delphi⁵⁸. Isagoras and Menekrates from Larisa came from a prominent Thessalian family⁵⁹. They were honoured with very honorific privileges: crowns, equestrian statues, announcements of the erection of the statues during the Pythian Games, the Soteria and the Eleutheria festivals. The decrees voting to honour them concern only the general reasons why, including reverence towards the god and nobleness⁶⁰.

⁵⁰ *FdD* IV 61 (AD 75–100).

⁵¹ *FdD* IV 47 (AD 98).

⁵² *FdD* IV 79 (beg. of 2nd c. AD).

⁵³ *FdD* II 105 (AD 125–150). This decree has largely been restored; *inter alia* the granting of the statue has also been restored.

⁵⁴ *FdD* I 466 [2] (AD 125–150). On Memmios Neikandros see above.

⁵⁵ *FdD* IV 63 (2nd c. AD).

⁵⁶ *FdD* III 244 (end of the 2nd c. AD?).

⁵⁷ CHEESMAN 1913: 253–266; WYPIJEWSKI, PIETRUSZKA 2013. CORSTEN 1997 examines literary and epigraphic sources on proconsuls of Achaia.

⁵⁸ *FdD* IV 77. HANNESTAD 1996 examines the relations between the eight Bithynian kings and the Greek cities and sanctuaries, and their role as city-benefactors.

⁵⁹ *IG* IX 2, 540. Cf. COLIN 1930: 80 f.

⁶⁰ *FdD* IV 49 and 50.

The Delphic polis also granted statues to a sophist⁶¹, a grammarian for teaching children⁶², an actor⁶³, and to the officials: M. Aurelius Tarsos, who was a *ne-aniskarches*⁶⁴, and Sosandros, son of Pleistarchos, *agonothetes*⁶⁵ and *epimeletes* of the Amphictyony⁶⁶. Two decrees⁶⁷ provide the same reason for granting honours to Aristodamos, son of Lykinos and to Kriton, son of Patron; they both helped Delphic ambassadors sent to them, although from the contexts of the decrees it is not known in what matters they helped them.

Decrees for C. Caristianus Iulianus, Leukios Likinios Eukleides, and Sosandros, son of Pleistarchos, were agreed on at the special meetings of the assembly – ἐν προσκλήτῳ ἐκκλησίᾳ⁶⁸. The Delphic ἐκκλησία πρόσκλητος was an extra meeting of the assembly called at short notice⁶⁹.

According to Delphic decrees, there was no one specific way to be granted a statue in Delphi. Nor were the images set up in Delphi reserved for a particular group of people. Both men and women could be praised with statues. The small number of grants indicates only that statues were a very honorific privilege devoted to a select few⁷⁰.

Types of statues

Delphic decrees provide information about three types of statues that were erected in Delphi. The most often granted was a bronze statue (χαλκῆ εἰκών), an honorific image of the person being honoured⁷¹. A bronze statue on horseback (χαλκῆ εἰκών ἐφ' ἵππου) was granted twice, to two brothers from Larisa⁷². Four decrees attest the granting of ἀνδριᾶς – either a statue of a mortal or a cult statue⁷³. While the images of M. Aurelius Tarsos⁷⁴, Auphria⁷⁵ and Leukios Likinios

⁶¹ *FdD* III 244. It is an abbreviated decree, therefore no reason was given.

⁶² *FdD* IV 61.

⁶³ *FdD* II 105.

⁶⁴ *FdD* I 238. Νεανισκάρχης was an official in charge of ἔφηβοι (LSJ⁹ s.v.).

⁶⁵ *Agotothetai* were responsible for the organization of festivals. Cf. SIFAKIS 1967: 64.

⁶⁶ SÁNCHEZ 2001, 437 f.

⁶⁷ *FdD* IV 52 and 54.

⁶⁸ *FdD* IV 47, 61 and 63.

⁶⁹ HANSEN 1987: 30.

⁷⁰ OLIVER 2007: 182.

⁷¹ *SGDI* 2727 (134 BC); *FdD* IV 52 (ca. 104 BC); *FdD* IV 77 (94 BC); *FdD* IV 54 (ca. 91 BC); *FdD* IV 47 (AD 98); *FdD* II 105 (AD 125–150); *FdD* IV 63 (2nd c. AD); BCH XCIII 1959, pp. 190 f. (= *FdD* III 244, end of the 2nd c. AD?). Cf. MA 2007: 206.

⁷² *FdD* IV 49 and 50 (106 BC).

⁷³ McLEAN 2002: 243 f.

⁷⁴ *FdD* I 238.

⁷⁵ *FdD* IV 79.

Eukleides⁷⁶ were rather statues of mortals, the monuments set up for Memmios Neikandros might have been treated as cult statues, since he was praised in the *prytaneion*⁷⁷. There is one fragmentary decree where the granting of a statue is uncertain. The editor of the decree suggests that the honorand was awarded with [εἰκόνα?]⁷⁸. Since εἰκών is a general term with a variety of meanings, it may refer to a bronze statue, a painting, a bust, a stone statue, or to a statuette, so it is not known what specific type of statue was chosen for Pheras, son of Ariston⁷⁹.

The location of the statues

R.R.R. SMITH claims that in the Hellenistic cities a statue of almost anyone could be erected, but what really mattered was *who* set it up and *where*⁸⁰. Usually statues were placed in the most prominent location (ἐν τῷ ἐπισημοτάτῳ τόπῳ) so that everyone could see and admire the images⁸¹. The sanctuary of Apollo was Delphi's most honorific place, so almost all decrees in which information about the location of a statue was given point to the sanctuary:

- ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος (Klio XV 1918, p. 24, n. 47; *FdD* IV 63),
- ἐν τῷ ἐπισημοτάτῳ τοῦ ἱεροῦ τόπῳ (*FdD* IV 47),
- ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος τοῦ Πυθίου ἐν ἐπιφανεστάτῳ τόπῳ (*FdD* IV 77).

Memmios Neikandros' statues were erected “in the most famous cities in Achaia, those where the sacred contests are celebrated, in Delphi, Pisa, Argos and in Corinth” (ἐν ταῖς ἐπισημοτάταις τῆς Ἀχαιᾶς πόλεσιν ἐν αἷς οἱ ἱεροὶ ἀγῶνες ἐπιτελοῦνται, ἐν Δελφοῖς καὶ ἐν Πίσῃ καὶ ἐν Ἄργει καὶ ἐν Κορίνθῳ) (*FdD* I 466[2]).

The sanctuary of Apollo was not the only location for statues in Delphi. The image of Aischylos, son of Antandrides from Eretria, was set up in the town, so we cannot assume that the statues whose location was not given in a decree, were set up in the sanctuary like the rest of them⁸². A decree for Sosandros, son of Pleistarchos, provides the text of an inscription that was supposed to be carved on the base of the statue: “The people of Delphi [honoured] Sosandros

⁷⁶ *FdD* IV 61.

⁷⁷ *FdD* I 466 [2].

⁷⁸ H. POMTOW, *Klio* XV 1918, p. 24, n. 47 (BC 134).

⁷⁹ Paus. V 25, 1. Cf. BUCKLER, ROBINSON 1913: 29–52; ROBERT 1969b: 832–840; WELSH 1904/1905: 32–49.

⁸⁰ SMITH 1998:16.

⁸¹ Cf. MA 2013: 67–154, esp. 67–70; RIDGWAY 1971: 336–356; STEMMER 1995. OLIVER 2007: 182 f. examines the location of the statues in Athens, stressing that “by studying the location of the statue, we can learn a great deal not only about the social hierarchies in Athens but also the ways in which space was exploited to confer further esteem on honorands in the polis”.

⁸² *SEG* XXXII 856; MA 2013: 107 f.

son of Pleistarchos, who purely and munificently served as an *agonothetes* and *epimeletes*, on account of his reverence towards the god and goodwill towards the city, [and dedicated this to] Pythian Apollo⁷⁸³.

The proclamation of the erection of the statue:

Sometimes the granting of a statue was announced publicly during important events where lots of people gathered. In Delphi, information about the granting of statues was proclaimed during:

- the Pythian Games (*FdD* IV 77),
- the Pythian Games and the Soteria festival (*FdD* IV 52),
- the Pythian Games, the Soteria festival and the festival of liberty (Ἐλευθέρια) (*FdD* IV 49 and 50).

The Pythian Games and the Soteria festival⁸⁴ were two of the most important festivals held in Delphi. The proclamation itself should be treated as a separate privilege, since it was not done for everyone. This honour was bestowed only on king Nikomedes and his wife, Aristodamos, son of Lykinos, and on Isagoras and Menekrates from Larisa. The decree granted for king Nikomedes (*FdD* IV 77) provides us with information on what the proclamation looked like: a herald made the proclamation (κάρυγμα ποιησαμέναν τόδε), saying what the Delphic polis had decided and what the reason for bestowing honours on the honorand(s) was:

The people of Delphi honour king Nikomedes, the son of king Nikomedes, and queen Laodike, the daughter of king Mithridates, with the crown of the god and with the bronze statue for each on account of their benevolence and reverence towards the god and towards the people of Delphi; the statues are to be erected in the sanctuary of the Pythian Apollo in the most prominent location⁸⁵.

The price and setting up the statue

Delphic decrees lack information about the price of the statues and who paid for the monuments. It is impossible to calculate even an approximate price since the dimensions of the statues are not known. If the sizes of the statues were equal, then a bronze statue was more expensive than a marble one. However,

⁸³ *FdD* IV 63: ἡ πόλις τῶν Δελφῶν Σώσανδρον Πλειστάρχου, ἀγωνοθετήσαντα καὶ ἐπιμελητεύσαντα ἀγνώως τε καὶ λαμπροψύχως, εὐσεβείας ἔνεκα τῆς εἰς τὸν θεὸν καὶ εὐνοίας τῆς εἰς τὴν πόλιν Ἀπόλλωνι Πυθίῳ.

⁸⁴ On the Soteria festival, see SIFAKIS 1967: 63–112, esp. 63 f.; SÁNCHEZ 2001: 306–309.

⁸⁵ ἡ πόλις τῶν Δε[λφῶν] στεφανοῖ <βασιλέα> Νικομ[ή]δη βασιλέος Νικομήδεος <καὶ βασιλίσσαν Λαοδίκαν βασιλέος Μιθριδάτου> τῷ τοῦ θεοῦ στεφάνῳ καὶ εἰκόνι χαλκῆαι ἐ[κατέρους φιλανθρωπία]ς ἔνεκεν καὶ εὐσεβείας ἃς ἔχοντι ποτὶ τε τὸν θεὸν καὶ ποτὶ τὰν [πόλιν τῶν Δελφῶν καὶ ἀνα]στάσοντι δὲ τὰς [εἰ]κόνας ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος τοῦ [Πυθίου ἐν ἐπιφανεστάτῳ τῷ] πῳι.

regardless of the size or the material, statues were a very expensive privilege as they could cost even 3.000–4.000 drachmae⁸⁶. Preserved decrees also say nothing about who was responsible for setting up a statue in Delphi, whether it were *epimeletai*, *epistatai*, *archontes* or some other commissioners. Only from Memmios Neikandros' decree it is known that some magistrates were to write the decree on the bases of the statues⁸⁷.

Delphic decrees attest the granting of only sixteen statues during a period of almost 350 years. Images were voted for different types of people starting with the king, through Roman and Thessalian high officials, a great Delphic benefactor, and ending with an actor and a grammarian who taught children. Even women could be praised with an image. Many other even more prominent people honoured in Delphi, like Eumenes II, the king of Pergamon⁸⁸, M. Aemilius Lepidus, Roman consul⁸⁹, or Sostratos from Knidos, the architect of the lighthouse of Alexandria⁹⁰ did not get the honour of receiving a statue in Delphi. Pliny the Younger in one of his letters stressed that not only was being rewarded with a statue an honour, but being the author of someone else's image was also an honour⁹¹. Without a doubt, the Delphic polis agreed on privileges for prominent people like the Roman emperors in order to gain honours and esteem in return for its own citizens.

Further research on *tituli honorarii* and private statues will allow us to examine Roman emperors granted statues in Delphi, Delphic citizens praised with images by their own polis, as well as types of monuments, location, the awarding body, and the price of the statues set up in Delphi. However, since the aim of this paper is to examine the most honorific privileges granted by the Delphic polis in the decrees, therefore all private statues and *tituli honorarii* inscribed on the statue bases have been excluded. The inscriptions carved on statue bases do not always indicate who authorised the statue, while decrees provide all the information on the approval of statues⁹². The location of all the statues set up in Delphi, not only those authorised by the Delphic polis, but also those awarded or approved by the Amphictyony, are a separate research problem that deserves further investigation⁹³.

⁸⁶ Diog. Laert. VI 2, 35; MA 2013: 264.

⁸⁷ *FdD* I 466 [2].

⁸⁸ *FdD* III 237 (during 197–158/157 BC or after the reign of Eumenes II).

⁸⁹ *FdD* IV 427 B I (189/188 BC).

⁹⁰ *FdD* I 299 (ca. 285 BC).

⁹¹ Plin. *Epist.* I 17.

⁹² Cf. OLIVER 2007: 183.

⁹³ So far this issue has not been explored properly. The literature on Greek statues is vast. J. MA in his recent book analysed the statues erected all over Greece (MA 2013), while GAUTHIER (1985) and OLIVER (2007) focused on the Athenian portraits. I. SCHMIDT (1995) examined Hellenistic

CROWNS

Thirty one Delphic decrees provide us with information on granting crowns to the honorands, although the reading of one document is uncertain. The decree in question (Klio XVII 1921, p. 177, n. 161) is very poorly preserved, and some parts of the inscription have been damaged with a hammer. Scholars are arguing about how to restore it. Since I have not examined the stone myself, I will not take part in this discussion and will refer to the articles dealing with this problem⁹⁴. For this reason I will not include this decree in further discussion here.

Six out of the thirty decrees granting crowns are dated to the 3rd century BC⁹⁵, twenty come from the 2nd century BC⁹⁶, while three are from the 1st century BC⁹⁷. Only one document is dated to the Imperial period⁹⁸. Crowns bestowed as an honour granted by the Delphic polis appear a century earlier than statues, but they disappear in the Imperial times, when the number of images being granted reached its highest point. Without doubt the 2nd century BC was the period when the largest number of crowns was awarded – over 66% of all crowns which were granted came from that period.

The most sizeable group granted with crowns are foreign judges (δικασταί)⁹⁹. Judges from foreign poleis came to Delphi to settle different types of disputes and in return the Delphic polis granted them honours and privileges¹⁰⁰. There were many disputes submitted for arbitration, but the most popular in Delphi were

statue bases; there are many studies concerning grave reliefs (e.g. S. SCHMIDT 1991; OLIVER 2000) or women's portraits (DILLON 2007). For further references, see the bibliography in the cited works.

⁹⁴ DAUX in BCH LXIII 1939, p. 169; ROBERT 1938: 11, and ROBERT in BCH LIII 1929, p. 37.

⁹⁵ *FdD* II 18 (300–200 BC); *FdD* II 21 (300–200 BC); *FdD* II 78 (ca. 230–225 BC); BCH LXXVII 1953, p. 168, n. 4 B (207 BC); *FdD* II 88 (ca. 205 BC); *FdD* II 224 (end of the 3rd ca. BC).

⁹⁶ *FdD* IV 434 (2nd c. BC); *SGDI* 2662 (2nd c. BC); *FdD* II 20 (178/177 BC); *FdD* III 242 (166 BC); *FdD* IV 161 (157/156 BC); Klio XVIII 1923, p. 283, n. 210 (155–130 BC); *FdD* III 146 (ca. 154 BC); *FdD* I 152 (ca. 150/149 BC); *FdD* I 458 (150–100 BC); Klio XVIII 1923, p. 278, n. 207 (138–135 BC); Klio XVIII 1923, p. 278, n. 207a (138–135 BC); *SGDI* 2727 (134 BC); *FdD* II 46 (128 BC); *FdD* II 47 (128 BC); *FdD* II 51 (106 BC); *FdD* IV 49 (106 BC); *FdD* IV 50 (106 BC); *FdD* IV 52 (c. 104 BC); *FdD* I 228 (1st c. [102/101] BC); *FdD* II 50 (106 or 97 BC).

⁹⁷ *FdD* IV 54 (ca. 91 BC); *FdD* IV 77 (94 BC); BCH LXX 1946, p. 248, n. 2 (end of the 1st c. BC).

⁹⁸ *FdD* III 129 (AD 20–75).

⁹⁹ *FdD* I 260 (3 judges from Hypata); *FdD* I 354 (3 judges from Thebes); *FdD* I 458 (3 judges from Thespiiai?); *FdD* III 120 (3 judges from Megalopolis); *FdD* III 146 (3 judges from Opous); *FdD* III 383 (9 judges from Rhodes); *FdD* IV 169 (3 judges from Hermion); *SGDI* 2662 (3 judges from Thebes); Klio XV 1918, p. 33, n. 54 (3 judges from Sparta); Klio XVIII 1923, p. 278, n. 207 (3 judges from Teithronion); Klio XVIII 1923, p. 279, n. 207a (3 judges from Lilaia); Klio XVIII 1923, p. 283, n. 210 (3 judges from Thespiiai).

¹⁰⁰ About interstate arbitrations in Greece, see TOD 1913; PICCIRILLI 1973; AGER 1996; ROBERT 2007: 299–314.

matters of boundaries and control of the holy precinct¹⁰¹. Delphic decrees attest six instances when foreign judges from Thespiæ, Opous, Thebes, Teithronion, and Lilaia (accompanied by one secretary) were praised with crowns for settling different types of disputes¹⁰². Since twelve decrees in total were bestowed in Delphi on foreign judges, 50% of those judges were praised with one of the highest honours granted by the people of Delphi, attesting the judges' prominent position and the esteem in which their work was held in Delphi.

Sometimes a crown was a collective honour granted to all the citizens of a polis. Three decrees were voted for the crowning of the citizens of Tetrapolis, a district in Attica, for renewing friendship and for sending ambassadors to Delphi¹⁰³. Close relationships between Delphi and Tetrapolis were cultivated during the procession called Pythaïs that was sent from Tetrapolis to Delphi. All the people of Chios were praised with a crown, together with Hermokles, son of Phainomenos, who served as *hieromnamon*¹⁰⁴. Hermokles offered a silver crater for the Theoxenia, wrote a hymn to the god, and made a speech during the meeting of the assembly¹⁰⁵. He was also honoured with crowns and a statue by the Amphictyony, which implies that he must have done a lot while he served as *hieromnamon*¹⁰⁶. In 166 BC, the people of Sardis were crowned in Delphi after the recognition of two new festivals, the Panathenaea and Eumeneia, which were celebrated in Sardis in honour of king Eumenes' victory over the Gauls¹⁰⁷. Another decree granting privileges to the citizens of Magnesia in Ionia also concerns the recognition of a new festival. The people of Magnesia asked the Delphic polis to recognise the festival in honour of Artemis Leukophryene¹⁰⁸. The Delphians not only recognised the festival, but they also granted honours to the citizens of Magnesia, including a crown.

¹⁰¹ *FdD* III 383 (180/179? 179/178? BC) and II 89 (180/179 or 179/178 BC); AGER 1996: 4.

¹⁰² *FdD* I 458 (150–100 BC): 3 judges and a secretary from Thespiæ?; *FdD* III 146 (ca. 154 BC): 3 judges and a secretary from Opous; *SGDI* 2662 (2nd c. BC): 3 judges and a secretary from Thebes; *Klio* XVIII 1923, p. 278, n. 207 (138–135 BC): 3 judges and a secretary from Teithronion (Phocis); *Klio* XVIII 1923, p. 278, n. 207a (138–135 BC): 3 judges and a secretary from Lilaia; *Klio* XVIII 1923, p. 283, n. 210 (155–130 BC): 3 judges and a secretary from Thespiæ.

¹⁰³ *FdD* II 18 (300–200 BC); *FdD* II 20 (178/177 BC); *FdD* II 21 (300–200 BC).

¹⁰⁴ About the origin, history, competence and numbers of the *hieromnamones*, see LEFÈVRE 1998: 205–214; SÁNCHEZ 2001: 498–507.

¹⁰⁵ *FdD* II 224 (end of the 3rd c. BC).

¹⁰⁶ *FdD* III 223. CHANIOTIS 1988: E11.

¹⁰⁷ *FdD* III 242. In 168/167 king Eumenes defeated the Gauls and both festivals were held and celebrated in honour of his victory. WILL 1967: 213–231, 291 f.

¹⁰⁸ BCH LXXVII 1953, p. 168, n. 4 B (207 BC).

Not only could the citizens of a polis get a crown as a collective honour, but also smaller groups like the cavalrymen from Athens¹⁰⁹, the Athenian guild of theatrical artists¹¹⁰, or the Athenian guild of epic poets¹¹¹. Both artistic associations came from Athens in the Pythais, an Athenian *theoria* sent to Delphi to offer a *hekatombe* and first-fruits to Apollo¹¹².

Some people granted with statues also received crowns, such as Isagoras and Menekrates, sons of Pherekrates from Larisa¹¹³, Aristodamos, son of Lykinos from Patrai¹¹⁴, Kriton, son of Patron from Drymos¹¹⁵, king Nikomedes and queen Laodike from Bythynia¹¹⁶, or a daughter of Aristikrates, a harpist from Kyme¹¹⁷. There is therefore no need to repeat the information about them or the reasons for granting them honours in Delphi. However, the awarding of both a crown and a statue raises the importance of people that were given the two most honorific privileges, thus making them some of the most prominent people praised in Delphi.

Among the other honorands praised with crowns are Biaios, son of Aristodamos from Nauapaktos, elected as a *theorodokos* of the Pythian Games and the Soteria Festival¹¹⁸, three Athenians: Ammonios, son of Ammonios, a philanthropist and benefactor¹¹⁹; Eirenaios, son of Eirenaios¹²⁰; and Kleochares, son of Bion, a lyric poet who wrote a processional hymn, a paean, and a hymn to the god which were sung by the children's choir during the festival of the Theoxenia. He was honoured by the Delphic polis with becoming a mas-

¹⁰⁹ *FdD* II 46 (128 BC). The crown granted to Diokles, son of Diokles, who was a *hipparchos*; to Diogenes, son of Aropos, and Lyson, son of Demokrates (they both were *tarantinarchai*); to Hermon, son of Dionysios, Hagias, son of Boulon, Charikles, son of Theodoros, Xenokles, son of Demetrios (four *phylarchoi*); and to κοινὸν τῶν ἰππέων. LAUNEY (1949: 1002, 1014) suggests that the Greek word κοινὸν when related to the military should be translated as "association". Κοινὸν τῶν ἰππέων consisted of 58 cavalrymen, who were responsible for escorting the Pythais, the Athenian *theoria* sent to Delphi in 128 BC. There are documents attesting to a similar group κοινὸν τῶν Πυθαϊστῶν ἰππέων, a military association of a religious character. See also DAUX 1936: 544, n. 1.

¹¹⁰ *FdD* II 47 (128 BC).

¹¹¹ *FdD* II 50 (106 or 97 BC). ANEZIRI 2003: A7.

¹¹² SIFAKIS 1967: 86; COLIN 1905; BOETHIUS 1918; *Choix* 2012: 363 f. Several articles on Pythais were written by KARILA-COHEN (2005a; 2005b; 2007).

¹¹³ *FdD* IV 49 and 50 (106 BC).

¹¹⁴ *FdD* IV 52 (ca. 104 BC).

¹¹⁵ *FdD* IV 54 (ca. 91 BC).

¹¹⁶ *FdD* IV 77 (94 BC).

¹¹⁷ *SGDI* 2727 (134 BC).

¹¹⁸ *FdD* I 152 (ca. 150/149 BC). On *theorodokoi* see PERLMAN 1995: 113–164; PERLMAN 2000, Rutherford 2013.

¹¹⁹ *FdD* I 228 (1st c. BC, probably 102/101 BC).

¹²⁰ *FdD* II 51 (106 BC).

ter of the choir (χοροδιδάσκαλος), so that he could train children each year to sing his compositions during the Theoxenia¹²¹. Philinos, son of Philainetos from Miletos was a *theorodokos*¹²², while Seleukos, son of Bithys from Alexandria in Egypt was honoured for taking care of the Delphic *theoroi* sent to king Ptolemaios VI. We can therefore assume that it is highly likely that he held the office of *theorodokos* or had a similar function¹²³. Mousaios, son of Apollonios from Magnesia in Ionia was a musician (χοράυλη)¹²⁴.

The proclamation of granting crowns

Just like the statues, the granting of crowns was also sometimes announced¹²⁵ during the main Delphic festivals:

- during the Pythian Games¹²⁶,
- during the Pythian Games and the Soteria festival¹²⁷,
- during the flute contest organized within the Soteria festival¹²⁸,
- during the gymnastic and Dionysian contests organized within the Soteria festival¹²⁹,
- a crown for the citizens of Sardis was proclaimed in the theatre during the most prominent days of the Panathenaea and Eumeneia festivals¹³⁰.

Types of crowns

Most of the honorands who were given crowns were “honoured with the crown of the god according to the Delphians’ custom” (στεφανῶσαι αὐτὰν τῷ τοῦ

¹²¹ *FdD* II 78 (ca. 230–225 BC). Cf. FLACELIÈRE 1937: 273; CHANIOTIS 2009: 83; AMANDRY in BCH LXVIII–LXIX 1944–1945, pp. 413–415.

¹²² *FdD* II 88 (ca. 205 BC).

¹²³ *FdD* IV 161 (157/156 BC). Seleukos is a well-known person, as he was an adviser to the king Ptolemaios VI and he had a court title of συγγενής – a title bestowed at the Ptolemaic court by the king as a mark of honour. On Cyprus he served as *strategos*, commander of a fleet, and as a chief-priest. He got privileges on Cyprus, Crete and in Olympia. They are also texts from Rhodes (his hometown?) mentioning Seleukos. Cf. *OGIS* 151–153 and 155; *Choix* 2012: n. 169; DAUX 1936: 516; ROBERT 1969b: 1306 f.; FRASER 1972: I 167, n. 333.

¹²⁴ Χοράυλης: one who accompanies a chorus on the flute. A category of ἀλύπητης, see ROBERT 1969b: 1154 f.; STÉPHANIS 1988: 314, n. 1752; BÉLIS 1988: 230–233; STRASSER in BCH CXXVI 2002, pp. 97 f.; VAN LIEFFERINGE 2000: 151. PERROT 2010: 283–299 examines prize money as an award for the musicians in Delphi.

¹²⁵ Expressed in the verbs ἀναγορεύω or ἀνακηρύσσω.

¹²⁶ *FdD* IV 77 (94 BC).

¹²⁷ *FdD* IV 52 (ca. 104 BC).

¹²⁸ *FdD* I 458 (150–100 BC); *FdD* II 88 (ca. 205 BC); *Klio* XVIII 1923, p. 283, n. 210 (155–130 BC). NACHTERGAEEL 1977: 385–362, 368–371.

¹²⁹ *FdD* II 224 (end of the 3rd c. BC). NACHTERGAEEL 197: 362–371.

¹³⁰ *FdD* III 242 (166 BC).

θεοῦ στεφάνωι, ὧι πάτριόν ἐστι Δελφοῖς)¹³¹. The phrase τοῦ θεοῦ στεφάνωι indicates that all Delphic crowns were dedicated to Apollo. Thirteen decrees specify that the crowns which were given were made of laurel (στεφανῶσαι δάφνας στεφάνωι)¹³². Surprisingly, not one gold crown, which would be the most prestigious crown, was granted by the people of Delphi. This might be explained by the fact that the Delphic Amphictyony granted gold crowns as a privilege¹³³, and so it is possible that gold crowns were reserved as an honour granted by the Amphictyony, while laurel crowns were bestowed by the Delphic polis. The Amphictyony gave laurel crowns as well, usually with a gold one¹³⁴.

Now it is time to raise this question: if the citizens of Delphi bestowed crowns, or rather wreaths made of laurel, hence from an inexpensive material whose value was negligible, then can we indeed suggest that crowns were among the most prominent privileges granted in Delphi? While statues were very honorific due to their size, cost and general nature, crowns which were granted were neither durable nor valuable. The crowns made of laurel were a symbol – they were about the glory and fame, not about the price. Analogously the Pythian Games were honorary games. The winners did not receive any prize money, but were given a laurel twig, because the laurel was sacred to Apollo¹³⁵. The crowns granted by the Delphic polis were a symbol of great tribute and esteem. Moreover we cannot forget that the granting of crowns was carved as decrees on the buildings so that

¹³¹ E.g. *FdD* II 47 (128 BC); *FdD* I 228 (1st c. [102/101] BC); *FdD* II 78 (ca. 230–225 BC) with many variations of words.

¹³² *FdD* II 21 (300–200 BC): στεφανῶσαι [Τ]ετραπολεῖς [παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ δάφνας στεφάνωι, καθὼς πάτριόν ἐστι Δελφοῖς]; *FdD* I 458 (150–100 BC): [στεφανῶσαι αὐτοὺς δάφνης στεφάνωι τῶι παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ]; *FdD* II 78 (ca. 230–225 BC): στεφανῶσαι αὐτὸν δάφνας στεφάνωι, καθὼς πάτριόν ἐστι Δελφοῖς; *FdD* III 146 (ca. 154 BC): στεφανῶσαι αὐτοῦ δάφνας στεφάνωι καθὼς πάτριόν ἐστι Δελφοῖς; *FdD* II 224 (end of the 3rd c. BC): [στεφανῶσαι αὐτὰν δάφνας στεφάνωι τῶι τοῦ θεοῦ καθὼς πάτριόν ἐστι Δελφοῖς; *FdD* III 242 (166 BC): στεφανῶσαι τε αὐτὸν πάλιν τῶι τοῦ θεοῦ στεφάνωι δάφνας ὧι πάτριόν ἐστι Δελφοῖς; *FdD* IV 161 (157/156 BC): στεφανῶσαι αὐτὸν δάφνας στεφάνωι τῆς παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ, καθὼς πάτριόν ἐστι Δελφοῖς; *FdD* IV 434 (2nd c. BC): [στεφανῶσαι δαφνᾶς στεφάνωι τῆς παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ καθὼς πάτριόν ἐστιν; *SGDI* 2662 (2nd c. BC): [στεφανῶσαι αὐτοὺς δάφνας στεφάνωι τῆι παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ, καθὼς πάτριόν ἐστι τοῖς Δελφοῖς; *Klio* XVIII 1923, p. 278, n. 207 (138–135 BC): στεφανῶσαι αὐτοὺς δάφνας στεφάνωι τῆι παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ, καθὼς πάτριόν ἐστι Δελφοῖς; *Klio* XVIII 1923, p. 278, n. 207a (138–135 BC): [στεφανῶσαι αὐτοὺς δάφνας στεφάνωι τῆι παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ, καθὼς πάτριόν ἐστι Δελφοῖς; *Klio* XVIII 1923, p. 283, n. 210 (155–130 BC): [στεφανῶσαι αὐτοὺς δάφνας στεφάνωι τῆι παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ, καθὼς πάτριόν ἐστι Δελφοῖς; *BCH* LXXXVII 1953, p. 168, n. 4 B (207 BC): [στεφανῶσαι τὸν δᾶμον τῶν Μαγνητῶν δάφνας στεφάνωι τῶι παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ καθὼς πάτριόν ἐστι Δελφοῖς – – – – –]. On laurel crowns see BLECH 1982: 58–60.

¹³³ E.g. *CID* IV 65, 86–89 and 99; *FdD* III 220, 223 and IV 163.


¹³⁴ E.g. *CID* IV 88 and 102.

¹³⁵ NIGEL 2004: 125–129; SWADDLING 1980: 74 f. On the meaning of the laurel in the Apollo cult, see BLECH 1982: 213–246.

information regarding the crowns that had been issued lived on. Public announcement made crowns even more valuable, as did the small number that were granted.

CONCLUSIONS

Crowns as an honour were granted in Delphi from the 3rd century BC onward. The largest number of them were given in the 2nd century BC, while they practically disappeared in the Imperial period. Statues became an honour a century later than crowns, but they flourished in the Imperial times. Heroic worship was issued only once, in the second quarter of the 2nd century AD (see graph below).



The reasons behind the changes in the preferences for awarding specific honours lay in the modification of the entire Delphic honorific habit over time. With the advent of Rome, the citizens of Delphi progressively adopted Roman practice and patterns. The formula of Delphic decrees reached its fully developed stage in the 2nd century BC. The decrees of the Hellenistic times have more extensive patterns, and they are longer than documents of the Roman age. Not only the core elements like the motivation clause, but also some additional elements (i.e. the name of the proposer of the motion, or the nature of the meeting) were shortened in the post-Hellenistic decrees. The style of Imperial decrees was not as elaborate as that from the Hellenistic period. Together with the reduction of the formulae, the number of privileges that were granted also shrank. The number of honours conferred in the Hellenistic times exceeds the number of privileges given in the Roman period, which may be connected with the fact that the total number of decrees voted in the Hellenistic period greatly exceeds the number of documents issued in post-Hellenistic times. The documentation

of the Imperial period is characterised by the growing number of *tituli honorarii*, honorific inscriptions engraved usually on the bases of statues, while the number of decrees that have been preserved is falling. Privileges granted from the early Imperial period onwards more and more often took the form of statues and *tituli honorarii*, as a result of which the contents of the decrees drastically increased. The citizens of Greek cities reduced the number of privileges granted, limiting it to a select few. Statues and citizenship were among the most often granted privileges within post-Hellenistic Delphi, so the number of decrees bestowing images upon meritorious people significantly increased from the 1st century AD onwards, while the number of crowns being granted decreased dramatically.

The most prominent privileges were not always chosen for the most prominent honorands granted by the Delphic polis. Among the most eminent people praised in Delphi were kings Eumenes II from Pergamon¹³⁶, Nikomedes III of Bithynia¹³⁷, and Seleukos II¹³⁸. Among the prominent Roman citizens and officials M. Aemilius Lepidus, Roman consul¹³⁹, Asinius Rufus, Roman praetor¹⁴⁰ and C. Sulpicius Galba, father or grandfather of the Roman emperor should be mentioned¹⁴¹. Only king Nikomedes III was awarded a statue and a crown in Delphi, indicating that the highest honours were not reserved for the most eminent people. The example of a harpist from Kyme granted with both a statue and a crown proves that the citizens of Delphi valued merits and actions toward the polis and the sanctuary much more highly than the social status of the honorands. It is very difficult to trace any patterns in the system of granting particular honours to certain people. The only common feature is that people granted with typical Delphic privileges were usually praised with abbreviated decrees, while more prominent honorands were awarded with full pattern decrees which contain more honorific privileges. However, there are even some exceptions to this rule, as statues were also granted in abbreviated decrees, and a large number of grants of naturalisation comes from abbreviated decrees of the Imperial period. Moreover, prominent people like Asinius Rufus¹⁴², the Asiarch Claudius Achaikos¹⁴³, or Sostratos from Knidos, the architect of the lighthouse of Alexandria¹⁴⁴, were all granted privileges in abbreviated decrees.

¹³⁶ *FdD* III 237.

¹³⁷ *FdD* IV 77.

¹³⁸ *FdD* IV 153.

¹³⁹ *FdD* IV 427 B I.

¹⁴⁰ *FdD* IV 48.

¹⁴¹ *FdD* IV 438.

¹⁴² *FdD* IV 48.

¹⁴³ *FdD* I 213.

¹⁴⁴ *FdD* I 299.

P. GAUTHIER devoted a lot of attention to the people who were awarded with μέγιστα τιμαί in Athens, including a statue set up in the *agora*, meals at public cost in the *prytaneion* (*sitesis*), and front seats at public festivals (*proedria*) among the highest honours. Foreigners were additionally honoured with citizenship¹⁴⁵. After examining the honours and privileges granted by the Delphic polis, questions about the Delphic list of μέγιστα τιμαί may be asked. Did the Delphic list consist of the same honours as the Athenian list? Or did the Delphic list of the highest honour exist at all?

In Delphic honorific decrees, the phrase ἐτείμησάν τε ταῖς μεγίσταις τιμαῖς occurs only once and from the context of the decree it is not known which kind of privileges it included, as the honorand was granted only with Delphic citizenship¹⁴⁶.

Hypothetical Delphic list of μέγιστα τιμαί would definitely not include *sitesis* or permanent meals at public cost in the *prytaneion*, since *sitesis* is not attested in any of the Delphic honorific decrees. Delphians only invited honorands for occasional feasts (called *xenia*¹⁴⁷ or *deipnon*¹⁴⁸). Moreover, the invitations were granted only in the 2nd and 1st centuries BC.

Proedria was one of the most regularly given honours in Delphi (it occurs in 74% of all decrees), so it is hard to include it among the most honorific privileges, especially if we accept the hypothesis that it did not include the Pythian Games¹⁴⁹. In that case, our starting point are statues. Only C. Caristianus Iulianus and Leukios Likinios Eukleides out of the other fourteen people awarded with a statue in Delphi were additionally honoured with citizenship and *proedria*¹⁵⁰. Eight honorands were granted with a statue and *proedria*, while only one person, king Nikomedes III, was awarded with a statue, *proedria* and an occasional invitation to the *prytaneion*¹⁵¹.

If, instead of the very common *proedria*, we add crowns to the list as a very honorific privilege, it would mean that among the people awarded

¹⁴⁵ GAUTHIER 1985. Cf. OLIVER 2007: 183–200.

¹⁴⁶ *FdD* IV 82 (AD 119).

¹⁴⁷ E.g. *FdD* IV 77 (94 BC); *FdD* III 120 (ca. 134 BC?); *FdD* II 20 (178 BC).

¹⁴⁸ *FdD* IV 438 (20–1 BC). The text has been reconstructed.

¹⁴⁹ The majority of decrees specify that the honorand was praised with “the front seat during the festivals organised by the polis” (προεδρίαν ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγῶνοις οἷς ἂ πόλις τίθητι). The Pythian Games were organised not by the Delphic polis, but by the Amphictyony. This would mean that Delphic *proedria* covered only minor festivals like the Theoxenia, or the Heraia. Furthermore, the Amphictyony also granted its own *proedria*, usually expressed with the phrase: προεδρίαν ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι ἐν οἷς ἂν οἱ Ἀμφικτύονες τιθῶσιν (“the front seat during the festivals organised by the Amphictyony”). Without any doubt, the following phrases make a distinction between various festivals organised by different bodies. Cf. LEFÈVRE 2002: 89; AMANDRY 1990: 304 f.

¹⁵⁰ *FdD* IV 47 and 61.

¹⁵¹ *FdD* IV 77.

with μέγιστα τιμαί in Delphi would be: Isagoras and Menekrates, sons of Pherekrates from Larisa¹⁵²; Aristodamos, son of Lykinos from Patrai¹⁵³; Kriton, son of Patron from Drymos¹⁵⁴; king Nikomedes and queen Laodike from Bythynia¹⁵⁵; and a daughter of Aristokrates, a harpist from Kyme¹⁵⁶. However, if we would also like to include heroic worship, such a list would not exist at all, since there is no example of heroic worship, a statue, and a crown being granted all together in one decree. If we narrow the list down to only a statue and heroic worship, then Memmios Neikandros is the only person granted with the highest honours in Delphi¹⁵⁷.

The hypothesis stated above proves that it is rather impossible to make a list of Delphic μέγιστα τιμαί and every attempt to create it ends with failure. The surviving information does not provide us with sufficient knowledge about the Delphic highest honours. The term μέγιστα τιμαί was not definitely as important and widely used in Delphi as it was in Athens, as it appears in only one decree.

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IMPORTANT ABBREVIATIONS

- Choix* A. JACQUEMIN, D. MULLIEZ, G. ROUGEMONT (eds.), *Choix d'inscriptions de Delphes, traduites et commentées*, Athènes 2012.
- CID* *Corpus des Inscriptions de Delphes*.
- FdD* *Fouilles de Delphes*.
- IG* *Inscriptiones Graecae*.
- OGIS* W. DITTENBERGER, *Orientalis Graecae Inscriptiones Selectae*.
- SEG* *Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum*.
- SGDI* *Sammlung der griechischen Dialekt-Inschriften*.
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¹⁵² *FdD* IV 49 and 4.50.

¹⁵³ *FdD* IV 52.

¹⁵⁴ *FdD* IV 54.

¹⁵⁵ *FdD* IV 77.

¹⁵⁶ *SGDI* 2727.

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THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF MEMBERS OF RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATIONS IN ITALY (1ST–3RD CENTURY AD)

by

PRZEMYSŁAW WOJCIECHOWSKI

ABSTRACT: In this article, I set out to show that the social structure of members of Roman religious associations was more complex than was suggested both by early 20th-century historians and the authors of studies published in the recent decades. Many members, especially officials in those corporations, certainly belonged to the so-called Roman middle class. However, they do not seem to have constituted the majority of college members. Depending on the prestige and role which a given college played in urban life, representatives of the lower classes, including slaves and women, were also accepted among the *cultores*.

The beginnings of modern studies on Roman corporations were dominated by a very one-sided vision of the *collegiati* as members of the poorest strata of the urban plebs, who supposedly looked for support and a guarantee of a decent burial in the colleges¹. Once the theory about the existence of funerary colleges was questioned, the issue of the social status of corporation members also came under scrutiny. Who were the *tenuiores* populating these organisations, if they were not paupers with nothing to live on (and no money for a burial)?

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, there were already suggestions that members of professional colleges were employers rather than employees². However, it was only in the 1980s that the perception of members of Roman private corporations underwent an essential change. F. AUSBÜTTEL's publication played a significant role here; the issue of social diversity among the *collegiati* became one of this scholar's central research problems. His new analysis of the source material convincingly showed that although college members belonged to the category of *tenuiores* in terms of their legal status, they were by no means paupers³. AUSBÜTTEL cites sources recording various kinds of contributions which the members paid, from an acceptance fee, a monthly contribution, and occasional

¹ WALTZING 1895–1900: I 256; KORNEMANN 1900: 387–390; DE ROBERTIS 1981: 41–62 and 275.

² Unpublished dissertations of J.H. MORE (1969) and J.L.D. PEARSE (1974); see LIU 2009: 162.

³ AUSBÜTTEL 1982: 34 f.

foundations in money or in kind, to expenses connected with assuming one of the collegial positions (*summa honoraria*, banquet). Among college members, we also find people who financed the construction of the college temple (chapel) or the purchase of the furnishings of the corporation's *scholae* (see below)⁴. The cost of such foundations amounted to thousands of sesterces⁵. Certainly, these were not expenses that a small shop-owner or a simple craftsman, let alone the poorest inhabitants of Roman cities, could afford. Therefore, contemporary historiography studying the *fenomeno associativo* largely tends to treat college members as representatives of the urban plebs elite; they were supposedly the elusive Roman middle class sought after by many historians. VAN NIJF expressed this opinion most forcefully. To him, there is no doubt that college members came from the social stratum which the Romans supposedly referred to as the *plebs media*⁶. According to VAN NIJF, one example of a person who could have been a college member is the baker known from Apuleius' novel – an owner of several slaves, who spent his afternoons in the company of his friends (a fuller, a gardener, and a shopkeeper; *Apul. Met.* II 13). B. BOLLMANN also believes that at least the colleges which we know from epigraphic sources were mainly composed of owners of large crafts shops and merchants⁷. According to this interpretation, membership in a college was a privilege and a status symbol. Colleges themselves became places of social promotion and integration, especially for the wealthy *liberti*⁸.

It is also not difficult to identify people of considerable wealth among members of Roman religious associations. The founders of corporate seats and temples⁹, elements of their furnishings or decorations¹⁰, statues of gods and emperors erected in the *scholae*¹¹, were undoubtedly wealthy people. The same can be said

⁴ Cf. WOJCIECHOWSKI 2005: 172.

⁵ BOLLMANN 1998: 29.

⁶ VAN NIJF 1997: 22. The Dutch historian points out that this term should not be confused with the “middle class” in the modern sense, and the term “urban bourgeoisie” should under no circumstances be used. On the polemics concerning the term *plebs media*, see WOJCIECHOWSKI 2005: 159 and 2012: 109 f.; ROHDE 2012: 36. VAN NIJF, of course, does not cite source testimonies of the usage of this term, only referring very vaguely to the publication of P. VEYNE (VAN NIJF'S reference is to “Veyne 1990–1991” but we will not find such a publication in the bibliography; on the subject of the existence of the Roman middle class, see VEYNE 2000).

⁷ BOLLMANN 1998 does not rule out the existence of colleges for small craftsmen and shop-owners, which due to their modest financial means did not leave traces in the epigraphic or archaeological material. Associations of imperial employees, the *horrea* and *praedia*, are an exception here. Numerous inscriptions left by these corporations document their good financial situation (building *scholae*, religious foundations, etc.). These colleges owed their prosperity to the assistance of successive rulers; see KOLB 1995: 201–211; BOLLMANN 1998: 93.

⁸ See: TRAN 2006; PATTERSON 2006 (in particular pp. 260–263); VERBOVEN 2007.

⁹ *CIL* VI 253, 285, 642; X 5904, 6483.

¹⁰ *CIL* VI 612; IX 3857; *AE* 1907, 78.

¹¹ *CIL* VI 355, 671; *AE* 1979, 62.

about those of the *corporati* who tell us about tombs or donations which they sponsored¹². The statement that many members of religious corporations were well-to-do is certainly valid. The question arises, however, whether this can be extended to include all, or at least the majority, of the *cultores deorum*. J. LIU, who faced the same problem when she studied the social structure of the *centonarii*, concluded that members of the colleges in question included individuals of very varied financial status, and the wealthy members of the Roman *plebs media* did not necessarily constitute the dominant group¹³. An analysis of the social structure of the *cultores deorum* leads us to similar conclusions.

Firstly, we should note the fact that a considerable percentage of the most generous benefactors was comprised of corporate officials, who for obvious reasons cannot be treated as typical *corporati*¹⁴. Their presence among the founders of buildings, statues, and donations is not surprising, since it stemmed from the expectations that the majority of association members had with regard to their functionaries. Naturally, there is no lack of rich *liberti* among the benefactors, who also used their membership in colleges to demonstrate their social promotion. The elite of this group consisted of imperial freedmen and they are the most sizeable group of donators. Ti. Claudius Fortunatus, who belonged to the *familia Caesaris*, funded a feast for the fourth decuria of the *sodalitium Silvani* in Rome¹⁵. Ti. Claudius Priscus, probably also a freedman, gifted *imaginem Imperatoris Caesaris Hadriani Augusti argenteam p(ondo) I cum basi aerea*¹⁶ to the Roman college of Silvanus. What may come as a surprise is the conclusion that almost as frequently slaves appear to be the donors of particularly impressive benefactions. For instance, Melanthus (P. Decius' slave) informs us that he and his colleagues with whom he held the function of *magister Herculis*, built or restored a *tribunal novom* (!) and a *theatrum et proscaenium*; not only that, but they also sponsored the shows performed in the theatre¹⁷. A marble altar with the image of Silvanus and a krater with a base were also gifts from slaves to two religious colleges active in Rome¹⁸. It seems that the origin of all the donations mentioned above was similar. Buildings, statues, feasts, and performances

¹² *AE* 1937, 161; *CIL* VI 630. The good financial condition of people such as L. Calpurnius Chius (who not only built a tomb for his family, but also held the highest offices in several corporations in Ostia, including the *collegium Silvani*) is of course indisputable (*CIL* XIV 309).

¹³ LIU 2009: 161 f.

¹⁴ *CIL* VI 471, 642; XIV 309.

¹⁵ *CIL* VI 630.

¹⁶ *AE* 1979, 62.

¹⁷ *CIL* IX 3857.

¹⁸ *CIL* VI 612 and 671. In the case of Eutyches (the sponsor of inscription *CIL* VI 671) we are dealing with a slave owned by the college, perhaps aspiring to become its member after being manumitted.

were supposed to be a testimony to the success (not only economic) of their benefactors. In order for this message to be clear, these acts of generosity had to considerably exceed the financial means of the majority of college members. Disregarding the doubts about whether all donors were corporation members or only acted as corporation benefactors, we can state without a doubt that in the source material presented so far there is no confirmation of the thesis that colleges accepted mainly well-to-do members of the “middle class”.

Unfortunately, the possibility of carrying out in-depth studies on the economic, social, or even legal status of rank-and-file *corporati* is very limited. The restrictions stem mainly from the nature of the source base. As we have seen, the relatively rich source material documenting the activity of Roman religious corporations is clearly dominated by foundations sponsored by quite a small group consisting of corporate officials and “benefactors” (both those formally connected with the colleges by membership or patronage and incidental donors). The names of regular members of these associations appear rarely, usually in very specific documents, i.e. corporate *alba*. Although a large number of lists of college members has survived, they are usually incomplete and laconic by nature. I do not share the view that the *alba* displayed in corporation seats had mainly administrative functions – they were supposed to help with the verification of those entitled to participate in college meetings, feasts, and donations; they could also have been helpful for example when collecting various contributions¹⁹. For such tasks, more useful lists were those recorded in a considerably less monumental form than stone or metal tablets, which quickly became outdated and lost their administrative functions. It seems that the inscriptions containing names of corporate members and officials which were displayed in the public space had a more symbolic and prestigious value. College officials painstakingly list their functions (regardless of their rank), and sometimes also mention family connections. Unfortunately, the other *corporati* had to restrict themselves to listing just their names, usually in their simplest form. One example is the list of members of the Roman *sodalitium Silvani Pollentis*²⁰. The inscription funded by the patron of the organisation lists a few dozen *socii* only by their *cognomina*. A one-element name, usually regarded as an indication of the servile status of its bearer, was sufficient to identify its owner with certainty in the case of the relatively small community of members of the *sodalitium Silvani*. The situation could have been similar in other associations²¹. As a result, it is impossible to give a clear-cut answer to the question whether we are dealing

¹⁹ AUSBÜTTEL 1982: 38; ROYDEN 1988: 17 f.

²⁰ *CIL* VI 647.

²¹ Members of the *collegium Silvani Aureliani* were also referred to by one-element names. In this case, however, it was a special situation – this college accepted gladiators. Terms referring to the gladiator specialisation of individual members were an additional identifying element (*CIL* VI 631).

with one of the slave colleges or an association of people of different legal statuses, although the latter interpretation seems much more convincing. The basic problem we are facing does not consist in distinguishing between free people and slaves but between those born free and freedmen. The latter, unlike slaves, appear among the *cultores deorum* so frequently that establishing what percentage of cult association members they made up is a vital element in the analysis of the social aspect of how these organisations functioned. Unfortunately, names appearing on lists of corporate members are rarely accompanied by clear status indicators. The meticulousness with which a group of *familia Silvani* members from Trebula Mutuesca emphasises their *ingenuitas* is an uncommon phenomenon. 25 *collegiati* belonging to this organisation give not only their filiation (father's *praenomen* + *filius*) but also the *tribus* to which they belong. The other members (51 people) give only their *tria nomina*²². Whether they are classified in the category of *liberti* or *ingenui* will be decisive for further reflections on the social background of the corporation in question. An onomastic analysis of the 51 names does not, however, lead to far-reaching conclusions about the status of their owners. The criteria which historians normally refer to when they search for traces indicating a servile origin of the people they study²³ prove unhelpful in research into the specific material which lists of college members are. The only indication of the servile origin of some *collegiati* are their Greek *cognomina*. The latter, however, should by no means be treated as clear-cut evidence of the freedman status of their owners. At most, we can assume that the likelihood of a person with a Greek name being a freedman was higher than in the case of bearers of Latin *cognomina*²⁴. A considerable percentage of people with *cognomina Graeca* in a given group therefore indicates that a relatively large percentage of its members were freedmen or their descendants. Following this line of thinking, AUSBÜTTEL concludes that the percentage of *liberti* among college members was the highest in Rome, where over one third of the *collegiati* bore Greek names, while in Italy the owners of non-Latin *cognomina* constituted only one fourth of all the *collegiati*. This, in turn, leads us to conclude that free-born members were clearly the most dominant group among the members of *collegia tenuiorum*²⁵. An onomastic analysis of lists of members of religious associations results in similar findings. Out of the 51 already mentioned

²² *AE* 1929, 161.

²³ On the onomastic indications of the freedman status see mainly ROYDEN 1988: 18–22; JOSHEL 1992: 41 f.; ZAJĄC 2000: 67 f.; LIU 2009: 72 f.

²⁴ For a lengthy summary of the discussion on the reliability of *cognomina Graeca* as an indication of the legal status and origin of their bearers, see ZAJĄC 2000: 17–26; cf. WOJCIECHOWSKI 2005, 71 f.; LIU 2009, 72 f.

²⁵ In the case of some (especially prestigious corporations, such as *collegia fabrum*) this amounts to only about 12 per cent; see AUSBÜTTEL 1982: 39 f.

members of the *familia Silvani* whose names do not include status indicators, thirteen bear Greek *cognomina*, which is almost exactly one fourth of the sample group. If we consider the fact that the other 25 members of the *familia Silvani* are *ingenui certi*, the percentage of likely freedmen among the *collegiati* will reduce drastically. The remaining surviving *alba* of Italic religious associations are only fragmentary²⁶, which makes it difficult to formulate serious statistical conclusions based on them. However, there is no doubt that people with Greek (or non-Latin) names were in the majority on none of the lists²⁷. On the other hand, we can cite the findings of ROYDEN's study on the legal status of officials in Roman corporate colleges. According to those findings, as many as two thirds of corporate functionaries whose legal status is known were freedmen²⁸. The percentage of *liberti* among the officials of religious associations would be just as high if we consider all their *quinquennales* and *curatores* with Greek *cognomina* to be freedmen²⁹. According to ROYDEN, such a large share of *liberti* and their descendants in the college authorities reflects the social structure of Roman colleges, which in turn supposedly stems from the fact that a lot of the population in the capital had servile roots³⁰. Leaving out doubts about the actual percentage of people of servile origin among the Roman population³¹, I do not believe this explains the domination of *liberti* among corporate officials. Not only does the social structure of college authorities not reflect the social structure of the centres where those colleges functioned³², it also does not reflect the structure of the *corporati* themselves. As we know, among the latter the percentage of people with Greek *cognomina* was considerably lower than two thirds. How then can we explain the overrepresentation of freedmen among corporate functionaries? It seems that it was due to the same mechanism that caused representatives of this social group to be exceptionally numerous represented among the city's

²⁶ CIL VI 647, 4872; IX 3578; X 4852; XI 1449, 5737, 6310.

²⁷ The largest percentage of people with *cognomina Graeca* was among the *cultores Herculis* from Pisa (CIL XI 1449) and the *cultores Mithae* from Sentinum (CIL XI 5737); in both cases, it considerably exceeded 25 per cent. On the other hand, out of the 28 surviving names of members of the association of *cultores Iovis Latii* only two have clearly Greek etymology (CIL XI 6310).

²⁸ ROYDEN 1988: 230 f. According to the same study, the percentage of collegial officials of servile origin (descendants of freedmen) was even higher.

²⁹ Only one *quinquennalis* provided information about his legal status: M. Aurelius Successus was *Augusti libertus* (CIL VI 8796). Out of the remaining fourteen *quinquennales* and *curatores*, as many as nine bore Greek *cognomina* (CIL VI 471, 642; XIV 25, 430, 3540).

³⁰ ROYDEN 1988: 230.

³¹ ROYDEN (1988: 21) refers to the research of L.R. TAYLOR (1961), who rejected the very high estimates of T. FRANK (1916) and proposed that we should assume that people of servile origin constituted approximately 50 per cent of the male population of Rome. Cf. ZAJĄC 2000: 22–24; NOY 2000.

³² It should be noted that outside Rome, the percentage of slaves must have been much lower, while they may have used Latin names more often than in Rome; see KAJANTO 1968: 517–534; ZAJĄC 2000: 25 f.

evergetai, funders of votive inscriptions, or owners of grand tombs³³. The determination which drove wealthy *liberti* to climb the corporate ladder followed from the desire to mark their privileged position (at least in comparison to the rest of the freedmen) and their success. The very accession to a college meant the possibility of achieving ambitions which exceeded the limits that confined the life of the vast majority of members of this social group was confined. Holding even the most modest college function turned a nameless member of the urban plebs into a public person. For former slaves this was a particularly coveted promotion. The careers of such figures as M. Aemilius Chrysanthus from Rome prove that wealthy and ambitious *liberti* often found their way to corporate offices, honours, and privileges³⁴. Those slaves whose ambitions went beyond the limits of their own *familia* had a much more difficult road to navigate.

Regulations concerning slaves found in the *lex* of the college of worshippers of Diana and Antinous of Lanuvium may suggest that the presence of *servi* among members of religious associations was a frequent phenomenon³⁵. This inscription tells us that if one of the slaves belonging to the college was manumitted, the person in question was obligated to gift an amphora of good wine to the association. Slaves could also count on being given a corporate funeral. Even if the owner did not want to release the body of a slave who was a member of the college, the *cultores* were supposed to organise a *funus imaginarium*. In truth, this regulation may have been less motivated by the *cultores*' concern over a suitable burial for their colleague and more by a wish to participate in the feast accompanying the funeral, but the fact that a slave was perceived as a member of their community is without doubt. The principle that slaves could enter colleges only with the permission of their owners does not change this fact (*Dig.* XLVII 22, 3, 2).

While the presence of slaves among the *cultores deorum* is unquestionable, the scale of their presence is a contentious matter. In the older literature, the dominant opinion was that quite large numbers of *servi* were represented among the *collegiati*³⁶. At present, historians generally agree with the theory that slaves who were corporate members were a marginal phenomenon³⁷. Indeed, if we analyse e.g. the lengthy lists of college members in ancient Ostia, it turns out that we will find no slaves among them. Similar lists from Rome and other Italic cities feature slaves sporadically. Naturally, the exception are the *familiae* (organised in the form of colleges) composed of slaves and freedmen belonging to

³³ See e.g. WOJCIECHOWSKI 2005: 171 f.

³⁴ *CIL* VI 717.

³⁵ *CIL* XIV 2112.

³⁶ LIEBENAM 1890: 41; KORNEMANN 1900; HUTTUNEN 1974: 121, 185.

³⁷ See AUSBÜTTEL 1982: 41; TRAN 2006: 50–55; LIU 2009: 176 f.

the staff of various “public” institutions (e.g. the *familia publica* in Ostia, the Roman *familia monetaria*)³⁸ or private estates and households³⁹. If we ignore this specific type of associations, it emerges that the majority of *collegiati* with servile status confirmed by the sources appeared in religious colleges⁴⁰. The most spectacular examples were the Spanish *sodalitium vernarum colentes Iside[m]* and the *cultores Mercurii Augusti* at Celeia, the majority of which were composed of slaves⁴¹. However, we also encounter slaves among the Italic *cultores deorum*. The names of more than a dozen slaves appear among the members of the Roman *collegium salutare*, active in the complex of imperial storehouses; we also find *servi* in the partially preserved list of *iuvenes Fificulani cultores Herculis*⁴². Individual slaves are attested among the members of the *familia Silvani* at Trebula Mutuesca⁴³ and *cultores Mithrae* at Sentinum⁴⁴. Additionally, a few slaves are attested as donors of various gifts, the beneficiaries of which were colleges. One of the greatest donations of this type was a gift from Malanthus, a *magister* in the college of the worshippers of Hercules⁴⁵. On the other hand, Hermes and Cinnamus only mention gifts presented to two Roman religious colleges, the *collegium salutare Fortunae Reducis* and the *collegium Liberi Patris et Mercuri*⁴⁶. Ursio and Successa, the parents of a girl named Logisma (a slave belonging to T. Caesienius Acanthus, whose tomb was paid for by the *collegium Silvani*⁴⁷) were probably also slaves.

Adding this information to the fact that no slave has been found among the *centonarii*, and that we can only identify one member of this group among the hundreds of attested *fabri*⁴⁸, has led to the conclusion that religious associations were the form of corporate life which slaves chose the most frequently⁴⁹. While

³⁸ *CIL* XIV 255 and VI 298 respectively.

³⁹ See e.g. *CIL* V 4087. Groups which refer to themselves as *conservi* or *conliberti*, quite frequently appearing in epigraphic material, may have modelled themselves on collegial organisation, but they can hardly be considered associations in the full meaning of the word (cf. AUSBÜTTEL 1982: 37).

⁴⁰ For a compilation of testimonies confirming the presence of *servi* among the members of professional and religious colleges, see WALTZING 1895–1900: IV 251–254.

⁴¹ *CIL* II 3730; III 5196.

⁴² *CIL* VI 30983; IX 3578.

⁴³ *AE* 1929, 161. Mopsus’ status is difficult to determine. AUSBÜTTEL (1982: 38, n. 31) and TRAN (2006: 53 f.) are probably correct in thinking that he was a slave.

⁴⁴ *CIL* XI 5737.

⁴⁵ *CIL* IX 3857.

⁴⁶ *CIL* VI 8826, 10251.

⁴⁷ *CIL* IX 3526.

⁴⁸ *CIL* XI 1355. In this case, the slave was an imperial one, which certainly made his access to the *collegium fabrum* easier. See also LIU 2009: 176.

⁴⁹ AUSBÜTTEL 1982: 41.

I generally agree with this assessment, I would like to emphasise that what we are dealing with here is a hypothesis rather than a statement based on solid sources. All that is necessary to reach the conclusion that slaves chose professional colleges almost as often as religious ones is to take inscriptions other than the *alba* into consideration. There are several tomb inscriptions from Italy alone which indicate that slaves could also be found among the members of professional corporations⁵⁰. Historians studying the presence of slaves in Roman private associations have not avoided obvious mistakes in interpretation; correcting those errors considerably decreases the number of testimonies of the presence of *servi* among the *cultores deorum*⁵¹. One consequence of overestimating the scale of the presence of slaves in cult colleges is the treatment of religious associations as “collegi più poveri”, as recently done by F. DIOSONO, referring not so much to the condition of their finances as to their prestige and place in the social hierarchy of cities⁵². The hierarchy of colleges functioning in a given city was certainly not based on a simple division into religious and professional associations. Such dualism is more typical of modern historiographic analyses than the Roman reality, in which the line between the two types of colleges was difficult to draw⁵³. For slaves, as for freedmen and free-born members, the choice of college was a compromise between the aspirations and the potential of the candidate. Access to the most prestigious corporations (which may have also included religious colleges), which often restricted the number of new members, was beyond the reach of not only slaves but also the majority of free citizens of the city. Unsurprisingly, it was mainly representatives of the slave elite who could pursue membership in colleges. This leads us to the question about the main magnet attracting the ambitious and, apparently, wealthy *servi* to religious associations.

Until recently, historians studying Roman colleges regarded the presence of slaves among their members as the final proof confirming the theory that even the weakest, the poorest, and the lowest in the social hierarchy could reach out to colleges for support in their fight for better living conditions and, most importantly, the guarantee of a decent burial. This now completely obsolete vision of the *fenomeno associativo* continues to live almost exclusively in popular

⁵⁰ CIL V 4501; VI 6699; IX 1505, 1688, 1746, 4129.

⁵¹ For instance, AUSBÜTTEL (1982: 41, n. 49), writing about the dominance of religious colleges among those where slaves appear, cites twelve epigraphic documents. Only three inscriptions from this group unambiguously refer to the *cultores deorum* (CIL VI 631; IX 3578; XI 6310), and in one of these (CIL XI 6310) I did not note the presence of slaves. The other ones were created in the milieu of professional corporations, e.g. the *fabri tignari* (CIL XI 1355), or professional-religious ones, such as the college of employees of *praedia Galbana* (CIL VI 30983), the college of gladiators (*collegium Silvani Aureliani*, CIL VI 631), or the college which accepted slaves belonging to an unknown family connected with the cult of the *Lares* (CIL V 4087).

⁵² DIOSONO 2007: 24.

⁵³ See e.g. CIL V 6970; AE 1937, 161.

scientific publications, whereas historians generally agree with the opinion that for slaves membership in colleges was first of all a means of self-presentation, a confirmation of their position in the privileged stratum of their social group and a form of social promotion, even if the latter was limited⁵⁴. Membership of a college gave them an opportunity to perform a role which was beyond the reach of the vast majority of *servi*. People such as Hermes, Melanthus, or Cinnamus could boast belonging to the community of the *corporati*, which in itself was an unquestionable success, as it meant leaving the small circle of the servile *familia*⁵⁵. However, their aspirations were bigger. They all acted as “benefactors” of the colleges to which they belonged, and two of them lived to enjoy first corporate honours. Cinnamus was honoured with the *immunitas*, whereas Melanthus held the function of one of the *magistri*. He was probably not one of the *magistri quinquennales* in charge of the college, because that would make Melanthus the only known slave to hold this function. He and his *collegae* were most likely a group of auxiliary officials, more usually referred to as *ministri*. A whole group of servile *ministri* functioned e.g. in the Roman college of fullers (*corpus fontanorum*)⁵⁶. The specific nature of this function is well illustrated by an inscription from Rome in which one of the *ministri* is mentioned along with the *curatores* of an unnamed association⁵⁷. All the *curatores* have *tria nomina*, one of them even gives his father’s *praenomen*, while the *minister*’s servile status is very clearly indicated in his introduction. The layout of the text of the inscription also emphasises that the function held by Abinnaeus was subordinate to the *curatores*. Unfortunately, we know little about the duties or powers of the *ministri*. It was probably an auxiliary function, but it may have been attractive for particularly ambitious slaves as a stepping stone to their later corporate career. They probably reached the next stages of their career as free people (*liberti*), and since the change of legal status was accompanied by a change of name, tracking those careers is not possible. This is indirectly confirmed by the fact that there are almost no slaves among the executive officials of colleges. Naturally, an absence of slaves in corporate authorities, especially at the highest level⁵⁸, may have stemmed from a resistance of the majority of the *corporati* against entrusting these positions to people of such a low legal status. The vision of a slave having any form of authority over free people went against the basic principles of the Roman social system. We know, however, that there were exceptions in this regard. Such an exceptional

⁵⁴ See mainly TRAN 2006: 55–65.

⁵⁵ *CIL* VI 8826, 10251; IX 3857.

⁵⁶ *AE* 1975, 21.

⁵⁷ *CIL* VI 10330.

⁵⁸ Perhaps one exception concerns the *quinquennales* of the *collegium fullonum* from Spolegium; the interpretation of the inscription which includes a mention of Pampilus, a slave of T. Turpilus, is not clear-cut; see *CIL* XI 4771.

career was pursued by Primigenius, who held the office of *curator* in the *collegium lotorum* in Aricia for at least two terms, as recorded in a votive inscription he funded⁵⁹. The co-funder of the inscription dedicated to Diana, the patroness of the corporation, was Primigenius' son, M. Arrecinus Gellianus, also a *curator* in the same college. It is worth noting that Primigenius' son was a free man, as indicated by his three names. The explanation for this rather unusual situation can be found in the inscription itself. Primigenius introduces himself as “r(ei) p(ublicae) Aricinorum ser(vus) arc(arius)”. Primigenius, in charge of the city treasury, held a prominent position within the *familia publica* and in the administration of Aricia⁶⁰. The price for the great prestige connected with holding the office of the city treasurer was the servile status of the people who held it. This was also the case for the *dispensatores*, both imperial and private. One of them, Cinnamus, *verna* and *dispensator* of Emperor Hadrian, was, as we remember, honoured with the *immunitas* of the *collegium Liberi Patris et Mercuri*⁶¹. Lixus Lucil(ianus) is a one-off exception; not only did he hold the function of *curator (iterum)* and *quaestor* of a college of unknown name, but he was also appointed one of the decurions of this corporation⁶². It is certainly not merely a coincidence that two out of the four slaves mentioned here who held particularly high positions in collegial structures belonged to the same “professional” category. The *arcarii* and the *dispensatores*, sometimes managing considerable financial resources, were in an unquestionably privileged position compared to the other *servi*. We know that the positions of various *institores*, which offered the opportunity to gain wealth and connections, were attractive even for the *ingenui*, who were prepared to go into slavery so that they could hold them⁶³. There are also numerous testimonies that members of this category of slaves entered into “marriages” with free women, which clearly indicates the high social status of the *dispensatores*⁶⁴. Their wealth and influence made them the natural elite of the slave world⁶⁵. What is equally vital in the context which is of interest to us is the fact that the *dispensatores* remained slaves much longer than other *servi*. While the majority of slaves were manumitted when they were around thirty years old, the *dispensatores*, due to the

⁵⁹ *CIL* XIV 2156.

⁶⁰ An example of the fact that slaves administering the city treasury may have owned large fortunes, and as a result an appropriately high social position, may be the *dispensator arcae summarum* of the city of Asculum, who covered a considerable part of the costs of building the sanctuary of Fortuna out of his *peculium* (*CIL* IX 5177).

⁶¹ *CIL* VI 8826.

⁶² *CIL* VI 10333. The slaves Asiaticus (*CIL* VI 10350) and Hymnus (*CIL* VI 10369) were also among corporate decurions.

⁶³ *Dig.* XXVIII 3, 6, 5; see CARLSEN 1995: 151 f.; HERRMANN-OTTO 2001: 181 f.

⁶⁴ *CIL* VI 6270, 9326, 9328, 9334; see HERRMANN-OTTO 1994: 383 f.

⁶⁵ See WOJCIECHOWSKI 2005: 175 f.

specific nature of their function, remained slaves at least a dozen years longer⁶⁶. We can therefore assume that the decisive majority of slaves who were ambitious and wealthy enough to think of a corporate career were freed before they even reached the first steps of this career. Only the *dispensatores* remained slaves long enough to hold the function of *curator* before the *manumissio*. The relatively low age limit when slaves were manumitted is, in my opinion, one of the main reasons (along with the traditional barriers resulting from the low social status of slaves) why there are so few *servi* not only in corporate authorities, but also generally among the epigraphically attested *corporati*.

Cases of slaves holding corporate offices, or at least para-offices, show how complex and removed from textbook models the reality of Roman colleges could have been. It turns out that at least for some *servi*, those who climbed to the higher rungs of the social ladder as a result of the functions they held (Primigenius and Cinnamus) or their connections, colleges were a space where they could realise their “political” ambitions and emulate the behaviour typical of the real urban elite.

An analysis of the social structure of members of religious corporations cannot overlook the problem of women’s participation in collegial life. Epigraphic testimonies leave no doubt that there were also women among the *collegiati*. Therefore, similarly to the case of slaves, the subject of the discussion is not whether women could belong to colleges, but what role they played in the life of these organisations.

Leaving aside the very specific case of the very poorly documented *collegia mulierum*⁶⁷, we can venture the statement that the presence of women among the *corporati* was rare⁶⁸. Female names appear in only a handful of the dozens of surviving corporate *alba*⁶⁹. Usually women also constitute a negligible percentage of their members. The *album* of the college of worshippers of Jupiter from Pisaurum is quite a typical document in this regard⁷⁰. Out of over a dozen *cultores* whose names have survived, only three are women. However, importantly, the author of the inscription in no way tried to separate the female names, which clearly distinguishes this inscription from the list of members of the *corpus (fabrum) sub(a)edianorum* at Virunum, which is frequently quoted in this context⁷¹. The latter document contains the names of as many as nineteen women, which adds up to

⁶⁶ WEAVER 1972: 226; BOULVERT 1974: 156 f.; HERMANN-OTTO 1994: 390 f.; AUBERT 1994, 196 f.; CARLSEN 1995: 151.

⁶⁷ See e.g. *CIL* VI 10109; AUSBÜTTEL 1982: 42.

⁶⁸ For a compilation of inscriptions documenting the presence of women among the *collegiati*, see WALTZING 1895–1900: IV 254–257.

⁶⁹ See *CIL* VI 9398, 34004, 30983; XI 1355; XIV 256, 326; *AE* 1977, 265; 1993, 1245.

⁷⁰ *CIL* XI 6310.

⁷¹ *AE* 1993, 1245.

more than one third of the members of the college. Importantly, twelve out of the nineteen women are wives, and the other three sisters, of college members. Their names are found in a separate column, in an order which mirrors the one in which their husbands and brothers appear. This specific way of presenting women belonging to the *corpus subaedianorum* does indeed provoke us to question the equality of women in the corporate structure⁷². Perhaps this was to do with the professional character of this college. Religious associations were by nature more open to women, since the sphere of cult gave them considerably more opportunities to participate actively and therefore to be full (or fuller) members of the college. We should especially expect a considerable female presence, if not dominance, in the case of colleges connected with the cult of goddesses such as Isis, Magna Mater, or Bona Dea. However, it turns out that epigraphic material supports these assumptions based on literary sources only in the case of the associations of the worshippers of Magna Mater. The colleges at Serdice and Saepinum, consisting solely of female worshippers of Magna Mater, are an extreme example⁷³. At Mactaris, there were *universi dendrophori et sacrati utriusque sexus*⁷⁴. We should remember, however, that organisations joining together the *dendrophori* and the *canophori* connected with the cult of Cybele had such a specific genesis and character that they can hardly be treated as being the same as other religious colleges. The same reservation applies to structures headed by epigraphically well-documented *magistrae* or *ministrae Bonae Deae*⁷⁵. Only in the case of Veturia Semna is there no doubt that she belonged to a religious college; on her tomb, we read: “D(is) M(anibus) Veturiae Semn(a)e honoratae o[b] magistratum collegi(i) Bonae deae”⁷⁶. We do not know, however, whether the college headed by Veturia was comprised of women only. The literary tradition would incline us to make such an assumption, but the considerable number of men among the funders of inscriptions dedicated to the goddess dictates much caution on this matter. In turn, an analysis of inscriptions documenting the activities of associations of worshippers of Isis gives us no reason whatsoever to state that they were organisations in which women played the dominant role. On the contrary, no women appear among the epigraphically attested Italic *Isiaci*. Therefore, similarly to professional corporations, the presence of women among the *cultores deorum* seems to have been an exception rather than the rule. On the other hand, there are testimonies confirming that women knew and frequently had various relations with the corporate environment. Sometimes this amounted to direct involvement in the collegial life through enrolment into the

⁷² LIU 2009: 179.

⁷³ *CIL* IX 2480; see also LIU 2009: 179.

⁷⁴ *CIL* VIII 23400.

⁷⁵ See e.g. *CIL* V 757, 759, 762; XI 4634; XII 654.

⁷⁶ *CIL* VI 2239.

association, but more frequently women played the role of benefactors of these corporations. An inscription from Ulubrae informs us about a temple erected for the local college of the worshippers of Jupiter⁷⁷. Its founders were Geminia Myrtis and Anicia Prisca. Their gift was not completely disinterested, since the *cultores* were supposed to organise feasts in the temple in honour of the husband of one of the benefactors. The founders did not have to be formally connected with the college. Myrtis and Prisca almost certainly did not belong to the *cultores Iovis Axorani* (they also dedicated a similar temple to Bellona)⁷⁸. We also do not know what ties connected Caesia Sabina, the priestess of Fortuna from Veii, with the college of which the goddess was patron. We can merely guess that Caesia was strongly involved in the life of the *collegium Fortunae*, since her husband founded a new grand seat for the association⁷⁹. On the other hand, Ulpia Cynegis, who gifted a quantity of olive oil and two sarcophagi to the Roman *collegium Aesculapi et Hygiae*, definitely belonged to the corporation in question⁸⁰. The title of *immunis*, which Ulpia was clearly proud of, leaves no doubt as to her place in the corporate structure. It is worth noting, however, that the founder reserved the sarcophagi donated to the temple for herself and her family. The college was clearly supposed to take care of the graves of Ulpia and her family. Such *tutela* was probably one of the things that attracted women (especially wealthy ones) to the associations in their milieu⁸¹. Let us remember that the founders of the temple gifted to the *cultores Iovis Axorani* also expected commemoration from them. Particularly wealthy and influential women could receive the titles of *mater* or *patrona collegii* from the colleges, which was of course connected with certain obligations towards the *collegiati* but also with some privileges, such as commemorative celebrations organised by the associations. The case of Salvia Marcellina (*mater collegii Aesculapii*) shows that women were eager to take advantage of this opportunity⁸². However, this does not change the general appraisal of the involvement of women in corporate life. Their presence among members of both professional and religious colleges was a rare phenomenon, without a visible influence on the functioning of these organisations.

Summing up our reflections on the composition of religious associations, we should focus the discussion on the social aspect of *il fenomeno associativo*, especially the theory, dominant in more recent historiography, according to which private Roman colleges played the role of status groups for members of the urban

⁷⁷ CIL X 6483.

⁷⁸ CIL X 6482.

⁷⁹ CIL XI 3810.

⁸⁰ AE 1937, 161.

⁸¹ Building a tomb may have been a part of the commemorative agreement; perhaps this is the case with Iulia Eupilia, whose tomb was erected by the *collegium Victoriae* (CIL IX 2811).

⁸² CIL VI 10234.

middle classes. With regard to professional colleges, the theory amounts to stating that members of these colleges were owners of craft shops rather than their staff. It seems that the social composition of these organisations was considerably more complex⁸³. As I have attempted to show, religious colleges also could have had (and usually had) a varied social composition. Although the clear domination of Latin *cognomina* among the members of religious corporations leads us to the conclusion (formulated already by AUSBÜTTEL) that the majority of the *collegiati* were free-born, it is much too risky to rely exclusively on the very unreliable onomastic criterion when appraising the legal status of the people in question. It would probably not be erroneous to state that the majority of the *corporati* belonged to the urban “middle classes”. However, the term is so imprecise that, depending on the definition we accept, it can include people belonging to very different social groups in terms of status, aspirations, and financial means⁸⁴. Depending on the prestige that a given corporation enjoyed, and the role it played in the public life of the local community, the level of its openness to people of low legal status could have varied. Naturally, it would be difficult to find freedmen among the *Martenses*, who recruited mainly veterans⁸⁵. Freedmen, on the other hand, played leading roles in the authorities of the majority of religious corporations. Differences in social and economic status occurred not only among members of various corporations, but also within one college. Corporate feasts were attended both by their wealthy and ambitious founders and by “regular” members, for whom the monthly contribution transferred to the collegial treasury was a considerable burden, and the fine of 20 sesterces was the ultimate argument to persuade them to fulfil their duties as college members (*familia Silvani* at Trebula Mutuesca).

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⁸³ The image of the college as a community comprising both wealthy members of the Roman *plebs media* and their poorer neighbours also emerges from reading Roman normative sources (see e.g. *Dig.* L 6, 6, 12).

⁸⁴ WOJCIECHOWSKI 2012.

⁸⁵ *CIL* V 6970; IX 1682–1687; XI 136.

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THE *ALBUM SENATORIUM* OF THE SEVERAN PERIOD – RESEARCH PROBLEMS*

by

DANUTA OKOŃ

ABSTRACT: The paper is a research report presenting the 292 new senators of the Severan period who should be added to the list compiled by BARBIERI in 1952. The analysis of this new album leads to the conclusion that the Senate of that period consisted of about 900–1000 members.

Commencing my research on the senatorial order of the Severan period (193–235), I assumed that my research priority should be the creation of a complete *album senatorium* illustrative of the then elite of the Roman Empire. Research on such an album turned out to be a necessity, particularly as the last known monograph on the subject, by G. BARBIERI entitled *L'albo senatorio da Settimio Severo a Carino (193–285)*, was published as early as 1952 and is thus out-of-date. The effects of my research on the subject in question demonstrate that undertaking such a work was indispensable. The new album¹ that has resulted from the said work offers answers to two recurring questions, namely, how many senators of the Severan period do we know of, and how many members comprised the Senate in the final years of the Early Empire?

According to a preliminary research assumption, the number of senators in the period under discussion oscillated between 1200 and 1800. This number has been acknowledged as in the literature on the subject, namely, that the then Senate comprised 600–900 persons², and that in the course of the 42 years of the Severan rule only one change of generation occurred.

* I have been conducting research on the senatorial order of the Severan period under the auspices of the Polish National Science Centre (NCN). The project “The Album of Senators from the Age of Severan Dynasty (AD 193–235)” has been financed from the funds provided by the National Science Centre on the basis of decision No. DEC-2011/01/B/HS3/01273. This article constitutes a report of the work conducted using the above mentioned grant.

¹ The album will be published in 2016.

² Since the Senate began functioning, the number of its members had been on the increase. This natural process was associated with the social and territorial development of the Roman state. In the early royal period, the Senate, traditionally, comprised 100 members; in the late royal period

The authors who confirmed the number 600 as the Senate's upper limit were the following: G. ALFÖLDY, K. HOPKINS, R.J.A. TALBERT, F. JACQUES, A. CHASTAGNOL, C. LETTA³. On the other hand, G. BARBIERI, F. VITTINGHOFF, and W. ECK⁴ were of a different opinion as regards the Senate's make-up, opting for the maximum number of senators to have reached 800, even 900. One needs to emphasise that in the majority of cases scholars accepted the results of long standing research which, however, was not based on specific prosopographical analyses and statistics.

Of all the scholars mentioned above, only G. BARBIERI was capable of presenting a list – in the form of a prosopographical album – of senatorial names so as to provide evidence for his suggested number of them.

According to BARBIERI's calculations, we know of 937 senators who functioned during the reign of emperors Septimius Severus and Caracalla, and of 471 senators working under the reign of emperors from Macrinus to Alexander Severus, that is, of 1408⁵ senators altogether for the entire Severan period, a number which makes for 78–88% of the then senatorial order (1600–1800) as estimated by the Italian researcher. Unfortunately, in his book BARBIERI repeated the same names of *clarissimi* living in the times of subsequent princes; as a result, in practice, the number of identified and accurately dated senators is far smaller than declared. Other senators from the later period should still be added to this number, who commenced their careers during the reign of the Severan dynasty and whose names BARBIERI mentioned on two separate lists (further subdivided into certain and probable senators). The names from these lists are in part the names formerly repeated, a situation which contributes to the chaos, lack of clarity and impossibility of an accurate estimation as regards the number of senators whose lives and activity could be dated to the years 193–235. One cannot but also notice that near the end of the book, in the chapter entitled "Aggiunte e correzioni", new senators appear (identified as numbers with the added letters a, b, c), some of them numbered twice (e.g. No. 264/265 is identical

– 300 members, whereas in the Republic period (starting from Sulla) – 600 members, only reaching the number of 1000 senators in the Caesarian period. During the Imperial period, Augustus, in an effort to reinforce both his position and the prestige of the Senate, returned to the maximum limit of 600 senators. As regards later emperors, we lack data on the actual number of members comprising the Senate. Therefore we can only speculate about such a number based on the known number of senators, a method which leads to the occurrence of significant differences in researchers' estimates.

³ ALFÖLDY 1977: 17 f.; HOPKINS 1983: esp. 147; TALBERT 1984: 29 f.; JACQUES 1987; CHASTAGNOL 1992: 110; LETTA 2014.

⁴ BARBIERI 1952: esp. 431; VITTINGHOFF 1957: 110 f.; ECK 1971: 396.

⁵ This number encompasses 885 certain and 523 possible senatorial names. BARBIERI has achieved such a result by adding 604 certain to 333 doubtful senatorial names dated for the Septimius Severus and Caracalla period as well as 281 certain and 190 uncertain senatorial names identified with the times of emperors from Macrinus to Alexander Severus. See BARBIERI 1952: 415 ff., 443 ff.

to No. 1280/1281). In effect, using BARBIERI's book as a springboard for further research becomes problematic⁶.

The works of G. ALFÖLDY⁷ and his successor P.M.M. LEUNISSEN⁸ must also be mentioned at this point. Their research concentrates on an analysis of the senatorial elite (e.g. consulars), yet include numbers which are significant for the purposes of this article. Utilizing both G. ALFÖLDY's own assumption that in practice every second senator became a consul⁹ as well as P.M.M. LEUNISSEN's estimates calculating the number of consuls functioning during the Severan period (emperors and second consuls excluded) for ca. 550¹⁰, we receive the number of 1100 (550 x 2) senators of the Severan period. Obviously, that is a speculative number (resulting directly from authorial assumptions) having little source validity and demonstrating that speculations unsupported by concrete and complete research can obscure the final results (as I will show later on).

One can fall into a similar trap while considering the speculative percentage of the so-called material representativeness. On the whole, scholars (e.g. W. ECK, P.M.M. LEUNISSEN)¹¹ concur as to the fact that about 50% of the actual *ordo senatorius* has already been identified. Accordingly, with the assumed 1200–1800 senators functioning in the entire Severan period, we should know about 600–900 of them. Still, even BARBIERI (his repetitions included) identified as many as 1408 senators (including 885 certain names), whereas the album I have produced (I shall return to this point later in this text) encompasses 1691 senatorial names (1188 confirmed names is included in this number). Deducing that I have managed to gather 50% of all existing senatorial names, then my album will not be completed until there are 3382 senators in it (2376 if we consider only the confirmed names), a number which suggests the Senate comprised of about 1200–1700 *clarissimi viri*!

⁶ BARBIERI's calculations have been analysed in detail by DIETZ (1980: 261 ff.) and I fully support the views presented in this latter book.

⁷ ALFÖLDY 1977.

⁸ LEUNISSEN 1989.

⁹ ALFÖLDY 1977: 19.

¹⁰ LEUNISSEN 1989: 11. This number seems slightly overestimated at first. Typically, the Roman Empire offered 12 consular positions annually (for 2 ordinary and 10 suffect consuls), a number which, stretched to cover the period of 42 years, amounts to 504 consuls altogether. However, the number in question does not include consuls-emperors and second consuls and excludes consuls and consulars functioning in the Senate during the reign of emperor Commodus (and even that of Marcus Aurelius) who remained active as late as the beginnings of the Severan rule. Taking into consideration the above elements, I support LEUNISSEN's calculations as being plausible.

¹¹ ECK (1973: 381–385) assumes that we have the knowledge of about 50% of all senatorial names of the principate period. LEUNISSEN (1989: 11) quotes similar percentage also as regards consuls of the Severan period. According to him, consuls constitute one of the best known groups (apart from *proconsules Asiae* and *proconsules Africae*) – e.g. we know of 15% of *curatores operum publicorum*.

Submitting the literature on the subject to academic analysis, we need to observe that at present none of the publications fulfill scholarly expectations as regards the estimates of the number of senators, the make-up of the Senate, or the degree of source representativeness in question.

With this state of affairs in mind, I resolved to create a complete, updated list of all known senators functioning in the Severan period as well as to determine the numerical ceiling for the Roman Senate in the period of the Early Empire's decline. In order to do so, I have critically analysed both G. BARBIERI's register of senatorial names and the data resulting from later archaeological discoveries (mainly epigraphic and published in e.g. *L'Année Épigraphique*, new volumes of the *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum* and the *Prosopographia Imperii Romani*).

The question whether, for the years 193–235, the division into senators of the Septimius Severus–Caracalla period and those belonging to the times of emperors from Macrinus to Alexander Severus is worthwhile, remained open. On one hand, over the course of 42 years, the generation changed; yet, some senators from the initial period in which the dynasty reigned could have lived till as late as the decline of Alexander Severus' rule. One good example might be C. Caesonius Macer Rufinianus, a man who used to be a military tribune in the times of Marcus Aurelius, a commander under Septimius Severus and Alexander's companion (*comes*) during the Persian expedition. During the reign of Alexander Severus (ca. 230) his son became consul, which meant that for at least 10 years the father and his son functioned together in the Senate. One must therefore take into consideration that such a situation may have been common for other senators, too¹².

On the other hand, the civil wars brought about significant fluctuations in the Senate, the elimination of certain senators (within the framework of political cleansing)¹³ and the rapid promotion of new people; *ergo*, the fixed division into the times of the "early" and "late" Severi in the album on a dynasty which ruled for 42 years seems unjustified. In my view, one list covering all the senators of the entire epoch and

¹² Demographic research demonstrates that the average length of a senator's life was longer than that of the rest of the population. It is assumed that 30% of the entire population, having lived through their 5th year, could count on living until 60. See e.g. SUDER 2003: 226 ff., the book based on the research quoted in world literature on the subject by e.g. R.P. DUNCAN-JONES, B.W. FRIER, K. HOPKINS and E. LO CASCIO. It should be mentioned that the majority of demographers (e.g. HOPKINS 1983: 147 f.; JACQUES 1987) assumes that the senatorial career, if it began at the age of 25, lasted for 30 years at least. Still, this number has been confirmed not so much by prosopographic research, but rather the will to adjust a senator's lifespan to the mathematical model based on the 20 quaestors introduced annually to the Senate. After 30 years, the received number amounts to 600 senators (20 quaestors x 30 years = 600 senators), and the make-up of the Senate's is completely reinvented (additional external *adlectiones* excluded!). Therefore, the actual lifespan (55 years at least, on the average) has been drawn up on the basis of an assumption that the Senate comprised approximately 600 members. Such calculations must, however, be "handled with care", remembering that life does not necessarily fit into mathematical patterns, in particular those which need to be reconsidered after as many as 2000 years.

¹³ OKOŃ 2012 and 2013. In both of these works I mention the repressed, establishing their total number to amount to 94 in the Severan period.

divided into those dated with certainty and into probable senators seems far more justified.

One must admit that a large part of the *nomina* – 1399 to be precise¹⁴ – that we know of from BARBIERI has remained uncorrected in the new album, even though I have filled in some of the missing information concerning their careers, family connections, or the identity of particular individuals. An example could be P. Fu(...) Pontianus, legate of Moesia, up till now identified as Furius while actually being one and the same as the legate of Pontus-Bithynia, C. Pontius Pontianus Fuficius Maximus¹⁵. Another example can also be the identification of the *consul ordinarius* for the year 234, who is quoted in the sources as [Su]lla Urbanus but is actually [M. Munatius Su]lla Urbanus, the son of M. Munatius Sulla Cerialis, *cos. ord.* 215¹⁶.

Still another example of the progress as regards the identification of senatorial names might be the anonymous father of Tullia P. f. Marsilla Quentinia Rossia Rufina Rufia Procula whom, owing to the fleet diploma of 206 published by W. ECK and H. LIEB¹⁷, I managed to identify as consul P. Tullius Marsus, as mentioned in the said certificate.

After years of research and many careful analyses of BARBIERI's list of 1398 senators, I have managed to add 292¹⁸ more names to this number (159 certain and 133 probable). Among those names there are representatives of several senatorial houses e.g. Aiacii¹⁹, Aradii²⁰, Asinii²¹, Attii Rufini²², Calpurnii

¹⁴ This is the number I reached after having verified BARBIERI's lists so that the repetitions on them were eliminated, the senators introduced as "Aggiunte e correzioni" were calculated, the people counted as one were separated, and the men who, according to the latest research, should not be dated to the Severan period, were removed from the list. I moved some of these people from the "probable" into the "certain" category (or the other way round), thus receiving the said total of 1399 senatorial names, of which 1028 names I recognised as certain and 371 – as probable.

¹⁵ HAENSCH, WEISS (2007; cf. *AE* 2007, 1335) published the inscription of the legate of Pontus-Bithynia. For its identification, see OKOŃ 2015.

¹⁶ KRIECKHAUS 2005.

¹⁷ ECK, LIEB 1993. The authors suggest the consul's affinity with Tullia Marsilla, known from the inscription *NS* 1919, 207, whereas I consider them to be father and daughter.

¹⁸ See the Appendix.

¹⁹ Q. Aiadius Censorinus Celsinus Arabianus (*AE* 1968, 518, 522 and 523), L. Aiadius Modestus Aurelianus Priscus Agricola Salvianus (*AE* 1968, 518, 522 and 523).

²⁰ (P?) Aradius Paternus (*RE* Suppl. XIV, col. 54, No. 1 a) – *cos. suff.* ante a. 231; P. Aradius Paternus Rufinianus Aelianus [Iu?]n(ior) (*CIL* VI 31 948); Q. Aradius Rufinus Optatus Aelianus (*PIR*² C Add. No. 1013a; *PIR*² R, p. 96 f.); P. Aradius Roscius Rufinus Saturninus Tiberianus (*CIL* VIII 14470); Ti. Aradi[us (?) Saturninus] (*CIL* X 6439 = *CIL* VI 1695).

²¹ C. Asinius Rufus Nicomachus (*AE* 1993, 1506) – *cos. suff.* sub Severis; Sex. Asinius Rufinus Fabianus; M. Asinius Rufinus Valerius Verus Sabinianus (*AE* 1954, 58 = *AE* 1955, 122) – *cos. suff.* sub Severis?

²² Attius Rufinus (*AE* 2003, 1674) – *cos. suff.* sub Severis; Attius Rufinus (*RE* Suppl. XV, coll. 75 f., No. 27 a) – *cos. suff.* inter a. 238 et 240; Attius Rufinus Metillianus (*AE* 2003, 1674).

Reginiani²³, Carminii²⁴, Marcii²⁵, Cn. Pompeii²⁶ from Ephesus, and Sollii²⁷, with the remaining senators being the only representatives of their *gentes* on the list. The entire group encompasses 77 consuls, of whom only a few came from the old aristocratic families of senators such as e.g. Asinii²⁸, Calpurnii Reginiani²⁹, Claudii Pompeiani³⁰, Claudii Severi³¹, Pompeii Falcones³², Nonii Arrii³³, whereas the rest constituted (as far as we know) *homines novi*.

In the majority of cases, the inclusion of new *nomina* on the list results from epigraphic discoveries, while a few other new *nomina* also emerged as a result of splitting what had been treated as a single identity into two different ones. Added to the already known senators, these names amount *in toto* to 1691 (1188 certain and 503 probable) of the ascertained *clarissimi viri*.

Assuming the above quoted numbers are complete, while having in mind that at least one generation change occurred during the reign of the Severan dynasty, we can estimate the number of senators comprising the Senate of the period under discussion.

If we surmise that the Senate constituted 600 senators, a number which, when considered within the entire period of the dynasty's reign (i.e. within 42 years), amounts to 1200 senators (one generation change) altogether, then the same number, added to the number of the ascertained 1188 senators (*certi*) would complete the list of almost all *clarissimi viri* of the period in question (99%). On the other hand, assuming the number of 1691 (*certi et probabiles*) to be the basis of calculations, we notice a contradiction – there are more *clarissimi viri* than is possible.

Also, considering the fact that the senate constituted 800 senators (i.e. 1600 altogether), we come to the following conclusions: the ascertained senators,

²³ Calpurnius Reginianus (*PIR*² C 307) – cos. suff. saec. III parte priore; Calpurnius Reginianus (*PIR*² C 308).

²⁴ (M. Ulpius) Carminius Claudianus (neoterus) (*PIR*² C 431); T. Flavius Carminius Athenogoras Claudianus (*PIR*² C 429).

²⁵ Marcus Maximilianus (*AE* 1998, 1619 = *RMD* I 2); (Q?) Marcus Victor Faustianus (*PIR*² M 252); P. Marcus Maximilianus (*CIL* IX 338, col. I 29); Marcus Vic[tor] (*CIL* VI 32334, 3).

²⁶ [Cn. Pompeius (?)] (*PIR*² P 579); [Cn. Pompeius (?)] (*PIR*² P 580); [Cn. Pompeius (?)] (*PIR*² P 581); [Cn. Pompeius (?)] (*I.Eph.* 710 b); Cn. Pompeius Antonius Amoenus (*PIR*² P 590).

²⁷ [...Sollius...] (*PIR*² S 767) – cos. suff. saec. III; M. Sollius At[ticus] (*PIR*² S 768).

²⁸ C. Asinius Rufus Nicomachus (*AE* 1993, 1506) – cos. suff. sub Severis; M. Asinius Rufinus Valerius Verus Sabinianus (*AE* 1954, 58 = *AE* 1955, 122) – cos. suff. sub Severis?

²⁹ Calpurnius Reginianus (*PIR*² C 307) – cos. suff. saec. III parte priore.

³⁰ (Ti. Claudius? vel Vettulenus) Pompeianus (*PIR*² P 567); (Ti. Claudius?) Pompeianus (*PIR*² P 569) – cos. suff. ca. a. 212; L. Clodius Pompeianus (*AE* 2006, 77).

³¹ (Cn. Claudius?) Severus (*PIR*² S 634); Cn. Claudius Severus (*PIR*² C 1024).

³² [Pompeius F]alco (*AE* 2006, 1866).

³³ M. Nonius Arrius Mucianus Manlius Carbo (*PIR*² M 115).

being the basis for our calculations, result in representative material amounting to 74.25%; when our calculations include also the probable senatorial names, the contradictions start to crop up anew. These contradictions cannot but be explained by a bigger number than assumed of generational changes in the Senate.

With the number of 600 men, there must have been almost three changes for the Senate to comprise 1691 senators (1691: 600 = ca. 2.8), whereas with the number of 800 men, the indicator would approximate 2.1 (1691: 800 = ca. 2.1). Still, demographers unanimously claim that the average senatorial lifespan was 55, with the years of his public service amounting to 30, a fact that explains why, in the Severan period, not even two full generations of senators constituted the make-up of the Senate (42: 30 = 1.4)³⁴. These calculations might be correct when we assume that the average senatorial lifespan decreased systematically. For example, with 600 people and 2.8 changes within the period of 42 years, a statistical senator could not but have lived to the age of 40 (42 years: 2.8 = 15 years; 25 + 15 years = 40 years)³⁵. On the other hand, with 800 senators, their average lifespan must have amounted, on the average, to 45 years (42 years : 2.1 = 20 years; 25 + 20 years = 45 years). This means that senators might have lived 15 and 10 years shorter respectively than the contemporary demographic research assumes³⁶. Such a calculation is hardly possible, the more so that we speak of a population of adult, rich, well-nourished men who were taken care of medically. Following the latter line of reasoning, we would have to assume that only a few senators lived long enough to become consuls, a contradiction in terms if we consider the data we have on the subject.

It needs to be emphasised as well that researchers' *communis opinio* clearly indicates that the source representativeness oscillates around 50%³⁷. The data I have collected is certainly not complete (even though I assess its representativeness at more than 50% – see below) and each subsequent year brings facts on new, so far unknown senators.

This being considered, the two calculations analysed above regarding the Senate's numerical make-up – 600 and 800 – must be considered to be too small to be scrutinised further.

³⁴ Even considering that the senatorial list includes both small boys who grew up and entered the Senate and *clarissimi* who, theoretically, never undertook public service, or we do not know they did.

³⁵ Just to make things clear: 42 years is the period of the rule of the Severi, while the limit of the 25th year of age results from the fact that the majority of senators became quaestors then, thus commencing their public career in the Senate.

³⁶ See HOPKINS 1983, and all the scholarly advocates and adversaries who quote him.

³⁷ This concerns senators only, of course. For comparison, as regards materials on equestrian officers, as much as 4% of them have been recognised (see DEVIJVER 1993), whereas for the whole 2nd century equestrian order the number is 5% (DEMOUGIN 1993: 240).

Therefore, factors must be selected which influenced the Senate's actual numerical make-up. They are as follows:

- young quaestors' promotion to the Senate,
- *adlectiones* to the Senate,
- senators' average lifespan,
- persecution.

If, following the demographers, we assume that a generation in public service amounted to 30 years of work for that service (from age 25 to age 55), then we can calculate that each year 20 young quaestors commenced their senatorial careers, with 5–10 *adlecti*, promoted at various stages of their careers, additionally entering the Senate³⁸. In consequence, within 30 years, this would give the number of 600 senators who entered the Senate as quaestors and 150–300 *adlecti*, that is, 750–900 senators *in toto*, and, for the entire period in question – 1500–1800. Additionally assuming the economic development, the increase in the level of affluence and medical progress, one cannot but conclude that the senatorial lifespan lengthened³⁹, which can be translated into the Senate's make-up comprising, despite generational changes, of more “old school” senators.

Another factor contributing to the increase in the number of senators could be the larger number of *quaestores provinciae* due to e.g. administrative reorganisation. If we assume that e.g. 5 additional quaestors were appointed annually, then the number of *clarissimi viri* during the reign of the Severan dynasty should be increased by an additional 200 men. Therefore, the maximum number of senators would oscillate around 2000, whereas that of the Senate – around 1000. All things considered, it must be emphasised that these calculations are based on intuition, yet are not necessarily incorrect.

Imperial persecution, on the other hand, had little impact on the Senate's numerical make-up. Within the period of 42 years, persecution concerned (to a various degree), 94⁴⁰ senators whose names (or careers, as regards *damnatio*

³⁸ Due to the lack of source materials, we are unable to accurately determine the scale of *adlectiones*. At present I assume that almost 240 senators in the period in question were *homines novi*, a part of whom had received *latus clavus* before becoming quaestors, whereas the other part got promoted during their equestrian careers. Since they were ashamed of this fact and hid it, their exact number has remained unknown to this day, but of the 1691 senatorial names we know of, only 550 cherish the confirmed senatorial origin. The remaining group (over 1000) could have been *homines novi* or members of old *gentes*. If only half of them were *homines novi*, then the number of *adlectiones* must have been relatively large, contrary to what has been presented in LEUNISSEN 1993: 88, who specifies the number of *laticlavii* within the Severan period (who got promoted before becoming quaestors) for 55, and *adlecti* for 36. See also ASSORATI 2014.

³⁹ HOPKINS (1983: 148) calculated that the extension of senators' average lifespan from 55 to 57.5 years of age augmented the number of members of the Senate by 28 (from 582 to 610). Assuming the increase of this average, the number of senators must therefore be augmented, too.

⁴⁰ During the reign of Septimius Severus 53, of Caracalla – 15, of Macrinus – 9, of Elagabalus – 14, and of Alexander Severus – 3. This data must comprise (as I have demonstrated in my

memoriae) we know of, a number amounting, on average, to two people being sentenced annually (2.23).

The increase in the number of senators, *ergo* of the Senate's numerical make-up, must have resulted from a change in at least one of the above mentioned factors, a fact that we acknowledge on the basis of the existing source materials.

All in all, we need to assume that the make-up of the Senate at the time comprised no less than 800 senators, a number, however, which was not fixed, but oscillated between 900 and 1000 (the album must therefore consist of approximately 1800–2000 names). Such a number was more than enough for the Empire's administration to function without any problems, and for the emperors to cherish the company of grateful supporters.

The problem "new" senators had to tackle seemed to have little to do with fulfilling financial demands they were met with. Cassius Dio points out that during the reign of emperor Augustus senators earned 1,000,000 *sestertii per annum* (LIV 26, 3 f.), whereas Suetonius claims that senators' annual income amounted to 1,200,000 *sestertii* (Aug. 41, 3). We do not know much about the Severan norms as regards the senators' income (even though the sources, including those compiled by Cassius Dio, never mention any changes in the income in question), yet the growing devaluation must have made many senators realise that the demand that they should possess property bringing 1,000,000–1,200,000 *sestertii* of annual income had been easier to fulfill in the times of Augustus' reign. We also need to remember that, during the reign of Septimius Severus and his successors, equestrian officers – both low and high – were promoted to senatorial careers. It therefore seems highly possible that the above-mentioned demands became more fluid in character. Besides, the civil war also contributed to a less meticulous approach when dealing with legal affairs, and the emperor himself is known to have regulated, *post factum*, the properties of his favourite supporters so that they reached the demanded minimum. A large quantity of land confiscated from defeated political enemies of the emperor must have facilitated such operations as well.

books) the bottom limit of the victim number, whereas its upper limit, due to a lack of sources, remains open. Recently LETTA (2014) has assumed the number of cases of persecution during the reign of Septimius Severus to be 111. One needs to be aware that this calculation is mostly intuitive. In particular, the calculations based on summing up the known and anonymous people enumerated in historical works (e.g. two anonymous senators, Niger's 7 legates, Albinus' 3 legates, at least two other deceased senators, 29 senators sentenced to death) are doubtful, for we do not know for sure whether they are the same people. Also, the recognition of 35 senators whom Severus acquitted after the battle of Lugdunum, considering them "emarginati" instead, has been difficult. Never having known their names, we cannot state whether the emperor treated them mercifully (like Caesar or Augustus did before him) preventing their further senatorial careers, or not. Thus, it is safer to assume that during the reign of Severus, the repressed encompassed no fewer than 53 senators; however, LETTA's conjecture might be right, too.

The increase in the number of people making up the Senate seemed to have little influence upon the quality of its functioning, for a host of senators never made it to sessions. One reason for this was the distance between the provinces and Rome, which directly (and, without doubt, inversely proportionally) translated into the number of senators from a given province actively participating in the Senate's sessions. The absence of even a large number of the senators constituted little obstacle even when making resolutions about the whole Empire. One needs to bear in mind that the *senatus consultum Beguense* of the year 138 (*CIL VIII* 23246 = 11451) includes the information that the CCL[...] senators took part in the proceedings on that issue (the damaged inscription allows us to merely state that the number in question did not exceed 300). Also, it is worth mentioning that during the reign of Alexander Severus, the presence of only 50 (!) senators sufficed for a resolution to be considered valid⁴¹.

Such a minimal participation of senators in sessions resolving imperial affairs has been also suggested by many inscriptions in which a given senator is referred to as *clarissimus vir*, with no *cursus* given, or enumeration of anything but his regional functions. One argument in favour of this assumption is the lot of four of the then senatorial dynasties residing in the following provinces far away from Rome: Arrii from Africa, and Attii, Carminii and Claudii Cleobuli from Asia Minor.

1. of the six Arrii: C. Arrius Antoninus (*PIR*² A 1089 et Add., p. XV), (C. Arrius Antoninus?) (*PIR*² A, p. 214), C. Arrius Antoninus (*PIR*² A 1090), Arrius Maximus (*PIR*² A 1098), C. Arrius Pacatus (*PIR*² A 1102), C. Arrius Pacatus (*PIR*² A 1101), only one – Arrius Maximus – could have functioned as a legate of Syria; we know little about the *cursus* of the remaining senators.

2. of the five Attii: P. Attius Clemens, P. Attius Clementinus Rufinus, P. Attius Pudens, P. Attius Pudens Rufinus Celsianus, P. Attius Ulpus Apuleius Clementinus Rufinus, few can boast of having a confirmed career in administration⁴².

3. of the five Carminii: (M.[?] Ulpus [?]) Carminius Flavius Athenagoras Claudianus, M. Fl(avius) Carminius Athenagoras Livianus, Carminius Claudianus, (M. Ulpus) Carminius Claudianus (*neoteros*), T. Flavius Carminius Athenagoras Claudianus, only the information about the first one is available to us – he was a proconsul of Lycia-Pamphylia (within Asia Minor!) and a consul.

4. of the three Claudii Cleobuli: Ti. Claudius Cleobulus and his two sons – Claudius Acilius Cleobulus and Claudius Acilius Iulius, only the elder brother served as an officer of an unidentified institution in Crete.

⁴¹ *Cod. Theod.* VI 4, 9: “Placet, ne minus quinquaginta clarissimi veniant in senatum: certum est namque hoc numero large abundare substantiam virtutis honorandae...”

⁴² It needs to be added that the three Attii Rufini (probably related to the above mentioned men) are known to us for one function only: Attius Rufinus (*AE* 2003, 1674) was proconsul of Africa, Attius Rufinus Metillianus (*AE* 2003, 1674) was his legate, and Attius Rufinus (*RE* Suppl. XV, coll. 75 f., No. 27 a) – a legate of Syria Coele.

There are many more examples like the above mentioned ones, yet the conclusion is obvious: some members of the senatorial order, as *honorati*, made do solely with the title of *clarissimus vir*, while hardly being engaged in the empire-wide service⁴³. It is worthwhile stating that a supplementary trend can be observed those days – a certain percent of senators participated in the management of the Empire, accepting various functions only in their own or a neighbouring region and thus eliminating tiresome voyages and residence in provinces distant from home. For example:

- Eastern born and bred M. Claudius Demetrius was *proconsul Achaiae et legatus Augusti pro praetore missus ad corrigendum statum civitatum liberarum Achaiae*, and after the consulate (which must have been served *in absentia*) – *legatus pro praetore Ponti-Bithyniae*,
- Achaia province-born Cn. Claudius Leonticus was *proconsul Achaiae et legatus Augusti pro praetore missus ad corrigendum statum civitatum liberarum Achaiae, Delphis, Megarae, Epidauri*,
- Lycia-born Ti. Claudius Telemachus never left the east of the Empire and fulfilled various functions: *princeps gerusiae Sidymorum, quaestor Achaiae, legatus proconsulis [As]iae aut [Acha]iae, conditor ac restaurator Laodiceae et Hierapolis, curator civitatis Callatinorum*.

We need to bear in mind that during the Dominate era, the senates of Rome and Constantinople comprised ca. 2000 members each, an attempt on the part of emperors to tackle their personnel problems. One can therefore safely establish (having the above calculations in mind) that the process of enlarging both the Senate and the senatorial order has been visible since the times of Septimius Severus and his successors, one reason for such a situation being the limited amount of participation of senators in the management of the Empire (which emerges from the source materials).

All in all, we can conclude that at present we know about 1691 senators of the Severan period. We must therefore dismiss the numbers 600 and 800 as indicative of the Senate's entire membership. According to my standards, one needs to assume that the imperial Senate consisted of no more than 900–1000 people. With that number in mind, we also have to assume that in the course of the over 40-year-long Severan rule the *album senatorium* contained about 1800–2000 senatorial names. Thus the representativeness of the collected source material has been demonstrated as being between 84.5% and 93.9%.

⁴³ This was guaranteed by legal regulations allowing for a family to continue as *clarissimi* for three generations, although its members held no senatorial positions during that period. I claim that this principle had to protect the senatorial houses unrepresented in the Senate in any generation from social degradation. See *Dig.* I 9, 8 and 10; L 1, 22, 5. We must, however, keep this trend in proportion, as we do not know the scope of the phenomenon. The lack of data results in us still not knowing whether a senator gave up his public career, or we may simply know nothing of his later career.

Additionally, we should give a second thought to the reasons for such an increase, one which went unnoticed by classical scholars and was not justified by any resolution. It seems that the increase in question resulted from obvious reasons such as the Empire's growth, limited senatorial participation in the management of the Empire, the need for a bigger number of officials, the increased affluence of the provincial elite, and the formation by subsequent emperors of their parties in the Senate. What also needs to be noticed is that persecution in the Severan period affected but a small number of all senators and that the sources never mention any serious epidemics; on the contrary, they highlight the influx of new men into the Senate. Summing up, we can conclude that the process of the Senate's incremental enlargement appeared to be natural, evolutionary and hence also by and large invisible, contrary to the period of Caesar's reign, when a similar numerical increase, only much more dramatic, led to a general reaction on the part of society (and historians).

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APPENDIX: A LIST OF NEW SENATORS⁴⁴

CERTI

1. A[*cu*]t[ian][us] (*AE* 1989, 580–582; *AE* 1989, 581 = *AE* 1995, 45 = *AE* 2001, 1566; *PIR*² S 258)
2. Aelius Gordianus (*PIR*² A 181)
3. Aelius Serenianus (*PIR*² A 258)
4. P. Aelius Symmachus (*PIR*² A 268)
5. A(l)fius Avitus (*PIR*² A 440)
6. P. Alfius Avitus (*DNP* XII 2, col. 888, Alfius [4a])
7. Amicus (*AE* 1974, 618 = *TAM* V 1, 758) – cos. suff. ca. a. 215–216
8. Appianus (T.B. MITFORD, I.K. NICOLAOU, *The Greek and Latin Inscriptions from Salamis*, pp. 33 sq, n. 18)
9. (P?) Aradius Paternus (*RE* Suppl. XIV, col. 54, n. 1 a) – cos. suff. ante a. 231
10. P. Aradius Paternus Rufinianus Aelianus [Iu?]n(ior) (*CIL* VI 31948)
11. Q. Aradius Rufinus Optatus Aelianus (*PIR*² C Add. n. 1013 a; *PIR*² R, pp. 96 sq.)
12. P. Aradius Roscius Rufinus Saturninus Tiberianus (*CIL* VIII 14470)
13. Ti. Aradi[us (?) Saturninus] (*CIL* X 6439 = VI 1695)
14. C. Asinius Rufus Nicomachus (*AE* 1993, 1506) – cos. suff. sub Severis
15. Sex. Asinius Rufinus Fabianus (*PIR*² A 1247)
16. Attius Rufinus (*AE* 2003, 1674) – cos. suff. sub Severis

⁴⁴ In preparing this list I have not yet read the volume *Prosopographia Imperii Romani*, ed. altera, pars VIII fasciculus 2.

17. Attius Rufinus (*RE* Suppl. XV, coll. 75 sq., n. 27 a) – cos. suff. inter a. 238 et 240
18. Attius Rufinus Metillianus (*AE* 2003, 1674)
19. P. Attius Ulpus Apuleius Clementinus Rufinus (*RE* Suppl. XV, coll. 75 sq.)
20. [...] T. f. Quir. Aurelianus (*AE* 1972, 598)
21. Aurelius Athenaeus (*I.Eph.* 971)
22. Aur(elius) Aurelianus (*AE* 1991, 1586; *AE* 1991, 1587)
23. Aur(elius) Mam[...] (*RE* Suppl. XV, col. 78, n. 160 b) – cos. suff. ante a. 216
24. Aurelius Trypho (HALFMANN, *EOS* II, p. 631)
25. M. Bassaeus Astur (*PIR*² B 67)
26. C. C[...] Hasta (*AE* 1983, 801) – cos. suff. ca a. 185/190/191
27. Q. Caeci[lius...] (*IRT* 33 = *AE* 1986, 710) – cos. suff. ante a. 202
28. Q. Caecilius Speratianus (*AE* 2006, 77) – cos. suff. a. 202 aut 203
29. P. Caecilius Urbicus Aemilianus (*RE* Suppl. XV, coll. 81 sq., n. 124 cc) – cos. suff. ca a. 208
30. Caelius Felix (*AE* 1991, 1591; ?*AE* 1991, 1592 [Felix])
31. M. Caelius Faustinus (*AE* 1993, 1789) – cos. suff. a. 206
32. C. Calpurnius Ceius Aemilianus (*AE* 1998, 1058)
33. Calpurnius Reginianus (*PIR*² C 307) – cos. suff. saec. III parte priore
34. Calpurnius Reginianus (*PIR*² C 308)
35. Calvisius Rufus (*PIR*² C 348; *PIR*² R, p. 118) – cos. suff. aetate Severorum
36. (M. Ulpus) Carminius Claudianus (neoterus) (*PIR*² C 431)
37. T. Flavius Carminius Athenagoras Claudianus (*PIR*² C 429)
38. Cassius (*AE* 1980, 117 = *CIL* VI 41104)
39. C. Cassius Regallianus (*AE* 2001, 2161) – cos. suff. a. 202
40. Q. Cerellius Apollinaris (*PIR*² C 665)
41. Claudius Acilius Iulius (*I.Eph.* 636)
42. Tib. Claudius Attalus Paterclianus (*AE* 2005, 1433) – cos. suff. aetate Severorum
43. Claudius Atticus Marathonius (*IG* II/III² 1077)
44. Ti. Cl[audius] M[odestus] (*AE* 1964, 71) – cos. suff. ca. a. 196
45. Claudius Nysius (*AE* 2000, 1481)
46. (Ti. Claudius? vel Vettulenus) Pompeianus (*PIR*² P 567) – cos. suff. inter a. 192 et 218, fortasse ca. a. 212
47. (Ti. Claudius?) Pompeianus (*PIR*² P 569) – cos. suff. ca. a. 212
48. (Cn. Claudius?) Severus (*PIR*² S 634) – cos. suff. inter a. 192 et 218, fortasse ca. a. 212
49. [...] Cl(audius) Subatia[nus...] (*PIR*² S 935)
50. [Tib. Claudius Te(?)]lema[chus] (*AE* 1993, 1550 a–b)
51. Claudius Venacus (*PIR*² C 1048)
52. T. Clodius Aurelius Saturninus (*AE* 1972, 598 = ECK, *ZPE* XXXVII 1980, 48 = *I.Eph.* III 657 = *IK* XIII 657; *AE* 1957, 161 = *AE* 1961, 58 = *I.Eph.* III 817 = *IK* XIII 817) – cos. suff. ca. a. 223
53. L. Clodius Pompeianus (*AE* 2006, 77) – cos. suff. a. 202 aut 203
54. Cosinius Marcianus (*AE* 1967, 563)
55. Egnatius Leo (*PIR*² E 22)
56. Egnatius Proclianus (*PIR*² E 28)
57. Q. Egnatius Proculus (*AE* 1959, 57; *AE* 1999, 1374 a)
58. (Aurelius?) Euphrates (*AE* 2000, 1214) – cos. suff. inter a. 202 et 206

59. Fabius Sabinus (*PIR*² F 64)
60. Flaccus (Cass. Dio LLXXVIII 22, 1) – cos. suff. ante a. 217–218
61. Flavius [An]tiochus (*The Excavations at Dura Europos, Preliminary Report...*, VI 1936, p. 433, n. 8)
62. P. Flavius Pudens Pomponianus (*PIR*² F 346)
63. Fonteius Maximus (*AE* 1987, 862)
64. C. Fulvius Ian[uaris?] (*CIL* III 14149/33)
65. C. Fulvius Maximus (*AE* 1944, 103 = *RIU* 663) – cos. suff. ante a. 210
66. C. Fulvius Plautius Hortensianus (*PIR*² F 555)
67. (M. Gavius) Galicanus (*CIL* V 3223 = *ILS* 3250 = *AE* 1979, 295) – cos. suff. ca. a. 180/185
68. M. Gav[ius] M[aximus] (*PIR*² G 103)
69. Gavius Tranquillus (*AE* 1994, 1725) – cos. suff. ca a. 197
70. [...]ius Gratilianus V[...] (*AE* 2004, 1243)
71. Q. Iulius Licin[ianus?] (*AE* 1983, 802 = *AE* 1984, 737 = *IDR* III 5, 429) – cos. suff. ante a. 236–238
72. C. Iulius Rufinus Laberius Fabianus Pomponius Triarius Erucius Clarus Sosius Priscus (*PIR*² I 525)
73. C. Iul[ius...] Titi[anus] (*AE* 2000, 1508 a)
74. M. Iunius Concessus Aemilianus (*AE* 1989, 721) – cos. suff. a. 212
75. Laelius Bassus (*PIR*² L 50)
76. Manilius (*PIR*² M 128) – cos. suff. sub Septimio Severo aut Antonino (Caracalla)
77. L. Mantennius Severus (*PIR* M² 174)
78. Marcius Maximillianus (*AE* 1998, 1619 = *RMD* IV, pp. 610 sq., App. I 2) – cos. suff. ante a. 240
79. (Q?) Marcius Victor Faustianus (*PIR*² M 252)
80. P. Marcius Maximillianus (*CIL* IX 338, col. I 29)
81. Marcius Vic[tor] (*CIL* VI 32334, 3)
82. [M. Munat]ius [Su]lla Urbanus (de alia lectione cf. BARBIERI, nn. 1165 et 1926) – cos. ord. a. 234
83. T. Murrenius Severus (*AE* 2001, 2161) – cos. suff. a. 202
84. C. Octavius Suetrius Proculus (*PIR*² O 61)
85. P[...] (*AE* 1932, 70)
86. [...] l[...] [P]ostu[m]us (*PIR*² P 907) – cos. suff. sub Septimio Severo
87. C. (Passienus) (*PIR*² P p. 47)
88. [...]pius (*CIL* VI 1993 = *CIL* XIV 2394)
89. Pius Cassius (*CIL* III 13371)
90. D. Plautius Felix Iulianus (*PIR*² P 464)
91. [Cn. Pompeius (?)] (*PIR*² P 579)
92. [Cn. Pompeius (?)] (*PIR*² P 580)
93. [Cn. Pompeius (?)] (*PIR*² P 581)
94. [Cn. Pompeius (?)] (*J.Eph.* 710 b)
95. Cn. Pompeius Antonius Amoenus (*PIR*² P 590)
96. [Pompeius F]alco (*AE* 2006, 1866) – cos. sub Severis?
97. Pontius [...] (*PIR*² P 790) – cos. suff. inter a. 202 et 211
98. Pontius Fuscus Pontianus (*AE* 1998, 282)
99. C. Pontius Pontianus Fuficius Maximus (*AE* 2007, 1335) – cos. suff. ante a. 217/218

100. Pontius Surus Iu[nianus] (*PIR*² P 825)
101. Quintillius Marcellus (*PIR*² Q 23)
102. L. Ranius Optatus (*AE* 2005, 1314)
103. Romanus (*AE* 2000, 1214) – cos. suff. inter a. 202 et 206
104. (Iunius) Rufinus (*PIR*² R 141)
105. [...]r[...]ius Rufinus (*PIR*² R 153) – cos. suff.
106. (A?) Sellius Clodianus (*PIR*² S 340) – cos. suff. ante a. 193
107. [L. Sem?]pronius Senecio (*PIR*² S 368) – cos. suff. sub Septimio Severo
108. L. Sem[pr]onius [...] (*PIR*² S 345)
109. [L.? S]ept(imius) Maria[nus] (*PIR*² S 469) – cos. suff. saec. II exeunte aut saec. III ineunte
110. L. Serg[ius Paullus? M. Anton]ius Zeno (*PIR*² S 536)
111. [Cn. Su]jellius Rufus (*PIR*² S 951) – cos. ante a. 184/192
112. [...] Tati(a)nus (*PIR*² T 39)
113. Q. Tine[...] (*PIR*² T 222)
114. Trebonius Fortunatus (*PIR*² T 330)
115. P. Tullius Marsus (*PIR*² T 385) – cos. suff. a. 206
116. Valerius Messala (*SEG* XXVI 1976–1977, 1261 = *I.Eph.* IV 1107) – cos. suff. ante a. 236.
117. Valerius O[pt?]titanus aut Q[ui?]titanus (*AE* 1982, 849 = *AE* 1993, 1362 = *ILBulg* 268ter = *ILNovae* 28 = *IGLN* 47)
118. C. Valerius [Sabinia?]nus (*AE* 1962, 119) – cos. suff. ante a. 214
119. [L. V]aleri[us Valerianus (?)] Paetus (?) (*AE* 1995, 1654)
120. Vibius Gallus (*AE* 2006, 1249; *AE* 2006, 1250)
121. P. Vittius Honoratus [...]titanus (*CIL* X 4758) – cos. suff. saec. II exeunte aut saec. III
122. [...]ianus (*CIL* VI 32319, 4)
123. [Iu?]cun[dius?] (*CIL* VI 32332, 24)
124. Anonymus, iuridicus Ra[...] (*AE* 1985, 872)
125. Anonymus, legatus Arabiae (*AE* 1991, 1589)
126. Anonymus, legatus pro praetore provinciae Baeticae (*CIL* XII 3172 = *CIL* XII, p. 836 = *ALFÖLDY, FH*, p. 97)
127. Anonymus, legatus Bithyniae (Chiron XXXVII 2007, pp. 189–195, n. 15 = *AE* 2007, 1334) – cos. suff. ante a. 213–214
128. Anonymus, legatus Bithyniae (*AE* 1994, 1929 b) – cos. suff. ante a. 199–200
129. Anonymus, legatus Britanniae sub Severo, Antonino (Caracalla) et Geta augustis (*CIL* VII 482 = *EE* IX 1156 = *RIB* 1151)
130. [...]ARE [...]NL [...], legatus Britanniae (*CIL* VII 142 = *RIB* 430)
131. Anonymus, legatus Britanniae (*AE* 1967, 260)
132. [...]imus Di[...] , legatus Britanniae (*EE* IX, p. 600 = *RIB* 1922)
133. Anonymus, proconsul Cypri (*IG* X 3161)
134. Anonymus, legatus III Daciae (*AE* 1980, 755) – cos. suff. sub Septimio Severo
135. Anonymus, proconsul Galliae Narbonensis (*HA Carac.* 5, 1)
136. Anonymus, legatus Germaniae (anonymus Minturnensis) (*AE* 1982, 158) – cos. suff. sub Severis?
137. Anonymus, legatus legionis I Minerviae (*CIL* XIII 8811)
138. Anonymus, legatus Lusitaniae (*CIL* VIII 15869)
139. Anonymus, legatus Moesiae inferioris (*SEG* XIX 1963, 493) – cos. suff. sub Severis
140. Anonymus, legatus Numidiae (*AE* 1992, 1861)

141. Anonymus, legatus Pannoniae inferioris (*AE* 1967, 360)
142. Anonymus, legatus Pannoniae inferioris (*CIL* III 10263) – cos. suff. ante a. 218?
143. [...]na[...] legatus Pannoniae inferioris (*AE* 1979, 469) – cos. suff. ante a. 228
144. Anonymus, proconsul Siciliae (*AE* 1990, 863 = *ILNovae* 46)
145. Anonymus, legatus Thraciae (*AE* 1987, 901)
146. Anonymus, sodalis Augustalis (*CIL* VI 1991 = *CIL* XIV 2393)
147. Anonymus (*CIL* VI 41199) – cos. suff. sub Antonino (Elagabalo) aut Severo Alexandro
148. Anonymus, praetor candidatus? (*AE* 2003, 365)
149. Anonymus, salius Palatinus (*CIL* VI 1981, 1)
150. Anonymus, salius Palatinus (*CIL* VI 1981, 5)
151. Anonymus, curator [...] (*AE* 1996, 168 = *CIL* VI 41201)
152. Anonymus, adlectus inter praetorios (*CIL* IX 1573)
153. Ve[...]tu[...] maritus (*CIL* VI 32329, 14 sq.)
154. [...]r Maxim[i?] pater (*CIL* VI 32331)
155. [...]i Maximi pater (*CIL* VI 32331)
156. [Al- aut Ru-]fae Vestinae Maxi[mae] pater (*NS* 1931, 340 add. v. 88 et p. 345 = PIGHI, p. 169 V^a 88)
157. C[-iae] Cattunillae pater aut maritus (*AE* 2001, 1213)
158. Corneliae Privignae filius (*PIR*² C 1495)
159. [Fl(avii)?] Aur(elii) Eili familia (*AE* 1992, 1608 = SEG XLI 1017, pp. 80 sq.)

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160. [Ae]lius Rugianus (*AE* 1989, 65 = *AE* 1992, 89 = *CIL* VI 41207)
161. [...]us Aem[ilian]us (*EE* VII 941 = *RIB* 741)
162. Aemilius Macer (*PIR*² A 356)
163. Q. Aiadius Censorinus Celsinus Arabianus (*AE* 1968, 518, 522, 523)
164. L. Aiadius Modestus Aurelianus Priscus Agricola Salvianus (*AE* 1968, 518, 522, 523)
165. L. Allius Volusianus (*AE* 1972, 179)
166. [...]Aq]u[i]linus (*CIL* VIII 27949 = *ILAlg* 1, 3634 = *AE* 1979, 665)
167. M. Asinius Rufinus Valerius Verus Sabinianus (*AE* 1954, 58 = *AE* 1955, 122) – cos. suff.
168. M. Aurelius Amarantus (*AE* 1955, 19)
169. Aurelius Victor (*CIL* V 486 = *CIL* XI 569)
170. [...Bassidius?] [Cor]nelianus Agrippinus (*AE* 2007, 256)
171. Appius Caecina Suetrius Sabinus (*PIR*² S 963)
172. M. Benn[ius...] (*AE* 2010, 309)
173. G. C[...] Calpurnius Rufinus (*AE* 1997, 857–961)
174. M. Casineius Vassius Passenilianus Titianus (*Antiqua Beneventana*, Benevento 2013, pp. 239 sqq.)
175. Catulus (*PIR*² C 585)
176. L. Cestius Gallus Cerrinius Iustus Lutatius Natalis (*PIR*² C 692) – cos. suff. saec. II/III
177. Ti. Cl(audius) Appius Atilius Bradua Regillus Atticus (*IG* II/III², p. 3978)
178. Claudius Flavius Catulus Munatianus (*AE* 1957, 123 = *AE* 2010, 1834)
179. L. Vibullius Claudius Herodes (*PIR*² C, inter pp. 182 et 183: stemma)

180. Cn. Claudius Severus (*PIR*² C 1024) – cos. suff. a. inc., cos. II ord. a. 173.
181. Clodius Celsinus (*AE* 1935, 164 = *AE* 1949, 201 = *AE* 1973, 435)
182. Q. Fabius Clodius Fabius Agrippinus Celsinus (*AE* 1991, 1508, 1509a, 1511, 1513)
183. L. Cu[sp. Gal(?)]lus S[a]ll[i]nianus vel L. Co[rne]lius Latinianus (*AE* 1967, 363 = *AE* 1969/1970, 479)
184. Sex. Decimius Verus Barbarus (*AE* 1990, 819)
185. [Acilius Priscus?] Egr[ilius Plarianus Larcus Lep]idus [Flavius ...] (*AE* 1969/1970, 87 = *AE* 2003, 284) – cos. suff. sub Commodus?
186. Q. Fabius Iulianus Optatianus L. Fabius Geminus Cornelianus (*PIR*² F 39) – cos. suff. saec. II parte posteriore
187. Flavius Balbus Diogenianus (*AE* 2003, 1673) – cos. suff. sub Severis?
188. L. Flavius Cleonaeus (*AE* 1986, 155; *CIL* VI 3846 = *CIL* VI 31808 = *CIL* VI 41123) – cos. suff. sub Commodus?
189. T. Flavius Lollianus Aristobulus (JÖAI L 1972–1975 [Beibl.], pp. 63 sq., n. 4)
190. Flavius Marc(ius?) Scribonianus (*JG* XII 5, 1, 328)
191. L. Fulvius Numisianus (*AE* 1999, 968)
192. Sex. Furnius Faustus Sulpicianus (*AE* 1984, 931)
193. Q. Gargilius Macer Aufidianus (*PIR*² G 81)
194. (Hortensius?) (*PIR*² P 535)
195. Tib. Iulius Frugi (*PIR*² I 330) – cos. suff. sub Severis?
196. Iulius Lepidianus (*AE* 1976, 690 = *AE* 1979, 632)
197. L. Iulius Lucilianus (*PIR*² I 386)
198. L. Iulius Proculianus (*AE* 1987, 843) – cos. suff. a. 179
199. (C. Iulius Pudens?) (*CIL* VIII 18908 = *ILAlg* II 4683)
200. (Iulius) Titianus (*PIR*² I 605)
201. [L. I]unius L. [f. Gal. Aurelius Ne]ratus G[allus Fulvius Ma]cer? (*AE* 1993, 432)
202. [...]unius [...] [...]cus Car[...] [...]ntilianus = [I]unius [...] [...]cus Gar[gilius] [Qui]ntil[i]an[us] (*AE* 1995, 231 = *CIL* VI 41127) – cos. suff. sub Commodus
203. Iunius Victorinus (*CIL* XIII 6638) – cos. suff. parte posteriore saec. II
204. M. Licinius Petilius Aia[cius?] (*PIR*² L 230)
205. Licinnius Mucianus (*PIR*² M 217) – cos. suff. ca. a. 177–178
206. Lusius Severus (*PIR*² L 441)
207. P. Maenius Cornelianus (*PIR*² M 68)
208. Marcellus (*PIR*² M 192)
209. C. Marcius Etruscus Gal(l)ianus (L. Kocsis, *Zur Periodisierung des Hauses des tribunus laticlavus im Legionslager von Aquincum*, in: *Akten des 14. Internationalen Limeskongresses in Carnuntum*, Wien 1990 [Der Römische Limes in Österreich XXXVI, fasc. 1–2], pp. 709–714)
210. M. Martiannus Pulcher (*PIR*² M 337)
211. [...] [M]artialis (*CIL* VI 41189)
212. L. Matucius Maximus (*ILN* II, Antibes, 4)
213. Cn. Minicius Tigidianus Annus Faustus (*AE* 1990, 818)
214. M. Nonius Arrius Mucianus Manlius Carbo (*PIR*² M 115) – cos. suff. a. 189 aut 190
215. P. Nonius M[u?]tianus (*PIR*² N 144)
216. [...]inus Paternus (*PIR*² P 157) – cos. suff. sub Severis?
217. Perpetuus (*PIR*² P 242)
218. D. Plautius Felix Iulianus (*PIR*² P 464)

219. Q. Pomponius Munat[ius aut -ianus] Clodianus (*PIR*² P 739) – cos. suff. sub Severo Alexandro?
220. [P]riscus (*PIR*² P 959)
221. Procu[l]us (*PIR*² P 993)
222. [...]iuenus aut [...]iuentius Ref[.]jentinus (*AE* 2000, 1534)
223. [?Re]stitutus (*PIR*² R 54)
224. M[...] Rufinus (*PIR*² R 142)
225. [...]lius Rugianus (*PIR*² R 209)
226. Sa[...] (?) (*PIR*² S 3)
227. [...] Scribon[ius...] (*PIR*² S 258)
228. [...]cius [...Se(?)]cundus (*PIR*² S 302)
229. M. Sempronius Proculus Faustianus (*CIL* VI 3834 = *CIL* VI 31733)
230. (Septimius?) Silvanus Nicolaus (*PIR*² S 490) – cos. suff. sub Severis?
231. [Se]rgius Faustus (*PIR*² S 522)
232. L. Sergius Volusius Matidius Heracleidianus (*PIR*² S 535)
233. Q. Servilius Pudens (*PIR*² S 596)
234. Severus (*HA Geta* 3, 1) – cos. suff. a. 189
235. [...Sollius...] (*PIR*² S 767) – cos. suff. saec. III
236. M. Sollius At[ticus] (*PIR*² S 768)
237. P. Sta[tius] Iulianus ... P(a)elignianus (*PIR*² S 874)
238. [...]stus (*PIR*² S 932)
239. Q. Suetrius Pudens (*PIR*² S 961)
240. [...]ius T[...] (*PIR*² T 1)
241. Q. Tarquitius Catu[l]us (*PIR*² T 22)
242. Tertullus (*PIR*² T 118)
243. Q. Ulpius D(omitius?) Ap(ollinaris?) (*AE* 1977, 723)
244. Ulpius Flavius Claudius Ponticus (*AE* 1976, 664)
245. Uranius Antoninus (*PIR* V 675)
246. Valerius Iunianus (*AE* 2001, 961 a)
247. M. Valerius Senecio (*RMD* I 69) – cos. suff. a. 186.
248. M. Vibius No[...] (*CIL* VI 41189)
249. [...]anus (*CIL* IX 1574) – cos. suff. a. inc. cum [...]no
250. [...]nus (*CIL* IX 1574) – cos. suff. a. inc. cum [...]a
251. [...]cus (*CIL* IX 1574) – cos. suff. a. inc. cum [...]esto
252. [...]estus (*CIL* IX 1574) – cos. suff. a. inc. cum [...]co
253. [...]mus (*CIL* XVI 131) – cos. suff. cum App. Claudio Laterano a. 189 aut 190
254. Anonymus, quaestor Asiae (*CIL* XIII 5091)
255. Anonymus, salius Palatinus (*CIL* VI 41174)
256. Anonymus, legatus et curator (*CIL* VI 41214)
257. Anonymus, legatus et curator (*CIL* VI 41160)
258. Anonymus, legatus Aquitaniae (*AE* 1992, 1794)
259. Anonymus, legatus Arabiae (*AE* 2000, 1529)
260. Anonymus, legatus Galatiae (*AE* 1981, 781)
261. Anonymus, legatus Phrygiae et Cariae (T. CORSTEN, *Die Inschriften von Laodikeia am Lykos*, vol. I, Bonn 1997, n. 39)
262. [...]rinus, senator, fortasse legatus Moesia inferioris (*ILNovae* 48 = *IGLNovae* 69)
263. Anonymus, legatus Panoniae inferioris (*CIL* XVI 131)

264. Anonymus, legatus Panoniae inferioris (*CIL* III 10478)
265. A[.]r[...].jecun[...] aut M (?) A[tius?] Regul[us?] (*CIL* III 14359, 27 + p. 2338, 105 = *ILS* 9268 = A. NEUMANN, *Inscripfen aus Vindobona*, Jahrbuch des Vereins für Geschichte der Stadt Wien, 1961/1962, n. 17/18, pp. 7 sqq.) – cos. suff. sub Severis?
266. Anonymus, legatus Raetiae (*AE* 1989, 584 = *AE* 1995, 45)
267. Anonymus, legatus Raetiae, Pannoniae inferioris et provinciae incertae (*AE* 1982, 121 = *CIL* VI 41193)
268. Anonymus, legatus Pannoniae vel Thraciae (*AE* 1950, 91 = *AE* 1974, 344)
269. Anonymus, praetor (*CIL* VI 31780 = *CIL* VI 41202/3)
270. Anonymus, praetor (*CIL* VI 41215)
271. Anonymus, praefectus alimentorum (*CIL* VI 1573 = *CIL* VI 41240)
272. Anonymus, proconsul Achaiae (Philostr. *VS* II 10, 6)
273. Anonymus, proconsul Achaiae (Philostr. *VS* II 1, 26)
274. Anonymus, proconsul Lyciae-Pamphyliae (*AE* 1972, 593)
275. Anonymus, proconsul Siciliae (PANCIERA, STEFANELLI, *EOS* I, pp. 636 sq.)
276. Anonymus, sacerdos aut [Sace]rdo[s] (*CIL* VI 41230 = *AE* 1980, 61)
277. Anonymus, salius Palatinus (*CIL* VI 41174)
278. Anonymus, senator, XVvir s.f. (*AE* 1993, 672)
279. Adaboniae Severinae pater aut maritus primus (*AE* 1991, 867)
280. Attiae Sacratae pater aut maritus (*PIR*² A 1369)
281. Cerelliae [Pa]uli[n]ae pater aut maritus (*PIR*² C 158)
282. Tiberii Claudii Alexandri familia (*AE* 1994, 1729)
283. Claudiae Rufinae maritus (*AE* 1966, 466)
284. Cl(audia)e Severae maritus (*AE* 1966, 442 = *I.Eph.* 956)
285. Flaviae Priscae pater aut maritus (*PIR*² F, p. 192)
286. Ialliae Bassianae pater aut maritus (*IG* XIV 1091 = *IGR* I 140)
287. Memmiae Nerullae pater aut maritus (*AE* 1954, 177 = *Arctos* XLII 2008, p. 224)
288. Rubriae Felicitatis pater aut maritus (*AE* 2001, 582)
289. Quintilii Eumenis nepotes (*AE* 2003, 1670–1672)
290. [Se]rgiae Au[re]li]ae Reginae pater et maritus (*IGR* III 958; *AE* 1975, 830)
291. Vibiae Domnae pater aut maritus (*AE* 1996, 1604)
292. G. V[...].ii Sempronii Visellii familia (*AE* 1994, 1743)

ABBREVIATIONS

<i>AE</i>	<i>Année Épigraphique.</i>
<i>CIL</i>	<i>Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum.</i>
<i>EE</i>	<i>Ephemeris Epigraphica.</i>
<i>EOS</i>	<i>Atti del Colloquio Internazionale AIEGL su epigrafia e ordine senatorio, Roma, 14–20 maggio 1981, vols. I–II, Roma 1982.</i>
<i>FH</i>	G. ALFÖLDY, <i>Fasti Hispanienses. Senatorische Reichsbeamte und Offiziere in den spanischen Provinzen des römischen Reiches von Augustus bis Diokletian</i> , Wiesbaden 1969.
<i>IDR</i>	D.M. PIPPIDI, I. RUSSU, I. PISO (et al.), <i>Inscriptiones Daciae Romanae.</i>
<i>I.Eph.</i>	H. ENGELMANN, R. MERKELBACH, H. WANKEL (et al.), <i>Die Inschriften von Ephesos.</i>
<i>IG</i>	<i>Inscriptiones Graecae.</i>
<i>IGLNovae</i>	J. KOLENDO, V. BOŽILOVA, <i>Inscriptions grecques et latines de Novae (Mésie inférieure)</i> , Paris 1997.

IGR	<i>Inscriptiones Graecae ad res Romanas pertinentes.</i>
IK	<i>Die Inschriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien.</i>
ILAlg	S. GSELL, H.-G. PFLAUM, X. DUPUIS (et al.), <i>Inscriptions latines de l'Algérie.</i>
ILN	<i>Inscriptiones latines de Gaule narbonnaise.</i>
ILNovae	J. KOLENDO, <i>Inscriptiones latines de Novae</i> , Poznań 1992.
ILS	H. DESSAU, <i>Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae.</i>
IRT	J.M. REYNOLDS, J.B. WARD-PERKINS, <i>The Inscriptions of Roman Tripolitania.</i>
JÖAI	Jahreshefte des Österreichischen Archäologischen Instituts.
NS	<i>Notizie degli Scavi di Antichità.</i>
PIR ²	<i>Prosopographia Imperii Romani saec. I, II, III</i> , Editio altera.
RIB	R.G. COLLINGWOOD, R.P. WRIGHT et al., <i>The Roman Inscriptions of Britain.</i>
RIU	L. BARKÓCZI, A. MÓCSY, B. LÖRINCZ et al., <i>Die römischen Inschriften Ungarns.</i>
RMD	<i>Roman Military Diplomas.</i>
SEG	<i>Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum.</i>
TAM	R. HEBERDEY, E. KALINKA et al., <i>Tituli Asiae Minoris.</i>

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THE NORTHERN BLACK SEA COAST: A TEST CASE FOR THE STUDY OF GREEK REPRESENTATIONS OF THE EAST AND EAST-WEST IMPACT*

by

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The thesis examines Greek perceptions of the North Pontic area with special focus being placed on intercultural relationships in the region and the development of local identities. By taking a multidisciplinary approach, the study uses various materials available for researching ancient societies. These include literary, epigraphic, numismatic and archaeological sources. Also, certain concepts of cultural anthropology have been used to discuss problems regarding ethnicity and collective identity in ancient society. The chronological scope of the thesis encompasses over a millennium of Greek–Barbarian (i.e. non-Greek) interrelations in the northern Black Sea region. The starting point of the work has been defined by the time when the Greeks first came into contact with local populations and Greek settlements were set up along the northern Black Sea shore, which can be traced to the 7th and 6th centuries BC, during the Archaic period. The following Classical and Hellenistic periods have come into special focus in the thesis due to the fact that the literary *topoi* and the imaginary view of the northern Black Sea region and its population, which deeply influenced later (especially Roman) writers, were developing over these periods.

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The thesis investigates the way in which mutual interrelations in the region were perceived by the Greeks themselves and how the Greek *apoikia* created their own distinctive local identities. The test cases that were analysed in the thesis illustrate how the cultural identity of the Black Sea cities was established through conscious self-representation of Black Sea society and its local elite. Apart from a local North Pontic perspective, the thesis also demonstrates the way in which the Greeks built up the image of their *Oikoumene* on a wider Panhellenic level. This is closely observed in the way nomadic societies and other local indigenous peoples (i.e. the main Black Sea *Others*) were perceived in Greek tradition. The thesis also discusses the economic and political relationships that existed between the North Pontic region and the rest of the Greco-Roman world which appear to have had an impact on a broader Greek literary tradition.

The discussion on Greek–Barbarian relationships in the North Pontic region begins with an overview of Eastern and Western approaches to the study of ethnicity and cultural identity. As demonstrated in the thesis, the North Pontic region appears to be a meeting place of Eastern and Western methodologies. Importantly, in the 20th century the western and northern Black Sea area was included into the conceptual framework of a homogeneous “Eastern Europe” which emerged (especially in its political sense) during the communist period¹. Although after 1990 the term “Eastern Europe” lost its political (and ideological) connotations, the effects of such a division between Eastern and Western Europe is still noticeable today. For many years the Black Sea region remained beyond the main focus of interest of Western scholarship. This was probably caused not only by the geographical remoteness of the Black Sea region from the Mediterranean World with which classical studies are mainly associated, but also by the political situation that resulted in the split in the way in which archaeological and anthropological thought developed. The language barrier is another important aspect which still impedes the flow of information between the Black Sea region and Anglophone scholars. Therefore, the thesis particularly emphasises the fact that East–West co-operation with regards to the study of the Black Sea area is crucial for a better understanding of multicultural encounters in this region.

It has been demonstrated that the growing interest in the study of ethnicity in the second half of the 20th century created an impetus to re-examine the question of Greek identity (Hellenicity)². The main change that occurred at that time in the perception of ethnicity in Western anthropology was the fact that ethnicity

¹ See Ch. KING, *The Black Sea. A History*, Oxford 2004, pp. 4 f. with n. 4.

² See especially J.M. HALL, *Ethnic Identity in Greek Antiquity*, Cambridge 1997; IDEM, *Hellenicity: between ethnicity and culture*, Chicago 2002; for an overview, see J. SKINNER, *The Invention of Greek Ethnography: From Homer to Herodotus*, Oxford 2012.

was no longer treated as a historically or biologically constructed social unit, but rather as a subjective self-categorisation of a group of people, which is in a constant process of “becoming”. Consequently, ethnicity is today regarded more as a situational and instrumental phenomenon than a passive and monolithic one³. Such a perception of ethnicity stands in opposition to Eastern-European approaches, which have long been influenced by the culture-history theory rooted in Marxism. As a consequence, an *ethnos* in Eastern anthropology is defined in terms of its long history, enduring attachment to the territory and material culture⁴. Such an approach however does not take into consideration the existence of collective identities that were established, for example, through a common experience of migration and a new self-definition.

A similar conceptual change in Western anthropology can be observed in the perception of culture. As a result, culture is no longer perceived as monolithic and fully coherent, since such an assumption, based on an illusory image of culture as a clearly defined and static unity, does not take into consideration the existence of other subgroups and subcultures that continuously negotiate their flexible sense of identity. Culture should instead be understood as changeable and dynamic, and based on receptivity and interaction with other cultures. Culture is what defines and organises social life and thus it needs a certain degree of integrity and a set of practices (SEWELL’S “thin cultural coherence”) which allow culture to function. However, this necessary minimal degree of coherence can be weakened by various trans-societal processes, such as migration and the creation of diasporas⁵. An important role in the constant process of negotiation and maintenance of cultural coherence is played by power and politics that define cultural boundaries and norms through state institutions and resistance to oppositional groups⁶.

Important focus has been placed on the fact that the North Pontic region has been conceptualised not only in antiquity but also in modern times when the region was included into the conceptual framework of Eurasia. This can be found in ROSTOVITZEFF’S concept of the Greco-Iranian world of the south Russian steppe, according to which the south Russian steppe was a meeting place of the

³ See F. BARTH, *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. The Social Organisation of Culture Difference*, Bergen–London 1969; C.P. JONES, *The Archaeology of Ethnicity. Constructing Identities in the Past and Present*, London–New York 1997; J. HUTCHINSON, A.D. SMITH (eds.), *Ethnicity*, Oxford–New York 1996.

⁴ S.J. SHENNAN, *Some Current Issues in the Archaeological Identification for Past Peoples*, *Archaeologia Polona* XXIX 1991, pp. 29–37.

⁵ W. SEWELL, *The Concept(s) of Culture*, in: V.E. BONNEL, L. HUNT (eds.), *Beyond the Cultural Turn: New Directions in the Study of Society and Culture*, Berkeley 1999, pp. 35–61.

⁶ See J. OBER, *Postscript: Culture, Thin Coherence, and the Persistence of Politics*, in: C. DOUGHERTY, L. KURKE (eds.), *The Cultures within Ancient Greek Culture: Contact, Conflict, Collaboration*, Cambridge 2003, pp. 237–255.

Western and Eastern worlds⁷. Such a concept was connected with the idea of the Eurasian Steppe as a Pan-Eurasian culturally, economically and politically unified region. However, it appears that this concept is a modern idea that was non-existent in antiquity. The evidence of a strong cultural link between various groups of peoples inhabiting the steppes and the Iranian plateau has in fact never been found⁸.

Therefore, it has been pointed out that an Iranian cultural impact on the northern Black Sea region may have had a different source, which is to be found in the Achaemenid Empire rather than in the Scythian steppes⁹. There are known objects that were inspired by Achaemenid art or that originated from the Achaemenid state that have been found in the North Pontic region, particularly in the necropolises of the Bosporan Kingdom, among which the most usual finds are cylindrical seals and carved stones (scaraboids) dated to the 5th–early 4th centuries BC¹⁰.

The analysis of Greek written, iconographic and archaeological sources carried out in the thesis has shown the nature of intercultural relationships in the North Pontic region and the way in which they were perceived in antiquity and also in modern study. For that reason, special focus has been placed on postcolonial studies, which offer a new methodology and a fresh insight into cross-cultural relationships in antiquity¹¹. This is particularly important in the case of the Black Sea region which has for many years been beyond the main focus of the study of ethnicity in Western scholarship. The northern Black Sea region in antiquity was a place of constant reciprocal contacts between the Greeks, local indigenous peoples (such as the Taurians and Maeotians) and the Steppe nomads (known as the Scythians and Sarmatians). For many years the North Pontic region was artificially divided between the Greek and “barbarian” civilisations, however, the clear-cut division between “civilised” Greeks (colonisers) and “barbarian”

⁷ M.I. ROSTOVITZEFF, *Iranians and Greeks in South Russia*, Oxford 1922.

⁸ See C. MEYER, *Rostovtzeff and the Classical Origins of Eurasianism*, *Anabases* IX 2009, pp. 185–198; IDEM, *Iranians and Greeks after 90 Years: A Religious History of Southern Russia in Ancient Times*, *Ancient West & East* X 2011, pp. 75–159.

⁹ See J. NIELING, H. REHM (eds.), *Achaemenid Impact in the Black Sea: Communication of Powers*, Aarhus 2010.

¹⁰ N.F. FEDOSEEV, *Zum achämenidischen Einfluß auf die historische Entwicklung der nordpontischen griechischen Staaten*, *Archäologische Mitteilungen aus Iran und Turan* XXIX 1997, pp. 309–319; M. TREISTER, *Achaemenid and Achaemenid-Inspired Goldware and Silverware, Jewellery and Arms and their Imitations to the North of the Achaemenid Empire*, in: NIELING, REHM (eds.), *op. cit.* (n. 9), pp. 223–280.

¹¹ See e.g. Ch. GOSDEN, *Archaeology and Colonialism. Cultural Contact from 5000 BC to the Present*, Cambridge 2004; P. VAN DOMMELEN, *Colonial Constructs: Colonialism and Archaeology in the Mediterranean*, *World Archaeology* XXVIII 1997, pp. 305–323; IDEM, *Colonial Interactions and Hybrid Practices: Phoenician and Carthaginian Settlement in Ancient Mediterranean*, in: G.J. STEIN (ed.), *Archaeology of Colonial Encounters: Comparative Perspectives*, Santa Fe–Oxford 2005, pp. 109–142.

non-Greeks (i.e. colonised) does not explain the complex nature of the inter-relationships that existed in the Black Sea area. The thesis shows a conceptual change that has been introduced in the study of “colonial” societies in antiquity, a change which has occurred as a result of the development of postcolonial and postmodernist thought and the recent effects of globalisation.

As a consequence, such ideas as acculturation (i.e. the Hellenisation of non-Greeks) have been questioned by scholars, since the concept of acculturation does not take into consideration such phenomena as mutual interactions, hybridisation, exchange and cultural reciprocity. It has been demonstrated that the process of developing local identities in the Greek *apoikiai* was a result of a common experience of migration and a new self-definition of a group of people who needed to establish a new collective identity¹². At the same time, a feasible middle ground for relations between Greeks and non-Greeks needed to be established, which does not appear to have been based on a structuralist system of opposition “us” (i.e. Greek) versus “them” (the imaginary *Other*), a system that gained popularity in classical studies especially due to the influential works by F. HARTOG and E. HALL¹³.

The thesis points out that the aforementioned dichotomy between Greeks and non-Greeks appears to have been artificially constructed in Greek thought for particular reasons which did not play an important role in the Black Sea “colonial” context. It has been argued that the boundaries of an ethnic group do not have to be based on a sharp opposition to other groups. On the contrary, ethnic boundaries such as norms, beliefs and values that are constructed and maintained in order to preserve a group’s identity and define social relations with a neighbouring and familiar *Other* are based on common understanding and mutual interest rather than “us–them” polarisation and conflict. Such a situation is characteristic of so-called plural societies, namely societies composed of different ethnic groups or cultural traditions, which seems to correspond closely to the societies in the North Pontic region. In such plural societies ethnic relations and boundary constructions are less sharp and they more often try to describe the way in which “we” are distinct from “them”, instead of creating a one-sided view of the *Other*¹⁴.

¹² I. MALKIN, *Networks and the Emergence of Greek Identity*, *Mediterranean Historical Review* XVIII 2003, pp. 56–74; see also IDEM, *Myth and Territory in the Spartan Mediterranean*, Cambridge 1994.

¹³ F. HARTOG, *The Mirror of Herodotus: The Representation of the Other in the Writing of History*, transl. by J. LLOYD, Berkeley 1988; E. HALL 1989, *Inventing the Barbarian: Greek Self-Definition through Tragedy*, Oxford 1989.

¹⁴ F. BARTH, *Enduring and Emerging Issues in the Analysis of Ethnicity*, in: H. VERMEULEN, C. GOVERS (eds.), *The Anthropology of Ethnicity. Beyond “Ethnic Groups and Boundaries”*, Amsterdam 1994, p. 13.

It has to be taken into consideration that non-Greeks were incorporated into the Greek *apoikiai* from the onset. Moreover, apart from non-Greeks, the population of Greek cities undoubtedly included a number of Greeks who did not come from the mother city and thus, their sense of ethnic identity may have been different than the identity applied to a particular *apoikia*. A city's cultural identity was established through the social, religious and political order reflected in the city's *nomima* (i.e. "customary institutions" established shortly after the foundation of an *apoikia*)¹⁵. This, however, did not have to exclude the existence of other groups that may have expressed their self-awareness so long as it did not affect the city's cultural coherence, which was maintained through the city institutions. Therefore, it does not seem appropriate to try to categorise a multicultural society by looking for clear ethnic markers in the archaeological material. It has been demonstrated that any attempt to find such clear ethnic markers in the archaeological material (especially in a "colonial" environment) fails due to the fact that a particular archaeological artefact or material form may remain the same, but their meaning will differ in every context¹⁶. Moreover, artefacts may have circulated among different groups of people and consequently such objects could easily cross cultural boundaries, as in the case of Greco-Scythian metalwork and burial assemblages from the North Pontic region¹⁷. It should also be taken into consideration that the expression of ethnic identity may have been different from that of modern times. The strong emphasis that is placed on biological affinity today may not have played such a crucial role in antiquity¹⁸.

It has been argued that the self-image of the North Pontic Greek *apoikiai* and their display of Greekness were crucial for the maintenance of cultural identity. The acceptance of a Greek cultural identity by other groups did not have to lead to acculturation; on the contrary, a sense of collective identity, which requires a certain (but not full) degree of integration, may have been successfully established in situations in which access to political and cultural participation in the city's life resulted in mutual benefits among the members of the "collective", as

¹⁵ I. MALKIN, *Foundations*, in: K.A. RAAFLAUB, H. VAN WEES (eds.), *A Companion to Archaic Greece*, Chichester 2009, pp. 386–390.

¹⁶ JONES, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 126.

¹⁷ See C. MEYER, *Greco-Scythian Art and the Birth of Eurasia. From Classical Antiquity to Russian Modernity*, Oxford 2013; F. FLESS, A. LORENZ, *Griechen, Skythien, Bosporaner? Zu den Problemen "ethnischer Etikettierungen" von Gräbern in den Nekropolen Pantikapaions*, *Eurasia Antiqua* XI 2005, pp. 57–77.

¹⁸ See S. LUCY, *Ethnic and Cultural Identities*, in: M. DÍAZ-ANDREU et al., *The Archaeology of Identity: Approaches to Gender, Age, Status, Ethnicity and Religion*, London–New York 2005, pp. 86–109; E. GRUEN, *Did Ancient Identity Depend on Ethnicity? A Preliminary Probe*, *Phoenix* LXVII 2013, pp. 1–22.

in the case of the Sarmatian influx into the city of Olbia after the Getic attack¹⁹. The case studies discussed in this thesis with regards to Olbia, Chersonesus and the Bosporan Kingdom have demonstrated that multiculturalism appears to have existed in Greek *poleis*, even though a certain degree of cultural coherence was necessary in order to maintain the Greek cultural identity of the *poleis*. The intentional display of Greekness was possible through such means as city institutions, local cults, local historiography, the creation of a common genealogy, and the expression of elite power. The importance of Greek genealogy among the Bosporan rulers (who were of non-Greek origin) is worth pointing out, since it appears to have been an ideological construct which was creatively used in order to express a sense of Greek identity, which was a crucial element of self-representation among the Bosporan elite. In turn, the existence of mixed genealogical traditions is likely to have reflected the multicultural character of Black Sea society, which is visible in Herodotus' story concerning the origin of the Scythians²⁰. Such a story need not be perceived only as an *interpretatio Graeca* of a Scythian tale, since such an approach does not take into consideration the importance of a mixed genealogical tradition for North Pontic society. Such a story may have had multiple meanings and interpretations depending on whether the tale was told among families that maintained a more Greek or Scythian identity.

Therefore, the thesis looks for other kinds of oppositions that may have played a more important role in the process of expressing and maintaining cultural identities in the North Pontic area. One such opposition may have been expressed both in the physical and psychological borders of a *polis* (where Greek cultural identity was intentionally maintained) and the rural and steppe territories (where multicultural encounters were not controlled by the city institutions). The importance of such an opposition between the city and the rural or/and steppe territory in the nature of cultural interrelationships in the North Pontic region is clearly visible in local cults and religion. In the case of Chersonesus, the cult of Heracles appears to have held a special importance in the rural territory, especially during the times of the high prosperity of the city's *chora* (the late 4th–early 3rd centuries BC) where the hero was mainly worshipped as a protector and patron. What is important is that the worship of Heracles in the rural territories appears to have stood in contrast to Parthenos who was most likely the goddess and guardian of the city itself²¹. Similarly, the cults of Apollo (with

¹⁹ For the idea of collective identity, see A. MELUCCI, *The Process of Collective Identity*, in: H. JOHNSTON, B. KLANDERMANS (eds.), *Social Movements and Culture*, Minneapolis 1995, pp. 41–63; F. POLETTA, J.M. JASPER, *Collective Identity and Social Movements*, Annual Review of Sociology XXVII 2001, pp. 283–305.

²⁰ Hdt. IV 8–10.

²¹ V.F. STOLBA, *Guderne i Chersones: Parthenos og Herakles*, in: J. HØJTE, P. GULDAGER BILDE (eds.), *Mennesker og guder ved Sortehavets kyster*, Aarhus 2004, pp. 53–64.

the epithets “Tetros” and “Delphinios”), Zeus, Athena and other gods from the Olympic pantheon that were worshipped in Olbia are almost absent outside the city, where in turn the cult of Achilles appears to have been very prominent²². A similar opposition is visible between the urban and steppe zones that are associated with different traditions and a different lifestyle. The Orphic-Dionysiac cult in Olbia appears to have played an important role in expressing the city’s unity through the establishment of a close relationship between the territory and the citizens of the *polis*²³. Moreover, the cults of Demeter and Dionysus that are attested in Olbia had a distinctive chthonic nature that was related to agriculture which stayed in opposition to the nomadic traditions of the Scythians²⁴. This is likely to have been reflected in Herodotus’ stories about Scyles and Anacharsis in which such a juxtaposition of the rural and urban environments and their way of life is expressed²⁵.

Apart from the local Black Sea perspective, the thesis also investigates the image of the region on a wider Panhellenic level. The Black Sea region belonged to a wider Greek cultural zone in which a set of representations, such as literary motifs, stereotypes and clichés, functioned and created an imaginary view of the North Pontic area and its non-Greek population. The thesis stresses the fact that Greek representations of the North Pontic *Others* (i.e. non-Greeks) were part of a large and complex Barbarian repertoire that existed on a broader Panhellenic level. The image(s) of the *Other* functioned as literary *topoi* that were consciously used in different contexts in order to create a desirable effect on the recipient. These contexts included Greek art, poetry and Athenian tragedy in which the barbarian *Other* played an important role²⁶. An essential element of Greek perception of the North Pontic region was ancient imaginary geography, according to which Scythia was the northern limit of the known world. This idea in turn resulted in the association of this region with common *topoi* regarding the edges of the world. However, in certain instances the influence of Panhellenic tradition on the North Pontic region seems to be present. An example of this is the iconog-

²² D. BRAUND, *Greater Olbia: Ethnic Religious, Economic, and Political Interactions in the Region of Olbia, c. 600–100 BC*, in: D. BRAUND, S.D. KRYZHITSKIY (eds.), *Classical Olbia and the Scythian World*, Oxford 2007, pp. 37–77.

²³ P. GULDAGER BILDE, *Some Reflections on Eschatological Currents, Diasporic Experience, and Group Identity in the Northwestern Black Sea Region*, in: P. GULDAGER BILDE, J. HJARL PETERSEN (eds.), *Meetings of Cultures in the Black Sea Region: Between Conflict and Coexistence*, Aarhus 2008, pp. 29–45.

²⁴ G. HINGE, *Dionysos and Herakles in Scythia – the Eschatological String of Herodotos’ book 4*, in: GULDAGER BILDE, HJARL PETERSEN (eds.), *op. cit.* (n. 23), pp. 369–397.

²⁵ Hdt. IV 76–80.

²⁶ Particularly in the so-called “escaping tragedies”, see HALL, *op. cit.* (n. 13), pp. 122 f.; EADEM, *The Theatrical Cast of Athens: Interactions between Ancient Greek Drama and Society*, Oxford 2006, p. 241; EADEM, *Greek Tragedy: Suffering under the Sun*, Oxford 2010, pp. 272 f.

raphy of Parthenos (the main deity of Chersonesus), especially as *Elaphoktonos* (deer-killing), which may have been introduced to the North Pontic area due to the Euripidean tragedy²⁷. Also, the Panhellenic motifs of Amazonomachy and Gryphomachy depicted on Kerch vases and other North Pontic objects may have reflected a local taste for myths that were familiar in the northern Black Sea milieu²⁸.

To conclude, the main arguments of this thesis are to demonstrate that first, East–West co-operation with regards to the study of the Black Sea area is crucial for a better understanding of multicultural encounters in the region in question; second, cultural identity of North Pontic poleis was based not on the opposition to the imaginary *Other* but on co-operation with non-Greeks and an intentional display of Greekness through such means as city institutions, local cults, local historiography and elite power. Therefore, the nature of cultural interrelationships in the northern Black Sea region was more likely based on the opposition between the city (where Greek cultural identity was intentionally maintained) and the rural and steppe territories (where multicultural encounters were not controlled by the city institutions). Lastly, it is argued that Greek representations of the North Pontic *Others* were a part of a large and complex “barbarian repertoire” which was consciously used in antiquity in various contexts such as art, poetry and Athenian tragedy in which the barbarian *Other* appear to have played a different and more important role.

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²⁷ P. GULDAGER BILDE, *Wandering Images: From Taurian (and Chersonesean) Parthenos to (Artemis) Tauropolos and (Artemis) Persike*, in: P. GULDAGER BILDE, J.M. HØJTE, V.F. STOLBA (eds.), *The Cauldron of Ariantas: Studies Presented to A.N. Ščeglov on the Occasion of his 70th Birthday*, Aarhus 2003, pp. 165–183.

²⁸ F. FLESS, *Taste at the Periphery of the Greek World: The Iberian Peninsula and the Black Sea*, in: K. LAPATIN (ed.), *Papers on Special Techniques in Athenian Vases*, Los Angeles 2008, pp. 225–234.

A COMMENTARY ON THE *CYNEGETICA* BY OPIAN
OF APAMEA, BOOK II*

by

MONIKA BŁAŚKIEWICZ

The *Cynegetica* (*On Hunting*) by Oppian of Apamea (3rd century AD) is a didactic poem written in hexameter and dedicated to the emperor Marcus Aurelius Severus Antoninus Augustus (better known as Caracalla), one of the two sons (the second being Geta) of Lucius Septimius Severus by his second wife, Julia Domna of Emesa in Syria (cf. *Cyneg.* I 3 f.; IV 20)¹. The work definitely must have been written after AD 212 judging by the allusion to the capture of Ctesiphon by Septimius Severus (I 31), but according to MAIR (1928) the most plausible date for the *Cynegetica* is after the murder of Caracalla's brother and co-emperor, Geta, which means after AD 212. The way in which Oppian presented Caracalla in the invocation opening the first book reinforces this theory: he is described as the sole emperor and heir of Septimius Severus, the master of lands and oceans (I 10 f.). However, in the light of what we know about the imperial family, one may assume that the poem was written even slightly later than AD 212; in AD 215 Caracalla and his mother Julia Domna undertook a trip to the East. That trip included Apamea and Antioch, where they were

* This paper announces my commentary on the second book of the *Cynegetica* by Oppian of Apamea, and is a summary of a PhD thesis that has been completed as part of the Project "The Eastern Mediterranean from the 4th century BC until Late Antiquity". The project has been coordinated by Professor Krzysztof NAWOTKA (University of Wrocław, Institute of History) and realised between 2011 and 2015 within the International PhD Projects Programme of the Foundation for Polish Science, co-financed by the European Union from the Regional Development Fund within the framework of Measure 1.2 "Strengthening the Human Potential within the Science Sector" of the Operational Programme "Innovative Economy". The thesis was supervised by Professor Gościwit MALINOWSKI (University of Wrocław) and Doctor Zofia ARCHIBALD (University of Liverpool) and defended at the Department of History, University of Wrocław, on 23rd June 2015. The dissertation was reviewed by Professor Magdalena STULIGROSZ (Adam Mickiewicz University of Poznań) and Professor Bogdan BURLIGA (University of Gdańsk).

¹ All references in this paper, unless stated otherwise, are to Oppian's *Cynegetica*. Where no book numbers are given, references are to the second book.

received with great honours and where they spent the winter of AD 216. Hence, SPATHARAKIS (2004) put forward the theory that Oppian might have written and offered his poem to Caracalla on the occasion of the emperor's stay in Syria. The poem also provides the reader with some information about the poet himself. Oppian refers to Apamea as his homeland (called here Chersonese II 100, or Pella II 101; 114) on the river Orontes while talking about the previously unattested labour of Heracles in Syria: as Oppian reports, Archippus, the lord of Pella and a friend of Heracles, asked the hero to make a hydrological improvement to the city, which was flooded by the river Orontes. Heracles was tasked with making separate channels for the waters of the river, and of the lake, which resulted in an extremely fertile plain, hence called the new plain of Heracles (νέον πέδον Ἡρακλήος, II 149). Elsewhere, Oppian mentions the tomb of the Ethiopian king Memnon, which was allegedly situated in the vicinity of Apamea. According to the poet, "the Assyrian dwellers mourn for Memnon, the glorious son of the Morning" (II 152 f.) in that place. Several lines later he once again refers to his fatherland: "Howbeit the spacious glories of our fatherland we shall sing in due order with sweet Pimplean song" (II 156 f.; transl. by MAIR 1928).

The issue of the authorship of the *Cynegetica* has attracted a protracted scholarly debate (in the last decades: HAMBLENNÉ 1968; MARTÍNEZ, SÁNCHEZ 2003; WHITE 2004). The author of the *Cynegetica* is frequently referred to as Pseudo-Oppian to avoid confusion with the author of the poem *Haliēutica* (*On Fishing*), Oppian of Cilicia, to whom an ancient *Life* (*Vita B*), the *Suda* (10th c.), a short biography by Constantine Manasses (12th c.) as well as manuscript tradition, in my opinion wrongly, ascribe the authorship of both poems. In the last of these testimonies one can find incorrect information that the same author wrote not only the *Cynegetica* and the *Haliēutica*, but also the *Ixeutica* (*On Fowling*), a work otherwise attributed to a certain Dionysius. However, since this problem was not the primary subject matter of my dissertation, I refer to the author simply as Oppian, for the sake of convenience.

The *Cynegetica* consists of four books. As noticed already by SCHMITT (1970), the books of the poem are thematically paired: the first pair is devoted to the triple division of the hunting, hunting seasons, the hunter's physical qualities and weapons, breeds of horses and dogs (which are treated in the first book); further, to the general precepts of hunting and finally the descriptions of hunting for particular kinds of game (which are treated in the fourth book). The second pair, which consists of the second and the third book, deals with different species of animals; the second book is dedicated mainly to horned animals such as bulls, deer and antelopes, and the third one to predators such as lions, leopards and tigers. Thus the poem describes different breeds of dogs and horses, various species of animals to be hunted as well as methods and weapons of hunting. In comparison to other hunting treatises, Oppian's poem is exceptional: its form and character is far more original and multifaceted than similar works dealing

with hunting and animals. However, the *Cynegetica* cannot be considered to be just a hunting handbook; the technical descriptions are enriched with numerous mythological digressions and vignettes about the animals' idiosyncrasies, which not only add colour to the discourse, but also prove the author's knowledge of ancient literary classics and provides the reader with insight into the state of contemporary knowledge of zoology.

The *Cynegetica* started to enjoy popularity in the sixteenth century, when four editions of the text were released (LIPPIUS 1517; VASCOSANUS 1549; TURNEBUS 1555; RITTERHAUSEN 1597) and three commentaries were written (BRODAEUS 1552; BODINUS 1555; RITTERSHAUSEN 1597). These first commentaries are written in Latin and have a form of factual commentaries, which contain brief explanations of particular words and phrases as well as ancient testimonies. The testimonies included in these works are extremely valuable for modern researchers working on commentaries. From the sixteenth century to the present day, twelve critical editions of the text have been produced. Apart from preparing editions of the text, authors in the nineteenth and twentieth century concentrated chiefly on studies on the linguistic problems of the *Cynegetica* (e.g. LEHRS 1837; BUSSEMAKER in DÜBNER, BUSSEMAKER 1849; MILLER 1891). In twentieth century research on the *Cynegetica* one can distinguish several different tendencies: scholars were deeply interested in didactic aspects of the poem (e.g. HOPKINSON 1994; TOOHEY 1996) and in Greek poetry's contribution to emperor worship (e.g. AYMARD 1951; OPELT 1960). The poem was also translated into English in the Loeb Classical Library series (MAIR 1928); this edition deserves special scholarly attention owing to valuable remarks and testimonies situated in the footnotes. The editor also provided the reader with a useful introduction dedicated to such problems as the authorship of the poem, zoology before Oppian, the division of the art of capturing animals into three types (hunting, fishing and fowling), information about some animal idiosyncrasies and a general plan of the books of the poem. The only modern commentary on any part of the poem is that of SCHMITT (1970), which is devoted to book one. It is worth emphasising that up until 1970 one can observe a gap in studies on the *Cynegetica* aimed at producing commentaries. Over the last few years one can observe various trends in the studies on Oppian: in one group, represented mostly by Italian scholarship, the scholars have focused on the particular problems of the poem (MASSIMILLA 1999; CIPOLLA 2006); in another one, the researchers have worked on bilingual editions of the poem, which were supplemented by brief remarks situated either in the footnotes or in the appendices (MAIR 1928; CALVO 1990; L'ALLIER 2009; SESTILI 2010). However, these comments and notes cannot be considered real commentaries, since they provide the reader with only brief and basic information about the characters and motifs. Thus, my commentary to the second book of the *Cynegetica* is going to fill the gap in studies on the *Cynegetica*.

In my commentary I scrutinise the composition of the second book of the poem in order to determine whether the particular compositional elements are

connected somehow, or whether they were introduced into the poem accidentally; I examine what Oppian calls particular animals and figures, what types of terms, names and epithets he uses and what role the animals and characters play in the poem. In my discussion of the second book of the *Cynegetica* I devote special attention to the means of artistic expression as well as the frequency of use of the particular terms and names, since Oppian, constantly striving for linguistic and poetical innovativeness, repeatedly replaces traditional appellations with rare and extraordinary equivalents. While analysing the descriptions of the animal species, I try to estimate to what extent these depictions reflect reality and from which sources Oppian may have derived knowledge about hunting, zoology and natural history: did he write based predominantly on his own knowledge or did he repeat hearsay? Did he have a chance of personally seeing the animals he discussed, or did he derive his knowledge solely from the available treatises on animals and hunting? Since Oppian was seeking novelty and originality, his poem abounds with rare and local versions of myths; furthermore, some of the myths were reinterpreted by Oppian himself (e.g. a myth about the tenth labour of Heracles, 109–158, or about the Thracian king Phineus, 612–628). My aims are to carry out an analysis of the modified myths and mythological motifs, to separate the traditional elements from newly introduced ones, and to determine their role in the second book of the poem. However, my commentary tries to contribute not only to furthering of research into Oppian's poetry, but also to studies on the pagan literature and the culture of the late antiquity: apart from the didactic part on the wildlife, the author includes in his work – knowingly or not – a great number of hints and allusions to phenomena of different types. Among them one can list historical phenomena (e.g. forms and practices of emperor worship, allusions to foreign imperial policy, such as the Roman–Parthian wars, the capture of the Parthian capital Ctesiphon in AD 198), literary tendencies (e.g. the development of court and didactic poetry modelled on erudite Hellenistic works), cultural references (e.g. hunting as a luxury form of entertainment and a part of *tryphé* – the elegant lifestyle), and social ones (e.g. imperial patronage over the poet).

I base my commentary on the newest critical edition of the text (PAPATHOMOPOULOS 2003). Since this edition comprises the critical apparatus with various *lectiones*, my commentary does not focus on textual problems. However, if a particular *lectio* changes the sense of the word and the passage, it is discussed in the body of the commentary. In the commentary I attempt to conduct an in-depth analysis of Oppian's work, distinguishing within it several major parts or so-called thematic panels which reflect the intended composition of the *Cynegetica*. Thus, at the first stage of the research, the whole book was divided into thematic panels; subsequently, the thematic panels were divided into sections and subsections; the smallest unit was a word or phrase accompanied by the number of the line in question. After the introduction of the preliminary division

of the text as described above, I examine the style of the particular compositional elements and I determine whether connections and interdependencies exist between them. Apart from the analysis of the text itself, the main research method is based on the comparative analysis of the literary testimonies, both those collected in 16th c. commentaries (BRODAEUS 1552; BODINUS 1555; RITTERSHAUSEN 1597) and those gathered from online databases of ancient literature (*TLG*, *TLL*). Of course I make frequent references to modern works on hunting in the ancient Mediterranean world (HULL 1964; ANDERSON 1985; BARRINGER 2001).

I distinguished six thematic panels within the inner structure of the commentary; each panel is preceded by an ample introduction which comprises a discussion of the character and the structure of the passage under consideration. The first thematic panel contains the invocation (1–42). The invocatory part is then divided into three parts: an address to Artemis (1–4), a catalogue of the human and semi-divine inventors of the different hunting arts (5–30) and a eulogy of hunting (31–42). The second thematic panel concerns bulls (43–175). This thematic panel has a highly elaborate structure. Briefly speaking, the part devoted to bulls consists of four main sections: a description of bulls' mating habits (43–82), a catalogue of breeds of bulls (83–108), a mythological excursus on Heracles and Orontes (109–158) and a part devoted to bison (159–175). The element which connects the excursus with the section about the breeds is a Syrian species of bulls. As was demonstrated in the commentary, this breed was, reasonably, discussed in the catalogue as the last one: it provides the poet with an excuse for the mythological *aition*, in which the Syrian cattle played the crucial role. The part which closes the thematic panel concerning bulls deals with the animal species termed by Oppian as bisons (159–175). The third thematic panel deals with “deer-like” animals (176–325): deer (176–292), fallow deer (293–295), *iorcus* (296–299), antelope (300–314) and gazelle (315–325). As I noticed, this thematic panel is interesting from the compositional point of view: one can suppose that Oppian matched the animal species following deer into pairs: fallow deer with *iorcus* (familiar woodland creatures) and antelope with gazelle (exotic plain animals). As my studies on the second book showed, the structure of the section about deer was complex to such an extent that I needed to divide the passages into six subsections: in the first one, Oppian provides the reader with some general information about deer (176–186): one can learn about the physical qualities of this animal, its temperament and its idiosyncrasy. The next subsection is devoted to stags' mating habits, a recurring motif in the *Cynegetica* (187–208). Within the next few lines the poet described the most conspicuous feature of deer, mainly focusing on the antlers (209–216). Subsequently, he proceeded with a description of the amphibious nature of deer (217–232). A lengthy passage dedicated to the idiosyncrasy of deer and snakes follows this description (233–290). This passage has the form of an excursus, but unlike that one about Heracles and Orontes, this one does not relate in any way to mythology. On the contrary, this excursus

shows how the ancients were trying to explain the phenomena among animals that they could observe but which they did not understand. The last part about deer has a purely fanciful nature and refers to a popular belief that persisted in antiquity (291 f.); according to that belief, deer were long-living animals, an opinion frequently repeated by ancient authors.

Oppian's fourth thematic panel is devoted to wild sheep and goats (326–488). As the analysis of its content indicates, this panel is strongly thematically and stylistically diversified. It is one of the longest thematic parts in the second book and it consists of nine sections. Just like in the panel dedicated to deer, Oppian starts his descriptions of wild sheep and goats with some general information about these animals (326–337). The second section relates to an idiosyncrasy concerning the respiratory system of wild goats (338–342). In the subsequent section, Oppian concentrates on the phenomenon of the mutual love between the parents and their young (343–376). The passage about the animals' affection is followed by thematically paired units dedicated to the sheep of Gortyn (377–381) and then to an animal species called *subus* (382–392). Three subsequent thematic sections are intrinsically combined in terms of the topics being discussed as well as the mood and style: the first unit is devoted to the interspecies relationship between animals (393–409); the second one has the form of a lengthy address to Eros (410–425); the final unit is a return to the *alien desires*, which means love between animals of different species (426–444). In the last section, included in the fourth thematic panel, Oppian meticulously describes an oryx: its appearance, temper and fighting style (445–488). A relatively short thematic panel is devoted to the elephant and the rhinoceros (489–569). In the sixth and final thematic panel, Oppian briefly discusses small creatures, which he seemingly condemns. Among the animals species which according to the poet are not worth poetical interest one can distinguish: panthers, cats and dormice (570–585), squirrels (586–597), spiny mice and hedgehogs (598–604), apes (605–611) and moles (612–628).

The division of the second book of the *Cynegetica* into thematic panels does not match the analysis of the structure of the book presented by MAIR in the introduction to his English translation of the poem; the editor proposed the general arrangement of the content of the book without any further information concerning the structure of the parts devoted to particular animal species discussed in the second book. In my opinion, the division of the book into thematic panels, sections and subsections better reflects the intended composition. As the analysis of the compositional elements clearly shows, the particular elements are closely connected in terms of content, style and sense. The research on the *Cynegetica* definitely proves that its composition was carefully and elaborately planned. On the grounds of the analysis of the catalogue of the first mythological hunters, I put forward the theory that the catalogue was composed according to the times of the day: the type of hunting discovered by Centaurs would take place at dawn (ἐπιδόρπιον

εὔρετο θήρην), the coursing invented by Castor would be organised at noon (μεσημβρινοῦ δρόμοιο) and the snaring with the use of traps and hunting nets started by Hippolytus and Orion – by night (νυχίην πανεπίκλοπον ἄγρην).

Another theory I formulate in my commentary also deals with the composition; this theory is based on the meaning of the word ἡ ὀπώρα used in the eulogy of hunting (31–42). In the body of the laudation, Oppian lists the indulgences connected with hunting: a nap in a flowered meadow, resting in a cave and in the shade of the rocks, or bathing in a stream. If one accepts LILLY'S (1919) theory, according to which the word ἡ ὀπώρα denotes here not fruit but autumn, one may suppose that the particular activities were listed according to the seasons: first spring, then summer, late summer and autumn.

As is clearly indicated in the studies on the second book of the *Cynegetica*, some animal species are given lengthy and detailed descriptions while others are just briefly mentioned; among those which enjoyed Oppian's greatest interest one can mention bulls (132 lines), wild sheep and goats (118 lines) and deer-like creatures (116 lines). In my commentary I explain this phenomenon; Oppian's deep sentiment for his fatherland underlies the poem and, as research into this book shows, some of the animals being discussed are closely connected to his home town: the fact that both cattle and wild goats are parts of the legend of the founding of Apamea seems to explain why Oppian provides these animals with such lengthy and meticulous descriptions. The poet's interest in the deer and deer-like creatures is also perfectly explainable: one may suppose that the poet alludes in this way to the noble, most valuable type of hunting, represented in the catalogue by Perseus. It is also worth mentioning that the hero was associated with the hunting of gazelles, oryxes and deer. Moreover, this interpretation offers the reader an explanation as to why Oppian disregards small animals like squirrels, hedgehogs or dormice; this type of prey surely did not enjoy the interest of the noble, mythological hunters, who decidedly preferred hunting for such animal species as boars, lions or deer. The passage in which Oppian compared the goats that attend their elderly parents to humans provokes scholarly discussion; contrary to the prevailing viewpoint, REBUFFAT (2001) claims that the sense of this simile is deeply negative. In my opinion, his reading is not correct, since it directly contradicts Oppian's ideas concerning animals; the poet praises the family bonds between animals, clearly approves the species which look after their young and on the other hand condemns those which favour or neglect one of their children. Oppian's approval of family bonds is also discernible in the further part of the text devoted to wild sheep and goats: it is worth noting that the fawns whose mother has just been caught in the snares ask not only Artemis, but also Zeus, her father, for help. In my opinion, the allusion to the kinship between the gods aims at emphasising the poet's endorsement of animals' family bonds.

The animal species whose identification poses a significant problem is the so-called sheep of Gortyn. Although the creature is given a shorter description

than the mysterious *subus*, it has one conspicuous feature, namely two pairs of horns. According to HULL (1964), this animal denotes the four-horned antelope (*Tetracerus quadricornis*). This interpretation is not completely unfounded, but I suggest that the animal described by Oppian under the name of the sheep of Gortyn is a four-horned sheep, the Jacob sheep. What makes this identification more probable is that this species is native to Syria. Hence, one cannot exclude the possibility that Oppian personally saw this creature.

The main aim of my commentary to the second book of the *Cynegetica* is to analyse its composition and to prove that connections between particular compositional elements do exist. I also elucidate the role of mythological characters, the animal species and the way in which they were termed; I juxtapose the descriptions included in the poem with modern publications on zoology to determine to what extent Oppian's depictions are in line with reality; I study the mythological digressions and reinterpreted myths to separate traditional elements from new ones. However, many aspects of the poem still remain to be discussed. Furthermore, one has to remember that the *Cynegetica* consists of four books and all connections can be traced only as a result of the analysis of the whole poem. Thus, since this commentary is dedicated only to the second book, some of these associations and interdependencies might have been merely mentioned or omitted.

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Kostas VLASSOPOULOS, *Greeks and Barbarians*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, XXII + 392 pp., ISBN 978-0-52-176468-1, £64.99 (hb.) / ISBN 978-0-52-114802-3, £25.99 (pb.).

Scholars investigating relationships between the ancient Greeks and other ethnic groups not only have to examine an immense amount of data, but they also have to make a difficult choice as to how they should describe contacts with so many peoples who in many cases differ from one another to a large extent. This situation is complicated by the fact that contacts between Greeks and non-Greeks very often varied depending on the place in which they occurred. What is more, the Greeks themselves were not uniform. For instance, in the archaic and classical periods, the Athenians and Cypriotes were considerably different in many aspects of everyday life such as language (dialect), script, political system, religion etc. The question arises if it is at all possible to present such complex relationships between the Greeks and their neighbours in one volume.

The book entitled *Greeks and Barbarians* by Kostas VLASSOPOULOS [= V.] can be treated as a positive answer to this question. Of course, the author had to select from the evidence and to emphasise certain issues while indicating only cursorily or passing over others, but he truly managed to achieve an impressive result. The book consists of eight main chapters whose titles reveal its character: 1. "Introduction" (pp. 1–33); 2. "The Panhellenic world and the world of empires" (pp. 34–77); 3. "The world of networks and the world of *apoikiai*" (pp. 78–128); 4. "Intercultural communication" (pp. 129–160); 5. "The Barbarian repertoire in Greek culture" (pp. 161–225); 6. "Globalisation and glocalisation" (pp. 226–277); 7. "The Hellenistic world" (pp. 278–320); 8. "Conclusions" (pp. 321–331).

V. focuses, first of all, on contacts in archaic and classical times, which is generally the subject of the introduction and chapters 2–6. In turn, chapter 7, which in principle is a separate part of the book, deals with intercultural relationships in Hellenistic times (only some issues connected with this period are mentioned in the previous chapters, especially in chapter 6). It is a pity that the author did not decide to add one more chapter devoted to the Mycenaean period as such a chapter would have made the book much more complete. Unfortunately, the author sometimes seems to forget about the Bronze Age, e.g. in the following statement: "Before 700 monumental buildings and monumental sculpture in stone were largely unknown in Greece and most areas of the Mediterranean world" (p. 231).

V. bases his work on four kinds of sources: literary, epigraphic, archaeological and numismatic (he does not take into consideration any linguistic data, especially loanwords; there is also no mention of genetic or isotopic methods). It is worth underlining that he makes use of a vast amount of evidence. Thus the reader has the opportunity to acquaint him or herself with many important and interesting types of data, including data that is not to be found in earlier books concerning contacts between the Greeks and other peoples. There are only a few points where one can object to insufficient criticism of the literary texts. This is evident e.g. on p. 98, where the author, on the basis of Plutarch's *Life of Themistocles* (26, 5) writes the following: "The renegade Themistocles managed to avoid the checkpoints in order to reach the Persian court by concealing himself in a closed wagon and by having his attendants claim that they were carrying a woman of Greek origin, whom they were taking from Ionia to one of the Persian nobles at the palace". I assume that the author treats this story as untrue. However, the lack of any comments regarding its historicity may point to a contrary conclusion. As regards the archaeological data, the description of some objects with respect to their date or place of origin is not wholly precise, e.g. on pp. 159 f. we read about a statuette of Osiris with a Greek dedication, but we are not informed as to where this

statuette was discovered and when it is dated to. Nevertheless, there are truly only a few such cases in the book.

As the titles of the chapters listed above may already indicate, V. particularly focuses in his work on the nature of relationships and their consequences. Special attention should be drawn to his concept of four parallel worlds. This interesting concept is both the subject of two chapters (2 and 3) and appears in many other places in the book. What exactly are these worlds? The author explains this in the introduction (pp. 11 f.):

In order to understand the complex relationships between Greeks and Barbarians we need to move beyond a simplistic definition between two separate and self-enclosed entities. Greeks and non-Greeks encountered and interacted with each other in a variety of different ways and contexts; exploring these encounters and interactions requires situating them within four parallel, yet interconnected, worlds; the world of networks; the world of *apoikiai*; the Panhellenic world; and the world of empires. To a certain extent, these four worlds involved different geographical areas; while, for example, the world of empires comprised the eastern Mediterranean, the world of *apoikiai* largely focused on the western Mediterranean and the Black Sea. But more important is the fact that these four worlds involved different form of interaction and encounters between Greeks and non-Greeks.

Generally speaking, V. provides a wide range of a variety of data and draws reliable conclusions from it. I would like to indicate only one specific detail that shows a kind of inconsistency. On p. 29 the author writes: “Greek culture lacked intertextuality and translation of foreign text”, and, similarly, on p. 165: “Translations were effectively unheard of”. But this statement sounds slightly different on pp. 216–218, where the author writes as follows:

“Bilingualism” and translations were rare in archaic and classical Greek literature, but a convincing case can be made for the fourth-century astronomer and mathematician Eudoxus of Cnidos. [...] The pharaoh gave him access to the priests of Heliopolis, where Eudoxus spent a year and a half with them [...]; it is this immersion that made possible Eudoxus’ translation into Greek of an Egyptian work entitled *Dialogues of Dogs*.

In this context we can add another convincing case: I mean here *The Voyage of Hanno*, dated to the 5th cent. BC, which is commonly credited to be a translation from Punic. I wonder why V. did not mention this work.

There is no doubt that *Greek and Barbarians* is a useful introduction and even a kind of companion to the issue of contacts between Greeks and non-Greeks in the first millennium BC. This work can be treated both as an academic handbook and as an important contribution to research on such a complex and controversial problem¹.

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Susan WOODFORD, *An Introduction to Greek Art: Sculpture and Vase Painting in the Archaic and Classical Periods*, 2nd edition, London: Bloomsbury, 2015, 224 pp., ISBN 978-1-47-252364-8, £19.99.

“This book is only a beginning!” – these words are published by the author at the end of her book, and we must admit that it would be hard to think of a better and more succinct motto for a book whose aim is to introduce the reader to, and encourage a deeper study of, the art of the ancient world. The first exercise is, however, a key one for the reader who wishes to become acquainted with a certain problem – he cannot be discouraged, disappointed, bored or intimidated. It is a great art to write an academic study in a way that is comprehensible and accessible but without undermining the high level of its subject matter and its scholarly reliability. This has been achieved without doubt by Susan WOODFORD (= W.), whose textbook *An Introduction to Greek Art. Sculpture and Vase Painting in the Archaic and Classical Periods* has been reprinted by Bloomsbury Publishing. As the author herself notes in the introduction to the first edition (London: Duckworth, 1986), the book is aimed at students, travellers and art lovers. The overriding conceptual organization of this publication is the demonstration of issues discussed in scholarship, limiting itself to a small number of examples, so that the reader is not overwhelmed by and lost in the sheer volume of information and images. This idea worked well twenty years ago, but an even better effect might be achieved today, in times when students are faced with a vast quantity of information. The young generation, accustomed to constantly consulting the internet and to changing images, is slowly losing its ability to concentrate on one concrete thing and analyse that in depth. Yet W. discusses phenomena and problems in the history of art using one example for illustration, or on rare occasions two. Each time she must of course make a difficult decision in choosing from the available artefacts the one which best illustrates the phenomenon under discussion. But she usually selects material in such a way as to keep track of the development of the technique or motif. The book is characterised by a low-key exposition; the narration is not loaded with information of an encyclopaedic nature. Professional terminology is italicised, so that the reader is aware of which words he must note and remember. Such terminology is confined only to what is absolutely essential. The author hardly ever digresses from the matter in hand; she avoids superfluous deviations from the subject, with the sole exception of mythical descriptions. Because she is aware that the book’s reader might be a complete layman in the question of Greek culture, she reaches out to him by explaining in a simple fashion the myths which are connected with what is presented on the artefacts. Thanks to this, the book is not only about art but also in a certain sense about Greek civilization. She has a particular fondness for the Homeric epics, which were essentially a huge inspiration for artists of the archaic and classical eras. And so, instead of imposing specialist epic expressions on the reader, she patiently translates in a logical and organic fashion the connections between Homeric formulae and the ornamentation of Dipylon vases. She also frequently demonstrates astute observations on connections with literature (e.g. the description of the François vase, pp. 18 f., or Exekias’ work). Thanks to this the textbook reads pleasantly, and in addition the reader sees that there is a natural and obvious correlation between literature and imaginary art, that the artefacts do not originate in a vacuum, but are rather the result of complex cultural processes. This is where W. of course aims to also show the historical and social background. This is easy to see in examples such as the discussion of methods of presenting war and its terrors in vase paintings during the Persian Wars, or in the presentation of sculptures such as the Tyrannicides. At the same time she avoids considerations of sexual subtexts, demonstrations of sexual violence or obscene presentations. It appears that this is a very sensible selection and one which is dictated by attention to the sensibilities of the reader. The book abounds in illustrative material, containing over 250 photographs, diagrams and charts. These schematic drawings and models are helpful in enabling an

understanding of the principles of composition (e.g. fig. 125), symmetry (e.g. figs. 195 and 196), or questions as prosaic as the method of pinning the peplos and chiton (figs. 70 and 71).

The current edition differs from the first not only in the addition of interesting sections, but also in the quality and distribution of the illustrations. The number of colour illustrations has increased significantly. This has been particularly helpful in improving the visibility of uniquely beautiful coloured drawings on white *lekylthoi*. The method of presenting black and red vase paintings has also benefited through this. The best example here is fig. 154, where on the *hydria* of the Pan Painter, the intensely red blood spilling from the neck of the Medusa figure is clearly distinct from the orange background. In the same illustration in the old edition this unusual effect employed by the painter was almost completely invisible. In some instances the author has decided to use additional illustrations to show magnified details (the perfect choice would be e.g. fig. 152), or an additional drawing of the detail (e.g. fig. 5). The places where W. has left the illustrations in black and white has been dictated by the quality of the contrast, in which the chiaroscuro extracts the structure of the artefact and its composition in a much better way; this is especially visible in the instances of sculpture. On the side, it is worth noting that there is no lack in this book of surprising and simultaneously splendid solutions in the presentation to the reader of conundrums which are difficult to imagine. It is common knowledge that in the instance of Greek sculpture of the classical and Hellenistic periods we often have to deal with only Roman copies of various qualities. We assume that these copies differ – often very significantly – from the originals, something which was dictated by various factors: a lesser talent on the artist's part, different material (bronze and marble), the influence of the different aesthetics of the era and indeed of the one purchasing the copy. W. has decided to show these varying factors by using drastic examples: in illustrations 186 and 187 she has presented Michelangelo's David and its modern souvenir copy in plastic on a reduced scale. It is probably impossible to find a better example which shows how difficult it is to imagine the Athene Parthenos of Phidias on the basis of the extant copies.

W. has added not only many short paragraphs to the new edition, but also a whole section on the topic of the Mausoleum of Halicarnassus, one of the wonders of the world which was known to the ancients, as well as the very useful section *Art in Greek Society*.

The book's most important asset is, however, simply the fact that it is well written, without superfluous rambling, with concern for the reader and with clear and elegant language. This is actually a very good handbook for people who are establishing their acquaintance with Greek art: school pupils, students, businessmen or retired people on holiday, who want to find new intellectual stimuli in antiquity and intelligent relief from everyday life. Let us return for a moment to the book's closing motto: "The way the works illustrated in this book *look* is unlikely to change, but the way we *look at* them is far from immutable. This book is only a beginning!" Yes, essentially every time we return to a museum and look at an artefact which we have already seen, sometimes more than once, it awakes in us different emotions and associations. The artefact itself is something that obviously does not change, but we and our feelings about life, art and that particular artefact do. It is similar with valuable literature: whenever we read a good book, it opens up new perspectives to us each time. Who has not got the impression when reading Homer for the fifth time that he is reading something completely new and revealing? The reader of W.'s handbook, who might be seeing some works of Greek art for the first time in his life, will be at the beginning of this road. Perhaps this book will give him precisely the chance of meeting and making the wonderful discovery of the works of Exekias, who will then encourage him to read Homer. It is just this power of potential which slumbers in textbooks for beginners: it cannot be underestimated.

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SACRED LAND IN CLASSICAL ATHENS
AND HISTORICAL EMPIRICISM*

Nikolaos PAPAARKADAS, *Sacred and Public Land in Ancient Athens*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011 (Oxford Classical Monographs), XII + 395 pp., ISBN 978-0-19-969400-6, £87.00.

Since the book by Nikolaos PAPAARKADAS [= P.] was published in 2011, it has already received a number of reviews, most notably those of David WHITEHEAD and Stephen LAMBERT, both esteemed experts on the subject of the book¹. The reviews by LAMBERT and William S. BUBELIS both touched upon some important methodological issues, but I believe that their remarks have not exhausted the subject and some points still need to be made before building a future discussion, as LAMBERT has wished², on the foundation laid by P.

The book is an impressive treatment of all aspects of land tenure in ancient Athens. The emphasis is put upon the Classical period, but the author has included Hellenistic, Roman and Archaic material to some extent, where he felt it necessary. The emphasis on the Classical period does not just come from its popularity among classical scholars; the most important material for P.'s work comes precisely from the time between the mid-fifth and the late fourth century BCE. Since the book is devoted to the use of sacred and public lands, the sale of lands, as this was predominantly the domain of private property and private economic activity, is only treated marginally. When the author does discuss the public sale of properties, it is only in the case of either confiscated or donated properties. He persuasively argues that the Athenian state, or any body of citizens (be it *phyle*, *phratry*, *genos* or *orgeones*) concerned with some landed properties, was not interested in selling but rather letting them to continually provide for their cultic needs. Therefore, in the author's opinion, and inspired by S. LAMBERT's comment on the *Rationes Centesimarum*³, the sale of lands attested in the *Rationes Centesimarum* was a strategy employed only when the state needed to return to financial equilibrium rather than a trace of a constant and regular procedure (pp. 132–135). P. deliberately speaks of “sacred and public land” rather than “sacred and public real property”, because he is naturally unable to include the leasing of the Attic silver mines in his investigation. Here he claims that the analysis of the mine leases would take much more space and consume much more time than “an average monograph” has (p. 13), which is a fair point. Even without such an analysis (for which there is also a great need), the work is absolutely satisfactory in terms of content and size. The monograph is impressive as it is – I can only guess that its initial version was so voluminous that the publisher chose to decrease the font size in the appendices (pp. 244–325 – which makes them a considerable part of the book). Unfortunately, the short sighted amongst us may much regret this publishing decision!

The work begins with an introductory Chapter 1 (pp. 1–15) which consists of a short review of the most important bibliography on the subject as well as with basic definitions. The author has also devoted some space to discussing the notion of the “public” and “sacred”. He rightfully asks where to draw the line between the sacred and public land and whether those two worlds

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¹ D. WHITEHEAD, *CR* LXII 2012, pp. 547–549; S.D. LAMBERT, *AJPh* CXXXIV 2013, pp. 507–510; see also W.S. BUBELIS, *BMCR* 2012.07.16.

² LAMBERT, *op. cit.* (n. 1), p. 510.

³ S.D. LAMBERT, *Rationes Centesimarum. Sales of Public Land in Lykourgan Athens*, Amsterdam 1997, pp. 280–291, esp. p. 288.

overlapped (p. 2). The question must remain unanswered and P. concludes, in agreement with other scholars, that “when a public executive body – the Boule, the Assembly, a committee appointed by them – or even an Athenian magistrate, appears to regulate some aspect of a given cult, we are probably on the right track to identify such a cult as public” (p. 17). Therefore, the lands of Athena or the Other Gods were *de facto* both public and sacred. The author reminds us that he must be cautious, even if somewhat eclectic, in his approach. However, the initial question becomes nothing more than a theorem with no practicality in the rest of the monograph (see his doubts on pp. 76, 96 and 140), while the monograph does little to address the distinction between the “public” and “sacred”, especially with regard to such difficult material as epigraphy. On the other hand, perhaps the lack of a conclusion is indeed the best answer, and once again the wider field needs to understand that our theoretical models remain at odds with the data we work on.

Chapter 2 (pp. 16–98) is devoted to the sacred property of the Athenian polis and the means by which it was leased. P. discusses the property of Athena Polias and the Other Gods, as well as the property of the Two Goddesses and the new polis-gods such as Asklepios and Amphiaraios. The discussion is accompanied by detailed analyses of the available sources, executed in an exemplary fashion, especially in the case of the enigmatic Pelargikon, the properties on Kythnos, the Rharian field, and the Athenian acquisition of Oropos in the 330s at the benevolence of Alexander the Great. The chapter, as the author notes (pp. 14 f.), needs to be read in conjunction with two appendices, namely Appendix I, concerned with the creation and administration of the Sacred Orgas, and Appendix II on the sacred olive trees, the *morai*. The chapter is accompanied by a careful commentary on the *Athenaion Politeia* 47, 4 f. (pp. 51–75), in which one can read that the *basileus* acted along with the board of the ten *poletai* in the matter of sacred leases. P. brilliantly demonstrates the shaky ground upon which the claim stands, and persuasively argues that there were apparently no “administrative links” between the *basileus* and *poletai* (p. 54). Instead, the author puts forward a new possibility which emphasizes the role of the *paredroi*. They are attested in the Eleusinian accounts (IG II² 1672 = *I.Eleusis* 177, ll. 372 f.) and they helped the *basileus* along with the *epimeletai* of the Mysteries and the Eleusinian *epistatai* to lease the sacred Eleusinian estates. Hence, P. proposes that they also helped the *basileus* to lease other sacred properties (pp. 54 f.). The author also presents a modified version of Vincent ROSIVACH’s hypothesis⁴ that sacred leases subsidised not only ancestral sacrifices (πάτριοι θυσίαι), but also the additional feasts (ἐπίθετοι ἑορταί) (pp. 77–79).

Chapter 3 (pp. 99–162) undertakes the problem of the sacred property of the Athenian *phylai* and demes. P. discusses the problematic case of land apportionment after Athens gained Oropos and deals excellently with the lack of the sources on the topic of the property of the *phylai*. However, if one excludes the tribal properties in the Oropia from the investigation, then there is almost no evidence to work on. Due to the fact that the *phylai* (in contrast to demes) were not able to levy taxes, the author concludes that since they did not possess significant property, some of their income must have come from loans (though only one such transaction in Athens is attested – IG II² 2670), but, admirably, he expresses a readiness to change his opinion with the emergence of new evidence (p. 109). Conversely, it is surprising that the author does not underline the very fact he has already discussed: the sole land allotment of the Oropia and handing it down to the *phylai* must have meant that the *phylai* had instruments and knowledge to deal with such property. It is, of course, an argument *ex silentio*, but it is striking that, with the acquisition of Oropos, nobody raised any doubts whether the *phylai* were entitled to acquire and administer any property (see Hyp. *Eux.* 16).

In case of demes, P. brings forward an argument that the rentals were used to provide for the sacrifices listed in the demes’ sacrificial calendars, since this was the most expensive item in their annual budget and leases were the most reliable option for securing a steady income (p. 140). The

⁴ V.J. ROSIVACH, *The System of Public Sacrifice in Fourth-Century Athens*, Atlanta 1994, pp. 121–127.

earlier lack of distinction between sacred and public has made P. doubt the validity of his earlier questions: “In theory, income raised from such properties should have been used by deme authorities for their cultic needs. [...] But is this premise confirmed by the evidence? Furthermore, how meaningful is the distinction between sacred and secular landholdings in the context of demes?” (pp. 139 f.).

The author makes a persuasive and impressive case for the buyers and lessees of deme property. While relying on the data provided by WHITEHEAD and LAMBERT, who have counted that 76.5 per cent of the lessees and 68 per cent of the buyers of deme properties belonged to the same demes as the property they were interested in⁵, P. states that the lessees and buyers did not only want to make a profit, but also to render service to their demes or (in the case of sacred property) their favourite cults (pp. 153–155). The hypothesis is very attractive, but some further evidence would be needed to support it. Demokedes of Aphidna, who bought a property at Sphettos⁶ and is known to have made a dedication to Hermes at Sphettos (*IG* II² 4628), could have been religiously motivated in his decision to buy at Sphettos, as P. argues, but it could also have been the other way round. The simple fact that Demokedes bought a property at Sphettos means that he must have visited the deme at least once. Such an event as the successful acquisition of property could have been an excellent opportunity to leave a dedication at the local sanctuary.

Chapter 4 deals with the “non-constitutional associations of Athens” as administrators of realty, i.e. the phratries (pp. 163–170), *gene* (pp. 170–191) and *orgeones* (pp. 191–211). P. honestly states that “thanks to two intact inscriptions found in the excavations of the Athenian Agora we know more about the Salaminioi’s landed property than we know about the landed assets of the remaining Attic *gene* taken together” (p. 171). This is true and the reader must constantly remind himself that the reasoning in the whole sub-chapter relies fully on the analysis of two decrees of the two branches of the Salaminioi. The author has justly summarised recent research on that topic and presented a coherent and convincing analysis of the inscriptions. The case, however, becomes complicated with regard to the *gene* supervising the state cults which had their own sources of financing. P. concludes that in the case of the Eumolpidai, Kerykes, Krokonidai, Koironidai, and Eudanemoi (but one might easily adduce here other *gene* like the Philleidai or the *gene* concerned with the other state cults, first and foremost the Eteoboutadai and Praxiergidai) the *gene* “might have had a say on issues concerning administration of realty belonging to the Two Goddesses. This is not to say, however, that the *gene* owned the real property in question; gentilician and polis-owned properties clearly stood apart” (pp. 190 f.). Such a statement is not convincing, especially when one takes into account the considerable sums the *genos* priests had to devote at their own expense just to maintain the normal functioning of the gentilician cult. The appearance of the leading families in particular *gene* and their subsequent multi-affiliation with many *gene* on the one hand, and the gradual impoverishment of the other *genos* families on the other, both of which are well attested to in the Hellenistic and Roman times, all suggest that the financing of the *genos* cult and the postulated division between the city, gentilician, and private financing might have been much more complicated⁷. The problem needs a thorough examination for which there is no space here, but I believe that the city might have financially supported some traditional and well respected

⁵ D. WHITEHEAD, *The Demes of Attica, 508/7–ca. 250 B.C.*, Princeton 1986, pp. 157 f.; LAMBERT, *Rationes...* (n. 3), pp. 248 f.

⁶ LAMBERT, *Rationes...* (n. 3), F6 B, col. 2, ll. 38–39, and p. 155.

⁷ The problem has been very fervently discussed since the article by K. KARILA-COHEN, *Les pythaïstes et leurs familles. L’apport de la prosopographie à l’histoire religieuse*, in: M.-F. BASLEZ, F. PRÉVOT (eds.), *Prosopographie et histoire religieuse. Actes du colloque tenu en l’Université Paris XII–Val de Marne les 27 & 28 octobre 2000*, Paris 2005, pp. 69–83; see also J.H. BLOK, S.D. LAMBERT, *The Appointment of Priests in Attic Gene*, ZPE CLXIX 2009, pp. 95–121.

genos cults just to allow them to survive in cases where the *genos* priests were not able to cope with all the expenses required from them and the *gene* did not have enough income on their own to support their cults.

In case of the *orgeones*, P. persuasively argues that the leases of orgeonic property can be seen as a form of liturgy and the tenants even took on themselves the burden of erecting inscriptions containing the leasing clauses (p. 197). The author is convincing in saying that the lessees of orgeonic property would get only a small profit out of such properties and that it would only make sense if the lessees themselves belonged to the leasing bodies and were interested in the well-being of their cultic groups (p. 205).

Chapter 5, which concerns “public, non-sacred realty” (pp. 212–236), has already been marked as “the most original and perhaps the most important of the book”⁸. P. duly states that it is his intention to test the hypothesis of David LEWIS that “no text encourages us to think that the Athenian state ever retained, worked, or leased anything called *ge demosia* (public land)”⁹ (p. 212). Hence, the following analysis focuses on the word *demostios* in the context of property, especially landed property. P. follows other scholars in arguing that in most cases where public lands (τὰ δημόσια) were mentioned, what was meant was “a commonly used land” (pp. 220, 223). He points out that Athens did not have the *astynomoi* (ἄστυνόμοι) who usually dealt with the leasing of public properties in other poleis, which further suggests that there were no leases of public lands in Athens (pp. 221 f.).

The main part of the book ends with a Conspectus (pp. 237–243) in which the author summarises the most important theses of his book.

I have already mentioned the first two appendices of the book, but it is worthwhile pausing at Appendix II concerning the *morai* (μοραία), i.e. the sacred olive trees of Athena (pp. 260–284). P. remarkably sums up modern scholarly research on the topic and undertakes a thorough analysis of the *Athenaion Politeia* 60, 1–3. He investigates the popular statement by Plutarch, who claimed that Solon had prohibited the export of all the agricultural products apart from olive oil (Plut. *Vit. Sol.* 24, 1 f.). After discussing many scholarly theories on the subject, the author comes to a brilliant conclusion: “Hard as one might search, it is impossible to find for the Classical period any archaeological evidence of Attic oil exports other than that of the Panathenaic amphorae” (p. 275). The author poses the question of what the sacred status of the *morai* was and he argues that the “*morai* along with their fences (σηκοί) were nothing but tiny *temene* like those attested as belonging to Athena in inscribed leases” (p. 283).

Appendix III is an informative analysis of *IG II² 1593* (pp. 285–290). The author argues for interpreting the inscription, a list of buyers and their guarantors from the Lykourgan period (337–324 BCE), as a list of tax-collecting contracts (pp. 288 f.), but his analysis has been already appraised as “perhaps not wholly convincing”¹⁰. Appendix IV (pp. 291–293) is a treatment of two inscriptions: *IG II² 2497*, a lease contract for a property named Theodoreion in the deme of Praseis, and *Rationes Centesimarum F7A, 3–8*, a sale contract for a property named Charinidai in the deme of Poros. P. makes valuable prosopographical remarks on the buyers and lessees and persuasively argues that the families in question were in fact the original owners of the public properties they wanted to buy or lease. In Appendix V (pp. 294 f.) P. objects to the earlier identification by LAMBERT¹¹ of the Pyrrhakidai as a phratry attested on Delos c. 400 BCE and argues for them being a *genos* which had a branch in the deme of Aigilia, just like the Salaminioi had a branch

⁸ LAMBERT, [Review] (n. 1), p. 508.

⁹ D. LEWIS, *Public Property in the City*, in: O. MURRAY, S. PRICE (eds.), *The Greek City from Homer to Alexander*, Oxford 1990, p. 251.

¹⁰ LAMBERT, [Review] (n. 1), p. 507.

¹¹ LAMBERT, *Rationes...* (n. 3), pp. 218, 368.

in Sounion. In Appendix VI (pp. 296–298) the author hypothesises whether the division of the Salaminioi into two branches and later two separate *gene* was an effect of political disturbances in the third century, especially around the time of the Chremonidean War (267–261 BCE).

Appendix VII: “Catalogue of Lessees and Guarantors of Polis-Controlled *Temene*” (pp. 299–325), is also of great importance. The list contains 96 names and all the available prosopographical data on them. In sharp contrast to the book by Kirsty SHIPTON¹², P. is able to prove that a significant part of the lessees (16 people = 16.68%) belonged to the liturgical class. Another 9 individuals (9.37%) were engaged in public life and 23 others (23.96%) were only possibly engaged in public life, but certainly belonged to families that were thus engaged (p. 319). All this means that nearly half of those engaged in land-leasing belonged to the higher echelons of Athenian society. P., however, duly states that such quasi-statistical analysis does not take into account the “mini-patterns”, i.e. “geographical considerations, professional interests, family ties, political aspects, and religious concerns” (p. 320).

The work, which is impressive in terms of content and size as well as the sheer number of literary and epigraphic sources cited and commented upon, is methodologically inconsistent. The author claims in the introductory chapter that he took “the rather unfashionable approach of historical empiricism, but with a new historicism twist. Theoretical schemes can only be useful if applied to concrete evidence” (p. 14). Contrary to David WHITEHEAD, who states in his review that these objectives were “achieved most satisfactorily”¹³ by the author, I cannot state the same. Historical empiricism, the approach of “choose-your-method-as-you-go”, may seem very tentative and indeed such methodological rigour is sometimes the only guarantee that saves one from various preconceptions and presuppositions while investigating problems that find their echo in modern times. On the other hand, such an approach more often leads to a lack of any methodological framework into which the aforesaid preconceived notions might easily slip undetected.

It was difficult for P. to stay on his declared path. The author at the outset shares his thoughts on the land held and administered by the church in modern Greece (pp. 8 f., n. 38), leaving the reader with a notion of the great injustice done to the Greeks when the state helplessly tried to get back land for the people but was blocked by a “small minority influenced by the clergy”. Such sentiments are easily recognisable in his discussion on the remarkable perseverance of the sacred land-leasing system in Oropos.

The author, while describing the acquisition of Oropos by Athens and its geographical proximity to Attica, writes of the Athenian plans for land allotment in Oropos as “sinister” (p. 44). In short, when the land of Oropos came into the hands of the Athenians, they in turn crowned Amphiaros (*I. Oropos* 296; 332/331 BCE), delimited a part of the newly gained territory with the help of 50 *horistai* (*Hyp. Eux.* 16), that part being the hill of Amphiaros, which probably had already been divided between the *phylai*, and which was then either sold or leased (as P. believes). The revenue from either the sale or the lease was the idea of the atthidographer Phanodemos, for which he was crowned in 332/331 (*I. Oropos* 297) and was later made one of the *epimeletai* of the Amphiareia in 329/328 (*I. Oropos* 298). I, however, fail to see anything sinister in the procedures involved. After the system had been invented in the 330s BCE and Oropos had been subsequently lost to Athens in 322, the system itself was apparently still at work in 80 BCE when the Roman *publicani* tried to exact taxes from the Oropia. The Oropians appealed to the Senate and got permission to use the revenues from the sacred lands to finance the daily functioning of the sanctuary of Amphiaros. P. therefore remarks: “Here again we get the same old tricks. The protagonists might have changed

¹² K. SHIPTON, *Leasing and Lending. The Cash Economy in Fourth-Century BC Athens*, London 2000, pp. 39–49.

¹³ WHITEHEAD, [Review] (n. 1), p. 549.

but the ingredients of the recipe remained the same: sacred rentals for sacred celebrations with an eye on political manipulation” (p. 50). It seems only reasonable that any collective body or individual, when given the opportunity and fully entitled to do it, would try to make themselves exempt from taxes, no matter who is trying to levy them. I again fail to see “the same old tricks here” as well as “an eye on political manipulation”. It seems illogical that a small group of envoys from Oropos would be able to effectively manipulate the whole Roman Senate into granting vindication for themselves. That would be true, of course, only if one is willing to see the piety of the Roman senators not as weakness making them susceptible to manipulation. What is more, P. adds here a surprising remark: “This litigation bears such a strong resemblance to the events that had taken place almost three centuries before that one cannot help recalling Karl Marx’s well-known maxim about history repeating itself” (pp. 49 f.). Although the author has every right to see the similarity of these events to the earlier proceedings, a reference to Karl Marx’s theory is thoroughly ahistorical and has more to do with evolutionism than with the declared empiricism.

The aforementioned presuppositions are not only to be found in the case of Oropos. While discussing the system of administration of deme property and the practice of the *ad hoc* making of the *horoi* that delimited the sacred estates, P. concludes: “In general, the picture we get is more that of automatic response to short-lived exigencies, rather than that of an orchestrated apparatus dealing with marking off properties. This picture, it has to be said, matches the amateurism of the polis in that respect” (p. 129). I fully agree with the first sentence: it appears that the demes did not have a unified system of administration of their properties. I cannot, however, accept the conclusion of the second sentence. No matter how disorganised the Athenians were as regards property administration, they seemed to be satisfied with the state of affairs as it was, because there is absolutely no evidence in the sources (from the Classical, but also the Hellenistic and Roman periods) of them wanting to change the aforesaid system. It is rather the author who expects the Athenians to behave professionally, whatever that might mean, and fails in his expectations. What is even more misleading is that the whole Athenian polis as well as its demes are marked as “amateurs” with regard to managing their properties. A similar phenomenon can be observed in a discussion of the tripartite division of land, done under the supervision of the Milesian town-planner and philosopher Hippodamos. P. then expresses his doubts as to whether, by the mid-fifth century, such a “rudimentary, albeit naive, concept of publicly owned territory had started materializing...” (p. 218). No matter how much respect Hippodamos enjoyed among the Athenians and how many of his philosophical ideas he wanted to employ in his model, the reader is left with an image of the naivety of either Hippodamos or, again, the Athenians who decided to bring the plan to life.

Another important methodological problem arises from the very definition of the word *temenos* (τέμενος). At the outset, the author is adamant in claiming that *temenos* could “apply both to a sanctuary and an arable sacred estate” (p. 3) and is very quick to accuse such scholars as Walter BURKERT and Irad MALKIN of confusing the two meanings of the term. BURKERT defines *temenos* as “the land cut off and dedicated to the god or hero”¹⁴. It is true that he is more interested in the religious aspect of the *temenos*, but his very definition does not exclude the possibility of renting the sacred land (or at least a part of it). The reference to MALKIN and his entry on *temenos* in the *OCD*³ is even more surprising: MALKIN indeed puts stress on the fact that the *temenos* had to be demarcated and needed to have a sanctuary and an altar; but, in the same entry, he does underline that *temene* could be “revenue-bearing estates”. It seems to me that P. would like to invert the proportions between the two aspects, the primary meaning being of purely economic significance (see p. 11, but also p. 99). Such an approach may lead to some oversimplifications, to say the least.

¹⁴ W. BURKERT, *Greek Religion. Archaic and Classical*, transl. by J. RAFFAN, Oxford 1985, p. 86.

Though a very exhaustive study, the monograph by P. is not for everyone. It not only requires from its reader familiarity with ancient sources on the problem, but it also leaves no doubt that a good knowledge of the following: J.V.A. FINE, *Horoi. Studies in Mortgage, Real Security, and Land Tenure in Ancient Athens*, Athens 1951; T. LINDERS, *The Treasurers of the Other Gods and Their Functions*, Meisenheim am Glan 1975; volume XIX of the *Athenian Agora* (1991) with its most useful commentaries on three of its parts written by G.V. LALONDE, M.K. LANGDON, and M.B. WALBANK; R. PARKER, *Athenian Religion. A History*, Oxford 1996; and S. LAMBERT, *Rationes Centesimarum. Sales of Public Land in Lykourgan Athens*, Amsterdam 1997, is absolutely necessary for merely having some idea of the problem and understanding the construction of the book. Therefore, the study seems hermetic and cannot serve as a guidebook through the complicated question of land tenure in Athens for students who are only beginning their adventure with the economic history of Athens.

That being said, one must note some radical differences between the monograph by P. and the aforementioned studies. The one that has caused me most confusion is the usage of the word “pledge” for three different forms of security in leasing contracts. The author either uses it to describe: (i) *apotimema* (ἀποτίμημα – p. 57), (ii) *hypotheke* (various forms of the verb ὑποκείμια – pp. 131, 132), or (iii) *enechyron* (ἐνεχύρον – p. 120). Such a merging of different phenomena would be understandable in a study on a completely different topic written by a non-specialist in the field, but it cannot be permitted in a work investigating the very nature of property leases where various forms of securities are indeed important for the author’s argument. According to a rather widely accepted definition which is excellently presented by FINE in *Horoi...*, pp. 61 f., only *enechyron* was a form of security that could be rendered by the English term “pledge”. What is more, P. generally defines *enechyrasia* (ἐνεχυρασία) as a procedure for “expropriating a part of the lessees’ property in case they failed to pay the due rent” (pp. 120 f.), but it seems that the author would see both movables and immovables in that group. FINE believes the *enechyron* was, in accordance with a passage from Pseudo-Demosthenes’ *Against Timotheos* ([Dem.] 49, 48–54), “movable property, the object offered as security passed immediately on the formation of the contract into the possession of the creditor”¹⁵. P. is fully entitled to his own view and definition of the *enechyron*, but then he should explain on what basis his understanding of the term lies, especially since the citations from the sources in the relevant entry in LSJ⁹ either support the interpretation of FINE or require further investigation¹⁶. One might accuse me of being far too rigorous in that respect. That sole detail, however, can completely change the conclusion of the sub-chapter on the public properties of the demes. In one of the last paragraphs on this problem, the author states: “demes would certainly from time to time [as an effect of the hypothecs and the *enechyrasia*, if I understand the argument correctly – PS] end up acquiring real property that previously belonged to individuals” (p. 132). The acquisition of a hypothec by a deme gave it only a *ius vendendi* of the property in question, therefore the deme would probably not be able to keep it and for that very reason the demes can be found in the *Rationes Centesimarum*. Furthermore, if the demes only acquired movables by means of the *enechyrasia*, the argument for the demes actually gaining real property with the passing of time does not find enough support.

Similar problems can be observed in P.’s discussion on the property of the phratries. Relying on the evidence provided by the inscriptions *I.Rhamnous* 187, ll. 2–4 and *SEG* 51, 164, ll. 1–3,

¹⁵ J.V.A. FINE, *Horoi. Studies in Mortgage, Real Security, and Land Tenure in Ancient Athens*, Athens 1951, p. 61, n. 4.

¹⁶ It refers to movables in the following sources: Hdt. II 136 (a corpse); Hermippus fr. 29 KOCK (a cup); Ar. *Pl.* 451 (a breastplate and a buckler); Ar. *Ec.* 755 (something carried in hands). And. 3, 39 (And. 1, 39 in LSJ⁹ is a typo) speaks of the city walls and the ships as the *enechyron*, but the sentence is undoubtedly rhetorical. The relevant passages in Xen. *An.* VII 6, 23 and Antiph. 6, 11 are enigmatic and would need further examination.

the author states that “upon the debtor’s default the ownership of the buildings would have been transferred to the phratry” (p. 165). That is true only in very broad terms. Both of the above inscriptions speak explicitly of the *πρᾶσις ἐπὶ λύσει* type of transaction in which the creditor could only get unqualified ownership of the property, and that property was still an object of redemption (at the price of the original loan) if the debtor had the means and desire to do so¹⁷. Since the money was the object of the original transaction and the property was only the security, in the case of the debtor defaulting the phratry would only gain a usufruct and would not be entitled to lease the property or sell it – the original debtor would still be legally bound to it. It would be interesting to examine what such a body like the phratry could do with the objects of *πρᾶσις ἐπὶ λύσει*, but I understand that the available evidence does not allow us to move forward. We deal with exactly the same type of inaccuracy when P. discusses the means by which the *orgeones* could acquire new property (p. 201), as evidenced by inscriptions from Lemnos *IG XII 8, 19* and *21* – these two inscriptions attest the procedure of *πρᾶσις ἐπὶ λύσει* as well.

The author discusses the fifth-century records of loans from both the Treasuries of Athena and the Other Gods and hypothesises whether the leases of the sacred lands did not already begin in the fifth century, though there is no solid evidence for such a procedure that early (p. 23). P. argues that, in comparison to the well attested leasing procedures from the fourth century, the leasing itself must have begun at least a century earlier. The evidence, however, might point in a different direction. If I am not mistaken, the first account of the lease of land and the buildings on it that is attested in Athens comes from 434–432 (*IG I³ 402*), but, quite importantly, it was a document of the Delian Amphictyony and the leased land was itself located on Delos. The first extant leasing of sacred land in Athens comes from 418/417 BCE and concerned the *temenos* of Neleus and Basile (*IG I³ 84*). All that evidence might therefore suggest that the leasing procedures were not that old in Athens and that some change occurred around the time of the acceptance of Asklepios into the public cults in 420 BCE. Such a change would coincide with the establishment of the leasing procedures of the property of Asklepios in Piraeus attested at the beginning of the fourth century (*IG II² 47* and *SEG 26, 121*), a coincidence that P. must have been well aware of (see pp. 42 f.).

All the above remarks do not change the fundamental notion about the book by P. as being so far the most important work on the subject of land leases in Classical Athens and it will hold that position for many years to come. The amount of evidence he discusses (some of which he is the first to bring to scholarly attention) must astound even the most stringent of readers. The monograph can both serve as a sourcebook and a key commentary on the problem of landholding in Athens, though one needs to be aware that it is sometimes too speculative, lacking in theoretical framework, and that the arguments are presented in a somewhat chaotic manner (see the author’s remark on p. 51). However, the overall narration and high requirements the monograph imposes on readers should already make them both cautious and attentive, and allow them to fully appreciate the effort that Nikolaos PAPAZARKADAS put into his book.

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¹⁷ For a detailed and exhaustive discussion of the *πρᾶσις ἐπὶ λύσει*, see FINE, *op. cit.* (n. 15), pp. 142–166.

« ENTENDRE UN POÈME VISUEL » : INTÉRÊTS ET PADADOXES
D'UNE ÉDITION RÉCENTE

Jan KWAPISZ, *The Greek Figure Poems*, Leuven : Peeters, 2013 (Hellenistica Groningana 19), X, 219 pp., ISBN 978-90-429-2745-2, €56.00.

1. Un geste ouvrant

En grec ancien, le corpus littéraire des poèmes visuels est assez limité : 6 poèmes, 108 vers en tout. Il s'agit de la *Hache*, des *Ailes* et de l'*Œuf* de Simias de Rhodes ; de la *Syrinx* attribuée à Théocrite ; et de deux *Autels* dus respectivement à un certain Δωσιάδας et à un certain Βησαντινος (probablement Lucius Iulius Vestinus, qui fréquentait la cour d'Hadrien, pp. 29 s.). Ces textes se sont trouvés compilés dans le XV^e livre de l'*Anthologie Palatine*, ou dispersés parmi les éditions manuscrites de Théocrite (pp. 50–56). Ces poèmes n'avaient pas reçu d'édition critique complète depuis celle d'HAEBERLIN, en 1887. La thèse de Jan KWAPISZ [= K.] répond donc à une longue attente. L'intention qu'il déclare en ouverture est double : certes il s'agit d'abord d'offrir aux savants ou curieux « a basic research tool », mais aussi d'offrir « new and unorthodox solutions to the numerous and persistent problems » (p. 7). C'est dire que son travail se propose moins de déterminer « le sens » des six textes édités que d'ouvrir l'espace d'une discussion à poursuivre à leur sujet. L'importance accordée au caractère nouveau et hétérodoxe des solutions suggère que la santé de cette discussion philologique dépend moins d'une base solide autour de laquelle elle s'élaborerait que d'une diversité de solutions argumentables entre lesquelles elle peut se développer. Plus soucieux d'ouvrir que de figer, le geste de K. se veut ainsi à la fois prudent et aventureux – et nous saluons cette belle philologie qui se sait le devoir d'innover. Sa proposition d'identification de Dosiadas avec l'éditeur de Théocrite, Munatius de Thralles, sur la base d'un jeu de mot (δόσις~*munus*) et de probables latinismes métriques est un exemple de cette prudente hétérodoxie (p. 28). Son souci d'ouverture se conjugue aussi avec une grande honnêteté intellectuelle : plutôt que de conclure à tout prix, il n'est pas rare qu'il laisse aux lectrices le soin de trancher une question que son travail aura eu le mérite de produire (p. 37 *et passim* : 88, 122 s., etc.).

2. Organisation du propos

Son propos est réparti en trois larges sections : au centre, l'édition des 6 textes (pp. 57–72), suivie d'un commentaire détaillé de chacun d'eux (pp. 73–190), le tout étant précédé d'une ample introduction (pp. 1–56), organisée en 9 points (1. « Preliminary remarks » ; 2. « Origin » ; 3. « Date and authorship » ; 4. « Nachleben » ; 5. « Shape » ; 6. « Metric » ; 7. « Dialect » ; 8. « Ancient Collection » ; 9. « MS tradition »). Celle-ci fonctionne également comme une conclusion générale aux discussions détaillées de la dernière partie. L'ensemble produit est assez foisonnant, mais réalise un bel équilibre entre traitement individuel des poèmes, et vue d'ensemble sur ce « mini-genre » (p. 8) qu'est le poème visuel.

Dans ce qui suit, nous ne pouvons rendre compte de toutes les suggestions offertes par K. Nous nous bornerons à identifier les principales lignes de forces de son travail. En soulignant son originalité et sa pertinence, nous serons aussi amenés à discuter de quelques faiblesses. Nous montrerons que les unes comme les autres nous semblent provenir d'un paradoxal *contournement du visuel*. Finalement, nous nous permettrons d'apporter, en hommage à ce travail important et stimulant, deux suggestions (l'une sur *La Hache*, l'autre sur le dernier *Autel* de la série) qui exploitent davantage la spatialité de ces textes.

3. Contextes, et intertextes

Si le corpus « cannot be located precisely within any ancient genres », K. ne souhaite pas traiter ces 6 poèmes « merely as eccentric experiments with the visual form », mais se concentrer « on

their contents » et voir quelle est « their place within the context in which they were composed » (p. 8). C'est ainsi qu'il s'attachera à montrer que leur origine les rattache à plusieurs traits caractéristiques de la poésie du début de l'époque hellénistique : la vogue de l'épigramme dédicatoire (pp. 11 s.) ; le goût des innovations métriques (p. 13) qui témoignent sans doute, dans le cas de Simias, des premières tentatives de colométrie des textes lyriques (pp. 14 s.) ; la pente énigmatique que peut prendre la poésie érudite (pp. 16–18) – le tout dans le contexte d'un banquet transformé par la nouvelle culture du livre, et où il est possible d'imaginer circuler, parmi les participants, des feuilles de papyrus (pp. 18–21). Parallèlement son commentaire s'emploie à montrer les diverses formes de liens intertextuels que l'on peut établir, non seulement entre les poèmes de la collection, mais entre chacun d'entre eux et les principaux auteurs hellénistiques : Callimaque, Théocrite, Lycophron. Cette immersion dans l'intertexte littéraire fournit d'ailleurs à K. une solution tout à fait intéressante aux problèmes posés par l'Éros barbu des *Ailes* : loin de peindre une figure grotesque, expliquée par quelque hellénistique goût du bizarre, Simias se référerait à l'image classique de l'Eros éphèbe et insisterait sur le contraste entre l'immense pouvoir dont il dispose et l'ombre à peine esquissée de son duvet de barbe (p. 98 s.).

4. Forme : un drôle de contournement

Les « Preliminary Remarks » (pp. 3–8) soulignent d'abord la marginalité esthétique du corpus étudié, et les jugements sévères que les Modernes ont porté sur lui. Ceux qui en ont parlé l'ont généralement fait pour les condamner. L'éventuelle admiration qu'ils ont pu susciter est demeurée essentiellement muette : elle a été le fait des lecteurs, qu'on peut tout de même imaginer nombreux (p. 5), celle des copistes qui nous les ont transmis ou des poètes qui les ont imités. Même les éditeurs qui ont pu apprécier ces textes – comme SAUMAISE – semblent n'avoir pas construit de discours à même de les défendre esthétiquement. Il est donc heureux que K. ait entrepris de le faire.

Sur ce point, deux dimensions nous semblent un peu trop superposées dans son discours : la condamnation de la dimension visuelle de ces poèmes n'est pas de même nature que celle portant sur leur caractère énigmatique ou obscur. En ouverture de son monumental *Carmen figuratum*, Ulrich ERNST montrait que la poésie visuelle se heurtait à des résistances tout à fait spécifiques¹. Pour sa part, en qualifiant ces textes de *technopaegnia* davantage que de *carmina figurata*, K. recourt à une appellation historiquement légitime (pp. 9–11) mais qui, sous sa plume, tend de fait à désigner une dimension ludique ou énigmatique, pas spécifiquement visuelle². Il est vrai qu'à des degrés divers, ces 6 poèmes relèvent de l'énigme. Lycophron a inspiré l'auteur de la *Syrinx* tout comme l'*Autel* de Dosiadas ; et K. nous rappelle que Lucien jugeait l'obscurité de ce dernier poème avec autant de sévérité que l'*Alexandra*. Mais dès lors, sa défense des poèmes visuels tourne surtout à une défense de l'énigme et de ses composantes : l'allusion, l'érudition mythologique et lexicographique, etc. – toutes qualités que nous avons apprises à identifier comme « alexandrines » (cf. sa préférence marquée pour le poème le plus énigmatique de la série, la *Syrinx* : pp. 138 s.). Sur ce point, sa salutaire volonté de ne plus marginaliser ces textes revient, aussi, à continuer de marginaliser leur aspect le plus saillant. De fait, le très riche commentaire de K. n'accorde qu'une place assez minimale à la disposition graphique de ces textes (pp. 151 ; 161 ; 162 ; 180 ; 187). Les nombreuses et intéressantes remarques qu'il consacre aux jeux de sons qu'on y trouve (pp. 78 ;

¹ U. ERNST, *Carmen figuratum. Geschichte des Figurengedichts von den antiken Ursprüngen bis zum Ausgang des Mittelalters*, Köln 1991, pp. 1 s.

² Le premier emploi connu du terme, chez Ausone, n'implique aucune mobilisation particulière de la dimension visuelle. Des poèmes qualifiés dans l'*Antiquité* de *paignia* n'ont pas forcément joué sur la disposition des lettres ou des vers. La connotation d'« énigme » semble en revanche attestée dès Philétas. Comme K. le sait, la restriction du terme *technopaegnia* aux poèmes figurés s'esquisse à partir du XVII^e siècle, mais ne sera jamais complète. Le choix du terme est donc moins innocent qu'il le laisse paraître (« I interchangeably use the terms *technopaegnia*, 'pattern poetry' or 'figure poems' », p. 10).

90 ; 118 ; 120 ; 128 ; 136 ; 137 ; 143 ; 151 ; 153 ; 154 ; 155 ; 184) en viennent à ressembler à un évitement du visible au profit du sonore. De ce point de vue, sa très suggestive remarque (« I find it thought-provoking to consider what it would mean to *hear* a figure poem », p. 19) prend aussi un air un peu symptomatique.

Il serait parfaitement compréhensible qu'un spécialiste des poèmes figurés éprouve un peu de ressentiment contre la visibilité de ces textes. Ce sont en effet les diverses tentatives de reconstruire cette dimension qui les ont le plus altérés (« the later evidence of the MSS, with the richness of the visual forms they exhibit, clearly shows how vulnerable the *technopaegnia* were to the destructive assaults of their scholarly readers », p. 35, cf. aussi pp. 110 et 112 pour le cas de l'*Œuf*). Pour K., ces « assauts destructeurs » impliquent que, malgré les enquêtes généalogiques de GUICHARD et STRODEL sur la présentation de ces poèmes, leur mise en page initiale doit d'abord être considérée comme perdue, peut-être irrémédiablement : « My [...] initial assumption is that neither the various layouts in which the medieval scribes arranged the *technopaegnia* when copying them to the MSS in which they were preserved, nor the testimonies of the ancient grammarians can be safely supposed to provide firm evidence as to the original shape of the poems » (p. 35). Ce qui est frappant, c'est que, dans *The Greek Figure Poems*, ce scepticisme initial, tout à fait défendable, ne débouche pas vraiment sur la recherche d'autres moyens de rétablir la disposition des poèmes. L'auteur semble finalement se satisfaire de cette incertitude. Après tout, elle n'empêche pas de travailler sur le texte.

5. Le cas de l'*Œuf*

De fait, c'est peut-être à ce paradoxal contournement du visuel qu'on doit les pages les plus provocantes et stimulantes de ce livre, consacrées justement à l'*Œuf*. Redonnant force à une idée avancée par Alan CAMERON, K. nous invite à penser qu'avec ce poème, Simias ait en réalité composé soit des *versus crescentes* (p. 36), soit une sorte d'« énigme métrique » (« metrical riddle »)³ : « [It is perhaps not impossible that the lines of the *Egg* were originally written in a flow of continuous text according to the normal early third-century practice of writing lyric poetry. In that case, the reader would have had to figure out the colometry by him or herself, led by internal suggestions » (p. 37). Seuls des éditeurs ultérieurs auraient cru devoir y reconnaître un « œuf », et par conséquent réarrangé les vers ἀντιθετικῶς, sur le modèle de la *Hache*. Et ce n'est d'ailleurs qu'ensuite que le terme d'*Œuf* aurait été introduit dans le texte (112). Les arguments de K. doivent retenir notre attention : (a) à la différence des autres poèmes de la collection, l'*Œuf* ne contient aucune allusion à sa forme visuelle ; (b) il est en revanche le seul à attirer l'attention de la lectrice sur sa forme métrique ; (c) enfin, des six poèmes de la collection, il est le seul à ne pas contenir de construction adversative du type οὐκ...ἀλλὰ (p. 36) ; et sur l'importance de cette construction : pp. 84–86). Ces arguments nous semblent forts, et nous convainquent de laisser ouverte la question du caractère originellement visuel de ce texte.

6. Pas si « facile » !

Toutefois, le scepticisme de K. est aussi alimenté par son « principe de simplicité », malheureusement plus fourvoyant. Il énonce ce principe au début de sa section sur les formes : « Paradoxically, many wordplays which are usually considered to be displays of poetic virtuosity are childishly simple ; for instance, to compose a poem containing an acrostic is a trivial task [...]. Figure poems are equally easy to compose [...] – this basic assumption determines my discussion of the shape of the *technopaegnia* » (p. 33). Dans la discussion sur l'*Œuf*, ce principe produit l'argument suivant : « ...my conviction is that it would not have been difficult to compose a perfectly egg-shaped poem » (p. 36). Sur ce point, K. peut se prévaloir du scepticisme de CAMERON et de LEGRAND. L'argument nous semble toutefois faible : il revient, croyons-nous, à appliquer aux

³ L'extension de cette hypothèse à tout le corpus (p. 17), faite il est vrai en passant, nous semble en revanche peu défendable.

productions de Simias un principe esthétique plus tardif, que notre documentation ne montre pas à l'œuvre avant Optatianus Porphyrius⁴. Ce que remarquent KWAPISZ, CAMERON et LEGRAND, c'est que l'espace pris par chaque vers ne dessine pas une progression suffisamment régulière pour former l'image d'un œuf sur la page (les vers 19 et 20 sont par exemple graphiquement plus courts que les précédents). Le problème avec ce critère purement graphique est que, comme K. lui-même le sait très bien (pp. 19 s.), son application stricte devrait susciter les mêmes objections à l'égard de la *Syrinx* et des deux *Autels* : considérés graphiquement, les « tuyaux » de l'instrument ne décroissent pas régulièrement, et le bord droit de chaque « étage » des autels demeure dentelé. Il aurait pourtant été sinon facile, du moins possible, de produire « a perfectly syrinx- or altar-shaped poem » – Optatianus Porphyrius en réaliserait, d'ailleurs. Ce qui, en revanche, décroît régulièrement dans la *Syrinx*, et ce qui reste constant dans les sections graphiques des *Autels*, c'est la longueur métrique du vers (pp. 38–45). C'est aussi cette longueur métrique qui croît régulièrement d'un vers (im)pair à l'autre de l'*Œuf*. En ce sens, le critère de réussite de ces poèmes visuels semble ne pas résider exclusivement dans le visuel, mais aussi et d'abord dans son interaction avec la métrique. Dans la mesure où celle-ci est (aussi) perceptible quand le poème est lu à haute voix, ou récité, on pourrait ainsi avancer qu'aucun de ces poèmes n'est strictement visuel, et que tous le sont, dans la mesure où c'est quelque alchimie du visible et de l'audible qui leur permet de produire tout leur effet. C'est peut-être cela, d'ailleurs, « entendre un poème figuré »...⁵

7. Suggestions

Si le contournement du visuel fait incontestablement une des forces du livre, il n'en reste pas moins un peu dommage, puisqu'il détourne K. d'une des dimensions de sens que ces poèmes (sauf peut-être l'*Œuf*) cherchaient tout de même à mobiliser. Dans sa propre recension du livre, Michael SQUIRE a jugé nécessaire d'ajouter ses propres suggestions concernant la dimension visuelle des poèmes. Après avoir salué la pertinence du commentaire que K. offre de la *Hache*, il fait ainsi remarquer :

One wonders, though, whether Simias' handiwork might hide an additional riddle besides. Among the most puzzling aspects of this poem, after all, is its presentation: in order to make logical sense of the « axe », readers have first to read the opening line, then the last, repeating the process until they reach the final two verses at the center (cf. pp. 34–5). To my mind, such deceptive outward appearances find knowing precedent in the most famous artefact of Epeius' epic axe – the wooden horse that duped viewers into overlooking the contents concealed within⁶.

Ce sont deux suggestions du même type que nous aimerions formuler en conclusion, et en hommage à ce beau travail de Jan KWAPISZ.

La première concerne justement la *Hache* et nous a été soufflée par l'ami Martin STEINRÜCK. La plupart des éditeurs admettent la formation d'une *double* hache, attestée de diverses manières par tous les manuscrits, et qui impose le parcours de lecture décrit ci-dessus par SQUIRE (et par Héphestion, en 61, 19–62 CONSRUCH). Mais K. préfère une succession linéaire, qui produit plutôt

⁴ Ulrich ERNST nous rappelle toutefois (*op. cit.* [n. 1], pp. 746 s.) que le compte-rendu d'Eustathe de Thessalonique nous empêche d'exclure l'existence de précédents grecs.

⁵ Notons sur ce point que, du point de vue métrique, le commentaire de l'*Œuf* est un peu court. Il cite, élogieusement, le commentaire qu'en avait donné Alessandra LUKINOVICH, mais sans intégrer ou même mentionner l'essentiel de cette contribution : l'*Œuf* supposerait non seulement « une » théorie colométrique, mais mettraient en œuvre une théorie générative des mètres lyriques, où ceux-ci dériveraient du crétique, un mètre aussi dorien que la rossignole qu'il évoque.

⁶ M. SQUIRE, [*Review of K.*], BMCR 2013.10.59.

une hache *simple* (p. 60). Sa défiance vis-à-vis de la mise en page et de l'ordre de lecture le plus souvent adoptés provient encore une fois de son principe de simplicité : « ...it is easy to compose a figure poem. If it had been Simias' intention to produce the shape of a double-axe, it could have been easily produced by lines that would read in the normal order » (p. 34). Là encore, ce principe de simplicité nous semble conduire à une confusion, en l'occurrence entre facilité de composition et facilité de lecture⁷. Car il est aussi facile de composer un poème antithétique que linéaire. Ce n'est que pour le lecteur que l'un est plus facile que l'autre. Or, il n'est guère difficile de concevoir pourquoi Simias aurait voulu composer une œuvre difficile à lire.

D'autre part, les manuscrits bucoliques ajoutent généralement un manche à la double lame. Certains y placent un vers (le *Schaftvers*, comme l'appelle STROBEL), lointainement dérivé du vingtième vers de l'*Œuf* ; d'autres, la ligne suivante : Σιμίου Ῥοδίου πέλεκυς ὄν Ἐπειὸς ὁ Φωκεὺς τῇ Ἀθηνᾶ δῶρον ἔδωκεν (que Strobel appelle *Schaftinschrift*, p. 72). Ce qui nous semble digne d'attention, c'est que dans cette dernière disposition, le poème forme un double acrostiche :

	Ἄνδροθέα δῶρον ὁ Φωκεὺς κρατερᾶς μηδοσύνας ἦρα τίνων Ἄθανα	1
	Τᾶμος, ἐπειτὰν ἱεράν κηρὶ πυρίπνῳ πόλιν ἠθάλωσεν	3
	Οὐκ ἐνάριθμος γεγαῶς ἐν προμάχοις Ἀχαιῶν	5
	Νῦν δ' ἔς Ἵμηρειον ἔβα κέλευθον	7
	Τρις μάκαρ, ὄν σὺ θυμῷ	9
	Ἔδ' ὄλβον	11
	Σιμίου Ῥοδίου κτλ.	<i>Schaftinschrift</i>
	Ἄει πνεῖ.	12
	Ἴλαος ἀμφιδερχθῆς	10
	Σὰν χάριν, ἀγνὰ πολύβουλε Παλλάς	8
	Ἄλλ' ἀπὸ κρανᾶν ἰθαῤᾧν νᾶμα κόμιζε δυσκλής	6
	Δαρδανιδᾶν χρυσοβαφεῖς τ' ἐστυφέλιξ' ἐκ θεμέθλων ἄνακτας,	4
	Ἔπας Ἐπειὸς πέλεκυν, τῷ ποτε πύργων θεοτεύκτων κατέρειψεν αἴπας,	2

En lisant les initiales des vers impairs, puis le sigma du manche, puis celles des vers pairs, et de nouveau le sigma de Σιμίου, on forme la séquence ΑΤΟΝΤΟΣ ΩΔΑΣΙΑΣ – qu'il est possible de comprendre : ἄτ' ὄντος ὦδ' Ἀσίας, voire, avec un dorisme : ἄτ' ὄντος κτλ. « Puisqu'ainsi ceci provient d'Asie » : cela conviendrait bien à une dédicace de l'objet qui a permis à Epeios de revenir de la côte troyenne avec les vainqueurs⁸. C'est en tout cas un argument important en faveur d'une hache à deux lames, et d'un manche commençant par le nom de l'auteur – quelle qu'elle ait été sa formulation initiale.

Deuxième suggestion, peut-être moins aventureuse, à propos de l'*Autel* de Vestinus. K. remarque à juste titre l'originalité de l'incipit et son insistance sur la dimension visuelle de l'autel dessiné par le texte : l'autel se dit teint non par « l'encre sombre » (ὄλος ... λιβρὸς) des victimes mais, implicitement, par celle qu'utilise le poète (p. 183). Nous aimerions ajouter que cette évocation de la

⁷ En éditant l'*Anthologie Palatine*, PATTON présentait lui aussi deux fois le texte, mais sans impliquer que l'ordre d'écriture (« to be written thus ») doive coïncider avec l'ordre de lecture (« to be read thus »).

⁸ Sans le manche, il serait encore possible de lire : ἄτ' ὄν τὸ, ὦδ' Ἀσία. La tournure serait peut-être un exemple de « Simias' disregard for the modern dictionaries and handbooks of Greek syntax » (p. 126), mais pourrait encore être comprise : « Ceci étant, voici comment est l'Asie ». L'acrostiche établirait alors un lien étymologique entre l'existence de la hache et l'état de l'Asie (= Troie) à l'époque supposée de sa dédicace par Epeios.

matérialité du texte mobilise une couleur supplémentaire : ladite encre sombre ne teint pas l'autel « de ses gouttes rougeoyantes semblables à la pourpre » (λιβάδεσιν οἷα κάλχησ/ ὑποφοινίησιν τέγγει). Dès lors, il n'est pas impossible que la description négative (dont K. a montré l'importance pour ce mini-genre) renvoie ici, non seulement à l'encre noire dont est en réalité fait l'*Autel*, mais également à quelque usage de la *rubrica* dans la mise en page originale de ce poème. Mais à quelle fin l'aurait-on employée ?

Première hypothèse : elle peut avoir mis en évidence l'acrostiche qui coule de la première à la dernière ligne du poème. Dans sa discussion (pp. 179–181), K. rappelle que les ligatures et les minuscules byzantines en ont obscurci la perception, et qu'il a fallu attendre le vingtième siècle pour qu'il soit à nouveau lu – comme d'ailleurs ceux de Chérémon, Aratos et Nicandre. Toutefois, les inscriptions antiques qui comportent un acrostiche suggèrent parfois que de tels jeux de lettres étaient destinés, non à être dissimulés, mais à « sauter aux yeux » de leurs lectrices ou lecteurs : les plus soignées – comme l'épithaphe de Sophytos (*SEG* LIV 1569, II^{ème} siècle av. notre ère), ou la dédicace de Moschion (*SEG* VIII 464, II^{ème} siècle de notre ère ?) – comportent par exemple un redoublement de l'acrostiche, sur la gauche du texte. De telles mises en évidence invitent à imaginer des équivalents sur papyrus ou sur parchemin. L'encre rouge est une possibilité. Dans ce cas de notre autel, l'acrostiche coulerait rouge sur son flanc – comme le sang des sacrifices (ou le vin des libations) qu'on souhaite à l'Olympien dédicataire⁹ (Ὀλύμπιε πολλοῖς ἔτεσι θύσειας). L'image suscitée par l'acrostiche serait donc moins « an epigraphic phenomenon, an inscription written on the poem » (p. 180) qu'une métonymie du sacrifice qu'est (métaphoriquement) l'écriture du poème, et auquel le lecteur impérial est invité à participer en tant que bénéficiaire.

Deuxième hypothèse : l'encre rouge peut avoir mis en évidence, non (seulement) l'acrostiche, mais (aussi) un mot diagonal. Il est en effet possible de lire, dans la section centrale du poème (vv. 10–20), qui forme le corps de l'autel, le mot *λιαρός* 'tiède'. Située dans le premier tiers du vers, cette diagonale se maintient relativement bien, que l'on pratique ou non l'interpunctio verbale.

ΛΑΒΟΝΤΕΜΗΚΑΔΩΝΚΕΡΑ	ΛΑΒΟΝΤΕ·ΜΗΚΑΔΩΝ·ΚΕΡΑ	1 ^{ère} lettre
ΛΙΣΣΑΙΣΙΝΑΜΦΙΔΕΙΡΑΣΙΝ	ΛΙΣΣΑΙΣΙΝ·ΑΜΦΙ·ΔΕΙΡΑΣΙΝ	2 ^{ème} lettre
ΟΣΑΙΝΕΜΟΝΤΑΙΚΥΝΘΙΑΙΣ	ΟΣΑΙ·ΝΕΜΟΝΤΑΙ·ΚΥΝΘΙΑΙΣ	3 ^{ème} lettre
ΙΣΟΡΡΟΠΟΣΠΕΛΟΙΤΟΜΟΙ	ΙΣΟΡΡΟΠΟΣ·ΠΕΛΟΙΤΟ·ΜΟΙ	4 ^{ème} lettre
ΣΥΝΟΥΡΑΝΟΥΓΑΡΕΓΚΟΝΟΙΣ	ΣΥΝ·ΟΥΡΑΝΟΥ·ΓΑΡ·ΕΓΚΟΝΟΙΣ	4 ^{ème} lettre
ΕΙΝΑΣΜΕΤΕΥΞΕΓΗΓΕΝΗΣ	ΕΙΝΑΣ·Μ·ΕΤΕΥΞΕ·ΓΗΓΕΝΗΣ	5 ^{ème} lettre
ΤΑΩΝΔΑΕΙΖΩΙΟΝΤΕΧΝΗΝ	ΤΑΩΝ·Δ·ΑΕΙΖΩΙΟΝ·ΤΕΧΝΗΝ	
ΕΝΕΥΣΕΠΑΛΜΥΣΑΦΘΙΤΩΝ	ΕΝΕΥΣΕ·ΠΑΛΜΥΣ·ΑΦΘΙΤΩΝ	
ΣΥΔΩΠΙΩΝΚΡΗΝΗΘΕΝΗΝ	ΣΥ·Δ·Ω·ΠΙΩΝ·ΚΡΗΝΗΘΕΝ·ΗΝ	

Dans ce contexte sacrificiel, *λιαρός* est intéressant parce que, dans la langue homérique, il peut qualifier le sang, encore tiède parce que fraîchement versé (*Il.* XI 477). Le masculin de l'adjectif n'est pas problématique puisque le nom que ce poème donne au sang n'est pas le dénotatif *αἷμα*, mais le métaphorique *ὄλος* (qualifié d'ailleurs du quasi-homographe *λιβρός*). À ce que nous connaissons des pratiques sacrificielles grecques, l'image produite serait plus réaliste qu'avec l'hypothèse précédente : l'aspersion des autels devait être très partielle, et ne laisser que des taches

⁹ Ce versement du sang sur l'autel correspond, sinon à des pratiques réelles, du moins à des représentations que les lecteurs impériaux puis byzantins se faisaient du sacrifice homérique (par exemple, Eustath. *Ad Od.* III 445).

ou des traînées très localisées¹⁰. Enfin, les travaux de François LISSARAGUE et Vassiliki ZACHARI nous ont appris que, si les autels représentés sur les vases attiques portent une ou plusieurs taches de sang, c'est que le peintre souhaitait impliquer qu'ils étaient, non abandonnés, mais toujours en usage au moment dépeint ; ces taches occupent souvent le même espace que les lettres ornementales qui esthétisent l'autel représenté¹¹. Selon ce code, une tâche de « tiède » sur l'autel résonnerait avec le contenu de l'acrostiche : le souhait que l'impérial dédicataire puisse user de l'autel pendant de nombreuses années se trouverait alors matérialisé par cette tache qui, à chaque lecteur, signalait qu'on venait d'y sacrifier.

8. *Vale*

Quelle que soit la valeur de ces suggestions, c'est avec reconnaissance que nous les déposons dans le sillage d'un travail riche et nécessaire : si *The Greek Figure Poems* a parfois les défauts de ses qualités, et reste pris dans une conception un peu étroite de ce qu'est un texte, il n'en reste pas moins une contribution essentielle à la discussion philologique sur ces poèmes visuels, en ce qu'elle les replace de manière convaincante au sein – et non en marge – de la culture littéraire hellénistique.

Maxime Laurent
Yverdon

¹⁰ G. EKROTH, *Blood on the Altars ? On the Treatment of Blood at Greek Sacrifices and the Iconographical Evidence*, *Antike Kunst* XLVIII 2005, pp. 9–29.

¹¹ V. ZACHARI, *Nommer l'espace autour de l'autel*, dans : M. JUFRESA et al. (éds.), *Ouranós – Gaïa : l'espai a Grècia III : Anomenar l'espai III, Col·loqui internacional sobre la concepció de l'espai a Grècia, 29–30 de novembre de 2010*, Barcelone–Tarragone 2013, pp. 103–116, notamment pp. 113 s.

Philip A. Stadter, *Plutarch and his Roman Readers*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, X + 394 pp., ISBN 978-0-19-871833-8, £80.00.

Philip STADTER [= S.] has published on Plutarch extensively for the last fifty years, starting with his 1965 book on *Mulierum virtutes*¹. In this period he has authored numerous papers (mostly on the *Lives* but occasionally also on the *Moralia*), published a commentary on the *Life of Pericles*², edited several volumes dedicated to Plutarch, and influenced the growth of Plutarchan scholarship by engaging in the activities of the International Plutarch Society³.

The reviewed book is a collection of twenty three papers by S., mostly devoted to Plutarch's *Lives*, published in the last twenty or so years (the earliest paper dates back to 1992; the most recent ones are still in press); the "Introduction" and the first chapter ("Friends or Patrons?") are completely new. The book makes S.'s scholarship more accessible to a broader audience – several of the papers included in the volume were published in conference proceedings that are difficult to acquire; two papers, originally published in Italian, have been translated into English. The formatting throughout the book is fairly consistent (though there is no consistency in the titles of Plutarch's texts, e.g. *Quaestiones convivales* are referred to in one paper as *Table-Talk* and in another as *Symposiaca*; the *index locorum*, however, helpfully uses uniformly Latin titles); some papers have been slightly revised and updated. The order of the papers is not chronological, but they are divided into four thematic groups constituting the four parts of the volume (I: "Two Worlds – or One?"; II: "Writing for Romans"; III: "Statesmen as Models and Warnings"; IV: "Post-Classical Receptions").

The title indicates the overarching theme of the book: the purpose of Plutarch's writings (in particular his biographies) and its intended and actual audience. Indeed, while S.'s contributions cover a whole range of Plutarch's texts and focus on a variety of topics, they share a common perspective on Plutarch and his goals. S.'s Plutarch is not an insulated philosopher avoiding engagement in contemporary political affairs. S. believes and repeatedly emphasises that Plutarch ambitiously intended to influence and instruct *via* his works. This was aimed not only at his Greek and occasionally Roman friends, but also at the ruling elite of the Roman empire, both Greek and Roman, those "responsible for the governance of cities, provinces, and the empire itself" (p. 108). This theme is particularly prominent in chapter 2 ("Plutarch's *Lives* and their Roman Readers"), but runs throughout the volume. S.'s Plutarch is a political philosopher and a philosophical adviser to the imperial ruling class, answering Plato's call to engage with the world of politics (pp. 10–12). From an early age he was acutely interested in political history of the empire, impressively educated in Roman history and customs, and purposefully maintaining personal ties with prominent Romans. This is an intriguing portrait, though by no means unproblematic if we take into account the fact that there are few explicit references to contemporary politics in Plutarch's works, which in general, as has been observed, seem to avoid direct engagement in current affairs⁴.

¹ P.A. STADTER, *Plutarch's Historical Methods: An Analysis of the Mulierum Virtutes*, Cambridge 1965.

² P.A. STADTER, *A Commentary on Plutarch's Pericles*, Chapel Hill 1989.

³ The International Plutarch Society published a volume dedicated to Philip STADTER in recognition of his contribution to Plutarchan scholarship: A. PÉREZ JIMÉNEZ, F. TITCHENER (eds.), *Historical and Biographical Values of Plutarch's Works. Studies Devoted to Professor Philip A. Stadter by International Plutarch Society*, Málaga–Logan 2005.

⁴ See e.g. C. PELLING, *Plutarch's Caesar: A Caesar for Caesars?*, in: P.A. STADTER, L. VAN DER STOCKT, (eds.) *Sage and Emperor: Plutarch, Greek Intellectuals, and Roman Power in the Time of Trajan, 98–117 AD*, Leuven 2002, pp. 213–226.

Part I (“Two Worlds – or One?”) consists of seven chapters which focus, to a greater or lesser extent, on Plutarch’s relationship with Rome and the Romans. This theme is particularly dominant in the first three contributions, which examine Plutarch’s “friendships” with prominent Romans (in particular with Mestrius Florus and Sosius Senecio) in the context of the conventions of the Roman institution of patronage (chapter 1: “Friends or Patrons?”), discuss the intended audience of the *Parallel Lives* (chapter 2: “Plutarch’s *Lives* and their Roman Readers”), and reconsider the place of the *Lives of the Caesars* in the Plutarchan corpus (chapter 3: “Revisiting Plutarch’s *Lives of Caesars*”). This last paper proposes a Vespasianic date for Plutarch’s largely lost biographies of emperors; if this were true, the work would have been composed by a young Plutarch, who had already managed to acquire an impressive knowledge of Roman history. Chapters 4 and 5 (“Plutarch: Diplomat for Delphi?” and “Plutarch and Apollo at Delphi”) focus on Plutarch’s ties with Delphi and the role of Delphic oracle in the *Parallel Lives*, chapters 6 and 7 (“Drinking, *Table Talk* and Plutarch’s Contemporaries” and “Leading the Party, Leading the City: The Symposiarch as *politikos*”) turn to the *Table-Talk* and relationship between *symposion* and politics.

The first three papers in Part II (“Writing for Romans”) discuss Plutarch’s preparations for the *Parallel Lives* (chapter 8: “Before Pen Touched Paper: Plutarch’s Preparations for the *Parallel Lives*”), his knowledge of Latin and use of Roman sources (chapter 9: “Plutarch’s Latin Reading: Cicero’s *Lucullus* and Horace’s *Epistle* 1.6”), and his representation of the careers of Roman politicians and Plutarch’s good understanding of the *cursus honorum* and its anomalies in the late republic (chapter 10: “Plutarchan Prosopography: The *Cursus honorum*”). S.’s arguments in chapter 9 for Plutarch’s good familiarity with Latin and with the works of Cicero as well as his suggestion that the biographer, who paraphrases Horace’s *Ep.* I 6, 45 f. in *Life of Lucullus* 39, might have had direct knowledge of the Roman poet’s work, are congruent with a recent shift in scholarship, no longer determined to deny Plutarch’s knowledge of Latin. Chapters 11 and 12 (“Plutarch and Trajanic Ideology” and “The Justice of Trajan in Pliny *Epistles* 10 and Plutarch”) focus on parallels in works of Plutarch and Pliny the Younger and consider them in the context of Trajanic ideology. S. believes that Plutarch’s *Lives*, like Pliny’s *Panegyricus* and Dio Chrysostom’s *Kingship Orations*, offer some suggestions for the Trajanic rule, though they are phrased indirectly as self-censorship was necessary in times of absolute monarchy. Not all will agree with this interpretation of the *Lives*; in fact, several contributions in the 2002 volume from which chapter 11 originates⁵ emphasise Plutarch’s disengagement rather than engagement with contemporary political life. Chapter 13 (“Plutarch’s Alexandrias”) discusses the representation of Alexandria in the *Lives* and *Moralia* and speculates about Plutarch’s own knowledge of and visit to the city (S. proposes that Plutarch travelled to Alexandria with an embassy to Vespasian in 69/70). The last chapter in section II (“The Philosopher’s Ambition: Plutarch, Arrian, and Marcus Aurelius”) compares the careers and ambitions of Plutarch, Arrian, and Marcus Aurelius.

The contributions in Part III (“Statesmen as Models and Warnings”) focus for the most part on the moral dimension of the *Parallel Lives*. In chapter 15 (“Plutarch’s *Lives*: The Statesman as Moral Actor”) S. argues that the *Lives* are innovative in their use of history and biography for a moral purpose; what sets Plutarch apart from earlier Greek historians is his focus on the moral aspect not only of specific actions of his protagonists, but of their whole lives. In chapter 16 (“The Rhetoric of Virtue in Plutarch’s *Lives*”) he asks how precisely the reader is to become more virtuous as a result of reading the *Lives* and examines the rhetorical strategies used to influence the moral growth of the audience. S. argues that Plutarch’s aim is to sensitise the reader to his own shortcomings and to spur him to emulate virtue by presenting images of men in action. He also points out that the technique of *synkrisis*, setting two lives side by side, allows the reader to see them more accurately and increases his ability to discern and differentiate virtues. Plutarch’s

⁵ STADTER, VAN DER STOCKT (eds.), *op. cit.* (n. 4).

moralizing programme in the *Lives* has been further examined by scholars⁶ in a vigorous and nuanced way since S.'s original delivery (in 1996) of the conference papers from which chapters 15 and 16 originated.

The next two chapters focus on specific lives and their purpose. In chapter 17 ("Paidagōgia pros to theion: Plutarch's *Numa*") S. interprets the *Life of Numa* as a representation of the ideal princeps; chapter 18 ("Paradoxical Paradigms: Plutarch's *Lysander* and *Sulla*") is an attempt to illuminate the Lysander–Sulla pair by pointing out the similarities between the two successful yet deeply flawed protagonists. Chapter 19 ("Competition and its Costs: Φιλονικία in Plutarch's *Society and Heroes*") discusses the term φιλονικία in Plutarch; after a short discussion of the ambivalence of φιλονικία and φιλονεικία and a very brief overview of the use of the term in the prose of the classical period, S. examines the term in the *Moralia* and the *Lives* and observes that, while in the *Moralia* it typically has negative connotations, in the *Lives* it is more ambiguous – desirable in some circumstances, yet dangerous. Chapter 20 ("Parallels in Three Dimensions") discusses interrelations between six lives of late republican Romans (Crassus, Pompey, Caesar, Cato Minor, Brutus and Antony) and accompanying Greek biographies. He distinguishes four areas of interplay between these lives: conquest, politics, kingship, and tragedy, and suggests that they might have been intended to be seen as a set aimed at the contemporary political elite speaking of great statesmen and their political failures.

The last part of the book is entitled "Post-Classical Reception" and moves away from the Roman readers to more recent reception. In chapters 21 and 22 ("Cato the Younger in the English Enlightenment: Addison's Rewriting of Plutarch" and "Alexander Hamilton's Notes on Plutarch in his Paybook") S. discusses reception of Plutarch in the eighteenth century: first, he compares the figure of Cato Minor in Plutarch and in the tragedy *Cato* by Joseph Addison and, second, he examines notes by the young Alexander Hamilton on two pairs in Plutarch's *Lives*, *Theseus–Romulus* and *Lycurgus–Numa*. The latter chapter, although chronologically removed from the realities of Plutarch's world, nevertheless fits well with the overall concept of the volume. Hamilton, as an ambitious young man eager to engage in political life, fits S.'s image of Plutarch's intended reader; consequently, S. reads Hamilton's notes not only as evidence of the statesman's development, but also as an example of a serious reading of Plutarch by a politically active man. The last chapter of the volume ("Should We Imitate Plutarch's Heroes?") returns to the question of how to approach the *Lives* and argues, similarly to chapter 16, that protagonists are not models to be imitated, but case studies to be examined. As elsewhere in the book, S.'s personal affection for Plutarch and his conviction that his works still have a potential to guide and instruct are clearly discernible. The book closes with a bibliography covering all the chapters, very useful *indices locorum* of both Plutarchan and non-Plutarchan passages, an index of names, and an index of topics.

All the papers included in the volume are informative and lucid. S.'s portrait of Plutarch is a result of long, intimate familiarity with the Plutarchan *corpus* (and a genuine regard and fondness for the Chaeronean author) combined with an interest in and understanding of the political realities of the early empire. He asks some big-picture questions – about purpose, audience and immediate reception. Because of the scarceness of both extra-textual evidence and Plutarch's explicit declarations, many of S.'s conclusions remain, as he is well aware, speculative; there is certainly room for disagreement and different perspectives. However, one does not have to be entirely convinced by his arguments to appreciate the consistency with which he contextualises Plutarch's *œuvre* with close attention to the historical and political circumstances in which it originated.

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⁶ For instance in T. DUFF, *Plutarch's Lives: Exploring Virtue and Vice*, Oxford 1999.

Raoul MORTLEY, *Plotinus, Self and the World*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 153, ISBN 978-1-10-704024-3, £64.99.

The concept of the “self” or “identity” is one of the most studied nowadays, in humanities as well as in social sciences. The same question has been intriguing Plotinian scholars for a long time and a seminal book by Gerard O’DALY¹ was just a beginning of a long series of publications trying to cast light on this fascinating subject. The work of Raoul MORTLEY [= M.] is an interesting contribution to the growing body of literature on the subject and we can be sure it will not be the last one.

In the “Introduction” to this short study, the author presents its main threads as well as his methodology. He informs the reader that he is inspired by questions asked by modern philosophy, but that he will also be respectful of Plotinus’ text. “The method chosen is exploratory and dubitative”, says M., “and seeks to engage an enquiry, without necessarily finishing an enquiry” (p. 2). This honest declaration prepares the reader in advance not to expect too comprehensive a study or too many references to the secondary literature. The author also points to his main area of interest: what was Plotinus’ position on autonomy, authenticity and the personal, individual self – the great themes of modern, Enlightenment philosophy, still debated and important today. He also suggests the main conclusion of this, at first glance, inconclusive, work: Plotinus’ was the idea of the human self “being thoroughly at home with the All” (p. 13).

The first chapter (“The individuated self and memory”) begins with a comparison of Plotinus with Augustine in terms of their views on the personal self. It is quite banal to say that Augustine is considered to be the one who “invented” the individual self for Western culture², especially because of his *Confessions*, an “autobiography” (which is not an autobiography) which seduces the modern reader with all the ideas of memory, individual history, dialogue, relationship, hermeneutics etc., so cherished by 20th century philosophy and culture. M. accepts those presuppositions, but argues that it was Plotinus who “invented” modern selfhood and asks a more intriguing (and less often asked) question: if so, why did Plotinus not write his own *Confessions*, in other words did not write an autobiography?

In the first chapter, the main problem is that of memory in Plotinus, contrasted with the quite crucial role that this concept plays in Augustine’s philosophy. After a brief review of the secondary literature on the self in Plotinus, M. describes two kinds of memory that can be found in the *Enneads* (or, more precisely, in a long treatise on the soul, divided rather clumsily by Porphyry, into *Enn.* IV 3, IV 4 and IV 5). One type of memory is a lower and affective memory, the other – a higher and disaffected one, which M. tries to clarify as being “analytical” and “clinical”. In this chapter, the author claims that he is presenting a “negative” view of memory in Plotinus; forgetfulness is praised as something much better than memory. This seems more than enough to explain why Plotinus would not write his autobiography (but still, it appears to be too easy an answer).

In the second chapter (“Memory and forgetting”), a more positive view of memory is presented. And yet, memory stands in opposition to contemplation, since the latter is always present, timeless and immediate, while memory, like consciousness, creates a distance between the subject and the object; it is always of past objects which are no longer there or which do not exist anymore. M. interprets a passage on “being” and “having” from *Enn.* IV 4, 4, one of the too often neglected and absolutely crucial texts concerning the fall of the soul in Plotinus. He notices that it implies the existence of the “subconscious or unconscious” in the soul (p. 32). The closer the soul is to the

¹ *Plotinus’ Philosophy of the Self*, Shannon 1973.

² Cf. P. CARY, *Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self: The Legacy of Christian Platonist*, Oxford 2000.

intelligible realm, the less it has and needs memory, but the more it falls into the sensible realm, the more there is room for remembering. And yet, in the fallen condition, it is memory which preserves the intelligible world in the soul and enables it to awaken and return to the spiritual realm. There is an apparent contradiction in Plotinus' view of memory: it is partly good and partly bad, depending on the context and the existential situation.

Chapter three ("Ignorance, love and play"), deals with the appreciation of the physical world. The author compares Plato and Plotinus, arguing that Plato's view is more positive towards the world, since his Demiurge delights in the created world, while Plotinus' Demiurge looks towards the Forms and delights in them instead. Nonetheless, Plotinus seems to come "close to the position of the orthodox Christians, maintaining the value of the physical world", as an image of intelligible beauty and goodness (p. 43). M. also reminds us of Plotinus' attacks on the Gnostics and places him somewhere between Plato and the Gnostics with regard to his attitude towards the material world. Later in the chapter, we find a meditation on the concept of ignorance, starting from Plato's image of an aviary and a wax tablet (from *Theaetetus*; there is also a reference to *First Alcibiades*). Towards the end, the author briefly touches upon the motif of acting and *theatrum mundi* in Plotinus.

In chapter four ("Plotinus' Eros"), there is again an attempt to compare Plato's and Plotinus' views, this time, on the role of Eros. The author argues that in Plotinus there is a great intimacy between the soul and beauty, unlike in Plato (Aristotle and Heidegger are used to cast light on this intimacy). In Plotinus, Eros is not only a Platonic desire for what is absent, but it is the very eye that enables us to contemplate what is present. Further on in the chapter, M. points to interesting aspects of the Plotinian concept of Eros, focusing mainly on his view on procreation. While Plato sees procreative desires as naturally coming from Eros, Plotinus insists that since procreation is caused by a lack, the self-sufficient, contemplative human self does not need or want, for that matter, to procreate. (This is also put in the context of Late Antiquity's generally negative view of sexuality.)

In chapter five ("The self: 'and we too are kings'"), M. focuses on the Intellect as it is presented by Plotinus in *Enn.* III 5. The Intellect is called "our king", but "we too are kings". The image of an intellect-king is traced down to Plato's *Philebus* as well as to ancient political theories, according to which the law is identical to the king. So it is in Plotinus: his Intellect is intelligible law and measure for everything in the sensible realm. The Intellect is not only beyond or above us, it is "ours" and precisely because of that, "we too are kings".

In the next chapter ("Being and having"), this subject is elaborated further. Starting from Gabriel Marcel's thoughts on "I" and "mine", M. links possession, being, and contemplation. He analyzes the ancient philosophical notion of *to oikeion*. Possession guarantees being and it is the goal of contemplation, it is above thinking. Nevertheless, the One does not possess at all; it is above possessing, which enables it to possess everything. Towards the end of the chapter, the author argues that the Plotinian self needs to be understood in terms of belonging, ownership and possession, or rather of "ownness", as he calls it. In Plotinus' thought, this forms a bridge between the self and otherness.

Chapter seven ("Self-knowledge") deals with the question of self-knowledge. The author starts from the image of the mirror (traced back to Plato's *Charmides* and *First Alcibiades*) as well as with Plotinus' remarks on consciousness functioning as a mirror. Further on, M. emphasises that the body belongs to us and is "ours", but that it does not determine us as individuals. It is rather an intelligible Form that is responsible for that. Towards the end, there are also some thoughts on the image of a "wandering" Intellect (from *Enn.* VI 7, 13). The conclusion is Plotinus' positive view of the All (the world): the Intellect embraces everything, otherness as well as sameness, and it finds itself everywhere it "goes".

The next chapter ("Art and the seduction of beauty") is concerned with art. Again, M. begins with Plato, his *Ion* and *Republic*, emphasising especially the seductive dangers of art. Art is appreciated more in Plotinus than in Plato. The author shows that art is an image of the divine, but an image retaining something of its prototype, thus stressing the continuity between the image and

the essence; this is absent from Plato's views. Further on, M. refers to André GRABAR's article on Plotinus and the art of his age (ideas of art as a mirror, derived from realistic paintings of Egypt, Plotinus' fatherland). GRABAR suggests Plotinus influenced Christian art, but M. disagrees, emphasising that Plotinus is essentially hostile towards images. The only kind of image he values is what M. labels "onto-image", that is, a living being reflecting the beauty of the intelligible Form. There is, however, ambiguity towards art in Plotinus and the author tries to explain it by referring to changing perspectives. It depends on whether Plotinus looks at art from "below" (as revealing something of the intelligible) or from "above" (as diminishing the essence). Ultimately, for Plotinus works of art are mere toys. The author comments: "Plotinus remains the prototype iconoclast, but iconophiles may have made some use of some of his writings" (p. 125).

The last chapter ("Face, image and the self") begins with an interesting comment on Plotinus' fascination with faces. The philosopher marvelled at the luminosity and beauty of the human face, especially the eyes. M. returns to Plotinus' hostility towards the Gnostics and provides us with a beautiful and insightful comparison: Plotinus "sees the engendered world as a kind of temple flooded with light. This contrasts with the Gnostic view of the world as a kind of prison, shrouded in darkness" (p. 130). The chapter ends with a thought of the self being "in the middle" (which, one can guess, should not be confused with Plotinus' famous statement, later repeated by Augustine, that the soul is *en mesō*; the author, however, does not refer to that in any way). "We" possess both the Intellect and the body, they are indeed "ours", not as material possessions, but forming a part of our very being, as the author suggests.

In the "Conclusion", the author summarises his enquiry: "Despite Plotinus' personal discomfort with it, the body and the physical world is fully embraced in his philosophy" (p. 140).

M.'s book is an important contribution to our understanding of Plotinus, and especially to his attitude towards the material world. This seems to be the most valuable part of the work, since many of the other brief analyses of selected concepts do not provide so much insight into Plotinus' philosophy. The book is written in a very clear, elegant, and interesting way, which should always be emphasised when we are dealing with such a difficult philosopher as Plotinus. When the reader accepts the author's method of enquiry (again, "exploratory and dubitative"), the lecture proves to be not only inspiring, but also, simply, pleasant (which makes us think that references to acting and beauty are not incidental in M.; he seems to actually enjoy Plotinus and wants the reader to enjoy him too).

What I find the most important idea in the book is that Plotinus was not entirely in harmony with the dominant atmosphere of his time, which was hostile towards the material world, sensible beauty and pleasure; that he was "at home in the All", as the author puts it. It is pity that M. does not take this thought further, because, indeed, with all the inner tensions, contradictions even, in the philosophy of Plotinus, a positive attitude towards everything that exists (in this sense, as M. says, "almost Christian", almost Genesis-like) prevails³. Of course, the negative perspective is also present, but it is, perhaps, too often taken for granted by readers⁴.

However, M. restrains himself from following in that direction, partly because of his reliance on Porphyry's biography as a source to understanding Plotinus' mind. I do not deny that it is an important source, but it should be read carefully for several reasons. If we have Porphyry claiming that Plotinus was ashamed to be in the body and Plotinus himself writing so powerfully about the beauty of the world, I do not understand why we should cling to Porphyry. But M., for some reason, hesitates to follow his own intuitions.

³ There is not much about this in literature. I tried to link this aspect of Plotinus' philosophy with his mysticism in my *Mystical Experience and Philosophical Discourse in Plotinus* (Poznań 2008).

⁴ I do not remember who said that people so often emphasise Plotinus' negative attitude towards the world, in terms of his "flight of the alone to the Alone", because this quotation is so easy to find... (being the last sentence of the last treatise of the last ennead in Porphyry's order); certainly, there is a grain of truth in this saying.

There are some minor weaknesses in the book that I want to address briefly. In chapter one, the author describes two types of memory in Plotinus, lower (affective) and higher (disaffected). But the lack of reference to contemplative literature of the West (not to mention the East) makes him misinterpret the higher memory as “analytic and clinical”. Both traditional mystics (e.g. Teresa of Avila, John of the Cross) and contemporary contemplatives (Philip St. Romain, James Arraj etc.) confess that, in later stages of spiritual growth, memory indeed becomes disaffected in the sense that events are remembered as images without emotional content. One quote from Teresa of Avila will suffice:

He has made my life to me now a kind of sleep; for almost always what I see seems to me to be seen as in a dream, nor have I any great sense either of pleasure or of pain. If matters occur which may occasion either, the sense of it passes away so quickly that it astonishes me, and leaves an impression as if I had been dreaming, and this is the simple truth; for if I wished afterwards to delight in that pleasure, or be sorry over that pain, it is not in my power to do so: just as a sensible person feels neither pain nor pleasure in the memory of a dream that is past⁵.

It can be debated what the advantages and disadvantages of that state are, but it is not about memory becoming abstract or analytic⁶.

References to Freud and Jung when M. deals with Plotinus’ intuition of the unconscious are completely mistaken. Freud’s unconscious is presented as a “reservoir of painful memories” which return in “perverse behaviour” (which is partly true of the early writings of Freud from the end of the 19th century, but this concept was soon abandoned by him and is not a part of his psychoanalytical theory) and Jung’s unconscious (called, for some reason, “subconscious”) is pictured as a reservoir of “universal and transcendent truths”, which is not a good description of the Jungian archetypes either.

M. also often draws conclusions from an interpretation of one single treatise of Plotinus. For instance, in *Enn.* V 3 the Intellect is seen as something above “us”, the “king”. But it is not always so in Plotinus. In VI 7 the individual selves are described as “gods” and “intellects” which have fallen into the bodies. Focusing on one treatise only gives us a limited perspective on what Plotinus was thinking, at least. M.’s view on the “we” as embracing the body along with other levels of our existence is untenable, since the “we”, in the view of many scholars, including the author of this review, is a mobile centre of attention and intention which identifies with various activities of the human self, but certainly cannot be equated with the totality of the embodied individual. What M. says is not entirely mistaken; on the contrary, it shows something important, but it should be nuanced and elaborated upon.

All in all, M.’s book is as inspiring as it is enjoyable, and its final thought on Plotinus being “at home in the All” is worth further consideration and popularisation, also in non-academic world.

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⁵ *Life of St. Teresa of Jesus* 40, 31 (<http://www.ccel.org/ccel/teresa/life.viii.xli.html#viii.xli-p0.2>, accessed 31 August 2015).

⁶ This disaffected memory is a part of what James Arraj described in Jungian terms as “the loss of affective ego” and demonstrated that this state was reported not only by mystics from the East and the West, but also by some contemporary Westerners without any specifically religious orientation. See the chapter on this in his book: J. ARRAJ, P. St. ROMAIN, *Critical Questions in Christian Contemplative Practice* (available online: <http://www.innerexplorations.com/chmystext/isit.htm>, accessed on 31 August 2015). See also very clarifying descriptions of this sort of change in memory functioning in the first, autobiographical chapter of Philip St. ROMAIN’s book: *Kundalini Energy and Christian Spirituality*, New York 1991, pp. 10–34.

John Peter KENNEY, *Contemplation and Classical Christianity: A Study in Augustine*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013 (Oxford Early Christian Studies), 206 pp., ISBN 978-0-19-956370-8, £53.00.

John Peter KENNEY [= K.] is one of the greatest specialists in the field of contemplation and mysticism in ancient philosophy. Apart from his broader monograph on the Platonic tradition¹, he has published an important book focused on Augustine's *Confessions*² as well as several articles about the bishop of Hippo³. His new book about Augustine is partially based on the set of earlier articles published by K. over the last several years. In the first chapter he also includes some material from his previous studies on Platonism. Nonetheless, the book remains an important follow-up to his monograph on the mysticism of the *Confessions*, providing a fruitful synthesis of his work on Augustine.

The book consists of five chapters and is rather meagre in size (one hundred seventy pages, not including the bibliography and indexes). In the "Introduction" K. presents his main purpose, which is to study the relationship between Platonic contemplation and Christian philosophy in Augustine. He points out both the "revolutionary" aspects of Christianity with respect to the previous philosophical and cultural tradition as well as the desire of Christian intellectuals to use those aspects of Platonism that appeared invaluable and acceptable to them. For example, he recognises "the inherent ambivalence of Augustine's creative appropriation of Platonism: both his respect for its transcendental monotheism as well as his disdain not just for its acceptance of pagan cult but also for the soteriology of the Plotinian school" (p. 9). The pivotal notion of K.'s assessment of Platonism is its "transcendentalism", entailing real knowledge of the spiritual reality provided by Platonic contemplation, which is perfectly compatible with the Christian revelation.

The first chapter ("Contemplation and Pagan Monotheism") tries to summarise the most important characteristics of Platonic contemplation, with a special emphasis on the views of Plotinus as the founder of Neoplatonism. K.'s understanding of *Plato redivivus* is both profound and fresh, even though he is not what might be called a particularly "Plotinian scholar". In his summary, he emphasises both intellectual and trans-intellectual aspects of Plotinus' attitude to contemplation as well as his crucial concept of the fall of the soul or, more precisely, of the self, which includes an intriguing idea, later rejected by other Neoplatonists, that there is a part of the soul that does not descend and remains "anchored" in the noetic realm. K. mentions the most important aspect of Plotinus' concept of contemplation: that beyond a noetic (non-discursive) intuition of the intelligible world there is also a "hypernoetic"⁴ contemplation of the One, which consists in a "not-knowing", in, as K. reminds us, "a presence beyond knowledge".

In chapter two ("Transcendence and Christian Monotheism"), K. tries to grasp and describe the appeal that Platonism had for Augustine and attempts to delineate those changes which the later bishop of Hippo had to make in order to integrate what he learnt from Plotinus' works with his Christian faith. The most important elements here, according to K., are (1) abandoning Plotinus' idea of the highest Principle as *epekeina ontos* (beyond being) and replacing it with the notion of God as being, (2) an emphasis on the view of God as personal or rather "relational" (that is,

¹ *Mystical Monotheism: A Study in Ancient Platonic Theology*, Providence–Hanover 1991.

² *The Mysticism of Saint Augustine: Rereading the "Confessions"*, New York 2005.

³ *Confession and the Contemplative Self in Augustine's Early Works*, Augustinian Studies XXX-VIII 2007, pp. 133–146 or, more recently, *God as Being*, Augustinian Studies XLIII 2012, pp. 77–88.

⁴ Term suggested by G.J.P. O'DALY (*Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self*, Shannon 1973, p. 84).

actively interested in individual human souls) in contrast to a more “detached” concept of divinity in Platonism. The latter element plays a crucial role in spiritual practice, since Augustine’s God is believed to be actively helping the soul in its return to him, unlike the Plotinian One (which, we ought to say, also attracts the soul to itself, but by means of its beauty and *charis*, not by personal care).

The third chapter (“Contemplation at Cassiciacum”) deals with Augustine’s early dialogues, written in Cassiciacum, in the villa belonging to his friend Verecundus, near Milan, after his conversion in 386. K. focuses particularly on early dialogues: *Contra academicos*, *De ordine* and *Soliloquia*, demonstrating that Augustine’s appropriation of Platonism was from the very beginning based on the important changes he had made in Neoplatonism (described in chapter two). K.’s strong (and open to debate) thesis is that “[f]rom Augustine’s first catechumenal treatise, *Contra academicos*, contemplation of God is relational, a form of intimacy initiated by divine intention towards the soul” (p. 61). He also emphasises that Augustine, unlike Plotinus, considered the fallen soul as too weak to return on its own to God. That is why it so desperately needs confession and grace.

In chapter four (“Early Catholic Treatises”), K. briefly analyses the descriptions of the contemplative ascent of the soul, which can be found in Augustine’s treatises written a bit later than the first Cassiciacum dialogues (such as *De utilitate credendi* or *De vera religione*, probably around years 390–391), concluding that his recognition of the shortcomings of Platonic contemplation had developed further. In these treatises, contemplation as such is seen by Augustine as “ambivalent”, in that it gives insight into the nature of God, particularly his transcendence, and, at the same time, into the soul’s fallenness and weakness, its need for help.

The fifth chapter (“Christian Transcendentalism”) focuses on the intriguing concept of the *caelum caeli* in Book Twelve of the *Confessions*. Augustine develops the idea of the “intellectual creature”, the community of angels and souls contemplating God. For the bishop of Hippo, the existence of the *caelum caeli* is also a justification of the possibility of Platonic contemplation in this life and even, as K. suggests, of the very authenticity of his vision at Ostia, shared with his mother, Monnica. The communal, dialogical aspect of the Ostia experience is linked by K. precisely to the idea of the *caelum caeli*.

In the “Conclusion” the author summarises the greatest difference between the Platonic and the Christian in Augustine’s understanding of contemplation. For Plotinus, contemplation is both epistemic and salvific: not only does it provide direct knowledge of spiritual reality, but also brings about a transformation of the soul through its intimate connection to the One. For Augustine, on the other hand, contemplation still remains *epistemic*, but is no longer *salvific*. It provides Christians with a sound and secure knowledge of God’s existence as the highest Being as well as of the whole order of reality, created by God, but Augustinian contemplation also results in a pessimistic insight into the miserable state of the fallen soul. K. reminds the reader that the spiritual, transcendent concept of God as pure intellect is not directly derived from the Bible, Jewish tradition or Jesus’ teachings for that matter, but is rather a path that was taken by educated Christians who wanted to understand the revelation in terms of Platonic philosophy. Not only Tertullian and Manichaeans, but many ancient Christians would imagine God just like Augustine did in his youth: as an omnipotent and omnipresent, but still *material, corporeal* being, without feeling unfaithful to the Bible and the Apostolic faith in the slightest. A purely spiritual understanding of God and the soul is a Platonic inheritance within Christianity and Augustine was one of the most influential advocates of this view.

The book is written in a very clear and precise style, without many bibliographical references or polemics with other scholars. The initial doubt of the reader as to whether K. is not simply repeating what he had already said in his previous book on Augustine is dispelled towards the end, when it becomes clear that the author is trying to reconstruct “the way to the *Confessions*” (and its mature view of contemplation) as well as to show the previously mentioned, profound continuity existing in Augustine’s thinking.

If we consider the book as a whole from the perspective of Augustinian scholarship, it seems obvious that K. wants to distance himself from the ongoing debate about the interplay of “Platonist” and “Christian” elements in Augustine’s thought. He attacks the very concept of “Christian Platonism” or rather defines it narrowly as “an effort to present Platonism in the language of Christianity” (p. 11). Even though he tries to avoid the controversy, his thinking is actually centrally placed in it and he presents a very strong position of his own. There are of course equally strong voices opposing the views for which K. tries to argue for. One can mention Philip CARY’s excellent work: *Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self*, with the telling subtitle: *The Legacy of a Christian Platonist* (Oxford 2000), which is a (successful) attempt to demonstrate that Augustine was, in fact, a Platonist philosopher throughout his whole life. Or, more recently, Brian DOBELL’s book with a equally telling title: *Augustine’s Intellectual Conversion: The Journey from Platonism to Christianity* (Cambridge 2009). Unlike CARY, DOBELL argues that Augustine started as a Christian Platonist, but with disappointment abandoned the Neoplatonic understanding of contemplation and spiritual life during his “Pauline revolution” in the mid-390ties.

We can try to see K. as standing in between those views to a certain degree. For him, there was no revolution, Pauline or otherwise, in Augustine attitude towards Platonism, but rather a slow *evolution* and development of the insights which had somehow been there from the very beginning. In my personal view, K. makes matter easy for himself by defining “Christian Platonism” in such a biased and narrow way: if it was only Platonism expressed, for some reason, in Christian language, neither Augustine nor even Origen could be honestly called a “Christian Platonist”. But few scholars would venture to defend such an extreme view, namely, that Augustine merely translated Platonic concepts into biblical metaphors. Robert J. O’CONNELL at times might have given that impression in his iconoclastic fervour, but I do not think that the scholars like Philip CARY, Roland TESKE or Joseph TORCHIA, who believe that Augustine was a deeply Platonic philosopher, trying to subordinate his Platonism to his Christian faith, would ever embrace such a simplistic view of the complicated and always evolving mind of the bishop of Hippo.

K., therefore, makes things easy for himself, but this does not mean that what he says is incorrect. On the contrary, he makes an important contribution by studying, in a profound and elegant way, a particular aspect of the complex relationship between Platonism and the biblical revelation in Augustine, namely, contemplation and its role in the spiritual life of Christians. His demonstration of the differences between Augustine and Plotinus in this respect is valid and clear. Even more important is that he shows that it is precisely the “relational” or “intentional” image of God which hides behind Augustine’s views of contemplation. Perhaps, what is lacking in K.’s argument is reference to an actual evolution in Augustine’s attitude to Platonism. He is so concerned with showing the (existing) continuity between the “early Augustine” and the “mature Augustine”, that we find little about the differences between those two Augustines, which are quite convincingly demonstrated by DOBELL in the book I have referred to above.

I realise that looking for what is missing is not a very good way to write a review. But I cannot help wondering why K. decided to leave aside some broader discussion of the concepts used in the book (such as, to begin with, “Christianity”, “Platonism”, “contemplation”) and especially some discussion of the dominant views in the field. Of course, this might be discouraging for a more general audience and K. seems to want his thoughts to be accessible not only to Augustinian specialists, but it would be quite helpful for Augustinian scholars who are painfully conscious of the vague and ambiguous status of such concepts.

For example, we do not learn whether K. believes that Christianity was for Augustine one of the schools of ancient philosophy or something completely incomparable to them, something that was radically new. The impression that the reader might get from the book is that K. sees Platonism and Christianity as somewhat competitive or even contradictory systems. But K.’s thinking seems to indicate that he recognises that there is a difference between “Platonism” as a theory of reality and “Platonism” as a soteriological system, therapy of the soul or a contemplative path. The problem is that Augustine at some point clearly rejected “Platonism” as a self-subsisting soteriological

and therapeutic system in favour of his own synthesis of Christianity and Platonism. But he never rejected Platonic theories on the whole, even though, towards the end of his life, the bishop of Hippo was criticising with increasing zeal those Platonic doctrines which were incompatible with the Christian view of the human being and his salvation.

However, a great and laudable achievement of K. in this book is both the clarity of the thesis presented and how it is rooted in the reading of Augustine's texts. It will prove equally fascinating and thought provoking for those who study Late Antiquity as for those who are interested in reflecting on Christian spirituality and its sources.

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