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## COMMENTARII

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# BESTIAL RIVALRY: ANIMAL PROPAGANDA IN THE HELLENISTIC KINGDOMS*

by

MAJA MIZIUR-MOŹDZIOCH

ABSTRACT: In this article the use of animals in Hellenistic politics is discussed: in parades, as gifts, and animal images functioning as symbols. The point of departure is the *Pompe* of Ptolemy Philadelphus, for which an alternative to the previously argued date is proposed. Ptolemaic propaganda is further compared with the way other Hellenistic monarchs used animals.

Animals, especially exotic species, are characteristic of the lavish lifestyle of the Roman emperors, and indeed, they played a prominent role as entertainment for the masses throughout the Roman era. This paper, however, will concentrate on another aspect of exotic animals – hidden behind entertainment and religious festivals – as symbols of power and kingship. The discussion will aim at answering the question of how the Hellenistic kings showed their power by means of animals and animal symbols. The crucial period in European history for this subject are the first two centuries after Alexander's Eastern campaign, which resulted in the appearance of the *exotica* in the Greek, and then the Roman world on such a large scale[1]. In this period people realized that the image they create,

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1 A very interesting and deep survey of the role of animals in the construction of cosmic kingship throughout the history of Europe and Asia was made by T. ALLSEN (2006). The examples given by ALLSEN help in understanding common patterns in Eurasian nations with regard to how animals were used in political propaganda and the constitution of rulership. The role of animals in Hellenistic kingship is deeply studied by V. ALONSO TRONCOSO, who inaugurated a project *The Zoology of Hellenistic Kingship: From Alexander the Great to the Epigoni (336–c. 250 BC)*, and part of his research

what they make others see, can become a reality[2]. Alexander's successors thus realized the power of the image and created zoological icons of their kingship[3]. These animal icons served as tools for their propaganda, which in this paper shall be understood as a way of influencing opinion and the "deliberate attempt to influence public opinion through the transmission of ideas and values for a specific purpose"[4]. The point of departure for this theme will be the Great Procession of Ptolemy II, around which this discussion will oscillate.

## PHILADELPHUS AND THE INDIAN TRIUMPH

Early in the Hellenistic period we hear of the immense procession of Ptolemy II Philadelphus[5]. The date of this event, estimated by the majority of scholars as being ca. 279/278 BC is dubious, as is the occasion on which it took place[6]. It began with the procession of the Morning Star, followed by the procession of the deified parents of Ptolemy II and Arsinoe II. The central part (according to the image created by Athenaeus) was the procession of Dionysos, followed by the procession of other gods and was concluded by a parade of military forces.

> After all of these there was a procession of cavalry and infantry forces, all armed with marvellous panoply. The number of infantry was about 57,600 and of cavalry 23,200. All marched wearing outfits suitable for them and proper armour. Apart from the armour worn by the forces, there were many other panoplies kept in reserve and their number is not easy to estimate[7].
>
> (Ath. V 35, 203 A)

Why should this be an important aspect of the pageant when considering the animal collections? The military part finishes the procession and thus directs

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regarding the elephant, and specifically coinage, has been recently published (Alonso Troncoso 2013).

[2] Kuttner 1999: 118.

[3] Alonso Troncoso 2013: 254 f.

[4] Cull, Culbert, Welsh 2003: 318. This definition is also applied by Manders (2012: 28) in her analysis of propaganda in the Roman world.

[5] Our only literary testimony is an extensive fragment by Callixeinus of Rhodes (*FGrH* 627 F 2), quoted in Athenaeus' *Deipnosophistae* (V 27–35, 197 D–203 B). The aspect of propaganda in the procession of Ptolemy as a whole has been discussed by F. Dunand (1981), whereas this paper concentrates only on its animal sections.

[6] Dating to ca. 270–268 BC is proposed in this paper. For the discussion and argumentation see below. As for the occasion of the event, Callixeinus names it to be a penteteric festival. It is supposed that it was the *Ptolemaieia* (Thompson 2000: 381–388). Rice, however, assumes that there were several penteteric festivals in Egypt at the time but none can be identified with the *Pompe* with any certainty (Rice 1983: 182–187, esp. 187).

[7] All translations in this paper are by the author.

us towards the interpretation of the event as a display of martial power, either as a triumphal return or as a mobilisation to a war[8]. Secondly, the central part of the procession was dedicated to the god Dionysos and his triumphal return from India followed by "Victories with golden wings" (V 27, 197 E) along with a parade of exotic animals (V 31 f., 200 E–201 C).

> On another cart there was a tableau of the triumphal return of Dionysos from India: a twelve-cubit large [statue] of the recumbent Dionysos was mounted on an elephant. The god was dressed in a purple garment and had a gold crown of ivy and vine. [...] [This section of the procession] was followed by five troops of asses mounted by Silens and Satyrs wearing crowns. [...] After them marched twenty-four elephant quadrigas (ἐλεφάντων ἅρματα) and sixty bigae (συνωρίδες) of he-goats, twelve of saiga antelopes, seven of Arabian oryx, fifteen of boubalos antelopes, twelve bigae of ostriches, seven of onelaphoi, four bigae of onagers, and four quadrigas of horses. All of these [chariots] were driven by boys wearing rider's tunics and hats. Girls were standing beside them. [...] They were preceded by six bigae of camels – three on each side – which were followed by wagons pulled by mules. [...] She-camels [came after them] carrying three hundred minae of frankincense and the same weight of myrrh, two hundred minae of saffron, cassia, cinnamon, orris root and other spices. Right after them there were Aethiopian tribute bearers carrying six hundred elephant tusks, others bearing two thousand ebony trunks, others with sixty wine jars of gold and silver and also gold dust. After them marched two hunters holding gilded hunting-spears. After them two thousand and four hundred dogs were led, some Indian, other Hyrcanian, Molosian, and of other breeds. After them came one hundred fifty men carrying trees to which all kinds of wild animals and birds were adhered. Also parrots and a peacock and guinea-fowls and pheasants, and other Aethiopian birds, all in great numbers were carried in cages. [There were also] thirty specimens of Aethiopian sheep, three hundred of Arabic, twenty of Euboean, twenty-six entirely white Indian bulls and eight Aethiopian, one very large white bear, fourteen leopards, sixteen cheetahs, four lynxes, three arkeloi, one giraffe, and one Aethiopian rhinoceros. [...] [There were also] many elements worth hearing of and many animals and horses and twenty-four lions of extraordinary size.
>
> (Ath. V 27–33, 197 E–201 C, 201 F)

Apart from the animals, many precious objects were carried. Scholars tend to stress the Classical Greek origins of the *Pompe*[9], which comprises of elements of typical Greek religious festivals, consisting of four main sections: a parade of a god's statue (*pompe*) finishing with a sacrifice before the temple, followed by a feast and athletic or artistic competitions[10]. Certainly, Ptolemy's pageant was a part of a tradition of Greek civic processions, which also did not abstain from incorporating political elements into the religious ceremony[11]. For instance, the

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[8] In contrast to the procession of Antiochus IV (see below), which began with a military display.

[9] Erskine 2013: 45. On the distinction of civic and Hellenistic *pompai* see Walbank 2002: 79–81.

[10] Rice 1983: 26. In the largest Athenian festival, the *Panathenaea,* there was a procession followed by musical and athletic games ([Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 60, 1).

[11] Pickard-Cambridge 1968: 58 f.

processional route of the Great Dionysia (from Athens to Eleutherai and back) marked the domination of Athens over the region. During the festivals, tributes from allied *poleis* were paid, again, to underline the power of Athens. Herodotus, describing the re-establishment of Pisistratus in Athens (I 60, 2–5), writes of his return in a procession of the goddess Athena standing in a chariot. As a result, a substantial increase in images referring to this event is to be found in vase painting of the period[12]. Strabo reports that in the past a religious procession dedicated to Artemis was held in Eretria, with soldiers, horsemen and chariots, to proclaim the military power of the city (X 1, 10, 488 C). Politics during a civic festival is also attested by Thucydides, who writes of a mutual renewal of oaths between Athens and Sparta during the festivals of Great Dionysia and Hyacinthia (V 23, 4–6). Isocrates (*De pace* 82) relates that tributes from allies were brought onto the stage of the theatre, also during the Dionysia. Henderson noted that both the Panathenaia and the Dionysia were useful for civic and political purposes. Their components (parades, sacrifices, ceremonies and tribute paying) were "a display of the authority, the power, and the character of the *dēmos*"[13]. Ptolemy's *Pompe* includes all the elements present in the Athenian processions discussed above, but it surpasses them all with its splendour and munificence[14]. However, since the display of animals in the Greek festivals is unprecedented, Ptolemy perhaps also drew from the Indian tradition, and was aiming in achieving a likeness to Indian parades[15]. The description of Callixeinus deceptively resembles an account of Cleitarchus on processions held by the Indians:

> And in the processions at the time of festivals many elephants are paraded, all adorned with gold and silver, as also are many four-horse chariots and ox-teams; and then follows the army, all wearing military uniforms, and then golden vessels consisting of large basins and bowls a fathom in breadth; and tables, high chairs, drinking-cups, and bath-tubs, all of which are made of Indian copper and most of them are set with precious stones – emeralds, beryls, and Indian anthraces; and also variegated garments spangled with gold, and tame bisons, leopards, and lions, and numbers of variegated and sweet-voiced birds. And Cleitarchus speaks of four-

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[12] See Connor 1987: 43.

[13] Henderson 1990: 286.

[14] In 334 BC as many as 240 cattle were sacrificed to Dionysos (*IG* II² 1496) and in the *Pompe* the number was 2000 bulls (Ath. V 33, 202 A).

[15] The use of animals in ancient Indian festivals is attested in *Jātakas* (tales of the former incarnations of Buddha), Singh 1967: 81. Cleitarchus, prior to the quoted passage, describes another Indian rite – a yearly festival of washing the hair of the king on his birthday, *tykta,* which was adapted by Chandragupta from Persian customs (see Hdt. IX 110; Briant 2002: 319, 959), and during which the king was presented with many gifts from his subjects eager to boast of their wealth (according to Cleitarchus, since in the account of Herodotus the king endows his people). This festival is perhaps referred to by Aelian (*NA* XV 14), speaking of people bringing precious or unusual animals (tigers, antelopes, oxen, doves – the kind which have never been domesticated, hounds and apes) to an Indian king, and that there were animal contests and fights (ibid. 15).

> wheeled carriages on which large-leaved trees are carried, and of different kinds of tamed birds that cling to those trees, and states that of these birds the orion has the sweetest voice, but that the catreus, as it is called, has the most splendid appearance and the most variegated plumage; for its appearance approaches nearest that of the peacock. But one must get the rest of the description from Cleitarchus.
>
> (Strabo XV 1, 69)

The account of Cleitarchus was presumably read at the time and his stories could have been known by the educated spectators of the *Pompe*[16]. Ptolemy II might have been acquainted with his work since Alexander's historian wrote his account in Egypt under his father's patronage (perhaps he was even somehow related to the Alexandrian court, but this is not certain)[17]. Also, Philadelphus' deified father wrote his account of Alexander's campaign and could have acquainted his son with the marvels of the Orient and their customs. This, on the other hand, is a link to Alexander the Great[18], whose eastern conquests were evoked by those events and underlined by the statues of Dionysos, Alexander and Ptolemy at the end of the animal part of the procession (Ath. V 33, 201 C–D). The Dionysian parade with its variety of exotic species of animals was supposed to demonstrate the range of Alexander's expedition and his might to subdue such distant and wild lands. According to the image displayed in the *Pompe*, Ptolemy, like Alexander before him, and Dionysos as well, was to conquer the whole world. All the tame and yoked wild beasts signified the victory of the Ptolemaic kings over the natural world, and even more reminded people of their legitimacy. However, the presence of exotic species was a novelty[19]: neither Alexander nor Dionysos were to such a great extent associated with such a remarkable menagerie before the *Pompe*. We can classify this as a part of the ideological propaganda of the Ptolemaic dynasty[20]. By means of references to the cult of Dionysos, they strengthened their ties with Alexander and thus seemed the most legitimate successors of the great king. The Ptolemies claimed to be the

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16 We know nothing of the popularity of his works during that period, but e.g. Strabo does not merely quote or abbreviate Cleitarchus' account, but he encourages his readers to take the original (τὴν δὲ λοιπὴν εἰκονογραφίαν παρ' ἐκείνου ληπτέον), which, judging by this, was still in circulation in the 1st c. BC/AD. It is proved that he was also the main source for many ancient historians from the age of Alexander, Bosworth 1997: 215. Possibly also Callixeinus was familiar with Cleitarchus' account, which might have influenced his description of the *Pompe*.

17 Bosworth 1997: 212 f.

18 Rice 1983: 48.

19 Almost all the species of the animals named by Callixeinus parading in the *Pompe* were considered exotic marvels by the spectators: the elephants, cats, birds, the bear, the rhinoceros, the giraffe. Even the sheep, since they were of different breeds, and hence looked different than the indigenous species.

20 Pamias 2004: 192.

righteous successors to Alexander's legacy[21], and as they were trying to "prove" by means of the *Pompe* (*inter alia*), their power was established by the divine authority of Dionysos[22]. The fact that it was Alexandria that held the body of the deceased Alexander substantially helped in creating the desired image. GOUKOWSKY believes that other Diadochoi asserted their legitimacy as rulers by referring to their relationship with Alexander since his name was synonymous with military victory[23], but the Ptolemies excelled over the others in inventing new ties and connections with Alexander[24] and in putting them into practice to consolidate the legitimacy of their government[25]. The image created by Philadelphus in the *Pompe* by the use of exotic animals, as certain scholars have noted, was transferred into art[26]. At the Serapeion in Memphis, sculptures of a lion, a panther, and a peacock were discovered along the processional route to the temple. These animals are devoted to Dionysos, they evoked Alexander's Indian expedition, and they were displayed in the Alexandrian parade. Specifically the peacock was an important link to Alexander, which was introduced into Egypt after his expedition and started to be revered in Egypt during the Ptolemaic rule[27]. The *Pompe* also greatly influenced the iconography of Dionysos' Indian Triumph, especially in Roman mosaics and sarcophagi[28]. We also have certain hints that the exhibition of *thaumata* by Ptolemy in his *Pompe* had a direct impact on Roman *venationes* and the late Republican tradition of exhibiting animal curiosities in such pageants[29]. And as COLEMAN suggests, the exotic display was the link with Dionysos' Indian Triumph, which also became a means of propaganda for the Romans[30].

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[21] The righteous legacy of Alexander claimed by the Ptolemies is notably visible in the symbolism of the tableau at the beginning of the *Pompe*, in which the statues of Alexander and Dionysos are standing beside and are followed by women in costumes – the personifications of Greek cities on the mainland and in Asia, ERSKINE 1995: 44.

[22] PAMIAS 2004: 192. See also RICE 1983: 84 and FRASER 1972: I, 218.

[23] GOUKOWSKY 1978: 145 ff.

[24] Ptolemy I Soter and Ptolemy II Philadelphus.

[25] RICE 1983: 84. The testimony of their "creativeness" can be the story of Ptolemy Soter allegedly being an illegitimate son of Philip of Macedonia and thus the half-brother of Alexander and, further, a descendant of the Dionysian dynasty. The story was naturally invented for the purpose of this propaganda, THOMPSON 2000: 377 f. See also RICE 1983: 84 f., on the accounts of Pausanias (I 6, 2) and Curtius Rufus (IX 8, 22). The stealing away of Alexander's corpse can also be included in this "creativeness". For the origin of the propagandist story see BOSWORTH 1997: 222 f.

[26] KUTTNER 1999: 105.

[27] See Ael. *NA* V 21; RICE 1983: 94; HÖLBL 2001: 282 f.

[28] See. e.g. DUNBABIN 1971.

[29] JENNISON 1937: 41.

[30] COLEMAN 1996: 58.

## THE FELINES OF DIONYSOS AND ROYAL GIFTS

Other Hellenistic rulers employing animals in their propaganda are also captured in the literature of the time. Ca. 305–303 BC Seleucus I Nicator donated a tiger[31] to the Athenians.

> Since Seleucus sent us here the tigress,
> Which we have seen ourselves; we should repay him,
> And send him a wild animal from us in return,
> A *trygeranos*: because they are not found there.
> (Philemon fr. 49 Kassel–Austin = Ath. XIII 57, 590 A)

The *terminus post quem* for the gift is probably the battle of Ipsos (301 BC)[32]. It may have been a result of the peace made between Seleucus and Chandragupta after which Seleucus, despite losing India, proclaimed himself the victor (306/305 BC)[33]. Most probably, however, the animal came from the Macedonian hunting parks based on the example of the former Persian *paradeisoi*[34]. Nonetheless, no matter where the tiger originally came from, it would still have been associated with India and such a gift fits well into the image of the conqueror of India that Seleucus attempted to create[35]. Kosmin notes a possible significance of the lexical opposition used in the joke here (δεῦρ') – there (αὐτόθι), which unveils the disproportion between the Athenian city-state and the Seleucid Asian empire, and that "Seleucus' faunal sensation deliberately advertised his kingdom's alien, eastern territories"[36]. Mehl goes even further in interpreting the aims of this propaganda by noticing that, firstly, the tiger was to indicate Seleucus' success in India and, secondly, it was to serve as a parallel with the god Dionysos[37]. Considering the fact that ferocious felines were devoted to Dionysos and, more importantly, that the tiger had become a symbol of Dionysos' Indian Triumph, Mehl may have a point. It would not be the only example associating Seleucus with Dionysos.

[31] The gift is attested also by Alexis fr. 207 Kassel–Austin (cf. also Antiphanes fr. 185 Kassel–Austin). Since the two poets, Alexis and Philemon, refer to two different types of tigers (respectively male and female) some scholars suspect that Seleucus in fact gave two tigers to the Athenians, see e.g. Bringmann, Steuben 1995: 49.

[32] Bringmann, Steuben 1995: 49.

[33] Walbank 1992: 123; Kosmin 2014: 117. Perhaps he himself received the tiger during the war with the Indian king Sandrocottos, Sherwin-White, Kuhrt 1993: 93. Moreover, such gifts were established in the Indian tradition (see above, Ael. *NA* XV 14; Curt. IX 30, 1), Bringmann, Steuben 1995: 49 f.

[34] As suggested by Sherwin-White, Kuhrt 1993: 93. Polybius (XXI 29, 1–8) reports that the Macedonian monarchs preserved large hunting grounds due to their passion for hunting. See Bedal 2004: 147.

[35] Sherwin-White, Kuhrt 1993: 93.

[36] Kosmin 2014: 117.

[37] Mehl 1986: 220. According to Megasthenes, Dionysos was the one to civilize India, he was their benefactor, teacher, and inventor (*FGrH* 715 F 12 = Arr. *Ind*. VII 1–9), see Kosmin 2013: 99 f.

Seleucus' victory at Ipsos was followed by the minting of tetradrachms and drachms with Nike on the reverse and a young male in a horned helmet covered with a leopard-skin on the obverse. The representation could be Seleucus or more probably Alexander, assimilated to Dionysos by the god's divine attributes, being perhaps Seleucus' attempt to legitimize the succession of the Iranian provinces[38]. It is hard to gauge the impact of the coin image but, regarding the tiger gift, the literature preserved indications that it was remembered by the Athenians as a symbol of unintelligent brutality[39] and was laughed off in comic plays[40]. Among several other big cats, such as leopards, cheetahs, and lions, no tiger is mentioned in Callixeinus' description of Ptolemy II's *Pompe*, although the lack of its name does not prove the animal's absence. Yet, as opposed to the effects of Seleucus' tiger propaganda, the propaganda of Philadelphus was certainly better perceived.

Of equal importance to the procession itself were those who came to see it. There was a huge ethnic variety in Alexandria in those days: mainland Greeks, Greeks from Asia, Greeks from Cyrene, Kos, Samos, Alexandrian Greeks, Macedonians, native Egyptians[41], Jews[42], Syrians and Phoenicians, to name only the most common nationalities. There was no better place to organize such an event: it was the capital of the Ptolemaic kingdom, Alexander's final resting place, and its suitable location guaranteed a relatively comfortable journey for both travellers from Egypt and overseas[43]. Athenaeus names "incomers" (παρεπίδημοι, Ath. V 25, 196 B), perhaps alluding to such people as "tourists" who had come specifically for this event. Amongst the spectators there were envoys and probably many Greek dignitaries from *poleis* allied with the Ptolemies, for it was common practice in the Greek world to summon *theoroi*[44] from other *poleis* for an organized festival[45]. The dignitaries were probably the main target of the procession[46]. In this way, the *Pompe* was a powerful message that was to be delivered through the mouths and pens of all nations present. What those spectators saw in

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38 Mørkholm 1991: 72. See also Fulińska 2012: 386 f.

39 Webster 1970: 107 f.

40 See note 28.

41 See Delia 1996.

42 For a more detailed discussion of the Jewish diaspora in Ptolemaic Alexandria see Barclay 1996. According to Josephus (*Ap*. II 33–44), a Jewish colony was settled with the foundation of the city by Alexander himself.

43 Strootman 2007: 317. He also points out that "the Grand Procession was a celebration of monarchy and empire, and established Alexandria as the heart of empire" (2007: 320).

44 Dillon 1997: 12, cf. the procession in Daphne where the *theoroi* are named.

45 Rice (1983: 30 f., 77 f.) provides a number of arguments attesting to their presence at the *Pompe*. Rice (1983: 182 f.) also notes the fact that there are decrees of Delphi and Athens agreeing to send their *theoroi* to Alexandrian *Ptolemaieia*.

46 Thompson 2000: 367 f. Hazzard (2000), likewise, assumes that the main target of the pageant were the Greek delegations summoned for the event.

the *Pompe*, be they foreign or Greek subjects, was that the Ptolemies were very wealthy rulers, able to control not only the human world but also the ferocious and uncontrollable world of the animal kingdom[47]. As Coleman formulated the message of the Ptolemies,

> [the *Pompe*] advertised the Ptolemies' wealth via the lavish display of objects of costly material, enormous size, all exhibited in abundant profusion [...], it advertised the Ptolemies' influence in foreign parts via the acquisition and display of foreign species of fauna, it emphasized the link between Alexander and Dionysos by the vivid portrayal of Dionysos' conquest of India and the lavish display of riches associated with that land[48].

From the presence of the birds Coleman draws even further conclusions. According to her thesis, the birds released into the crowds should be linked with the animal gifts of an *erastes* to *eromenos*[49]. In this context they have a comparable function and a parallel symbolism: the spectators who caught a bird should consider it as an endowment from the king, gaining at the same time the king's special favours and blessings[50]. Would it be, therefore, too much to suggest an analogous symbolism of the tiger given by Seleucus to the Athenians? The argument supporting the above question might be a custom, spread among the wealthy Athenians, of giving their lovers not only birds and small pets but also tame cheetahs[51]. This, however, is just a hypothesis.

We can apply, though, a similar pattern when interpreting a lavish feast of Antiochus VIII Grypus[52]:

> Posidonius in book XXVIII of his *Histories* says of king Antiochus Grypus that during the celebrations of the festival in Daphne magnificent receptions took place. At the beginning of each whole units of meat were distributed, and afterwards live geese, hares and gazelles. Posidonius further says that golden wreaths and great amounts of silverware, servants, horses and camels were distributed among the banqueters. Each banqueter had to mount the camel, drink [a toast] and take the camel, and all that was on the camel, and the accompanying slave.
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> (Ath. XII 56, 540 A–B)[53]

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47 Erskine 1995: 44.

48 Coleman 1996: 51.

49 Interesting statements on the gifts of lovers and their symbolism in the context of Greek hunting are made by Barringer 2001.

50 Coleman 1996: 55.

51 Ashmead 1978; Barringer 2001: 73.

52 Before him there is also an account of the feasts of Antiochus Sidetes (Ath. V 47, 210 C–D = Posid. fr. 61 b Edelstein–Kidd [*FGrH* 87 F 9 b]).

53 Ath. XII 56, 540 A–B = Posid. fr. 72 a Edelstein–Kidd (*FGrH* 87 F 21 a) and Ath. V 46, 210 E = Posid. fr. 72 b Edelstein–Kidd (*FGrH* 87 F 21 b).

The gifts[54] of horses and more exotic camels along with their load were to show the wealth of the monarch and his extravagance. Camels were widely used in trade, but Antiochus III employed camel corps in the battle of Magnesia (190 BC)[55]. Other animals so generously distributed by the king, geese, hares and gazelles, can be compared to the birds released by Ptolemy in his *Pompe*, for geese and hares also constituted the traditional set of gifts of *erastes* to *eromenos*. A gazelle could be thus a substitute of the traditional metaphor of an *eromenos* to a pursued fawn[56]. A few centuries later Cassius Dio called this a barbaric custom[57] to give live animals at a feast, but animal gift-giving inspired by the Eastern and Hellenistic examples entered to the Roman courts[58].

One must also draw attention to the message carried by the character of the animals in Ptolemy's Great Procession. Many savage animals were also present in the procession and all had been tamed. Lions and leopards walked peacefully with people and other creatures in the parade! This detail underlines Philadelphus' power to control Nature, and in consequence also the world[59], again serving as a link with Dionysos who, from the very beginning of his cult, was represented as having control over ferocious animals[60]. Tame felines as a means of royal propaganda and a display of power were not a new theme. Already the Egyptian Pharaoh Ramses II had a lion-pet which he took to the battlefield with him and used when fighting his enemies[61]. In the Greek realm, wild cats like leopards and lions, a number of which were displayed in the procession, were especially sacred to Dionysos[62]. This connection was applied by the Greco-Bactrian king

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[54] The feast most probably took place during the years of peace in the Seleucid kingdom (121–115/114 BC), Kidd 1999: 138; Kidd 2004: 231 f.

[55] Livy XXXVII 40, 12; Sherwin-White, Kuhrt 1993: 56.

[56] Barringer 2001: 88; Pl. *Chrm*. 155 D–E.

[57] Cass. Dio LXXVII 1, 2.

[58] See e.g. Suet. *Nero* 11, 2. Nero's munificence is one of many Roman examples in which animals are part of the lavish lifestyle and propaganda. But the fragmentary Hellenistic instances show its origins, Coleman 1996.

[59] Coleman (1996: 58 f.) believes that the wild beasts in the *Pompe* were exhibited for purely "decorative" reasons, and I must disagree with this statement due to the reason mentioned above, that the beasts were under human control. Nevertheless, she recognizes the complexity of their appearance in the propaganda. Coleman's statement resembles that of Rice (1983: 86), who writes that the main reason for the display of exotic species in the *Pompe* was Philadelphus' intention of showing royal interest in wild animals and science along with his desire to boast the multitude and variety of his zoological collection. Strootman (2007: 324), on the contrary, distinguishes their role in Ptolemy's attempt to claim authority over Alexander's legacy.

[60] There are numerous archaic and classical vases showing Dionysos accompanied by felines. The association is also clear in a dithyramb of Pindar describing the Dionysian cult (*Dith.* 70 b). See also Shelton 2007: 114 f.

[61] Diod. Sic. I 48.

[62] Rice 1983: 86.

Fig. 1: Alloy bilingual coin of king Agathocles, British Museum, *BMC* India (Greek & Scythic), p. 11.10. Photo: © Trustees of the British Museum.

Agathocles, who issued coins with Dionysos and a panther on them. Those destined only for the Greeks had a bust of Dionysos on the obverse and a panther on the reverse[63]. The bilingual ones were minted with the image of an Indian goddess Subhadra (Krishna’s sister) and a Brahmi inscription: “of king Agathocles” on the obverse, whereas on the reverse there figured a panther and a Greek version of the same inscription (fig. 1)[64]. For the Greeks the connection of Agathocles and Dionysos was clear, especially regarding the myth according to which Dionysos conquered Bactria[65]. This was a symbol of the legitimization of his kingship in the region.

## THE ELEPHANT KINGS

Of all the exotic animals used in the Hellenistic period as means of propaganda the most significant position belonged to elephants. The elephant became

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[63] Agathocles was the first of the Graeco-Bactrian kings to begin minting bilingual coins, Mørkholm 1991: 182.

[64] British Museum, registration no. 1844,0909.9 = *BMC* India (Greek & Scythic) p. 11.10. See a parallel coin in the British Museum collection: registration nos. IOC.17 = *BMC* India (Greek & Scythic) p. 11.13; CM IOC.16. Bilingual coins were also issued by Agathocles’ brother (or son) Pantaleon and are called the “pedigree coins”.

[65] Eurip. *Bacch.* 15. See also another coin of Agathocles with Dionysos on the reverse and a panther on the obverse in the British Museum, registration no. IOC.15 = *BMC* India (Greek & Scythic) p. 11.8. Another “animal” type of coins issued by Agathocles was an elephant-panther one (on the obverse and reverse respectively), e.g. British Museum collection registration no. 1838, EIC. 112 = *BMC* India (Ancient) 85, p. 224.

a symbol of military victory several decades before the *Pompe*. Alexander, after his victory over Poros (326 BC), issued medallions commemorating this event, as proved by F.L. Holt, being probably *aristeiai*, or rewards for the battle veterans[66]. Some of the medallions depict on the obverse a warrior on a horse with a spear fighting two men mounting an elephant[67] – Alexander defeating Poros – and on the reverse a man holding a spear in one hand and a thunderbolt in the other – interpreted as Zeus, the deified Alexander[68]. The same event also served Ptolemy I in his propaganda. The monarch issued ca. 320 BC tetradrachms with Alexander wearing an elephant-scalp. Undoubtedly, the scalp referred to Alexander's Indian campaigns, especially his victory over Poros, and alluded to Ptolemy's victory over Perdiccas' elephants[69]. Alonso Troncoso noted that the scalp must have been seen as a war trophy of a terrible beast which, despite its strength, was defeated[70]. This image adapted by Ptolemy carried a message, which was the heroic power of the Egyptian ruler. Since these tetratrachms were to replace those bearing Alexander-Heracles/Zeus connotations minted during Alexander's lifetime, the elephant scalp was to be seen as a parallel of the lion scalp worn by Heracles[71]. Later on, Demetrius I Anicetos copied this model on his coins in the Bactrian coinage from the beginning of his reign[72]. By adopting Alexander's headdress in his own image, he claimed Alexander's legacy. Yet Ptolemy I, to strengthen his message, transmitted the elephant symbolism to coinage once more. Ca. 305/304 golden staters with elephant quadrigas pulling Alexander's chariot were minted[73], bearing symbolism reused a few decades later in Philadelphus' *Pompe*: they depicted the Macedonian conqueror in his victory over the Indians and his heroic power to subdue Nature[74]. At the same time, Seleucus Nicator, being engaged in a war with

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66 Holt 2003: 147.

67 British Museum, museum no. 1887,0609.1, catalogue no. GC28p191.61 = *BMC* Greek (Arabia) 61, p. 191. A similar medallion with a man crowned by Nike on the recto and two men mounted on an elephant fighting a cavalry man, see museum no. 1926,0402.1; PCG IV.A.4. Holt 2003: 53, 61.

68 Arrian (V 12, 3) describes this battle as being carried out after a strong storm with thunderstorm, a visible sign of Zeus' protection, Holt 2003: 153.

69 Alonso Troncoso 2013: 257. The date 320 BC for the first issue of the coins, as supposed by certain scholars (Alonso Troncoso 2013: 256–267 with references), follows the abduction of Alexander's body, preventing his Syrian funeral, and its burial in Memphis.

70 Alonso Troncoso 2013: 256. He also contrasts the symbolism of the elephant as used by the Successors with the elephants adorning Alexander's hearse (Diod. Sic. XVIII 27) where the animals stood for "multiethnic military power". A detailed examination of the symbolism of the elephant scalp in coins is also conducted by J. Maritz (2004).

71 Stewart 1993: 235. For a whole discussion on the symbolism of the elephant scalp see ibid. 233–236, esp. 233, nn. 13 and 14. Alonso Troncoso 2013: 257.

72 British Museum coins, reg. no. 1904,0407.20; Bopearachchi 1991: 164.

73 E.g. British Museum coins, reg. no. 1897,0104.508.

74 Alonso Troncoso 2013: 262.

the Mauryan kingdom, issued tetradrachms showing Alexander in the elephant quadriga. The mint certainly alluded to Seleucus' victory over Chandragupta and the acquisition of a large number of elephants ca. 305 BC[75]. Kosmin spotted that in Megasthenes' account of this event the giving of the elephants to Seleucus by Chandragupta figures as an acknowledgement of his royal status. Owing to this treaty and its image through Megasthenes' words, the elephants of Chandragupta were turned into a visual symbol of the Seleucid kingdom and power. "To think Seleucid was to see elephants"[76]. The image and the elephant victory symbolism created by the Diadochoi was further copied by Ptolemy II in his *Pompe*[77]. The elephant-scalp motive was much more broadly used in the monetary propaganda of the rulers, and generally it is to be comprehended as a symbol of Hellenistic kingship[78]. Therefore, another propagandist message of Ptolemaic power could have been transferred via the elephant chariots in the *Pompe*. The symbol of India was subjugated as it had formerly been done with the country itself by Dionysos and Alexander[79].

According to Callixeinus' record, statues of Dionysos and a Satyr were seated on a (possibly artificial)[80] elephant and were followed by twenty-four chariots driven by elephants. How many animals actually was this? E. Rice in her monograph has calculated it by multiplying the number of elephants yoked to each quadriga and adding the remaining individual, which gives a total number of 97 elephants in the parade[81]. She *ipso facto* contradicts the calculations made by Scullard, who assumes that there was only one elephant yoked to each quadriga, giving the total number of 25 elephants[82]. In the context of listing the numbers of animals paraded in the *Pompe*, the expression ἐλεφάντων ἅρματα [...] εἴκοσι τέτταρα (24 quadrigae of elephants) should be understood as a way of enumerating the animals, i.e. as 24 x 4 elephants[83]. Four elephants pulling a chariot are standard as well in the Hellenistic coinage[84]. Thus there is no reason to suppose that only one elephant was pulling each chariot. Rice also noticed that such number of creatures

75 Howgego 1995: 66; Sherwin-White, Kuhrt 1993: 12. Strabo XV 2, 9; Plut. *Alex*. 62.

76 Kosmin 2013: 105.

77 Stewart 1993: 236.

78 Maritz 2004: 48.

79 Shelton 2007: 114.

80 Scullard 1974: 124 f.

81 Rice 1983: 90 f.

82 Scullard 1974: 125. Nonetheless, his arguments are not fully convincing. Cf. Burstein (2008: 145), who, like Rice, concludes that Ptolemy had at least 96 elephants.

83 See the quoted passage of the description above.

84 E.g. a coin of Ptolemy Soter (British Museum registration no. 1897,0104.508), or Seleucus I's drachm with Athena driving the elephant quadriga (British Museum coin registration no. 1994,0915.77).

could not possibly have been inherited by Ptolemy I from Alexander, and that those elephants could not have come as booty from battles with the Diadochoi, for they would not have survived until the beginning of the third century BC. Thus Ptolemy II must have obtained new elephants for the procession and certainly not from India, to which he had little access through the hostile territories of the Seleucid kingdom, but from Africa[85]. This means that in 279/278 Philadelphus could not have had almost 100 elephants in his possession, not to mention the tamed and trained ones. This fact forces the establishment of a later date for the *Pompe*. Foertmeyer[86] in her article devoted to this problem concludes that we should date the *Pompe* to the time of the second *Ptolemaieia* which took place at Alexandria ca. December 275 and February 274 BC and which were actually established by Ptolemy II as a penteteric festival in 279/278[87]. She also supports the theory that the procession was a military mobilization for a war (the First Syrian War in 274 BC), which would confirm her date. However, 275/274 was still too early for Ptolemy to gather 100 elephants, especially taking into account that he did not begin his elephant hunts before the end of the First Syrian War, i.e. ca. 271 BC, which becomes our *terminus post quem*. Since the procession must have taken place before the death of Arsinoe II[88], the *terminus ante quem* is July 268 BC[89]. J.M. Burstein notices that the early date in the 270s for the *Pompe* does not correspond with the Nubian tribute displayed in the pageant, and such a tribute is recorded in Pithom Stele dated ca. 270 and is related to Ptolemy's Nubian campaign[90]. Moreover, the *Pompe*, with its precious items and tribute bearers and most of all the elephants, is an image of a triumphal return from a conquest of distant lands. It is a parallel to the conquest of Alexander and of Dionysos, hence their images are highlighted in the festival. Philadelphus conquered Nubia as Dionysos and Alexander conquered India. From the African hinterland other animals, like giraffe and rhinoceros, were brought along with the elephants. Ptolemy would then incorporate his triumphal conquest with the celebration of *Ptolemaieia*. The

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85 Scullard 1974 and more recent research of Casson 1993 and Burstein 2008.

86 Foertmeyer 1998.

87 Thompson 2000: 381–388 revises the theories regarding the date of the *Pompe* and herself supports the date of 279/278 on the basis of papyri attesting to the organization of penteteric festivals.

88 Callixeinus speaks of both the king and queen as being alive (Ath. V 27, 197 D).

89 Foertmeyer also establishes the death of Arsinoe II (at the time she wrote her article was dated to 270) as *terminus ante quem*. Recent research has proved the date of Arsinoe's death to be 268, see Carney 2013: 104. The date of 275/274 for the Grand Procession is also supported by Hölbl (2001: 38 ff.) and it agrees with the period estimated by Rice (1983: 187) between the years 279–275. The dating by Hazzard (2000: 66) is very different. He assumes that the *Pompe* took place about January 25, 262. Hazzard based this assumption on the analysis of the use of cognomens of the Ptolemaic kings and their dating compared with those appearing in the text by Callixeinus, but on the basis of the above mentioned argument of Arsinoe II's death, Hazzard's proposition must be rejected.

90 Burstein 2008: 140, n. 78.

most reasonable date for the *Pompe* would therefore occur between 270 and 268 BC. The *Pompe* could have been a display of power before the Chremonidean War against Antigonus Gonatas. But to an even greater extent, it could be an addendum to the victorious (although quite unexpectedly[91]) for Ptolemy First Syrian War, and also testify to his ambition to have an equal number of war elephants as those of Antiochus, who owed his elephant legacy to his father Seleucus I Nicator[92], known as ελεφαντάρχης[93] (Master of the Elephants). Parallel to the epithet of Nicator, Philadelphus, along with the establishment of the elephant hunts, incorporated the elephant scalp headdress into his own image. The British Museum holds a bronze statuette of the naked king with an elephant scalp and holding a club (fig. 2)[94]. There is no

Fig. 2: Bronze statuette of Ptolemy II Philadelphus and his wife Berenice, 3rd c. BC, British Museum, Registration no. 1849,0517.1, museum no. EA38442. Photo: © Trustees of the British Museum.

[91] Hölbl 2001: 40.

[92] I must disagree with Rice on this point. Rice (1983: 90) states that "the presence of the animals must be seen against their strategic military role in the third century". If the elephants were part of Dionysos' Indian Triumph which, as all in Alexandria were aware, directly related to Alexander's invasion of Asia, they could not be derived from their role in war connotations. The elephants were not only the booty of the distant conquests that Alexander/Dionysos brought, but they were one of their means of conquering distant lands. Moreover, the Ptolemaic Dynasty made elaborate efforts to rival the Seleucids with their elephant troops, Epplett 2007: 223.

[93] Plut. *Demetr*. 25. Seleucus owned five hundred elephants at the time of the battle of Ipsos in 301 BC (if we can believe the numbers recorded by Strabo XV 2, 9; XVI 2, 10 and Plut. *Alex.* 62, 2), while other Diadochoi had: Ptolemy at least 43, Cassander 40, Antigonus 75 (later taken by Seleucus), and Lysimachus probably none before the battle of Ipsos; Scullard 1974: 97 f.

[94] Registration no. 1849,0517.1, museum no. EA38442. The statuette of Philadelphus is accompanied by a statuette of his sister-wife Arsinoe holding a cornucopia. Together the images of the monarchs were to imply the power and abundance of Egypt.

precise date for the statuette, the heroic effigy of Philadelphus, and it is not certain whether it could have referred to his elephant expeditions, but it definitely played a role in creating his victorious image.

Elephants, beginning with the battle at Gaugamela in 331 BC[95], were used in battles of the Hellenistic period. The Diadochoi and their successors fought many wars in which they used elephants. In 321 BC, Perdiccas invaded Egypt and besieged Ptolemy using elephant corps to recapture Alexander's body (Diod. XVIII 33, 6–25). The following year also brought an elephant encounter between the Succesors: Antigonus used them against Eumenes in Cappadocia (Diod XVIII 40, 7) and the two kings later fought with the beasts against each other in the battle at Gabiene (317/316 BC, Diod. XIX)[96], not to mention the Battle of Ipsos[97]: "In the battle the elephants of Antigonus and of Lysimachus were fighting as if they were equally equipped by nature with courage and strength" (Diod. XXI 1, 2).

War was the main reason for gaining elephants in the kingdoms of Alexander's successors[98], and acquiring a new specimen became a must for the monarchs[99]. It was not only for their practical role in battle, but also for the image created solely by their presence, since as Diodorus notes, only the employment of elephants caused fear in the opponents (Diod. XIX 15, 5). Again Diodorus (XVIII 70, 4) relates:

> The fame of the royal army's greatness and the great amount of the accompanying elephants, which are considered as irresistible in their strength and the attack force of their bodies, was widespread.

Although the historian refers here to Polyperchon's army supported by elephant corps when it was approaching Megalopolis, the statement can easily refer to the Hellenistic monarchs in general, and vocalizes what they wished their armies to be.

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[95] Arrian, *Anab.* III 8, 6. This battle was possibly the first encounter of the Greeks with the war elephants, although they knew these animals much earlier. They are mentioned e.g. by Plato (*Hp. mai.* 290 B; *Leg*. 956 A) and Ctesias (*FGrH* 688 F 45).

[96] For more details on the Successors' battles with the use of elephants see Diod. Sic. XVIII; XIX; XX 73, 113.

[97] The battle was probably a turning point in the exploitation of elephants in war (Scullard 1974: 98 f.), and of their image (Alonso Troncoso 2013: 261). As for the latter, Alonso Troncoso notices that the mints of Asia Minor widely begun to issue coins commemorating Seleucus' success in those territories, combining the Seleucid symbols with elephant emblems.

[98] All the Hellenistic kings considered elephants to be substantial factors in their armies, Burstein 2008: 140. According to Epplett 2007: 209, the Greeks discovered the possibility of applying elephants into battles even before 326 BC – Alexander's battle against Poros on the Hydaspes.

[99] As Diodorus relates, Eumenes obtained a new specimen from India for the war with Antigonus (Diod. Sic. XIX 15, 5).

The military significance of the elephant unravels also from an inscription engraved at the beginning of the Third Syrian War (246–241 BC) during Ptolemy III's reign. It is passed down to us by the sixth century monk and traveller Cosmas Indicopleustes[100] and depicts Ptolemy III as a successful monarch occupying a large part of the Seleucid kingdom, and who surpasses their strength with the elephants he and his father hunted in the African hinterland and trained for war. Ptolemy III's power is symbolized by subduing the African elephants and the defeat of the Indian species (belonging to the Seleucids) which enabled him to conquer Asia[101].

The Ptolemaic propaganda definitely worked and Philadelphus' *Pompe* was recorded especially for its splendour and innovativeness. But it was not the only example of Hellenistic propaganda in which elephants were displayed in a parade, although it was the most exciting one. We have a record of another procession, mounted by Antiochus IV Epiphanes at Daphne in 166 BC after the campaign in Egypt and before his expedition to the East. Antiochus' aim in staging the festival was to surpass the Roman games organized by Aemilius Paulus in Macedonia[102]. Hence not only a display of animals, but also hunts and combats were organised there. Other elements of his festival are parallel to those included by Ptolemy. As the ancient sources attest[103] there were personifications of Night and Day – certainly an allusion to the Horai and Eniautos that appeared in Dionysos' Indian Triumph, signifying the life span of a year. As for the animal aspect of the propaganda, as has already been said, one of the crucial features of Antiochus' procession was the display of military elephants – 42 specimens altogether: some yoked to war chariots, others carrying equipment. This may also be seen as the continuation of rivalry with the Ptolemies on acquiring elephant corps. Ptolemy VI Philometer, who reigned in Egypt at the time of the Antioch festival, is known to have pursued the tradition of African elephant hunts[104]. Antiochus displayed 42 animals, which in comparison with the numbers presented by his predecessors

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[100] *OGIS* 54.

[101] Kosmin 2013: 107. Kosmin writes that the inscription purposefully contrasts the origin of the elephants (Africa and India) to underline the territories acquired by Ptolemy III.

[102] Edmondson (1999: esp. 85–89) compares Antiochus' *pompe* with two Roman triumphs that occurred within eighteen months, those of the already mentioned Aemilius Paulus in 167 BC and Anicius Gallus in 166 BC. He goes even further and argues that the entire Daphne festival was borrowed from the Roman triumphal tradition. He does not consider that it is the Roman triumph which is derived from the Hellenistic festivals, see Strootman 2007: 308 f., n. 176. It is worth noting, as assumed by Erskine (2013: esp. 38, 47 f.) that we should distinguish between the Hellenistic *pompai* (especially of Ptolemy and Antiochus IV) and the Roman triumphs. The latter could not exist without a military victory. The former visualised the idea of a triumph rather than an actual triumph itself.

[103] Polybius XXX 25, 1–26, 4; Ath. V 22, 194 C–195 F (Athenaeus, however, follows Polybius). The event is also mentioned by Diodorus (XXXI 16) who also bases his account on Polybius.

[104] Perhaps he was also the one who established bases west of Cape Guardafui, Casson 1993: 256, n. 35.



Fig. 3: Coin of Antiochus IV Epiphanes, 2001,1201.7769, 175BC–164BC, British Museum. Photo: © Trustees of the British Museum.

does not seem a large quantity. The cause of this situation was the growth of the Parthian kingdom and the expansion of the Graeco-Bactrian kingdom under the rule of Demetrius I in the 180s BC. Presumably, the former satrapies cut off the Seleucids from their Indian supplies of war elephants, at least via the land routes. In consequence, over a hundred years after the Great Procession, it was the Seleucids who were (partially) isolated from their Indian elephant supplies[105]. But Antiochus IV had probably found a resolution to this problem. Pliny records that Aniochus initiated the exploration of the coast of the Euphrates (*NH* VI 147). The king also established a mint at Antioch on the Erythrean Sea, which became the main point for the maritime trade with India in the Persian Gulf[106]. In Tyre Epiphanes issued coins showing Demeter and the elephant's head with a galley's prow[107] (fig. 3), a combination which might attest to the acquisition of those animals via the sea. In view of this possible alteration of the elephant trade route, ca. forty elephants was not such a small amount[108]. Apart from the live animals eight hundred tusks were also carried. The Daphne festival had two main recipients of the propaganda message: the Romans, who took a great number of the Seleucids elephant corps upon the treaty in Magnesia in 190 BC upon which the Seleucids were to stop the upkeep of the elephants[109]. The other recipient was the Ptolemies,

[105] Therefore, according to Scullard (1974: 186), it is not certain where the elephants of Antiochus IV came from.

[106] Mørkholm 1991: 178.

[107] British Museum, museum no. 2001,1201.7769, 175BC–164BC; acquired in 2001.

[108] One also has to bear in mind the treaty of Apamea with Rome in 188 BC. One of its stipulations regulated that the Seleucids must surrender their war elephants to the Romans, Livy, XXXVIII 38, 8; App. *Syr.* 38, after Epplett 2007: 225. The presence of the elephant troops, proving that he had not obeyed the conditions of the treaty, was therefore a very significant message of Antiochus' power and a rejection of the hegemony of the Romans, Strootman 2007: 312, n. 194.

[109] App. *Syr.* 38.

whom Antiochus had invaded a few years earlier with his elephant force[110]. He managed then to bring some booty from Egypt, which helped Antiochus to pay for the festival[111]. F.W. Walbank suggested that one of Antiochus' aims was to repair his reputation, damaged after the humiliating ultimatum in Eleusis in 168 BC which was presented by a Roman politician, Popillius Laenas[112].

Although in the descriptions of the festival we do not hear of any other beasts named as participating in the procession, the passage ends with a laconic statement that during the thirty-day festival there were many beast fights[113]. Does this mean that Antiochus was not mighty enough to tame the beasts and thus they were absent from the pageant, waiting only in special *loci* for their fate? Or perhaps their presence seemed obvious or uninteresting to Polybius, who underlines that he does not describe everything that happened during the procession? The absence of wild and exotic animals from the descriptions of Antiochus' procession and festival does not necessarily mean they did not appear in it. Considering the circumstances of the emulation between rulers in splendour and military power, the assumption of their presence seems closer to the truth[114]. It is rather unlikely that the games indicated by Polybius as κυνηγέσια were *venationes*, since at the time of Antiochus' procession staged hunts did not occur as Roman entertainment. Combined with gladiatorial games, *venationes* appeared in Rome in the late Republic at the earliest[115]. The κυνηγέσια could, however, be hunts as in the Macedonian court, which was influenced by the Persian tradition. Daphne was known to possess a beautiful *paradeisos* at the time, in which the festival was probably being held[116].

The result of Epiphanes' festival propaganda was partially achieved – the king displayed his military power and the wealth for which he was indeed admired – but his behaviour during the feast gave him the epithet *Epimanes* (insane)[117].

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[110] 1 *Macc*. 1, 17.

[111] Polyb. XXIX 27, 1–13; Livy XIV 12, 3–8; Diod. Sic. XXXI 2; Walbank 2002: 87.

[112] Walbank 2002: 86; Polyb. XXIX 27, 1–13; Livy XIV 12, 3–8; Diod. Sic. XXXI 2. This opinion is shared by Edmondson 1999.

[113] Ἐπιτελεσθέντων δὲ τῶν ἀγώνων καὶ μονομαχιῶν καὶ κυνηγεσίων κατὰ τριάκονθ' ἡμέρας, ἐν αἷς τὰς θέας συνετέλει, Polyb. XXX 26, 1 = Ath. V 22–24, 194 C–195 F. Peculiarly Diod. Sic. XXXI 16 does not mention the gladiatorial games or hunts and, therefore, some scholars assume that the final statement quoted in Athenaeus' account is his or Polybius' addition and colouring of the actual event; see Erskine 2013: 51 and Carter 2001: 60 f., who, in his article devoted to the μονομάχοι of this procession, concludes that the statement καὶ κυνηγεσίων is an addition made by Athenaeus, since at the time he wrote his *Deipnosophistai* gladiatorial combats and *venationes* went together.

[114] Carter 2001: 52.

[115] Carter 2001: 52.

[116] Strabo XVI 2, 6; Bedal 2004: 152.

[117] Ath. V 24 f., 195 F–196 B. For the "insane" behaviour of the king in a ritual context and Dionysian association see Iossif 2011.

## FINAL REMARKS

The role of animals in the propaganda of the Hellenistic monarchy is clearly dividable into two streams. First, there were elephants – the symbol of universal power. The number of elephants signified the military might of the king and his capability of conquering distant lands. To this we can add other wild beasts, like tame felines in the *Pompe*, and Seleucus' tiger associated with Dionysos. They also provided links to the legitimacy of dynastic successions by evoking gods and heroes. Thus, the power of the monarchs was displayed by using the symbols of powerful animals or, when possible, live animals. When looking at the animal propaganda of the Hellenistic rulers against the background of Euroasian history[118] a clear pattern emerges of a relationship between wilderness and power. The establishing of kingship demands conquering and subduing. Thus hunting, slaying, and taming wild beasts becomes a universal metaphor of ruling. Such images incorporated to media like coins gained another symbolic dimension. Those tokens recorded the royal message to spread it throughout their kingdoms. The other category consists of rather familiar animals, but again, bearing some symbolic connotations. The king was to appear as someone who takes care of his people with love and affection. By placing animals along with other precious items, a ruler was trying to buy himself into his guests' favours. The two streams were complimentary in displaying the generosity and the power of the monarchs towards their people. The Hellenistic period therefore becomes a peculiar time when animals enter the politics in Greece and Rome to a great extent, which is another exotic feature incorporated by the Greek culture from the East.

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# DIE RHETORISCHEN FRAGEN IN DER RÖMISCHEN THEORIE DER BEREDSAMKEIT

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ABSTRACT: This paper discusses the function of rhetorical questions in the Roman theory of elocution. Roman rhetoricians divided these questions into two main issues: the rational-persuasive and the emotional-persuasive figures of speech. *Subiectio* and *ratiocinatio* belong to the first category, whereas *dubitatio* and *ratiocinatio* to the second one.

Die rhetorischen Fragen nahmen in der antiken Theorie der Beredsamkeit unter den so genannten *figurae sententiarum*, und zwar den rhetorischen Denkfiguren[1], den zentralen Platz ein. Im vorliegenden Beitrag soll untersucht werden, welche Bedeutung die antiken Redetheoretiker diesen figuralen Ausdrücken zuschrieben; entweder bildeten diese Figuren ein einfaches, homogenes Mittel der stilistischen Gestaltung, oder sie teilten sich in mehrere Unterarten, abhängig von dem Zusammenhang, in welchem sie gebraucht werden konnten. Wir legen unseren Untersuchungen hauptsächlich zwei Vertreter der römischen Rhetorik zugrunde: den Autor der Abhandlung *Rhetorik an Herennius* und Quintilian. Wo es nötig ist, berufen wir uns auch auf Cicero und die *Rhetores Latini Minores*.

Quintilian setzt die rhetorischen Fragen an den ersten Platz unter den Denkfiguren[2]. Er bestimmt sie als die Frage, die wir stellen, nicht um eine neue Mitteilung zu erhalten, sondern um unseren Standpunkt zu unterstreichen („quotiens non suscitandi gratia adsumitur, sed instandi“, IX 2, 7). Eine solche Definition stimmt mit der Meinung der gegenwärtigen Sprachwissenschaft überein, die als *differentia specifica* dieser *schemata* zumeist die Tatsache benennt,

[1] Die alten Autoren unterschieden zwischen Denkfiguren und Sprachfiguren. Die Denkfiguren wurden allerdings für aussagekräftiger als die Sprachfiguren gehalten. Diese Tendenz ist deutlich bei Quintilian zu sehen: „Ut vero natura prius est concipere animo res quam enuntiare, ita de iis figuris ante est loquendum quae ad mentem pertinent quarum quidem utilitas cum magna tum multiplex in nullo non orationis opere vel clarissime lucet“ (IX 1, 19). Vgl. Stroh 2011: 260.

[2] Lausberg (1960: 376) rechnet die rhetorischen Fragen zu den sogenannten Figuren der Publikumszugewandheit. Außer den rhetorischen Fragen nennt er hier noch *obsecratio*, *licentia* und Apostrophe.

dass der Fragende keine Antwort erwartet, da sie ja für alle offensichtlich ist[3]. Manche Forscher nennen als ein charakteristisches Merkmal dieser Figur z.B. eine Umkehrung von Assertion und Negation[4], die Präsupposition oder die Konversationsimplikatur[5]. In der antiken Theorie wurden die rhetorischen Fragen für ein sehr hilfreiches Überzeugungsmittel gehalten, das dem Redner erlaubte, den Zuhörer von seiner Meinung zu überzeugen. Obgleich nicht jede *interrogatio* sich mit einer großen Kraft auszeichnet, wie der Autor der ältesten erhaltenen lateinischen rhetorischen Abhandlung, der *Rhetorik an Herennius*, zugesteht, so vermag sie doch beträchtlich unsere Argumente zu verstärken: „Interrogatio non omnis gravis est neque concinna, sed haec, quae cum enumerata sunt ea, quae obsunt causae adversariorum, confirmat superiorem orationem" (IV 22). *Interrogatio* wurde also als ein fundamentales rhetorisches Mittel angesehen, dessen man sich bedient, um einen Standpunkt zu verstärken und zugleich den Gesichtspunkt des Gegners abzuschwächen.

* * *

Wir wenden uns nun der Klassifizierung der rhetorischen Fragen zu, erörtern also das Problem, in welche Arten diese von den antiken Theoretikern der Redekunst unterteilt wurden. Die folgende Klassifizierung dieser Fragen ist nur eine der möglichen Gliederungen, der als Unterscheidungskriterium die Funktion dieser Figuren zugrunde gelegt wird[6]. Zunächst sollen die zur logischen Persuasion in Beziehung stehenden *interrogationes* analysiert werden. Als Erstes untersuchen wir die *subiectio*, wobei wir auf die folgenden Fragen eine Antwort zu geben versuchen: Wodurch zeichnen sich die Fragen aus der Gruppe *subiectio* aus und wie funktionieren sie?[7]. Die modernen Forscher betonen, dass *subiectio* aus einer Reihe von Fragen besteht – der Hauptfrage und den darauf folgenden ausführlichen Fragen[8]. Die genaue Bedeutung des Terminus *subiectio* ist

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[3] Vgl. Lausberg 1960: 379; Stati 1982: 195; Rhebock 1984: 156; Schöpsdau 1996: 445.

[4] Rhetorische Fragen zwingen durch den Negationsträger Zustimmung auf und umgekehrt. Die Frage: „Haben wir dir das denn nicht schon oft gesagt?" bedeutet z.B., dass wir es ganz gewiss schon oft gesagt haben. Die Frage: „Hast du uns wenigstens einmal aufmerksam zugehört?" hingegen unterstellt, dass der Befragte es nie getan hat. Vgl. Grésillon 1980: 277; Rhebock 1984: 156; Schöpsdau 1996: 445.

[5] Vgl. Meibauer 1986: 160.

[6] Andere Klassifizierungen untergliedern die rhetorischen Fragen im Hinblick auf die Antworten, die sie suggerieren, oder auf ihre Funktionen. Vgl. Rowe 1997: 139 f.; Schöpsdau 1996: 448 f.

[7] Die hier angegebenen lateinischen Begriffe werden wegen der großen Verwirrung, die in der antiken Nomenklatur der rhetorischen Figuren herrschte, oft mit anderen, nicht immer fragenden Figuren gleichgesetzt. In der vorliegenden Arbeit werden wir sie stets adäquat zu den analysierten *interrogationes* interpretieren. Zur Fachsprache der rhetorischen Figuren vgl. etwa Clarke 1968: 50.

[8] Schöpsdau (1996: 446) gibt die folgende Definition: „Bei der sog. *subiectio* folgen auf eine allgemeine Frage, die der Redner an sich selbst oder an den Gegner richtet, mehrere (als Antwort fungierende) spezielle Fragen; die in diesen Einzelfragen vorgebrachten Antworten, Vorschläge, Einwürfe usw. weist der Redner von seinem Standpunkt aus sofort als untriftig, undurchführbar usw.

„Hinstellen“ oder „Hinzufügen“, also das suggestive Aufdrängen eines logischen Konzepts und der Lösung desselben durch die selbst beantworteten Fragen. Der Autor der *Rhetorik an Herennius* schenkt den sich aus diesen Fragen ergebenden Schlussfolgerungen eine größere Aufmerksamkeit und entscheidet nicht, ob sie in der Form von weiteren Fragen oder Behauptungen auftreten (IV 33):

> Subiectio est, cum interrogamus adversarios aut quaerimus ipsi, quid ab illis aut quid contra nos dici possit, deinde subicimus, id quod oportet dici aut non oportet aut nobis adiumento futurum sit aut illis obfuturum sit e contrario.

Die *subiectio* ist also eine Methode der rationellen Beeinflussung der Hörer – wir leiten eine Aussage mit einer Frage ein, die wir dann gleich selbst beantworten, natürlich auf eine Art und Weise, die uns für uns selbst am günstigsten und für den Gegner am ungünstigsten erscheint[9]. Im Fall der *subiectio* ist die Begriffsbestimmung, mit der die rhetorischen Fragen als *interrogatio sine responsione* bezeichnet werden, nicht adäquat, weil die Antwort, wenn auch nicht vom Zuhörer, so doch vom Fragenden gegeben wird. Bei dieser Art von Fragen handelt es sich also darum, dem Gegner die Waffe aus der Hand zu nehmen und, indem man den feindlichen Vorwürfen vorgreift, auf dieser Grundlage die eigene Argumentation vorzubereiten. Die gestellte Frage ist hier eine Strategie, die nicht auf den Erhalt einer Information abzielt, sondern auf ein meisterhaft durchdachtes Spiel mit dem Auditorium oder dem Gegenspieler[10].

Der Autor erläutert diese Figur auch an Beispielen. In einem davon führt er die Fragen und Antworten vor, die der Verteidigung eines Mannes (eines Betrügers, Diebes), der nicht ehrlich zu seinem großen Vermögen gekommen ist, vorgreifen (alle Zitate IV 33). Der Autor beginnt mit einer einleitenden Frage, die in die ganze Abfolge der in der verwendeten Subjektion auftretenden *interrogationes* und *responsiones* einführt: „Quaero igitur unde iste tam pecuniosus factus sit?“ Die grundlegende Frage ist also: „Woher hat dieser Mann so viel Geld?“ Indem der Autor die nächste Frage stellt, versucht er das Problem zu lösen und erreicht möglicherweise dadurch, den irreführenden Antworten des Angeklagten zuvorzukommen. Er fragt also weiter: „Amplum patrimonium relictum est?“, doch

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zurück“. Lausberg (1960: 381) legt dagegen größeren Nachdruck auf die Bedeutung der auf diese Fragen folgenden Antworten.

[9] Ähnlich wie im Fall anderer Figuren ist die *subiectio* in der antiken Rhetorik nicht eindeutig bestimmt. Im *Carmen de figuris* (31) wird sie mit dem griechischen Begriff ἀπόκρισις wiedergegeben. Quintilian (IX 2, 15) nennt sie *schema per suggestionem*, Tiberios (*Fig.* 77, 5) gebraucht den Terminus ὑποφορά oder ἀνθυποφορά. Über *subiectio* vgl. auch Schwitalla 1984: 132.

[10] Stroh (2011: 124 f.) beschreibt folgendermaßen die Verwendung der *subiectio* in Isaios’ Rede *Über die Erbe des Menekles*: „Es handelt sich um die später sogenannte *hypophora (subiectio)*, bei der auf eine rhetorische Frage [...] verschiedene alternative Antworten gegeben und jeweils als unmöglich bewiesen werden, um dadurch die eigene Behauptung als die einzig denkbare erscheinen zu lassen“.

schnell lehnt er eine solche Möglichkeit ab – die Güter des Vaters wurden doch verkauft. Die nächste Frage lautet: „Hereditas aliqua venit?“, und wieder folgt die sofortige Antwort: „Unmöglich, er wurde von allen Verwandten enterbt“. Er stellt also eine andere Frage: „Praemium aliquod ex lite aut iudicio cepit?“ Doch auch hier fällt die Antwort für den Angeklagten ungünstig aus: Er hat nicht nur keine Vergütung bekommen, sondern muss selbst eine große Geldstrafe bezahlen. Diese auf die logische Abfolge von Fragen und Antworten gegründete Subjektion schließt mit einer ironischen Konklusion[11], die den Gegner verspotten und verleugnen soll: „Wenn er aus den obengenannten Gründen nicht reich wurde, wie ihr alle seht, so hat er entweder zu Hause eine Goldgrube oder ist auf eine unehrliche Weise zu dem Geld gekommen“. Die ironische Suggestion: „Aut isti domi nascitur aurum“, ist selbstverständlich komisch und unsinnig und drängt dem Hörer automatisch eine zweite Antwort auf: „aut unde non est licitum pecunias cepit“. Das von dem Autor der *Rhetorik an Herennius* angeführte Beispiel der rhetorischen Frage, der Subjektion, zeigt, wie effektiv diese Figur wirkt. Die einfachen Behauptungen („Die Güter deines Vaters wurden verkauft, du wurdest von der Familie enterbt, du wurdest zu der Geldstrafe verurteilt“) sind nicht so überzeugend, sie können die Zuhörer nicht durch die Kraft der logischen Argumentation so stark beeinflussen, wie es die dargestellte *subiectio* vermag. Die letztere besteht aus (1) einer einführenden Frage, (2) den ausführlichen Fragen mit gleichzeitig folgenden Fragen, die den Gegner nach und nach desavouieren sollen und (3) aus einer verspottenden und zugleich anklagenden Schlussfolgerung. Indem der Redner diese Fragen stellt, zwingt er den Hörer zu einer tieferen Überlegung, stellt ihn vor ein Problem und wenn er eine unmittelbare Erwiderung gibt, liefert er dem Empfänger die fertige, überzeugende Lösung, die für den Gegner natürlich ungünstig ist[12].

Der Autor der *Rhetorik an Herennius* unterstreicht weiter, welche Wirkung und welcher Ernst in einer Subjektion enthalten sind (IV 34):

> Multum inest acrimoniae et gravitatis in hac exornatione, propterea quod, cum quaesitum est, quid oporteat, subicitur id non esse factum. Quare facillime fit, ut exaugeatur indignitas negotii.

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[11] Sowohl die Konklusion, als auch die Ironie wurden von den antiken Redekünstlern zu den rhetorischen Figuren gezählt. Der Terminus *conclusio* bezeichnete nicht nur die rhetorische Figur, sondern auch den Redeschluss (Cic. *Inv.* I 98; *Rhet. Her.* II 2; III 9). Über die Konklusion als rhetorische Figur heißt es bei dem Autor der *Rhetorik an Herennius*: „Conclusio est, quae brevi argumentatione ex iis, quae ante dicta sunt, aut facta conficit, quod necessario consequatur...“ (IV 41). Die Ironie wird auch zu den Tropen gezahlt. Vgl. Quint. IX 2, 44.

[12] In dem angegebenen Beispiel suggeriert der Autor der *Rhetorik an Herennius*, was er nicht deutlich genug in der Definition ausgedrückt hat, nämlich dass in der *subiectio* nach der Hauptfrage die Nebenfragen stehen, die bei der Beeinflussung des Auditoriums eine sehr wichtige Rolle spielen.

Die von uns analysierte Art der rhetorischen Frage erlaubt es also, die üblen Taten übermäßig zu steigern, wenn durch eine Frage nahegelegt wird, dass man etwas hätten tun müssen, und man sofort hinzufügt, dass dies nicht getan worden ist. Der Autor stellt fest, dass die *subiectio* nicht nur für den Angriff, sondern auch für die Selbstverteidigung gebraucht werden kann („Ex eodem genere, ut ad nostram quoque personam referamus subiectionem“, IV 34). Diese Figur dient zur Ablehnung der vorgebrachten Vorwürfe, wie es der in der Abhandlung zitierte römische Heerführer auch tat[13]. Er stellt am Anfang, der Subjektionsregel gemäß, die allgemeine Frage: „Nam quid me facere convenit, cum a tanta Gallorum multitudine circumsederer?“ Darauf folgen die ausführlichen Fragen und die sofortigen Antworten des Redners (IV 34):

> An dimicarem? At cum parva manu tum prodiremus: locum quoque inimicissimum habebamus. Sederem in castris? At neque subsidium, quod expectarem, habebamus, neque erat, qui vitam produceremus. Castra relinquerem? At obsidebamur. Vitam militum neglegerem? At eos videbar ea accepisse condicione ut eos, quoad possem, incolumis patriae et parentibus conservarem. Hostium condicionem repudiarem? At salus antiquior est militum quam impedimentorum[14].

Der Redner bedient sich also, ähnlich wie in dem oben zitierten Beleg, der Subjektion, um den feindlichen Vorwürfen eine Frage vorauszuschicken, dem Gegner die Argumente zu nehmen und die Zuhörer von seinem Standpunkt zu überzeugen[15]. Mit der letzten zu einer Konklusion führenden Frage lässt der Redner die ganze Angelegenheit schließlich als eine Wahl zwischen Gepäck und Menschen erscheinen. Das ist ein schlauer Kniff, der es dem Heerfüher erlaubt, die ganze Reihe der für ihn unangenehmen Umstände zu verschweigen: warum er nicht kämpfte, warum er sich ergab, warum er sich unterjochen ließ. Indem der Autor der Abhandlung über den Ernst der Lage schreibt, gibt er zu verstehen, dass die so logisch und überzeugend dargestellten Erklärungen dem redenden Heerführer Autorität verleihen und seine Niederlage in einer ganz anderen Dimension erscheinen lassen. Er kann von dem Publikum gar als Erlöser der geretteten Soldaten wahrgenommen werden.

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[13] Nach der Niederlage des Cassius Longinus im Land der Turini 107 v. Chr., verständigte sich der Legat Popilius mit den Heerführern der Feinde. Er hatte sein Heer gerettet, musste aber die Geisel, eine Hälfte des Gepäcks und der Ausrüstung lassen und unter das Joch gehen. In Rom wurde er deswegen vom Volkstribun Caelius Caldus angeklagt. Die genaueren Umstände dieses Prozesses bleiben unbekannt.

[14] Die am Anfang gestellte Frage: „Nam quid me facere convenit?“, falls sie eigenständig verwendet wurde, könnte man als die *dubitatio* betrachten. Im angeführten Abschnitt leitet sie aber eine ganze Reihe von *interrogationes* ein, denen unmittelbar Antworten folgen; es liegt uns dabei also eine evidente Subjektion vor.

[15] Eine solche Verteidigung vor dem wörtlichen Angriff nennt Cicero die *praemunitio*: „praemunitio etiam est ad id, quod adgrediare, et traiectio in alium“ (*De or*. III 204).

Die *subiectio* ist nicht der einzige lateinische Terminus, mit dem eine derartige rhetorische Frage bezeichnet wird. Ein anderer Terminus, nämlich *schema per suggestionem*, d.h. eine den Zuhörer durch Suggestion beeinflussende Figur, begegnet in der *Institutio oratoria* von Quintilian. Hier ergibt sich also nur der terminologische Unterschied – statt „des Aufdrängens eines logischen Konzeptes", wie es aus der Begriffsbestimmung in der *Rhetorik an Herennius* hervorgeht, bezeichnet der von Quintilian verwendete Terminus „das Suggerieren eines Konzepts":

> Cui diversum est, cum alium rogaveris, non expectare responsum, sed statim subicere: „Domus tibi deerat? At habebas. Pecunia superabat? At egebas". Quod schema quidam per suggestionem vocant.
>
> (IX 2, 15)

Quintilian gibt zugleich die Begriffsbestimmung und das Beispiel für *schema per suggestionem* in einem Fragment von Ciceros' Rede *Pro Scauro* an[16]. Die Beschreibung der Figur ist nicht so genau wie beim Autor der *Rhetorik an Herennius*. Bei Quintilian liegen die deutlichsten Abgrenzungen zur *subiectio* darin, dass der Fragende hierbei keine Antwort erwartet[17]. Im weiter angeführten Beispiel sehen wir allerdings, dass der Redner entsprechend den bei der *subiectio* geltenden Regeln der Argumentation des Gegners die Fragen vorausschickt, um sofort selbst darauf zu antworten, wodurch er dem letzteren keine Möglichkeit zur Verteidigung gibt[18].

Sehen wir uns nun die zweite Art der rhetorischen Fragen an, und zwar die *ratiocinatio*, die die logische Persuasion benutzt, um das Publikum durch Vernunftsgründe zu beeinflussen[19]. Der Autor der *Rhetorik an Herennius* definiert sie folgendermaßen: „Ratiocinatio est, per quam ipsi a nobis rationem poscimus, quare quicque dicamus, et crebro nosmet a nobis petimus unius cuiusque propositionis explanationem" (IV 23). Der Unterschied zwischen *subiectio* und *ratiocinatio* liegt also darin, dass wir bei der *ratiocinatio* den eventuellen Vorwürfen oder Entschuldigungen nicht mit Fragen vorgreifen, sondern unter Anwendung von *interrogationes* von uns selbst Erklärungen und Erläuterungen

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[16] Dasselbe Zitat findet sich in Ciceros *Orator* (223). Cicero führt es dort an, nicht um die Subjektion zu erläutern, sondern um damit den Aufbau einer aus Kolonnen bestehenden Periode zu erklären.

[17] Manche modernen Theoretiker sehen diese Eigenart als das Wesen aller rhetorischen Fragen an. Vgl. Anm. 3.

[18] Grésillon (1980: 276) erwähnt als eine der wichtigeren Funktionen der rhetorischen Fragen die strategisch erzwungene Überzeugung von der Richtigkeit der vorgebrachten Argumente bei dem Gesprächspartner. Diese Beobachtung fügt sich ideal in unsere Bemerkungen über die Überzeugungskraft der *subiectio* ein.

[19] Steudel-Günter (2005: 595) erklärt die *ratiocinatio* folgendermaßen: „Die *Ratiocinatio* bezeichnet einen auf Vernunftgründen basierenden Schluss, der als Frage formuliert wird".

verlangen und uns damit in die Lage versetzen, den Gedankengang der Zuhörer zu beeinflussen[20]. Unsere Antworten müssen nicht objektiv sein, wir selbst bilden uns ein Urteil von den geschilderten Taten und erschaffen ganz subjektiv eine Welt von Wahrheit und Falschheit[21]. Der Autor der *Rhetorik an Herennius* erläutert diese Figur an zwei Beispielen. An einem davon erwägt er das eigenartige Sophisma: Sollen wir einem im Krieg besiegten, feindlichen König das Leben nehmen (IV 23)[22]:

> Bene maiores hoc conparaverunt, ut neminem regem, quem armis cepissent, vita privarent. Quid ita? Quia quam nobis fortuna facultatem dedisset, iniquum erat in eorum supplicium consumere, quos eadem fortuna paulo ante in amplissimo statu conlocarat. Quid, quod exercitum contra duxit? Desino meminisse. Quid ita? Quia viri fortis est, qui de victoria contendant, eos hostes putare; qui victi sunt, eos homines iudicare, ut possit bellum fortitudo minuere, pacem humanitas augere. Et ille, si vicisset, num idem fecisset? Non profecto tam sapiens fuisset. Cur igitur ei parcis? Quia tantam stultitiam contemnere, non imitari consuevi[23].

Die hierbei benutzte logische Schlussfolgerung birgt die Überlegungen des Weisen, und die in der letzten Frage verwendete Partikel *cur*, worauf die Forscher ihre Aufmerksamkeit richten, trägt einen nachdrücklich überzeugenden Charakter[24]. Die in den Gedankengang eingeschalteten rhetorischen Fragen lassen den Diskurs abwechslungsreicher erscheinen und heben dessen wichtigste Punkte hervor. Der Sprecher könnte das dargestellte Problem natürlich ohne diese zwischengeschalteten Fragen näher bringen: „Unsere Vorfahren hatten recht, wenn sie dem festgenommenen König nicht das Leben genommen haben. Es wäre ungerecht, die Gelegenheit zur Rache zu nutzen, die uns das Schicksal in

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[20] SCHÖPSDAU (1996: 446) stellt fest, die *ratiocinatio* bilden knappe, zwischen die einzelnen Argumentationsschritte eingeschaltete Fragen, die der Redner zur Verdeutlichung gebrauche. Als Beispiel zitiert er den Abschnitt aus Ciceros *Pro Tullio*: „Wenn jemand einen Dieb tötet, dann tötet er ihn widerrechtlich. Warum? Weil keinerlei Recht hierzu vorgesehen ist. Doch wenn sich der Dieb mit der Waffe verteidigt? Dann tötet man ihn nicht widerrechtlich. Warum? Weil das Recht hierzu vorgesehen ist".

[21] In der verwendeten rhetorischen Frage geht es also nicht um die Wahrheit der Antwort, sondern um die Absichten und Ziele des Fragenden. Vgl. GRÉSILLON 1980: 277.

[22] Das zweite vom Autor der *Rhetorik an Herennius* angeführte Beispiel ist ein Sophisma, das die Natur der Frauen zeigt. Indem er die Methode mehrerer, in den logischen Gedankengang eingeschalteter kurzer Fragen anwendet, führt der Autor den Beweis, dass eine Frau, die die Sünde der Unkeuschheit begangen hat, sich vieler anderer Verbrechen, u.a. des Giftmords, schuldig gemacht hat.

[23] ACHARD (1989: 156) gibt an, dass der Autor nicht über König Iugurtha, sondern über Syphax schreibt, weil Iugurtha nicht im Kampf gefangengenommen, sondern von seinen Feinden den Römern ausgeliefert wurde.

[24] Die Fragepartikel „warum" äußert in den rhetorischen Fragen eine Negation von der Art „es gibt keinen Grund dazu" aus. Wäre diese Bedingung nicht erfüllt, dann läge eine andere Art der *interrogatio* und nicht eine rhetorische Frage vor. Vgl. SCHWITALLA 1984: 136.

Bezug auf diejenigen gegeben hat, die von demselben Schicksal so hoch gestellt worden sind. Ganz davon zu schweigen, dass dieser König gegen uns das Heer führte. Der mutige Mensch sollte doch in denen einen Gegner sehen, mit denen er kämpft, wohingegen er in den Besiegten Menschen sehen sollte“ usw. Wir sehen also, dass die einfachen Ausführungen nicht so überzeugend sind, dass sie unsere Aufmerksamkeit nicht in dem Maße erwecken und fesseln wie dasselbe Problem, das als *ratiocinatio* zur Sprache gebracht worden ist. Das Fehlen von rhetorischen Fragen bewirkt, dass die Erörterung zu einem langweiligen Disput eines Weisen wird, der seine ausgeklügelte Gedankenkonstruktion abstrakt darzulegen sucht. Die hinzugefügten konkreten Fragen beleben dagegen die Erwägungen zu einer Debatte, an der eine größere Anzahl von Personen, darunter der betreffende Zuhörer, beteiligt sind[25].

Manche Gelehrte nennen noch eine Art von rhetorischen Fragen, mit deren Hilfe der Redner das Publikum mit logischer Argumentationskraft zu beeinflussen sucht, und zwar die *sermocinatio*, die in der griechischen Sprache als *dialogismos* bezeichnet wird[26]. Die Zuordnung dieser Figur zu den rhetorischen Fragen scheint freilich nicht zutreffend zu sein, weil die römischen Rhetoren unter dem Terminus *sermocinatio* zunächst ein fiktives Gespräch verstanden, das dem Status der redenden Person entspricht. Dieses Gespräch konnte eventuell Fragen enthalten, allerdings nicht unbedingt rhetorische Fragen[27]. Es wäre deshalb sinnvoller, die *sermocinatio*-Fragen den oben dargestellten *subiectiones* und *ratiocinationes* oder eventuell den die Unentschlossenheit ausdrückenden Fragen zuzurechnen. Auf die letzteren soll an anderer Stelle näher eingegangen werden.

Zum Schluss dieses Überblicks über die rhetorischen Fragen, die der Beweisführung einen größeren logischen Nachdruck verleihen, wollen wir uns noch einer weiteren Art der *interrogationes* zuwenden, bei denen der Schwerpunkt auf der Antwort liegt. Es handelt sich hierbei vor allem um das

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[25] Rutilius Rufus bezeichnet diese Figur mit dem griechischen Wort αἰτιολογία. Er zählt sie nicht zu den rhetorischen Fragen, wohl aber behandelt er die *ratiocinatio* als eine Behauptung, die den Hörer jegliche Zweifel loswerden lässt: „hoc schema efficitur ratione brevi et sententiosa, ita ut, quod dubium est visum, ad certam fidem adduci videatur“ (19). Eine ähnliche Begriffsbestimmung findet sich im *Carmen de figuris*: „Redditio causae porro est, cum, cur ita, dico./ Audi, etsi durum est; nam verum quod grave primo/ consilium acciderit, fit iocundum utilitate“ (25–27).

[26] Die *sermocinatio* nennt Schöpsdau (1996: 447) unter den rhetorischen Fragen. Diese Klassifikation findet man bei dem griechischen Rhetor Tiberios (67). Letzterer bezeichnet solche Fragen als διαλεκτικόν oder διαλογισμός. *Sermocinatio* nimmt nur manchmal die Form der Fragen und Antworten an.

[27] Der Autor der *Rhetorik an Herennius* definiert die *sermocinatio* als ein fiktives Gespräch: „Sermocinatio est [...] in qua constituetur alicuius personae oratio adcommodata ad dignitatem“ (IV 55). Bei Quintilian finden wir dagegen Folgendes über diese Figur: „His et adversariorum cogitationes velut secum loquentium protrahimus [...] et nostros cum aliis sermones et aliorum inter se credibiliter introducimus [...]. Ac sunt quidam qui has demum προσωποποιίας dicant in quibus et corpora et verba fingimus; sermones hominum adsimulatos dicere διαλόγους malunt, quod Latinorum quidam dixerunt sermocinationem“ (IX 2, 30 f.).

Ausweichen vor einer Antwort, die der Fragende zu erzwingen sucht. Bei Quintilian finden wir dazu Folgendes: „Est aliqua etiam in respondendo figura, cum aliud interroganti ad aliud, quia sic utilius sit, occurritur, tum augendi criminis gratia...“ (IX 2, 12). Der größte Nachdruck liegt also auf der Antwort, nicht auf der Frage, obwohl die letztere in dieser Figur unentbehrlich ist. Wenn z.B. der Angeklagte eine Frage hört, erwidert er diese nicht direkt, sondern erteilt eine Antwort, die inhaltlich nur lose mit der Angelegenheit verbunden ist. Am wichtigsten ist in diesem Fall jedoch nicht eine erschöpfende Erwiderung, die die Neugier der Hörer befriedigt, sondern, wie der Autor der *Institutio oratoria* betont, der Nutzen, den der Befragte und nicht der Fragende durch diese Frage gewinnt. Wesentlich ist in dieser Figur nicht so sehr die Redlichkeit der Aussage, sondern die Schlagfertigkeit einer scharfsinnigen Entgegnung. Quintilian nimmt an, dass diese vor allem dazu geeignet ist, die Anschuldigungen hochzuspielen („augendi criminis gratia“), und gibt folgendes Beispiel (alle Zitate aus IX 2, 12): „Ut testis in reum rogatus, an ab reo fustibus vapulasset: ‚Innocens‘ inquit“. Der Zeuge erwidert also einfach nicht mit „ja“ oder „nein“, was in diesem Fall zu erwarten wäre, sondern indem er behauptet, er hätte kein Delikt begangen, und gibt so zu verstehen, dass er als unschuldige Person angegriffen worden sei, was die Schuld des Angeklagten noch größer werden lässt. Ein weiterer Grund für die Benutzung dieser Figur sei, so Quintilian, der Versuch der Anklagevermeidung („declinandi, quod est frequentissimum“). Der Autor der *Institutio oratoria* führt hier Folgendes als Beispiel an: „‚Quaero an occideris hominem‘ respondetur ‚latronem‘: ‚an fundum occupaveris?‘ respondetur ‚meum‘“. Der Angeklagte gibt hier Antworten, die seine Schuld vermindern. Er erklärt, er habe wirklich den Mann getötet, dieser sei aber ein Verbrecher gewesen, der Angeklagte habe zwar das Landgut überfallen, dieses sei doch sein Besitz gewesen. Er gibt also ausführliche Erklärungen ab, obwohl der Fragende von ihm nur ein kurzes „Ja“ oder „Nein“ verlangt. Die von uns analysierten *interrogationes* sind keine echten Mitteilungsfragen, sondern rhetorische Fragen, da die Person, die sie stellt, im Grunde genommen keine Antwort erwartet, weil die ja sowieso allgemein wohlbekannt ist[28]. Die Beantwortung dient also der Überraschung, sie kann dem Anwalt weiterhelfen oder dem Ankläger einen Strich durch die Rechnung machen. Der logische Nachdruck besteht also in einer derartigen Frage-Antwort-Sequenz darin, dass dem Zwischenredner auf diese listige Weise eine Nachricht übermittelt wird, um mit dieser figürlichen Erwiderung den Gegner zu überwinden und sich selbst dagegen im günstigsten Licht zu zeigen. Wenn man also

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[28] Diese Fragen gehören zu den sogenannten Entscheidungsfragen, die als Antwort ein kurzes „Ja“ oder „Nein“ nahelegen, im Gegensatz zu Fragen, deren Beantwortung einer längeren Ausführung bedarf, die mit dem Terminus *pysma* (*interrogatio, quaesitum*) bezeichnet werden. Siehe Schöpsdau 1996: 446.

diesen Typ von rhetorischen Fragen beschreibt, so möchte man ihn wohl als eine „Antipersuasion“ bezeichnen, und zwar eine Opposition zum logischen oder emotionalen Nachdruck der rhetorischen Fragen, wobei die Antworten hier von größter Bedeutung sind.

Jetzt wollen wir die zweite Art der rhetorischen Fragen behandeln, deren Überzeugungskraft auf der Steuerung der Leidenschaften des Publikums beruht. Zu dieser Art wird die *dubitatio* gezählt: Eine Frage, die durch die Bekundung von Hilflosigkeit eine gewisse Glaubwürdigkeit erweckt[29]. Obwohl die *dubitatio* schon den alten Griechen als die *diaporesis* bekannt war, ist sie erst vom Autor der *Rhetorik an Herennius* genau definiert worden[30]. Seine Charakterisierung dieser Figur ist formal; der Autor beschäftigt sich nicht mit ihrer Wirkung auf die Hörer, sondern versucht nur ihren Aufbau zu erklären: „Dubitatio est, cum quaerere videtur orator utrum de duobus potius aut quid de pluribus potissimum dicat“ (IV 40). Wir erfahren nicht, warum der Redner eine rhetorische Frage stellt, es heißt nur, ihrem Wesen liege das Zögern zugrunde, ob etwas mit zwei oder mehreren Begriffen definiert werden soll – nach einer solchen Auffassung wäre das Vorgehen als eine Wortfigur zu interpretieren. Mehr Licht auf die vorgestellte Figur wirft das vom Autor angeführte *exemplum*: „Offuit eo tempore plurimum rei publicae consulum sive stultitiam sive malitiam dicere oportet sive utrumque“ (IV 40). Der Sprecher erwartet bei weitem nicht eine Antwort auf die Frage: „Welches Versäumnis der Konsuln hat der Republik am meisten geschadet?“. Indem er zu manchen Fragen sein Zögern an den Tag legt, zeigt er einerseits seine Unentschlossenheit und gewinnt die Zuneigung des Publikums, betont allerdings andererseits die Schuld der angegriffenen Konsuln.

Am zutreffendsten stellt Quintilian die *dubitatio* dar: „Adfert aliquam fidem veritatis et dubitatio, cum simulamus quaerere nos unde incipiendum, ubi desinendum, quid potissimum dicendum, an omnino dicendum sit“ (IX 2, 19). Laut dieser Definition wenden wir uns mit Fragen an die Zuhörer, nicht um eine Information zu bekommen, sondern um ihr Vertrauen zu gewinnen. Indem wir Unwissenheit und Hilflosigkeit vortäuschen, erwecken wir beim Auditorium nur Mitleid und bereiten damit das Publikum darauf vor, unsere Argumentation zu akzeptieren. Bei Quintlilian heißt es, dass diese Figur sowohl in Bezug auf die Gegenwart als auch auf die Vergangenheit benutzt werden kann, da die Unentschlossenheit ja in jedem grammatischen Tempus vorgetäuscht werden kann (IX 2, 19). Quintilian bringt dem Leser die *dubitatio* durch ein Beispiel aus Ciceros’ Rede *Pro Cluentio* näher: „Equidem, quod ad me attinet, quo me vertam nescio. Negem fuisse infamiam illam iudicii corrupti?“ (IX 2, 19). Wenn der Redner seine Rede vor Gericht mit Fragen beginnt, in denen Unentschlossenheit

[29] Ein anderer lateinischer Terminus, der diese Art von Fragesätzen bezeichnet, ist *deliberatio*, in der griechischen Nomenklatur sind es dagegen διαπόρησις oder ἀπορία.

[30] Siehe Népote-Desmarres, Tröger 1994: 973.

und Hilflosigkeit mitschwingen, wendet er die *captatio benevolentiae* an – er macht den Eindruck einer bescheidenen Person, die sich eher einen Ratschlag von den Zuhörern erhofft, und dadurch sucht er die Gunst des Prozesspublikums zu erhaschen[31]. Ein Redner, der die *dubitatio* verwendet, sucht nicht durch logische Beweisführung seine Zuhörer zu überzeugen, sondern beeinflusst deren Gefühle durch außersachliche „Argumente": Ich bin schwächer als ihr, nicht so gut orientiert, vielleicht weniger klug – helft mir, ich frage euch, was ich tun soll. Der Fragende erwartet natürlich keine Erwiderung, sondern setzt sich zum Ziel, seine eigene Person in möglichst günstigem Licht erscheinen zu lassen, indem er der zuvor angenommenen Strategie folgt[32].

Ein anderes Beispiel des Zweifelns in der Funktion einer rhetorischen Frage begegnet uns in Ciceros Rede *Pro Sexto Roscio Amerino* (29):

> Quid primum querar aut unde potissimum, iudices, ordiar, aut quod aut a quibus auxilium petam? deorumne immortalium, populine Romani, vestramne, qui summam potestatem habetis hoc tempore fidem implorem?

Indem Cicero mit diesen Fragen die *narratio* der Rede beginnt, versucht er sich die Freundlichkeit der Richter zu sichern[33], bevor er die Angelegenheit eingehend darstellt. Er täuscht Hilflosigkeit vor, obgleich er, was im weiteren Verlauf der Verteidigung des Roscius deutlich werden soll, bereits einen ausführlichen Plan vor Augen hat[34]. Die unentschlossen vorangebrachten Fragen sind also eine berechnende und listige Taktik, um die Zuneigung des Tribunals zu erhaschen und dieses freundlich zu stimmen. In die analysierte *dubitatio* ist auch eine Apostrophe an die Richter eingeschlossen, die deren Bedeutung und Macht unterstreicht. Cicero hebt damit die Bedeutung des Gerichts hervor und versucht, seine Gunst durch ein zusätzliches figürliches Mittel zu erwerben[35].

Ein gleiches Beispiel für die *dubitatio* wie Quintilian schlägt Aquila Romanus vor. Seine Begriffsbestimmung ist aber eine etwas andere (10):

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[31] Es gibt vier klassische Quellen der *captatio benevolentiae*: *ab adversario*, *a reo* zusammen mit *ab oratore*, *ab auditoribus* und *a rebus*. Das oben angeführte Beispiel gehört zur *captatio benevolentiae ab oratore*, weil Cicero sich als ein desorientierter, hilfloser Redner zeigt. Vgl. Loutsch 1994: 155 f.

[32] Eine ähnliche Definition wie die von Quintilian gibt Rufinus an: Ἀπορία, *eadem est et* διαπόρησις, *addubitatio quaedam, cum simulamus quaerere nos, unde incipiendum, ubi desinendum, quid potissimum dicendum aut omnino dicendum...* (9). Rufinus wird sie wahrscheinlich von Quintilian übernommen haben.

[33] Der Redner gebraucht schon im *exordium* die *captatio benevolentiae*, aber nicht indem er die *dubitatio*, sondern eine andere Art der rhetorischen Fragen, und zwar die *subiectio*, verwendet.

[34] Die weiteren Teile der Rede sind ein starker Angriff auf Roscius' Ankläger und ihren Beschützer, Sullas Ohrenbläser, Chrysogonos.

[35] Die Apostrophe ist oft die Umwendung der Rede zu den Richtern.

> addubitatio: hac utimur, cum propter aliqua volumus videri addubitare et quasi ab ipsis iudicibus consilium capere, quo potissimum genere orationis utamur, quale est pro Cluentio prooemium.

Aquila schreibt über die Benutzung des Zweifels vor den Richtern[36]. Die zweifelnde Frage, die der Redner ans Tribunal richtet, soll sich durch einen hohen Grad an Allgemeinheit auszeichnen. Wer also die *dubitatio* verwendet, sollte sich die Frage stellen: „Wie sollte man überhaupt sprechen?". Eine so allgemein formulierte Frage, die sich generell auf die Redeweise bezieht, drückt in stärkerem Maße die Hilflosigkeit des Sprechers aus, als dies bei ausführlichen Fragen der Fall ist. Doch nicht in jedem Fall ist eine solche Unentschlossenheit bzw. Unkenntnis erfolgversprechend; deshalb erscheinen die eingehenden Empfehlungen Quintilians als zutreffender.

Auf einen weiteren Aspekt der *dubitatio* verweist Rutilius Lupus: „Hoc schema efficitur, cum quaerimus quid aut quem ad modum pro rei dignitate dicamus, nec reperire nos ostendimus" (II 10). Er stellt fest, dass wir entweder überhaupt nicht wissen, was wir zu sagen haben, oder dass wir keine Methode finden können, ein Problem zur Sprache zu bringen; deswegen wenden wir uns mit allgemeinen oder konkreten Fragen an die Hörer. Im letzteren Fall gibt der Autor an, dass der Sprecher es nicht vermag, den Ernst einer Situation wiederzugeben, was ihn eben dazu zwingt, sich den Rat bei den Zuhörern einzuholen. Rutilius Lupus hebt hervor, diese Figur bestehe in einer offensichtlichen Bekundung der Hilflosigkeit, und, obwohl er den auf diese Weise erreichten Zweck nicht erwähnt, können wir vermuten, dass es eben eine Methode ist, die Gunst des Auditoriums zu erwerben.

Zum Schluss schauen wir uns die letzte Art der rhetorischen Fragen an, die Hörer bewegt, und zwar die *communicatio*. Diese Art kommt der *dubitatio* sehr nahe, der Unterschied besteht allerdings darin, dass die dabei gestellten Fragen sich nicht auf die Sprechweise, sondern auf die Handlung beziehen[37]. Die *communicatio* lässt unsere Hilflosigkeit in einem etwas geringeren Maße zum Ausdruck kommen als die *dubitatio*; der Schwerpunkt bei der ersteren liegt dagegen vielmehr auf dem Willen zur gemeinsamen Lösung des Problems, auf gemeinsamer Beratschlagung. Die letztere trägt selbstverständlich einen fiktiven Charakter, tatsächlich wissen wir doch selbst, was zu tun ist. Indem wir aber die Zuhörer um Hilfe bitten, berühren wir sie emotional und gewinnen ihr Vertrauen. Cicero

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[36] Aquila Romanus, der zu den *rhetores Latini* gezählt wird, lebte im 3. Jahrhundert n. Chr., also später als Quintilian. In seiner Zeit waren politische Auftritte selten, so dass der Autor den Bereich der Redneraktivitäten auf die Gerichtsreden beschränkt.

[37] Lausberg (1960: 384) sieht hier nicht die Frage, was zu tun ist, sondern die nach der Methode, von der wir uns leiten sollen. Neuber (1994: 292) gibt an, als *communicatio* bezeichne man eine Gedankenfigur in der Form eines fiktiven Mitteilungsprozesses. Der Redner hole sich vorgeblich Rat und Auskunft vom Zuhörer. Vgl. auch Schöpsdau 1996: 446.

macht bei seiner Begriffbestimmung in *De oratore* darauf aufmerksam, dass wir durch diese Figur die Zuhörer in das behandelte Problem einbinden: „communicatio, quae est quasi cum iis ipsis, apud quos dicas, deliberatio“ (III 204)[38]. Von dem fiktiven Charakter jener Ausführungen zeugt die von Cicero benutzte Wendung *quasi deliberatio*. Quintilian erläutert das von uns analysierte rhetorische Überzeugungsmittel am folgenden Beispiel aus Domitius Afer, der Cloatilla vor dem Gericht verteidigte: „Nescit trepida quid liceat feminae, quid coniugem deceat: forte vos in illa solitudine obvios casus miserae mulieri obtulit; tu, frater, vos, paterni amici, quod consilium datis?“ (IX 2, 20)[39]. Wenn der Redner hier bei seinen Gegnern einen Rat sucht, zeigt er nicht seine Unwissenheit, seinen Zweifel, wie im Fall der *dubitatio*, sondern er fragt, was sie bezüglich der Gerichtsverhandlung der verwirrten Frau raten könnten. Er bemüht sich seine Prozessgegner positiv zu motivieren, fragt, wie sie helfen könnten, er erweckt den Anschein, als wollte er nicht nur seine Mandantin retten, sondern auch andere für diesen edlen Zweck zu gewinnen suchen. Er erzeugt also um sich herum eine Atmosphäre, als ob er ein ehrlicher, vertrauenswürdiger Mann wäre. Die angeführte *communicatio* ist eine ganz fiktive Deliberation. Der Redner erwartet keine Antwort auf seine Fragen, er stellt sie ausschließlich, um einen günstigen Eindruck auf die Hörer zu machen. Diese Frage als Bitte um Hilfe konnte an die Gegner oder an die Richter gerichtet sein[40]; dieses war, so Quintilian, eine häufige Praxis und er gibt als Beispiel einige gebräuchliche Wendungen dieser Art: „Quid suadetis?; Vos interrogo; Quid tandem fieri oportuit?“ (IX 2, 21). Es handelt sich dabei, und dieses sei nochmals betont, um ein folgerichtiges Verfahren, die Zuneigung zu gewinnen (*ad conciliandos animos*) und eventuell die Gemüter der für die Urteilsprechung verantwortlichen Mitglieder des Tribunals emotional zu beeinflussen (*ad commovendos*).

Manchmal, wenn der Hörer dazu genötigt war, einige Zeit auf eine Erklärung zu warten, wurde die *communicatio* mit einem Überraschungseffekt verbunden. Diese Erwartung bezeichnet Quintilian als eine getrennte Figur, die *sustentatio*, die den scheinbaren Zweifel verstärkt (IX 2, 22):

> Sed non numquam communicantes aliquid inexpectatum subiungimus, quod et per se schema est, ut in Verrem Cicero: „Quid deinde? quid censetis? furtum fortasse aut praedam aliquam?“ Deinde, cum diu suspendisset iudicum animos, subiecit quod multo esset improbius. Hoc Celsus sustentationem vocat.

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[38] Diese Begriffsbestimmung wiederholt Quintilian (IX 1, 30).

[39] Quintilian schreibt mehr über diese Rede in VIII 5, 16: „ut Afer Domitius, cum Cloatillam defenderet, cui obiectum crimen quod virum qui inter rebellantis fuerat sepelisset, remiserat Claudius, in epilogo filios eius adloquens: ‚Matrem tamen‘, inquit, ‚pueri sepelitote‘“.

[40] Manchmal konnte die Frage als eine Bitte um Rat gleichzeitig den Gegnern und den Richtern gestellt werden, wie in Ciceros *Rab. Post*. 22.

Der Redner fragt also die Empfänger nach etwas und lässt sie gleichzeitig warten, wodurch er ein Unsicherheitsgefühl in ihnen aufsteigen lässt. Die auf diese Weise hervorgerufene Überraschung hat die doppelte Wesensart – die Sache, die wir erkennen, ist für uns unerwartet und wir werden beispielsweise durch ihren Ernst, ihre Anschaulichkeit überrascht, eventuell positiv enttäuscht – wir hoffen, etwas Schreckliches, Bestürzendes zu hören; indessen ist die Mitteilung nicht so schlecht, weil wir erfahren, dass kein Verbrechen begangen worden ist, dass wir es nur mit einem Kavaliersdelikt zu tun haben. Quintilian zitiert als Beispiel für die Verbindung der *communicatio* und *sustentatio* den Abschnitt aus Ciceros *In Verrem*: „Quid deinde? quid censetis? furtum fortasse aut praedam aliquam?" (V 10). Die angeführte Stelle stammt aus der *narratio* der Rede. Der Redner spielt ein doppeltes Spiel mit dem Auditorium. Indem er die Zuhörer fragt, ob sie Verres in Verdacht haben, hält er mit ihnen eine kurze Beratung ab. Ungewöhnlicherweise zieht er in seinen Fragen die Wahrheit der Vorwürfe in Zweifel. Das Publikum wundert sich, wo ein Verbrechen vorliege? Trage Verres wirklich eine Schuld? Nachdem also Cicero so die Spannung auf ein Maximum steigen lässt, gibt er nach einer Serie von Fragen an die Zuhörer erst Tatsachen an, die den Angeklagten definitiv überführen sollen[41]. Wir haben es hier also mit einem Musterbeispiel für die Verbindung der von uns analysierten Figuren zu tun: Indem Cicero dem Publikum die provozierenden, Verres' Schuld anzweifelnden Fragen stellt, bei denen er sich selbst angeblich um Rat bittet, erzeugt er bei den Zuhörern ein Höchstmaß an Spannung, um danach den Angeklagten noch stärker anzugreifen und dadurch die Überzeugung von seiner Schuld zu steigern. Er überzeugt in diesem Moment die Richter nicht durch Vernunftsgründe, er versucht nicht, sie durch die Logik seiner Argumentation zu gewinnen, sondern beeinflusst durch die Verwendung der verbundenen Figuren *communicatio-sustentatio* ihre Gemüter und erweckt eine für sich freundliche Atmosphäre.

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Zusammenfassend ist Folgendes festzuhalten: Die rhetorischen Fragen spielten in dem römischen rhetorischen System eine sehr wichtige Rolle. Sie zählen zu den Hauptinstrumenten der Überzeugungsmittel eines Redners. Zwar handelt es sich dabei nicht um ein einfaches, homogenes Mittel unter den so genannten *figurae sententiarum*, es lassen sich dabei aber einige Arten herausstellen. Bei der allgemeinen Gliederung, die im vorliegenden Beitrag vorgenommen worden ist, lassen sich zwei Gruppen unterscheiden: Fragen, die sich auf die logische, rationale Einwirkungskraft beziehen, und solche, die die Gefühle der Empfänger

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[41] Indem Cicero die *sustentatio* auflöst, entlarvt er die Mitarbeiter von Verres und vergrößert den Überraschungseffekt durch eine andere Figur, und zwar das *incrementum*: „Homines sceleris coniurationisque damnati, ad supplicium traditi, ad palum alligati – repente, multis milibus hominum inspectantibus, soluti sunt et Triocalino illi domino redditi" (V 11).

beeinflussen. Zu der ersten Gruppe haben wir die als *subiectio* und *ratiocinatio* bezeichneten Fragen gerechnet, zu der zweiten dagegen *dubitatio* und *communicatio*.

Die *subiectio* stellt eine Frage dar, die vorwiegend in Streitsachen verwendet wurde. Die am Anfang gestellte allgemeine Frage führt ins Problem ein, wohingegen die darauf folgenden ausführlichen *interrogationes* und die sofortigen Antworten, die den Vorwürfen des Widersachers vorgreifen und diese zurückzuweisen haben, möglicherweise sogar die Schuld des Gegners zu vergrößern erlauben. Die Subjektion wurde am umfassendsten vom Autor der *Rhetorik an Herennius* definiert. Sie wurde auch von Quintilian bestimmt, der sie als *schema per suggestionem* bezeichnet. Die zweite Art der rhetorischen Fragen, die *ratiocinatio*, wurde auch vom Autor der *Rhetorik an Herennius* vorgestellt. Durch die Verwendung dieser Fragen sucht der Redner die Zuhörer für seine Ausführungen zu gewinnen, indem er ihnen seine Argumentationslogik aufzwingt, die schwer zu erschüttern zu sein scheint. Er greift den Vorwürfen des Widersachers nicht, wie dies in der *subiectio* der Fall ist, mit Fragen vor, sondern beeinflusst durch eine abwechselnd aus Fragen und Antworten bestehende Abfolge die Denkweise der Zuhörer und kreiert dadurch die erwünschte Realität. Von großer Bedeutung ist dabei auch die Tatsache, dass diese Fragen die Monotonie durchbrechen und die Zuhörer in stärkerem Maße in den geführten Diskurs einbeziehen.

Die weiteren analysierten Fragen, von uns als emotionale Fragen bezeichnet, sind die *dubitationes*. Der Redner greift auf diese Fragen zurück, um die Gemüter der Zuhörer mit außerrationalen Mitteln zu beeinflussen. Er legt dabei eine scheinbare Ratlosigkeit an den Tag, wenn er fragt, wie er seine Ausführungen gestalten soll, welche Worte er benutzen soll, was er überhaupt sagen soll. Indem der Redner sich als eine unentschlossene, schwankende Person zu erkennen zu geben versucht, stellt er sich scheinbar niedriger als die Zuhörer, wodurch die letzteren sich aufgewertet fühlen und den Argumenten des Redners mit mehr Gunst und Vertrauen begegnen. Das in der *dubitatio* mitschwingende Zögern bezieht sich auf den verbalen Bereich und bedeutet die sprachliche Hilflosigkeit des Redners. Die Eigenart der zweiten Gruppe von emotionalen rhetorischen Fragen, nämlich der *communicatio*, liegt dagegen in der Unentschlossenheit des Sprechers im Bereich der Handlung. Indem er nach den Verfahrensmethoden und der Art der Problemlösung fragt, versucht er die Zuhörer für die Sache zu gewinnen. Er gewinnt ihre Gunst, indem er den Eindruck erweckt, als ob seine bescheidene Person nicht in der Lage sei, die Schwierigkeiten ohne ihre Hilfe zu überwinden. Die rhetorischen Fragen bildeten also ein wesentliches Mittel, das es dem römischen Redner erleichterte, seine Zuhörer zu überzeugen. Die Tatsache, dass auf dieses Mittel auch heutzutage allgemein zurückgegriffen wird, zeugt von der Bedeutung, die dieses schon von den antiken Rhetoren definierte rhetorische Werkzeug des Überredens in den sprachlichen Systemen verschiedener Epochen erlangt hat.

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# DIALOGIC FORMAT OF PHILO OF ALEXANDRIA'S *DE ANIMALIBUS*

by

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ABSTRACT: This contribution examines Philo of Alexandria's *De animalibus*, paying particular attention to its dialogic format and considering it within the broader context of the development of the genre of the dialogue in antiquity. It argues that as an early imperial-period text, composed probably around 50 CE, *De animalibus* is of considerable importance to our understanding of transformations in ancient dialogue in the post-classical period.

Philo of Alexandria's dialogue *De animalibus* (= *De anim.*), extant only in Armenian, has drawn little interest from scholars of Greek and Latin literature. It has been read almost exclusively by Philonic specialists and by scholars working on the ancient debate on animal rationality, who have focused mostly on Philo's sources of animal *exempla* and on the philosophical provenience of the arguments presented in the dialogue. There is little awareness of the existence of *De anim.* even among scholars whose work focuses on prose of the imperial period and on the genre of the dialogue. Suffice to say that Philo is not discussed in Hirzel's *Der Dialog*[1], a comprehensive study of the genre in antiquity, although his *De anim.*, as an imperial-period dialogue composed before Plutarch (who is sometimes perceived as responsible for the revival of the Platonic format[2]), is of considerable importance to our understanding of the development of this literary form.

The aim of my contribution is to discuss *De anim.* with particular attention paid to its dialogic format and to consider it within the broader context of the development of the ancient genre of the dialogue. There is very little dialogic literature extant from the period between Plato and Xenophon on the one hand, and Plutarch and other imperial period authors (such as Dio Chrysostom, Lucian, Philostratos) on the other. Certainly, some of the Pseudo-Platonic dialogues were composed in this period, but they are notoriously difficult to date; moreover, they constitute a very particular sub-category of the dialogue (Socratic dialogues

[1] Hirzel 1895.

[2] E.g. Sedley 1999: 149; Pade 2007: 45.

modelled on Plato, possibly composed by members of the Academy)[3] and should not be considered as representative of the general development of the genre after Plato. We know that the dialogue form was used by some Hellenistic period philosophers – chiefly by followers of Plato, by Aristotle and his school, but also by Epicurus (who composed a *Symposium*) and some of the earlier Stoics (Ariston, Persaios, Herillos, Sphairos)[4]; we also know that certain innovations were introduced (such as the authorial preface and the introduction of an author as one of the main speakers)[5]. Cicero in his dialogues makes use of these later developments and his texts can, to some extent, testify to changes the genre of the dialogue had undergone in the Hellenistic period; however, Cicero himself adapted the dialogic genre to his Roman audience's needs and tastes, and the extent of these adaptations remains unclear[6]. Considered from this perspective, *De anim.* is of particular importance as an heir to the post-classical dialogic tradition and a link between Hellenistic and imperial period dialogues.

Today there are two main translations of Philo's text: AUCHER's translation into Latin, published in 1822, and TERIAN's translation into English, published in 1981[7]. TERIAN's translation is particularly helpful, as he provides *De anim.* with generous annotations, discusses obscure passages, and points out divergences between his and AUCHER's understanding of the text, which makes Philo's work more accessible to classical scholars than before. My paper is of necessity based on two presumptions: firstly, that the Armenian text, though at times obscure and difficult to interpret, is a relatively faithful translation of Philo's Greek (as scholars working on Armenian versions of Philo's works tend to assume)[8]; secondly, that TERIAN's translation is an accurate rendering of the Armenian. It should be remembered, however, that the text before us is merely an approximation of Philo's original dialogue, which imposes certain limitations on my study

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[3] Some common features of the Ps.-Platonic dialogues include: the presence of Socrates (apart from the *Demodokos*) and characters known from Plato and other Socratics (Alcibiades, Critias, Theages, Chairephon etc.), brevity, a preoccupation with typical Socratic themes (virtue, wealth, justice, political ambition, etc.), the imitation of openings and settings of Plato's dialogues. Some of these texts might have been intended for school use.

[4] For Stoics, see SEDLEY 1999: 149 (he suggests that Zeno condemned the dialogue form, which led later Stoics to avoid it). WHITE (2010: 371) rightly observes that the titles of works (e.g. in Diogenes Laertios) are unreliable indications of their formats (cf. Seneca's *Dialogi*).

[5] For the development of the dialogue between Plato and Cicero, see HIRZEL 1895: vol. I, 272–421; RUCH 1958: 39–55.

[6] Cicero's use of a dialogue form is discussed by e.g. HIRZEL 1895: vol. I, 457–552; RUCH 1958; SCHOFIELD 2008.

[7] AUCHER 1822; TERIAN 1981. There is also a French translation by TERIAN (TERIAN 1988, *non vidi*).

[8] For a general discussion of Armenian translations of Philo, see MANCINI LOMBARDI, PONTANI 2011. For the translation of *De anim.* in particular, see TERIAN 1981: 9–14.

(in particular, detailed linguistic and stylistic analyses are impossible to conduct) and makes some of my conclusions conjectural.

## PHILO'S *DE ANIMALIBUS* AND ITS DIALOGIC FORMAT

As a dialogue, *De anim.* is a remarkable exception in the *corpus* of Philo's works: apart from it, we know of only one other text of his in dialogue form, namely the fragmentarily preserved *De providentia* (= *De prov.*), dedicated to the question of divine providence[9]. The Armenian translation of *De prov.* consists of two books; only book II is in the form of a dialogue[10]. Together with *Quod omnis probus liber sit* (extant in Greek) and *De aeternitate mundi* (partially preserved in Greek), the two dialogues belong to Philo's philosophical writings, firmly rooted in the Greek philosophical tradition, with little or no references to Judaism and the Bible. In both *De anim.* and *De prov.* II, Philo is an interlocutor and argues against the views of a character called Alexander, who is identified by scholars with Tiberius Julius Alexander, Philo's apostate nephew[11]. Both dialogues uphold certain Stoic doctrines which are consistent with Judaism: the irrationality of animals in *De anim.*, and divine providence in *De prov.* II. The dating of *De anim.* and *De prov.* II is controversial, but recent scholarship tends to date both works to the later period of Philo's life, possibly to around 50 CE[12].

Let us turn to the dialogic format of *De anim*. While Philo's Platonic inspiration behind the choice of the genre is manifest (as I will discuss in detail below), yet this is not a Socratic dialogue. Philo makes use of the format of a dramatic dialogue – i.e. a dialogue without narration – in order to present two opposing views on whether animals possess reason. These views are expressed in two speeches – by Alexander and by Philo – and reflect a dispute between two philosophical schools (Alexander's position is aligned with that of the New Academy,

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[9] *De prov.* is extant only in lengthy fragments preserved by Eusebios and in an Armenian translation. Both the Armenian version and Eusebios' Greek are to be found in Aucher 1822 (with a Latin translation), and the fragments of *De prov.* from Eusebios also in Colson 1941. *De prov.* was translated into German and French, but the translations of the portions extant in Armenian are based on Aucher's Latin: Früchtel-Gunzenhausen 1964 and Hadas-Lebel 1973. For a discussion and comparison of the Greek and Armenian text of *De prov.*, see Olivieri 2011.

[10] Book I of *De prov.*, preserved in the Armenian translation, may be an abridgement of the original. It is not clear whether this part of the text was a treatise from the beginning, or a dialogue which lost dialogic format in transmission (so Wendland 1892: 38). There have been attempts to reject Philo's authorship of *De prov.* I altogether (cf. Diels 1879: 1–4).

[11] On Philo's family and his nephew Alexander, see e.g. Schwartz 2009:12–14.

[12] However, different representations of Alexander in the two dialogues (more favourable in *De prov.* II than in *De anim.*) suggest that *De anim.* was composed later than *De prov.* II. For a discussion of the two dialogues, see Terian 1981: 1–63; Terian 1984.

while Philo defends a Stoic doctrine[13]). In this respect *De anim.* resembles some of Cicero's dialogic works (such as *De finibus*, *De natura deorum*, *De divinatione*), in which philosophical arguments of different provenience, put in the mouths of Cicero and his friends, are juxtaposed and argued for and against. Similarly, several of Plutarch's dialogues – *Adversus Colotem*, *Non posse*, in a less direct way *De sollertia animalium* – are engaged in the refutation of arguments formed by philosophers (Epicureans, Stoics) of the Hellenistic period.

Unlike Cicero's and Plutarch's dialogues, however, *De anim.* does not explicitly associate views represented by interlocutors with particular philosophical traditions: neither Stoics nor Academics are mentioned in the text as we have it (there is only one passing remark concerning the Pythagoreans in *De anim.* 62). This reluctance to name specific philosophers and schools is consistent with the character of the text – with the rhetorical flavour of Alexander's speech, which constitutes the greater part of the dialogue, with the overall simplicity of the dialogue, and with the strong moralizing undertone of Alexander's speech (manifest in recurrent references to human depravity, which is contrasted with the chastity of animals – men fall short of animals with respect to self-restraint in food, drink, and sex; they yield to the pleasures of the stomach, are enslaved by food and drink, lead dissolute and adulterous lives which are sometimes even contrary to nature). The target audience of *De anim.* might have been envisioned in the figure of Lysimachos, a youth in the course of his education, and the simplicity of the dialogue may be due to it being tailored to the needs of a young audience[14].

A dramatic dialogue with a contemporary setting, *De anim.* depicts a conversation held by two interlocutors, Philo and his great nephew Lysimachos. The third key figure is Alexander, who, besides being a nephew of Philo, is also an uncle and the father-in-law of Lysimachos[15]. Alexander is not present during the reported conversation, but his speech is read out in the course of the dialogue. The inclusion of the author himself as a principal, authoritative speaker is believed to be an Aristotelian development[16]. Cicero and Plutarch also sometimes

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[13] For a discussion of the philosophical arguments presented in *De anim.*, see Tappe 1912; Terian 1981: 49 f.; for a detailed examination of the debate on the rationality of animals in antiquity and beyond, see Sorabji 1993. Mansfeld (1988: 81–84) discusses Philo's views on animals as presented in *De anim.* in the context of Philo's Judaism and his Bible interpretation.

[14] Cf. also a conclusion drawn by Mansfeld (1988: 84) that *De anim.* "only enters the outer orbit of Philo's thought, that connected with literal interpretation".

[15] For a discussion of Alexander and his relationship to both Philo and Lysimachos, see Terian 1981: 25–28.

[16] Cf. Cic. *Ad Att.* XIII 19: "Quae autem his temporibus scripsi Ἀριστοτέλειον morem habent, in quo ita sermo inducitur ceterorum ut penes ipsum sit principatus". For a discussion of the presence of the figure of Aristotle himself in his dialogues, see Hirzel 1895: vol. I, 292–294; Ruch 1958: 40–43; as Ruch observes, however, in another passage (*Ad fam.* I 9, 23), Cicero says that *De oratore*

include themselves among the interlocutors in their dialogues, though not always in a dominant position[17]. Like Philo, Cicero and Plutarch also include their family members and friends as characters in dialogues.

Philo's dialogue has a tripartite structure. First, there is an introductory conversation between Philo and Lysimachos, which provides background information about the occasion and the interlocutors and sketches the relationships between them. The exact time, place, and surroundings of the conversation are not specified, which leaves much to the reader's imagination. Next, Alexander's speech is read aloud; it constitutes the lengthiest, middle section of the dialogue. The speech argues that animals possess *logos* (which Alexander divides into two kinds, uttered *logos*, i.e. speech, and *logos* located in the mind, i.e. thought or reason)[18] and contains a plethora of examples of animal habits and behaviours[19].

Alexander's speech is followed by the third part of the dialogue, which, except for two short comments by Lysimachos, is dedicated entirely to Philo's refutation of his nephew's arguments. The figure of Philo is provided with an unmistakable air of authority here[20]. There is no encouragement for a discussion and shared exploration: Lysimachos does not ask any questions nor express any concerns, nor does Philo invite him to do so[21]. Again, Philo might be following the Aristotelian dialogic model here, in which, according to Cicero (*Ad Att.* XIII 19), the speech of others (*sermo ceterorum*) is introduced in such a way that

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is composed "Aristotelio more", though Cicero is not a character in the dialogue. For Aristotle's dialogues in general, see Laurenti 2003.

17 Cf. e.g. Plutarch's *De E apud Delphos*, in which Plutarch narrates a discussion in which he took part as a very young man. For Cicero's presence in his dialogues, both in his interventions as a character and in the prefaces, see Schofield 2008: 74–84.

18 On the distinction between uttered *logos* (λόγος προφορικός) and inner *logos* (λόγος ἐνδιάθεος), see Porph. *Abst.* III 2; also Terian 1981: 125; Sorabji 1993: 80.

19 There is a great overlap of the material and arguments between imperial-period texts on animals (such as Philo's *De anim.*, Plutarch's texts on animals, Aelian's *De natura animalium*, Porphyry's *De abstinentia*), probably a result of their authors' shared use of Hellenistic-period sources (paradoxographical collections, compendia of animal-world *exempla*, zoological and philosophical works on the behaviours and nature of animals), though one should not rule out the possibility of imperial-period authors influencing one another (in particular Aelian and Porphyry might have drawn from Plutarch). For a (frequently speculative) discussion of possible sources and relations between ancient texts on animals, see e.g. Wellmann 1891a; Wellmann 1891b; Wellmann 1892; Dickerman 1911; Tappe 1912; more recently, Müller 1975: 307–311; Bouffartigue 2012: XXXVI–LII. Some parallels between animal stories by different authors can also be found in Terian's commentary (Terian 1981, mostly parallels between Philo and Plutarch) and in Dickerman 1911.

20 For Philo's authoritative stance, cf. Runia (1986: 97) on Philo's *persona* in *De prov.* II: "It is perhaps no coincidence that snippets of the conversation remind us of the sage (here Philo!) taking his seat among the contentious philosophers and resolving the dispute".

21 In this respect *De anim.* differs significantly from *De prov.* II, which favours discussion rather than authoritative exposition.

the *principatus* – the principal part, the preeminence, possibly the authority – is given to the author himself (*penes ipsum sit*)[22].

The section dedicated to Philo's refutation of Alexander is considerably shorter than Alexander's speech (it amounts to about one third of it); taken together, the speeches may be conceived as presenting an argument *in utramque partem*, which Cicero, particularly fond of arguing both sides of a question, associated with Aristotle[23]. But there is no scepticism in *De anim.* and the two arguments – Alexander's and Philo's – are presented within the conversation between Philo and Lysimachos in a way that does not leave any doubt about which one is right. It is noteworthy that Alexander is in the spotlight a lot in the dialogue: his speech occupies about seventy percent of the text, a lot for an argument that the author disagrees with (by comparison, in *De prov.* II Alexander's objections to the concept of divine providence, interspersed throughout the text, constitute about one third of the dialogue). There are several possible reasons, both intra- and extra-dramatic, for such a structure of the dialogue. Within the dramatic setting, the relative brevity of Philo's refutation may be interpreted as a sign of his general dismissiveness toward Alexander's speech; or may be a result of Philo's conviction that a handful of examples suffice, as they make the whole matter clear by way of analogy (*De anim.* 80). As for extra-dramatic justification for devoting two-thirds of the dialogue to a contested position, it is possible that Philo considered the material contained in Alexander's speech – the animal *exempla* – as having some educational merit. This is suggested by Philo's remark in *De anim.* 73, where he agrees to the educational usefulness of animal stories: they are easy to grasp, memorable, and appealing to young people[24]. If interpreted correctly – and Philo's refutation provides the "right" interpretation of several of Alexander's examples – they are indicative of the amazing work of nature.

## PHILO'S *DE ANIMALIBUS* AND PLATO'S *PHAEDRUS*

One of the most interesting features of *De anim.* is that, while arguing for the position aligned with Stoic philosophy, the dialogue is closely modelled on

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[22] Though as Hirzel (1895: vol. I, 293) observes, we do not have a clear understanding of how exactly this *principatus* of the author was displayed in Aristotle's dialogues. See also above, n. 16.

[23] Long 2006: 299–304 (he believes that Cicero does not refer to Aristotle's methodology in his dialogues). In his discussion of Cicero's dialogues, Gigon (1959: 150 f.) distinguishes dialogues structured according to the principle of *in utramque partem dicere* (aporetic) and of πρὸς θέσιν λέγειν (elenchic).

[24] Plutarch's *De sollertia animalium*, in which the two young men deliver speeches filled with stories about animal behaviours, provides a great illustration of the use of animal-*exempla* in an educational setting.

Plato's *Phaedrus*[25]. The *Phaedrus* was one of the most popular of Plato's dialogues in Philo's times, read widely not only by philosophers, but also by teachers and students of rhetoric[26]. In *De anim.*, as in the *Phaedrus*, a speech of an absent character (of Lysias in Plato, and of Alexander in Philo) is read out and then argued against. Lysimachos is characterized by Philo in a manner reminiscent of Phaedrus and of Socrates (or, to be exact, of Socrates' ironic pose): he is always "eager to hear new things" and filled with "love for learning and hunger for truth" (*De anim.* 5, 76, cf. *Phdr.* 228 A–C, 236 E), ready to postpone whatever duties he has in order to listen to Philo (*De anim.* 76, cf. *Phdr.* 227 B). Alexander's speech makes a visible impression on him: as Philo observes, Lysimachos kept nodding his head and was "absorbed as bacchanals and corybants" during the reading (*De anim.* 73, cf. *Phdr.* 234 B). Yet, contrary to Phaedrus, Lysimachos, while apparently moved by the speech, is not completely persuaded by it: he has some objections to Alexander's argument and believes that it is against obvious evidence (*De anim.* 2).

Philo, then, peruses the structure of the first part of the *Phaedrus* in order to assign specific roles to the dialogue's characters. Alexander is substituted for Lysias, Lysimachos occupies the place of Phaedrus, and it is left to Philo to step into the shoes of Socrates. Alexander's speech, which parallels the speech of Plato's Lysias, is more of a rhetorical display than of a philosophical argument. It moves Lysimachos, but is far removed from the truth and real learning. Philo criticizes Alexander for coming merely to "entertain a relative with useless words designed to tickle the ears" (*De anim.* 3); we also learn that Alexander was unwilling to answer Lysimachos' objections (*De anim.* 2). As a result, Alexander's speech is defenceless, bereft of its father, as Philo observes after the speech has been read out:

> The affection of a father or of a mother for their children is unequalled. Even honest, wise, and knowledgeable parents blend with their words an indescribable affection when they relate their experiences to those who listen. They add quite a few nouns and verbs. That is fine and appropriate, you say. But from the interpreter's point of view, I admire your method. You appeared to present the subject much as the author himself would have presented it by reading. It seems to me that you have not omitted anything.
>
> (*De anim.* 74)

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[25] As observed by Terian 1981: 111. For a list of correspondences between *De anim.* and the *Phaedrus*, see Terian 1981: 265–271 (though I do not find all the parallels listed there persuasive). For Philo's references to Platonic dialogues in general, see lists of parallels in Billings 1919: 88–103 and Cohn, Wendland 1926: 19 f.; the lists testify to the importance of the *Phaedrus* for Philo. For a slightly later (2nd c. CE) reception of the *Phaedrus*, see Trapp 1990; of Plato in general, De Lacy 1974.

[26] The popularity of the *Phaedrus* in rhetorical circles is attested to by citations in rhetorical treatises such as Aelius Theon's *Progymnasmata* or Ps.-Hermogenes' *On forceful speaking*. Dionysios of Halikarnassos names the *Phaedrus* one of Plato's most celebrated dialogues (τῶν πάνυ περιβοήτων) and discusses it as an example of the elevated style (*Dem.* 7, 2).

The passage is somewhat obscure, yet the connection of *De anim.* with the *Phaedrus* suggests that in the original Greek Philo alluded to Plato's metaphor of an author as a parent to his text (cf. *Phdr.* 275 E, where Socrates says that a written text needs its father's support, τοῦ πατρὸς ἀεὶ δεῖται βοηθοῦ). Alexander, the father of the text, had a chance to discuss his arguments with Lysimachos and support them, but his unwillingness to do so left his speech bereft of a parent and defenceless. Alexander's lack of interest in discussing his arguments with Lysimachos justifies Philo's refutation of his nephew's speech behind his back.

By drawing the link between Alexander and Plato's Lysias, Philo might also have aimed to denigrate Alexander's speech as contrary to common sense. Lysias argued against common sense when he maintained that one should grant favours to a non-lover rather than to a lover, as Socrates wittily pointed out (*Phdr.* 228 D: "I wish he would write that you should give your favours to a poor rather than to a rich man, to an older rather than to a younger one!"). Alexander, on the other hand, argues that animals have reason; to Lysimachos, his argument seems to be against obvious evidence (*De anim.* 2), and for Philo against sound learning (*De anim.* 75).

By imitating the structure of the *Phaedrus*, Philo, as I have observed, steps into the shoes of Socrates. He is concerned only with the truth and is going to thoroughly and critically examine Alexander's position (*De anim.* 75). Yet, he does not imitate the *persona* of Socrates, his humour and irony, but is a figure of authority, direct and straightforward. His refutation of Alexander's arguments takes the form of a continuous speech which goes through several of his opponent's points and examples. Remarkably, as he argues against ascribing reason and virtues to animals, Philo is concerned that his demonstration that animals are imperfect and inferior to men might be understood as a criticism of nature (*De anim.* 100) and of "the sacred mind" (77), and therefore as sinful and sacrilegious. This, again, as observed by Terian[27], is reminiscent of the *Phaedrus*, in which Socrates felt compelled to deliver a second speech after he realized that the first one was offensive to the gods and impious, ἀσεβής (*Phdr.* 242 B–D). However, while in the *Phaedrus* both the speech of Lysias and the first speech of Socrates are said to be offensive to the gods, in *De anim.* Philo has enough prudence to steer his speech in a safe direction. This use of the motif of impiety is an instance of a creative adaptation of a Platonic motif, as the underlying understanding of divinity and of the offence committed against it (or, in the case of Philo, potentially committed) differs in the case of the two dialogues.

Philo's use of the *Phaedrus* as a model is remarkable, particularly if we remember that *De anim.* was composed around 50 CE at the latest, i.e. before the supposed "revival" of the dialogue in the hands of Plutarch. Though the loss of the Greek text of *De anim.* does not allow us to evaluate the full extent of the

[27] Terian 1981: 186, 206.

interplay between Philo's dialogue and the *Phaedrus* – in particular it is impossible to conduct comparisons of the stylistic and verbal layer – we can see that Philo skillfully makes use of mimetic strategies familiar to scholars of slightly later imperial period prose. He imitates the structure of the first part of the *Phaedrus* (the reading of a speech of an absent character followed by a counter-speech by one of the interlocutors); he distributes the roles of and draws the relationships between the interlocutors in line with the Platonic model – and thereby indirectly supplements their characterization; and he imbues *De anim.* with numerous Platonic allusions. He uses the *Phaedrus* selectively, choosing and highlighting elements which he finds particularly fitting. As a *mimesis* of a Platonic dialogue, *De anim.* bears a resemblance to such later texts as, for instance, Plutarch's *De genio Socratis* and *Septem sapientium convivium* (both modelled on the *Phaedo*), *Amatorius* (modelled on the *Phaedrus* and *Symposium*), Dio Chrysostom's *Charidemos* (imitating the *Phaedo*), or Athenaios' *Deipnosophists* (which is interwoven with allusions to both the *Phaedo* and *Symposium*); but also is reminiscent of Cicero's emulation of Plato in several dialogues[28]. This is not to say that all these texts rework their models in the same manner (one of the challenges of mimetic practice was to do it in an imaginative, attention-grabbing way) or for the same purpose (by imitating Plato, an author may intend to signal his philosophical affiliation, to bolster his authority, to locate himself within a particular literary tradition, to rethink and rearrange Plato's ideas, and finally to criticize Plato and to fill the Platonic matrix with new ideas which "correct" him). In *De anim.*, Philo makes use of the Platonic frame and enhances his own authority by putting himself in the place of Socrates, while at the same time undermining the standing of Alexander by depicting him as a new Lysias. Although he fills this frame with a wholly new theme – the question of the rationality of animals rather than love – he manages to touch upon some crucial themes of the *Phaedrus* such as the distinction between philosophy and rhetoric, represented in *De anim.* by Philo and Alexander respectively.

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

Let me summarize the results of my discussion of the format of *De anim*. The theme of the dialogue, its arguments and philosophical concepts are influenced by a debate between philosophical schools of the Hellenistic period, with a Stoic position favoured by Philo. The interlocutors include the author himself – an authoritative figure, upholding a dogmatic position (which distances him from, for instance, Cicero's scepticism) – and a member of his family. There is little

[28] For the presence of Plato in Cicero, see De Graff 1940; for Cicero's emulation of Plato's dialogues and their scenery, see Long 2006: 290 f.; for Cicero's *De oratore* as a response and emulation of Plato's *Phaedrus*, see Stull 2011.

interest in Socratic dialectic and *elenchus*. A continuous discourse is preferred to the question-and-answer format. The contested argument – that animals possess reason – gets ample space in the dialogue, although it is refuted by Philo in the final part of the text. There is a strong influence, at least in Alexander's speech, of rhetoric and of popular philosophical literature of a moralizing character. Finally, while Philo argues for a doctrine of Stoic provenience, he uses the Platonic genre and emphasizes his Platonic allegiance by means of imitation of and allusions to the *Phaedrus*. This is consistent with Philo's philosophical position, which draws from both Middle Platonism and Stoicism[29]; however, Philo's Stoic position in *De anim.* is noteworthy in the context of the emphatically Platonic format of the dialogue.

Composed a century after Cicero's dialogues and a few decades before Plutarch's, Philo's *De anim.* resembles them in many respects. It is reasonable to assume that the features shared by *De anim.* and a number of dialogues by Cicero and Plutarch are indicative of the development of the genre – or, to be precise, of a specific branch of the genre[30] – in the Hellenistic period rather than being the authors' own innovations. These shared features include the presence of an author and his friends as interlocutors in the dialogue, a contemporary setting, a preference for *oratio continua*, an engagement in the polemics of post-classical philosophical schools, the modelling (to a greater or a lesser extent) of dialogic conversations and interlocutors on Platonic dialogues and characters, and imbuing reports of contemporary philosophical discussions with Platonic reminiscences.

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[29] As Reydams-Schils (2008: 169) observes, "the scholarly debate over whether Philo should be considered a Stoic or a Platonist has been going strong since Lipsius, in the seventeenth century". The literature on the topic is abundant; see e.g. Dillon 1996: 139–183 and contributions in Alesse 2008.

[30] A typology of post-classical dialogic literature is a topic requiring a separate treatment.

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# HEAVEN, HELL, AND THE EARTH: INFANTICIDE IN SENECA'S *HERCULES*

by

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ABSTRACT: The methodology used in the paper combines the traditional philological method of text analysis with methods of interpretation of the object relations school of psychoanalysis. My focus is on the images of self and other expressed in characters' interactions as well as in poetic metaphors and similes. In the paper I describe several crucial self and object patterns of relationship that are intertwined in various ways. Through the analysis of conflicted self and object relationships, the central conflict of the play is determined as a conflict between two images of emotional dependence. Infanticide, as the dramatic climax of the play, is understood as an attempt to symbolically destroy the children and their mother, who stand for conflicted dependence patterns. The resolution, however, is not a liberation from the struggle between love and hate, but turns out to be another expression of painful dependence, depicted through Hercules' suffering towards the end of the play. The poetic dynamics of Hercules' madness seem to come very close to certain psychoanalytic theories of the narcissistic personality structure. Ultimately, in this play Seneca seems to criticize certain forms of pseudo-Stoicism by showing a caricature of the Stoic sage.

## INTRODUCTION

Despite the fact that the corpus of ten tragedies ascribed to Seneca had a great impact on Renaissance drama and Western tragedy in general[1], in the first half of the 20th century Seneca was not considered by critics to be a great Latin poet. A good example of the dominant view was that of Thomas S. Eliot, expressed in his essay concerning Elizabethan translations of Senecan tragedies. Having summed up the contemporary criticism of Senecan drama (empty, declamatory rhetoric, the lack of dramatic qualities), he concluded that "the tragedies of Seneca deserve the censure that has been directed upon them"[2].

Eliot did not consider Senecan tragedies to be completely worthless, but he believed that their "un-dramatic" quality was a proof that they were composed only for private declamation[3] and that in those tragedies:

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[1] Cf. Cunliffe 1893; Lucas 1922; Boyle 2009.

[2] Eliot 1966: 67.

[3] Cf. Kohn 2012; Zanobi 2014.

> ...the drama is all in the word, and the word has no further reality behind it. His characters all seem to speak with the same voice, and at the top of it; they recite in turn. [...] In the tragedies of Seneca the centre of value is shifted from what the personage says to the way in which he says it[4].

He also pointed out that "[i]n the drama of Seneca there are no conflicts, except the conflict of passion, temper, or appetite with the external duties"[5]. However, this view of Seneca has changed considerably within the last fifty years and many English-speaking scholars begin their treatment of the subject precisely with rejecting the opinion of Eliot[6]. In this Introduction I would like first to give a brief overview of the literature concerning the essential value of Seneca's tragedies and the relationship between his poetry and his philosophy, and then to show the main tendencies in the interpretation of the *Hercules Furens*. As it will become clear, these two problems are inseparable.

Berthe Marti, in her paper published in 1945 presented Seneca's dramatic works as a poetic expression of his philosophical ideas. She suggested that "Seneca did not intend to write plays after the manner of the Greek dramatists but that he adapted the technique of drama to the teaching of philosophy"[7]. Elizabeth Evans, who analyzed the tragedies from the point of view of Stoic physiognomy, was also convinced that "Seneca adapts his characterizations and portraits from earlier sources to meet the interests of his own philosophy and of his own day"[8].

In the following decades, however, it became clear that it is impossible to see Senecan drama simply as a poetic way of teaching Stoicism, and many scholars started to see the elements of the plays that are in opposition to the tenets of philosophy. Charles Segal, who used psychoanalysis (Freud and Lacan)[9] to interpret Seneca's *Phaedra*, emphasized in his introductory remarks a tension between *Seneca Tragicus* and *Seneca Philosophus*. He also stated that what is more attractive to the audience in the tragedies are their psychological, not moral aspects, and that Seneca's psychology is deeply un-Stoic[10]. Segal also pointed out that Seneca is especially suitable for those kinds of interpretations which refer to psychology because of the intimate context of performance and his focus on psychological conflict. Segal is close to Eliot in his emphasis on the significance of words and rhetoric in Seneca's plays[11]. Recently, Segal stressed the interior,

4 Eliot 1966: 68.

5 *Ibidem*, 71.

6 Boyle 2009: 3; Staley 2009: 8; Trinacty 2014: 29.

7 Marti 1945: 219.

8 Evans 1950: 183.

9 Segal 1986: 17.

10 *Ibidem*, 11.

11 "The phantasmagoric quality of Seneca's plays is related to his self-conscious elaboration of a text that has been experienced through reading, for it is the texture and evocations of the words,

psychological aspect of the tragedies: "In Seneca the tragic element operates in a struggle that is almost entirely inward, in a battle against the passions rather than in a head-on conflict with divine powers, universal moral principles, or an unyielding world order"[12].

John FITCH also criticized the older attitude towards Seneca, which looked for Stoic lessons in his tragedies, because this led critics to "disregard those elements in the tragedies which do not agree with a Stoic interpretation"[13]. He did not, however, go as far as SEGAL in arguing for the un-Stoic character of the plays. FITCH admitted the existence of the tension, which he ascribed mostly to the demands of the tragic genre: "in tragedy one takes a tragic view of life, in Stoic philosophy not"[14]. He suggested that Seneca wanted to be more "Stoic", but that the nature of tragic poetry inevitably led him astray.

Anthony BOYLE seems to agree with SEGAL that the value of the tragedies lies in their "pervasive concern with psychological interiority". What characterizes Seneca is "the focus on the inner workings of the human mind, on the mind as *locus* of emotional conflict, incalculable suffering, insatiable appetite, manic joy, cognitive vulnerability, self-deception, irrational guilt"[15]. As far as Stoicism is concerned, BOYLE noticed the difficulty:

> The tragedies abound in Stoic moral ideas (many traceable to the *Epistulae Morales*) and their preoccupation with emotional pathology and with the destructive consequences of passion, especially anger, is deeply indebted to the Stoic tradition (see especially *De Ira*). But such Stoicism is no outer ideological clothing but part of the dramatic texture of the plays, in which the world-view is generally unStoic, even a negation of Stoicism, central principles of which are critically exhibited within a quite different vision[16].

An important book by Alessandro SCHIESARO, devoted to Seneca's *Thyestes*, dealt both with the psychology of the play (again, through a psychoanalytic lens) and with Seneca's Stoicism. SCHIESARO began with an outright suggestion that:

> ...we would probably do well [...] to relinquish the desire to reunite the whole Senecan corpus under the reassuring, conclusive sign of Stoic orthodoxy, or even only of Stoicizing morality. We must give up the illusion of a "Seneca morale", who

rather than the action *per se*, that carry the meaning. Words fixed by a previous literary experience are elaborated to refract reality in the artificial light of rhetorical description. Language functions as the active medium of displacement, as the area where something analogous to the Freudian "transference" occurs. Language here serves less as a transparent window to a signified than as a translucent screen behind which appears a chain of other signifiers" (*ibidem*, 206).

12 SEGAL 2008: 139.

13 FITCH 1987: 40.

14 *Ibidem*, 43.

15 BOYLE 2009: 25.

16 *Ibidem*, 32 f.

> structures his literary production along the constant axis of philosophic doctrine, and welcome in its stead the nuanced image of an author who is at times enigmatic, often contradictory and always challenging[17].

However, SCHIESARO does more than that, since his interpretation of all Senecan poetry is based on an idea that it is repressed passion that unconsciously animates the poet[18]. The passions are “the driving force not just behind the actions of several characters but also behind the very existence of the tragedies as we read them, and especially how this genetic function is represented in the tragedies”[19]. Seneca’s poetry is, in Freudian terms (or rather in the light of ORLANDO’s work on the Freudian theory of *Witz*[20]), “a return of the repressed”[21].

SCHIESARO sees the repressed as a rebellious, “subversive”, evil force, trying to break through the barriers set by rationality, and this leads him to the conclusion that “[a]ll sublime, grandiose poetry is *nefas*, is inevitably implicated in transgressive actions, since it abandons self-composure in a heady atmosphere of semi-prophetic creation”[22]. In Plato’s terms, we should say that poetry is dangerous, because of its closeness with the *alogon*, because it is against reason[23].

> [Poetry] is the sphere of human activity where the kinds of thoughts, feelings and images which reason would rather keep under control and even silence are expressed and communicated. Furthermore, one might propose that the poet’s violation of this censorship is homologous to the tyrant’s transgression of behavioural norms[24].

I will leave aside here the question of whether SCHIESARO understands FREUD correctly[25]. This, however, leads SCHIESARO to the inevitable conclusion that

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[17] SCHIESARO 2003: 6 f.

[18] *Ibidem*, 12.

[19] *Ibidem*, 20.

[20] ORLANDO 1975.

[21] SCHIESARO 2003: 42 f.

[22] *Ibidem*, 55.

[23] *Ibidem*, 119.

[24] *Ibidem*, 120.

[25] I will limit myself to pointing out that his interpretation of the relationship between the id and the superego seems to be much more Lacanian than strictly Freudian. FREUD saw in literature an expression of repressed instincts, but he was far from focusing on the “transgressive” and “subversive” nature of the unconscious. It was LACAN or rather his popular reading in the revolutionary climate of the seventies in France that suggested the “subversive” potential of psychoanalysis to literary critics (see TURKLE 1978: 72–86). Those in favour of such a Lacanian FREUD easily forget that he considered the *restraint* of instincts by reason and not subversion to be the highest human achievement. He wrote about Michelangelo’s *Moses*: “the giant frame with its tremendous physical power becomes only a concrete expression of the highest mental achievement that is possible in a man, that of struggling successfully against an inward passion for the sake of a cause to which he has devoted himself” (FREUD 1955: 233).

poetry as such must stand against Stoicism and against any theory promoting moral order, for that matter. He writes: "Stoic theories on poetry fail to provide an adequate explanation of how the moral and educational value of poetry can be safeguarded in forms of poetry which represent negative *exempla*"[26]. Senecan tragedy excites the preliminary form of passions in the audience, but leaves the burden of choice (acceptance or rejection of the passion) to the audience alone[27]. Therefore, in terms of *Seneca Tragicus* vs. *Seneca Philosophus* SCHIESARO has to say that "[Seneca's] choice of the tragic form is inevitably perilous and ambivalent"[28]. He stresses the conflict between the tragedy itself and Stoicism, leaving no imaginable solution: "the other world, the one of passions, blood, revenge, hatred, deceit and darkness, has its appeal; its *horror* is inextricably fused with *voluptas*, its pleasure and beauty (moral or otherwise) forever disjointed"[29].

Recently, SCHIESARO noticed that "[i]t has long been known that Seneca comes closest, among ancient authors before Augustine, to a notion of the unconscious"[30]. But the fact that Seneca seems to be particularly apt for psychoanalytic interpretations does not have to mean that we have to accept the idea of the transgressive nature of poetry. A few years later Gregory STALEY wrote a book in which he also used psychoanalysis to some degree, but the conclusions were quite the opposite. STALEY points out that there are two schools of Senecan criticism: "a moralistic school that assumes that the plays are a vehicle for Stoic teaching and a skeptical school that sees them instead as utterly unconcerned about morality or even as hostile to it"[31]. SCHIESARO, obviously, represents the latter, which STALEY sees in terms of a "Platonic" view on poetry. He proposes looking at Seneca through another lens, through the lens of a Stoic idea of poetry. Then the tragedies are not a transgressive questioning of Stoic morality, but "a kind of *extispicium*, an examination of the insides in the search for meaningful signs. [...] Passion is a disease, a tumor (*De Ira* I 20,1), or an ulcer (III 9,5), and poetry, Seneca suggests, offers a way to make this truth manifest"[32].

STALEY calls those who reject plays on moral grounds "squeymish Areopagites", after Thomas Newton (an 18th century English author)[33]. He refers to an anecdote of Plutarch about Euripides (*De aud. poet*. 4 = *Mor.* 19 E) who reacted to an outburst of moral outrage during one of his plays by saying that he would not

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26 SCHIESARO 2003: 132.

27 *Ibidem*, 234, 252.

28 *Ibidem*, 252.

29 *Ibidem*, 254.

30 SCHIESARO 2009: 234.

31 STALEY 2009: 6 f.

32 *Ibidem*, 20.

33 "...those who judge and reject plays on moral grounds" (*ibidem*, 21).

let his Ixion go off the stage without being fastened to the wheel. SCHIESARO and others are for STALEY "squeymish Areopagites, alert to the moral dangers inherent in tragedy and inclined to believe that Seneca was, too"[34].

As STALEY shows in his book, Seneca is against the very idea that "the humanities can teach virtue or that drama can serve as a vehicle for engaging a broader public to think about philosophy. [...] Seneca's tragedies grow out of a different aspect of the Stoic tradition, the view that tragedy offers a vivid image of the human soul"[35]. The Roman poet and philosopher wants rather to explore the human soul and to "show it naked", which was "part of a long Stoic tradition". Seneca's goal is not "moral" in so far as we would take it to mean that the audience is given a lecture on what is right and what is wrong, but his objective is the "kind of clarification with which the Stoics associated the vividness of poetry"[36].

And this *is* a Freudian view (I would say, more Freudian than SCHIESARO's predilection to transgression and subversion). STALEY correctly states that "[l]ike Freud much later, Seneca turned to Vergil to construct an argument from the poet, an image of the invisible soul". The author means here the famous motto from the first edition of FREUD's *Die Traumdeutung*: "Flectere si nequeo superos, Acheronta movebo", taken from the *Aeneid* (VII 312)[37]. His understanding is that Seneca in his tragedies, like FREUD, wanted to show the truth and not teach morals:

> I argue instead that Seneca's poetics grows out of a conscious recognition that the soul must be made manifest; Seneca does not summon Furies from the underworld in order to release repressed desires but to reveal the otherwise invisible nature of forbidden emotions[38].

Christopher GILL is a very strong advocate of the thesis that Seneca's plays are completely Stoic – not because they contain Stoic sentences, but because they show that "surrender to passion generates internal conflict, madness, and psychological disintegration"[39]. The Stoic ideal of personality implies unity and coherence of the self, while chaos, disintegration, fragmentation, and conflict itself is a sign of stupidity and madness[40]. GILL argues that "we can see in Seneca's writings a consistent – and consistently Stoic – position on psycho-ethical

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[34] *Ibidem*, 22. He does not explicitly count SCHIESARO among those critics, but I would certainly do so, despite the fact that he is, obviously, far from *warning* against the dangers of the tragedy.

[35] *Ibidem*, 23 f.

[36] *Ibidem*, 68.

[37] Cf. a very interesting article about FREUD and Vergil by this author: STALEY 2013.

[38] STALEY 2009: 98.

[39] GILL 2006: 423.

[40] GILL 2009: 71–73.

integration"[41], mostly because Senecan heroes – conflicted, fragmented and filled with passions – are ultimately not pictured as "role models", despite the fact that SCHIESARO emphasizes their unconscious appeal.

David WRAY has recently published a very interesting paper in which he points out that if we view psychology as irrational and Stoicism as rational, then "we can acquit ourselves of the relation between his philosophy and his poetry by saying, very simply, that Seneca's tragic theatre stages the *repressed content* of his Stoicism"[42]. WRAY's purpose is to go beyond the opposing views of "the *folie* of Seneca's poetry and the *sagesse* of his prose"[43]. The author suggests that Seneca's tragic poetry is rooted in the judicial rule "audiatur et altera pars". If we want to convince someone to live according to reason and to relinquish passions, we will be much more efficient, WRAY argues, if we listen to his passions first, letting him express them. Seneca takes this rhetorico-judicial position in his poetry[44]. He says that "[o]n Seneca's view the process of philosophy [...] needs rhetoric, to plead both the philosopher's case against passion and also the opposing side"[45]. WRAY also suggests that "reason, Seneca thinks, must do more than plead. It must arbitrate as well – he calls reason the arbiter of goods and ills – and arbitration is valid only when the arbiter has heard both sides to the end and taken full account, full *ratio*, even of the personated reasoning madness of a tragic self"[46].

Even though recently there have been some very interesting suggestions for solving the problem of *Seneca Tragicus* vs. *Philosophus*[47], it seems reasonable to accept that there is and must be a tension between poetry and philosophy, which had been there in ancient culture at least since Plato. When it comes to the *Hercules Furens*, the scholars have noticed that there are two threads in the body of existing interpretations. Ten years ago Thalia PAPADOPOULOU pointed out a division between those critics who think that Hercules' madness grows gradually and continuously throughout the play (this group has a "negative" attitude towards the hero) and those who emphasize the virtue and innocence of Alcmena's son and the suddenness of his madness[48]. Hence the author sees Hercules as essentially "ambivalent"[49].

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[41] *Ibidem*, 81.

[42] WRAY 2009: 238.

[43] *Ibidem*, 245 f.

[44] *Ibidem*, 248–250.

[45] *Ibidem*, 250.

[46] *Ibidem*, 254.

[47] The problem seems to be very much alive. For instance, TRINACTY admits its existence in his recent book (TRINACTY 2014: 28).

[48] PAPADOPOULOU 2004: 268.

[49] *Ibidem*, 270 .

Early interpretations of the play were actually very "positive" about the main protagonist. HAYWOOD saw Hercules' madness as a natural condition, caused by "intense excitement following the killing of Lycus"[50]. For MARTI the hero was "the patron saint of Stoicism"[51] and she assumed that he was an allegory of the Stoic sage, persecuted by a cruel goddess, who, nevertheless, was able to triumph morally over his fate[52]. However, MARTI could not ignore the fact that the play is not a successful defence of Stoic tenets, so she suggested that the play's pessimism is due to its incompleteness. It is the *Hercules Oetaeus* which completes Hercules' fate by showing the meaning of his suffering and his apotheosis: the *Oetaeus* is for MARTI a summary and completion of all Senecan tragedies[53]. This interpretation is problematic, among other things, because most scholars do not believe nowadays that the *Hercules Oetaeus* is actually Seneca's play[54].

Twenty years later, Denis HENRY and Barbara WALKER gave an entirely different interpretation of the tragedy. Hercules was not a tragic hero, but a "circus impresario"[55], a "ridiculous demigod with aspirations for full divinity", who "[a]t no point in the play does [...] reveal heroic or impressive qualities of character; he does not reveal even real strength"[56]. According to their view, the *Hercules Furens* is tragic, but not because the main hero is tragic: "The sense of tragedy is pervasive in this play, but it never centers on Hercules. He has had contact with death for the purposes of the plot, but the significance of the tragic realm of Hell has escaped him"[57].

Not only these two authors suggested that Hercules' is not a Stoic sage, but rather a pathological personality. William H. OWEN also believed that Hercules' madness is "merely an extension of his sanity. Thus Juno's prologue and the mad-scene establish a counterpoint between the actual violence of Hercules' life and its so-called beneficience, which is grounded in astronomical delusions of birth and ambition"[58]. This view was further elaborated and developed by Jo-Ann SHELTON who focused in her book on Hercules' aggressiveness and violence[59], on the similarities between the tyrant Lycus and Hercules[60], and who suggested that

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50 HAYWOOD 1942: 422.

51 MARTI 1945: 221.

52 *Ibidem*, 224.

53 *Ibidem*, 224 f., 241 f.

54 Cf. BOYLE 2009: 15, 83.

55 HENRY, WALKER 1965: 17.

56 *Ibidem*, 18.

57 *Ibidem*, 20.

58 OWEN 1968: 305.

59 SHELTON 1978: 60–63.

60 *Ibidem*, 64.

all the time the hero had "the beast in himself"[61]. In her interpretation of the play, the tragic conflict is based on the fact that Hercules is self-sufficient and strong but there is an "excess" or "obsession" which makes him abuse his strength[62]. A similar view was also expressed by Fitch who pointed out that "there is no significant change in Hercules' attitudes; what Seneca has dramatised is not a transformation, but on the contrary the rigidity and unresponsiveness of Hercules' character"[63]. This character is based on pride and lack of emotion: "Feelings of human tenderness or grief come a poor second to his obsession with punishment, with elimination of evil"[64].

Those views were criticized by Anna Motto and John Clark who argued that Hercules was a totally innocent, virtuous hero, "persecuted by Juno and persecuted by her for what he is, not for what he does". According to these authors, the whole story of Hercules is nothing but "the story of deliberately oppressed and maligned greatness"[65]. This interpretation was supported two years later by Gilbert Lawall who also criticized the interpretations of Shelton, Henry and Walker or Fitch as "orthodox"[66], but wrong, and proposed a different reading. He used Seneca's reception of Augustan poetry as an argument for Hercules' "innocence" and "oppressed greatness": since Juno is modelled on Vergil and Ovid, she must be an external cause of the hero's madness[67]. The author also emphasized that "*Pietas* and *virtus* characterize Hercules from his first appearance on stage"[68].

What is a great weakness of this interpretation is that Lawall looks for arguments in what Seneca said about Hercules in his philosophical works, ignoring the difference of the genre and assuming that Seneca necessarily had only one simple view on Hercules throughout his whole life[69]. In fact, Seneca, in *De Constantia* (2, 1) and *De Beneficiis* (I 13, 3), makes of Hercules an allegory of the Stoic sage, but it does not mean that he necessarily showed him in the same way in his tragedy.

Kathleen Riley, in her book about Heracles, described Hercules' madness in Seneca's play as psychological[70] (contrary to – which is debatable[71] – the

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[61] *Ibidem*, 65.

[62] *Ibidem*, 72 f.

[63] Fitch 1979: 242.

[64] *Ibidem*.

[65] Motto, Clark 1981: 111.

[66] Lawall 1983: 21.

[67] *Ibidem*, 9.

[68] *Ibidem*, 11.

[69] *Ibidem*, 23–26.

[70] Riley 2008: 54 f.

[71] Cf. Stróżyński 2013c.

"externally caused" madness in Euripides' play) and she emphasized the continuity of this madness throughout the tragedy[72]. This view has recently been shared by Thomas Kohn, who in his book about the dramaturgy of Seneca's tragedy says that "[m]any aspects of the *Hercules Furens* appear unclear and confused. But instead of being evidence of poor and fuzzy dramaturgy, these in fact serve to emphasize the central theme of the play: Hercules' madness"[73].

In this paper I will show that Hercules' madness is an outcome of his very character, which is consistent throughout the play. I will also follow those critics who used psychoanalysis as a method particularly apt for interpreting Seneca's tragedies. But, unlike Segal, Schiesaro or Staley, I will use not Freud, but the school of object relations, for reasons which will become clear towards the end of the paper.

The interpretive method to be used here is a combination of psychoanalysis and a traditional philological reading of the text. I will employ some strategies developed by Otto F. Kernberg[74], which I will attempt to adjust to a treatment of literary material which differs in the number of ways from clinical material provided by a therapeutic or analytic relationship. The method is based on identifying self (that is, subject) images and object images whose relationship is marked by particular affects. Those images of object relations are expressed in tragedy both through the interaction of characters and through poetic metaphors and other rhetorical devices used in monologues or choral odes[75].

When the main patterns of self and object relationships in Seneca's play have been elucidated, I will analyze their mutual interplay. The result of such an analysis will be a new way of seeing the nature of the crucial conflict present in the play and the meaning of the infanticide as a symbol of the desperate defence against this conflict in the structure of the play. I will also refer my interpretation of the play to some psychoanalytic ideas about personality pathology and will end my paper by trying to address the problem of Stoicism in the *Hercules Furens*.

## THE BASIC PSYCHOLOGICAL STRUCTURE OF THE *HERCULES FURENS*

In an article devoted to the underworld narrative in Seneca's *Hercules* I offered a rather detailed interpretation of Hercules' descent to the underworld in terms of crucial object and self images. I suggested that those self and object images form a particular dynamic sequence, whose purpose is a psychological *defence* against painful affects (according to the psychoanalytical principles of mental life). The sequence consists of four relationship patterns:

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72 Riley 2008: 77.

73 Kohn 2012: 141.

74 Kernberg 1979, 1980, 1988.

75 For a more detailed description of this method see: Stróżyński 2013a and 2013c.

(1) a hungry self frustrated and enraged with an un-giving object,
(2) a helpless self afraid of a powerful, controlling object,
(3) a guilty self tortured by a sadistic object,
(4) an omnipotent, fearless self conquering a humiliated, devalued object[76].

This sequence can be simplified into three basic images of the relationship between the self and the object, since (2) and (3) seem very close to each other (the main difference being open aggression on the part of the object and a sense of guilt in the self). The first image is expressed in a most clear way through the poignant depiction of the barren, empty land of the underworld, in which Seneca abundantly uses earlier poetic descriptions of the Golden Age in order to *revert* the meaning of those descriptions. Seneca generally emulates Augustan poets[77], but does it here by building the antithesis of the Golden Age, of the Lucretian, Vergilian and Ovidian visions of maternal Nature providing her children with the immediate satisfaction of all their needs. The self is hungry and on the verge of dying of starvation, but does not die and has to live in a state between life and death, imprisoned in the relationship with the object that could satisfy this hunger but for some reason refuses to do so. This painfully frustrating mother is depicted by Seneca through poetic fantasies that either picture her as greedy and envious (it offers an "explanation" of why she does not feed the child), or as barren and empty (another "explanation" given by the infantile mind).

The second image is a direct consequence of trying to survive in a relationship with such a mother – there is a projection of rage on her, ascribing to her the intent to torture the self. In such a way another mother is created – powerful, having total control over the self and torturing it – either maliciously, or for some crimes committed by it (rage itself could suffice for such a "crime"). In order to express the image of this sadistic mother, Seneca recurs to a variety of traditional images of the terrifying Dis and perpetrators suffering all sorts of punishments in his kingdom.

The third image is associated with Hercules descending to the underworld and overcoming its power (Charon, Dis, Proserpine and Cerberus). It can be seen as an ultimate, efficacious defence against the intolerable dependence of the self on the evil mother, since the self gains superhuman strength and reverses the roles: now it is the mother that is frustrated, enraged, trembles with fear and is humiliated by the victorious self, represented by Hercules. The self is no longer dependent and weak, it becomes self-sufficient, powerful and godlike.

I also suggested that the underworld narrative can be seen as central to the meaning of the whole tragedy, functioning, as it were, in a way similar to a dream in Freud's theory[78]: here the hidden, repressed wishes and fantasies are permitted

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[76] Stróżyński 2013b: 158.

[77] Cf. Pypłacz 2010: 29–59; Trinacty 2014.

[78] Cf. Freud 1953: 122–162.

partial, symbolic expression[79]. If so, the same object relations or even the whole sequence of defensive transformations could also be discovered beyond the underworld narrative, in the totality of the play. Such an analysis, however, went far beyond the scope of the article in question – it was only mentioned that the climactic scene of Hercules' madness could be understood as a reversal of the process described in the underworld, as the breaking down of defences, instead of erecting them[80].

In another paper about Seneca's *Hercules*, I tried to take a closer look at three mother images in the play (Alcmena, Juno, and Megara) as well as at what I called the grandiosity of Hercules, that is, his extremely idealized, narcissistic self-image[81]. In the light of the analysis of the underworld it could be added that Alcmena seems to represent to a certain degree the first object relations pattern in the play, that is, the consuming hunger of the eternally dying self. Of course, the great difference is that underworld visions are very close to the primitive, oral fantasies of the infant, filled with terrifying images of devouring mouths or sharp teeth, of sucking in, vomiting etc., rather than the picture of Alcmena who, as I showed, is presented simply as a curiously absent mother, hiding behind the more vivid and present characters of Juno and Megara. This difference is due to the "dream-like" status of the underworld narrative and the "fully awake" status of the rest of the play (with the important exception of the Prologue/Act I and the madness scene). And yet, poignant references to the absence of a protecting and loving parent, made both in the case of Hercules' family waiting for the hero, while being on the verge of dying, and in the case of the silence surrounding Alcmena and Hercules' deep loneliness, can be understood as weaker, more rational poetic suggestions that an image of a child that is hungry for love and cannot have it is hidden in the play.

Juno, on the other hand, functions as a "wicked step-mother" of Hercules[82] and allows Seneca to depict an evil mother who is fundamentally connected with the second self and object pattern, that is, the sadistic mother controlling and torturing her helpless child. The dream-like status of Act I enables Juno to become a figure belonging more to the dark world of the unconscious than to

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[79] Stróżyński 2013b: 137 f. Cf. also Segal 1986: 180 and Schiesaro 2003: 2.

[80] Stróżyński 2013b: 159 f.

[81] Many scholars have noticed this: see Henry, Walker 1965: 19; Owen 1968: 305; Shelton 1978: 21; Fitch 1979: 243; Motto, Clark 1994: 269–272; Fitch, McElduff 2008: 177; Riley 2008: 75. Motto and Clark argued that such grandiosity is nothing strange in the case of such a hero as Hercules (Motto, Clark 1981: 109), but I strongly disagree: the more so because there are other features of his grandiosity than merely his pride. I borrowed this term from an American psychoanalyst known for his theory of narcissism and the development of so called "self psychology", Heinz Kohut (Kohut 1971). This term was later adopted by Kernberg, despite the fact that he understood the nature and sources of the grandiose self in an opposite way (Kernberg 1974).

[82] Cf. Wesołowska 1998: 53 f.

the world of broad daylight[83]. What SEGAL writes about the function of the gods in Seneca seems to be very appropriate here: "They are essentially metaphors for the passions or a screen on which the characters, left to the isolation of their own devouring emotions, can project their anxieties..."[84]. Thus Juno represents a very sadistic, terrifying mother image in the play[85]. Seneca shows that there is profound link between Juno's monologue and Hercules' madness scene, since the madness is precisely predicted and described by the step-mother. SHELTON points out that Act I and the madness scene are described as happening at the same time[86].

I suggested that in Act I Seneca gives us two pictures of the relationship between Hercules and Juno. At first, Juno describes herself as humiliated, conquered by the powerful Hercules. Her descent from Olympus to earth represents her symbolic degradation. This finds its precise counterpart in the gradual idealization of Hercules, his rising towards divine status: Juno descends, Hercules ascends, she loses power and prestige, he gains it, virtually from the moment of his miraculous conception[87].

The second picture, however, is actually the image of a powerful and cruel mother torturing her helpless child, which I mentioned above. Despite the fact that the *aeterna bella* (29) between Hercules and Juno are at first described as perpetual triumphs of the first and humiliating failures of the second part, there is a sense of fear and powerful hostility in the image of Juno sending monsters to kill Hercules[88]. In fact, those two object relation patterns seem to reveal

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[83] Cf. SCHIESARO 2003: 17, 27, 186.

[84] SEGAL 1986: 224.

[85] SCHIESARO points out that her meta-dramatic function in the play is crucial: she represents the poet, creating the tragedy, driven by repressed passions (SCHIESARO 2003: 17). He writes: "Juno's words do not describe reality as much as they in fact create it"; "she embodies the creative power of the author" (*ibidem*, 186).

[86] See on this: SHELTON 1978: 18; SCHIESARO 2003: 184–186.

[87] Cf. OWEN, who writes: "This allegory of mad ambitions to divinity which are ultimately frustrated by the nature of madness herself, Juno, develops extensively the topos of the stars as symbols of deification, in conjunction with the idea of the heavens as mirrors of the moral atmosphere on earth. Juno's opening catabasis from heaven to earth and to madness sets the tone for this inverted rendering of the theme. It is provoked by a moral disintegration so pervasive as to make the heavens themselves uninhabitable, springing as it does from Zeus' marital delicts" (OWEN 1968: 303). WESOŁOWSKA pointed out that Juno feels towards Hercules a mixture of hate, admiration and fear: such an attitude is a *reversal* of a typical mortal–immortal relationship (WESOŁOWSKA 1998: 56).

[88] All Juno's monsters are defeated and vanquished by Hercules (30–33). The hero "prevails" (*superat*, 33) all the time. Juno's frustration and Hercules' triumph are particularly emphasized by the goddess' desperate confession that she has run out of monsters (40) and that he wins all the battles with her almost effortlessly (41 f.; the motif of the weary Juno is probably taken from Ovid, as FITCH suggests in his commentary: FITCH 1987: 133 f.). The motif returns later in the play, when Amphitryon refers to the previously mentioned "eternal warfare" and describes how his infant son strangled terrifying snakes that Juno had sent to kill him. The word *superare* (to prevail over) is

a defensive dynamic too – the image of the fearless hero victorious over enraged goddess intends to undo the terrifying possibility that it is Juno who is going to win, since she is the deity and Hercules is a mortal man. In the idealized image of the fearless hero, playing with the frustrated Juno, we can see the last self and object relationship from the underworld, that is, the grandiose self, which reverses the roles and overcomes the powerful mother: he is not afraid anymore. However, already in Act I there is a hint that it is merely a defence, "wishful thinking" of a kind, since the reader knows that Juno will win by making Hercules mad. When, towards the end of her monologue, Juno summons the Furies, she is no longer identified with a weak, devalued mother, she is no longer – as Littlewood put it – a "helpless Juno"[89]: Seneca reveals her most terrifying aspect, represented by the powers of the underworld torturing guilty souls.

Now it is Juno who mocks Hercules, saying: "go ahead, proud man, aspire to the gods' abodes, despise human nature" ("i nunc, superbe, caelitum sedes pete,/ humana temne", 89 f.). She no longer appears as humiliated and it is Hercules who does not know what is going to happen to him. He is no longer in control – it is Juno who is pulling the strings. Her new "gang" of monsters (*Scelus*, *Impietas*, *Error* and *Furor*) will eventually rob or – if we accept Shelton's suggestion – are robbing Hercules *right now* of his sanity (96–98; cf. also 114–116). Seneca tries to show that Juno's identification with the sadistic mother is also her identification with madness itself[90]. She says that she has to be insane if she is to vanquish Hercules (108–112), and, later, she describes how she will possess Hercules' mind and guide his hands herself (118–120). Eventually, for this one moment they will become one[91].

Whereas in Act I Seneca focuses on a magnificent description of Juno as the embodiment of the evil mother and the grandiosity of Hercules is in the background, in the rest of the play we have much more about the nature of this grandiose self, which – as the underworld narrative reveals – serves a defensive purpose. In the paper about mothers in *Hercules*, I continued the observations of Fitch to show that Hercules – although he is obviously not an ordinary man – is seeing himself in a highly idealized way, just as the others see him – as a god, a saviour of the universe, almost equal to Jupiter. I also pointed out that it is

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repeated in this context and Seneca emphasizes the effortlessness with which the little Hercules vanquishes snakes that could terrify an adult warrior (215–222).

89 Littlewood 2004: 115.

90 Owen writes that: "Juno's *aeterna bella*, her insatiate desire for revenge [...] lead to her ultimate renunciation [...] of all personality except Madness" (Owen 1968: 303). Shelton also notes that "[i]t is madness that directs his weapons. Juno is a vivid dramatization of the disorder in the human mind" (Shelton 1978: 23).

91 As Rose pointed out: "...she [Juno] exemplifies *ira*. Her anger, hatred, and the dolor which craves vengeance on Hercules all reveal the turmoil of passion and prefigure a similar state of mind in the hero himself" (Rose 1979: 138; cf. also Rose 1978: 173–175).

this particular structure of Hercules' self that is responsible for his inability to experience a full range of human emotions, especially the ones connected with mourning, such as sadness and longing. Seneca pictures Hercules – both before and after the madness scene – as someone who is to a considerable degree inhuman, because he traded love for power.

It seems, therefore, that Seneca actually builds the psychology of Hercules in the play by means of the intricate interaction of those three patterns of relationship. It does not matter whether Seneca is describing Hercules' attitude to the world from his own perspective, from Juno's point of view (Act I), or from a somewhat neutral, third-person position (the underworld), those motifs, which I described in the two papers mentioned above, are repeated like musical motifs in various forms.

## THE DEFENCES ARE BREAKING DOWN: THE MADNESS SCENE

In this section I will analyze the madness scene in terms of the pattern described above, trying to argue that the madness is basically a breaking down of Hercules' psychological defences[92]. I will also substantiate my earlier suggestion that the pivot of Hercules' madness is an attack on love bonds and dependence[93]. According to the psychoanalytic interpretive method, it is precisely the breaking down of defences that allows us to see and understand the conflict that is being defended against. Analogically, the madness scene allows us to understand the inner dynamics of Hercules' character and the whole play. I will, therefore, propose an interpretation of the central conflict of the play and the significance of the infanticide in its structure.

The hero's madness is foreshadowed by his grandiose rejection of ritual purification, even though Amphitryon reminds him about it (918 f.). The hero seems to exalt himself above religious duties and to be praying not only to Jupiter, but also to himself. Motto and Clark suggested that it is at this point that the madness begins, but in the context of the whole play Hercules' grandiosity and omnipotence are typical features of his character[94]. The prayer, or rather, "self-prayer" of Hercules reveals a rejection of all dependence on the part of self, which is pictured now as totally self-sufficient. Jupiter, as the most powerful of the gods and the ruler of the universe, is no longer an ideal to which Hercules could aspire, as was suggested earlier, when Hercules is described in Act I as

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[92] Stróżyński 2013b: 159.

[93] Stróżyński 2013d: 126–128.

[94] Motto, Clark 1994: 272. Owen maintained that "[h]is madness is merely an extension of his sanity. Thus Juno's prologue and the mad-scene establish a counterpoint between the actual violence of Hercules' life and its so-called beneficience, which is grounded in astronomical delusions of birth and ambition" (Owen 1968: 305). Shelton also writes that the madness is a continuous process (Shelton 1978: 63–66) as well as does Fitch (1987: 30 and 36).

the one who wants to "earn" divinity by his labours and that divinity will be his reward. The hero practically sees himself as equal to his divine father[95].

Hercules prays for a new Golden Age. The Golden Age is a fantasy that reveals in a symbolic way this curious "fusion" between Hercules and Jupiter, in which the father of the gods becomes almost an "extension" of the hero's self. Now the idealized, grandiose self of Hercules possesses both maternal (Nature) and paternal (Jupiter) qualities, which emphasizes even more the wish that all the needs of the self are satisfied through this peculiar fusion[96]. Nothing is lacking, nothing is to be wanted anymore – it is a perfect denial of all need and dependence, since the self becomes its own mother and father at the same time. The images Seneca uses here are classical. The Golden Age is characterized by peace in which there is no aggression (927–931), by perfect weather (931–934) and by the absence of poisonous herbs (935 f.). There are also no tyrants and no crimes, and if any monster should appear, Hercules will destroy it immediately (938 f.).

In the light of the underworld narrative, this tells us a lot. In the underworld there was a negative, perverse image of the Golden Age and I proposed to see the grandiosity of Hercules as a defence against it[97]. Here we can see that the very grandiosity of the hero is designed as a denial and reversal of the terrifying image of the perverse mother. Since the mother of the underworld does not want or is not able to give anything to the hungry child, the child will convince himself that he does not need such a mother anymore and will take care of himself, becoming his own mother and father. Seneca links all Hercules' activity (the labours in particular) with the omnipotent fantasy of bringing back the Golden Age, where aggression and danger are eliminated, where all the needs of the self are satisfied and where the self controls everything. The idealized self image seems to contain no aggression, since this is non-existent in the Golden Age, but the idea of the destruction of all evil by Hercules already reveals the powerful hostility underlying this "peaceful" project[98]. Also, the Golden Age is associated with the rule of Saturn, who had been overthrown by his own son, so the res-

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[95] See Papadopoulou 2004: 275. Littlewood (2004: 110–113) interprets this prayer in a political way.

[96] It does not seem fruitful to analyze Oedipal conflicts here. Even though Jupiter as the father tends to be idealized, while Juno as the mother is hated and devalued, the difference of the sexes is not that clear and important as in typical neurotic dynamics. In fact, as I will show, maternal and paternal objects are actually interchangeable for Hercules.

[97] The underworld symbolizes painful and threatening self and object relationships, so Hercules' victory is a symbolic victory over those object relations. His victory is also reflected in Act I, where he constantly *superat* Juno.

[98] Henry and Walker noticed how the "solemnity and moral authority" of the prayer "cannot be long sustained. The ambition to destroy all evil elements which may threaten it proves to introduce disruption and chaos" (Henry, Walker 1965: 21). As Motto and Clark notice: "This boastful attitude smacks of hubris in the extreme. [...] Hercules seems to be dangerously vaunting against fate itself, and therefore it should come as no surprise to us when we learn in the play's very next

toration of his kingdom seems to convey some hidden hostility against Jupiter. Hercules, perhaps, imagines himself as a son who will overthrow the rule of his own divine father[99].

A price, however, has to be paid for establishing this ideal state. The price is the very humanity of Hercules[100]. As I showed, his relationships with others are shallow, he is emotionally and physically absent from his family, unable to mourn and to experience tender and loving feelings, because of his total rejection of any dependence on the object[101]. The earlier comparison of Hercules to Orpheus by the chorus (569–591) suggests that Orpheus also paid a price for his catabasis[102]. He lost his beloved who gave meaning to his life, but Hercules has no love in his life at all – he is pictured, therefore, as the one who had already paid the price for his grandiosity. His loss is associated with the realm of the underworld, but there is no particular moment in which the hero loses his ability to love and develop bonds of love. He aspires to divinity, but sacrifices his humanity in the process. As Juno ironically commands: "aspire to the gods' abodes, despise human nature" (89 f.)[103].

The madness of Hercules begins with the breaking down of the first layer of the defensive structure. The first sign is the darkening of the sky. A clear, luminous sky is connected to Golden Age imagery, so here it expresses the fact that the perfect state of the Golden Age is threatened (939 f.). Hercules' first hallucinatory fantasy concerns the rebellion of the Leo constellation. It has a deep symbolic significance. The Nemean Lion was the first labour of Hercules, so it represents all of his omnipotent, defensive activity. As Fitch observes: "It

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half-line that Hercules commences to display overt signs of an incipient and hallucinating madness" (Motto, Clark 1994: 269).

99 Hercules also says that in the Golden Age there will be no lightning, which is the key attribute of Jupiter (932–933). I would like to express my gratitude to the anonymous reader for suggesting to me the idea that bringing back the Golden Age may allude to the Saturn–Jupiter relationship.

100 As Owen pointed out, "[t]he traditional deification theme has been altered by Seneca to imply a faulty comprehension of reality which substitutes for healthy human aspirations delusions of celestial grandeur" (Owen 1968: 305).

101 See Stróżyński 2013d: 106–114.

102 See Papadopoulou (2004: 274), who notices the similarity, but links this with the "eagerness and haste" of both heroes.

103 Motto and Clark captured the atmosphere of this prayer: "At this point, Hercules' wishes and ideals take a flight into the unnatural. We have to assess fully not merely Hercules' naïveté that could generate such fantastic aspirations, but also the magnitude of his ego: for he appears to believe that only he, that he alone, can and will – almost instantly – eliminate all sin, crime, and difficulty from the creation, as if he alone could serve as instantaneous Savior, one about to institute a Nirvana purged of impurities, thereby providing us with a universe transformed to perfection" (Motto, Clark 1994: 271). However, they understand it as an expression of Hercules' madness, not of his ordinary character. They admit that "it is only reasonable to assume that the rising tide of madness has been upon him throughout the entire play", and yet they do not explain it in psychological terms, but see Juno's hand in it (*ibidem*, 272).

suggests a disruption of the order for which H. prayed [...] and a corresponding chaos among the seasons, for the point of the references to autumn, winter, and spring is that Leo is the zodiacal constellation of summer"[104]. The order that Hercules attempts to establish is disrupted, but it is disrupted by the Lion that he conquered and killed and that is a part of himself (45). I propose seeing this hallucination as a symbolic expression of the fact that the rebellion is a rebellion within the metaphorical "internal world" of Hercules. The self is no longer able to contain the aggression and the forces of destruction are coming to the surface.

The next hallucinatory fantasy (955 ff.) pictures what happens after the breakdown of the fantasy of the Golden Age, when aggression is unleashed. Hercules expresses his wish to invade heaven. Jupiter is no longer seen as an extension of Hercules' self, but now he appears to be not only distinct, but also antagonistic. Jupiter now represents an object which is wealthy (has divinity to offer: 959), but unwilling to give what he has. This is a self and object relationship that also appeared in the underworld. The object is denying the hungry self what it needs, but the self's frustrated needs are so intense that they become excessive, hubristic, and aggressive. Hercules' greed is accompanied by a metaphor of a swelling self (960), which appeared in Act I (68) as a symbol of Hercules' insatiable desire.

For a moment Hercules fantasizes that all the gods will welcome him on Olympus. The gates of heaven seem to be wide open for him, he is wanted there – it is a symbol of a generous and loving mother, a reversal of the frustrating mother of the underworld, but after a while the hero becomes sure that Juno will certainly oppose him (963). When he thinks of Juno, the situation changes immediately – the evil mother enters the stage (Jupiter is seen as merged with her into one object). This terrifying image of a hostile mother and father fused into one is called *impius* by Hercules, that is, devoid of natural, familial love (966)[105]. Seneca suggests here what was also clear in the underworld: the play hides a powerful image of a parent that behaves against nature, does not love, does not care or feed (even though the parent "promised" to do so, as Jupiter promised Hercules that he would fulfill his desires). This betrayal of the child by a parent is a source of powerful rage.

It is very interesting, therefore, that Hercules' madness reveals the same object relations that can be found in the underworld narrative. The hungry self is denied food (love) by his mother and the consequence is not only his rage, but also a projection of hostility on the mother and the creation of a terrifying mother-monster. Here, in this section, this monstrous image is constructed from the parental couple – there is no difference between the mother and the father. Seneca alludes here to the underworld, showing the deep connections between madness

[104] Fitch 1987: 365.

[105] Cf. *ibidem*, 370.

and this realm. Hercules imagines himself freeing the prisoners of the underworld (Saturn, the Titans, Centaurs) and leading them against the sadistic Juno-Jupiter couple. Eventually, the horrible powers of the underworld begin to appear before Hercules' eyes: the Giants and the Furies. The Furies, called earlier by Juno from hell, now appear on stage (976–986). We can also see the connection between the underworld images of punished prisoners and the Juno–Hercules relationship: in the hero's mind Juno, Jupiter, and Dis become one figure of a sadistic object torturing a helpless self.

The next section begins at line 987 and involves another change in object relation patterns. Hercules suddenly sees his children and is convinced they are Lycus' children (987–989 and 1001 f.). To understand this sudden shift we have to take into consideration that up to this point Hercules had experienced primitive emotional states which are based on deep dependence on the evil object. His grandiose self is completely independent, but after it broke down he became intensely dependent, firstly on the un-giving, frustrating object (represented by the gods on Olympus), and secondly on the sadistic object (represented by Jupiter and Juno, but also the Furies sent by her). Dependence on the evil object is extremely painful and frightening – that is precisely why it is defended against.

Hercules' attack on his children is a defensive move intended to free himself from the unbearable object relations. Alcmena's son defends himself by identifying with the sadistic object and attacking the children who represent his own dependence, his weakness and his fragile humanity. This type of role reversal – becoming the persecutor in order not to be a victim – can be frequently observed in clinical circumstances. By destroying the children, Hercules unconsciously intends to destroy the very self and object relationship which is so painful.

This can be seen when his attack on the children is accompanied by an image of an evil father (*inviso patri*, 988; *scelesti patris*, 1002). It seems to be a further development of an earlier image of Jupiter (or, as I showed, rather the Jupiter-Juno couple) as *impius pater* (966). The intent here is not to be a child of such an evil parent and the means is to become such an evil parent himself and destroy the whole relationship. By identifying with the persecutor, Hercules is no longer in a painful situation of being weak and dependent; on the contrary, he regains control and power, starts another labour, anticipates another glorious triumph. He comes back to his primary omnipotent fantasy of destroying evil and bringing back the Golden Age.

What Seneca seems to emphasize here is Hercules' close similarity to Lycus and Juno, the characters who functioned earlier in the play as the main representatives of the sadistic object (here again we can see that the distinctions between the mother and the father images are blurred – there is just an image of the sadistic parent, Jupiter = Juno = Lycus). Similarities between Hercules and Lycus are quite visible, and their images seem particularly close when Hercules does what Lycus wanted to do but could not: murder Megara and the sons[106]. Earlier Hercules destroyed the tyrant to protect his family and eliminate another "monster" from the world. Now he himself becomes a monster, even though, in his psychosis, he is convinced that he is freeing the world from one. Hercules' similarities to Juno are also significant. At this moment, she really seems to "possess" Hercules and guide his hand, they become one. This motif is clearly present when the hero with intended and unintended irony compares his murdered victims to an offering to Juno (1037 f.)[107].

It is obvious that Hercules is identified here with a monster as an extension of Juno. His qualities resembling monsters were hinted upon earlier by Juno (45), especially when she says that Hercules will vanquish himself, as if he were at the same time the hero and a monster[108]. The irony is that there is a difference between Hercules' delusional perception on the one hand and reality on the other. In Hercules' delusional fantasies he is a hero destroying monsters (Lycus' children, and later Juno herself), whereas in reality he is the monster destroying innocent, good people he imagines he is protecting from evil[109].

## LOVE AGAINST HATE, LIFE AGAINST DEATH

The scene of murder expresses a particular pattern of object relations which is almost absent from the rest of the play. The children are pictured as dependent and vulnerable: for example, Hercules' son stretches out his little hands and

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[106] Shelton notes that "Hercules is as much a tyrant as the man he has just destroyed" (Shelton 1978: 64). For a more detailed analysis of similarities between Lycus and Hercules, see Papadopoulou (2004: 271–273), who understands it, however, in terms of her own conception of the hero's "ambivalence", and Owen who observes that "Seneca has then created, in the figure of Lycus, a careful *Doppelgänger* of the hero, a man of deeds, brutal, a master of *bella*. Lycus differs from the hero only in his candor in recognizing his lack of birthright (337–339) and his reliance not on right but on force – which he, too, calls *clara virtus* (340). All of these themes finally coalesce in the mad-scene" (Owen 1968: 304).

[107] At this point, Jupiter seems to be again functioning as an ideal paternal object which, in Hercules' delusions, has to be protected from or freed from his malignant wife. It can be understood as an attempt to split the good and bad aspects of the object so that everything is not destroyed in the sadistic attack.

[108] Shelton describes this aspect as "the beast in himself" (Shelton 1978: 65).

[109] In this light, the words he says during his prayer: "and if she is furnishing some monster, let it be mine" ("et si quod parat monstrum, meum sit", 938 f.) can have a deeper meaning. The monster "will belong to him" in the sense that he will become it. Rose suggests that "[i]t is as though throughout his labors, not merely now, he has felt himself to be a monster" (Rose 1978: 124). Fitch is less straightforward in saying: "the monstrous evil will indeed be his own, as the onset of madness will immediately show" (Fitch 1987: 27). Motto and Clark in their paper emphasize that Hercules becomes a monster in the madness scene: "Hercules in a trice becomes himself the very monster he has been asking for" (Motto, Clark 1994: 270; see also Motto, Clark 1988: 292). And Papadopoulou: "This moment constitutes an elaborate dramatic climax, as the implication is that the monster that Hercules asks for is no other than Hercules himself" (Papadopoulou 2004: 271).

begs his father to spare him (1002 f.). It is an image of utter helplessness and fragility, but also of love and hope for the love of the object. At the same time, Megara – in contrast with the absent Alcmena and the sadistic Juno – is presented as the only good and protecting mother, willing to sacrifice her life for the children's sake. Therefore, I do not entirely agree with Shelton, who contends that Seneca does not develop "Megara the mother"[110]. He does not develop her psychology, but her function in the play is crucial, even though it is symbolic. She is the counterpart of the images of the evil mother which appear in the rest of the play – both the frustrating, un-giving mothers and the sadistic, torturing one, because she cares for and protects her children. She represents the humanity which Hercules lacks[111].

The central conflict of the play, then, is the one between two contradictory images of dependence[112]. There is an image of a vulnerable self which desires to be cared for and protected and there is an image of a frustrated, enraged, frightened self that is tortured by the evil mother. It can also be formulated in psychoanalytic terms as a conflict between love and hate, between life and death. In the whole play the forces of love are pictured as weak and fragile, while the powers of hate are strong and triumphant.

The grandiose, idealized self of Hercules is a defence against that conflict: if being dependent means to be hungry, terrified, enraged and tortured, then it is better not to be dependent at all. If the mother is so evil, it is better not to have a mother at all. I propose seeing the climactic murder of the family (particularly the infanticide) as a symbolic expression of desperate defence against this situation. To kill the mother and her children means here to eliminate dependence which is threatening. Why Hercules destroys what is good and not what is evil (as he did in his labours)? First, he has delusions that he is eliminating evil; but there is also another reason: evil is powerful, goodness is weak, so his

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[110] Shelton 1978: 30.

[111] Amphitryon says that the other son of Hercules died out of fear, looking at his father's face (1022 f.). The fear that the self experiences in the face of the sadistic object is pictured as the most intense. Hercules' actions towards the other son are, on the other hand, inhuman, more fitting for a monster than a human being (1005–1007). In fact, it is exactly the same image that was used earlier by Seneca when Amphitryon described how Juno's snakes, with horrible eyes, tried to kill the infant Hercules (215–222). It seems that Hercules does to his son what Juno tried to do to him when he was an infant.

[112] Critics tend to view this conflict in traditional terms of reason vs. passion. Pratt suggests that the images of control and security on the one hand, and non-control, chaos, and insecurity on the other "are the main images used in the *Hercules Furens* to convey ideas related to the theme of irrationality pitted against the ideal of reason" (Pratt 1963: 210). Shelton suggests that the conflict in the play is the discrepancy between Hercules' illusions about strength (*virtus*) and the reality of strength" (Shelton 1978: 28). Papadopoulou also seems to take this perspective and she adds that "this conflict in Seneca takes on an added meaning when it is filtered through a Roman audience familiar with the Stoic treatment of the issue" (Papadopoulou 2004: 278).

identification with a monster and destruction of humanity is choosing power, even if it is evil, over love, when it is seen as weak.

It can be also suggested that the image of the family as threatened by Lycus that was encountered by Hercules after his coming back from the underworld functioned as a "trigger" responsible for the breakdown and madness. Hercules, who fantasized about protecting the whole world and bringing back the Golden Age, realized that he could not protect his own children and wife from evil. This may have led to a conclusion that he is not omnipotent, that he is actually vulnerable and that his love and his family is his fragile point. The only way to become self-sufficient and safe from pain is, therefore, to get rid of his family and thus to get rid of dependence[113].

In my recent papers about Euripides' *Medea* and *Heracles*, I interpreted the meaning of infanticide in those plays in a similar vein[114]. I also showed that there is an essential difference between those two tragedies in terms of presenting the symbolic attempt to destroy painful dependence to escape the conflict. While in the *Medea* this destruction is described as the successful establishment of inhuman control represented by Medea in a dragon-chariot, in the *Heracles* there is a successful attempt to begin the restoration of the destroyed internal world of object relations through the process of mourning. Seneca uses infanticide in the *Hercules Furens* in the same way that Euripides did – to symbolize an attack on dependence and the ability to love, but his play is a sort of combination of the two plays of the Greek author. As in the *Heracles*, there is an opportunity for mourning and the reparation of what was destroyed, but, as in the *Medea*, the forces of destruction remain stronger than the creative forces[115]. Thus Seneca gives a very interesting picture not only of failed mourning, but also gives a different ending that we find in Euripides' *Medea*: instead of inhuman triumph, the main character suffers equally inhuman misery.

When Hercules wakes up, he is not yet aware of what he has done. He looks somewhat helpless, especially since the reader, as well as the chorus, Amphitryon and Theseus, can see the depth of his misery more than he can. The change in his self-image is reflected by his straightforward admittance that he is afraid: "I confess with shame that I am afraid" ("pudet fateri: paveo", 1147). When he wonders where his father and wife are, he seems to be pictured, for a fleeting

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[113] Note the completely different interpretation of infanticide in SCHIESARO: "Astyanax's death is thus highly symbolic, as are the deaths of so many other children in Senecan tragedy. In *Hercules furens*, *Troades*, *Medea*, *Phaedra* and *Thyestes*, children are sacrificed to a regressive logic of revenge, punishment and furor. Their deaths testify to the overwhelming power of the past over the future" (SCHIESARO 2003: 202). I suppose that infanticide can or even must have a different function in different contexts and Seneca's plays *are* different.

[114] Cf. STRÓŻYŃSKI 2013a and 2013c.

[115] HAYWOOD sees both plays as similar in that regard (HAYWOOD 1942: 424). Cf. also FITCH 1979: 248 and RILEY 2008: 85–92.

moment, as a lonely child in need of protection: "Where are you, father? Where is my wife, so proud of her flock of sons?" ("ubi es, parens? Ubi illa natorum grege/ animosa coniunx?", 1149 f.). His helplessness is also emphasized by the fact that he is unarmed – also a symbol that his psychological defences have gone ("Where are my arrows, my bow?"; "ubi tela? ubi arcus?", 1153). As Shelton points out, "the catastrophe has stripped Hercules of his emotional and material defences"[116]. But it is but a passing moment – as soon as the audience realizes and feels the self image reflected in Hercules, the image of a dependent, frightened and helpless self in an insecure world, Seneca begins to show how Hercules tries to restore his ideal self.

Hercules admits that he has been disarmed, but immediately starts to wonder who could be so brave as to take away his arms in his sleep. In this very question we can see that he is trying to imagine himself as so powerful that it demands great courage to approach him, even when he is asleep (1154 f.). He says he would like to see his conqueror, who appears to be a replica of himself – perhaps, another son of Jupiter, his twin brother (1156–1159). The grandiosity of this fantasy lies in the fact that he cannot conceive of anyone who might conquer him apart from someone who is just like him, who is another version of him.

The situation changes when Hercules sees the corpses of his wife and children. His first reaction reveals his inability to mourn, which, as I wrote in an earlier paper, is due to the structure of the grandiose self. Instead, he is enraged and wishes to destroy the perpetrator. The idealized twin-brother who disarmed him in his sleep turns into a sadistic persecutor who killed his family and must be punished immediately. He wants to act in an instant: "I make no delay in fighting" ("nulla pugnandi mora est", 1171). The experience of mourning is unbearable, because it involves dependence and guilt, and so Hercules tries to come back to his grandiose self, whose power and aggression could eliminate evil and control everything. Assuming the role of the hero who ventures on another labour is intended to save Hercules from experiencing the utter powerlessness and despair of his situation.

The sight of the sad, grieving faces of Theseus and Amphitryon undercuts Hercules' attempts: *they* can mourn, *they* can weep (1178–1180), and *they* can experience what he cannot, thus reminding him of this aspect of being human which he is trying to avoid at all cost. He asks them in the way he earlier asked his family when they were threatened by Lycus: "postpone your tears" ("differte fletus", 1175), but to no avail[117]. Hercules is not able to cling to his grandiosity

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[116] Shelton 1978, 67.

[117] Fitch's comments on this reaction seem to show it very clearly: "His first reactions to the deed are entirely typical of him. Once he perceives that his wife and children have been murdered, he wastes no time on grief but concerns himself at once with revenge (1163 ff.). In asking the grief-stricken Amphitryon and Theseus to name the murderer, he uses a revealing phrase – *differte fletus*

any more – he identifies instead with a dependent self, stretching out his hands towards his father (1192). He realizes that it is he who murdered his family, but still begs Amphitryon to confirm this terrible suspicion.

At a certain point Hercules has insight into his inability to mourn: "O heart too fierce!" ("Pectus o nimium ferum!", 1226). Shelton writes: "his realization of guilt and acceptance of responsibility are heroic features. Hercules' reaction to his guilt signals a return to sanity"[118]. This does not seem to be accurate, since Hercules admits that he *cannot* cry and mourn for his family because his face cannot weep: "This face, hardened by sufferings, is incapable of weeping" ("hic durus malis/ lacrimare vultus nescit", 1228 f.). Hammond has recently written about the way that Seneca in the *Thyestes* uses body parts to express passions symbolically[119]. Here *vultus* has a similar meaning, that of the psychological defence against dependence, the grandiose, omnipotent self showed to others, consequently preventing intimacy with others[120].

I wrote in another article about the meaning of Hercules' suicidal wishes[121]. Here I just want to stress that the hero is much more afraid of being weak and dependent than of death, which here is thought of as his ultimate triumph over monsters, his total control over fear and dependence. Amphitryon's speech in response to those suicidal wishes represents realistic, caring and loving object relations, which are inaccessible to Hercules[122]. Amphitryon is a loving parent who was always worrying about his beloved son. The image seems to be maternal rather than paternal. At the same time, Amphitryon is able to identify with a dependent self, when he begs Hercules not to be abandoned by him. This reaches its greatest intensity in his poignant wish: "always as your father I long for the enjoyment and touch and sight of you, my absent son" ("semper absentis pater/ fructum tui tactumque et aspectum peto", 1256 f.).

(1175) – which echoes his words to wife and father earlier, on his return from the long and dangerous exploit in the underworld: *differ amplexus, parens, coniunxque differ* (638 f.), he says to them, as he hurries off again to dispatch Lycus. Feelings of human tenderness or grief come a poor second to his obsession with punishment, with elimination of evil – with police action, so to speak. Again later in Act V, when he discovers that the murderer is himself, his immediate thought is for an adequate punishment (1202 ff.)" (Fitch 1979: 242).

[118] Shelton 1978: 68.

[119] Hammond 2009: 108–114.

[120] Fitch and McElduff have written recently that Hercules' grandiose self "becomes a straight-jacket for the authentic self: Hercules' heroic self-concept prevents him from relating adequately to father and wife (626–639), or weeping for the family he has destroyed (1226–1229), or responding wholeheartedly to his father's need of love and support" (Fitch, McElduff 2008: 177).

[121] Stróżyński 2013d: 108–110.

[122] Fitch writes that Amphitryon represents "qualities of unambitious sanity and human love" (Fitch 1979: 242).

Hercules' answer shows a powerful contrast to Amphitryon's. His son does not reciprocate this love – he says that there is nothing here worth living for ("I have lost all of value"; "cuncta iam amisi bona", 1259). Death is idealized as the only solution. For Hercules human love is not a solution at all – it is a threat. Amphitryon says that Hercules' suicide will kill him, but the hero does not seem to care. The father offers him forgiveness and a possibility of expiation, but Hercules does not want it, since it would mean, again, dependence and an experience of guilt, giving the self up to the more powerful, good object which has been harmed by the self's aggression. And Hercules cannot enter such dependence; he wants power at any cost and that is why he mistakes love for a desire to control, and says that if Amphitryon loves him, he will let him kill himself, so that he could be victorious in the end (1269–1272)[123].

Theseus also tries to convince Hercules. He is also a symbol of love, care, and human relatedness. He weeps and hopes that Hercules will be moved by that ("let yourself be moved by my tears also"; "sed tamen nostro quoque/ movere fletu", 1273 f.). The hero, however, thinks only of the restoration of his grandiose, omnipotent self that will save him from agonizing dependence and mourning (1278 ff). Eventually, Amphitryon agrees to give Hercules back his arms. Hercules comments that this act is worthy of Hercules' parent, as if Amphitryon has proved himself to be worthy of him (1295). The bitter irony is that Hercules subtly devalues his father, who is actually behaving in a more human way than he[124]. A little later Amphitryon, in a longer speech, describes to Hercules in what way his decision affects him. Hercules is able to save his father from death by saving himself – concern for the other is equated with life, while triumph – with death (1308). Papadopoulou called what Amphitryon does here "psychological blackmail"[125], and it certainly can look like that, but in the whole context of Hercules' lack of concern for others and his lack of empathy, what his father does seems to be rather an extreme measure that is supposed to shake Hercules and show him what he is really doing with himself and others[126]. Amphitryon

[123] Fitch emphasizes "Hercules' lack of consideration for Amphitryon. When the old man appeals to Hercules in terms of his personal need, he meets with a blank refusal" (Fitch 1979: 246).

[124] For Lawall, who sees in this episode, curiously, "a humble, pious" supplication (Lawall 1983: 16), it is a "moment of triumph for Hercules" (*ibidem*, 18).

[125] Papadopoulou 2004: 279. She also writes that "Hercules' decision to live is presented as the result of a psychological manipulation on the part of Amphitryon" or "Amphitryon's 'ultimatum' which is addressed, it should be noted, not strictly to Hercules' concern for his father but rather to his concern for his own reputation (1306 f.)" (*ibidem*). I would rather emphasize the fact that it is Hercules who is concerned only with his "reputation" (self-image) rather than a possible "manipulative" aspect of Amphitryon's speech.

[126] Shelton writes that "his final submission to Amphitryon's emotional plea against suicide is puzzling" (Shelton 1978: 69), but she understands the last part of the play as Hercules' realization of the Stoic notion of *virtus*, whereas the situation seems quite un-Stoic.

points the sword to his chest and it seems like a theatrical gesture, but in fact it is rather a metaphor for the actions of Hercules' grandiose self. Earlier, he put his family in danger by being absent and chasing monsters, later, he killed his family in madness, but, now, as Amphitryon tries to demonstrate, he can really become a murderer in a different way: by rejecting love and destroying love's bonds with full awareness. This will be a crime of Hercules in his right mind, "Herculis sani scelus" (1313).

Amphitryon represents here the forces of love, care, and concern for others, as well as the forces of forgiveness and reparation of the horrible damages that were done, metaphorically, in the internal world of Hercules. The grandiose self destroys and kills the capacity to love, to depend, to mourn – everything that makes us human. Amphitryon's gesture is intended to show to Hercules that by killing himself he is able to restore a sense of triumph and power, but at the cost of destroying the good that is still left[127] – Amphitryon (and, implicitly, also Theseus) who are not destroyed by his madness and can be a source of healing[128].

Hercules decides to save himself and his father, and by this Seneca lets some hope survive the utter destruction[129]. Amphitryon shows Hercules, or rather – the audience (since Hercules does not seem to understand the full scope of it), that love and concern have the power to heal damage, even though they cannot eliminate pain. Moreover, pain is inseparable from dependence and from love – the elimination of pain that was intended by the omnipotent, grandiose self was inhuman. Amphitryon identifies with a self that can depend, love, and

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[127] I partially agree with Fitch's observation that "[t]he irony is, of course, that he uses Hercules' own methods against him. He forces Hercules to recognise the destructiveness of an impulsive resort to violence, and to the weapons which effect it" (Fitch 1979: 242). Later he points out that "[t]he final decision against suicide, it should be re-emphasised, is a reluctant one, taken under duress. Although it is expressed in terms of Herculean endurance, the words suggest defeat rather than victory" (*ibidem*, 247).

[128] Fitch writes: "Does this not give at least a partial solution to the tragedy? Of course it does; and it is significant, in terms of the major themes of the play, that the resolution will come about through the power of tolerance and love against evil, rather through retributive punishment [...] but he shows no sign of being transformed by love himself, nothing like the recognition of the value of φιλία which he gains in Euripides' play. Like the other Senecan dramas, then, the *H. F.* leaves the central conflict of the play unhealed and unresolved" (Fitch 1979: 248).

[129] Papadopoulou, however, seems to go too far in her comparison of the *Hercules* to Euripides' *Herakles* in that regard. She writes: "At the end of the Senecan play there is some hope of Hercules following his decision to live. Thus a positive tone seems to be introduced as in the case of Euripides' *Herakles*" (Papadopoulou 2004: 278). She points out the similarities between the two plays, whereas Fitch focuses on the differences between the two endings and concludes that "Hercules' decision to live on is not a source of new hope, and that his final speech is a long cry of pain" (Fitch 1987: 38). Even though I would agree that there is little hope left in Seneca's *Hercules*, Fitch seems to disregard the dramatic function of the surviving characters: Amphitryon and Theseus, and what they stand for. Henry and Walker concentrated on showing that "Seneca seems concerned mainly to suggest the mental incapacity of Hercules and his lack of dignity when real suffering comes" (Henry, Walker 1965: 19).

receive help from the other, even though it still suffers a great deal. This healthy dependence is pictured by Seneca in the image of the old man leaning on his son (1319–1321). Hercules does not seem to realize the meaning of it. He immediately fantasizes about himself, his self-image, imagining himself as the greatest criminal ever and wondering which place can hide him with his unbearable shame (1321 ff.). To the very end he tries to defend himself from suffering by self-idealization: he imagines the whole world avoiding him and heaven changing its movement because of him (1332 f.).

The whole last section of the play shows the primitive object relations that were hidden and defended against earlier[130]. The underworld is mentioned not without a reason. Hercules' repeated desire to return to the kingdom of Dis reflects his identification with those primitive self and object images[131]. In the madness scene Hercules is identified with the sadistic self and object relationship; here he is identified with the more primitive self image – with the hungry, dying self in relation to the unloving mother. It is symbolically expressed by the hero's saying that no place on earth will receive him and welcome him any more[132]. In this we can see an image of the mother that does not want her child, rejecting it entirely, and the child being left alone and helpless.

Hercules is so deeply identified with this inner state that he is not able to receive the help that Theseus and Amphitryon offer him[133]. He is imprisoned in the world of hate, in the world of an unloving object: heaven turns his parental face away from Hercules (1332–1334). Hercules does not want to live in such a world, but he has to. He wants to hide, to disappear, to die, but he has to live on. The unbearable reality of the underworld is reactivated here as if Hercules has come back to hell – not as the victorious hero, but as a tormented soul.

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[130] Papadopoulou (2004: 279) notes that "[t]he image of a yielding Hercules is important as it is unprecedented in the play and follows the equally new image of a vulnerable Hercules after the mad slaughter of his family", even though she understands the meaning of it differently.

[131] Cf. Henry, Walker 1965: 19.

[132] Owen notices that "[t]he expansive terrain has now, with pathetic irony, become the guarantor of the hero's contamination and concomitant humanization (1321–1341). The very lands and stars that knew his fame now, by that knowledge, prevent him from hiding himself and his guilt. Thus, a figure which seems at the outset no more than a rhetorical exaggeration has, through the broader working of the celestial references which it conventionally contained, significantly changed and been revitalized. It has become a vivid symbol for the overreaching which is the key to Hercules' personality and his tragedy" (Owen 1968: 307).

[133] Even though I generally agree with Owen's understanding of Hercules' grandiosity and aggressiveness, I do not think, as he does, that "[t]his ultimately is resolved when Hercules renounces the entire immortal fabric of illusion, the convenient moral escape of having been ordered (1200, 1237, 1297), and accepts both responsibility (1238, 1261 f., 1278) and the genuine paternity of Amphitryon (1315)" (Owen 1968: 305). Fitch is much closer to my understanding: Fitch 1979: 248. It is also Owen who speaks about the "final humanization of the hero" (Owen 1968: 304); Shelton (1978: 68 f.) and Lawall (1983: 22–26) also argue for his moral and human triumph, analogous to what happens in Euripides' Heracles.

Theseus said about the underworld: “the place of death is worse than death itself” (“ipsaque morte peior est mortis locus”, 706)[134]. It seems like a good description of Hercules’ psychological state towards the end of the play: he is stuck somewhere between life and death, in a state that is worse than death, because real death would be a liberation from it.

## THE NARCISSISTIC WORLD

In this paper I have used some psychoanalytic methods of interpretation to understand the meaning of Hercules’ madness in the structure of the whole play. Literary characters are not real people, so we can only talk metaphorically about their “psychology”. It seems that in his poetry Seneca presents psychological processes that *could* exist in living people, too. As Segal put it: “they [*scil.* Senecan characters] can serve as symbolic condensations of the author’s insights into the human condition, as the congruent parts of an imaginative sketch into which he distills the most essential details”[135].

I would, however, be very cautious about treating Senecan characters as if their behaviour and utterances were being observed in a psychotherapist’s room. Nevertheless, I have used some concepts in this paper which were developed by psychoanalysts during their work with patients suffering from a narcissistic personality. I have mainly used the theories of Herbert Rosenfeld and Otto F. Kernberg who belong to the *sensu largo* object relations school of psychoanalysis[136]. Seneca’s poetic vision of Hercules’ madness and misery is so strikingly similar to the ideas of these two psychoanalysts, especially Kernberg, that I will allow myself to show those intriguing similarities.

Herbert Rosenfeld worked with deeply disturbed patients who are considered to be on the verge of psychosis, and most of his cases reveal great amounts of aggression and destructiveness. Out of his experiences with such patients, Rosenfeld built a theory of pathological narcissism which is based on the

[134] It has also been noticed by Owen, even though he understands it in different terms: “There is one final aspect of the celestial imagery of the *Hercules Furens* which we must note: Hell. As consistently and significantly characterized by its murk and starlessness as by its natural inevitability and finality for all mortals, it offers still the only real hint of salvation, even of deification. Although the good and bad alike must die, that inevitable path leads, for the good at least, to the stars (742–743): ‘longa permensus diu / felicis aevi spatia vel caelum petit’. Thus the true realization of Hercules’ ambitions is not apparently to be found in the main conquest of Hades but in the mortal subjection to it. If Hell lacks stars, it is the only route to them. A similar perception of real philanthropy appears in Hercules’ final recognition that Theseus’ contemplative approach to sin, and not his own violent and purgative way, holds the only promise (1336–1338)...” (Owen 1968: 307).

[135] Segal 1986: 14.

[136] Rosenfeld is much closer to the ideas and techniques of the founder of the school, Melanie Klein, whereas Kernberg created a synthesis of object relations theory with the American ego psychology.

premise that self-idealization and the idealization of aggression is a defense against dependence. He wrote:

> ...when considering narcissism from the destructive aspect, we find that again self-idealization plays a central role, but now it is the idealization of the omnipotent destructive parts of the self. They are directed both against any positive libidinal object relationship and any libidinal part of the self which experiences need for an object and the desire to depend on it[137].

In Seneca's play, Hercules manifests many of the features described by Rosenfeld. The British psychoanalyst also points out that the destructive, omnipotent self of the narcissist directs its hostility in a symbolic way towards his parents:

> The whole self becomes temporarily identified with the destructive self, which aims to triumph over life and creativity represented by the parents and the analyst by destroying the dependent libidinal self experienced as the child. The patient often believes that he has destroyed his caring self, his love, for ever and there is nothing anybody can do to change the situation[138].

Actually, Rosenfeld describes an internal catastrophe, an internal murder in the psychological world of the narcissistic personality, of which the murder of Hercules' family would be a very good illustration. What the Roman poet pictured through a whole series of events is for Rosenfeld a permanent state in which the patient has to live.

Metaphors of killing are often used by the British psychoanalyst. For example, such a passage seems very close to what we can observe in Seneca's play:

> It appears that these patients have dealt with the struggle between their destructive and libidinal impulses by trying to get rid of their concern and love for their objects by killing their loving dependent self and identifying themselves almost entirely with the destructive narcissistic part of the self which provides them with a sense of superiority and self-admiration[139].

I find Hercules' "depression" towards the end of the play very close to what Rosenfeld found in some of his patients, who "become very depressed and suicidal, and their desire to die, to disappear into oblivion, is expressed openly. Death is idealized as a solution to all problems"[140]. He also reported the

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137 Rosenfeld 1971: 173.

138 *Ibidem*.

139 *Ibidem*, 174. Compare also: "they [*scil*. narcissistic defences] are directed against life and destroy the links between objects and the self by attacking or killing parts of the self, but they are also destructive to any good objects by trying to devalue and eliminate them as important" (Rosenfeld 1987: 109).

140 Rosenfeld 1987: 107.

presence of infanticidal fantasies and dreams in narcissistic patients, an impulse to destroy the "child in themselves"[141]. I want to briefly mention one of his patients, "Simon", who had a dream in which there was an image of a dying boy. ROSENFELD's interpretation was that:

> ...he was using the killing of his infantile dependent self to triumph over me and to show me up as a failure. The dream illustrates that the destructive narcissistic state is maintained in power by keeping the libidinal infantile self in a constant dead or dying condition[142].

This "dead or dying" condition is expressed in Seneca's *Hercules* not only in the madness scene, but throughout the whole play.

Otto F. KERNBERG, in his classical article on the subject, pointed out the main observable features of the narcissistic personality, which are also shared by Seneca's Hercules[143]: grandiosity, self-centeredness, lack of empathy, emotional shallowness and the inability to mourn. KERNBERG created his own theory concerning where those personality features come from, developing, among others, ROSENFELD's ideas. For KERNBERG, the narcissistic personality structure is a defence, erected in the second year of an infant's life against extremely painful dependence. If the child is temperamentally very aggressive or has a cold mother devoid of empathy, then his internal life is dominated by the images of evil mother and frustrated, worthless, enraged self, which have to be somehow dealt with, if there is to be at least some psychological equilibrium necessary for survival. Another factor contributing to the development of the narcissistic structure is that the child has some talents or "exceptional" features which are then used and exploited by the mother to raise her own self-esteem. Those "exceptional" features allow the child to build the grandiose self as a defence against painful dependence.

According to KERNBERG, this idealized narcissistic self is created by fusing together ideal object and self images along with certain aspects of the real self. This fusion means that the narcissist ceases to love anyone else, because he does

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[141] *Ibidem*.

[142] *Ibidem*, 110.

[143] "...grandiosity, extreme self-centeredness, and a remarkable absence of interest in and empathy for others in spite of the fact that they are so very eager to obtain admiration and approval from other people. These patients experience a remarkably intense envy of other people who seem to have things they do not have or who simply seem to enjoy their lives. These patients not only lack emotional depth and fail to understand complex emotions in other people, but their own feelings lack differentiation, with quick flare-ups and subsequent dispersal of emotion. They are especially deficient in genuine feelings of sadness and mournful longing; their incapacity for experiencing depressive reactions is a basic feature of their personalities. When abandoned or disappointed by other people they may show what on the surface looks like depression, but which on further examination emerges as anger and resentment, loaded with revengeful wishes, rather than real sadness for the loss of a person whom they appreciated" (KERNBERG 1970: 52 f.).

not project the ideal object image onto other people; instead, he unconsciously believes that he is already perfect and thus does not need anyone else, he does not need to love or be loved, because he can give himself all he wants and needs. He only needs admiration from others in order to "prove" that he is perfect and exceptional[144].

Kernberg described three layers of the narcissistic personality which can be discovered in a long period of psychoanalysis, when the defences are gradually broken down (although he points out that many of those patients cannot change their personality at all). He says:

> ...one eventually encounters in the transference paranoid developments, with feelings of emptiness, rage, and fear of being attacked. On an even less regressed level, the available remnants of such self images reveal a picture of a worthless, poverty-stricken, empty person who feels always left "outside", devoured by envy of those who have food, happiness, and fame[145].

Those three layers seem to be strikingly similar to the three sets of self and object images that I discovered in Seneca's play. The grandiose, idealized layer, described also by Rosenfeld, is Hercules' "normal" self – his victorious descent into the underworld, his labours and triumphs over Juno as well as his coldness and lack of empathy towards his family. At its extreme, this self-idealization is pictured by fantasies of the Golden Age and the divinization of the hero, who wants to become equal to Jupiter. The hallucinatory entrance into the palace of the gods would be an equivalent in Kernberg's language of the fusion of the ideal self and object images.

The "paranoid" layer, with feelings of emptiness, rage and being attacked, is pictured by Seneca in the monologue of Juno in Act I, where she represents the paranoid persecutor of Hercules, as well as in the underworld scenes of torture and punishment, monsters etc. On this level, aggression is not rationalized as a "saving" activity of eliminating evil, but is revealed in its primitive form. The last layer of "poverty", "hunger" and "emptiness" is represented in the play in a most hidden way, through symbolic images of the underworld – the barren land, the lifeless antithesis of the Golden Age, the images of an unloving, frustrating mother etc.

What is interesting is that Seneca depicts the process of building defences (in the underworld narrative) as going from the layer of hunger through the paranoid layer of torture to the idealized layer of the grandiose self, and the process of breaking down those defences in the madness scene, precisely in this order. First, Hercules fantasizes about being a god and living on Olympus, then he is "possessed" by Juno and murders his family, and ultimately he ends as a man

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144 *Ibidem*, 55 f.

145 *Ibidem*, 58.

who has lost everything, who has no place to live, whose life has become worthless and devoid of meaning.

Those similarities do not seem to be coincidental. They could rather be explained by the poet's intuitive access to the depths of human emotional life. FREUD was sure that artists can come very close to the unconscious processes that are discovered in psychoanalytic treatment, but their knowledge is intuitive and lacks the conceptual coherence and precision which psychoanalytic theory aims at:

> Our procedure consists in the conscious observation of abnormal mental processes in other people so as to be able to elicit and announce their laws. The author no doubt proceeds differently. He directs his attention to the unconscious in his own mind, he listens to its possible developments and lends them artistic expression instead of suppressing them by conscious criticism. Thus he experiences from himself what we learn from others – the laws which the activities of this unconscious must obey. But he need not state these laws, nor even be clearly aware of them; as a result of the tolerance of his intelligence, they are incorporated within his creations. We discover these laws by analysing his writings just as we find them from cases of real illness[146].

If we look at Seneca's *Hercules* as an intuitive picture of narcissistic pathology, we must admit that it is an astonishingly precise one. TARRANT said that "Seneca has few rivals, ancient or modern, in the observation of neurosis"[147] – surely, not only neurosis but also many other phenomena of the human mind were understood very deeply by Seneca. In Euripides' *Medea* we also have a moving study of pathological narcissism[148], but the breaking down of defences in the Great Monologue is showed differently and the end of the play is a return to the grandiose self. Seneca's *Hercules* ends with a narcissistic depression which Euripides begins his *Medea* with.

I would also suggest that the Roman poet ascribes symbolic meanings to the three realms of the universe in his play. Heaven, the abode of the gods, represents the idealized, omnipotent, and grandiose aspects of Hercules' character. His "divine" features and his desire to be accepted on Olympus indicate the ultimate narcissistic defence against dependence. The earth, where the most of the play takes place and where Hercules kills his family represents the paranoid, sadistic layer of *aeterna bella* of the hero against Juno. The earth is the stage for the labours, too. Juno descends from heaven to the earth in order to take control over Hercules and make him kill his wife and children[149]. The underworld signifies

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146 FREUD 1959: 92.

147 TARRANT 1985: 23.

148 Cf. STRÓŻYŃSKI 2013a.

149 I disagree with SCHIESARO (2003: 27–29, 35, 186), who takes Juno to be a symbol of "subversive" desires, rebellious against the superego. His interpretation seems to be correct in terms

the deepest layer of narcissistic object relations – hunger, poverty, emptiness, the state between life and death, *morte peior*. Of course, we cannot take these symbolic meanings too rigidly – I have already shown how in the underworld we can see all three layers of object relations and "the earth" is a place of Hercules' grandiosity too.

But if we follow this line of interpretation, we can understand Hercules' descending into the underworld and triumphing over its forces as the establishment of narcissistic defences. Conversely, Juno's descent into the underworld in order to bring from there what Hercules did not entirely vanquish when he was there represents the fact that the forces of the unconscious are still active in narcissistic structure and have to be constantly struggled against. Hercules' madness brings him from "heaven" to "hell" and is a reversal of plans to journey from "hell" to "heaven". This is not a temporal, linear description of the development of a pathological personality. Seneca seems to be describing something timeless, something which is already there. SCHIESARO wrote about the *Thyestes*:

> ...the non-linear organization of dramatic time and the complex framing structure of the play as a whole allegorize the force of regressive repetition which can be seen as the tragedy's driving dynamic. [...] There is no progression in the play: from the end of the prologue onwards, the tragedy is trapped in the repetitive exploration of the consequences of Tantalus' pollution[150].

In the *Hercules* we can observe a similar phenomenon.

## CONCLUSION: THE SAGE OR THE NARCISSIST?

In the Introduction I referred to the debate about Seneca's plays and their relationship to the philosophical part of Seneca's work and particularly his Stoicism. The interpretation of the *Hercules Furens* presented above as well as in my previous papers about this play does not give an easy way out of this problem. Hercules was traditionally considered to be an example of a Stoic sage, that is, of a perfectly rational being, living according to nature, wise, good and free. What we encounter in the *Hercules Furens*, however, is rather a parody of those features, as if Seneca was trying to pervert all the characteristics of the true Stoic sage. The grandiose, omnipotent layer of Hercules' "personality" seems similar to the popular image of the sage. The hero is presented as godlike, completely independent and autonomous, he is apparently almost devoid of passions, he destroys evil and brings peace. But Seneca does not only show that this makes

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of the *Thyestes*, but not in the *Hercules Furens*. Here Juno represented what is repressed, but this repression is not the result of neurotic conflict between impulse and ego's obligations to superego. The conflict is, as I have shown, different: it is narcissistic, not neurotic.

150 SCHIESARO 2003: 189.

him a cold, inhuman and rather repulsive figure (which was a typical line of criticism against the Stoic ideal of the sage from antiquity onwards), he also demonstrates that this is only a superficial, defensive layer of his self, hiding chaos and madness.

The poetic description of this chaos, disintegration and madness of passions is a typical subject for Seneca in his plays. But in the *Hercules Furens*, Seneca pictures a "sage" who disintegrates and becomes an example of insanity, showing passions under the grotesque mask of Stoic wisdom. What could be his intent in doing this?

Fitch believed that "[a]s a Stoic philosopher Seneca inclines toward the orthodox, favorable view of Hercules; as a tragedian he has license to explore the tragic aspects of his heroism"[151], but it suggests that the terrifying image of Hercules' inner conflict is somehow a byproduct of Seneca's poetic *furor*. This does not seem to be a correct interpretation. Littlewood, in his book about Seneca, suggested that the Roman philosopher criticized the radical autonomy of the sage, depicting it in his plays as a sort of tyranny[152]. According to him, Seneca juxtaposed the king and the tyrant as positive and negative aspects of the ideal of the sage and especially the "isolationism" implied by this ideal. In the face of the "broken", chaotic, evil world, the Roman Stoic withdraws into his own mind, where he can be a king and a god, ruling omnipotently over his passions and thoughts.

Curiously, Littlewood uses other plays to illustrate this phenomenon – the *Medea* or *Thyestes* (where he goes as far as to describe Atreus as the counterpart of Cato) – but not the *Hercules*. The scholar writes: "Stoicism promises freedom defined as the 'authority to act on one's own' and the *sapiens* therefore is naturally parallel to and opposed to the tyrant, the autocrat who is supremely powerful and supremely free in the terrestrial world"[153]. Further Littlewood says about Atreus: "his self-sufficiency is a mocking echo of that of the sage"[154]. Much earlier Tarrant observed that Medea and Atreus resemble "perverted mirror-images of the *sapiens*", because of their "single-mindedness" and evil "concentration"[155]. Tarrant, like Littlewood, excluded Hercules from this, but, as it seems, it is precisely the key to understanding this character and the play's relationship with Stoicism. The psychoanalytic interpretation of this play provided in this paper supports Littlewood's and Tarrant's ideas. Hercules seems to be not the sage, but a "mocking echo" of the Stoic ideal, perhaps showing the danger of what

[151] Fitch 1987: 43.

[152] Littlewood 2004: 15–18.

[153] *Ibidem*, 25.

[154] *Ibidem*, 30.

[155] Tarrant 1985: 25.

Littlewood called "the pose of Stoic sage"[156]. In this light we could look at Seneca's play as a story about Hercules, who only pretended to be the "true Hercules", that is, to be the Stoic sage.

Seneca's play goes further than to be a warning against pride, the abuse of power or passions in general[157]. His play is a warning against rejecting humanity in the name of some idealized psychological state that is mistaken for Stoic virtue. Gill pointed out the importance in Seneca of "the ideal of psycho-ethical integration"[158] and added that this importance had a peculiar, personal touch, because Seneca himself experienced a conflict in his life between philosophy and politics, so "the theme of psychological integration and disintegration is not only central to the Stoic conception of selfhood but also, in this very particular and even poignant way, central to Seneca's view of his own selfhood"[159].

Seneca is, then, perhaps warning himself about the illusory version of the Stoic ideal, but it is hard to negate the fact that there is a Nero figure somewhere in the picture. Of course, the *Hercules* is literature, and even Suetonius is literature, so I do not want to suggest that Seneca's play is a psychoanalysis of Nero under the guise of a tragedy *à clef*. But some scholars take into consideration obvious analogies between Nero and Seneca's Hercules. Given the fact that Seneca, while he was writing his tragedy (as Fitch shows[160], *terminus ante quem* was AD 54), was a tutor to the young *princeps*, Nero's personality could have been an inspiration for him. Not only the most obvious narcissistic qualities that he seems to have had, like the need for admiration and emotional exhibitionism[161], but also traits like cruelty, lack of empathy and deficiencies in the superego structure make Nero look to us similar to Seneca's Hercules. There is even a hated and feared mother image, at least in Suetonius' description: at first, Nero idealized his mother (*Nero* 6, 4; 9, 1), in order to devalue her, kill her and report that after her death he was persecuted by her ghost along with the Furies with whips and torches (*Nero* 34). Even if this is literary fiction, Agrippina certainly resembles Seneca's Juno[162].

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[156] *Ibidem*, 27.

[157] Cf. Shelton 1978: 72 f.

[158] Gill 2009: 80.

[159] *Ibidem*, 83.

[160] Fitch 1987: 41.

[161] Pliny the Younger wrote about Nero that the Roman people was "scaenici imperatoris spectator et applausor": *Paneg.* 46. See Boyle 2009: 116 on this.

[162] Boyle writes: "Similarly Hercules' competition with Jove may have reminded the audience of Caligula's insane attempt to replace Jupiter (Suetonius *Gaius* 22). What is clear is that from the late republic onwards politicians and emperors, most notably Augustus and Nero, had associated themselves with Hercules; and, like Seneca's Hercules (926ff), Augustus and Nero claimed to inaugurate a new Golden Age. In Nero's case the association seems especially developed. Not only did the emperor have coins minted inscribed with the legend 'To Hercules Augustus' (*Herculi Augusto*),

At the same time, it is a brilliant poetic portrait of a narcissistic personality, because narcissism may be particularly prone to put on the mask of a Stoic sage, since narcissistic personalities may present many features to others that seem "Stoic", such as a lack of emotion, independence, rationality etc. Seneca condemns his Hercules for being inhuman not through passions, but through some caricature of *apatheia*. The problem is that *Seneca Tragicus* here goes so far as to suggest that "human nature" means to experience weakness, dependence, mourning, longing and sadness, which is no longer Stoic. Perhaps *Seneca Philosophus* would correct that view.

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but Suetonius reports (*Nero* 21.3; see also Dio *Roman History* 63.9.4) that one of the tragic parts Nero particularly like 'to sing' was that of *Hercules insanus*, 'Hercules Mad'" (BOYLE 2009: 108). And STALEY: "If the Hercules of the *Furens* is not the exemplar of the Stoic wise man [...], it is perhaps because Seneca had Nero in mind for the part" (STALEY 2009: 125). Cf. also RILEY 2008: 58–66.

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# THE OFFICE OF *A RATIONIBUS* IN THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT. A HISTORIOGRAPHICAL CONTROVERSY*

by

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ABSTRACT: This article provides a detailed analysis of modern historiographical discourse on the administrative position of the *a rationibus* office in the Roman imperial government, based on the findings of FRIEDLÄNDER, HIRSCHFELD, MOMMSEN, LIEBENAM, CUQ and others, in order to investigate the origins of disparate opinions on the office of *a rationibus*. The author also analyses the process of updating the terminology used to describe the office and comments on two dominant views of imperial administration (bureaucratic and non-bureaucratic) in historiographical works that have shaped the contemporary scholarship on the subject.

## INTRODUCTION

The origins of modern research on Roman imperial administration have not received adequate scholarly attention, as many contemporary scholars have either focused on the reception of *Römisches Staatsrecht* (vols. I–III, Leipzig 1871–1888) by Th. MOMMSEN in German historiography[1] or discussed the analysis of key concepts in the Roman constitution also formulated by this author[2]. Without doubt,

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[1] See, for instance, GRZIWOTZ 1986; BEHNE 1999; NIPPEL 2004: 215–228; NIPPEL 2005a: 9–60; NIPPEL 2005b: 246–258; NIPPEL 2005c: 165–184; TIMPE 2011: 127–160. A broader perspective adopted by scholars in studies on Roman administration (with MOMMSEN's work at its centre) both in German and French historiography was already rare at that time, see HÖLKESKAMP 1997: 93–111; cf. SIMON 1988: 86–90. It is worth noting that the international renown of MOMMSEN's *Staatsrecht* contributed to its translation into French and Italian, REBENICH 2006: 99. Other early syntheses devoted to Roman administration, written by scholars such as MADVIG or HERZOG, who followed or competed with MOMMSEN in their theories, did not meet with equal interest among contemporary historians, cf. CHRIST 1982: 78 f.

[2] It seems that the most widely debated issue related to the political system of the Principate was MOMMSEN's concept of the dual power ("dyarchy") of the Senate and the emperor, see WINTERLING 2005: 177–198; cf. HEUSS 1974: 77–90; WINTERLING 2001: 93–122.

*Roman Constitutional Law* by MOMMSEN[3] markedly influenced the content of 19th-century textbooks and monographs on Roman government, written mostly in German and French[4]. His work was crucial for many scholars – historians of antiquity, historians of Roman law or historians of historiography[5]. Nevertheless, particular issues related to Roman administration analysed in 19th-century historiographical discourse are not discussed in contemporary research. One case in point – so far mostly ignored by scholars – was the history of palatine offices in the Principate[6]. It seems that A. WINTERLING was the only scholar who referred to the views of classic researchers – FRIEDLÄNDER, MOMMSEN and HIRSCHFELD – on the functioning of palatine bureaux while writing about the organization of the Roman imperial court[7]. At the core of WINTERLING's analysis was the opposition of the private and the public in the palatine offices as perceived in earlier historiography.

Lack of interest in the origins of contemporary academic discussions appears to be especially vivid in the case of the *a rationibus* office which, similarly to the *a memoria* office[8], remains controversial up to this day. Despite the fact that

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[3] It was *Römisches Staatsrecht* that MOMMSEN considered to be his greatest work. HEUSS 1956: 44: "Von seinen vielen Arbeiten hat Mommsen das 'Staatsrecht' am höchsten geschätzt", see NIPPEL 2007: 211 f.; cf. CHRIST 1982: 65 f.; MOMIGLIANO 2012: 296.

[4] See HÖLKESKAMP 1997: 96–99; KŁODZIŃSKI 2013a: 167–182. The German scholars of antiquity (among others L. LANGE, E. HERZOG, J. MARQUARDT, O. HIRSCHFELD), following MOMMSEN, laid the foundations for modern studies of Roman administration.

[5] Another issue is the academic debate which started after the publication of MOMMSEN's work. See NIPPEL 2005a: 12–27. Since that moment, scholars began wondering whether the dogmatic (non-historical) and systemic attitude towards 'the Roman constitution' taken by the author of *Römische Geschichte* is appropriate. See BLEICKEN 1975: 16–51; THOMAS 1984: 1–52; cf. LINDERSKI 1993: 42–53; LINDERSKI 2007: 34 f. Even today the validity of MOMMSEN's research perspective is often questioned. This is even more the case since J.M. RAINER, in the introduction to his textbook which referred to *Römisches Staatsrecht* in its title, clearly emphasised the most important aspect of his own research perspective – "der juristisch-institutionelle Aspekt im Sinne Theodor Mommsens" (RAINER 2006: 9).

[6] For more, see KŁODZIŃSKI 2013a: 167–182. Interestingly, the second edition of HIRSCHFELD's *Die kaiserlichen Verwaltungsbeamten bis auf Diocletian*, published in 1905, remains to this date the seminal work on imperial palatine administration. Cf. DEMOUGIN 2005: 375. It seems that the only monograph which would be capable of challenging its status is the work *The Emperor in the Roman World, 31 BC–AD 337* by F. MILLAR, see also CHANTRAINE 1967; WEAVER 1972; BOULVERT 1970; BOULVERT 1974; SEITZ 1970; WINTERLING 1999. In the 20th century, studies devoted to palatine offices were scarce, which was emphasised by BLEICKEN 1982: 190; see also MAROTTA 1991: VII. Until that time, only single studies concerning particular palatine offices – *ab epistulis*, *a studiis*, *a bybliothecis*, *a censibus*, *a libellis* and *a memoria* had been written, see TOWNEND 1961: 375–381; VAN'T DACK 1963: 177–184; PEACHIN 1989: 168–208; LINDSAY 1994: 454–469; DEMOUGIN 2001a: 621–631; LIEBS 2006: 137–152; cf. MALITZ 1987: 51–72.

[7] WINTERLING 1999: 86–89, 94–96; cf. RUTLEDGE 2002: 317–319.

[8] It is not known definitely for which tasks *a memoria* officials were responsible, see PEACHIN 1989: 168–208; ECK 1998: 74; KŁODZIŃSKI 2013b: 57–96.

contemporary scholars have often studied the administrative activities of this fiscal office in charge of the emperor's properties and financial accounts in general[9], there are still some areas that require clarification[10]. The position of the office of *a rationibus* in the imperial government is rather controversial, since most historians associate the activities of the office with imperial court offices, referred to as secretariats or bureaux ("secretariats", "segreterie", "bureaux"), or the imperial chancery ("Kanzlei", "chancellerie", "cancelleria") in modern literature. Although views on the office of imperial finances based on the 19th-century formalized and systemic presentation of Roman 'bureaucracy' are well-established in historiographical works, they are definitely not indisputable.

Quite recently, I. Mennen noticed a difference of opinion on that matter between W. Eck and F. Millar[11]. Eck included the office of *a rationibus* in *officia palatina*, thus suggesting that it functioned within the structure of the emperor's court and was similar to other secretariats[12]. A different view was expressed by Millar, who believed that in comparison to imperial court offices (for instance, *ab epistulis*, *a libellis*) after the reign of the Julio-Claudian dynasty, the official of *a rationibus* neither performed his tasks in the vicinity of the emperor, nor served as his advisor and as such should not be associated with palatine administration[13]. The equestrian officials of *a rationibus* were by no means literati or jurists (in contrast to *ab epistulis* or *a libellis*), but individuals with outstanding

[9] See Christol, Demougin 1990: 159–211; Alpers 1995; Eich, Petzl 2000: 190–194; P. Eich 2005: 159–188; Claes 2014: 166 f. The range of competences of the *a rationibus* official, first confirmed for the reign of emperor Tiberius (*CIL* VI 8409c), is not fully clear. It is impossible to state whether his responsibilities changed over time or remained stable. Any discussions related to the issue are also connected to differing views on the divisions (or their lack) between *fiscus*, *patrimonium* and *aerarium*. Most scholars, nevertheless, tend to associate the activities of the *a rationibus* with the *fiscus Caesaris*. In general, it may be said that the *a rationibus* was responsible for imperial income and expenditure (Demougin 2005: 374: "gestion des revenus fiscaux et des dépenses") as well as controlling the funds of *res publica* held by the Emperor. The official would then be in charge of calculating the cost of supporting the army or minting coins. Cf. Statius, *Silv*. III 3, 85–105. A strict division between the competences of the *procurator patrimonii* and the *a rationibus* is difficult to prove, but we can assume that in the early principate (until the reign of Domitian) the *a rationibus* was responsible for the emperor's private properties in Rome and Italy (*patrimonium*). See Eck 2000: 249; Eich 2005: 311 f.

[10] There is still no exhaustive prosopographic study devoted to the particular *a rationibus* officials. Friedländer 1861: 6–9 was the first one to create a list of *procuratores a rationibus*, cf. Friedländer 1888: 171–177; Rostowzew 1906: 133 f. A list of *a rationibus* officials, including both freedmen and *equites*, yet only till the times of Hadrian, was created by Seitz 1970: 72–87. A list of those officials can also be found in two studies from the second half of the 20th century. Wachtel 1966: 117–121 presented *a rationibus* freedmen (and subordinate officials), whereas Pflaum 1961: 1019 enumerated the *equites* holding the office, cf. Pflaum 1982: 109; see also Liebenam 1886: 90; Hüttl 1933: 194; Christol, Demougin 1990: 199–201. Recently discovered inscriptions necessitate a reexamination of previous findings. Cf. *AE* 1990, 69 f.; *AE* 2010, 284; Camodeca 2012: 305–321.

[11] Mennen 2011: 145, n. 34.

[12] Eck 2000: 240; see also Eck 1989: 216, 222 f.

[13] Millar 1977: 105 f.

civil or military careers[14]. According to Millar, many officials of *a rationibus* – unlike palatine secretaries – had previously held the procuratorship of Gaul[15].

A parallel dissonance may be found contemporarily among authors of textbooks on Roman administration. J. Rougé, when describing the central administration of the Principate, enumerated its four basic pillars: the emperor's council, praetorian prefects and – quite significantly – separate palatine offices ("grands bureaux de la chancellerie impérial") and the *procurator a rationibus*[16]. Rougé clearly separated the office of imperial finances from imperial court offices[17], as he saw it as a procuratorship associated with the emperor's *fiscus*. On the other hand, the problem seems to have been overlooked by J. Scheid, S. Demougin and S. Lefebvre, who include the *a rationibus* office in the structures of "bureaux centraux" / "bureaux palatins"[18].

It appears to be customary that contemporary scholars, when describing the administrative position of the *a rationibus* office, tend not to refer to the findings of modern historiography. None of them, when including the office in the structures of imperial court offices or excluding it from them, addressed the opinions of their predecessors on that matter. This may be in part attributed to the fact that contemporary historiography (especially Anglo-Saxon scholarship) has refrained from using an overelaborated scientific apparatus and has abandoned past methods of building a historical narration, which required referring to all (or at least to the most important) views of predecessors. Moreover, another common detrimental practice is to narrow down the catalogue of works that forms the basis of analysis to scholarship in only one language.

The aim of this article is to investigate the origins of controversies surrounding the functioning of *a rationibus* within the imperial government. Thus, it is also essential to define issues connected to the updating of terminology and to determine two different historiographical views of Roman administration that shaped later descriptions of the office of *a rationibus*. A detailed presentation of the "Rezeptionsgeschichte" in this office is important and necessary, as the differences in describing the position of this office do not result from different interpretations of ancient evidence, but are of a primarily heuristic character and

[14] With the exception of only *a rationibus* officials, Ti. Claudius Vibianus Tertullus (*PIR*² C 1049; Pflaum 1960b: 683 f., nº 252; Sablayrolles 1996: 491 f., nº 17) and T. Taius Sanctus (*PIR*² S 173; Pflaum 1961: 1002–1007, nº 178bis; Corbier 1974: 290–296, nº 58; Eck 1974: 40 f.), who also held the post of *ab epistulis Graecis*, see Lewis 1981: 150–152. The *nomen gentile* of Sanctus, as was recently convincingly proven by F. Mitthof 2010: 230–232, was Taius, not Aius.

[15] Millar 1977: 105. Cf. Liebenam 1886: 52.

[16] Rougé 1991: 107–109.

[17] Rougé 1991: 109: "A côté de grands bureaux et souvent confondue avec eux s'est développée une direction générale des Finances issue de l'administration de la caisse impériale – *fiscus* –, c'est le service des comptes dirigé par le *procurator a rationibus*".

[18] Scheid 1990: 104 f.; Demougin 2005: 374 f.; Lefebvre 2011: 66–71.

often depend on a knowledge of works by the authors cited and the terminology they adopted. The present detailed analysis of the history of classical scholarship follows the case study model, which allows the identification of tendencies prevalent in describing historical reality characteristic of earlier historiography.

## IMPERIAL COURT OFFICES WITH OR WITHOUT THE OFFICE OF *A RATIONIBUS*?[19]

In the second half of the 19th century, none of the modern authors devoted a separate study to the office of imperial finances[20]. Scholarly attention at that time focused on a holistic description of three main palatine offices *a rationibus*, *a libellis* and *ab epistulis*[21]. Given the activity of Claudius's and Nero's 'officials' Pallas, Callistus and Narcissus, influential scholars of that time included those most powerful offices in the *officia maxima* (Suet. *Dom*. 7, 2) or *ministeria principatus* (Tac. *Hist*. I 58, 1), at the same time usually describing the structures − using the concepts of state law ("im staatsrechtlichen Sinne") – as an organized administration of imperial court offices, mostly referred to in the 19th century as the chancery ("Kanzlei", "chancellerie", "cancelleria") or the cabinet ("Kabinett").

It seems that L. Friedländer was the first to examine the functioning of the office of *a rationibus* in connection with two other palatine secretaries – *ab epistulis* and *a libellis*. The three offices were referred to by the classicist from Königsberg as *tria illa potissima*[22]. In 1861, the scholar devoted an 18-page outline entitled *De eis qui primis duobus saeculis a rationibus, ab epistulis, a libellis imperatorum Romanorum fuerunt*[23] to the officials of those three secretaries. Friedländer wrote the study with the aim of presenting the palatine secretaries. This pre-prosopographical approach was later reflected in what

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[19] A preliminary discussion of the questions raised in this article was published in Kłodziński 2013a: 175–177.

[20] Only Humbert (1896: 1144) dedicated a few sentences to the office of *a rationibus*, in the context of the administration of the emperor's *fiscus*. Later Rostowzew (1906: 133–137) made a list of *a rationibus* officials. Lécrivain (1904: 812) also wrote about the offices of *a rationibus* and *rationalis* separately. In the *Realencyclopädie*, Liebenam (1914: 263 f.) described the *officium a rationibus*. Short entries concerning the *a rationibus* office were also written by Winkler (1972: 1340) and Eck, Gross-Albenhausen (2001: 784); see also Berger 1953: 338; Knapowski 1965: 1.

[21] Tac. *Ann.* XV 35, 2: "quos ab epistulis et libellis et rationibus appellet, nomina summae curae et meditamenta"; XVI 8, 1: "tamquam disponeret iam imperii curas praeficeretque rationibus et libellis et epistulis libertos".

[22] Friedländer 1861: 3.

[23] Friedländer 1861. The outline, which is available in two European libraries (Strasbourg and Zürich), does not have a proper title. It was catalogued under two names – 1. *De eis qui primis duobus saeculis a rationibus, ab epistulis, a libellis imperatorum Romanorum fuerunt* (C.145.826; Bibliothèque nationale et universitaire de Strasbourg); 2. *Ministeria principatus per libertos deinde equites acta* (1861/29; Kantons-, Stadt- und Universitätsbibliothek von Zürich). The work has not been widely used in historical studies.

arguably was FRIEDLÄNDER's most important historical work, *Darstellungen aus der Sittengeschichte Roms*[24]. One of the sub-chapters of this work, edited and supplemented by HIRSCHFELD, is entitled "Die Beamten *a rationibus*, *a libellis*, *ab epistulis*"[25]. According to FRIEDLÄNDER, if one desires to reliably present the history of the abovementioned secretaries, one should prepare and analyse a list of the officials whose activities determined the political significance and administrative position of palatine offices from the 1st to the 3rd century AD[26].

Nevertheless, some of the views on the role of the *a rationibus* office within the imperial administration expressed by the Königsberg scholar in his monograph evolved after the publication of the brief outline of 1861. In his earlier work, FRIEDLÄNDER emphasised the exceptional character of the procuratorial *a rationibus* office that in the 2nd century AD was held not only by *equites*, but also by freedmen. This phenomenon is unique in comparison to the two other *ministeria* which, since the times of Hadrian, had been held by members of the equestrian order. According to FRIEDLÄNDER, it was probably the result of particular decisions made by emperors, who would often nominate the most faithful and experienced freedmen (*principalium opum custodes*) for the position of *a rationibus*[27]. In this study, unlike in many others, the reign of the emperor Hadrian does not serve as a caesura of any kind in the history of the office of imperial finances.

A different opinion on the matter can be found in FRIEDLÄNDER's later monograph, *Darstellungen aus der Sittengeschichte Roms*. This time the scholar preceded the list of officials with a separate outline of the history of the office of *a rationibus*, which in the times of Claudius – as he emphasised – became the most respected and influential palatine office ("angesehenst und einflussreichst Hofamt")[28]. In the same work, FRIEDLÄNDER expressed the view that the emperor Hadrian gave the office of *a rationibus* to equestrian procurators. At the same time he noted, yet without attempting to explain the phenomenon, that the procuratorial post was also held by freedmen during the reign of Trajan's successor and later[29]. However, in this case, perhaps due to HIRSCHFELD's suggestions

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[24] FRIEDLÄNDER 1888.

[25] FRIEDLÄNDER 1888: 171–177.

[26] FRIEDLÄNDER's presentation of *a rationibus* officials mainly involved providing their names and relevant sources.

[27] FRIEDLÄNDER 1861: 5: "sed credibile est imperatores hos principalium opum custodes nonnunquam e fidissimis et expertissimis domus suae ministris eligere maluisse quam ex ordine equestri". By using the term *principalium opum custodes*, Friedländer referred to the term used by Pliny the Younger (*Epist*. VIII 6, 7).

[28] FRIEDLÄNDER 1888: 171 f.

[29] FRIEDLÄNDER 1888: 171, 173. FRIEDLÄNDER (1888: 172) also noticed that there were a large number of lower-rank 'office clerks', mostly freedmen, working within the office of imperial finances. He did not discuss them further, but referred readers to the analysis by HIRSCHFELD.

or supplements, the emperor Hadrian as the reformer of the office of *a rationibus* was at the centre of Friedländer's findings.

It is worth noting that the findings of Hirschfeld, often referred to by Friedländer, influenced later descriptions of the *a rationibus* office and no longer took the form of a joint description of three palatine offices: *a rationibus*, *ab epistulis* and *a libellis*[30]. Hirschfeld's main thesis was that the office of *a rationibus* was already held by a member of the equestrian order in the times of the emperor Hadrian, during whose reign the emperor's private offices (including *ab epistulis* and *a libellis*) were incorporated into the public administrative structure referred to as the "Kanzlei"[31]. However, unlike the office of *a rationibus* ("Verwaltungsamt"), imperial court offices ("Hofämter") – *ab epistulis*, *a libellis*, *a memoria*, *a studiis* and *a cognitionibus* – were in fact never held by procurators[32]. Hirschfeld was of the opinion that this administrative practice was as a consequence of the fact that those offices did not manage finances ("Finanzverwaltung")[33].

Although Mommsen noticed the similarity of the *ab epistulis*, *a libellis* and *a rationibus* offices in the context of the positions being taken by members of the *ordo equester* from the hands of slaves and freedmen, he also gave separate descriptions of the history of palatine offices (*ab epistulis*, *a libellis*) and the posts associated with the emperor's *fiscus* (including *a rationibus*)[34]. His decisions were similar to those of Hirschfeld, to whom he frequently referred. Mommsen also emphasised the administrative significance of this procuratorial post, which was held by the equestrians who had the title of *procurator Augusti a rationibus* in the 2nd century AD. Interestingly, however, in Mommsen's work there is no

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30 The history of the *a rationibus* office was described by Hirschfeld in the chapter "Die kaiserlichen Kassenbeamten" (subchapter "Die Beamten des Fiskus"), not in "Die kaiserliche Kanzlei und der Staatsrath", where the history of imperial court offices (*ab epistulis*, *a libellis*, *a studiis*, *a cognitionibus* and *a memoria*) was provided, see Hirschfeld 1877: 30–40, 201–218. In the second edition of his work (Hirschfeld 1905: 318–342) he changed the title of the aforementioned chapter to "Das kaiserliche Kabinett und der Staatsrat". Its contents, however, generally remained unchanged.

31 Hirschfeld 1877: 32, 201. Hirschfeld wrote in a similar manner about the history of the *a rationibus* office in his early article devoted to the *aerarium militare*. Hirschfeld 1868: 688, n. 10: "Erst nach Hadrian, der das ganze verwaltungswesen reformierte, verwandle sich diese *liberti a rationibus* in *procuratores a rationibus* aus dem ritterstande, und dieses amt nimt dann unter den procuratoren die erste stelle ein".

32 An exception to this rule, noticed by Hirschfeld, is the career of Cn. Octavius Titinius Capito, whom an inscription presented as *procurator ab epistulis et a patrimonio* (*AE* 1934, 154 = *CIL* VI 40489). Quite interestingly, scholars at that time agreed with Hirschfeld in their belief that the title was invalid or at odds with the context of the inscription, see, for instance, Mispoulet 1882: 280, n. 3.

33 Hirschfeld 1877: 201.

34 Mommsen 1877: 809 f.; Mommsen 1893: 209–212; see also Mommsen 1887: 554 f.

mention of freedmen-procurators or the emperor Hadrian, the reformer of the office of *a rationibus*[35].

An altogether different view concerning the functioning of the *a rationibus* office in the imperial administration was held by LIEBENAM, who described the office of imperial finances not only in his work on the procuratorial careers of members of the equestrian order from Augustus to Diocletian, but also in the *Realencyclopädie*[36]. In his work from 1886, LIEBENAM emphasised that the procuratorial post of *a rationibus* should be associated with the moment when the office was taken over by *equites*[37]. He did not, however, point to the times of Hadrian in that context. His table presenting *procuratores a rationibus* only indicates that it was in about 140 AD at the earliest, the beginning of Antoninus Pius's reign, when an equestrian held the office[38]. Quite surprisingly, LIEBENAM completely ignored freedmen *procuratores a rationibus*. His later encyclopedic entry, however, contains a slightly different opinion, comparable to the views of HIRSCHFELD[39]. This time the emperor Hadrian is presented as the reformer of the office, giving three palatine offices ("Hofämter") to members of the equestrian order, with only the *a rationibus* being a procuratorial post from then on. Apart from that, LIEBENAM also mentioned freedmen *procuratores a rationibus* (for example: *CIL* XIV 2104) as several exceptions to the rule, since the office was usually held by members of the equestrian order.

É. CUQ presented the *a rationibus* office in his work *Le Conseil des Empereurs d'Auguste à Dioclétien*[40]. This imperial office was, according to the historian of law, unlike other imperial secretaries ("secretaires du Prince") included in the imperial chancery ("chancellerie")[41]. For CUQ, the office, although held by freedmen (T. Aurelius Aphrodisius) even after the times of Hadrian, was not given the procuratorial rank until his reign. The findings of CUQ, however, do not indicate clearly whether the rise of *a rationibus* to the procuratorial rank during the reign of Trajan's successor was equal to the office being handed over to members of the equestrian order[42]. In other words, CUQ fails to answer the question of who held the procuratorial post of *a rationibus* during Hadrian's reign.

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[35] In vol. III of *Römisches Staatsrecht* MOMMSEN (1887: 555) made a clear distinction between the "höchste Kanzleiposten", gradually taken over by *equites* in the period between Nero and Hadrian, and the office of *a rationibus*, taken over by *equites* during the reign of Marcus Aurelius.

[36] LIEBENAM 1886: 51–54; LIEBENAM 1914: 263 f.

[37] LIEBENAM 1886: 51.

[38] LIEBENAM 1886: 90.

[39] LIEBENAM 1914: 264.

[40] CUQ 1884: 394–397.

[41] CUQ 1884: 395.

[42] Unlike the aforementioned FRIEDLÄNDER, HIRSCHFELD and LIEBENAM, CUQ was of the opinion that members of the equestrian order did not take over the office until the second half of the 2nd century.

For the purposes of this article, I have decided to refer only to the findings of Friedländer, Hirschfeld, Mommsen, Liebenam and Cuq, whose works, I presume, determined the later 19th-century descriptions of the office of imperial finances. In some cases, this influence amounted to a literal repetition of the scholars' opinions. An analysis of their views concerning the administrative position of the *officium a rationibus*, however, allowed me to identify several historiographical tendencies characteristic of this period as well as particular differences and similarities in the manner of describing the office.

In the second half of the 19th century, scholars unanimously claimed that the *a rationibus* was among the imperial offices responsible for the ruler's finances. At the same time, most of them emphasised the unique character acquired by this procuratorial office in charge of the imperial finances during the reign of Hadrian. For some, it was a part of a larger administrative structure – the imperial chancery (or cabinet). Still, for some reason, others believed that the *a rationibus* was not a branch of this administrative body. Let us now turn to the possible sources of this controversy.

It seems that the scholars of the 19th century, not unlike their contemporary counterparts, struggled to define palatine administration in the circles close to the emperor. Even Mommsen expressed doubts whether describing it in terms of formalized administrative structures was the appropriate line of action[43]. Scholars unsuccessfully attempted to find a common definition for the "imperial chancery" of the Principate, despite numerous more or less detailed analyses conducted in the second half of the 19th century. The difficulty inherent in defining the "imperial chancery" as a complete administrative structure, functioning within the emperor's palace and consisting of particular offices, determined the manner in which it was described. J. Marquardt, for instance, put forward a rather exceptional proposal to include not only *ab epistulis* (*Latinis* and *Graecis*), *a libellis* and *a rationibus* secretaries in the "Cabinet des Kaisers", but also praetorian prefects[44], which reflects the complexity of the subject.

Generally speaking, scholars at that time adopted particular criteria concerning the description of the imperial chancery. Firstly, on the basis of the competences of imperial court offices, scholars included the posts of *ab epistulis*, *a libellis* or *a commentariis* in the imperial chancery as, in line with the modern understanding of this word, the offices were involved in the process of drafting documents[45]. Furthermore, 19th-century scholars considered the fact of its functioning (or not functioning) within the procuratorial administration to be the main criterion for its activities within imperial court offices. On the basis of these two criteria, a substantial number of modern scholars have decided to

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[43] Mommsen 1877: 806.

[44] Marquardt 1884: 109.

[45] See Tennant 1985: 69; Malitz 1987: 51, n. 1.

exclude the *officium a rationibus* from the imperial chancery. From their point of view, the competences of this unique procuratorial office involved not drafting documents but managing financial administration (they controlled the emperor's *fiscus* since the times of Claudius). It seems that HIRSCHFELD was the first to ascribe "autonomy" of the procuratorial office to the *a rationibus* in 1877. The scholar declared that the unique office of *a rationibus* ("Verwaltugsamt") was already held by an equestrian procurator during the reign of Hadrian[46]. A similar description of the relation between imperial court offices and procuratorial posts was provided by O. KARLOWA[47]. He considered the case of the *a rationibus* to be exceptional, as the office, unlike the one of "Hausämter", was held by procurators[48]. Thus, in the chapter devoted to the "kaiserliche Hofsämter", the German historian of law described only four posts: *ab epistulis*, *a libellis*, *a cognitionibus* and *a memoria*[49]. A similar approach was taken by M. ZOELLER, who excluded the *a rationibus* office from the structure of imperial court offices[50] and clearly declared that "doch verwandelt sich der a rationibus später in einen procurator"[51]. MOMMSEN also associated the functioning of the procuratorial *a rationibus* office not with the chancery ("Secretariat"; "Kanzlei"), but with managing the emperor's finances ("Kassenführung"; "Centralkasse")[52]. It seems that LIEBENAM included the office of *a rationibus* in the "Ämter der Kasse' and not in the "kaiserliche Kanzlei"[53].

HIRSCHFELD's findings were, often uncritically, followed by not only German, but also French and Anglo-Saxon scholars. J.-B. MISPOULET claimed that "les employés de ces bureaux (*ab epistulis*, *a libellis*, *a memoria*, *a cognitionibus*), à la différence du fonctionnaire financier *a rationibus*, ne furent jamais qualifiés *procuratores*"[54]. L. HOMO also believed that the *a rationibus* office, held by an equestrian procurator since the times of Hadrian, did not belong to the imperial court offices. HOMO included five main palatine offices (*ab epistulis*, *a libellis*,

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[46] HIRSCHFELD 1877: 201.

[47] KARLOWA 1885: 538.

[48] It is worth noting at this point that KARLOWA's understanding of a procuratorial post was different from HIRSCHFELD's. KARLOWA defined a *procurator* primarily as a representative of the emperor's power, in charge of executing the emperor's tasks. HIRSCHFELD, on the other hand, associated a procuratorial post with financial administration, or at least with financial matters. It seems that procuratorial posts in the Early Empire were more diverse both in terms of administrative positions and tasks, see BRUNT 1966: 461–487.

[49] KARLOWA 1885: 544–549.

[50] ZOELLER 1895: 312–314.

[51] ZOELLER 1895: 312.

[52] MOMMSEN 1877: 809 f.; MOMMSEN 1893: 209–212.

[53] LIEBENAM 1886: 51.

[54] MISPOULET 1882: 279 f.

*a cognitionibus*, *a studiis* and *a memoria*) in their structure[55], as did Anglo-Saxon scholars. H. Mattingly wrote: "Of these [*ministeria principatus*] the *a rationibus* alone could be regarded as a procuratorship; the *ab epistulis*, *a libellis*, *a studiis*, and *a cognitionibus* on the other hand lacked the financial character associated with the meaning of the word *procurator*"[56]. A similar argumentation was used by A.H.J. Greenidge, who did not include the *a rationibus* office in charge of the *fiscus* in "the Secretariate of the Principate"[57].

However, other scholars, such as J.N. Madvig, A. Bouché-Leclercq, E. Herzog, P. Willems or F.F. Abbott, regarded the office of *a rationibus* as one of the imperial court offices[58]. In most cases, these scholars discussed the history and competences of the office in the parts of their works devoted not to matters related to palatine offices, but to financial issues[59]. Although É. Cuq presented *a rationibus* in the chapter entitled "Les principes officiorum"[60], he started his analysis by enumerating the *a libellis*, *a studiis*, *a cognitionibus* and *ab epistulis* secretaries as auxiliary offices in charge of the functioning of the *consilium principis*[61].

The findings presented herein indicate that the office of *a rationibus* was under much debate in 19th century historiography. The office was primarily associated with the secretaries of the "kaiserliche Kanzlei" (*tria illa potissima* for Friedländer) whenever the enormous political influence (*potentia*) of the three freedmen of emperors Claudius and Nero was considered[62]. On the other hand, the situation was different when scholars pointed to the financial tasks (managing the emperor's *fiscus* since the times of Claudius) of the office which – according to Hirschfeld – were associated with the procuratorial *a rationibus* office. The *procurator a rationibus* was then presented as an autonomous position in financial administration, unrelated to the imperial court.

## THE FIRST EQUESTRIAN *PROCURATOR A RATIONIBUS* OF THE EMPEROR HADRIAN?

In 19th-century historiography, the emperor Hadrian was regarded as a reformer of administration, responsible for handing imperial court offices over from

55 Homo 1927: 372–375.

56 Mattingly 1910: 86.

57 Greenidge 1901: 416, 418–420.

58 Madvig 1881: 559 f.; Bouché-Leclercq 1886: 164; Willems 1888: 428 f.; Abbott 1901: 361 f.

59 Madvig 1881: 560; Bouché-Leclercq 1886: 164, n. 3; Willems 1888: 429, 479 f.; Herzog 1887: 667.

60 Cuq 1884: 394–397.

61 Cuq 1884: 361.

62 Kretschmar (1879: 22) referred to Narcissus, Polybius and Callistus as "Cabinetsministerien".

freedmen to *equites*[63]. One of the premises in favour of this thesis was Hadrian's "consitutioneller Act", described by HIRSCHFELD, according to which three palatine offices (*ab epistulis*, *a libellis* and *a rationibus*) were taken over by members of the *ordo equester*, with only the "Finanzamt" – *a rationibus* from then on classified as an equestrian procuratorial post[64]. It seems that HIRSCHFELD's thesis, which connected the *procurator a rationibus* with Hadrian's 'equestrian reform' and was later repeated in the works by FRIEDLÄNDER, MARQUARDT, HUMBERT, SCHILLER, DE RUGGIERO, WILLEMS, ABBOTT or LIEBENAM[65] was not the only view on this question at that time. Some of the 19th-century historians (such as CUQ or HERZOG) associated the *a rationibus* with a procuratorial post, at the same time declaring the first procurator to be one of two of the emperor's freedmen: the father of Claudius Etruscus (Tiberius Iulius?)[66], described by Statius (*Silv.* III 3) or T. Aurelius Aphrodisius[67], mentioned in an inscription (*CIL* XIV 2104)[68]. In this way, without negating Hadrian's 'equestrian reform' of the *a rationibus* office, some scholars pointed to the administrative activities of freedmen-procurators. Although HIRSCHFELD and FRIEDLÄNDER knew about the existence of freedmen *procuratores a rationibus*, they ignored this knowledge[69], since accepting the coexistence of both freedmen and *equites* as procurators in the office of imperial finances in the 2nd century AD would undermine the thesis on the evolutionary process of "the ousting of the freedmen by *equites*" (H. LAST). This view was promoted in earlier historiography, with Hadrian's administrative reform recognised as the crowning achievement of the process[70].

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[63] See SCHURZ 1883. A characteristic feature of HIRSCHFELD's narration – which was noted, among others, by DEMANDT (1992: 173) – was to attribute numerous administrative reforms not only to Claudius and Septimius Severus but to Hadrian in the first place. It seems that LACEY (1917) and SHERWIN-WHITE (1939: 11–26) were the first to point to other emperors, between Claudius and Hadrian, as those who introduced a number of changes in the imperial procuratorial administration.

[64] HIRSCHFELD 1877: 32. Other authors of 19th-century monographs on public finance in the Early Empire, HUMBERT (1886: 233) and MARQUARDT (1884: 308 f.), also pointed to Hadrian's reign as the period of handing the *procurator a rationibus* office over to the *equites*.

[65] FRIEDLÄNDER 1888: 171, 173; MARQUARDT 1884: 308 f. HUMBERT 1886: 233; SCHILLER 1887: 587; DE RUGGIERO 1888: 263, n. 6; WILLEMS 1888: 428 f.; ABBOTT 1901: 361 f.; LIEBENAM 1914: 264.

[66] See WEAVER 1972: 290. Some scholars are of the opinion that freeing the father of Claudius Etruscus by the emperor Tiberius resulted in the change of his name (*praenomen* and *gentilicium*) to Tiberius Iulius. See WEAVER 1972: 285.

[67] *PIR*² A 1451.

[68] CUQ 1884: 395; HERZOG 1887: 667, n. 5. It did not, however, stop them from referring to the emperor Hadrian as the reformer of the *a rationibus* office.

[69] FRIEDLÄNDER 1888: 171, 173; HIRSCHFELD 1868: 688, n. 10; HIRSCHFELD 1877: 32. A similar accusation referring to the findings of H.-G. PFLAUM was formulated later by F. MILLAR (1963: 196); see also WEAVER 1965: 460–469.

[70] LAST 1936: 430; cf. WEAVER 1967: 18. The process is also associated with the topic exhaustively described by A. WINTERLING, namely the well-established division between the public and the

It remains to be seen whether Hirschfeld and other scholars correctly identified the first equestrian *procurator a rationibus* during the reign of Hadrian. This question appears to be even more interesting if we take into account the fact that Hirschfeld, when putting forward the thesis, failed to provide any sources to confirm it[71]. It therefore seems necessary to consider Hirschfeld's motivation in this respect. The list of *a rationibus* officials made by Friedländer, which Hirschfeld frequently referred to, as well as the list of *praefecti annonae* compiled by Hirschfeld in a separate article[72], provide grounds for an interesting observation. Sources from that period did not contain any information about an equestrian *a rationibus* procurator whose activity could be unambiguously dated to the times of Hadrian, although Hirschfeld and Friedländer presented the careers of two equestrian *procuratores a rationibus* who later held great prefectures (*praefectus Aegypti*, *praefectus annonae*) at the beginning of the reigns of Antoninus Pius, L. Valerius Proculus[73] and Ti. Claudius Secundinus L. Statius Macedo[74] and they did not clearly point to Hadrian's reign as the period of their term in office as *a rationibus*[75]. Thus, the thesis formulated by Hirschfeld, and later accepted by many scholars, that assumed the existence of an equestrian *a rationibus* procurator during Hadrian's reign was not – as it seems – sufficiently confirmed by the sources from that time[76]. It is for this reason that the

private sphere, the emperor's private posts held by freedmen and the later public (state) offices held by *equites* in modern historiography.

71 Hirschfeld 1877: 32.

72 Hirschfeld 1870: 30–32.

73 *PIR* V 119; Hüttl 1933: 63 f.; Stein 1950: 76–78; Pflaum 1960a: 274–279, nº 113; Bastianini 1975: 289 f.; Brunt 1975: 145; Pavis d'Escurac 1976: 342; Devijver 1993: 825 f., nº 29.

74 *PIR*² C 1015; Hüttl 1933: 106 f.; Pflaum 1960a: 262–264, nº 109; Pavis d'Escurac 1976: 345; Dobson 1978: 241 f., nº 119.

75 Hirschfeld 1870: 30–32; Friedländer 1888: 173 f. Later scholars unanimously dated the activity of Ti. Claudius Macedo and L. Valerius Proculus as *a rationibus* officials to the beginning of the reign of Antoninus Pius, see Lacey 1917: 40; Pflaum 1961: 1019; Pavis d'Escurac 1976: 342, 345.

76 Herzog (1891: 668, n. 4) was the only 19th-century scholar who, while referring to Friedländer's list, clearly emphasised that the first equestrian *procurator a rationibus* was confirmed during the reign of Antoninus Pius. Despite this fact, Herzog (1891: 668) also believed that it was Hadrian who first handed the office over to the equestrian order. Much later scholars, with a varying degree of doubt, pointed to another equestrian *a rationibus* official of the emperor Hadrian – T. Statilius Optatus (*CIL* VI 31863 = *ILS* 9011; *PIR*² S 838), see Pflaum 1961: 1019; Seitz 1970: 83–87; cf. *AE* 1976, 676; Eck 1977: 227–231; Pflaum 1982: 38–40, nº 119a. Moreover, during Trajan's reign there were two equestrian *procuratores a rationibus*: L. Vibius Lentulus (*AE* 1913, 143a = *IEph* 2061; *AE* 1924, 81 = *IEph* 3046; *SEG* XXVI 1246; Lacey 1917: 40; Pflaum 1960a: 156–158, nº 66; Seitz 1970: 85 f.; Devijver 1977: 864 f., nº 97; Peachin 1986: 94 f., nº 1) and Cn. Pompeius Homullus Aelius Gracilis Cassianus Longinus (*CIL* VI 1626 = *ILS* 1385; *PIR*² P 617; Wuilleumier 1948: 44, nº 3; Pflaum 1960a: 187–189, nº 89; Seitz 1970: 83 f.; Dobson 1978: 19 f., 219, nº 97; Dąbrowa 1993: 93 f., nº 31; Sablayrolles 1996: 546 f., nº 7).

foundations of the "constitutioneller Act" of Trajan's successor, promoted by HIRSCHFELD, which concerned not only the offices of *ab epistulis* and *a libellis* but also *a rationibus*, were very weak[77].

Despite the lack of evidence in support of this thesis, it was customary in historiographical discourse for many years to describe the emperor Hadrian as the reformer of the office. Although the 19th-century view that the first equestrian *procurator* was appointed during the reign of Hadrian was challenged as early as 1917[78] and then established as erroneous[79], the uniqueness of this procuratorial post in the financial administration since the times of Hadrian in comparison to other palatine offices was reproduced in many later studies[80].

## THE OFFICE OF *A RATIONIBUS* AS "REICHSFINANZMINISTERIUM" AND NEW TERMINOLOGY

There was a tendency among 19th-century scholars to discuss the history of the imperial administration within the formal categories of the constitutional law that was contemporary to their research. This tendency is reflected in the phenomenon of providing modern-day equivalents to ancient terms[81] adopted by MOMMSEN in *Römische Geschichte*[82]. It was for a reason that J. LINDERSKI expressed the view that the word "cabinet" represented "a modernistic outlook reminiscent of the

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[77] The account provided by the *Historia Augusta* (*Hadr*. 22, 8), according to which Hadrian was the first to give the offices of *ab epistulis* and *a libellis* to *equites*, is now considered false, see BENARIO 1980: 128. In the 19th century, however, scholars did not challenge it at all. In spite of their knowledge of the sources confirming the fact that the offices of *ab epistulis* and *a libellis* were held by *equites* before Hadrian, they considered these changes to be merely ephemeral. For them, Hadrian remained the reformer of palatine offices; see, for instance, HERZOG 1887: 363, n. 1: "Die Vorgänge, welche von Vitellius (Tac. hist. 1, 58) und Domitian (Suet. 7) berichtet werden, waren nur von vorübergehender Bedeutung, so daß 'primus' bei Spartian immerhin seine Richtigkeit hat".

[78] LACEY (1917: 40) wrote with apparent doubt: "We have no sure example under Hadrian of the *a rationibus*...".

[79] See WEAVER 1967: 18, n. 36: "...among the Palatine secretaries who were equestrian by the time of Hadrian, no mention is made of the most important of them all, secretary *a rationibus*". HIRSCHFELD's views on the office of *a rationibus* were revised, most notably, by PFLAUM 1950: 74, 256.

[80] See, for instance, DULCKEIT, SCHWARZ 1966: 173: "An seiner Spitze stand der Kassenvorsteher a rationibus. Unter Hadrian wurde dieses Amt zu einer Art Reichsfinanzministerium ausgebaut"; WINKLER 1972: 1340: "Erst Hadrianus übertrug die Finanzverwaltung einem eigenen *procurator a. r.*, der dem Ritterstand entstammte..."; HAMMERSTEIN 1975: 45, n. 191: "In dem Amt [*a rationibus* – K.K.] kommen auch nach Hadrian, der es dem Ritterstand vorbehielt, hin und wieder kaiserliche Freigelassene vor"; CLAES 2014: 167: "the office was held by freedman, but from the reign of Hadrian onwards equestrians assumed total control of the office of the a *rationibus*...".

[81] The terminology used by MOMMSEN and other 19th-century scholars was influenced by the dominance of constitutionalism at that time as well as the so-called conceptual jurisprudence ("Begriffsjurisprudenz"), see WINTERLING 2009: 13.

[82] NIPPEL 2007: 210.

young MOMMSEN's linguistic innovations in his Roman History"[83]. This issue is more evident in the case of imperial court offices. S. DEMOUGIN wrote that "[l]a definition la plus commode des bureaux palatins doit être empruntée au monde moderne"[84]. The widespread use of the modern words "chancery", "chancellerie", "Kanzlei", "Kabinett" and other similar terms used when denoting the *a rationibus* office should be regarded as examples of the same tendency[85]. It seems that HIRSCHFELD was the first to use the term "Reichsfinanzministerium" when referring to the office of *a rationibus* in German historiography[86]. The term was then used by e.g. G. KRETSCHMAR or W. LIEBENAM[87]. P. von ROHDEN when writing about Pallas preferred to say that "er war Finanzminister (a rationibus) des Claudius"[88]. The term "Reichsfinanzministerium", interestingly, can also be found in textbooks from the first half of the 20th century[89]. Some scholars used different terms when referring to the *a rationibus* office, yet the terms, in a similar way to the "Reichsfinanzministerium", emphasised the political and administrative significance of the office. FRIEDLÄNDER referred to the *a rationibus* as "Dirigent der Zentralstelle für die kaiserliche Finanzverwaltung"[90], whereas MARQUARDT wrote about "Chef des Finanzwesens"[91].

In Anglo-Saxon literature, on the other hand, one can find the term "Chancellor of the Exchequer" referring to the office of *a rationibus*[92]. CUQ, a French scholar, used the term "directeur des finances impériales"[93]. HUMBERT, however, referred to the office of *a rationibus* as "ministre des finances"[94]. The terms – as one may suppose – suggested a continuation of administrative solutions and political connections between imperial Rome and modern European states. In addition, the vocabulary used was supposed to be understood first of all by a contemporary

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83 LINDERSKI 1993: 46.

84 DEMOUGIN 2005: 374.

85 HIRSCHFELD (1905: 321), when writing about the imperial cabinet ("das kaiserliche Kabinett") functioning during Claudius' reign and the imperial chancery ("die kaiserliche Kanzlei") reformed by Hadrian, seems to have in mind two institutions of different character. According to him, "Kabinett" was first of all a political institution, in which the most prominent roles were played by the emperor's influential freedmen, whereas "Kanzlei" was a state office in charge of drafting imperial documents, held by professional *equites*. Cf. MALITZ 1987: 51, n. 1.

86 HIRSCHFELD 1905: 31. At present ALPERS 1995: 142 and SCHMALL 2011: 159 noticed HIRSCHFELD's "Reichsfinanzminister".

87 KRETSCHMAR 1879: 22–24; LIEBENAM 1886: 51 f., n. 5; LIEBENAM 1914: 263.

88 ROHDEN 1894: 2634. See also MEYER 1961: 203.

89 See, for instance, SCHMIDT 1903: 281; POLAND 1913: 396.

90 FRIEDLÄNDER 1888: 171.

91 MARQUARDT 1884: 109.

92 MATTINGLY 1910: 15.

93 CUQ 1884: 394.

94 HUMBERT 1886: 234.

reader, who fully understood their political and social meaning. MOMMSEN emphasised that the competences of the "Rechnungsführer" (*a rationibus*) were generally in accordance with the duties of the 19th-century "Finanzministerien"[95].

The use of contemporary terms denoting high-ranking posts when referring to the Roman office of *a rationibus* was primarily due to the political and administrative significance of this office in the *Imperium Romanum*. HIRSCHFELD and FRIEDLÄNDER emphasised the superior position of the "Reichsfinanzministerium" in the imperial administration, which they ascribed to the procuratorial position of *a rationibus*, its competences involving the emperor's accounts, fiscal expenditures and the omnipotent political position of the freedmen – M. Antonius Pallas or the father of Claudius Etruscus. LIEBENAM wrote about the great power ("ganz ungeheure Macht") of the emperor's servants (such as Pallas or Etruscus) who held the office of *a rationibus* in the 1st century AD[96]. KRETSCHMAR believed that "das bedeutendste dieser Cabinetsämter ist das Rechnungsamt, a rationibus"[97]. HERZOG, when referring to the father of Claudius Etruscus described by Statius, went as far as to claim that the freedman was at the top of the whole imperial administration[98].

It cannot, however, be assumed that there is a direct institutional continuation between the antique office of *a rationibus* and the central financial institutions in modern states. P. VEYNE criticised such simplifications and warned against the dangers of establishing a "deceptive continuity" between historically distant terms[99]. The author of this article appreciates the influence of modern cultural and linguistic concepts on scholarly writing, but believes that the use of modern terms in the case presented is not grounded in historical evidence.

Although the title "accountant" or "bookkeeper" (in German e.g. "Rechnungsführer") is not distant from its Latin original (*ratio*, *-onis* 'account'), it may imply a narrowing down of the competences of the office to a particular sphere of public activity[100]. This terminological custom is not fully justified in the light of the findings of P. BRUNT, M. ALPERS, P. EICH and S. SCHMALL about

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95 MOMMSEN 1893: 211.

96 LIEBENAM 1886: 51.

97 KRETSCHMAR 1879: 22.

98 HERZOG 1887: 667.

99 VEYNE 1984: 134.

100 The affiliation of *a rationibus* with *rationes* is complex and ambiguous. It may seem that the *officium a rationibus* was also in charge of the emperor's bookkeeping and accounting, but there is no source material that would confirm that the *arcarii* or the *dispensatores* worked in the office, HIRSCHFELD 1905: 30; WACHTEL 1966: 22 f.; BOULVERT 1970: 106. It seems that the *officium a rationibus* managed imperial income and expenditure in the administrative sense by controlling them. The office, however, did not perform the function of cashier's office. There is every reason to assume that the officials of lower rank responsible for more technical tasks in the *officium a rationibus* were *tabularii a rationibus* as well as *adiutores tabularii*. See BOULVERT 1970: 98 f.

a wider (but still unclear) scope of the competences of the *a rationibus*. The often used title of "finance minister", on the other hand, could suggest the great political influence (*potentia*) of the *a rationibus* officials in the period from the 1st to the 2nd century AD and the superiority of their status to other fiscal officials in equestrian procuratorial hierarchy, which again may be an overinterpretation[101]. It seems that using the term *officium a rationibus / rationum* is a culturally neutral denomination confirmed in the source material from the period of the early Roman Empire[102].

## BUREAUCRATIC AND NON-BUREAUCRATIC PERSPECTIVES ON THE OFFICE *A RATIONIBUS*

Historians of antiquity have often looked for patterns that governed the functioning of the Roman civil administration. In the case described, the decisive factor is the manner of looking at Roman institutions through the lens of modern bureaucracy which is rooted in the traditions of 19th-century academic discourse. Many representatives of old historiography, such as O. Hirschfeld and A. Stein, used to conflate the administrative realities of ancient Rome with the semantics of "bureaucracy" in the way it was understood and popularised by M. Weber[103].

The authors of works published since the beginning of the 1970's have revised the old dominant views on the Roman administration[104]. As was duly noted by S. Demougin, they have focused mainly on two basic and closely-connected elements that shaped the imperial administration: the role of the emperor and the practice of patronage[105]. Contemporary scholars have refrained from speaking about the stability of Roman institutions and strict divisions of competences within the ranks of its officials. P. Garnsey and R. Saller, among others, convincingly proved that ancient Romans did not think about their offices in terms of organized "bureaucracy", at least not during the early imperial period[106]. The first emperors did not create a structured administrative system, as the choices they made with regard to their officials were often made in an *ad hoc* manner,

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101 P. Eich 2005: 162, n. 2. Cf. Bruun 1991: 294. The phrase *ministeria principatus* used by Tacitus (*Hist*. I 58, 1; cf. *Ann*. XII 53, 2) was probably meant to depict the political role of the court posts and not their administrative (institutional) function. It should, however, be noted that the term *ministerium* is derived from Roman public law. The phrase *publica ministeria* certainly referred to "public officials". See *Dig*. XI 4, 1, 6. Cf. *Dig*. XLVIII 11, 1 *praef*.

102 Cf. *CIL* VI 8424a = *ILS* 1706. See also Kłodziński 2013a: 168, n. 1.

103 Here I have in mind the concept of "patrimonial bureaucracy", a form of protobureaucracy. This issue is more extensively discussed by P. Eich (2007: 21–25; 2015: 90–95).

104 This refers mainly to Garnsey 1970; Millar 1977; Saller 1982; Brunt 1990.

105 Demougin 2001b: 25.

106 Garnsey, Saller 1987: 20–40 ("Government without Bureaucracy"). Cf. Scheid 1990: 106–109 ("Les limites de la bureaucratie impériale").

initiated by the emperor Augustus[107]. Later emperors usually experimented, because administrative solutions were sanctioned only if they worked in practice. Structures seen as impractical and ineffective were dissolved. This led the doubling of competences or the blurring of boundaries between the functions of different officials. Such factors as the number of administrative offices (that did not rise from the times of the Roman Republic), the recruitment process or the promotion system the offices implement should not be seen as decisive evidence for the existence of a professional, organised and strictly regulated administration in the early Empire period[108]. Scholars often underlined the quantitative aspect of the comparison between a disproportionately low number of officials in imperial Rome to their number in, for instance, ancient China, not to mention modern bureaucracies[109]. As A. Eich rightfully points out,

> In der althistorischen Literatur besteht Konsens darüber, daß die zivilen Verwaltungsinstitutionen des früh- und hochkaiserzeitlichen Reichsstaates keinen hohen Entwicklungsgrad erreicht haben[110].

In spite of revising scholarly views on imperial administration, some authors still tend to use the term "bureaucracy" without considering the controversies and complexities it implies[111]. For example, H. Bellen, while writing about the development of palatine secretariats during the reign of Claudius, stated that "[d]ie genannten 'Ministerien' waren Ausdruck der beginnenden Bürokratisierung der kaiserlichen Verwaltung"[112].

The "Rezeptionsgeschichte" of the *a rationibus* office and its administrative position is indicative of a more general tendency in historiography. 19th-century scholars defined early imperial administration, including the office of *a rationibus*,

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[107] Cf. Eck 1986: 105–120; Eck 1994: 23–34.

[108] Garnsey, Saller 1987: 25 f. Not so long ago P. Eich (2007: 48) proved that the Roman Empire of the third century AD can be defined as "pre-modern bureaucracy". For him, the factors in favour of the thesis included: the hierarchical division of official competences, confirmed in twenty-five cases. See also P. Eich 2007: 38 f. The thesis on the bureaucratisation of Roman administration was popularised earlier on, but was seen as referring to the times after Diocletian. See e.g. Carney 1971: 6: "...the power of the civil administration grew piecemeal in the first century, consolidated in the second, gained immense strategic importance in the third and developed into a mammoth bureaucracy in the fourth"; Demandt 1989: XVIII: "Die Verwaltung wird bürokratisiert. Die Zahl der Beamten wächst, die Kompetenzen werden aufgeteilt". Cf. Noethlichs 1981: 3–18; Migl 1994: 24–32.

[109] See, for example Scheid 1990: 106.

[110] A. Eich 2010: 9.

[111] P. Eich 2015: 90. See also Bruun 2014a: 274.

[112] Bellen 2010: 34. See also Carney 1960: 99 f.: "a devoted and hardworking administrator, the organizer of a complex, centralized bureaucratic machine". The term 'bureaucracy' was also used by scholars researching the functioning of freedmen administration: Boulvert 1974: 334; Weaver 1972: 174. For some critical remarks on seeing the *familia Caesaris* from the bureaucratic perspective, see Wallace-Hadrill 1996: 297; P. Eich 2015: 100 f.

using modern terms. The terms they adopted implied retrospectively and anachronistically an excessive level of systemic organization and structure. This phenomenon, which is also discernible today, results in simplifications and misunderstandings. Nowadays, it is necessary to be especially careful when thinking about the existence of institutionalised or formalised structure, organisation and definition in the areas of the imperial administration (in particular, in the first two centuries AD).

F. Millar, W. Eck, P. Eich and others in their analyses questioned the bureaucratic nature of the *a rationibus* office and, in general, all administrative structures from the period of the early Empire. They conveyed the complexity of the history of *a rationibus* and underscored the absence of clear rules in the structure of imperial administration, disproving for instance the thesis on the specialization of tasks. In comparison to older historiography, the main difference was the analysis of other aspects of the *officium a rationibus*. The discussions related to the position of the office during the reign of Claudius and during Hadrian's reform, appointing equestrian procurators to the office, were no longer as important as before. Similarly, the question as to whether the office of *a rationibus* constituted a part of a bureaucratic institution was seen as a matter of lesser relevance. Contemporary scholars have concentrated on the informal influences and mutually-depended personal relations between the emperor and the imperial freedmen[113]. While writing about the imperial freedmen, Eck emphasised "their constant proximity to the emperor"[114]. As a result, the *familia Caesaris* created during the reign of Claudius[115] was not an effect implementing strict administrative rules, because the position and the influence of the officials were still dependent on the emperor's favour[116]. The key reforms of the *a rationibus* office were no longer associated with the times of Claudius or Hadrian. Even though recent writers on the subject appreciate the power and informal political influences (*potentia*) of the freedman Pallas, they do not associate his position with the importance of the *a rationibus*, since the reform that extended the competences of the office and increased its prestige cannot be dated to Claudius' reign[117]. The only feature of the office that may be linked to his reign was the proximity of its

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[113] Saller 1982: 106.

[114] Eck 2000: 195.

[115] To use the words of Chantraine (1967: 28), the shift was "vom libertus eines bestimmten Kaiser zum kaiserlichen Freigelassenen schlechthin". Since the times of Claudius, the *familia Caesaris* began to function as a regular support service for the emperor that was taken over by later rulers along with the *patrimonium*, from which administrative workers were recruited.

[116] See Eck 1994: 33.

[117] The thesis on the "bureaucratisation" of financial administration in the times of Claudius was also challenged; see P. Eich 2005: 161; Schmall 2011: 151. Some scholars believed that most changes in central administration were introduced not during the reign of Claudius, but later under the Flavian dynasty, Weaver 1979: 70–102.

officials to the emperor; they worked close to the emperor and had free access to him that allowed for personal influences. Their work in the vicinity of the emperor undoubtedly was the source of their influences not only during the reign of Claudius, but also under the Flavian dynasty[118].

More important in the history of the office were structural administrative changes that transformed some court offices into branches of fiscal administration by giving the offices to *equites*. Since that time, the position of equestrians as head fiscal officials was not based on the principle of personal allegiance to the emperor, but on a "quasi Kontraktbasis" with the emperor, to use the words of Eich[119]. The transformation of the *a rationibus* office into an equestrian office did not result in stricter hierarchisation in the procuratorial system nor the subordination of other equestrian offices to the central office of finances[120].

Similarly, freedmen were not excluded from fiscal administration, as since the times of the Flavian dynasty they often held the same official titles as *equites*. In this context, it is important to consider the opinion of G. Boulvert[121] who hypothesised that during the reign of Domitian pairings of officials functioned, consisting of an equestrian official and a freedman who was his deputy[122]. This thesis, referring to two court offices (*a patrimonio* and *ab epistulis*)[123], was designed to explain the fact that freedmen and *equites* often held the same posts simultaneously[124]. There is some historical grounding for the above hypothesis[125], yet whether it should be extended to the office of *a rationibus* is unclear. The first freeborn *eques* that held the post of *a rationibus* is confirmed during the times of Trajan; therefore, it is impossible to prove the existence of such a relationship

[118] Nevertheless, holding the post of *a rationibus* should not be equated with having this kind of influence. The political position of the father of Claudius Etruscus, the *a rationibus* official from c. 70 until 82/83 AD, cannot be compared to the one held earlier by Pallas, cf. Claes 2014: 167, n. 21. The meaning of an official post (including court offices) held by freedmen should not be undervalued, since the *liberti Augusti* often used their proximity to the emperor to increase their competences. See Oost 1958: 124–129.

[119] P. Eich 2005: 161.

[120] P. Eich 2005: 162.

[121] The genesis of this idea may be traced back to the works of H.-G. Pflaum. See Demougin 1994: 295; Millar 2004: 153 f.

[122] Boulvert 1970: 253: "Les postes [*a patrimonio* and *ab epistulis* – K.K.] de deux affranchis ne sont pas supprimés mais ils ne sont plus que les sous-directeurs des services".

[123] Cn. Octavius Titinius Capito (*CIL* VI 798 = *ILS* 1448) is seen as an official superior to the two freedmen and administering the two offices – *procurator ab epistulis et a patrimonio* during the reign of Domitian and *ab epistulis* from Nerva to Trajan.

[124] The hypothesis about "collégialité inégale" formulated by Pflaum reinvigorated the discussion on the functioning of the administration. Some scholars also applied the "principe de la collégialité inégale" to other branches of the administration (e.g. in the imperial domains of Africa Proconsularis). See Kolendo 1969: 319–329; Eck 2000: 255 f.

[125] Pflaum 1974: 65 f.; P. Eich 2005: 162–175.

of mutual dependence in the case of the *a rationibus* in the times of Domitian[126]. Is it, however, possible that such a "collégialité inégale" functioned during the reign of Trajan and later? In the case of the *a rationibus* office, there are thirteen known freedmen who held the title *procurator a rationibus* / *a rationibus* in the period from the rule of the Flavian dynasty to the 2nd century AD[127]. According to Demougin, who expressed a general opinion on the "bureaux palatins", the existence of this rule is a plausible explanation why the imperial freedmen held "titre directeur d'un bureau palatin" in the second century AD[128]. Quite interestingly, Weaver, while accepting Boulvert's thesis, did not rule out the possibility that during the reign of Marcus Aurelius, the freedman Cosmus[129] was probably the assistant to M. Bassaeus Rufus, the equestrian *a rationibus*[130]. Did the freedman with the same title as the *eques* have to be his assistant? Or is it possible that the officials worked independently? Even if we accept the thesis on the "equestrian-freedman pairs" in the *officium a rationibus*, it is impossible to know the interrelationships between the two posts and the division of competences between them. Moreover, in the inscriptions, often only the official title is mentioned with no additional descriptions of the rank of the office (e.g. *adiutor*, *subprocurator*, *tabularius*) that could indicate a negative difference in competences between a freedman and an *eques*. The hypothesis on the subordination of freedmen to *equites* cannot be confirmed beyond all doubt due to the lack of adequate source materials[131]. Although Pflaum's thesis on the administration in the 2nd century AD seems convincing, it also has its weaknesses. If we accept his assumption, we also have to concede to the thesis on the existence of an exclusively equestrian system of procuratorial posts without autonomous freedmen-procurators[132]. For this reason, the simultaneous activity of the *equites* of *a rationibus* and the

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126 Demougin 1994: 296.

127 Wachtel (1966: 118 f.) calculated that there were 12 such freedmen and Bruun (1989: 50–53) convincingly proved that the *a rationibus* Phaon functioned not during the reign of Nero, but in the times of the Flavian dynasty or later.

128 Demougin 2005: 375.

129 *PIR*² C 1535.

130 Weaver 1972: 237. The character and the position of Cosmus' post are not fully known. He could have been a lower-ranking official (according to P. Eich 2005: 225: "nachgeordnete Stelle im Kollegium der *rationales*") or the main official in the *officium a rationibus* ("Leiter des Ressorts") as a successor to Bassaeus Rufus. Cf. Kolb 1995: 211, n. 44. The last thesis was ruled out by Weaver 1972: 237, who stated that "[i]t is hard to believe that in 168 a *freedman* could occupy the highest and apparently only trecenerian equestrian post in the administration". In his opinion, only an equestrian or a person who had received the status of an equestrian could be the head of this office.

131 Burton (1977: 162 f.), who reviewed the two works by Boulvert, decided that there are too few source materials to formulate a thesis on the hierarchical structure of the offices held by the emperor's freedmen. Cf. also Weaver 1972: 229, n. 4; Millar 2004: 154.

132 Millar 2004: 154.

freedmen (holding the same title) supposedly subordinate to them is not sufficiently supported or is controversial at best[133].

The concept of the "collégialité inégale" also appears in the case of the activity of *rationales* in the second half of the 2nd century. H.-G. Pflaum dated the reorganisation of the *officium a rationibus* to the times of Marcus Aurelius[134], the period when the post of *procurator summarum rationum* was created[135]. Since then the *a rationibus* (*trecenarius*) and a *procurator summarum rationum* (*ducenarius*) subordinate to him were to be described as *rationales* functioning in the system of the "Pseudokollegialität"[136]. Some scholars, accepting Pflaum's findings and considering the career of Beryllus[137], who was the *vicarius rationalium*, that is the lower-ranking envoy to the mines in Vipasca (Aljustrel), in their studies, assumed that since the times of Marcus Aurelius the office of *rationales* existed that included the posts *a rationibus* and *procurator summarum rationum*[138]. On the other hand Eich, basing on the inscription dated to 193 (*CIL* VI 1585b = *ILS* 5920), assumed that there was "a collegium of four rationales" with two *equites* and two subordinate freedmen at the end of the 2nd century[139]. At the head of this structure, according to Eich, was the *a rationibus* (*rationalis*)[140]. Such a categorical statement with regard to the superiority of the *a rationibus* over the *procurator summarum rationum* cannot be seen as decisive in this case[141]. It may merely be said that in all likelihood the *a rationibus* reached the highest position of *trecenarius* in the equestrian procuratorial administration at the end of the 2nd century AD[142]. To Eich, the fiscal official was the head of the *collegium* of *rationales*, but this is

[133] Cf. Hirt 2010: 122: "Given the available evidence, Saturninus might not have been subordinate to an equestrian colleague, but possibly held the financial procuratorship alone". *Ibid*. 129: „Although this sort of unequal arrangement – with the freedman procurator being the subordinate partner to this equestrian colleague – can be detected fairly often in procuratorial offices of the second century, it was probably not a general rule".

[134] Pflaum 1950: 74.

[135] *CIL* VI 1598 = *ILS* 1740; Pflaum 1960a: 395, nº 163. The *procurator summarum rationum* was a part of the imperial fiscal administration in the 2nd century AD, but the exact date when the office was introduced is not known, see P. Eich 2005: 162. Cf. Demougin 1976: 135–145; Eck 1977: 227–231.

[136] Cf. *CIL* VI 1585b = *ILS* 5920. Pflaum 1974: 65: "Il s'agit de l'*a rationibus*, du *procurator summarum rationum* et de leurs subordonnés affranchis".

[137] *AE* 1908, 233. For more information about Beryllus, see P. Eich 2005: 167 f.

[138] Domergue 1990: 300; Hirt 2010: 124.

[139] P. Eich 2005: 162, 168 f.

[140] P. Eich 2015: 106.

[141] Schmall 2011: 502: "Keines dieser Argumente ist jedoch konklusiv, da weder Laufbahn noch Status noch Gehaltsstufe auf eine hierarchische Unterordnung verweisen müssen. Die Stellung des *procurator summarum rationum* zum *procurator a rationibus* bleibt vorerst unklar".

[142] *ILS* 8854 = *IGUR* 424. See Hirschfeld 1905: 31; Pflaum 1960b: 697, nº 160; P. Eich 2005: 162. Cf. Birley 1992: 54.

also difficult to prove, since only the phrase *rationales dominorum nostrorum* is used in the inscription (*CIL* VI 1585b = *ILS* 5920) and the interdependencies between the four offices remain unknown. The question of whether at the end of the second century there was a *collegium* (or *officium*) of *rationales* or two separate departments – *a rationibus* and *procurator summarum rationum* cannot be satisfactorily answered[143]. Additionally, there is not sufficient evidence to confirm the equivalence of *a rationibus* / *rationalis* titles in the second century AD[144] − the only inscription that could support this thesis was written much earlier[145]. It seems that there was a gradual replacement of the title of *a rationibus* by that of *rationalis* at the beginning of the third century, instead of an interchangeable use of the two terms in administrative practice from the 2nd century AD[146]. The changes in the central financial administration at the end of the 2nd century and in the 3rd century, including the terminology used to describe its structures, are not fully understood today due to the lack of unambiguous evidence.

In the introduction, I quoted Millar's suggestion on the independence of the equestrian office of *a rationibus* in comparison to other palatine offices, such as

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143 Cf. Schmall 2011: 502–504.

144 Christol, Demougin 1990: 201; Eich, Petzl (2000: 191) have a different opinion on the subject. Greek terminology referring to central fiscal offices is complicated and ambiguous. The title κυθολικός describes *rationalis* and *a rationibus* officials. This term cannot be seen as a clear equivalent to the Latin *rationalis*, Eich, Petzl 2000: 191–193. In Greek, other titles such as [ἐπί]τροπος [ἀ]πὸ τῶν λόγων (*AE* 1913, 143), ἐπὶ τῶν καθόλου λόγων (*CIL* III 6574, 7126; *IEph* 651 = *ILS* 1344 – a bilingual inscription depicting the career of the *a rationibus* Tertullus) and ἐπίτροπος κυθολικός (*IGR* IV 1627; Eich, Petzl 2000: 190–194) could also refer to the Roman official of *a rationibus*. Cf. Christol, Demougin 1990: 199–201. For more information on Greek terminology describing imperial court offices, see Mason 1974: 140–142.

145 See *CIL* XV 7740 = *CIL* XIV 2008a = *ILS* 8686: "Imp(eratoris) Antonini Aug(usti) Pii sub cur(a) Cl(audi) Secundini ra[tionalis et] / Anni Phlegontis Aug(usti) l(iberti) ex off(icina) Demetri liber[t]i". On the basis of this inscription, some authors assumed that the title *a rationibus* / *rationalis* were used interchangeably from the 2nd century AD. See Christol, Demougin 1990: 193 f., 201. Cf. Bruun 1991: 293 f. Such a view is justifiable only if *rationalis* Claudius Secundinus is seen as the same person as *a rationibus* Ti. Claudius Secundinus L. Statius Macedo (*CIL* V 867 = *ILS* 1339). Recently, however, this assumption has been questioned by Schmall 2011: 541, n. 1813. It is also important to mention the phrase *sub cura rationalium*, confirmed by inscriptions from the second half of the 2nd century – *CIL* XIV 1979; XV 7741, 7742a, 7744, 7745. See Christol, Demougin 1990: 193 f.

146 At the end of the 2nd century AD, the title *procurator a rationibus* / *a rationibus* was very rarely used (only two *a rationibus* officials are confirmed at the beginning of the 3rd century AD, L. Septimius Antonius Agathonicus (*EE* IX 695, *CIL* VI 10233) and Q. Marcius Dioga (Pflaum 1960b: 719–725, n° 271; Christol 1991: 165–186; Sablayrolles 1996: 500–503, nº 28). The title was replaced with the more often seen title of *rationalis* (probably *vir perfectissimus* from the reign of Alexander Severus, *CIL* XIV 5309[21], 5309[22]) that described the official responsible for the imperial *fiscus*. See Delmaire 1989: 11; Bruun 1991: 294; P. Eich 2005: 162. Cf. Jones 1950: 29; Eck, Gross-Albenhausen 2001: 784. It should be noted that after a long break, the title *a rationibus* reappeared at the end of the 3rd century and the beginning of the 4th AD – *CIL* VI 1120a, 31384. There is every reason to suppose that it was an exceptional use of an archaic title that denoted the official *rationalis* who functioned in the period of the Tetrarchy. See Delmaire 1989: 15.

*ab epistulis*[147]. He based his views on the full military and civilian equestrian careers characteristic for *a rationibus* officials. It seems important to compare these careers with respect to military experience. For twenty-five *equites* of *a rationibus* confirmed before the beginning of the 3rd century[148], excluding the *v.p. rationalis* officials in the 3rd century[149], as many as fifteen, that is 60% of the whole group[150], had previously held military posts (mainly within the ranks of the *militiae equestres*)[151]. This observation could confirm the thesis of the British historian, but no unambiguous conclusions on the independent nature of the office

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[147] See also Roth 1999: 263; Mennen 2011: 145.

[148] The cited number of twenty-five officials was based on the *fasti a rationibus*, compiled by Pflaum (1961: 1019; 1982: 109; see also Rostowzew 1906: 133 f.), with the inclusion of two anonymous equestrian *a rationibus* officials (*CIL* IX 5440; Sablayrolles 1996: 523, nº 46 and *AE* 1976, 676; Eck 1977: 227–231; Pflaum 1982: 38–40, nº 119a). In my calculation, I also included three *equites* of *a rationibus* omitted by Pflaum: ----Ius Achil[leus] (*IGR* IV 1627; Eich, Petzl 2000: 190–194), Iulius (Aelius?) Iulianus (*AE* 1994, 421; 2010, 284; Camodeca 2012: 305–321) and Q. Marcius Dioga (*CIL* VI 41277; XIV 4468–4470; Christol 1991: 165–188). In contrast to Pflaum (1982: 109), I decided not to count Marcius Festus among the *a rationibus* officials (*PIR*² M 234), since it is not known for certain whether he held the position of *a rationibus* or *a cubiculo*. See Pflaum 1961: 1019, 1024; Boulvert 1970: 245 f., n. 315; Millar 1977: 82, n. 105; Peachin 1989: 174, n. 16. Moreover, I excluded from *fasti a rationibus* the eminent jurist – M. Cn. Licinius Rufinus. About Rufinus see Mennen 2011: 153. It is not known for certain whether he held the post of *a rationibus* or *rationalis* during the first half of the 3rd century, *AE* 1997, 1425: ἐπὶ τῶν καθόλου λόγων. See Millar 1999: 99; cf. Eck 2006: 71 f. In my opinion Rufinus was *rationalis*.

[149] The number of *a rationibus* calculated for the purposes of this article – different from Pflaum's *fasti* (1961: 1019) – does not include the *rationales* from the 3rd century AD. Similarly to Rostowzew (1906: 133–135), I resolved to see these officials as a separate group.

[150] This statistical calculation, based on the available ancient sources, may raise reasonable doubts. It should be remembered that it is a result of analysing incomplete historical materials (mostly epigraphic). The other ten *equites a rationibus*, whose career development is not fully known, could have held military posts, but without adequate source materials it is impossible to confirm this assumption. Perhaps the careers of other unknown *a rationibus* officials were less spectacular and for this reason were not recorded epigraphically. Generally speaking, the purpose of inscriptions (most often honorific and funerary) was not to recount the full *cursus honorum* of a given person, but merely to commemorate the activities of an individual in the public sphere. See Eck 2009: 70–92; Bruun 2014b: 214.

[151] L. Vibius Lentulus (*AE* 1913, 143a = *IEph* 2061; *AE* 1924, 81 = *IEph* 3046; *SEG* XXVI 1246), Cn. Pompeius Homullus Aelius Gracilis Cassianus Longinus (*CIL* VI 1626 = *ILS* 1385), T. Statilius Optatus (*CIL* VI 31863 = *AE* 1983, 120 = *ILS* 9011), Anonymous official (*AE* 1976, 676), L. Valerius Proculus (*CIL* II 1970 = *ILS* 1341; *CIL* XIV 2957), M. Petronius Honoratus (*CIL* VI 1625a, 1625b = ILS 1340; *CIL* XIV 4458 = *AE* 1913, 197), Ti. Claudius Secundinus L. Statius Macedo (*CIL* V 867 = *ILS* 1339; *AE* 1934, 232 = Brusin, *IA* 486a; *AE* 1955, 211), T. Furius Victorinus (*AE* 1907, 152 = *CIL* VI 39440 = *ILS* 9002), C. Iunius Flavianus (*CIL* VI 1620 = *CIL* VI 3163 = *ILS* 1342; *CIL* XIII 1812), Q. Baienus Blassianus (*AE* 1974, 123 = *CIL* V 539 = *IIt* X, IV, 38–40; *CIL* XIV 5341, 5353, 5382), M. Bassaeus Rufus (*CIL* VI 1599 = *CIL* VI 31828 = *ILS* 1326), L. Iulius Vehilius Gallus Iulianus (*CIL* VI 31856 = *ILS* 1327; *CIL* V 4343), Iulius (Aelius?) Iulianus (*AE* 1994, 421; 2010, 284; Camodeca 2012: 305–321), Aurelius Felix (*ILS* 8854 = *IGUR* 424) Q. Marcius Dioga (*CIL* VI 41277, XIV 4468–4470; Christol 1991: 165–188). The references to the sources were based only on materials that depicted the military stage in the equestrian careers of *a rationibus*.

*a rationibus* can be drawn from analysing the careers of its officials. A. Birley, in a text devoted to the office of *ab epistulis*[152], took into account the military competences of the *ab epistulis* office, as usually appointed to the posts of *militiae equestres*[153]. There were also military officers on Birley's list of *ab epistulis* officials (both *Latinis* and *Graecis*)[154]. In the light of these findings, it may be concluded that the office *a rationibus* was not that different from other court offices with regard to the military character of its tasks[155]; the career development of its officials was also not that exceptional, although undoubtedly the number of officers holding the post was higher than the number of officers who later became *ab epistulis* officials[156]. Still, I am far from seeing the office of *a rationibus* as a post held only by military men. The pathway of a first military then a civil career (mainly civil procuratorial posts) of the *a rationibus* officials may not have been binding for all *equites*. There is a possibility that some of these officials, educated and qualified in a particular domain (e.g. sophists and rhetors), held only civilian administrative posts[157]. For instance, Ti. Claudius Vibianus Tertullus performed the duties of *ab epistulis Graecis*, *a rationibus* and *praefectus vigilum*[158]. There is no information on other positions held by this official, which may have also included military offices. Typically, however, the office of *ab epistulis Graecis* held by Tertullus was not given to officers, but to literary men (sophists and rhetors)[159], so the military stage of his career is debatable, since factors such as the personal decisions of emperors and/or their advisors, the patronage and qualifications of candidates played a decisive role in the process of nominating equestrian officials of high rank.

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[152] Birley 1992: 41–54.

[153] Birley 1992: 47: "Das hatte zur Folge, daß auch sein Kanzleichef eine nicht geringe Rolle in allen militärischen Angelegenheiten erlangen mußte". Cf. Stat. *Silv.* V 1, 84–100; Suet. *Vesp.* 4, 1.

[154] Birley 1992: 48–54.

[155] See Stat. *Silv.* III 3, 99 f. The "military" competences of the *a rationibus* remain unclear. Some historians, it seems, overextended the competences of the office in this respect (e.g. managing the logistic system of the Roman army) without providing sufficient historical evidence. See Roth 1999: 262; Kehne 2007: 330; Mennen 2011: 145.

[156] This matter requires further analyses and comparisons with court offices.

[157] Bowersock 1969: 50–57; Lewis 1981: 149–154. For instance, the jurist M. Cn. Licinius Rufinus (*rationalis* or *a rationibus*) had only experience in civil administration. See n. 148; Millar 1999: 90–108; Mennen 2011: 153. On the other hand Sex. Cornelius Repentinus (*PIR*² C 1428), the *ab epistulis* and then the *praefectus praetorio* from 160 to 166/167. Before his service in the court offices he only worked as a civilian official in Rome. He had no military background. It may be said that Repentinus belonged to the circle of intellectuals (Fronto, *Ad Amic.* 2, 4). See Camodeca 1981: 43–56; Ruciński 2013: 373 f.

[158] *PIR*² C 1049; Pflaum 1960b: 683 f., nº 252; Sablayrolles 1996: 491 f., nº 17.

[159] It is possible that the tasks of the *ab epistulis Graecis*, in contrast to the *ab epistulis Latinis*, were of a purely civilian character. See Birley 1992: 47.

## CONCLUSION

A detailed analysis of the ways of describing the position of the office of *a rationibus* in the imperial government has allowed me to identify not only certain characteristic tendencies in the manners of describing historical reality in 19th-century discourse (the process of removing freedmen from palatine administration or the role of the emperor Hadrian as the reformer of palatine offices), but also, perhaps first of all, particular research theses, put forward mainly by Hirschfeld and Friedländer, which established its definition in academic discourse.

The analysis presented here proves that, long before Millar and Rougé, numerous other 19th-century scholars, starting from Hirschfeld, believed the *a rationibus* office to have been functioning outside the administrative structure of the imperial court (*ministeria principatus*; *officia maxima*), mostly referred to as the "Kanzlei" or the "Kabinett". The validity of this thesis was usually recognized due to the emphasis on the equestrian *procurator a rationibus*, whose post was at that time incorrectly assumed to have been established by the emperor Hadrian.

Some contemporary scholars replicated existing theses without considering their genesis or carrying out a comparative ancient evidence analysis. These researchers, in a similar way to old scholars such as Hirschfeld, described Roman administration using an updated "bureaucratic model" that stipulates whether a given office functioned within or outside Roman administrative structures. Some scholars decided against the formalised vision of the *a rationibus* office, basing their views on the importance of personal relations (patronage) and its later status as an equestrian office. For them, the argumentation that referred to the bureaucratisation of Roman administration in the times of Claudius and Hadrian, so much debated in older historiography, was not the most significant aspect of the issue.

Exceptionally rare expressions, such as *officia maxima* and *ministeria principatus*, were a result of literary conventions, rather than formalized administrative terms. For the Romans, the "Kanzlei" was not an administrative (bureaucratic) and stand-alone structure, but a group of individuals appointed *ad hoc* by the emperor for the posts of *a rationibus*, *a declamationibus*, *a diplomatibus* etc. In this regard, the emperor's will and his decisions were more important than any administrative rules reminiscent of modern bureaucratic ideas. There is no evidence that would allow us to unanimously confirm the existence of an organized group of palatine offices (levels of annual payments made to equestrian officials are insufficient evidence). Although, for instance, J. Scheid resolved to write about "les chefs des bureaux centraux qui forment le cabinet impérial"[160], it

[160] Scheid 1990: 102.

should be remembered that his decisions were not grounded in ancient evidence but in the 19th-century scholarly tradition of presenting imperial administration.

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# NOTES ON ESCHATOLOGICAL PATTERNS IN A 12TH CENTURY ANONYMOUS SATIRICAL DIALOGUE THE *TIMARION*[1]

by

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*Katabasis*, namely descending to the underworld, is one of the most meaningful mythological and literary motives of all times, widespread in Antiquity in numerous well-known stories[2] – to mention here at least Sumerian Inanna's visiting her sister Ereshkigal, the epic of Gilgamesh, the twelfth labour of Heracles, Orpheus' journey to bring back his Eurydice or Aeneas' descent in the sixth book of Vergil's *Aeneid*. In medieval Western Europe it was reinterpreted in Dante's *Divine Comedy* and was also popular in Byzantium[3], although in a completely different context. An anonymous satirical work that was composed in the 12th century[4], the *Timarion* (Τιμαρίων ἤ περὶ τῶν κατ' αὐτὸν παθημάτων), belongs to

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[1] Some parts of the text have been delivered under the title: *Beware of Mice in Hades! Ancient Greek Eschatological Beliefs in a Satirical 12th Century Anonymous Dialogue "Timarion"* during the conference: "Μίμησις in Byzantine Art: Classical, Realistic or Imitative? The Second Cracow Symposium on Byzantine Art and Archaeology" organized by the Institute of History of Art and Culture of the Pontifical University of John Paul II in Krakow, 5–7.9.2012.

[2] Contrary to popular convictions, Homer's Odysseus does not descend to the Underworld but invokes the souls out of Hades in a sort of a necromancy ritual and thus the passage from the eleventh book of the *Odyssey* cannot be regarded as a *katabasis* motif.

[3] The most comprehensive studies regarding the *katabasis* motives in Byzantine medieval literature are still: an unpublished doctoral dissertation by Lambakis 1982 and Jane Baun's extensive monograph (Baun 2007). Most recently see also Cupane 2014.

[4] Vlachakos (2001: 20 f.) gives a valuable survey of the hypotheses concerning the conjectural date of the composition as well as the authorship of the *Timarion*. See also Tozer 1881: 235; Lambakis 1982: 82; Alexiou 2002: 100; Macrides 2005: 139; Kaldellis 2012: 275. In 19th century scholarship it was attributed to Theodore Prodromos, an acclaimed Byzantine 12th century writer and scholar. Because of the thorough knowledge of medical art, it was also later ascribed to the famous court physician of the emperor Manuel I Komnenos, Nicolaos Callicles. Kazhdan, Epstein 1990: 139; Kazhdan 1991: 2085; Vlachakos 2001: 21. Krallis 2013: 242. On 12th century and earlier Byzantine medicine see especially Kazhdan 1984, who formulates a hypothesis that by the end of the 12th century physicians regained their status in Byzantine society which had been lost earlier due to the healing powers of the saints. He remarks (p. 50) that the person of Theodore of Smyrna (born mid-11th c., died after 1112), whom Timarion meets in Hades and who handles his defence, is an

this genre and brings many interesting observations as for the usage of the *katabasis* motif as well as literary inspirations and the reception of different Greek ideas.

It is well known that the educated Byzantines of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, during the period of Komnene rule (1081–1204), had a thorough knowledge of classical literature[5]. Although the presence of classical inheritance was inseparably linked to Byzantine culture in earlier centuries and the transmission of ancient texts as well as the maintenance of classical tradition were extremely important earlier, during the Komnene period the ancient legacy was rediscovered from new perspectives[6]. Insofar as classical literature was mainly gathered and transcribed from the ninth century onwards, in the time the *Timarion* was written it began the process of deeper reflections on ancient heritage and identification with the Hellenic past[7]. It is clearly visible for instance in the commentaries on Homer made by Eustathios of Thessaloniki and John Tzetzes, in which the Byzantine commentators did not restrict themselves to the sophisticated analysis of the language of the poems, but significantly they attempted to refer to Homeric poems, drawing comparisons to contemporary reality and thus commenting on current affairs[8]. Therefore, the ancient Greek legacy became in time the point of reference to the present as well as the mirror in which the Byzantines could look in order to see their own world identified with the Hellenic past in many areas.

The unknown author of the *Timarion*, keeping up with the times, intertwined countless indirect quotations and hidden allusions to classical texts into his narrative[9]. Besides Lucianic satirical dialogues, which he used as formal patterns in his composition, borrowing from the rhetorician of Samosata the technique of a dialogue as a structural pivot[10], we come across in the story of Timarion a variety of references to ancient Greek sources. The phrases and passages drawn from Homeric poems constitute an integral part of the protagonists' conversation and confirm that the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* were undoubtedly extremely popular at that time and that a knowledge of the epics was an obligatory part of the education of every Byzantine intellectual[11]. Indeed, the origins of the exegesis

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example of a parody of Christian temperance. Timarion's former tutor is now quite slim because of the diet of asphodel flowers. See Alexiou 2002: 109. As for Byzantine medical art in the *Timarion*, see also Leven 1993: 129–135.

5 Kazhdan, Epstein: 1990: 138. Magdalino 2002: 323 ff.

6 Alexiou 2002: 98.

7 Kazhdan, Epstein: 1990: 133, 138.

8 Kazhdan, Epstein: 1990: 134 f.; Alexiou 2002: 98.

9 Krallis 2013: 222.

10 Kaldellis 2012: 275. Krallis (2013: 226) notes that indeed there are two dialogues: the first one between Timarion and his friend Kydion in the world of the living, the second in Hades between Timarion and his teacher, Theodore of Smyrna.

11 Vlachakos 2001: 31. It was a basic school text used uninterruptedly until the end of the Eastern Empire. See Niehoff 2012: 16–18. On Homer' s role in education from Antiquity up to

on Homer began no earlier than in the eleventh century, when the poems started to be explained allegorically, and therefore in the twelfth century commentators could already exploit the Homeric material more profoundly and with more versatility[12]. The same applies to the tragedies and especially to the comedies of Aristophanes, which the *Timarion* was significantly inspired by and which started to be studied critically by Tzetzes and Eustathios in the twelfth century[13]. Likewise, the attitude of the Byzantine scholars to the text they commented upon was different than in earlier periods. Aristophanes' case may be a good example of the change of attitude of the Byzantine intellectuals to the ancient legacy in the twelfth century. Tzetzes, in his scholia to Aristophanes' comedies, does not avoid a full explanation of all the obscenities they contain and treats them with due respect, whereas earlier it would have been impossible, because the sources antiquity provided to the Byzantines tended to be treated with great reverence[14]. It is also worth mentioning here that Aristophanes' comedies figured in the Byzantine school curriculum and were often used as a sort of reference for commenting on reality[15]. In case of the *Timarion*, it is clearly visible that Aristophanes' *Frogs* and especially the underworld setting for the comedy were used to satirize as well as comment on current affairs, including the ideology and social phenomena, which was rather a common characteristic of well-educated Byzantine writers of that time[16].

There have been many substantial studies discussing various aspects of the *Timarion*, including authorship and historical setting[17], Lucian's influence[18], detailed analyses focused on narrow but significant issues such as the legal context in the trial scene (one of the most important in the narrative)[19], as well as the narrative structure[20] and the meaning of classical quotations embedded in the text[21]. Most recently, a completely new approach was proposed by Krallis, who in his detailed analysis attempts to show a new reading of the text, paying attention to the political, religious and cultural background of the *Timarion*. He has

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Byzantium, see also Marrou 1956. On education in the twelfth century and the books that were read, see Magdalino 2002: 323–330.

12 Kazhdan, Epstein: 1990: 134 f.

13 Kazhdan, Epstein: 1990: 136.

14 Alexiou 2002: 98.

15 Marciniak 2004: 69, pays attention to the abundance of Aristophanic vocabulary in *Mazaris' Journey to Hades*. See also Garland 2007: 185.

16 Alexiou 2002: 101; Tozer 1881: 236; Kazhdan, Epstein: 1990: 139.

17 Beaton 1996: 329–338; Alexiou 1982–1983: 29–45.

18 Tozer 1881: 233–270.

19 Magdalino 2002: 358; Macrides 2005: 139–141; Krallis 2013: 222, 237.

20 Alexiou 2002: 101–111; Krallis 2013: 226 ff.

21 Kaldellis 2012.

convincingly proved that the satire is a broad critique of Byzantium under the Komnene dynasty[22].

However, the *Timarion*, as scholars dealing with the text have already underlined[23], is unique among works of Byzantine literature with a similar form as well as plot and its content is not easily definable. It would be rather an oversimplification if we assume that the author's main aim was to mock the values of twelfth century Byzantine aristocracy and that the work is a satire on the whole establishment, as some researchers tend to underline[24]. Of course, it is beyond the scope of this paper to refer to all possible interpretations and theories concerning the multi-aspect significance of the satire. Here is also not the place to touch upon such questions as the art of rhetoric in the twelfth century, medieval Byzantine philosophy and its reception, not to mention the impossibility of open philosophical debate under a Christian regime[25] and the problem of the revival of some literary genres in twelfth century literature. Likewise, I am not able to analyze the problem of whom exactly the *Timarion* was written for and if it was produced for court occasions in the same way as other satirical works of that time[26]. Because of the complexity of intertextual interplay with the author's contemporaries and ancient writers as well as countless references to famous personalities from the Greek, Roman and Byzantine periods[27], the text does not easily lend itself to interpretation and still continues to open up new fields of research.

In this paper I would like to shed some light only and – let me underline this – exclusively on one aspect of the *Timarion*, which has been rather neglected in modern scholarship, namely the motif of the *katabasis* to Hades and the elements of afterlife imagery. To my knowledge, this aspect of the satire has not been the subject of any separate studies and has not been treated adequately by researchers dealing with the work. However, in my opinion the question of eschatological motives in the *Timarion* deserves more attention, not only in the light of its affinity to other literary texts belonging to the same genre, which is rather obvious, but – strange and improbable as it may seem at first glance – regarding possible traces of popular or religious elements in the description of the eschatological landscape.

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[22] Krallis 2013.

[23] Kaldellis 2012: 275 f.

[24] Kaldellis 1999: 20. Two centuries later, in a letter, a minister of the emperor Michael VIII Palaiologos, Constantine Acropolites, accuses the anonymous writer of the *Timarion* among others that "his intention was to string together pagan nonsense in an incompatible union with the truth" (*ibidem*). See also Alexiou 2002: 101. She considers that the accusations of Acropolites were due to the idea expressed in the *Timarion* that as a matter of fact pagans are more tolerant of other religions than Christians (p. 109). See also Magdalino 2002: 355; Krallis 2013: 221. The first edition of Acropolites' letter was made by Treu 1892: 361–365.

[25] Krallis 2013: 221.

[26] Magdalino 2002: 355.

[27] Krallis 2013: 222 ff.

As it turns out, the twelfth century Byzantium, which was marked by dynamic changes in culture and literature together with the change towards the ancient legacy and a more profound investigation of classical texts, as mentioned earlier, was also characterized by the growing interest of intellectuals in ethnography and folklore elements[28]. The phenomenon could be also observed in the change of attitude to the vernacular language that hitherto had been unacceptable. After so many centuries of linguistic conservatism among educated Byzantines, who were obliged to study and write in Hellenistic Greek *Koine*, in twelfth century literature we come across three works where the vernacular idiom was used: the Ptochoprodromic Poems, Michael Glykas' chronicle from the creation of the world to the death of Alexius I Comnenus (1118) and an unknown work by an author called Spaneas[29]. The social and cultural changes in the Komnene period also affected the religious life of the Byzantines as far as the perception of the holy man is concerned, as well as church decorations and religious iconography[30].

It would seem rather improbable if the abovementioned changes did not somehow affect the author of the *Timarion*. It is obvious, that – as in another *katabasis*, Mazaris' *Journey to Hades* (Ἐπιδημία Μάζαρι ἐν Ἅιδου), written two centuries later during the reign of Manuel Palaeologus II between 1414–1415[31] – the text of the satire belongs to secular and political discourse and differs entirely from other visions that have a very strong religious background[32]. However, if we take into account that, from the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries, some apocryphal versions of biblical stories started to permeate into church iconography[33], forming more elaborate liturgical images than before, we may also assume – although with some restraint – that the same may apply for literary texts, especially those related in a way to religious matters. Whatever the core meaning of the *Timarion*, due to its obvious eschatological context it would be highly inappropriate to separate it entirely from the religious references. Thereby,

28 Kazhdan, Epstein 1990: 134. For example, Eustathios of Thessaloniki, in commentaries on Homer, did not hesitate to include examples of popular folkloric elements coming from English and Russian traditions in his work (*ibidem*).

29 Kazhdan, Epstein 1990: 84 f. Significantly, all three works are regarded by most historians of Modern Greek literature as an integral part of it and are considered as the first monuments of Greek demotic language. On vernacular texts in the Komnene period see Knös 1962: 71–82; Vitti 1994: 13–25.

30 Kazhdan, Epstein 1990: 86–99.

31 For more on Mazaris, see especially a detailed analysis by Garland 2007, who expresses an opinion that the author might have read the *Timarion* (p. 185). There is an English translation of the work: Maximus Mazaris, *Journey to Hades or Interviews with Dead Men about Certain Officials of the Imperial Court.* Greek Text with Translation, Notes, Introduction and Index by Seminar Classics 609 [Buffalo, NY 1975]. For the relation of Mazaris to Ancient comedy, see Marciniak 2004: 68–70.

32 Baun 2007: 127.

33 Kazhdan, Epstein 1990: 97.

analyzing the eschatological motives, we should not forget and exclude medieval Greek visionary journeys to heaven and hell anonymously composed between the ninth and eleventh centuries[34]. In other words, the question that it is tempting to ask during a thorough reading of the *Timarion* is: whether the eschatological image the author sketches in any way may echo twelfth century and earlier popular beliefs. Moreover, another question seems justifiable on this subject, namely if the motives we come across in Byzantine and post-Byzantine literary adaptations, including the *Timarion*, appear at all in Modern Greek folk eschatological beliefs that we know mainly from demotic poetry (δημοτικά τραγούδια)[35].

Although such a methodology may seem odd at first sight and useless I would like to reiterate the fact that it has already been used by acknowledged scholars, to mention here for instance Alexiou in her influential monograph where she underlines the cyclical rather than linear aspect of time in the understanding of Greek culture through the centuries[36]. Moreover, let me stress this clearly – I realize I may be wrong in my opinion – the excursions of the Byzantinists to modern Greek culture and inversely happen unfortunately rather rarely with some significant exceptions[37].

Thus, researching the traces of apparent folk origins, which in some cases turn out to be a direct continuation of ancient ideas, I will focus on images connected with the journey to the underworld and some characteristics of Hades that I regard as "eschatological patterns", namely the units of the *katabasis* narratives that are invariable although their content sometimes reveals unexpected sources of inspiration and brings to mind a broader context than one would expect.

## 1. THE PASSAGE TO THE UNDERWORLD THROUGH SLEEP

The *Timarion*'s plot until the title character reaches Hades is as follows: Timarion comes back to Constantinople from his journey to Thessaloniki, where he had the opportunity to observe and to take part in a religious feast devoted to Saint Demetrius of Thessaloniki (τα Δημήτρια) which was held on the 26th of

[34] The first full-length study of the *Apocalypse of the Theotokos* and the *Apocalypse of Anastasia* was made by Baun (2007), who analyses also numerous other stories of that kind, for instance the *Life of Philaretos* (9th c.), *Vision of Kaioumenos concerning Philentolos* (7th c.), *Oneirokritikon of Achmet* (probably 10th c.), *Lives of Basil and Andrew* (10th c.).

[35] Demotic Greek songs were gathered mainly in the 19th century and at that time were treated by the collectors as "written" rather than "oral" texts, which significantly affected their final shape in the editions that appeared then. See especially Beaton 2004: 1–12; Alexiou 1984: 7–10. The oldest text we have in manuscript is *The Song of Armouris* dated back to the 15th century. See Beaton 2004: 82–86. Even the medieval provenience of the songs called *akritika* was lately questioned, as well as their connection with the Byzantine epic of Digenes Akritas. See Politis 2011: 55.

[36] Alexiou 2002.

[37] Alexiou 1978; Alexiou 2002; Bakker, van Gemert 2008; Beaton 2004.

October[38]. When the feast day ends, Timarion suddenly develops a high fever and decides to return to Constantinople. His health deteriorates, he does not eat for thirty days and is forced to stay in the city. Exhausted he eventually falls asleep on the bank of the river Evros. The rest of the story is a description of what the protagonist thought he saw and experienced in the underworld and what perplexed him so much was that he was not quite sure if it was real or just a weird dream.

The first significant element of Timarion's *katabasis* is the motif of the passage to the underworld through sleep, which turns out to be a characteristic feature of most Byzantine and post-Byzantine versions of the journey to Hades[39]: "thus, the sleep that is called a father of death knocked me down, and I don't know how to say, it sent me on a journey to Hades"[40] (ὕπνος γὰρ ἐνταῦθα ὁ θρυλλούμενος καὶ θανάτου πατὴρ κατασχὼν ἡμᾶς, εἰς ἀποδημίαν οὐκ οἶδα πῶς είπω τὴν εἰς Ἅιδου ἐστείλατο, 330).

Thus, the identification of sleep with death as twin brothers[41], well-known in antiquity, commonly accepted and diffused by the Fathers of the Desert[42], gains another dimension in the Byzantine context. Because the author could not choose a real *katabasis*, due to the fact that "a real" descent in the Christian world was reserved only for Christ and exceptionally in apocryphal *katabaseis* also to the Mother of God, *Theotokos*[43], he showed Timarion's descent into Hades as being the result of a disease. Because of it "he lost the fourth basic element and lived with the other three without bile (χολή)", which was – according to the author – against the rules of Hippocrates and Asclepios and led to his death (405–410)[44].

[38] Kazhdan, Epstein 1990: 35. Thessaloniki was one of the most important and largest cities of the time, visited in the first half of the 12th century by merchants from the coasts of the Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea. See also Alexiou 2002: 105. Krallis (2013: 230 f.) notes that visitors to Thessaloniki were mostly Western Europeans with some Greeks from the mainland as well as some Egyptians, Phoenicians and inhabitants of the coasts of the Black Sea. However, there is no one from Asia Minor, which is, according to him, an evident sign of the lost Byzantine territory now laying outside the eastern borders.

[39] Cupane 2014: 53. In case of *Mazaris' Journey to Hades*, it is not quite clear how he managed to get to Hades after the plague that affected the capital. However, in the second part of the work Mazaris expresses his complaints to Manuel Holobolos, an imperial secretary, in a dream, which may be an echo of other *katabaseis*. See Garland 2007: 183.

[40] The first complete English translation was made by Baldwin (1984). In this paper, due to philological reasons, all English translations of the passages and phrases from the *Timarion* are by the author of the present paper. I use the edition of Vlachakos 2001.

[41] See for example: *Il*. XIV 231: ἔνθ' Ὕπνῳ ξύμβλητο κασιγνήτῳ Θανάτοιο ["there she met Sleep, the brother of Death"].

[42] Vlachakos 2001: 197.

[43] Lambakis 1982: 45 f., 83. Cupane 2014: 53 f.

[44] As Krallis (2013: 239) convincingly reminds us, bile was connected with a hot temper and anger and in the case of Timarion its lack and in consequence his seeming death might have been caused by events he experienced at the fair of Saint Demetrios. The strong emotions of dislike and hate he felt towards the Komnenian establishment made Timarion lose one of the basic elements.

Although there are some clues indicating that the motif might have been borrowed from one of Lucian's dialogues[45], the main source of inspiration for the author of the *Timarion* in handling the motif of a disease and consequently the passage to Hades could rather have been contemporary and earlier Byzantine works. The dream as a special medium, a "vehicle" to the other world, was usually sent by God himself to holy men in order to allow them to see the fate of the soul after death in the Underworld. In time it developed in literature into a special genre called "Visions of the other world"[46]. Significantly, most of the visions tended to show the torments of the darkness of Hell rather than the brightness and joy of Paradise, which was obviously connected with the Church's need to impose its unquestionable power on people[47].

An example of such a vision, which the author of the *Timarion* might have known, could be the *Vision of the Monk Kosmas*[48], the other near-death Byzantine narrative dated to 930 AD, namely in the thirteenth year during the reign of the Byzantine Emperor Romanos I Lekapenos[49]. The monk Kosmas, who was an abbot at the imperial monastery of the Theotokos tou Eusebiou on the Sangarios River, five months after falling badly ill (ἀρρωστίᾳ σωματικῇ), was one morning thrown into ecstasy, whispering incomprehensible words (ἄναρθρα καὶ πάντη ἀκατανόητα) for six hours. Next day, he presented his vision (ὀπτασία) of Hell as well as of the heavenly world to his monk brothers[50].

The other post-Byzantine *katabaseis* prove that the motif of a passage through sleep – not necessarily because of disease – was widespread in popular tradition as well. The protagonists of two stories about the descent into the underworld written in demotic Greek come down to Hades in this manner: *Apokopos*

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45 See the Lucianic dialogue *Philopseudes sive Incredulus*, where Kleodemos – one of the narrators of the stories about adventures in Hades – relates: εἴ πως δυνηθείην εἰς ὕπνον τραπέσθαι, τότε οὖν ἐφίσταταί μοι νεανίας ἐγρηγορότι πάγκαλος λευκὸν ἱμάτιον περιβεβλημένος, εἶτα ἀναστήσας ἄγει διά τινος χάσματος εἰς τὸν Ἅιδην, ὡς αὐτίκα ἐγνώρισα Τάνταλον ἰδὼν καὶ Τιτυὸν καὶ Σίσυφον ["I was to get some sleep if I could. Well, I woke up to find a handsome young man standing at my side, in a white cloak. He raised me up from the bed, and conducted me through a sort of chasm into Hades; I knew where I was at once, because I saw Tantalus and Tityus and Sisyphus", *Philops.* 25, transl. by F.G. and H.W. Fowler].

46 Cupane 2014: 53 ff.

47 Cupane 2014: 53 f. The author is obviously oversimplifying the situation by saying that both the *Timarion* and "Mazaris" as well as post-Byzantine vernacular *katabaseis* describe "the torments of Hell".

48 Kazhdan, Talbot 1998: 61. The vision of Kosmas is included in the *Synaxarion of Constantinople* (in a 14th-c. manuscript, Paris gr. 1582). A longer version is preserved in a manuscript from 992 (Venice, Marc. gr. 346). Kosmas' tale was written by an erudite author and is an artfully composed literary artifice, differing from the other medieval near-death narratives, see Baun 2007: 126. For the longer version of the vision, see Angelide 1983.

49 Lambakis 1982: 52; 83. For more on Kosmas' vision, see also Cupane 2014: 59–61.

50 Mango 1980: 152 f.

(Απόκοπος) ascribed to Bergadis (Μπεργαδής) from Crete, the first modern Greek work to appear in print in Venice in 1519[51] and Ρίμα θρηνητική εις τον πικρόν και ακόρεστον Άδην (*Mournful Rhyme on the Bitter and Insatiable Hades*) by Ioannis Pikatoros of Rethymnon, a major work of medieval vernacular literature, dated to the end of the 15th century[52]. These two works deal with the same genre but handle it in a completely different way. I will refer to these two works later. In both of them the narrators of the story fall asleep and wake up in a dream on a meadow[53].

Although, as I mentioned earlier, this element in Timarion's story might have been borrowed from Lucian, in my opinion it is more probable that here we are also dealing with the adaptation of apocryphal theological *katabaseis* that echo later in post-Byzantine Modern Greek works[54].

## 2. JOURNEY TO THE UNDERWORLD

After describing the circumstances of his disease, Timarion explains to his friend Kydion how he eventually managed to get to Hades. According to his account, among the different *daimones* there are some "punishing" ones (ποίνιμοι δαίμονες) as well as "the good" ones (αγαθοί), who reward those who are virtuous[55]. Indeed, among them there were some demons that had duties of *psychagogoi*, in other words they were responsible for carrying the souls to the underworld: "The guides of the souls, leading into the netherworld the souls separated from the body" (ψυχαγωγοὶ [...] τὰς ἤδη τοῦ σώματος διϊσταμένας ψυχὰς [...] κατάγοντες)[56].

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51 Knös 1962: 207–210.

52 The up-to-date critical edition with scholia and commentary was edited by Bakker, van Gemert 2008.

53 Μιαν από κόπου ενύσταξα, να κοιμηθώ εθυμήθην·/ έθεκα στο κλινάρι μου κ' ύπνον αποκοιμήθην./ Εφάνιστή μου κ' έτρεχα 'ς λιβάδιν ωραιωμένον,/ φαρίν εκαβαλλίκευγα σελλοχαλινωμένον (Bergadis, *Απόκοπος. Η βοσκοπούλα*, ed. by S. Alexiou, Athina 1979, 19–32). Ως πρικαμένος με χολήν, διατί πολλά εγρύπνουν,/ Ήθεκα ν'αποκοιμηθώ, να πάρω αέραν ύπνου./ Εφανιστή μου κείτοντα εις υπνοφαντασιά μου/ -επόνειν το κεφάλι μου κι έκλαιγεν η καρδιά μου-/ Εφάνιστη μου να περνώ σ'ένα λεφτό λαγκάδι (Bakker, van Gemert 2008: 95).

54 The motif of passage to the underworld through sleep, as far as I know, is absent in Greek demotic songs.

55 Oversimplifying, we can say that the world around was for the Byzantines overcrowded with a variety of demons, strictly connected with one place and rivalling each other, as Mango describes it in his well-known study (1980: 160 f.). Cuningham (2006: 148–150) draws attention to the fact that a belief in demons was widespread, especially in the early Byzantine period. One of the best sources describing Byzantine demons is the *Life of Saint Theodore of Sykeon*. On Byzantine demonology, see especially the detailed and up-to-date monograph by Greenfield 1988.

56 It is worth mentioning here the well-known 12th century icon "The Ladder of Divine Ascent" representing the teaching of John Klimakos, with a depiction of black demons trying to pull down the monks attempting to ascend the ladder to heaven to attain salvation. The icon is preserved

Two such guides appeared to Timarion to take him down to Hades when he was seized by "the last sleep" (πύματος ὕπνος): they "looked like shadows, were black in appearance and flew in the air" (σκιοειδεῖς ἄνδρες, γνοφεροὶ τὴν ὄψιν, ἀέρι πετόμενοι). Their role is strictly determined: apart from guiding the soul to Hades, when they obviously function like the ancient Hermes *psychopompos* and are described as *nekragogoi* and *mystagogoi*, they are the ones that "tear the soul from the body" (ψυχὴν ἀποσπῶν τοῦ σώματος). Significantly, the soul is regarded as something touchable and material – the two *nekragogoi* are later accused by Timarion himself during the trial scene[57] of prematurely dispatching his soul from the body, which is visible in the way the soul looks – it is still bleeding profusely because it was one with the body when they tore it off: "they tore off by force the soul from the body, although it was tightly glued to the body and it was difficult for them to tear it off him" (βίᾳ τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ σώματος διεῖλον ἰσχυρῶς ἐμφυρομένην τῷ σώματι καὶ δυσαποσπάστως αὐτοῦ ἔχουσαν).

Regarding the two guides of the soul, these enigmatic figures "black in appearance" are supposed to reflect the "Ethiops" (Αιθίοπες) or dark-skinned Arabs[58] known from theological *katabaseis* with apocalyptic visions, where they appear with the classical names of Οξύβας (Speedy) and Νυκτίων (Nightly)[59]. For instance, we come across them in *The Vision of a Taxeota* (Το όραμα του ταξεώτη), where a soldier just after his death sees beside him some terrible Ethiops (τινὰς Αἰθίοπας παρισταμένους) as well as two young men, probably angels, that take his soul and try to carry it to heaven (θεωρῶ δύο νεανίσκους εὐειδεῖς ἐλθόντας [...] η ψυχή μου ἐπήδησεν ἐς τὰς χεῖρας αὐτῶν)[60]. However, terrible, black Ethiops (Αἰθίοπας ζοφώδεις) who lurk to examine every sin of the soul at the tollhouses or tollgates (τελώνια), found the sin of adultery after thorough examination and sent his soul to hell. We come across similar looking people later when Timarion, together with his guides, reaches the entrance to Hades. Other gate keepers awaited the perplexed Timarion behind the iron gate. These ones seemed to be another kind of infernal demons, like his black guides: "Inside the gate there were gate keepers, black and gloomy men" (ἔσωθεν δὲ αὐτῆς πυλωροί, σκιοειδεῖς ἄνδρες καὶ ἀμειδεῖς, 15, 395)[61].

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in Saint Catherine's Monastery, Mount Sinai. See James 2010: 101. These black figures also appear in the well-known iconographic depictions of the Last Judgment, which were widespread in Byzantine times and in eastern Orthodoxy.

[57] The trial scene is analysed by Macrides 2005.

[58] James 2010: 101.

[59] Lambakis 1982: 83

[60] De Boor 1896: 307 f.

[61] There seems to be a reminiscence of these figures in the above-mentioned poem by Joannis Pikatoros, where the protagonist hunted by the dragon is thrown into its mouth by "someone dressed in black" (έναν μαυροφόρο, *R. Thr.* 58–61) who appears to be the dragon's servant or someone who helps in passing to the netherworld.

Interestingly, we come across such awful looking black-faced figures in the aforementioned *Vision of the Monk Kosmas* from the 10th century. His account to his monk brothers brings a similar description of "black Ethiops". As he relates, he seemed to have seen (ἔδοξα θεωρεῖν): πλῆθος ἀνθρωπαρίων δυσειδῶν καὶ αἰσχρῶν, ἀνείκαστον, πάντων μὲν ἐχόντων μεμελανωμένα τὰ μιαρὰ αὐτῶν πρόσωπα, οἷοι τυγχάνουσιν οἱ αἰθίοπες[62] – "a crowd of people incomparably ugly and deformed, all of them having black dirty faces, just like in Ethiops". When the monk Kosmas is led to the entrance, as it seems, to Hell, he sees a similar looking guardian: γιγάντιος ἀνήρ, μέλας μὲν τὸ εἶδος[63] – "a gigantic black-looking man".

However, another enticing, although at first sight controversial, possibility was taken into account by earlier scholars trying to decipher the motif of black figures in the *Timarion*. For instance, Hase suggested that it is very probable in this case that it may constitute an allusion to the angels of Muslim eschatology, Munkar and Nakir, who according to Islamic beliefs, test the faith of the dead[64]. Another possibility is one of the angels, Malak al-Maut, known in some Jewish, Christian and Islamic traditions under the name of Azrael, as an angel of death executes God's orders, separating the soul from the body[65] and taking it back to God[66].

Does the connection between Arabian folk tradition and the text of a learned Byzantine really seem curious and unjustifiable? Not necessarily, if we take into account the place Timarion comes from. Indeed, he is supposed to be a Cappadocian[67] and arrives at Thessaloniki, which is the Western part of the empire, from the lost Byzantine territory, where the Arabian influences must have been much stronger[68]. The traces of Arabian origins may be visible even in the underworld: all the judges, except the emperor Theophilos, that are about

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[62] Angelide 1983: 82.

[63] Angelide 1983: 83.

[64] Hase 1813: 145. See also Tozer 1881: 248, who mentions the names of Munkar and Nekir. However, in traditional Islamic mythology the role of these angels is to try the faith of the deceased by the graves. See *Encyclopedia of Death and Dying* accessible at: http://www.deathreference.com/Ho-Ka/Islam.html [accessed 2.7.2014]. Vlachakos (2001: 198) mentions the fact in his commentary to the *Timarion*, without entering into a discussion if the assumption made by Hase and Tozer is convincing or not.

[65] See for example Chapter (32) sūrat l-sajdah (The Prostration): "The Angel of Death, put in charge of you, will (duly) take your souls: then shall ye be brought back to your Lord", translated by Yusuf Ali; http://corpus.quran.com/translation.jsp?chapter=32&verse=11 [accessed 25.6.2014].

[66] As for the Islamic Angel of Death see http://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/articles/5018-death-angel-of [accessed 17.6.2014]. See also J.E. Hanauer, *Folk-lore of the Holy Land, Moslem, Christian and Jewish*, London 1907. The chapter of the book, "The Angel of Death" is accessible at: http://www.sacred-texts.com/asia/flhl/flhl30.htm [accessed 17.6.2014].

[67] Alexiou (2002: 111) assumes that Timarion is rather "a high member of Constantinopolitan society".

[68] Krallis 2013: 230.

to examine Timarion are dressed in Arab clothes, like for instance Hippocrates (Ἀρραβικός τις ἐδόκει, 915) and the description of the Elysian fields reminds us of the type of oriental gardens, *paradeisoi*[69].

In my opinion, there are some characteristics in those two "black figures" that make them closer to the Modern Greek folk personification of death Charos (Χάρος, Χάροντας), who is considered by scholars, following the well-known study by Alexiou, as a fusion of the ancient Greek Hades, Thanatos and Charon[70]. In my opinion this is an oversimplified statement, excluding other possible cultural sources of evolution of this mythological person. Of course, it is beyond the scope of this paper to present in detail the complex problem of intercultural elements in the Modern Greek representation of death, which has been already a subject of my studies[71], but let me pay attention to some features linking him both with the characters from the *Timarion* and the Islamic angel of death.

Firstly, Charos is usually depicted as a horseman riding a black horse, dressed in black, with a black face which slightly resembles the picture of the black figures in the *Timarion*. This can also be linked to the ancient Greek picture of death of Homeric origin[72], like in a well-known song "Charos and the Souls" (Χάρος και οι ψυχές): "He is black, dressed in black, black is his horse,/ black are his hounds chasing the deer (Μαύρος είναι, μαύρα φορεί, μαύρ' είν' και τ' άλογό του,/ μαύρα και τα ζαγάρια του, τ' αλαφοκυνηγάτα)[73].

Secondly, two figures "black in appearance" take the surprised Timarion "flying through the air" (αέρι πετόμενοι), which brings to mind another archetypal image of death as something/someone "flying" from the sky. Such an image has its antecedence, among other things, in ancient depictions of Thanatos as a young boy with wings and with sword in hand. Moreover, it also resembles some Modern Greek folk images of death reflected in phraseology[74] as well as in representations in demotic songs of Charos as a black swallow (μαύρο χελιδόνι).

Lastly, let me mention that during the Byzantine period the Archangel Michael, who had often been confused and identified with Death/Charos[75], was

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[69] Krallis 2013: 236 f. In Timarion's court in Hades Krallis sees a replica of a Byzantine imperial pavilion built in an Arab style.

[70] Alexiou 1978.

[71] Bzinkowski 2009; Bzinkowski 2011b.

[72] Anagnostopoulos 1984: 75, who gives the possible sources of "black death": *Il*. II 859; III 360, 454; Hes. *Op*. 155. I cite the above mentioned passage in my paper in which I sketch the role of Charos as *psychopompos*. See Bzinkowski 2009.

[73] This passage is cited by Anagnostopoulos 1984: 75.

[74] Anagnostopoulos pays attention to the linguistic image of death hidden in such phrases as αγγελοσκιάζουμαι or αγγελομαχώ (I fight with the angel), αγγελοκρίνομαι, αγγελοκριτηρεύομαι (I am judged by the angel) as synonyms to "dying". See Anagnostopoulos 1984: 120, Bzinkowski 2009: 28.

[75] Angold 2000: 445.

regarded as the "escort of souls"[76], as in the third century apocryphal *Apocalypse of Paul*[77]. Numerous apocalypses from early as well as late Antiquity confirm that the cult of the Archangel Michael was extremely popular in Byzantium[78]. In an eschatological context the miraculous icon of the Archangel Michael on Lesvos is very interesting. It is known as Archangel Michael of Mantamados, who is called also the "Arab" (Αράπης, Αραπέλλι) due to his black face (!)[79].

The question sketched here obviously needs further investigation and as far as I know, no consideration has been given so far for instance to Byzantine paintings, especially frescos with representations of the Last Judgement and the punishment of the wicked ones[80].

## 3. THE ENTRANCE TO HADES

Having crossed the river Evros, without getting soaked, as the surprised Timarion notices (370–375), "the black angels" flew with him over lake Acherousia (διὰ λίμνης Ἀχερουσίας [...] διωδεύκειμεν), another important element in underworld topography, which brings to mind many ancient sources connected with the place as a passage to Hades (among others: Hom. *Od*. X 513; Aesch. *Ag*. 1160; Lucian, *De luctu* 5–7)[81].

The next step during the journey to Hades for Timarion and his guides was a sort of "mouth" (στόμιο): "we came closer to an underground mouth" (στομίῳ τινὶ προσηγγίσαμεν καταγαίῳ, 380). Timarion, though resisting with all his strength, was pushed into it by force by his two guides who had to punch him in order to get him down. However, this was not the proper entrance to the kingdom of the dead. After walking a great distance in the darkness, the travellers stood in front of an "iron gate": "when we reached the iron gate, where the kingdoms of Hades close up" (κατὰ τὴν σιδηρᾶν πύλην γεγόναμεν, ᾗ τὰ τοῦ Ἅιδου βασίλεια κλείεται, 385). The phraseology used in this passage in the description

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76 Krueger 2006: 125.

77 Known also as *Visio Pauli* or *Visio Sancti Pauli* (ed. Tischendorf 1866). It presents the vision of heaven and hell seen by Paul the Apostle. See Baun 2007: 205 f. About the plot as well as the characteristics of the story, see Lambakis 1982: 43 f., 47 f.

78 Baun 2007: 205. Significantly, it is the Archangel Michael who is the guide for the Mother of God and for Saint Anastasia in the Underworld in two Apocalypses dating to the 10th century. See Angold 2000: 447; Baun 2007: 75.

79 Psychogiou 2008: 48. More on the connection between the Archangel Michael and Charos/Death in the folk tradition of Modern Greece, see my forthcoming paper: *The Case of the Angels. The Relevance of the Research by Classical Scholar John Cuthbert Lawson (1874–1919) on Modern Greek Culture*, Classica Cracoviensia XVIII 2015.

80 Tozer 1881: 248 made such a suggestion, assuming that the motif might have been borrowed from the west front of some Greek monasteries.

81 Vlachakos 2001: 201, following Lambakis 1982: 100 f.

of the gate is visibly of classical origin and proves once more that the author of the *Timarion* must have had a thorough knowledge of ancient sources connected with the concept of an iron entrance to the abode of the dead. We come across the same image, adapted from Homer's *Iliad* (VIII 15), in Lucian's *Erotes* (32) "where in truth, 'are gates of iron and thresholds of bronze'" (ἔνθα ὡς ἀληθῶς "σιδήρειαί τε πύλαι καὶ χάλκεος οὐδός").

The motif of the guards at the iron gate is also interesting. In the *Timarion* they constitute a mixture of different mythological traditions and literary motives: "dragons with fiery eyes and the dog with very sharp teeth which is called Cerberus by the Greeks" (δράκοντες πυρώδεις τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ κύων κάρχαρος μάλα, ὃν Κέρβερον ὀνόμαζον Ἕλληνες, 395).

The well-known image of a hellhound preventing the dead from escaping Hades is one of the most frequently recurring elements regarding the *katabasis* motif. Greek as well as Latin sources transmit the story about Heracles' last labour in numerous versions throughout Antiquity (Hom. *Il*. VIII 36; *Od*. XI 623; Hes. *Th.* 310, 769; Pl. *Rep.* 588 C, etc). The same three-headed hound of Hades is placed by Dante at the gate of the Inferno (*Inferno*, Canto VI, 13–18)[82].

Regarding the place where the visitor enters the abode of the dead, the dragon or snake motif is more interesting to consider, bearing in mind that these creatures can be easily identified with each other. It seems to me that two traditions might have been confused in the *Timarion*: namely the literary tradition with the motif of a helldog, confused with the folk tradition, which quite often connects the passage to the underworld to meeting with snakes or falling into a dragon's jaws[83].

In the aforementioned vernacular post-Byzantine *katabaseis*, we come across the motif of a dragon's mouth as the entrance to Hades[84], into which the narrator of the story falls from a tree that was undermined by two mice, one white and one black, as in the *Apokopos*: "And I saw at the bottom of the well the terrible dragon/ he gaped and waited for me to fall down" (Και δράκοντ' είδα φοβερόν στου πηγαδιού τον πάτον/ κ' έχασκεν και μ' ακαρτερεί πότε να πέσω κάτω, *Apokopos* 59 f.).

[82] In Joannis Pikatoros' poem a "three-headed-mouthed snake" (όφης τρισκεφαλόστομος, *R. Thr.* 83) appears as a guardian of the Underworld. The passage survived in the folk songs of Crete. See Bakker, van Gemert 2008: 144 f.

[83] As for the snake motif in demotic Modern Greek songs, see for example Anagnostopoulos 1984: 333 f.

[84] For instance, in the above-mentioned 15th century Ρίμα Θρηνητική (*Mournful Rhyme*) by Ioannis Pikatoros of Rethymnon, a dragon appears who pursues the protagonist of the story and finally devours him, thus enabling him to get into Hades (δράκον μεγάλον είδα, *R.Thr*. 7–12). However, the dragon in this *katabasis* differs from similar creatures from other near-death narratives. As Bakker and van Gemert (2008: 128) notice, its characteristics, the poison dripping from its jaws as well as its fiery tongues, indicate that it might have been created as a sort of mythical creature rather than a usual snake-dragon and reminds us of the dragons that we come across in visions of the Church Fathers.

Such a picture is frequently attested and well-known in Byzantine iconography. There are for instance representations of the Heavenly Ladder of John Climacus showing monks falling from the Ladder into the mouth of a dragon, which is in fact Hades' open mouth that swallows everyone who falls into it. In accordance with this convention, images of the Last Judgement were also painted, in which the mouth of Hell was depicted as gaping jaws of a dragon or a serpent[85].

## 4. THE UNDERWORLD

The image of Hades in Timarion's account is far from Christian eschatological visions[86]. It seems to be shrouded in an all-surrounding darkness devoid of sunlight, which evokes and reflects the most archaic Greek ideas concerning the afterlife beliefs contained mainly in the Homeric poems: "everything in Hades is obscure and sunless" (τὰ ἐν Ἅιδου πάντα ζοφερά καὶ ἀνήλια [420], adapted in turn from Lucian: τοῦτον εἶναι καὶ ζοφερόν καὶ ανήλιον, *De luctu* 12–16).

However, such an image should be by no means surprising and restricted only to the tendency of the author to imitate the ancients, thus intertwining his work with citations of different kinds. The eschatological dimension becomes less obscure if one takes into account the Modern Greek afterlife beliefs that have been preserved until now and are vital, especially in lament songs called *moirologia* (μοιρολόγια) or so called "songs of the Underworld and of Charos/ Death" (Του Κάτω Κόσμου και του Χάρου)[87]. Transmitted in oral tradition throughout Byzantium and still alive and marking their presence in funeral rites, they convey a vision that could be one of the proofs of the continuity of Greek tradition from Antiquity until now, as is testified by Alexiou in her well-known study[88]. Without entering into details, which I have attempted to research elsewhere[89], let me point out that the convictions concerning the place where the soul of the dead finally go are far from the Christian vision of heaven and hell. The most common names for the world of the dead (Hades – ο Άδης, the World Below/the Underworld – ο Κάτω Κόσμος, "down at the furthest edges of the

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[85] The dragon placed at the entrance to the underworld is also reminiscent of the well-known art motif of a Hellmouth or Jaws of Hell imagined as the gaping mouth of a huge monster. It was extremely popular in Byzantine and post-Byzantine iconographic representations of the Last Judgement. See Bakker, van Gemert 2008: 140; Skrzyniarz 2002: 179–181.

[86] Krallis 2013: 222; Alexiou 2002: 110 f.

[87] Among different collections of folk songs with *moirologia*, it is worth mentioning here: K. Pasayanis, *Μανιάτικα μοιρολόγια και τραγούδια*, Athina 1928; S. Kougeas, *Τραγούδια του κάτω κόσμου. Μοιρολόγια της Μεσσηνιακής Μάνης, συλλογή του ακαδημαϊκού Σωκράτη Κουγέα, κατά τα έτη 1901–1904*, Athina 2000; G. Saunier, *Ελληνικά δημοτικά τραγούδια. Τα μοιρολόγια*, Athina 1999.

[88] Alexiou 2002a.

[89] Bzinkowski 2011a.

earth" – κάτω στα Τάρταρα της γης) reflect the most archaic Greek ideas regarding the soul's lot that inevitably dwells finally in a place that is morally "neutral" and thus comprising all the dead.

However, the author of the *Timarion* seems to have combined literary as well as demotic tradition, adding his own additional features of afterlife existence, obviously accordingly to his satirical prerogatives. Besides, life in Hades seems to be almost the same as in the world above. The ones who were prosperous are still happy down there; however the ones who suffered during their life, unfortunately, do not cease to suffer. As Kaldellis rightly notices, Hades is a mere replication of the social divisions of the living[90]. The dead in the *Timarion* residing in Hades live in tents[91] (σκηνώσεις τῶν νεκρῶν, 420), the same as in the aforementioned *Vision of the Monk Kosmas* (οἷον σκηνὴ ἦν)[92]. In spite of the darkness, they light a fire accordingly to their previous status in life (420–425), which apparently is the author's satirical commentary on Byzantine inequality in the society of his time, which continues to last even after death[93]: "The common and vulgar people have the light made by their hands, the others made of wood and charcoal and the others made of twigs; however those who distinguished themselves in life and were more illustrious used to light the torches" (Ἔχουσι δὲ χειροποίητα φῶτα, ὁ μὲν ἐκ ξύλων καὶ ἀνθρακιᾶς, ὁ δ΄ ἐκ κλάδων, ὁ κοινὸς καὶ ἀγοραῖος ὄχλος, ὅσοι δὲ παρὰ τὸν βίον ἐλλόγιμοί ποτε καὶ λαμπρότεροι καὶ λαμπάδας ἀνάπτουσι, 420–425). Interestingly, although the vision of Hades is composed "Homerically" and at the same time according to the folk vision of afterlife beliefs, the author differentiates the seemingly "morally neutral" abode of the dead by the way the inhabitants light the fire, which is probably his own invention.

However, proceeding further, Timarion reaches a place overflowing with brightness and light (φωτεινὸν τόπον, 750), a paradise garden, the green plain (πεδιὰς χλοερά, 750) with an abundance of various plants, rivers and streams, the musical chirping of birds, devoid of winter and decay, with an everlasting spring. The description of the place brings to mind the image of the Christian Paradise. Yet, as Timarion's guide explains to him, that was the place that was called by people the Elysian Fields and the Asphodel Meadows (θρυλλούμενον

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90 Kaldellis 2008: 279.

91 A motif of a "tent" also appears in Modern Greek folk songs, but it is used in a slightly different context. Significantly, the word for a "tent" that is used is not σκηνή, but the Latin τέντα. It is used in connection with Charos/Death, who – when taking the dead with him to his "tent" – warns them that they will be scared if they see it: Μωρέ αν δγης την τέντα μου, όλος ανατρομάξεις ("You fool, if you see my tent, you will be wholly scared"; A. Passow, *Popularia carmina Graeciae recentioris*, Lipsiae 1860, p. 305, no. 428). Saunier (1982: 301 f.) suggests that τέντα is a military term and he directs attention to the historical background of the motif.

92 Cupane 2014: 59.

93 Tozer 1881: 249; Lambakis 1982: 84; Vlachakos 2001: 203.

πεδίον Ἠλύσιον καὶ Ἀσφοδελὸς Λειμών, 755–765), places well known from Ancient Greek eschatological topography (*Od*. IV 561–569; XI 539, 572 f.; XXIV 13 f.; Hes. *Op*. 169–173)[94].

We come across a very similar vision in the above-mentioned Kosmas narrative[95]. In this case there is no doubt that the place where Kosmas' two guides, St. Andrew and St. John lead him, is clearly Paradise. As he relates, in a similar way to Timarion, he had a vision of a "flat place" (πεδιάσιμον τόπον), in which there was a beautiful green valley (κοιλάδα χλοεράν)[96]. It is noteworthy that here, as in the *Timarion*, the guides explain to the protagonist of the story that it is indeed "Abraham's bosom" – κόλπον τοῦ πατριάρχου Ἀβραάμ[97], place full of olive trees under which the inhabitants of the valley dwell in tents.

The similarities between Timarion's and Kosmas' account, in imagery as well as in the construction of the narrative, may prove that the author of the former could have known, if not Kosmas' vision, then another medieval dream vision with the same content, which he handled in his own way. Such a mixture of classical mythological references intertwined with Byzantine elements of learned as well as of apparently vernacular origin[98] is also visible in the characteristics of the court of the three judges: the ancient Greek Minos and Aiakos[99] together with the third one, the Byzantine emperor Theophilos (805). It is beyond the scope of this article to develop and analyze the question of the presence of Byzantine as well as Ancient Greek figures appearing in Timarion's Hades, especially as this has already been done[100]. Here, let me pay attention only to the fact that Theophilos' justice, which reached far after his death, is not the only reason for placing him among the judges in the underworld. The explanation of his presence is quite understandable and reasonable: "Yet, because the fame of Christians possessed all the *oikoumene* and the whole of Europe, many parts of Asia, the Divine Providence decided to place also someone to help the Ancient Greek judges" (ἀλλ' ὅμως τῆς

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94 Vlachakos (2001: 225 f.) sees here echoes of Lucian's *Verae Historiae* II 2; 5.

95 Paradise is depicted as a fantastic garden in many Byzantine dream visions, to mention here the *Vision of Anastasia* or the vision of Niketas in the *Life of Philaretos*, see Baun 2007: 124 ff.

96 Angelide 1983: 84.

97 Angelide 1983: 85.

98 Alexiou's (2002: 108) remark about the motif of the two fat mice (Δύο μύες τῇ ὄψει προσέπεσαν λιπώδεις, παχεῖς, 475) that Timarion sees in Hades is very intriguing. According to her, the motif of mice – which might have been borrowed from Theodoros Prodromos and which constitutes a topos in Byzantine literature – may also be another variation on a traditional feature of apocalyptic visions in which mice and other pets in Hell are the souls of the sinful dead. Alexiou follows Lambakis 1982, but she does not specify the exact passage from the cited dissertation.

99 According to one mythological tradition Minos, the son of Zeus and Europa, became a judge of the dead in the underworld after his death. He ruled there together with his brother Rhadamanthus and another of Zeus' sons, Aiakos (Plato, *Gorgias* 523 A and 524 B ff.).

100 More recently Alexiou 2002: 100–111; Krallis 2013.

τῶν Γαλιλαίων δόξης ἐπί πάσαν τὴν οἰκουμένην διαδραμούσης καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν Εὐρώπην κατασχούσης, τὰ πολλὰ δὲ τῆς Ἀσίας, ἔδοξε τῇ προνοίᾳ καὶ τοιοῦτόν τινα καθίσαι τοῖς ἀρχαίοις Ἕλλησι τούτοις δικασταῖς σύνεδρον, 725–730). Moreover, Theophilos, who is dressed in black and looks very modest – unlike the Greek judges – is accompanied by a young person dressed in a white robe (λευκενδύτης), looking like an eunuch. Timarion's guide explains to him that he is a guardian angel, because an angel was given to every single Christian king to remind him what he should do, and that this is the same angel that followed Theophilos during his life (825)[101].

Happily for Timarion, the three judges in the underworld, thanks to the expertise of Asclepius and Hippocrates who were ordered to give an opinion in the matter, finally released him and sent his soul back to his body so that he could come back to life (ἐπὶ τὸν βίον, 1150).

All the remarks regarding the *katabasis* motif and eschatological patterns prove that the author of the *Timarion* used quite various and complex sources of inspiration in his composition, which are not so easily tangible. The literary references to ancient Greek and Byzantine sources[102], as well as the observations of contemporary Byzantine intellectual life[103], are obvious and clearly present in his work. However, as I have attempted to show, it is highly probable that he also used motives appearing in the vernacular tradition regarding the theological apocryphal *katabaseis* and the representations of the Last Judgement that he might have seen in Byzantine churches and that must have also been known to the readers of his satire. This should not be surprising if we take into account that the twelfth century constitutes a sort of a caesura mark, from which the vernacular language and tradition started to penetrate into the sophisticated and conservative Byzantine literature written in Hellenistic *koine*, as I have already mentioned[104]. Thus, it seems quite probable that the author of the *Timarion* could have embellished his vision with popular elements that undoubtedly might have enforced, for an educated reader, the satirical tone of his work. Nevertheless, the anonymous text still remains full of secrets and, as Kaldellis significantly notices, it is more than just a satire[105] and it should be read simultaneously as a literary, satirical and philosophical narrative[106].

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[101] The question as to whether the picture of Theophilos with a guardian angel might be a derision of the divine nature of imperial office is still disputable. See Vlachakos 2001: 229.

[102] Vlachakos 2001: 33 f.

[103] Kazhdan, Epstein 1990: 140; Kaldellis 2008: 282; Krallis 2013.

[104] Kazhdan, Epstein 1990: 83–86.

[105] Kaldellis 2008: 282.

[106] Kaldellis 2012: 287.

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# ONCE AGAIN ON THE CYPRIOT GENITIVE: MARGINALIA TO M. EGETMEYER'S MONOGRAPH ON THE CYPRIOT DIALECT*

by

ROBERT A. SUCHARSKI

ABSTRACT: The deciphering of the Linear B script gave a new stimulus to studies of Greek dialects. The discovery is of special importance to research upon the Cypriot dialect and literacy. The Cypriot genitive of the thematic declension is characterized by the possible usage of singular and plural forms that are graphically identical. This paper aims to show that the relevant cases actually differed – it was only the syllabic script which did not make the difference visible.

The decipherment of the Linear B syllabary – the greatest achievement of 20th century Hellenic studies – gave a new stimulus for Greek dialectology. No doubt, this discovery marks a turning point – it is simply impossible to seriously write about Greek without taking into consideration the existence of the well attested Greek idiom in the 2nd millennium BCE. C.D. Buck was able to embed the information about the discovery in the final version of his epoch-making monograph on Greek dialects. The book was published in 1955, and then reprinted, practically without any changes or additions. The monograph has not yet lost in its importance – it is still one of the most important studies on the subject, all the more valuable in that it provides not only an analysis of the dialects, but also the texts of the inscriptions.

We read thus about the genitive singular (the thematic declension) in Cypriot:

> In Cyprian -ōν beside -ō (at Idalium μισθō͂ν, ἀργύρōν, Φιλοκύπρōν, etc. and so usually -ōν in nouns, whether vowel or consonant follows; but also ἀργύρō, ἄλϝō, before a consonant, and always τō͂). [...] For the added ν in Cyprian no explanation that has been offered is adequate.
>
> (Buck 1955: 88)

* The first draft of the paper (in Polish) was presented during the conference "Philologorum Polonorum Colloquium Linguisticum Secundum", coorganized on 24th September 2013 by the Chair of the Classical Philology (Katedra Filologii Klasycznej) and the Chair of Linguistics and Indo-European Studies (Zakład Językoznawstwa i Indoeuropeistyki) of the University of Łódź.

Olivier MASSON's monograph, published six years later (1961): *Les inscriptions chypriotes syllabiques, recueil critique et commenté* (re-printed in 1983 as a supplemented version) has been for 50 years a model of how to write about inscriptions coming from the island of Aphrodite. MASSON however does not provide his own understanding of the origin of the genitive, but refers to many previous attempts to explain this phenomenon, first of all by Michel LEJEUNE. Let us read *in extenso* the abstract of LEJEUNE's paper, printed in *L'Année philologique*: "Ces génitifs présentent une extension analogique au singulier du -ν du génitif pluriel, s'expliquant par la débilité de la nasale finale en cypriote" (LEJEUNE 1932). BUCK finds such an explanation insufficient. MASSON however underlines the fact that genitive in -ων is found in the inscriptions coming from Paphos and might be treated as an innovation („Le génitif en -ων est notable à Paphos, et pourrait représenter un élément récent?") (*ICS*: 115).

We find a classical attempt to explain the phenomenon of the Cypriot genitive in the thematic declension in the monograph by Pierre CHANTRAINE: *Morphologie historique du grec*. CHANTRAINE in fact follows LEJEUNE:

> En arcado-chypriote la finale est -ω issu de *-οο; toutefois à Chypre on rencontre dans certains textes, notamment dans ceux d'Édalion, une finale -ων dans les noms, par opposition à l'article qui a la forme τω. Cette finale s'explique par l'analogie du génitif pluriel où la nasale était débile et pouvait ou non figurer.
>
> (CHANTRAINE 1984: 38)

The phenomenon is treated by Cornelis J. RUIGH in a very similar, though not identical way. The scholar assumes that the forms of the article which ended with /n/ i.e. τᾱ́ν (acc. sg. fem.), τᾶν (gen. pl. fem.), and τῶν (gen. pl. masc.-ntr.), were used before the nominal forms with the vocalic *Anlaut*; it means therefore that they should also have parallels without a final /n/ before a consonantal *Anlaut* (RUIJGH 1988: 137 f.). Such an assumption allows him to ascertain:

> [c]'est dans ce cadre qu'on peut rendre compte de l'addition facultative de la nasale au gén. sing. thématique en -ō [...]: vis-à-vis du type κασιγνήτō τε, on a pu créer le type κασιγνητōν pour utiliser devant une frontière plus forte et devant la voyelle initiale d'un enclitique.
>
> (RUIJGH 1988, *ibidem*)

This is exactly the way of explaining the Cypriot phenomenon that Stephen COLVIN accepts in his publication, which is intended as a modern attempt to present the issues of Greek dialects and the development of the language in antiquity in the light of more than fifty years of research since the monograph by C.D. BUCK. We read thus in COLVIN's book:

> Thematic gen. sing. in -*ōν* (syllabic -*o-ne*). This is unlikely to represent -*ων*, since it would be strange for the gen. sing. and gen. plur. to be identical. It can be connected with the loss of -*n* in Cypriot [...]: e.g. gen. plur. τῶν will have had two variants

> (final *-n* before vowels, lost before consonants), giving a proportional analogy τῶ : τῶν :: τō : x (x→τōν).
>
> (Colvin 2007: 35)

The assumption that it would be a strange thing, as Colvin ascertains, if the genitive singular and plural sounded the same, is of course vulnerable and questionable: the Polish language (in its younger variety) for example allows for such a situation. When we do not have any attribute or when the context does not clearly indicate this, there is no possible way to determine the number of e.g. the word 'inskrypcji' (nowadays both: gen. sing and plur.), although quite recently we used to distinguish 'inskrypcji' (gen. sg.) from 'inskrypcyj' (gen. plur.). Since, as we know today, the Cypriot phenomenon is attested only for anthroponyms and appellatives (Egetmeyer 2010: 391) it is however safer to accept Colvin's argument. We face therefore a fundamental question as to whether Cypriot Greek had at its disposal any phonological *vz*. morphological means to distinguish between the genitive singular and the genitive plural within such nouns of the thematic declension.

It is generally accepted (Egetmeyer 2010: 154) that one of the characteristic features of Cypriot is the lenition of the *Auslaut* nasal consonant, leading to:

a) nasalization on a preceding vowel,
b) assimilation to a following consonant,
c) its entire disappearance.

There is however a unique source in which we read the explicitly written *Auslaut* /n/ before the *Anlaut* consonant (in this case, labial). I mean, of course, the most famous Cypriot inscription, the Idalion bronze tablet: *ICS* 217. In lines 27–28 we read *ta-na-ta-na-ne ta-ne-pe-re* (28) *ta-li-o-ne* ταν Αθαναν ταν περ' Εδαλιον – the record is clearly unusual and may be explained by the exceptional position of the article (Egetmeyer 2010: *ibidem*). On the other hand however we are quite aware of the specifically Cypriot morphological feature, i.e. the appending of the *Auslaut* /-n/ to the accusative singular of 3rd declension nouns (the consonantal stems) (cf. (2) [...] *a-no-ko-ne-o-na-si-la-ne to-no-na-si-ku-po* (3) *ro-ne-to-ni-ja-te-ra-ne* ανωγον Ονασιλον τον Ονασικυπρōν τον ιγατεραν found in the same Idalion inscription, *ICS* 217, 2–3), and the retaining of the phoneme in absolute *Auslaut*. What is even more striking is the fact that this specifically Cypriot isogloss (originally probably an analogy to accusatives of the 1st and 2nd declensions) is characterized by remarkable durability: it has remained to this day, although modern Cypriot by no means continues the ancient dialect, and, as with the vast majority of modern Greek, has its roots in Koiné (Horrocks 2010: 113).

Both observations invite us to conclude that in the ancient Cypriot the presence/absence of the nasal in *Auslaut* was conditioned phonotactically (euphony), and, while being such, could not function as a distinctive feature.

The solution, therefore, that arises looks as follows: in Cypriot it is presumably the sound of the vowel that distinguishes the genitive singular from the plural one within thematic declension. I do not assume any difference in quantity: the ending of the genitive plural (thematic declension) without doubt retains the long vowel, being a reflex of the linguistic change in prehistoric times (Cypriot, in no way, differs here from other Greek dialects); on the other hand, the ending of the genitive singular probably does contain a long vowel too, but it seems to be a reflex of the vowel contraction already present in historical times. Unfortunately, the specific character of the Cypriot syllabic script, which does not distinguish either the length or the possible openness of a vowel, at the same time does not allow for certainty.

It is quite common to treat the form of the genitive plural of the thematic declension as the reflex of the PIE, yet a contraction of the thematic vowel **-o-* with the reconstructed ending **-om* used both in thematic and consonantal declensions; as a result we then get **-ōm*, changed regularly within Greek into /*-ōn*/ [-ων] (Rix 1992: 140). The situation of the genitive singular is much more complicated; the threefold ending **-es*/*-os*/*-s* reconstructed for the PIE proto-language consonantal declension was not used in the thematic declension. The originally pronominal ending **-si̯o/-so* was used instead of it (Rix 1992: 118). When we talk about Greek, we know the ending **-si̯o* from Mycenaean sources (written in the form of *-o-jo*) and from East-Thessalian (in the slightly modified form of -οι due to the apocope of the final vowel). All the other ancient dialects of Greek made use of the other ending **-so* (I omit here the so-called literary dialects, especially the "Homeric dialect", which cannot be overestimated for the history of literature, but at the same time also cannot be of any value to the research into actual dialects due to its artificiality). All these things considered, we assume that Cypriot Greek does not differ from the remaining Hellenic idioms of the 1st millennium BCE, and that the genitive singular of the thematic declension is formed with the use of the originally pronominal ending **-so*.

The oldest Cypriot text we are aware of was found inscribed on a spit (*obelos*) recovered from Tomb 49 in ancient Paphos (Palaepaphos *Skales*) (Karageorghis 1983: 59–76). It is not clear which variety of syllabic script was used for the inscription: it is either a curious combination of two varieties of the Cypriot syllabary: "common" and "Paphian" (Palaima 2005: 38) or, what seems preferable today, a proof of the belated usage of a variety of the Cypro-Minoan syllabary (Egetmeyer 2010: 879). What is however important is the fact that the inscription (datable to the 11th c. BCE) presents the genitive singular of the personal name Οφελτας, and in doing thus, it also demonstrates one of the most important Cypriot isoglosses, i.e. the tendency to close (*vz.* to raise) the mid-vowels: *o-pe-le-ta-u* with the clearly recorded /u/, i.e. the reflex of the original /o/. Long before the recovering of the inscription, the Cypriot isogloss was described as follows: "In both Arcadian and Cyprian, final ο nearly always appears as υ" (Buck 1955: 23).

We therefore face such a situation:

a) the genitive singular and the genitive plural of anthroponyms and appellatives sometimes take the same form graphically within the thematic declension;
b) due to the fact that we are dealing with anthroponyms and appellatives we may reasonably argue that the forms of the genitives should not sound the same;
c) as it seems, the *Auslaut* /n/ no longer functions in the ancient Cypriot as distinctive;
d) within the majority of the post-Mycenaean Greek dialects the final form of the genitive singular is an effect of the contraction of the thematic vowel /-o-/ and the other /-o/ remaining in the genitival case ending, once the intervocalic /-s-/ disappeared due to the typically Greek lenition;
e) articulation of the *Auslaut* /-o/ in Cypriot undergoes a raising to /-u/;
f) as it seems, this is a close (raised) vowel which is the result of the vowel contraction in the ancient Cypriot
g) the ancient Cypriot retains the opposition between the open [η] and [ω] (IPA /ɛ:/ and /ɔ:/) and the close [ε̄] and [ō] (IPA /ẹ:/ and /ọ:/) (Ruijgh 1988: 143).

In one of the most recent books on ancient Cypriot, which became the starting point for the present paper, we read about the evolution of the vowel system:

> La phase de bonne attestation du dialecte par des inscriptions présente les évolutions suivantes:
>
> 5 voyelles brèves: /*a*/, /*o*/, /*e*/, /*u*/, /*i*/. Pourtant, les voyelles moyennes /*o*/ et /*e*/ montrent une tendance à se fermer en /*u*/ et /*i*/. La fermeture de /*o*/ en /*u*/ en finale est l'évolution phonétique la plus ancienne attestée et appartient à une phase où le passage des Grecs du continent était encore en cours et où leur écriture n'était pas encore créée.
>
> 5 voyelles longues: /*ā*/, /*ō*/, /*ē*/, /*ū*/, /*ī*/. Une fermeture des voyelles moyennes comparable à celle des voyelles brèves moyennes n'a pas eu lieu. **Pourtant, des exemples sporadiques peuvent exister, notamment pour /*ē*/. Dans l'ensemble, une prononciation fermée des voyelles moyennes est probable.**
>
> (Egetmeyer 2010: 237)

Our considerations taken into account, we may conclude that Egetmeyer's formulation (undoubtedly right) might appear to be too cautious.

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# A NOTE ON THE MEANING OF ΘΕΟΔΕΓΜΩΝ ΚΗΠΟΣ IN A NONNIAN VERSE INSCRIPTION FROM APHRODISIAS*

by

PAWEŁ NOWAKOWSKI

ABSTRACT: The author discusses the meaning of the phrase θεοδέγμων κῆπος that occurs in a late antique verse inscription from Aphrodisias, drawing on the poetry of Nonnus (*IAph*2007, no. 7.2). Earlier scholars understood this expression as either Paradise, or the Mount of Olives, or the garden in which Jesus was buried. However, the facts that the adjective θεοδέγμων is an epithet of the Virgin Mary in an inscription from the church of the Dormition of the Virgin of Skripou (Orchomenus) in Boeotia and that an early Christian tradition depicts Mary as "the closed garden" (κῆπος κεκλεισμένος, cf. *Sg* 4, 12) may lead to another interpretation of the expression. Θεοδέγμων κῆπος may be a sublime metaphor for the Virgin Mary that brings to mind the idea of the immaculate conception.

Among the inscriptions found in Aphrodisias, one attracts the extraordinary attention of scholars[1] because it includes a couple of Nonnian phrases. The inscription, written on several marble blocks, is in a very poor state of preservation. Only four fragments have survived to date. Together they form fragments of three nonsequential verses[2]:

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[1] The fact that the inscription is cited in *PGL* attests to its noticeable importance.

[2] The piece with verse C was copied in 1893 by W. Kubitschek (K.V.6) and W. Reichel (R.I.30). When they visited Aphrodisias during their journey across Asia Minor, they found the fragment reused in the wall of a house. H. Grégoire published it in *IGC* in the entry no. 264bis. Later it was revisited by members of the *MAMA* expedition. In 1962 J.M.R. Cormack prepared an edition in the eighth volume of the *MAMA* series (no. 603). The fragment, including verse B, was discovered in the narthex at the Temple/Church site by P. Gaudin, a director of the Rail Line Smyrna–Kassaba. In 1904 he acquired a license to start archaeological research in Aphrodisias that resulted in 221 squeezes and pictures of inscriptions (see Reinach 1906: 79). Part B was recorded in squeeze no. 69. Th. Reinach used it to publish the text in 1906 in "Revue des Études Grecques" (Reinach 1906, no. 207). Later H. Grégoire improved the reading and published it in *IGC*, no. 263. Grégoire was the first to link the passage with the wording of the poetry of Nonnus, but at the same time, he separated it from verse C, already known and likewise reprinted in *IGC*. Part A, the latest find, was found in section 5 of the *martyrion*, next to the southern wall. It consists of two fragments which match together; the left-hand edge is preserved. They were first noticed by the NYU Aphrodisias

A: / + ἐκ Μαρίης θεόπαιδος ἀπηνέος [- - -]
B: [- - -] θεοδέγμονα κῆπον vacat /
C: [- - -]ΝΙ θῆκα τὸ δῶμα + /

A. θεοπαῖδος Roueché || B. ΘΕΟΔΕΙΜΟΝΑ Reinach || C. ἀ]νίθηκα Roueché 1989, ]ΝΙ θῆκα Roueché 2004 et 2007, [ἀνε]θήκατο δῶ[μ]α (?) Grégoire, ΔΩΙΟΙΑ Reichel, [- - -]ΝΙ θῆκα τὸ vel θήκατο Feissel, θήκατο Merkelbach & Stauber

Despite the serious damage to the inscription, we can still conclude that the whole poem was written in hexameter verse. Because fragment A begins with a cross and C ends with the same sign, Ch. Roueché claims that these were the opening and closing verses of the work. She proposes that it originally consisted of at least four verses[3].

Both Nonnian references have long been recognised. They reveal that the author of the inscription was evidently inspired by the *Paraphrase of the Gospel of John*[4]. The first reference occurs in verse A: the word θεόπαις resembles a passage from Nonn. *Par.* XIX 138. The Nonnian context of the second word, the adjective θεοδέγμων, raises no doubts either. It was the proposal of H. Grégoire[5] to correct Reinach's reading of ΘΕΟΔΕΙΜΟΝΑ in verse B to θεοδέγμονα and to compare it with the poetry of Nonnus. Grégoire was, of course, aware that the whole expression θεοδέγμων κῆπος did not occur in Nonnus' poems, so he searched for similar passages[6]. It was likewise Grégoire who suggested the

expedition in 1961, then in 1962 and in 1969. Verses A, B and C were identified as deriving from the same inscription and published by Roueché in 1989 (no. 100; the entry was briefly commented on by Feissel 1991: 372, n. 25). Later she reprinted the inscription in Roueché, *ALA* 2004, no. 100 and in *IAph*2007, no. 7.2. Merkelbach and Stauber also included them in *SGO* I, no. 02/09/97.

[3] Roueché, *ALA* 2004, ch. VII.16. Actually it is difficult to estimate the length of the inscription based on other monuments of this kind. In Late Antiquity Anatolian dedicatory inscriptions could consist of several verses but even a single hexameter verse was acceptable (see e.g. *SGO* III, no. 15/02/10 = *RECAM* II, no. 211 which commemorates the embellishment of a *martyrion* of St. Theodotus near Ancyra). Peculiar examples of extremely elaborate dedicatory poems are provided by imperial inscriptions. The foundation of the church of St. Polyeuctus in Constantinople by Anicia Juliana was commemorated with a poem consisting of 167 verses (see Shahîd 2003: 476–480).

[4] Nonnus' authorship of the *Paraphrase* has been questioned (see Sherry 1991 [a doctoral thesis]; Sherry 1996, and in the introduction to *Thesaurus Pseudo-Nonni quondam Panopolitani*, pp. VII–XXIV). Sherry argues that metric discrepancies between the *Dionysiaca* and the *Paraphrase* are too serious to allow the supposition that both works come from the same author. Subsequent studies conducted in this field led, however, to the dismissal of this view (see Shorrock 2013: 51). Differences may be the result of the complex procedure of writing such a peculiar work as the *Paraphrase*. On the other hand, some quotations from Callimachus and an analysis of the tradition of authorship may also support the thesis that Nonnus wrote both works.

[5] Grégoire, *IGC*, no. 263.

[6] Paying more attention to the word κῆπος than to θεοδέγμων, he identified first: *Par.* XVIII 15: ἤλυθεν ἀλλοπρόσαλλος ἐς ἠθάδα κῆπον Ἰούδας, but then also *Par.* XVIII 73: Χριστῷ σύνδρομος ἦλθεν ἔσω θεοδέγμονος αὐλῆς.

literal interpretation of the phrase as "a garden": either Paradise or the Mount of Olives. The literal interpretation was supported by subsequent scholars dealing with this text. G.W.H. Lampe accepted both possibilities[7]. Ch. Roueché[8] opted for another, still similar, meaning. She understood θεοδέγμων κῆπος as the garden in which Jesus was buried[9]. She went one step further and suggested that the actual theme of the poem was the life of Jesus – first his birth followed by "the harsh experiences of His life" and finally the burial. Roueché was also keen to consider the inscription as a kind of label which could accompany a series of paintings showing the life of Jesus[10].

It is true that in the *Paraphrase* the word κῆπος refers either to the Mount of Olives[11] or to the garden in which Jesus' tomb is situated[12], or to "a regular garden"[13]. It was also a very old, originally pagan custom to locate tombs in gardens[14]. Our sources give an account of graves adorned with flowers, trees and vine sprouts[15] (but it is not always clear then whether this means a whole garden). In other cases there is little doubt that a large garden is indeed implied[16]. Such an establishment is, for example, mentioned in an inscription from Alexandria

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7 *PGL*, s.v. θεοδέγμων 1.

8 Roueché, *ALA* 2004, ch. VII.16.

9 J. 19, 41: ἦν δὲ ἐν τῷ τόπῳ ὅπου ἐσταυρώθη κῆπος, καὶ ἐν τῷ κήπῳ μνημεῖον καινὸν ἐν ᾧ οὐδέπω οὐδεὶς ἦν τεθειμένος.

10 Roueché, *ALA* 2004, ch. VII.16.

11 Nonn. *Par.* XVIII 5–7: ἀγχιφανὴς ὅτι κῆπος ἐύχλοος, ὃν παραμείβων/ κοίρανος ἔνδον ἵκανεν ἐθήμονος οἷά τε βαίνων/ φυταλιὴν εὔοδμον ἀειθαλέος παραδείσου; XVIII 15: ἤλυθεν ἀλλοπρόσαλλος ἐς ἠθάδα κῆπον Ἰούδας; XVIII 26: αὐτοκέλευστος ἀνέδραμε κῆπον ἐάσας; XVIII 126 f.: οὔ σε μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ/ εἶδον εγὼ δρυόεντος ὁμέστιον ἔνδοθι κήπου.

12 Nonn. *Par.* XIX 213: ἦν δέ τις αὐτοθι κῆπος ἀερσιλόφῳ παρὰ χώρῳ; XIX 215: ἐνὶ γείτονι κήπῳ; XX 64: καὶ ξεῖνος ἀνὴρ ἅτε κῆπον ὁδεύων.

13 Nonn. *Par.* XII 55: ἀπ᾽ εὐδένδροιο δὲ κήπου/ ἀκροκόμους φοίνικας ἐγυμνώσαντο κορύμβων.

14 For the description of functions and shapes of ancient gardens see: Carroll-Spillecke 2003 (especially chapter "Gardens of the Dead", pp. 72–79); Carroll-Spillecke *et al.* 1992; Carroll-Spillecke 1989. The so called κηποτάφια (tomb gardens) were maintained not only for aesthetic reasons. They were sometimes leased and the income they generated (from growing vegetables and fruits) was spent on the upkeep of the tombs.

15 (a) *SGO* III, no. 15/02/06 = Peek *GV* 469 = Kaibel *EG* 400: ἔρνεσιν εὐπετάλοις (...) [ἔχει σκιερόν] (a grave shaded by trees; perhaps from Ancyra in Galatia); (b) *SEG* XLI 855 = Kaibel *EG* 1135: Νώτωι <μὲν> μολάκην τε καὶ ἀσφόδ<ε>λον πολύριζον (...) ἔχω (mallow – *malva silvestris* and asphodel – *asphodelus ramosus*; from Lucania in Italy); (c) *IG* XIV 2294 = Kaibel *EG* 720: ἀλλά σε καλύ|πτουσι <θ>αλερ<ὴ> (?) ἄμπελος | καὶ γε̂α ἐν Μεδιωλάνῳ (vine sprouts; from Milan); (d) the epitaph of a certain Patron from the city of Rome (2nd c. AD) likewise mentions only some trees surrounding the grave: *IGUR* III 1303f, ll. 3 f.: ἀλλά με πᾶν δένδρος χαρίεν περὶ ῥίσκον ἀνέρπει | κυκλόθεν, εὐκάρποις κλωσὶν ἀγαλλόμενον (= Peek *GV* 2027 = *IG* XIV 1934 = Kaibel *EG* 546, see also: Peek 1979: 258–260).

16 See Kubińska 1968: 142–147; Jashemski 1970/1971 (a description of tomb gardens in Pompeii).

in Egypt recording a very interesting case of an illegal sale of a large tomb garden[17]. The term used here is κηπόταφον, which means that the funerary garden was actually indistinguishable from the tomb itself. The third peculiar possibility was burial in an already existing regular garden: a certain inhabitant of Rome says, in the epitaph for his wife, that he buried her in her favourite garden[18].

This classical custom seems to support the suppositions of Grégoire and Roueché. Certainly it was easy for the ancients to associate a garden with a tomb. Nevertheless, after closer examination, the identification of the θεοδέγμων κῆπος with the tomb of Jesus seems questionable. In my opinion, there is at least a theoretical possibility that the expression θεοδέγμων κῆπος was in this peculiar case metaphorically used to represent the Virgin Mary and the idea of the immaculate conception rather than any of the gardens mentioned in the Scriptures. There are two major arguments that allow for such a supposition.

The first argument is that before the 12th c. the adjective θεοδέγμων was never associated either with regular gardens or with the tomb of Jesus[19]. It was in fact a very uncommon word in ancient literature. It first appeared in the Hellenistic period, but then it was abandoned[20] until Late Antiquity when Nonnus revived it[21]. Though he did it in the *Paraphrase of the Gospel of John*, he did

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17 See Fraser, Nicholas 1958 and further remarks in Fraser, Nicholas 1962.

18 *IGUR* III 1273: τοιγὰρ ἐγὼ τόδε σῆμα φίλοις σταδίοισιν ἔτευξα (= Peek *GV* 1478 = *IG* XIV 1853).

19 The word θεοδέγμων becomes an epithet of Christ's tomb not earlier than in the Middle Byzantine period: from the 12th c. onwards we observe several occurrences of the very unambiguous phrase, θεοδέγμων τάφος (12th c.: Nicetas Choniates, *Historia de Manuele Comneno lib. I*, *PG* CXXXIX, col. 404: ἡμεῖς ἐσμεν οἱ δυνατοὶ καὶ διεσπασμένοι πάντες ῥομφαίαν καὶ ὡς κλίνην περιέποντες Σολομώντειον τὸν ζωοδόχον τάφον καὶ θεοδέγμονα; *Halosis*, *PG* CXXXIX, col. 976: τοῖς ἱκέταις ὑμῶν χεῖρα ὀρέξατε, ναὶ πρὸς τοῦ τάφου τοῦ θεοδέγμονος καὶ τῶν Χριστοῦ παραιφάσεων; 13th c.: Germanus II Nauplius, *Oratio II* (*PG* XCVIII, col. 243): ἐπεὶ δὲ τῷ μεγάλῳ ἐρύματι τῆς ἀφθάρτου θεότητος, καὶ τῇ πέτρᾳ τοῦ θεοδέγμονος προσέῤῥηξε τάφου; 15th c.: Joannes Argyropulus, *Epistula ad papam Nicolaum* 159β (ed. S.P. Lambros, p. 130): ἧς ἴσον τὸ κέρδος ἥγημαι τοῖς εἰς Παλαιστίνην ἀπαίρουσιν ἐφ' ᾧ τῷ θεοδέγμονι τάφῳ προσκυνῆσαι, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ μεῖζον).

20 Its first occurrence is in a poem by Archestratus of Gela (fr. 13 ed. Brandt = fr. 41 ed. Ribbeck, l. 8), a 4th c. BC hedonistic writer from Sicily praising wine and culinary pleasures. The poem, and the word, are cited with disgust by Athenaeus (Ath. VII 113, 320 B): πάσσειν δ' ἁλσὶ κυμινοτρίβοις καὶ γλαυκῷ ἐλαίῳ/ ἐκ χειρὸς κατακρουνίζων θεοδέγμονα πηγήν). Then the word disappears until Late Antiquity.

21 In *Par.* Nonnus uses the word θεοδέγμων nine times: I 23: θεοδέγμονι λαῷ; I 148: θεοδέγμονος αὐλῆς; III 155: θεοδέγμονος ἵκετο κόλπου; IV 137: θεοδέγμονι πηγῇ; V 127: θεοδέγμονος ὀμφῆς; VII 150: θεοδέγμονι θυμῷ; X 55: θεοδέγμονος αὐλῆς; XVII 73: θεοδέγμονος αὐλῆς; XIX 203: θεοδέγμονι κείμενον ὤμῳ. The word is also used in the *Dionysiaca*. Roueché provides a single reference, XVIII 88, where it appears in a literary sense: καὶ μόγις ἴχνος ἔκαμψεν ἔσω θεοδέγμονος αὐλῆς, but the word θεοδέγμων occurs in this work in six different verses. Because of the topic of the poem, the word must refer to pagan gods, although some phrases are identical to those from the *Paraphrase*, cf. IX 162: θεοδέγμονος αὐλῆς; XIII 435:

not connect it to the garden tomb of Jesus. Actually, in none of the phrases does Nonnus ever put emphasis on any gardens. He describes them as εὔδενδροι (XII 55: "well-wooded"), as εὔχλοοι (XVIII 5: "ever green"), or as γείτονες (XIX 215: "nearby"). For him they are just plain elements of the setting. To say that a garden was endowed with divine grace or that it was host to God is much too lofty for Nonnus.

In contrast, the dedicatory inscription from the church of the Dormition of the Virgin of Skripou[22] (Orchomenus) in Boeotia (AD 873/874), consisting of 12 Homeric hexametres, clearly shows that the word θεοδέγμων fits the Virgin Mary perfectly. The crucial reference is in lines 5 f., which read: μητρὸς ἀπειρογάμου, θεοδέγμονος ἰφιανάσσης,/ τερπνὸν ἀποστίλβον περικαλλέα πάντοθεν αἴγλην ("of the virgin Mother, the great sovereign who received God,/ a delight, such a beautiful brightness gleaming all around", transl. by Prieto-Domínguez 2013: 168 f.).

Also the fact that even Nonnus was apt to associate the adjective θεοδέγμων with the birth (not the burial) of Jesus may be strengthened by a closer examination of a certain passage from the *Paraphrase*. Three verses from the third book (III 155–157) read:

Κύπρον ἐυπτερύγων θεοδέγμονα νῆσον Ἐρώτων; XX 222: θεοδέγμονος ἔνδοθι νηοῦ; XXVII 242: θεοδέγμονος αὐλῆς; XL 412: θεοδέγμονος ἔνδοθι νηοῦ; XLVIII 955: Παλλὰς ἀνυμφεύτῳ θεοδέγμονι δέξατο κόλπῳ. It is only a guess where Nonnus learned the word θεοδέγμων, but its occurrence in the *Dionysiaca* may be something more than a mere coincidence. It is tempting to assume that Nonnus borrowed the word from genuine Dionysian literature, because it occurs in an inscription from Epidauros, dated to AD 308, which was erected by a Dionysian priest (*IG* IV$^2$ 1, no. 436): σεῖο, μάκαρ, βουλαῖσιν ὑπ' ἀρρήτοισιν ὀνίροις | ἀρητὴρ γεγαὼς *vac.* ἰκόνα σὴν ἔθετο | Πλούταρχος, κλεινῆς θεοδέγμονος Ἀτθίδος αἴης | ἀρχιερεὺς κεδνοῦ τ' *vac.* ἱροπόλος Βρομίου | ἱεραπολήσας ἔτους ρπε'. A poem from *Anth. Gr.* VII 363, l. 4 associates the word with Orpheus (the initial four lines are: † Τετμενάνης ὅδε τύμβος ἐυγλύπτοιο μετάλλου/ ἥρωος μεγάλου νέκυος κατὰ σῶμα καλύπτει,/ Ζηνοδότου· ψυχὴ δὲ κατ' οὐρανόν, ἧχί περ Ὀρφεύς,/ ἧχι Πλάτων, ἱερὸν θεοδέγμονα θῶκον ἐφεῦρεν; "This tomb of polished metal covers the body of the great hero Zenodotus; but his soul has found in heavens, where Orpheus and Plato are, a holy seat fit to receive god"; transl. by W.R. Paton) which also points at a Dionysian milieu. One can wonder whether or not the worshippers of Dionysus appropriated it directly from the wine-loving Archestratus or via Athenaeus. Other channels of transmission are also possible, but this topic is beyond the scope of this paper. Nonnus' influence caused late antique and Byzantine authors to use the word θεοδέγμων in various contexts. For example, it was familiar to Dioscorus of Aphrodito, who used it in his encomium of the arrival of the emperor Justin II (*P.Aphrod.Lit.*, fr. IV 17, v. 25 = *P.Cair.Masp*. II, 67183 verso, v. 6: [πίστ]ιν ἀερτάζεις θεοδέγμονα κυδιανείρην: this is a corrected reading of δεοδεγμονα). Two other 6th c. poets – John of Gaza (Jo. Gaz. *Descriptio tabulae mundi* I 38: καὶ γραμμῆς διδύμης θεοδέγμονος εὔδιος εἰκὼν/ χρυσοφαὴς μάρμαιρεν) and Paulus Silentiarius (Paul. Sil. *Descriptio Sanctae Sophiae* v. 787: Παῦλος, ὅλης σοφίης θεοδέγμονος ἔμπλεος ἀνήρ; *Descriptio ambonis*, v. 298–302: πολυστέπτοις δ' ἐπὶ δώροις/ καὶ σέλας ἀστυόχοιο ἑῆς ἀνέθηκε γαλήνης/ νηὸν ὕπερ πολύυμνον, ὅπως θεοδέγμονι βουλῆι/ ἔμπνοον ἱδρύσειε γέρας κοσμήτορι κόσμου,/ Χριστῶι παμβασιλῆϊ) also incorporated the word in their works.

22 Oikonomides 1994: 483–485, 489–493; Papalexandrou 2000: 142–155; Prieto-Domínguez 2013: 168 f.

ὃς δὲ δι' αἰθερίου θεοδέγμονος ἵκετο κόλπου,
φθέγγεται, οὐρανόθεν τόπερ ἔκλυεν, οὐδέ τις αὐτοῦ
μαρτυρίην ζαθέην ἐπιδέχνυται.

While he who comes from the heavenly God-receiving womb,
Reveals what was reveal'd in heaven. And no man
Can add unto his holy testimony.
(transl. by Prost 2003: III 155–157, slightly modified)

The quoted verses refer to the last paragraphs of the third chapter of the Gospel of St. John, especially to the passage: ὁ ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἐρχόμενος ἐπάνω πάντων ἐστίν· ὃ ἑώρακεν καὶ ἤκουσεν τοῦτο μαρτυρεῖ, καὶ τὴν μαρτυρίαν αὐτοῦ οὐδεὶς λαμβάνει ("He that cometh from heaven is above all. And what he hath seen and heard, that he testifieth; and no man receiveth his testimony", J 3, 31 f., transl. King James Version). Travesting this passage, Nonnus evidently uses the phrase θεοδέγμων κόλπος to describe the place from which Jesus came[23]. While it is true that the mentioned κόλπος is not literally Mary's womb, but rather a *heavenly* (αἰθερίος) *womb*, the character of the phrase fits well with the story about the birth of Jesus and brings to mind Mary's role to such extent that it could easily be reshaped and put in a new context by a poet inspired by Nonnus.

The other argument supports this reasoning: the word κῆπος can equally easily refer to the Virgin Mary and virginity as it can to the tomb of Jesus. The information that Jesus was buried in a garden occurs in only one of the four canonical Gospels (the Gospel of John[24]). The earliest Christian authors rarely mentioned this tradition. Such information was only actually repeated in the apocryphal Gospel of St. Peter (24): εἰσήγαγεν εἰς ἴδιον τάφον καλούμενον Κῆπον Ἰωσήφ ("He laid [the body] in his own tomb, called 'the Garden of Joseph'", transl. P. Nowakowski), but its author simply followed John's narration. It is also remarkable that the image of Jesus as a gardener (κηπουρός) is rare in the works

[23] Yet another, this time pagan, example of this phrase is present in *Dionysiaca* XLVIII 955: Παλλὰς ἀνυμφεύτῳ θεοδέγμονι δέξατο κόλπῳ. It proves that Nonnus was quite familiar with the idea that *womb* may be shown as θεοδέγμων.

[24] Anthony M. Moore tries to explain why the author of this Gospel claimed so. Perhaps he was simply inspired by *kepotaphia* that he knew himself, but there are more complex possibilities too. The image of the gardener and the tomb garden may refer to the Garden of Eden and show Jesus as the Creator. Yet another theological explanation is that Mary Magdalene's confusion (she mistook Jesus for a gardener) may illustrate that seeing the resurrection does not mean understanding it. The scene may also have something in common with the Jewish polemic that asserted that a gardener removed the body of Jesus from the illegally seized tomb. See Moore 2003: 54–93, 196–198. Interestingly, the author of the Gospel claims that this garden was located in the Kidron Valley, which is far from Golgotha. The question of the actual location of Jesus' tomb is, however, an issue which I am not going to discuss in the present paper. See Janiszewski 2009: 432 f.; Kloner, Zissu 2007; *CIIP* I 1: 8–10.

of early Christian writers.[25] The literal perception of the setting depicted in this evangelical story had little significance for them.

In contrast, the connection between gardens and virginity was already noted by early Christian authors (it was also a common motive in pagan poetry)[26]. Beginning with Origen, even the story about the garden in which Jesus was buried starts to be perceived as an allegory. In *Contra Celsum* II 69, the renowned theologian remarks that the tomb of Jesus and the womb of Mary resemble each other. Both were immaculate, pure (i.e. new, previously not used), both accepted the body of Jesus. The idea gained strength in the 4th c. with Jerome in his *Commentary to the Gospel of Matthew* (27, 60). He writes clearly that the tomb of Jesus *points to* the womb of Mary. Later, in two greetings the Virgin Mary is even explicitly called a *garden*. In the *Oratio in Sanctam Mariam Deiparam* by Chrysippus of Jerusalem[27], Gabriel the archangel addresses her: "the garden of the Father" (χαῖρε, ὁ κῆπος ὁ τοῦ πατρός). John of Damascus[28] goes even further and calls Mary "the closed garden" (χαῖρε, κῆπος κεκλεισμένος) accessible to no one except God.

The metaphor of the closed garden (κῆπος κεκλεισμένος) is based on the contents of two verses from the fourth chapter of the *Song of Solomon* which read: κῆπος κεκλεισμένος ἀδελφή μου νύμφη/ κῆπος κεκλεισμένος, πηγὴ ἐσφραγισμένη. In this passage the "closed garden" is an allegory of a bride. The garden-metaphor is then repeated several times[29], mostly depicting *the lover entering his garden*[30]. This metaphor, originally used to illustrate the relationship between lovers, is, as we can see, evidently borrowed and allegorically interpreted by John of Damascus to narrate the story of the *reception of God* by the Virgin.

A depiction of the Virgin accepting the Word of God and agreeing to bear God's Son has many points of similarity to the image of the lover entering his perfect, isolated garden in the *Song of Solomon*. Thus it is reasonable to conclude that the author of the discussed inscription merged the literary tradition naming Mary the κῆπος κεκλεισμένος with the Nonnian style and wording (the adjective θεοδέγμων and the *epiclesis* θεόπαις). By this literary operation he transformed the Biblical story into sublime multi-reference poetry. It is unknown whether this

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25 See Janiszewski 2009: 429.

26 Robin Lane Fox emphasises this in his recent essay on the image of gardens in Christian literature; see Lane Fox 2014: 377.

27 Chrysipp. *Oratio in Mariam Deiparam* 1 (*PO* XIX, p. 337).

28 Jo. D. *Homilia in nativ. BMV* 7 (*PG* XCVI, col. 692).

29 *Sg* 4, 15; 4, 16; 5, 1; 6, 2; 6, 11; 8, 13.

30 *Sg* 4,17: καταβήτω ἀδελφιδός μου εἰς κῆπον αὐτοῦ/ καὶ φαγέτω καρπὸν ἀκροδρύων αὐτοῦ; 5, 1: εἰσῆλθον εἰς κῆπόν μου; 6, 2: ἀδελφιδός μου κατέβη εἰς κῆπον αὐτοῦ/ εἰς φιάλας τοῦ ἀρώματος/ ποιμαίνειν ἐν κήποις καὶ συλλέγειν κρίνα; 6, 11: εἰς κῆπον καρύας κατέβην; 8, 13: ὁ καθήμενος ἐν κήποις.

poem was an original work prepared exclusively for the discussed inscription or if it was copied from another, now lost, work.

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# DOS RECETAS DEL *ARS MEDICINALIS DE ANIMALIBUS* EN UN MANUSCRITO DEL SIGLO XII

por

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ABSTRACT: After having identified two medical recipes of the *Ars medicinalis de animalibus* in a new manuscript, a comparison between them and the two extant versions of this work suggests that both recipes are *excerpta* from a lost manuscript of the Harleiano-Vindobonensis version.

## 1. TEXTOS DE ZOOTERAPIA EN LA ANTIGÜEDAD TARDÍA Y EN LA ALTA EDAD MEDIA

Al margen de remedios sueltos en recetarios misceláneos, en la larga etapa que transcurre entre la Antigüedad Clásica y la eclosión de la escuela médica salernitana sólo tenemos noticia de un reducidísimo número de escritos latinos de zooterapia. En contraste con la profusa circulación de herbarios desde el siglo III, ya sea completos ya bajo la forma de extractos, sólo cinco textos sobre materia médica animal pueden ser enumerados en el largo período de más de un milenio, sin contar con que dos de ellos son en realidad opúsculos que no sobrepasan el par de páginas: si exceptuamos los libros que a los animales dedica Plinio el Viejo en su *Historia Natural*, a la Antigüedad Tardía han de ser atribuidos la *Epistula Hipparchi ad Octauium de taxone*, un opúsculo en forma epistolar sobre las propiedades mágico-médicas del tejón; el *Liber medicinae ex animalibus*, atribuido a un desconocido Sexto Plácido (o Plácito) Papiriense, que describe los remedios obtenidos de secreciones y partes del cuerpo de treinta y dos animales, divididos en cuadrúpedos y aves; una anónima *Epistula de vulture*, traducción latina de una epístola griega sobre las aplicaciones medicinales del buitre; y unas incompletas *Curae quae ex hominibus atque animalibus fiunt*, que son, en realidad, una reescritura de los libros XXVIII–XXX de Plinio en forma de recetario[1]. De época altomedieval es el *Ars medicinalis de animalibus*,

[1] Con la excepción de las *Curae quae ex hominibus atque animalibus fiunt*, para las ediciones más autorizadas de los textos remito a los datos recogidos en G. Sabbah, P.-P. Corsetti, K.-D. Fischer, *Bibliographie des textes médicaux latins. Antiquité et haut Moyen Âge*, Saint-Étienne

una obra en dos libros – también, en este caso, uno sobre cuadrúpedos y otro sobre aves – cuya redacción inicial se ha perdido y que ha perdurado sólo en dos reescrituras posteriores, diferentes entre sí tanto por su extensión como por su registro lingüístico. La más antigua (= *Anim. Sang.*) cuenta con sólo un manuscrito, el de Sankt Gallen, Stiftsbibliothek, 217, de principios del siglo IX. La más reciente (*Anim. Harl.-Vind.*) ha llegado a nosotros en tres códices, el de Londres, British Library, Harley 4986, de finales del s. XI o principios del XII; el de Viena, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, 187, del s. XIII; y el de Eton College, 204, de mediados del s. XII, este último un apógrafo del Harleiano y, por tanto, de nulo interés para el establecimiento del texto[2]. Las dos versiones han sido publicadas recientemente en edición crítica, con presentación de los dos textos en columnas paralelas. El estudio de fuentes revela que en la obra ha confluido material del *Liber medicinae ex animalibus* de Sexto Plácido Papiriense y, quizás, de una segunda fuente principal que ha desaparecido y de la que desconocemos todos los detalles[3].

Con la excepción de las *Curae quae ex hominibus atque animalibus fiunt*, los demás textos de zooterapia de la Antigüedad Tardía fueron reelaborados reiteradamente, al tiempo que recetas sueltas de los mismos, o de sus reelaboraciones, fueron reutilizadas en numerosos recetarios misceláneos[4]. Por el contrario, del

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1987. Una actualización fue publicada posteriormente por K.-D. Fischer, *Bibliographie des textes médicaux latins. Antiquité et haut Moyen Âge. Prémier supplément 1986–1999*, Saint-Étienne 2000. La *Epistula Hipparchi ad Octauium de taxone* cuenta con una edición crítica, por E. Howald, H.E. Sigerist, *Antonii Musae de herba vettonica liber. Pseudoapulei Herbarius. Anonymi de taxone liber. Sexti Placiti Liber medicinae ex animalibus, etc.*, Leipzig–Berlin 1927, pp. 227–232. Conocida por su título abreviado, *De taxone*, y hasta ahora considerada anónima, dicha *Epistula* es atribuida en los manuscritos a un tal *Hipparchus*. Para las circunstancias de transmisión y para la restitución del nombre del autor, A. Ferraces Rodríguez, *Remedia Bodleiana de taxone: una retractación cristiana de la epístola de Hiparco a Octavio sobre el tejón*, Mediaeval Studies LXXI 2009, pp. 1–21; sobre las *Curae quae ex hominibus atque animalibus fiunt*, idem, *Unité, réélaboration des sources et composition d'un réceptaire du haut Moyen Âge: Curae que ex hominibus atque animalibus fiunt*, en: F. Le Blay (dir.), *Transmettre les savoirs dans les mondes hellénistique et romain*, Rennes 2009, pp. 207–222.

[2] El códice de Eton College, cuya mención yo había omitido en el artículo citado en la nota siguiente, contiene el texto de *Anim. Harl.-Vind.* en los ff. 78r–80r. Se trata de una copia fiel del Harleiano y no aporta ni una sola variante para la edición crítica de este recetario. Para la descripción del manuscrito remito a N. Ker, *Medieval Manuscripts in British Libraries*, t. II, Oxford 1977, pp. 779–781. Una referencia más reciente, con bibliografía, en M. Collins, *Medieval Herbals. The Illustrative Traditions*, London 2000, p. 209 y p. 236, n. 249. Debo a Monica H. Green el haber llamado mi atención sobre este testigo de la versión Harleiano-Vindobonense del *Ars medicinalis de animalibus*. Quede aquí testimonio de mi gratitud por su amable indicación.

[3] A. Ferraces Rodríguez, *Ars medicinalis de animalibus. Estudio y edición crítica de un anecdotum de zooterapia altomedieval*, Myrtia XXVIII 2013, pp. 175–241.

[4] Ferraces Rodríguez, *Remedia*.... (n. 1); idem, *Dos retractaciones inéditas del De taxone*, en: V. Ortoleva, M.R. Petringa (dir.), *La veterinaria antica e medievale. Testi greci, latini, arabi e romanzi. Atti del II Convegno Internazionale Catania, 3–5 ottobre 2007*, Lugano 2009, pp. 227–242;

*Ars medicinalis de animalibus* no había sido localizada hasta ahora ni una sola huella en obras posteriores. Recientemente he podido identificar una copia casi literal de dos pasajes en un manuscrito del siglo XII. Confiando en su utilidad para futuras indagaciones sobre la obra de la que proceden, ofreceré una transcripción de ambos e intentaré situarlos dentro de la tradición manuscrita de su fuente.

## 2. DOS PASAJES DEL *ARS MEDICINALIS DE ANIMALIBUS* EN UN RECETARIO MÉDICO

El códice al que me refiero es el de Salzburg, Salzburg Museum, 2169. Se trata de un manuscrito de pequeño formato, constituido por 85 folios de 13 x 20 cm y de contenido exclusivamente medicinal. De su historia lo ignoramos casi todo[5]. Más allá de la centuria a la que se adscribe, el siglo XII, el único dato seguro es su procedencia del área germánica, a juzgar porque en los ff. 4v–6r contiene algunas glosas latino-germánicas[6]. En el siglo XVIII perteneció a un tal Zacharias Stewitz y, con los demás manuscritos del mismo personaje, pasó a integrar los fondos del Salzburg Museum (antes Museum Carolino-Augusteum) en 1834. En cuanto al contenido, se distinguen en él dos secciones: la primera (ff. 1–29) está constituida por una serie de opúsculos que en unos casos son de la Antigüedad Tardía y en otros son reescrituras de textos tardoantiguos. Entre otros escritos de esta sección cabe citar una *Epistula de phlebotomia*, capítulos de las *Medicinae ex oleribus et pomis*, de Gargilio Marcial, el inicio de los *Therapeutica ad Glauconem* de Galeno, o el libro IV de las *Etimologías* de Isidoro de Sevilla, además de un calendario dietético[7]. Su parte principal, ff. 30r–85v, la ocupa un recetario en varios libros que carecen de atribución de autor. Un rastreo inicial de sus fuentes me ha permitido averiguar que algunas de las

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R. Möhler, *Epistula de vulture. Untersuchungen zu einer organotherapeutischen Drogenmonographie des Frühmittelalters*, Pattensen–Hannover 1990.

[5] Sobre el manuscrito conozco únicamente el trabajo de W. Speyer, *Der heilkundige Hippozentaur, Alexander der Große und Hippokrates. Ein neuer Text über die erste Offenbarung der Heilpflanzen*, en: *Symmicta Philologica Salisburgensia Georgio Pfligersdorffer sexagenario oblata*, Roma 1980, pp. 171–185. Además, cabe citar dos breves referencias, una en P. Kibre, *Hippocrates latinus. Repertorium of Hippocratic Writings in the Latin Middle Ages*, New York 1985, pp. XIII y 113; y otra en J. Barbaud, *Les boissons dans les calendriers diététiques*, Bull. de Liaison de l'Assoc. des Amis du Musée de la Pharm. (Montpellier) XI 1986, pp. 15–26 (mención del manuscrito en pp. 17, 22 y 23).

[6] Barbaud, *op. cit.* (n. 5), p. 23, afirma que el manuscrito es originario del sur de Alemania, pero no ofrece referencias bibliográficas ni dato alguno en apoyo de su afirmación.

[7] Para las ediciones de tales textos, Sabbah, Corsetti, Fischer, *op. cit.* (n. 1). El calendario fue identificado por Barbaud, *op. cit.* (n. 5), p. 17, pero de su existencia no tuvo conocimiento F.-G. Groenke, *Die frühmittelalterlichen lateinischen Monatskalendarien. Text, Übersetzung, Kommentar*, Berlin 1986.

recetas proceden de un corpus de textos de fitoterapia y de zooterapia reunido hacia el siglo V y constituido por el *De herba vettonica* atribuido a Antonio Musa, el *Herbario* de Pseudo-Apuleyo, la *Epistula Hipparchi ad Octavium de taxone* y el *Liber medicinae ex animalibus* de Sexto Plácido Papiriense[8]. Además, uno de los capítulos es una reescritura de la tardoantigua *Epistula de vulture*[9]. Es en el marco de dicho recetario donde han sido incluidos dos pasajes del *Ars medicinalis de animalibus*. Dentro de una tirada de recetas para la curación de patologías oculares, el manuscrito de Salzburgo da la siguiente (f. 70v–71r):

> Item ad oculorum temporalem dolorem. Puluis de caulibus una pars altera de thure cum lacte caprino et uino equali mensura distempera postea hirundinis fel et sanguinem perquirere debes usque dum plenum ouum inuenias. Tunc conficis cum oleo in uase cupreo usque dum plenum conficiatur, deinde cooperis cum plumbo tenui pertuso quod cooperis in fimo caballino XL diebus et totidem noctibus deinde effodis et consideras et flores qui in ipso plumbo desuper adherent abrades et in pergameno colligis pulueremque minutissimum facis et in oculos mittes aut foris inunges. Probatum est.

Fue la mención de la golondrina (*hirundo*) en el pasaje el detalle que me llevó a indagar en los capítulos sobre este animal incluidos en dos de los textos de zooterapia mencionados más arriba, el *Liber medicinae ex animalibus* de Sexto Plácido Papiriense y el *Ars medicinalis de animalibus*. Pude, así, descubrir en esta última un paralelo para la receta de Salzburgo que llamó mi atención por su carácter completamente literal. En efecto, el capítulo sobre la golondrina consta, en las dos versiones de la obra, de tres recetas, la última de las cuales está referida a problemas oculares. La redacción que de la misma dan *Anim. Sang*. y *Anim. Harl.-Vind.* es la que sigue[10]:

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8 Howald, Sigerist, *op. cit.* (n. 1).

9 Möhler, *op. cit*. (n. 4).

10 Cito por libro, capítulo y número de la receta de la edición Ferraces Rodríguez, *Ars*... (n. 3). El texto de *Anim. Sang*. es de una factura lingüística menos cuidada que la versión harleiano-vindobonense. Esa es la razón de la presencia de una lectura llamativa, *cum oliuas*, sobre la que ha llamado la atención uno de los anónimos informes del artículo. La construcción de la preposición *cum* con un término en acusativo está atestiguada ya en inscripciones pompeyanas, pero se hace especialmente frecuente en textos de época tardía (cf. *ThLL* IV, coll. 1342, 60–1343, 33). En consecuencia, no hay razones para enmendarla en el presente pasaje. A propósito de *cum* más acusativo véanse, entre otras, las referencias siguientes: H. Rönsch, *Itala und Vulgata*, Marburg 1875 (reimpr. München 1965), pp. 409–410; A. Ernout, F. Thomas, *Syntaxe latine*, Paris 1984 (2e édition; 6e tirage revu et corrigé), p. 121; J. Bastardas Parera, *Particularidades sintácticas del latín medieval*, Barcelona 1953, p. 94; V. Väänänen, *Le latin vulgaire des inscriptions pompéiennes*. Nouvelle édition revue et corrigée, Berlin 1959, p. 121; idem, *Introducción al latín vulgar*. Versión española de M. Carrión. Segunda edición revisada y aumentada. Madrid 1985, p. 199; P. Stotz, *Handbuch zur lateinischen Sprache des Mittelalters*, t. IV, München 1998, p. 253 (Handbuch der Altertumswisenschaft II 5, 4).

| *ANIM. SANG.* II 10, 3 | *ANIM. HARL.-VIND.* II 8, 3 |
|---|---|
| Ad oculorum uitia.<br>Hirundinis fel et sanguine<m> perquirere debes, usque plenum ouum inueni<a>s; conficis eum in cubre cum oliuas usque melinum deueniat; coperis de plumbo minuto pertusato et tenuo, coperis in fimo cauallino usque ad XL diebus et XL noctibus; de ipsa flore[s] que super stat mittis in pergamino, facis puluere, mittis in oculis et de ea causa oculos inunguis; probatum est. | Item ad oculos.<br>Hirundinis fel et sanguinem perquirere debes, usque dum plenum ouum inuenias. Tunc conficis cum oleo in uase cupreo usque dum melinum efficiatur. Deinde cooperies de plumbo tenui pertuso et cooperies in fimo caballino usque ad XL dies et totidem noctes. Post hec effodias et consideras, et flores qui in ipso plumbo desuper adherent abradis et in pergameno colligis pulueremque minutissimum facias et in oculos mittes aut foris inungues; probatum est. |

El cotejo riguroso del pasaje de Salzburgo con estas dos versiones de la misma receta pone de manifiesto dos hechos: en primer lugar, que la frase inicial de aquél, la que se refiere al empleo de polvillo de col y de incienso, junto con otros ingredientes, en la confección del remedio, nada tiene que ver con el *Ars medicinalis de animalibus*, sino que se trata de una receta autónoma, truncada por su parte final, en el adverbio *postea*; y, en segundo lugar, que la parte restante reproduce al pie de la letra el texto de la receta *Item ad oculos*, de *Anim. Harl.-Vind.* II 8, 3[11]. Estamos, por tanto, ante un fragmento relacionado con la versión harleiano-vindobonense del *Ars medicinalis de animalibus*, un dato nada sorprendente, por cuanto los dos manuscritos principales de esta versión proceden de la misma área geográfica que el de Salzburgo[12].

El segundo pasaje es una receta referida al empleo de excremento de pato contra una patología denominada *ficus* (f. 73r)[13]:

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[11] El procedimiento de elaboración de la receta presenta notables semejanzas con el que, a propósito del empleo de excrementos de golondrina, ofrece Marcell. *Med*. 7, 3 y 7, 7.

[12] En cuanto al manuscrito de Londres, BL, Harley 4986, los estudiosos coinciden en situar su origen en Alemania. Cf., al respecto, A. Beccaria, *I codici di medicina del periodo presalernitano (secoli IX, X e XI)*, Roma 1956, p. 252; B. Munk Olsen, *L'étude des auteurs classiques latins aux XI^e et XII^e siècles*, t. I, Paris 1982, p. 29; Collins, *op. cit*. (n. 2), pp. 208 s. y 236; R. Bergmann, S. Stricker, *Katalog der althochdeutschen und altsächsischen Glossenhandschriften*, t. II, Berlin–New York 2005, pp. 889–891. Sobre el códice de Viena, ÖNB, 187, R. Reiche, *Deutsche Pflanzenglossen aus Codex Vindobonensis 187 und Codex Stuttgart HB XI 46*, Sudhoffs Archiv LVII 1973, pp. 1–14; P. Hudler, *Die Pflanzenbilder in den Codices 187 und 2277 der Österreichischen Nationalbibliothek in Beziehung zu ihren Vorbildern in den bebilderten Dioskurides-Angaben*, Codices manuscripti LXVI–LXVII 2008, pp. 1–54 (para su procedencia del área germánica, p. 6).

[13] El término *ficus* designaba una excrecencia o una dilatación varicosa, externa o interna, que puede ir acompañada de hemorragia. Cf. Paris, BNF, lat. 11219, 125va: «Item ad ficum qui patet»; f. 125vb: «Item ad ficum corale et qui sanguinem per posteriorem faciunt»; Rouen, Bibl. munic., 1407 (O. 55), f. 134v: «Ad eos qui sanguinem uomunt per os aut de fico aut undecumque»; f. 135r:

> Item. Anserini stercoris puluis in ouo cotidie sumptum ubicumque in corpore fuerit ficus intrinsecus deorsum incessus emittitur.

Se trata de la cuarta receta, dentro de una serie de cinco consecutivas, que el recetario de Salzburgo dedica a la curación del *ficus*[14]. Una receta idéntica figura también en el *Ars medicinalis de animalibus*, pero ahora el paralelo no está atestiguado en las dos versiones de esta obra, sino tan sólo en la harleiano-vindobonense (*Anim. Harl.-Vind.* II 5, 4):

> Ad ficum siccum.
> Anserinum stercus in puluerem redactum cottidieque in ouo sumptum, ubicumque in corpore ficus fuerit, intrinsecus deorsum in secessum emittitur.

Al margen de que en *Anim. Harl.-Vind*. se trata de una receta para el *ficus siccus*, mientras que la de Salzburgo debe de referirse al *ficus qui semper currit*, también ahora, al igual que sucedía en el caso del pasaje referido a problemas oculares, el paralelo es de un literalismo tal que apenas cabe dudar de que el compilador del recetario de Salzburgo introdujo en el texto de la fuente modificaciones escasas, que afectan sólo a la morfología y al orden de palabras. En cualquier caso, se trata de un paralelo que coincide con el mencionado más arriba en establecer una vinculación clara entre algunos pasajes del recetario de Salzburgo y la versión harleiano-vindobonense del *Ars medicinalis de animalibus*.

## 3. POSIBLE ORIGEN EN UN MANUSCRITO PERDIDO DE LA VERSIÓN HARLEIANO-VINDOBONENSE

En cuanto a su filiación dentro de la tradición manuscrita del *Ars medicinalis de animalibus*, los dos extractos ahora identificados se adscriben a un estado de texto idéntico al ofrecido por el manuscrito harleiano, del que parecen una copia literal, si exceptuamos dos variantes que quizás se deban a error, la lectura

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«Item ad ficum qui patet»; f. 135r: «Ad ficum qui sanguinem per posteriora facit»; f. 137r: «Ad ficum qui per se crepat in corpore et sanguinem multum facit»; f. 167r: «Ad ficum interius siue exterius»; Città del Vaticano, BAV, lat. 4417, f. 86v: «Ad fico qui iectat sanguis deintus corpus»; Palat. lat. 1088, f. 36v: «Ad syringio interior quod alii fico dicunt corale». El término está atestiguado con el mismo sentido en textos médicos del español medieval. Cf., M.T. Herrera (dir.), *Diccionario español de textos médicos antiguos*, t. I, Madrid 1996, s. v. 'higo'.

[14] El texto de la serie completa (ff. 72v–73r) es el siguiente: «CONTRA FICUM. Betoniam gamandream benedictam marrubium quinquefolium mentastrum artemesiam millefolium equaliter simul teris et in uino ueteri cum melle distemperas et per IIII dies singulos calices bibat. ITEM. Ebuli suci coclearia III uini III mellis I olei I pipere permixtum da ei qui patitur. ITEM AD FICUM QUI SEMPER CURRIT. Fac ouum plenum de iure cauli et plenum de iure mente plenum de oleo et duo oua de uino et misce simul et da bibere. ITEM. Anserini stercoris puluis in ouo cotidie sumptum ubicumque in corpore fuerit ficus intrinsecus deorsum incessus emittitur. ITEM AD FICUM. Accipienda sunt ossa de capite puscis lucre ut crementur et redigantur in pulurem adiecto sale mittatur in ouum et ieiunus manducet».

*plenum* en lugar de *melenum*, en la receta sobre problemas oculares, e *incessus* en lugar de *in secessum*, en la que se refiere al *ficus*. El manuscrito de Viena, por su parte, al margen de sus particulares circunstancias de transmisión y de errores exclusivos del mismo, es más tardío que el de Salzburgo, lo cual excluye la posibilidad de que los extractos de este último tengan su origen en aquél[15]. Una situación tal admite dos explicaciones: o bien las dos recetas han sido tomadas directamente del manuscrito harleiano o de su apógrafo de Eton College, o bien derivan de algún testigo perdido de la misma rama de la tradición.

El primer dato a tener en cuenta es la diferente organización de la materia en el *Ars medicinalis de animalibus* y en el recetario de Salzburgo. En aquélla las recetas están agrupadas por animales, siguiendo el modelo de otras obras tardoantiguas de materia médica animal, como el *Liber medicinae ex animalibus* de Sexto Plácido Papiriense o las *Curae quae ex hominibus atque animalibus fiunt*. En el recetario de Salzburgo, en cambio, se ordenan por patologías, de modo que cada serie de recetas suele comprender las referidas a una misma enfermedad. Los dos pasajes mencionados son los únicos que proceden del *Ars medicinalis de animalibus*. Y es precisamente su condición de extractos lo que hace inverosímil que se trate de préstamos tomados directamente de este recetario, entendiendo por tal el texto completo actualmente conservado. En efecto, no sólo otras recetas que en la misma fuente se referían también al *ficus* o a patologías oculares no han pasado al recetario de Salzburgo, sino que, por lo que toca al propio capítulo *De hirundine*, la receta que en el *Ars medicinalis de animalibus* precede a la extractada se refería también a afecciones visuales y tampoco fue utilizada por el compilador. El detalle no resulta desdeñable, por cuanto parece imaginable que quien ha extractado la tercera, lo hubiese hecho también con la segunda, que describe un remedio para la misma patología. La hipótesis más verosímil es que el compilador del recetario de Salzburgo no haya tenido acceso al texto completo del *Ars medicinalis de animalibus* y, por tanto, a ninguno de los manuscritos de la misma conservados. Quizás su fuente directa haya sido alguna miscelánea de recetas ya extractadas que incluía las dos aquí concernidas. Por tratarse de *excerpta* que pueden haber pasado por varias manos intermedias, entre el momento de su extractación inicial y el de su reutilización en el recetario de Salzburgo debe de haber transcurrido un lapso cronológico de cierta extensión. Aún manejado con cautela, este dato parece excluir la posibilidad de que las dos recetas de Salzburgo deriven directamente del manuscrito harleiano o de su apógrafo. Antes al contrario, estamos ante un indicio de que deben de remontar a algún testigo

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[15] En el manuscrito de Viena el *Ars medicinalis de animalibus* no es una obra autónoma, sino que sus capítulos han sido yuxtapuestos a los del *Liber medicinae ex animalibus* para formar un texto único de zooterapia. Para más detalles sobre este punto, Ferraces Rodríguez, *Ars*... (n. 3), pp. 176–180. En cuanto a los pasajes aquí concernidos, el texto de Viena presenta, en la receta *Item ad oculos*, dos variantes erróneas que ni el manuscrito harleiano ni los extractos de Salzburgo contienen: *inueniad*, en lugar de *inuenias*, y *flores quod* en lugar de *flores qui*.

perdido que habría que encuadrar en una fase intermedia de transmisión de la versión harleiano-vindobonense del *Ars medicinalis de animalibus*[16].

## 4. A MODO DE CONCLUSIÓN

Si el examen de los testimonios de tradición indirecta de cualquier obra antigua es, a veces, un elemento capital para la fijación del texto, principalmente en pasajes problemáticos, en un caso como el del *Ars medicinalis de animalibus*, hasta ahora sólo conocida por un número de manuscritos muy reducido, la carencia de testigos indirectos acrecienta la dificultad de los problemas, dada la existencia de varias redacciones y la desaparición de eslabones intermedios de la transmisión. A ello se añade el carácter movedizo de la situación lingüística entre la Antigüedad Tardía y la Alta Edad Media, que aporta un grado adicional de inseguridad en la edición de las dos versiones del texto. En situaciones tales, cualquier fragmento de tradición indirecta, sobre todo si alcanza cierta extensión, como es el caso de la receta *Ad oculorum temporalem dolorem*, supone un eficaz medio de contraste y un punto de referencia valioso para el editor. En este sentido, conviene llamar la atención sobre un detalle que requerirá atención cuidadosa en futuras revisiones del *Ars medicinalis de animalibus*. En lugar de *melinum* (o *melenum*), atestiguado en la receta *Item ad oculos*, la receta de Salzburgo da una lectura diferente, pero que da sentido al texto, *plenum*. Será necesario determinar todavía si se trata de un error del extracto, favorecido por la presencia del mismo término en una frase anterior, o si, por el contrario, *plenum* era también aquí lectura originaria, modificada después en *melinum* o *melenum* en un estadio temprano de la transmisión del *Ars medicinalis de animalibus*. También la receta para el *ficus* requiere todavía un estudio pormenorizado a fin de averiguar si la redacción de Salzburgo es la originaria, o si se trata de una versión revisada a manos de algún copista.

Al margen de su utilidad para la fijación del texto mismo, la tradición indirecta permite tener un conocimiento más exacto de las áreas de difusión de una obra dada. En el caso que nos ocupa, los dos extractos no añaden información nueva en este aspecto, puesto que de la circulación del recetario en área germánica ya tenemos certeza por los manuscritos de la versión que he denominado harleiano-vindobonense[17]. Pero, de confirmarse la hipótesis aquí sugerida, la de que las dos recetas de Salzburgo derivan de un manuscrito intermedio perdido, ello implicaría que la difusión de esta versión por zona germánica fue más temprana de lo que hasta ahora se había creído.

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[16] Para un stemma de las relaciones entre las dos versiones del *Ars medicinalis de animalibus*, con indicación de puntos de transmisión correspondientes a eslabones intermedios perdidos, FERRACES RODRÍGUEZ, *Ars*... (n. 3), p. 212.

[17] Para los detalles y la bibliografía pertinente remito a la nota 12 de este mismo trabajo.

Aunque las certezas son todavía escasas, la verdadera importancia de los dos extractos de Salzburgo reside en las posibilidades que abren a propósito de la transmisión del *Ars medicinalis de animalibus*. Ahora sabemos que la tradición de dicho recetario no se agota en el reducido número de manuscritos conocido, sino que, en un proceso similar al de muchos otros recetarios tardoantiguos y altomedievales, también éste debe de haber circulado bajo apariencias diversas, en un azaroso proceso de copia y modificación que estamos lejos de conocer en detalle. Y no debe ser excluida la posibilidad de que ulteriores rastreos en textos hasta ahora inéditos o no estudiados puedan alumbrar nuevos fragmentos del mismo recetario o de las fuentes directas por él utilizadas[18].

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# INDIA IN THE *ALEXANDER ROMANCE*[*]

by

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The history of the campaign of Alexander the Great is known to us from sources written years after it happened. The first-handed accounts of Alexander's companions, Onesicritus of Astypalaia, Nearchus of Crete, Aristobulus of Cassandreia or Chares of Mitylene, have come down to us only in fragments and testimonies. This scarcity of sources concerning Alexander prompted scholars to expand their area of research to include Oriental sources, epigraphic sources and other evidence which could shed new light on Alexander, a figure who may seem well known and well researched now. These new sources have been neglected for a long time since they were considered fanciful and valueless as a historical source. The main subject of this dissertation, the *Alexander Romance*, is one of such sources. The authorship of the *Romance* is unknown, but has been attributed to Callisthenes of Olynthus (and cited as Ps.-Callisth.). This anonymous text is a fictional biography[1] of Alexander which was extremely popular in the Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages. The fact that the *Alexander Romance* was read so widely contributed to the popularity and presence of the Macedonian king in the culture of both the East and the West.

Dividing my scholarly interests, which focus both on the history of Alexander the Great, Greek-Indian contacts and the history of Ancient India, I decided to try to look at the *Alexander Romance* as a historical source; this kind of approach can be found in recent studies on Alexander[2] and fulfils the need for interdisciplinary study on the history of the Macedonian conqueror. I examined the *Alexander Romance* from both sides; as a historian approaching another source

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[*] Summary of a doctoral dissertation *Indie w Romansie o Aleksandrze*, written under the supervision of Professor Krzysztof Nawotka in the Institute of History, University of Wrocław.

[1] Ross 1988: 5.

[2] Fraser 1972: vol. I, 3–5; 1996: 38–46; Baynham 2000; Bosworth 2000; McInerney 2007.

for the history of Alexander and as a person interested in Greek–Indian contacts in Antiquity.

The campaign of Alexander the Great in the *Romance* preserves the historical timeline, although it does contain a lot of fanciful material. The third book in particular, which focuses on Alexander's stay in India, is rich in various fictional motifs. This book is the subject of my detailed analysis, which is focused on dividing the layer of information on India known from earlier writers from the new elements which may hide authentic information on the Indian landscape, art or literature. This method of study revealed the level of fanciful stories in early writings on India as well as in the later accounts of India, created after the Alexander's campaign. It also explored how much of this material found its way into the *Romance* and how it was used, as well as considering if there is something new and authentic about India in the legend of Alexander.

The main source of this dissertation was the earliest version of the Alexander *Romance* (referred to as the α recension) and dated most probably to the 3rd c. AD[3]. It is necessary to underline that the α recension means the lost archetype of the *Romance*. The text which is being used and generally accepted as the closest to the archetype is called manuscript A, edited by W. Kroll (*Historia Alexandri Magni (Pseudo-Callisthenes)*, vol. I: *Recensio vetusta*, edidit Guilelmus Kroll, Berlin 1926). The motif of the Water of Life, also examined in this doctoral thesis, comes from the β recension (4th–6th c. AD). As the witnesses of the earliest recension, I used also the translation into Latin by Iulius Valerius (4th c. AD) and the Armenian version (5th c. AD). Furthermore, I examined the branches of the lost δ* recension; the Latin translation by Leo the Archpriest (10th c. AD) and the Syriac recension of the *Romance* (6th c. AD), which is not only close to the lost archetype of the *Romance*, but also marks the beginning of the Oriental tradition of the *Alexander Romance*. For the expanded variant of the Water of Life, I used also the manuscript L, which belongs to the β recension. The main Greek sources used in the dissertation were: the *Indica* of Ctesias of Cnidus, Herodotus, Megasthenes, the accounts of Alexander's companions and the Vulgate. As for the Indian literary sources, I examined the selected hymns of *Veda*, *Upanishads* and the epics: *Mahābhārata* and *Rāmāyana*. Other important sources were: the books of law by Manu (*Mānava-Dharmaśāstra*, 3rd c. BC–3rd c. AD) and the *Arthaśāstra* by Kautilya (2nd c. AD). I also had an opportunity to conduct my research on early Indian art in Indian museums and *in situ*.

The dissertation contains a detailed analysis of five episodes from the *Alexander Romance*, which takes place in India or nearby in the undefined East. The first chapter focused on the analysis of the image of the Indian landscape, fauna and flora and mostly the monsters which attacked Alexander during the

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[3] See: Stoneman, Gargiulo 2007: XXV–XXXIV; Kroll 1919; Ross 1988: 5; Jouanno 2002: 13; Stoneman 1991: 28. *Contra*: Ausfeld 1907: 151 f.; Rohde 1914: 198; Pfister 1946: 42–44.

so-called "night of terror". The next episode of interest was Alexander's dialogue with Indian gymnosophists. The main focus of my research in this chapter was to find matching questions (both with respect to sense and structure) in the Indian literature preceding the events described in the *Romance*. I also stressed the importance and place of dialogue in Indian literature. The third chapter contains an analysis of the meeting of Alexander and queen Kandake of Meroe. The location of her kingdom seemed uncertain to me, as the majority of its descriptions may be attributed to India. The last chapter is devoted to the two episodes which mark the symbolic end to Alexander's journey and his life; the episode of the Water of Life and the meeting with the prophetic trees of Sun and Moon.

This analysis revealed that, in fact, the majority of the elements in the description of India in the *Romance* can also be attributed to the real India; these elements also correlate with early Greek accounts of India. Indian artefacts which can be seen nowadays in Indian museums, *in situ* and in the literature also reveal a connection with the *Romance* and other Greek writings on India.

The first chapter should be considered as an analysis of the motifs related to the Indian landscape, such as the presence of huge, unknown animals, multiple-handed people, creatures with additional limbs or composite creatures. The research I conducted has revealed that such composite monsters as for example ταυρελέφαντες (Ps.-Callisth. III 17, the bull-elephant composite) are uniquely represented in early Indian art, starting from the first millennium BC, including the seals from Mohenjo-daro, the Brahmanical and Jaina caves in Badami (Karnataka) and Ajanta (Maharastra), up to the present times in Southern India (the *gopura* in Srirangam, Tamil Nadu). These and other examples, like multiple-handed people, fit the thesis that the *Romance* may describe authentic Indian pieces of art seen in India by Alexander's companions.

The account of Alexander's meeting with Indian philosophers is frequently interpreted as a Cynic text, included in the *Romance* for moral purpose[4]. Alexander poses witty, riddle-like questions to the philosophers to examine their wisdom (in other versions of the dialogue preserved in Plutarch (Plut. *Alex*. 64), he threatens them with death in the case of a wrong answer). In contradiction to this view, I have decided to search for similar dialogues with respect to their form and merits (content). This research showed that the hymns of the *Veda*, *Upanishads* and the epic *Mahābhārata* contain questions of the same form and meaning as those in the *Romance*. Furthermore, the tradition of the riddle contest and the neck-riddle is widely reflected in Indian culture[5]. It is also worth noticing that the life of the Indian gymnosophists as described in the *Romance* is not very distant from their authentic behaviour. They cannot be ascribed to any particular school of philosophy, but their habits are positively confirmed in ancient Indian

[4] Wilcken 1923: 161 f.; Brown 1949: 47; Powers 1998: 84 f.

[5] Huizinga 1949: 106; Szalc 2011: 17.

law codices like the *Arthaśāstra* or the *Mānava-Dharmaśāstra*, contrary to the popular belief that they dwell in idyllic, nearly utopian scenery and have nothing in common with authentic Indian ascetics.

The next chapter should be considered as an attempt to locate the kingdom of queen Kandake of Meroe; it is said that the queen dwells in the palace of the legendary queen Semiramis, but the exact location of this palace remains a matter for discussion. The landscape as described in the *Romance* (III 21 f.) is a mosaic of various motifs; the name Kandake is in fact the Nubian royal title meaning "queen mother", the queen lives in the palace of the legendary Assyrian queen Semiramis, but on the other hand, the number of characteristics, such as the pepper trees, the beryl, the richly ornamented monuments carved from a single stone, or the caves "inhabited by the gods" indicate that the episode takes place in India. What is more, the queen's palace is ornamented by Median columns typical of Gandhara art. It looks like a giant chariot pulled by twenty elephants. This type of Indian chariots, pulled by elephants or resting on their backs, may be seen in India even nowadays.

The last chapter is devoted to one of the late but significant episodes in the *Alexander Romance*, namely the search for the Water of Life. This episode appears in the β recension of the *Romance*, dated to the $4^{th}$–$6^{th}$ c. AD and is not present in the α recension. The idea of water which brings one back to life is almost totally unknown in Greek literature. Despite some ideas proposed by researchers[6], the circumstances of the creation of the episode and its geographical location remain unclear. The idea of reviving water which gives immortality features substantially in Indian beliefs, and its presence in the Indian subcontinent has been uninterrupted to the present times. Various examples from Indian literature: the *Vedas*, epics and fairy tales, confirm this long-lasting tradition. However, since the Indian origins of this idea cannot be clearly proved, I decided not to determine the Indian origin of the episode.

The second part of the last chapter contains the analysis of Alexander's meeting with the prophetic trees of Sun and Moon, this time undoubtedly placed in India. The very first mention of the Indian custom of reverence for trees comes from Ctesias' account and it is safe to assume that this particular information has found its way into the *Romance*. The research I conducted shows that the cult of the Sun and Moon and of trees has a long tradition in India, which is why, in my opinion, this episode can be safely assumed to be authentic information on Indian customs.

The thesis presented here should be considered as a historical approach to neglected sources on the history of Alexander the Great and Greek–Indian contacts. I decided to look at the *Alexander Romance* as the historical source, contrary to the long held view that the *Romance* is completely useless and does not

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[6] Friedlaender 1913; Meissner 1894; Dawkins 1937: 173–192.

contain any valuable historical information. In my opinion, the results presented are convincing and at the same time indicate the necessity to expand research in previously neglected areas, as is being done these days with other minor sources as well as with other parts of the *Romance*, which have been omitted from this dissertation.

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# LES ÉLÉMENTS ÉPIQUES DANS LES SATIRES DE JUVÉNAL[*]

par

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Selon Susanna Morton Braund, une chercheuse canadienne spécialisée dans les études sur Juvénal, les satires de cet auteur possèdent trois caractéristiques narratives qui les rendent uniques en comparaison aux autres poèmes de ce type : l'indignation, des éléments rhétoriques et des éléments épiques[1]. Parmi ces traits fondamentaux, l'élément épique est très rarement étudié par les chercheurs de manière systématique et intertextuelle[2]. Le but de notre thèse était donc de compléter cette partie des études juvénaliennes en examinant le fonctionnement de tous les éléments épiques dans la satire en tant que genre, leurs associations mutuelles et leur rôle par rapport à la narration.

Avant d'analyser le fonctionnement des éléments épiques dans la satire, il fallait déterminer les traits distinctifs de l'épopée. Ce qui distingue l'épopée d'autres genres ce sont certaines caractéristiques du contenu, du style et de la narration. D'Aristote jusqu'au Tasse et à l'époque moderne, ces caractérisques restent les mêmes ne changeant que par l'importance plus ou moins grande qu'on leur a donnée. Ce sont ces éléments que nous avons pris pour sujet de recherche et d'analyse dans notre thèse.

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[*] Cet article est un résumé de la thèse de doctorat écrite en polonais sous le titre *Elementy epickie w satyrach Juwenalisa*. Le travail a été effectué à l'Institut d'Études Classiques, Méditerranéennes et Orientales de l'Université de Wrocław sous la direction du Professeur Jakub Pigoń. La thèse a été soutenue au mois de janvier 2015 à Wrocław. Nous souhaiterons exprimer ici notre vive reconnaissance au Professeur Pigoń pour son assistance. Nous tenons également à remercier pour leurs utiles remarques les Professeurs Teresa Szostek (Université de Wrocław) et Jerzy Styka (Université Jagellonne de Cracovie) qui ont examiné la thèse avant la soutenance.

[1] Braund 1996 : 17.

[2] Les polémiques sur la théorie de la satire, particulièrement vives pendant la Renaissance et au début du XX[e] siècle, se concentrent sur sa genèse et l'étymologie de son nom. Le premier auteur qui a signalé l'existence du rapport régulier entre la satire et l'épopée est John Dryden qui dans le *Discourse concerning the Original and Progress of Satire* (1693) a commenté la ressemblance de ces deux genres tant au niveau du style que dans leurs aspects didactiques et métriques.

La première question abordée concerne la perception de la poésie et des poètes épiques dans les satires. L'opinion dominante dans les études juvénaliennes d'après laquelle le poète détesterait l´épopée en général devient peu convainquante après l'analyse des extraits dans lesquels Juvénal traite des poètes épiques. Une telle analyse permet de distinguer trois types d'auteurs : les *vates* ou poètes quasi devins tels qu'Homère et Virgile, les poètes de l'époque précédant Juvénal et les auteurs modernes (personnifiés par Stace) qui composent des poèmes mythologiques. Seul le dernier groupe mérite l'aversion du satiriste, ce qui est un premier signe que l'antipathie manifestée par Juvénal envers l'épopée est peut-être plus compliquée qu'on ne le pense souvent. Pour bien saisir l'attitude du satiriste envers à la poèsie épique nous analysons aussi deux phénomènes littéraires et sociaux vivement exploités par Juvénal : la *recusatio* et la *recitatio*. Toutes les deux font partie de la satire première dite programmatique et comportent un commentaire négatif sur l'épopée. Néanmoins, la narration en tant que texte narratif contient une discordance considérable qui met en doute les opinions sur l'animosité du satiriste envers la poèsie épique : en la critiquant Juvénal se sert de techniques et d'expressions épiques sans intention comique. Ainsi, il construit sa *recusatio* non seulement à la manière des *recusationes* d'autres poètes satiriques et de Martial, mais aussi de celle de Stace : les éléments constitutifs de la *recusatio* juvénalienne, y compris la *recitatio*, sont les mêmes que les composantes de la *recusatio* d'Horace et de Perse, et la structure de la *recusatio* de *Sat.* 1, 1–21 de Juvénal imite la *recusatio* de la *Thébaïde* de Stace, I 1–24. Ces exemples avec d'autres ressemblances[3] que l'on observe dans la formation de la *recusatio* et de l'image de la *recitatio* chez Juvénal permettent de constater que notre satiriste remonte à la tradition littéraire et que ses opinions négatives sur l´épopée résultent simplement des règles du genre répétées après les poètes mentionnés.

L'étude de l'usage de l'imaginaire épique dans les satires a un caractère intertextuel en se concentrant sur le problème de savoir comment Juvénal introduit les éléments épiques dans ses poèmes (question des techniques intertextuelles) et quels éléments il tire de l'épique (question du contenu). Les techniques avec lesquelles on introduit un élément épique dans la satire, observées déjà chez Ennius et Lucilius, peuvent être limitées à deux phénomènes principaux : imitation (parodie littéraire et parodie génologique) et allusion littéraire (par réponse, citation, reprise du personnage épique, comparaison, périphrase). On y ajoute le troisième type de technique intertextuelle appelé « référence générale » (fonctionnant dans la littérature aussi comme réminiscence, écho, convention).

[3] Cf. p. ex. les *recusationes* de Perse (*Prol.* et 5, 1–24) et Juvénal. Toutes les trois contiennent les *verba dicendi* du refus (Pers. *Prol.* et 1, 50 : *remitto* ; Iuv. 1, 2 : *repono*), thèmes de la poésie épique mythologique fonctionnant comme exemple de la mauvaise poésie (Pers. 5, 1–13 ; Juv. 1, 1–14), critique en fonction de la justification, apologie.

L'imitation dans la satire, toujours de caractère comique, prend une forme de parodie littéraire qui change le contenu du texte épique défini en conservant ses caractéristiques de style ou une forme de parodie génologique des modèles épiques (motifs, héros etc.) mais sans références aux poèmes concrets. Ainsi, dans la *Sat*. 3, 115–118 l'auteur se sert de la parodie littéraire de la *Thébaïde* IV 59–62 de Stace, ce qui dans la perspective du poème entier est une suite logique de l'invective contre les Grecs. Dans la satire 4 qui est une parodie du *concilium principis* de Domitien, on dégage la parodie littéraire du passage du *De bello Germanico* de Stace[4] traitant des conseils militaires de Domitien. Le poème se divise en trois parties : description de Crispinus (1–33), invocation aux Muses (33–36), *consilium principis* (37–154). C'est dans la dernière section que l'auteur se sert de la parodie littéraire du catalogue des *amici Caesaris* de l'épopée de Stace ; de plus, le début de la section troisième est une périphrase para-épique (37–38 : « Cum iam semianimum laceraret Flavius orbem/ ultimus et calvo serviret Roma Neroni »). Les deux premières introduisent le thème du conseil en se servant entre autres de références épiques : Crispinus présenté comme Thersite (et puisque Crispinus annonce l'empereur, qu'il est considéré comme « un petit Domitien »[5], c'est là une critique voilée du césar) et parodie de l'invocation épique (34 : « incipe, Calliope ; licet et considere »). En prenant en considération la parodie du *De bello Germanico*, on peut suggérer que les élément épiques dégagés dans les vers 1–36 sont aussi une sorte de jeu poétique, probablement en forme de parodie de ce poème de Stace[6].

Juvénal utilise aussi une parodie littéraire spécifique du point de vue de la forme : il cite le passage d'un poème épique en y introduisant un élément nouveau de valeur décroissant ce qui crée un effet comique ou ironique. Ainsi, cette technique fonctionne de la même manière que le *bathos* qui apparaît dans les satires de Juvénal assez souvent ; c'est l'usage de la citation épique qui rend ce phénomène littéraire unique. Il n'y a que quatre occurrences de cette sorte de parodie (*Sat*. 2, 99–101 = Verg. *Aen*. III 286 ; *Sat*. 5, 137–139 = Verg. *Aen*. IV 327–330 ; *Sat*. 7, 115–117 = Ov. *Met*. XIII 1–3 ; *Sat*. 9, 37 = Hom. *Od*. XVI 294, XIX 13 ; cf. *Sat*. 1, 81–84 = Ov. *Met*. I 316–402). Dans trois cas, il utilise les citations qui décrivent des héros épiques connus pour décrire des héros satiriques en créant ainsi un parallèle entre eux et en amenant le lecteur à les comparer (au détriment des personnages satiriques) ; dans le dernier cas, il se sert de la transformation d'une expression à caractère gnomique. L'auteur ne fait donc jamais rire de la poésie épique de laquelle la citation est tirée, mais afin de

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[4] Seuls quatre vers du *De bello Germanico* nous ont été conservées par Giorgio Valla qui dans son commentaire sur Juvénal publié en 1486 cite ces vers d'après des scholies aujourd'hui perdues.

[5] Helmbold, O'Neil 1956 : 70; cf. Gowers 1993 : 206.

[6] Cf. Townend 1973 : 154.

créer un univers satirique, il utilise des éléments bien connus hors du monde de la littérature et dont la nature est proche du proverbe.

La même technique est utilisée dans la parodie génologique ; ce qui change c'est l'élément auquel elle fait référence : non le passage précis d'une œuvre littéraire, mais un modèle qui trouve ses racines dans l'épopée (motifs, héros etc.). Au début de la satire 6 le satiriste se sert du mythe des âges de l'humanité de provenance épique en les présentant d'une façon caricaturale comme brutaux et primitifs ; ainsi, la critique du monde moderne comparé aux âges précédants de l'humanité, est mise en relief.

La deuxième technique intertextuelle, l'allusion littéraire, qui consiste à transplanter un élément tiré d'un texte A dans un texte B, est toujours intentionnelle et son déchiffrement correct peut jouer un rôle essentiel dans l'interprétation du poème. Tel est le cas de la *Satire* 3 où l'allusion est une clef pour bien comprendre le poème et expliquer tous ses passages jugés par les chercheurs comme discordants. Le héros de la satire, Umbricius, décide de quitter Rome de peur des dépravations de ses habitants et de l'immoralité des immigrés, particulièrement des Grecs. Il veut s'enfuir à Cumes, ce qui semble surprenant – Cumes, ville de la *Magna Graecia*, est un épitomé de la Grèce que le héros déteste. Le choix de la ville devient clair si l'on note que la périphrase de Cumes apparaissant au début de la satire « ubi Daedalus exuit alas » (3, 25) est une allusion à l'*Énéide* – car seul Virgile fait atterrir Dédale à Cumes (*Aen*. VI 14 s.). Juvénal introduit cette ville à cause de son rôle dans l'épopée et de son association avec Énée. Cumes est le premier lieu en Italie où Énée et ses compagnons débarquent ; ainsi se termine son voyage commencé pendant la nuit de l'attaque contre Troie[7]. Le reste de la satire reprend les événements de cette nuit en présentant Rome sur le modèle de la chute de Troi : Grecs possédant les traits des Achéens (3, 58–78), temps (les 24 heures de la vie de Rome reflètent la chronologie de la chute de Troie dans l'*Énéide* avec la nuit comme le temps crucial), motif de l'incendie (*Sat*. 3, 58 ; 197–202 = *Aen*. II 310–312), dangers dans les rues (description détaillée de la foule dont le comportement est décrit dans le style d'une bataille épique), dangers nocturnes, deuil d'Achille (Hom. *Il*. XXIV 10 s.) = comportement de l'ivre (*Sat*. 3, 278–280), fin : Énée disant « iamque iugis summae surgebat Lucifer Idae/ ducebatque diem » (*Aen*. II 801 s.) *vs*. Umbricius déclarant « sol inclinat : eundum est » (*Sat*. 3, 316), c'est-à-dire que tandis qu'Énée ayant

[7] L'une des propositions d'explication de la déstination d'Umbricius a identifié Rome avec Cumes et Umbricius avec Dédale (Lelièvre 1972 : 459–461) sur la base de références à un passage du livre VI de l'*Énéide* (Rome et Cumes comme les enfers ; Sybilla = le nom d'Umbricius est le nom d'un haruspice connu : Umbricius Melior ; la descente d'Umbricius dans une valléé d'Egeria = la descente d'Énée dans un monde souterrain ; point de départ : *porta eburna* (Énée) = Porta Capena (Umbricius) ; Charon : *Aen*. VI 296 s. = *Sat*. 3, 265–267 ; citations polémiques : *Aen*. VI 96 s., 163 *vs*. *Sat*. 3, 60 s.; *Aen*. VI 620 *vs*. *Sat*. 3, 145 s.; *Aen*. VI 664 s. *vs*. *Sat*. 3, 21 s.). Toutes ces occurrences ne forment pas un réseau cohérent de références intertextuelles, ce qu'admet Lelièvre.

survécu aux dangers nocturnes part pour de nouvelles aventures, Umbricius part pour chercher un lieu calme et ainsi éviter les dangers de la nuit. Juvénal reprend alors le motif de la chute de Troie en mettant en parallèle Rome et Troie ; cet arrangement permet d'avertir les Romains de la chute de leur ville.

Parmi les types d'allusions littéraires utilisées par Juvénal on distingue :

– l'allusion par réponse (p. ex. le dialogue avec Calliope d'Ovide, *Met*. V 338 s., dans *Sat*. 4, 34 s.),
– l'allusion par citation paraphrasée (*Sat*. 1, 43 comme l'allusion à l'*Aen*. II 379 s. pour évoquer le topos de la pâleur comme indice de la peur),
– l'allusion par la réutilisation dans la satire de personnages épiques (le satiriste se sert de tels personnages à cause de leur caractère proverbial),
– l'allusion par comparaison (p. ex. *Sat*. 5, 37–48 = *Aen*. IV 261–264 ; comparaison entre autres à l'aide d'une *ekphrasis* d'un objet quotidien avec l'arme d'Énée),
– l'allusion par périphrase (p. ex. *Sat*. 3, 24 s. mentionnée précédemment).

À part les techniques d'imitation et d'allusion qui dominent dans les satires on observe les occurrences des références de provenance épique plus ou moins vagues sans les référents intertextuels. L'auteur reprend sans intention parodique des structures qui sont apparues pour la première fois dans une épopée mais qui depuis sont entrées dans la culture commune. Ainsi, Juvénal introduit les expressions du corpus épique telles qu'épithètes (10, 292 : *pulchra Diana*), verbes (1, 89 ; 4, 65 : *itur*) ou noms (4, 29 : *induperator*).

Les relations entre les satires de Juvénal et la tradition épique sont de nature narrative, métrique et stylistique. Les influences au niveau de la narration englobent Lucilius comme héros épique et, par extension, le problème de l'identité de la *persona* du satiriste, la présentation d'Umbricius comme un anti-Énée, le fonctionnement des héros épiques dans les satires, les motifs tels que la tempête et la bataille épique et les techniques narratives telles que l'*ekphrasis* et le catalogue.

Dans la satire 1, le narrateur déclare qu'il choisit la satire en tant que genre : « cur tamen hoc potius libeat decurrere campo,/ per quem magnus equos Auruncae flexit alumnus [i. e. Lucilius – A.F.-C.],/ si vacat ac placidi rationem admittitis, edam » (1, 19–21). Lucilius, le satiriste par excellence, est présenté ici comme un héros épique ; cette image est mise en relief à la fin de la satire où le narrateur retourne à cette symbolique en attribuant au satiriste les armes épiques : fureur et épée : « ense velut stricto quotiens Lucilius ardens / infremuit »[8] (1, 165 s.). En bref, écrire des satires, c'est partir à la bataille[9]. Comment

[8] Cf. Mezentius chez Virgile, *Aen*. X 711.

[9] Ce n'est pas une invention de Juvénal; le motif semblable épée = plume paraît chez Horace, *Sat*. II 1, 40–46. Cf. aussi le verbe *repono* de la *Sat*. 1, 1 : « numquamne reponam », qui implique une sorte de vengeance soulignant ainsi un caractère militant de l'occupation du satiriste.

expliquer alors les derniers mots de la satire : « experiar quid concedatur in illos/ quorum Flaminia tegitur cinis atque Latina » (1, 170 s.) ? Le satiriste ne se comporte pas comme un héros courageux et ne condamne pas les vices de son temps – il se tourne vers la critique du temps passé et des personnages décédés[10] du temps de Domitien ce qui naturellement offre plus d'exemples de vices, mais n'est pas explicable du point de vue de la logique de la narration et plus précisément de la personne du narrateur créée autour de l'idée du héros épique. Il semble que Juvénal-auteur confonde ses mots avec les mots de la *persona* qui est active au temps de Domitien ce que montrent des indices visibles déjà depuis les premiers vers[11]. « Experiar quid concedatur » sont les mots de la *persona* et « in illos/ quorum Flaminia tegitur cinis atque Latina » est une expression dite du point de vue de Juvénal qui vit à l'époque de Trajan. Cette contamination de la réalité de l'auteur et de la réalité satirique peut être due à l'inattention de l'auteur – le maintien du masque nécessitait une stricte discipline poétique qui parfois pouvait faillir. Les ressemblances entre le narrateur satirique et le héros épique ne peuvent pas être considérées comme la preuve que Juvénal tend à faire de la satire un genre qui va remplacer l'épopée. C'est plutôt un témoignage que la satire est, comme le dit MORGAN[12], une mauvaise sœur jumelle de l'épopée dont le contenu en est une antithèse.

Une seconde influence de l'épopée sur l'œuvre de Juvénal se manifestant au niveau de la narration concerne le personnage d'Énée. Dans la satire 3, l'auteur forme d'une manière inexplicite le personnage d'Umbricius sur le modèle d'Énée en créant un système de références épiques déjà visible dans la *Sat*. 2, 153–157 (motif des Champs Élysées qui annonce le motif de la descente dans la *Sat*. 3, 17). D'autres allusions et réminiscences épiques (Cumes et Sybille – 3, 2 s. ; allusion à l'*Énéide* – 3, 25 ; motif de la fuite et de la recherche d'un asile – 3, 59 et 81, cf. *Aen*. I 2 ; VI 14) et la structure du nom *Umbricius* évoquant la prédiction qu'Énée reçoit d'Helenus[13] permettent de juxtaposer Umbricius et Énée. Théoriquement, Umbricius en entreprenant le voyage là où Énée l'a fini devient son continuateur, mais la narration satirique fait d'Umbricius un anti-Énée, ou un mauvais frère jumeau d'Énée car la fortune d'Umbricius est une antithèse de celle d'Énée :

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[10] Cette discordance n'étonnait pas seulement les philologues classiques (HEINRICH 1839 : 4 ; FRIEDLAENDER 1895 : 162 *ad loc*. ; HELMBOLD 1951 : 57 ; HIGHET 1962 : 57 ; KENNEY 1962 : 37 s. ; DUFF 1970 : 124 *ad loc*. ; COURTNEY 1980 : 82, 119 *ad loc*. ; ANDERSON 1982 : 207 ; FREUDENBURG 2001 : 237 s.) ; même BAKHTINE a essayé d'en expliquer les raisons (v. BAKHTINE 2009 : 363).

[11] Toutes les personnes mentionnées dans la satire vivaient au temps de Domitien. Le satiriste applique alors la solution annoncée dans les vers 170 s. beaucoup plus tôt qu'il ne la verbalise.

[12] MORGAN 2004: 8.

[13] *Sat*. 3, 21 s. : « Hic tunc **Umbricius** « quando artibus » inquit « honestis/ nullus in **urbe** **locus**, nulla emolumenta laborum » ; *Aen*. III 393 : « is locus urbis erit, requies ea certa laborum ».

– la Rome d'Umbricius est une dystopie[14] alors que le héros de l'*Énéide* cherche son utopie ;
– le salut des Troyens est dû à une cité grecque (*Aen*. VI 96 s.), alors qu'Umbricius déteste le grec ;
– Umbricius a l'intention de partir seul en se séparant des Romains (*Sat*. 3, 3); Énée a ses compagnons avec lesquels il fonde la société romaine ;
– Umbricius est inactif, il ne part pas, mais il en parle, contrairement à Énée.

Ainsi, l'histoire de la cité et de Rome forme un cercle : Énée et ses compagnons partent de Cumes pour arriver à Rome en apportant la vertu, tandis qu'Umbricius fuit de Rome à Cumes tout seul en apportant le désillusion causée par la décadence de la vertu.

Le héros épique de la satire 1 et l'Énée de la satire 3 sont nécessaires du point de vue de la narration pour construire le poème. Les rôles des autres personnages épiques et mythologiques qui apparaissent dans les satires sont d'une moindre ampleur : ils servent d'*exempla dissimilia* justifiant le raisonnement du satiriste qui les utilise dans la comparaison, la métonymie (plus particulièrement dans sa variante qu'est l'antonomase) et la périphrase. Leur usage (toujours comme *comparans*) est simplifié et symbolique (un personnage = un trait distinctif) ce qui est caractéristique de la rhétorique.

Parmi les motifs épiques que Juvénal transplante dans la satire, deux jouent un rôle fondamental dans la structure du poème où ils apparaissent : la bataille et la tempête. Dans la satire 15, l'auteur montre la dégradation de l'humanité en se servant de la métaphore du cannibalisme. La description de la bataille est précédée d'une scène homérique : Ulysse raconte les coutumes anthropophages des Lestrygons et des Cyclopes (*Od*. IX 289–299, X 103–132). L'audience qui exprime le scepticisme et l'incrédulité symbolise le monde de l'*humanitas*. Le narrateur assume alors le rôle d'Ulysse et raconte une histoire de cannibalisme moderne parmi les Égyptiens. En reprenant le ton et le style du conteur épique (33–46), il présente d'une façon détaillée la bataille qui se finit par un acte de cannibalisme. La narration est un mélange d'allusions et de parodies littéraires (préparation à la bataille : cf. Stat. *Theb*. I 408 s. ; le commencement : cf. Ov. *Met*. XII 220 s. ; la bataille : cf. Verg. *Aen*. XII 896–902, Hom. *Il*. VII 264–270, V 302–308 ; acte de cannibalisme et fureur : cf. Sil. VI 41 s., Stat. *Theb*. VIII 751–766). La bataille montre que l'humanité a perdu sa conscience. Du point de vue de la construction du texte le passage sert d'exemple de dégradation des peuples sur laquelle Juvénal commente explicitement dans la dernière partie du poème qui suit la scène de la bataille. L'épique, outre qu'il sert d'exemple de raisonnement du satiriste, a des fonctions génologiques. D'abord, en prenant le rôle

[14] Notons *Sat*. 3, 22: Rome = *nullus locus*, alors une utopie, mais avant More. Comparé au terme inventé par More, Rome comme *nullus locus* dans la *Sat*. 3 apparaît comme une ironie de l'histoire.

d'Ulysse, le narrateur réalise le motif du satiriste en tant que héros épique. De plus, une comparaison de toutes les scènes de cannibalisme dans la littérature antique (chez Juvénal, Tite-Live, Stace et Silius Italicus) donne un résultat intéressant : contrairement à ce qui se passe dans les scènes de ce genre chez tous ces auteurs, Juvénal n'introduit pas de spectateurs et ne dépeint pas leur réaction face au cannibalisme. Son rôle est repris par le narrateur satirique qui observe la bataille et exprime son opinion. Ainsi, le monde présenté, tellement épique s'il s'agit de contenu, est montré dans la perspective du sujet parlant, ce qui est déjà une caractéristique lyrique.

La satire 12 comprend un autre motif narratif provenant de l'épopée : la tempête[15]. Le poème est un mélange de thèmes tirés du *prosphonetikon* écrit pour saluer un voyageur rentrant à la maison (1–16, 101) et de l'épique (17–82). La parodie, la dérision et l'ironie, d'habitude exprimées plus ou moins explicitement dans les satires juvénaliennes, sont presqu'invisibles dans la première partie du poème qui forme le *prosphonetikon* (1–16). En conséquence, le passage était considéré comme « merveilleusement frais »[16], l'expression d'une vraie amitié[17] ou la preuve d'une conversion épicurienne de Juvénal[18]. Certes, on y observe des référents qui suggèrent la parodie de *prosphonetikon* (v. la description de la victime dans les vers 5–12 et la comparaison dans le vers 11) dont la description de la tempête est une continuation – chaque élément de sa description est une parodie de l'épique (p. ex. 28 : les dieux, ici Isis ; 32 s. : le timonier ; 24 s. : la peur ; 70–79 : l'arrivée à destination). Dans la suite de la satire, le narrateur critique les chasseurs d´héritages. On entend deux voix parlant dans la narration : celle de la *persona* et celle de Juvénal-auteur. La *persona* est un poète du temps de Domitien qui écrit des panégyriques exagérés en le considérant noble par rapport aux actes des chasseurs d´héritages. Néanmoins, l'ironie observée dans l'énoncé de la *persona* dévoile le vrai jugement de Juvénal sur l'attitude de la *persona* : la satire n'est pas une apologie de l'amitié, mais une critique des adulateurs.

L'*ekphrasis* et le catalogue, deux techniques narratives associées avec l'épique, sont appliqués assez rarement dans les satires (*ekphrasis* : 2, 93–103 ; 3, 17–20 ; 4, 47–59 ; 5, 38, 114–124, 145–155 ; 6, 120–124 ; 7, 2–5 ; 9, 12–15 ; 11, 106 s. ; 15, 126–128 ; catalogue : 1, 22–80 ; 3, 69–71 ; 4, 75–116 ; 11, 64–76). Ainsi, dans la satire 1 l'auteur introduit le catalogue des canailles et de

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[15] La description de la tempête apparaît déjà dans l'*Odyssée* (V 291–332, XII 403–425) dans la littérature grecque, et chez Névius (fr. 17 Morel) et Ennius (*Ann*. 443–445 Vahlen) dans la littérature latine. Le passage qui devient un modèle pour les représentations successives est celui de Virgile (*Aen*. I 34–156) construit autour des contrastes entre la tempête et le calme, Junon et Vénus, *furor* et *pietas* (Brooks 1995 : 328).

[16] Carcopino 1960 : 126.

[17] Ramage 1978.

[18] Il faut remarquer que Helmbold (1959 : 16) et Courtney (1980 : 456) regardaient ces lignes avec une dose de méfiance.

leurs vices en présentant les personnages qui vont apparaître dans les satires suivantes[19]. La fonction du catalogue présenté est informative, la structure systématisée (les éléments du catalogue sont introduits par les pronoms interrogatifs au conditionnel et au discours indirect), il lui manque des référents intertextuels car Juvénal reprend non le contenu, mais la forme (y compris l'annonce : *Sat*. 1, 21). L'auteur adapte le catalogue aux exigences de la satire : il est plus dynamique (à cause des questions indirectes) et il ne joue pas un rôle de digression, mais de ressort de la narration. Ainsi, il change sa place dans la structure de la satire et d'élément descriptif il devient un élément du récit.

La métrique juvénalienne montre le plus de ressemblances avec la versification de Virgile et d'Horace. Ce qui fait Juvénal unique par rapport aux autres poètes, y-compris à ceux de l'époque flavienne, c'est son usage du vers spondaïque, un schéma métrique avec le spondée dans le cinquième pied qui donne l'impression d'un tempo lent et grave. Le *spondeiazon* apparaît 34 fois dans les satires, ce qui est l'une des plus hautes fréquences parmi les auteurs latins[20]. Dans 12 cas, le vers spondaïque est intentionnellement lié aux scènes épiques alors que dans d'autres occurrences un élément épique ou mythologique est placé en position anaphorique ou cataphorique par rapport au *spondeiazon* avec les caractéristiques du style grave ; ainsi, il fait partie du réseau des références épiques[21].

L'analyse stylistique montre que Juvénal se sert sporadiquement des figures de style épiques telles que les comparaisons homériques (1, 42 s. ; 2, 78–81 ; 4, 59 ; 6, 431 s., 649 s. ; 9, 64 s. ; 10, 231 s., 268–270 ; 11, 200 s. ; 12, 34–36 ; 13, 67–70 ; 15, 65–67), les épithètes (1, 62, 91 ; 3, 69 ; 4, 56, 113 ; 5, 115 ; 10, 182), les noms propres (1, 100 ; 4, 35, 65 ; 6, 326, 655, 657, 660 ; 8, 46, 53, 181, 215, 270 ; 11, 95 ; 15, 66) et les métonymies en tant que personnifications d'un trait particulier (4, 39, 81 ; 12, 32 s., 60, 90 ; 13, 184 s.). Les occurrences de ces figures sont toujours justifiées du point de vue narratif par le fait qu'elle renforcent une idée-clé du poème.

En bref, Juvénal commence la satire première dite programmatique avec une attaque sur le caractère répétitif et irréel de la littérature, y compris de l'épopée de son temps. Il cherche alors un genre nouveau, plus adapté à la réalité contemporaine, et son choix tombe sur la satire. Il reprend des éléments épiques (la structure de la *recusatio* et du catalogue, la représentation du héros épique) pour partir en guerre contre les vices des Romains. Dans la satire 2, il incarne le personnage du héros militant en critiquant agressivement l'hypocrisie morale – les références intertextuelles à l'épopée qui soutiennent cette fonction prennent la forme d'une parodie littéraire et du *spondeiazon*. Dans la satire 3 l'auteur

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[19] Cf. la fonction du catalogue des guerriers grecs dans le livre II de l'*Iliade* et du catalogue de l'armée italienne dans le livre VII de l'*Énéide*.

[20] Juvénal occupe la troisième place, après l'auteur du *Ciris* et Catulle.

[21] Sur les relations du vers spondaïque avec l'épopée, voir Franczyk-Cegła 2013.

retourne à la solution connue déjà de la satire 1 : la structure du poème entier est basé sur le modèle épique. En se servant de techniques intertextuelles variées, qui vont de l'allusion littéraire à la réminiscence épique, il réalise le motif de l'Ἰλίου πέρσις où Rome devient une Troie (ou plus correctement une anti-Troie) moderne. Le personnage qui raconte la fortune de Rome à la manière d'Énée est Umbricius ; ses attributs font de lui un anti-Énée. La satire 4 est dominée par la parodie littéraire de l'œuvre de Stace *De bello Germanico*. La description du conseil de Domitien qui commence par une invocation stylisée à la manière épique englobe la parodie d'une idée de *consilium principis*, des conseillers (*amici principis*) et de la technique narrative du catalogue. L'attaque est dirigée contre Domitien et contre les relations des poètes de la court (dont Stace est la quintessence) avec l'empereur. Les références à l'épique dans la satire 5, bien qu'intéressantes, ne dominent pas dans le poème. L'énoncé du satiriste se concentre autour de la relation patron–client et du festin qui démontre l'inégalité de leurs statuts. La description du festin comprend des éléments épiques hyperboliques (allusion à l'épée d'Énée, périphrase pseudo-épique, comparaison du style homérique avec la fonction comique) qui déprécient les ambitions du patron. L'*indignatio* du satiriste est à son point culminant dans la satire 6 où l'on observe l'occurrence de quelques éléments épiques due à leur caractère proverbial. Le ton de la satire, extrêmement agressif, s'harmonise avec le satiriste militant et l'*indignatio* semble aussi effrénée que le *furor* au champ de bataille. L'indignation du satiriste s'atténue dans la satire 7 dans laquelle il se sert de techniques poétiques plus raffinées : ironie, dérision cachée, discours d'apparente approbation. Le narrateur présente entre autres le monde des poètes épiques et leurs finances. Virgile et Lucain, libres de problèmes financiers, pouvaient se concentrer sur leur travail d'écrivain et créer des chefs d'œuvres par opposition aux poètes tels que Saleius Bassus et Stace qui devaient entrer au service des empereurs en se vendant à la court. La critique n'est pas dirigée contre leur œuvre en général mais plutôt contre leur attitude ; le satiriste semble dire qu'ils pourraient écrire une deuxième *Énéide*, s'ils ne perdaient pas leur temps à tenter de s'attirer les faveurs de l'empereur. Dans la satire 8, le satire retourne à l'attaque directe en se servant des éléments épiques en fonction du *comparans*. Il oppose les crimes contemporains aux crimes littéraires au détriment de ces derniers ; la comparaison du mauvais avec le mauvais met en relief les vices de son temps. L'usage des éléments épiques est de même nature que dans la satire 6 : le satiriste exploite leur valeur proverbial[22]. Les satires 9, 10 et 11 possèdent des éléments épiques éparses. Dans la satire 9, ils soulignent l'ironie du narrateur envers Naevolus, le héros de la satire ; dans la satire 10, ils mettent en relief les

[22] Cf. aussi les fins des satires 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13 – on y observe un élément épique de caractère proverbial qui prend la forme d'un résumé ; la fonction impressive des exemples tirés de l'épopée est alors bien plus importante que celle des exemples pris de la réalité.

désavantages de la longévité et dans la satire 11, ils dévoilent les ambitions prétentieuses du protagoniste Persicus. La parodie génologique réapparaît dans la satire 12 où le satiriste stylise la première partie du poème sur le *prosphonetikon* (1–16) et la deuxième (17–82) sur l'épopée. Cette technique sert apparemment à l'auteur comme de défense du client dans une relation d'*amicitia* : d'après le satiriste, même les poètes-adulateurs sont meilleurs du point de vue moral que les chasseurs d'héritages. Néanmoins, l'ironie et la parodie permettent d'interpréter la satire dans un contexte plus large, comme la critique des adulateurs en général. Dans les satires 13 et 14 les références aux personnages épiques et mythologiques illustrent le raisonnement du narrateur. Le manque de référents intertextuels montre que le satiriste remonte à la tradition et à la conscience commune, et non au répertoire des textes littéraires concrets. La satire 15 est le dernier poème où l'on observe des éléments épiques ; la bataille épique y est un point central qui montre la disparition de l'*humanitas* dans la société. De plus, le satiriste reprend le rôle du narrateur épique. Ainsi, on a affaire à un changement intéressant : dans la satire 1 le satiriste s'identifiait avec un héros épique militant, alors que dans la satire 15 il s'identifie avec un héros épique racontant. Cette évolution est visible aussi au niveau de la structure de l'œuvre de Juvénal. Le héros militant est remplacé par le héros parlant depuis la satire 7 ; la transition n'influence pas l'usage des éléments épiques.

Pour résumer, Juvénal reprend les structures de l'épopée ce qui fait de la satire un négatif de la poésie épique. Ainsi, la satire tout en utilisant les mêmes techniques présente une réalité complètement différente. Le choix de l'épopée n'est pas surprenant : le caractère didactique de la satire exige des points de références faciles à identifier, contrastant avec le ton de la satire et possédant des éléments schématiques. Cet usage d'éléments épiques de la part de Juvénal est-elle devenu un élément distinctif de la satire ? C'est une question à laquelle il est difficile de répondre et qui exigerait peut-être une analyse des mêmes éléments chez les successeurs du satiriste, p. ex. chez les poètes anglais du XVIII$^{e}$ siècle. Leur présence serait une preuve que les efforts de Juvénal pour donner à la satire des traits génologiques en l'opposant à l´épopée ne furent pas vains.

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# C E N S U R A E  L I B R O R U M

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**Alex Gottesman,** ***Politics and the Street in Democratic Athens***, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014, XIII + 247 S., ISBN 978-1-10-704168-4, £ 60.00.

Es gibt eine Art von Lesern wissenschaftlicher Texte, welche die Lektüre jedes neuen Buches vom Ende aus, d.h. mit einer aufmerksamen Durchsicht des Sachregisters beginnen, da dessen Funktion nach Ansicht des britischen Historikers Hugh Trevor-Roper vornehmlich darin bestehe, den Leser zur Lektüre der gesamten Studie zu ermuntern. Das Sachregister der neuen Monographie von Alex Gottesman [= G.] ist zwar subjektiv und folglich beschränkt, verspricht aber trotzdem eine Vielfalt von spannenden Problemen und bestärkt in der Auffassung, dass die vollständige Lektüre dieses Werkes für jeden an der athenischen Demokratie interessierten Leser lohnenswert und durchaus anregend sein kann.

Das Anliegen dieses Buches stellt die Erforschung der außerinstitutionellen öffentlichen Sphäre in der athenischen Demokratie dar, wobei sich der Autor entschieden hat, anstatt von der öffentlichen Meinung lieber von „der Straße" (daher „the Street" im Buchtitel) zu sprechen. Dabei verweist er auf „die Straße" als politische Metapher, die in der arabischsprachigen Welt zur Bezeichnung der allgemeinen Meinung verwendet wird und die insbesondere infolge der Ereignisse des arabischen Frühlings ebenso in den öffentlichen Diskurs der westlichen Welt durchgedrungen ist und sich etabliert hat. Doch die Begründung, warum der Verfasser diesen Ausdruck vorzieht – zum einen habe dieser Begriff sowohl positive wie auch negative Konnotationen, wohingegen das Konzept der „öffentlichen Meinung" entweder positiv oder neutral konnotiert sei, zum anderen beschreibe der Ausdruck „the Street" eine politisierte soziale Sphäre, welche marginal gegenüber den staatlichen Institutionen sei – erscheint zweifelhaft und wenig überzeugend. Davon abgesehen hat das Problem des wechselseitigen Zusammenhangs von der außerinstitutionellen Sphäre und den Institutionen der athenischen Demokratie als auch dasjenige des Einflusses von nicht-institutionellen Handlungen der athenischen Bürger auf ihre politische Rolle längst (zumindest seit der Veröffentlichung Virginia J. Hunters *Policing Athens* im Jahre 1994) eine frischere, vor allem aber ausführlichere Behandlung verdient. Zu Recht beschwert sich G. über eine gewöhnlich ziemlich tendenziöse Darlegung und Betrachtungsweise von der athenischen Demokratie ausschließlich durch das Prisma ihrer Institutionen – der Volksversammlung, des Rats der Fünfhundert oder der Gerichtshöfe. Übrigens griff man nicht nur unter Altertumswissenschaftlern, sondern ebenfalls im breiteren Kreis der Intellektuellen des letzten Jahrhunderts – an dieser Stelle seien nur die Werke Hannah Arendts und diejenigen der von ihren Betrachtungen ausgehenden Gelehrten, darunter Jürgen Habermas, erwähnt – auf die Vorstellung von der griechischen öffentlichen Sphäre zurück, die durch eine idealisierende Lektüre der aristotelischen Schriften verzerrt war. Die Mechanismen des Funktionierens der athenischen Demokratie, wie in letzter Zeit immer mehr Forscher betonen, gehen über den Rahmen des Institutionellen hinaus. Des Weiteren wurde selbst das Problem der Öffentlichkeit von Althistorikern weitgehend mit einer komischen Gleichgültigkeit behandelt und das bahnbrechende Buch *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit* von Habermas (1962) ist in ihren Kreisen erstaunlicherweise kaum rezipiert worden[1]. Der Forschungsansatz G.s schöpft viel aus den Überlegungen Habermas', doch distanziert sich zugleich deutlich davon, indem das gleichzeitige Bestehen mehrerer „Öffentlichkeiten" im klassischen Athen betont wird und nicht eine einzige,

[1] So auch V. Azoulay, *L'Espace public et la cité grecque: d'un malentendu structurel à une clarification conceptuelle*, in: P. Boucheron, N. Offenstadt (Hgg.), *L'espace public au Moyen Âge*, Paris 2011, S. 63–76.

überdies angeblich egalitäre öffentliche Sphäre, die Habermas im Europa des 18. Jahrhunderts zu erkennen suchte. Dabei greift der Verfasser auf das von Danielle Allen entworfene Modell der „Vielfalt öffentlicher Sphären" (*multiplicity of public spheres*) zurück und hebt hervor, dass sich im Falle des demokratischen Athen die öffentlichen Sphären – sowohl institutionelle als auch außerinstitutionelle – auf mehrfache Weisen gekreuzt und überlappt haben. Dies versucht er in sieben Kapiteln seines schmalen Buches zu zeigen.

Die zwei ersten Kapitel stellen den deskriptiven Teil des Buches dar, in dem sich der Verfasser der Beschreibung der sozialen Raumes und der Netzwerke widmet. Einen Gang durch die klassische Agora bietet das erste Kapitel (S. 26–43), wobei sich G. weitgehend auf eine Darstellung der baulichen Umgebung beschränkt und ihre semantischen Besonderheiten bedauerlicherweise außer Acht lässt. Er weist ohnehin darauf hin, dass der institutionelle, rituell gereinigte Teil der Agora nicht, wie von vielen Forschern angenommen wird, von ihrem kommerziellen Teil deutlich abgesondert gewesen sei, sondern dass die Grenze zwischen dem Institutionellen und dem Nicht-Institutionellen auf dem Marktplatz fließend und unscharf geblieben sei. Die Vereine und sozialen Netzwerke als Forum der außerinstitutionellen und dennoch für das öffentliche Leben der Polis und insbesondere für die Formierung der öffentlichen Meinung so bedeutsamen Handlungen der Bürger als auch der Vertreter anderer sozialer Schichten bilden den Gegenstand der Überlegungen des Autors im zweiten Kapitel (S. 44–76). Zahlreiche Veröffentlichungen der letzten Jahre belegen das wachsende Interesse an der Netzwerkforschung innerhalb der Geschichtswissenschaften und brachten viele neue Erkenntnisse in die Erforschung von athenischen sozialen Netzwerken. Sie haben deutlich gezeigt, dass im Verlauf des 4. Jh. v. Chr. immer mehr Bewohner Athens an unterschiedlichen – sowohl bürgerlichen als auch gemischten – Netzwerken engagiert waren und G. bespricht bündig ihre Rolle als Räume der Interaktionen zwischen Bürgern und Nicht-Bürgern (oder wie Kostas Vlassopoulos sie benennt – als „free spaces"[2]), d.h. als einen informellen, politisch marginalen Raum, in dem sich die öffentliche Meinung der Bürgerschaft formieren konnte. Man fragt sich jedoch dabei, warum sich der Autor entschieden hat, gewisse Netzwerktypen zu erwähnen (z.B. *orgeones*, *thiasoi*, die Gruppen der *eranistai*), andere wiederum (Symposionkreise) stillschweigend zu übergehen. Möglicherweise versteht er Vereine als öffentliche (was ich jedoch als problematisch betrachte), die Gruppen der Symposiasten zu Recht als private Netzwerktypen. Diese Unklarheit entsteht jedenfalls aus der Vernachlässigung, den Begriff des „Öffentlichen" präzise zu klären. Anschließend geht der Verfasser auf die – in der bisherigen Forschung weitgehend vernachlässigte – soziale Dimension von Läden und Werkstätten als Orte der Sozialisierung ein, wobei er sie *en masse* behandelt, ohne zu versuchen ihre gesellschaftlichen Funktionen, die semantischen Nuancen der Wahrnehmung jeweiliger Räume oder aber ihrer möglichen diachronen Veränderungen zu erschließen.

Die restlichen fünf Kapitel (vom dritten bis zum siebten) stellen den analytischen Teil des Buches dar, in dem anhand etlicher Fallstudien gezeigt wird, wie man die politischen Angelegenheiten im demokratischen Athen mithilfe außerinstitutioneller Maßnahmen zu beeinflussen suchte. Diese Kapitel in G.s Monographie bieten eine faszinierende Einsicht in die alltägliche Welt der athenischen Gesellschaft, indem sie die – weitaus wichtige – theatralische Dimension des öffentlichen Lebens enthüllen und auf die mögliche politische Ausprägung jener in der Öffentlichkeit inszenierten Handlungen der Bürger und der Nicht-Bürger aufmerksam machen. Zweifelsohne handelt es sich dabei um die besten Partien des Buches, vermutlich deswegen, weil sie auf der unpublizierten Dissertation des Verfassers (*A Branch on the Altar: Supplication and Symbolic Capital in Ancient Greece*, University of Chicago 2006) beruhen und so von ihm längst detailliert untersucht wurden.

Im Fokus des dritten (S. 77–99) und vierten (S. 100–113) Kapitels steht die Hikesie (*hiketeia*). Die Spannung zwischen der Praxis und dem Diskurs über die Hikesie lässt sich deutlich in den klassischen Quellen erkennen, denen zu entnehmen ist, dass das Appellieren um Mitleid bei

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[2] K. Vlassopoulos, *Free Spaces: Identity, Experience and Democracy in Classical Athens*, CQ LVII 2007, S. 33–52.

Zuhörern illegal gewesen sei und dass das Argument höher zu gewichten sei als eine performative und gefühlsbetonte Ansprache sein solle. Und dennoch, wie G. überzeugend zeigt, wird im klassischen Athen der Werbegag (*publicity stunt*) des Bittgesuches als eine nicht seltene und vor allem wirksame Überzeugungsstrategie herangezogen. Der Verfasser weist des Weiteren darauf hin, dass die Athener im 4. Jh. (zu einem nicht näher bestimmbaren Zeitpunkt zwischen 353 und ca. 330 v. Chr.) die *hiketeia* institutionalisiert haben, da diese Handlung zu einem regulären, planmäßigen Punkt auf der Tagesordnung der Volksversammlung geworden war (Aristot. *Ath. pol.* 43, 6). Dabei stellt er die Hypothese auf, dass infolge dieser Handlungen in erster Linie nicht die Flehenden, sondern ihre Befürworter profitiert haben. Durch das Auftreten in der Rolle eines Protektors der *hiketai* – eine Handlung, die ideologisch enorm aufgeladen war – suchten sie ihr symbolisches Kapital zu vermehren und dadurch ihre eigene soziopolitische Stellung innerhalb der athenischen Demokratie zu verbessern.

Im fünften Kapitel (S. 114–154) untersucht der Autor diverse Kunstgriffe und theatralische Verhaltensweisen, die von politischen Führern des 5. Jh. v. Chr. verwendet wurden, in der Absicht, auf diese Art und Weise die öffentliche Meinung zu bestimmten Problemen oder gewissen Personen zu prägen und so informell die Willensbildung zu gewissen Angelegenheiten zu beeinflussen. Beachtenswert ist, dass G. einen diachronen Wandel in der Verwendung von Maßnahmen dieser Art im klassischen Athen bemerkt: während solch theatralischen Gags im 6. und 5. Jh. eine nicht geringfügige Rolle in der athenischen Demokratie zufiel, so sinkt die Verwendung von solchen Handlungsweisen durch die in der Politik engagierten athenischen Bürger nach dem Ende des 5. Jh. Diese Veränderung in der öffentlichen Kommunikation verrät zugleich eine Verschiebung in der politischen Kultur, welche sich im spätklassischen Athen allmählich vollzog und von vielen komplexen Faktoren mitbestimmt wurde. Der Rückgang des politischen Kunstgriffes sei G. zufolge u.a. eine Folge des Aufkommens neuer Kommunikationsformen (z.B. der Pamphlete) gewesen.

Im sechsten Kapitel (S. 155–179) wird die Perspektive von den Freien auf die Sklaven verschoben und argumentiert, dass sich ebenfalls die Nichtfreien in der athenischen Demokratie darauf verlegt haben, die für die informelle öffentliche Sphäre typischen Handlungsweisen zu benutzen, um ihre eigene soziale Stellung zu verbessern. Dabei handelt es sich um die möglichen Fälle der von entflohenen Sklaven im Theseion theatralisch aufgeführten Supplikationen, welche allem Anschein nach darauf abzielten, entweder einen neuen Herren zu gewinnen, oder den alten Herren dazu zu zwingen, jenen Sklaven besser zu behandeln, oder aber unter Mitwirkung von der „Straße" eine neue – freie – Identität zu gewinnen (durch die Inszenierung der *aphairesis eis eleutherian*). Letzteres macht insbesondere deutlich, welch große Bedeutung die öffentliche Meinung in einer vormodernen Gesellschaft spielte, in der die Identität einer Person davon abhing, ob andere sie kannten und ihren Status bestätigen konnten. Anders formuliert: das Gerede über den Sozialstatus einer Person konstituierte deren Status. Zwar waren solche Fälle für die Politik im engeren Sinne gewiss nicht relevant, doch seien sie G. zufolge für „die Straße" von großer Bedeutung gewesen. Diese Ausführungen scheinen zwar plausibel, müssen allerdings wegen der dürftigen Quellenlage mehr oder weniger hypothetisch bleiben.

Das letzte Kapitel (S. 180–209) widmet der Verfasser Platons Magnesia, dessen Bild vielen Forschern zufolge gewissermaßen von athenischen Realitäten inspiriert worden sei. Von dieser Annahme ausgehend unternimmt G. den Versuch, die Rolle zu erschließen, welche Platon der magnesischen öffentlichen Sphäre in seinen *Nomoi* zuschreibt. Die Lektüre dieser Schrift zeigt, dass für die Einhaltung der Gesetze in der imaginierten Polis Platons nicht die Beamten, sondern die Bürger selbst – *hoi boulomenoi* – sorgen. G. beweist nicht nur, dass das Gerücht in Magnesia eine zentrale Rolle für die Regulierung persönlicher Verhaltensweisen spiele, sondern auch dass die außerinstitutionelle öffentliche Sphäre (in der Frauen eine schlüssige Rolle zufiel) für die Aufrechterhaltung der soziopolitischen Ordnung wesentlich gewesen sei. Ein solches Bild, so G., habe seine Wurzeln in der „athenischen Straße" gehabt.

Das Buch wird durch eine Zusammenfassung (S. 210–213), eine Bibliographie (S. 214–240) und ein Sachregister (S. 241–247) abgerundet.

Da im Detail, wie man zu sagen pflegt, der Teufel steckt, so soll im Folgenden auf etliche Einzelheiten hingewiesen werden, welche zwar das von G. skizzierte Gesamtbild und seine Thesen grundsätzlich nicht beeinträchtigen, doch für den Leser verwirrend oder sogar irreführend sein können. Zu solchen gehört der Satz auf Seite 9, welcher das Gerichtswesen Athens betrifft: „in most cases only citizens could serve as jurors", woraufhin eine Anmerkung folgt „the big exception was maritime cases, where non-Athenians could participate without requiring a citizen-intermediary": im Hauptsatz geht es also darum, wer als Richter dienen durfte, wiederum in der darauffolgenden Fußnote darum, wer Klagen aus Handelsgeschäften (*dikai emporikai*) initiieren und am Prozess teilnehmen durfte. Eine solche Darlegung ist nicht nur verwirrend, sondern im Falle des Hauptsatzes irreführend: als Dikasten dienten im klassischen Athen ausschließlich Bürger, ebenfalls im Falle der *dikai emporikai* (unabhängig davon, ob man COHENS Hypothese über das Expertenteam als Richter in solchen Fällen annimmt oder auch nicht)[3]. Des Weiteren ist auch die Feststellung „Athens did grant citizenship to slaves who served militarily, especially in the aftermath of the Peloponnesian War" (S. 22) insofern irreführend, als sie die Einbürgerung von an Kriegen teilnehmenden Sklaven im klassischen Athen als eine gewissermaßen übliche Maßnahme suggeriert. Zwar gab es Fälle der *Befreiung* von Sklaven nach Schlachten, doch die *Einbürgerung* war gewiss ein extremer und einmaliger Schritt – nur die Einbürgerung von Sklaven nach der Schlacht bei den Arginusen ist hinreichend belegt (Marathon ist ein zweiter möglicher, doch höchst umstrittener Fall)[4]. Darüber hinaus erwähnt der Autor bei der Beschreibung der Agora das *prytanikon*, welches Wort man seit dem 3. Jh. v. Chr. zur Bezeichnung der Tholos und ihrer engsten Umgebung verwendet hat. Es ist jedoch sehr fraglich, ob es zur Bezeichnung des ganzen Bereiches – „the Council and Metroon and Tholos" – benutzt wurde, wie G. schreibt (S. 31). Auf Seite 40 nennt er wortwörtlich das *prytanikon* als „Council district" und insbesondere diese Stelle macht deutlich, dass der Verfasser die Bezeichnung *prytanikon* mit der Bezeichnung *ta archeia* verwechselt haben muss[5]. Das nächste Problem betrifft die Säulenhallen. So G.: „it does not appear that the stoas served commercial functions at this time" (d.h. in der klassischen Zeit; S. 36). Sicherer wäre es allerdings zu sagen, dass die Säulenhallen im vorhellenistischen Athen *in erster Linie* keine kommerziellen Funktionen erfüllten. Es ist nämlich nicht völlig auszuschließen, dass es zu dieser Zeit gewisse Stoen gegeben haben könnte, die genau (zumindest teilweise) zu diesem Zweck (d.h. zum Verkauf von Mehl bzw. Getreide) gebraucht wurden, wobei dies in der Tat umstritten ist (vgl. Aristoph. *Eccl*. 684 ff., weiter vielleicht auch Demosth. 34, 37).

Zu Recht schreibt der Verfasser über die Agora als Wohngebiet (S. 39), dabei führt er allerdings als Beleg das Zeugnis von Demosth. 18, 169 zu Unrecht an: Bei aller Unklarheit dieser Quellenstelle fällt es einem sehr schwer, die *skenai* für die Wohnräume zu halten. Mit Behutsamkeit sollte man auch die interessanten Ausführungen zu den „'mixed' associations" lesen, da der Autor seine Argumentation zuweilen auf nachklassischen Quellen stütz und daraus entnommene Sachverhalte auf die klassische Zeit projiziert (insb. S. 53 ff.). Außerdem ist die Darlegung mancher Quellen fehlerhaft: der im bekannten *katadesmos* (*IG* III App. 87) erwähnte Aristandros von Eleusis war nicht – wie G. auf Seite 56 schreibt – ein Metöke, sondern ein athenischer Bürger (der Ausdruck τὸ καπηλεῖον τὸ Ἀρίστανδρος Ἐλευσινίου lässt daran keinen Zweifel).

Gewiss kann den Leser folgende Feststellung verblüffen: „the shops' owners as a rule were all citizens, since only citizens could own real property" (S. 61). Der zweite Teil dieses Satzes

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[3] E.E. COHEN, *Ancient Athenian Maritime Courts*, Princeton 1973, S. 93–95. Vgl. S.C. TODD, *The Shape of Athenian Law*, Oxford 1993, S. 334–337 und jetzt vor allem A. LANNI, *Law and Justice in the Courts of Classical Athens*, Cambridge 2006, S. 149–174 (insbes. S. 152 f.).

[4] Vgl. z.B. P. HUNT, *Slaves, Warfare, and Ideology in the Greek Historians*, Cambridge 1998, S. 92–95 (mit weiterer Literatur).

[5] Die Quellenbelege führt R.E. WYCHERLEY, *Literary and Epigraphical Testimonia*, Princeton 1957 (*The Athenian Agora*, Bd. III), S. 126 an.

bedarf keines Kommentars, der erste hingegen ist eine reine Absurdität, denn jeder an der athenischen Geschichte Interessierte weiß, dass insbesondere Metöken im klassischen Athen als Geschäftsbesitzer tätig waren. Dies ergibt sich aus zwei Möglichkeiten: zum einen durften die Gebäude (deren Besitzer natürlich Bürger waren) an Metöken verpachtet werden, zum anderen durften die Nicht-Bürger allem Anschein nach gegen Bezahlung eines Standgeldes (*xenikon telos*) einfache Buden (*skenai*) auf der Agora besitzen, da solche Baustrukturen nicht als *oikoi*, welche gesetzlich nur den Bürgern (und diejenigen, die das Privileg der *enktesis* erhalten haben) vorbehaltenen waren, betrachtet wurden[6].

Schließlich sei noch konstatiert, dass Leser mit einem gargantuesken Appetit für detaillierte wie systematische Studien der Beschreibung dieses Buches auf dem Umschlag als „the first in-depth study of the classical Athenian public sphere" vermutlich nicht zustimmen werden.

Diese kritischen Bemerkungen verringern jedoch in keiner Weise den Wert dieser spannenden Arbeit, welche in den Quellen unterrepräsentierte Sachverhalte ans Tageslicht bringt und ausgeblendete, unterschätze oder nicht ausreichend erforschte Facetten der athenischen Demokratie überzeugend aufzeigt. Der Verfasser hat die traditionelle Herangehensweise in der Erforschung athenischer Demokratie in Frage gestellt und überzeugend gezeigt, dass die älteren Untersuchungen dazu tendierten, die soziale Dynamik und Prozesse zu einem statischen, vereinfachten Bestand zu reduzieren. Nicht nur die Erforschung der Institutionen, sondern ebenfalls der außerinstitutionellen öffentlichen Sphäre, ermöglicht erst, die Mechanismen des Funktionierens der Demokratie besser zu verstehen.

G.s Buch zeugt deutlich davon, dass das Interesse an der athenischen Demokratie neue und vielversprechende Wege ebnet. Mit der vorliegenden Untersuchung ist ein erster, wohl anregender Schritt in diese Richtung gemacht worden.

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[6] Vgl. z.B. M. Finley, *Studies in Land and Credit in Ancient Athens, 500–200 B.C.: The Horos-Inscriptions*, New Brunswick 1952, S. 69.

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**Agnieszka Kotlińska-Toma, *Hellenistic Tragedy: Texts, Translations and a Critical Survey***, London–New York: Bloomsbury, 2015, XVI + 322 pp., ISBN 978-1-47252-421-8, £ 70.00.

Kotlińska-Toma's [= K.-T.] monograph, based on the author's doctoral dissertation which was first published in Polish in 2006, is the first all-inclusive study of Hellenistic tragedy since F. Schramm's *Tragicorum Graecorum hellenisticae, quae dicitur, aetatis fragmenta* (1929). As such, it is undoubtedly a useful book, if not a particularly groundbreaking, well written or error-free one.

This densely printed tome comprises four chapters, an Appendix, a sizeable bibliography and three indices. Chapter 1 (pp. 1–48) provides general observations on Hellenistic tragedy as a subgenre, tackling such topics as: the preservation and transmission of the fragments; Hellenistic criticism on tragedy (by this the author is referring to the extensive body of scholarly work on various aspects of the genre, which may have influenced playwriting practice); common themes and motifs in Hellenistic tragic plays (historical, mythical, philosophical, moral, etc.); problems concerning metre and language; the question of the chorus' presence in Hellenistic tragedy; and the changed nature of satyr drama in this period. The chapter is mostly addressed to a non-specialist audience, taking pains to explain, for example, the idiosyncrasies of Athenaeus and Stobaeus as excerpters, etc.

Two points of detail:

(a) In pp. 23–28, the author tends to regard tragedies with historical and political themes as a single category and to overemphasise this category's importance in Hellenistic tragedy. She argues that, in the early Hellenistic period, historical themes became a trend in response to wider socio-political changes. This is, in fact, overstated. It is possible that satyr drama did turn to political themes, occupying the space left vacant by comedy (although even that may have just been a passing phase); but to argue that as a rule the "authors of tragedies now focused on political themes" is an exaggeration. The only *bona fide* political tragedy one can speak of in this period is Lycophron's *Cassandreians* (of which only the title survives, but whose topical character is very likely). Moschion's *Men of Pherae* may have had a mythological theme after all (it does not *need* to be a rehash of Euripides' *Alcestis*, as K.-T. is convinced, since that was not the only story associated with the House of Pheres). In general, even with the information we have, there seems to be little in common between *Cassandreians*, the Gyges tragedy (which thematises the history of 6th-century BC Lydia along the tracks of Herodotus), and the *Themistocles* plays by Moschion and Philiscus, whose political significance in the Hellenistic context is far from obvious. Given the current state of the evidence, no particular trend can be identified.

(b) In terms of mythological themes, K.-T. notes the Hellenistic tendency for more recherché topics. This is certainly right, but the Aeolus myth should not be counted among these. Euripides himself wrote quite an infamous play based on this story. Lycophron's *Aeolus* is actually far from "unique" (p. 31).

Chapters 2 and 3 offer a critical survey of Hellenistic tragedy as we have it. Commendably, not every Hellenistic tragedian or every fragment found in *TrGF* I is included in K.-T.'s presentation, who focuses only on the major poets and texts. Chapter 2 (pp. 49–198) examines first the so-called "Pleiad", that is, the canon of the most important tragic playwrights operating under the patronage of or, at any rate, during the reign of Ptolemy II Philadelphus. It continues with other tragedians mentioned either in literature or in the inscriptional record. K.-T.'s arrangement is advantageous compared to *TrGF* I, which employs purely chronological criteria: it allows the reader to better gauge contemporary Hellenistic perceptions of the genre and the relative significance of its practitioners.

It should be noted that the plays examined in this chapter do *not* include Lycophron's *Alexandra*, which the author, arguably against current scholarly opinion, considers to be a *sui generis* literary work with no place in a survey of tragic drama (this matter is briefly discussed in pp. 86–89).

Chapter 3 (pp. 199–242) turns to Hellenistic tragedy with biblical themes, focusing mostly on Ezekiel's *Exagogē,* the most substantial, and yet problematic, fragment of Hellenistic tragedy at our disposal. The chapter also surveys a number of *pseudepigrapha* assumed to be "Jewish tragedies", as well as a reported play about Susanna (a character from the Book of Daniel), probably by Nicolaus of Damascus.

In chapters 2 and 3, the fragments are accompanied by short critical essays (rather than a commentary proper). The essays mostly recapitulate, often in a somewhat redundant fashion, the current state of research. Given the lamentably fragmentary state of the texts and the significant amount of previous scholarly work on which K.-T. builds, the new insights she provides are inevitably few and far between, but they are not entirely lacking.

Here are some observations I found particularly interesting. Although tentatively posited, the possibility that Sosiphanes *TrGF* I 92 F1 (= fr. 1 K.-T.) may refer to Meleager's wife Cleopatra practicing Thessalian love magic to win her husband back from Atalanta is worth taking seriously, although the connection of Cleopatra with Thessaly is not clear (p. 60). Another attractive suggestion is that Python's *Agen* would have served its purpose as a piece of Alexander's royal propaganda much better in the earlier part of 324 BC (pp. 115–123). Finally, I was engrossed by K.-T.'s analysis of the "internal harmony" in the structure of Moschion *TrGF* I F6 (= fr. 4 K.-T.), as well as of the fragment's way of assimilating elements from Hellenistic philosophy and ethnography (pp. 134–139).

Generally speaking, K.-T. is thorough in her critical analyses, although her general tendency towards prolixity (see also below) is rather bothersome. Not simply itemizing but also analysing at length every single conjecture on a particular fragment may be good academic manners, but since, as is the case here, few of these conjectures are based on anything other than guesswork, the reader is not necessarily any the wiser for the practice.

Regarding K.-T.'s comments on the fragments, I have the following specific qualms:

(a) K.-T. changes the numbering and sometimes the order of the fragments in *TrGF* I, providing her own enumeration. This is an understandable editorial choice, as mentioned above. However, problems arise in some instances. One such case is Sosiphanes *TrGF* I 92 F5? (= fr. 2 K.-T.) and *TrGF* I 92 F7 (= fr. 3 K.-T.). First of all, it is not correct that both these fragments are "found in scholia to Theocritus' *Epithalamium for Helen*" (p. 60). As K.-T. herself notes when citing the text a few lines above, the second fragment derives from the scholia to Eur. *Andr.* 32. Secondly, given that both fragments refer to Menelaus' descendants (the first lists the children of Menelaus and Helen, the second Hermione's son with Neoptolemus), grouping them together may give the impression that they come from the same play (or even the same section of a play), a possibility that nobody can either prove or disprove.

(b) In the same fragment of Sosiphanes (*TrGF* I 92 F5? = fr. 2 K.-T.), there is lack of consistency between ancient text and modern commentary. Snell–Kannicht print † Ἴολμος, obelizing the reading of codices UEA. In her text K.-T. accepts Wendel's emendation Ἰόλαος, but in the discussion she defends the paradosis ("it is significant that Sosiphanes names Nicostratus and Iolmos...", p. 60). Notice also that Snell–Kannicht put a question mark after the fragment's number to alert the reader to the possibility that the source may not actually cite a work by Sosiphanes (the scholium on Theocritus 18, 51 is textually suspect). K.-T. should have retained Snell–Kannicht's notation.

(c) The commentary on Lycophron fr. 5 K.-T. is incomplete: if only for the purpose of underlining Lycophron's reuse of topoi established in classical tragedy, the author should have noted the parallel of Euripides' *Alcestis* 669–672, which expresses the same general sentiment about people's reactions to death (cf. also Sophocles fr. 66 Radt).

(d) In p. 232 one reads: "Such scenes [*scil*. of fire supposedly seen on stage] are present, for instance, in Euripides' *Bacchae*, where Kapaneus' funeral pyre burns, in the *Suppliants*, where Pentheus' palace burns...". It is, in fact, the other way around.

(e) Finally, two corrections on points made in the Preface and in Chapter 1 concerning playwrights of the fifth and fourth centuries respectively. First, Cratinus' *Dionysalexandros* did not simply "resemble a comedy" (p. 45); it was actually a comic play. Despite the fact that it featured a chorus of satyrs, it was *not* a satyr drama, as K.-T. believes. Second, regarding Chaeremon, in pp. XV f., n. 6, K.-T. rejects the idea that Aristotle's description of this playwright as ἀναγνωστικός may point to the possibility that he also wrote *Lesedramen*. This may well be correct: Chaeremon had a lively presence on stage. But at least one of his surviving fragments (*TrGF* I 71 F14b, from an unknown play, probably the *Centaur*) included an acrostic, which could only have been appreciated by a reading public. This is after all a period of change and adjustment, albeit obscured by the dearth of evidence: conclusions that are too neat and certainties that are too solid should be avoided.

K.-T.'s translations are generally accurate, though in some cases more caution was required. The sample list that follows is not exhaustive:

(a) Sosiphanes, *TrGF* I 92 F6 (= fr. 7 K.-T.): καὶ οὐ μόνον γε ηὐδοκίμησεν [*scil*. the orator Aristodemus], ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐτιμήθη ὡς εὐσεβῆ τηρήσας τὸν ἥρωα. K.-T. renders this as "and not only did he appreciate this but even honoured him as the reverent hero". The correct translation would be "and he was not only highly esteemed but also honoured for the fact that he took care to present the hero [*scil*. Phoenix] as a reverent man" (*scil*. by changing Homer's τῇ πιθόμην to τῇ οὐ πιθόμην].

(b) Philiscus T2, lines 5 f.: rather than "entwining with noble gifts among the living and dead" (which is more ponderous than incorrect), ἐσθλὰ / δῶρα καὶ ἐν ζωοῖς κἀμφθιμένοισι τίνων would be better rendered as "honouring you with gifts considered noble among both the living and the dead".

(c) Lycophron, fr. 2 K.-T.: ἀλλὰ κυλίκιον / ὑδαρὲς ὁ παῖς περιῆγε τοῦ πεντωβόλου is inaccurately translated as "the boy / passed around a cup of diluted wine". It should rather be: "and the boy passed around a cup of wine of the five-obol variety, mixed with too much water" (the point being not that the wine is diluted, which is not particularly noteworthy, but that the addition of excessive water spoiled an otherwise fine and expensive drink).

(d) p. 65: Translating Diogenes Laertius IX 113, μετεδίδου δὲ τῶν τραγῳδιῶν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ καὶ Ὁμήρῳ, as "he [*scil*. Timon of Phlious] wrote his tragedies together with..." is potentially misleading. The Loeb translates "he used to give the dramatists Alexander and Homer materials for their tragedies" and glosses as follows: "he collaborated with them partly by furnishing them with plots...".

(e) p. 202: καὶ θέατρον ἐν Ἱεροσολύμοις ᾠκοδόμησεν, αὖθίς τ' ἐν τῷ πεδίῳ μέγιστον ἀμφιθέατρον, περίοπτα μὲν ἄμφω τῇ πολυτελείᾳ. The last phrase is wrongly rendered as "visible from all sides and built at a great cost". It should rather be: "both conspicuous/standing out in their lavishness" (or, with the Loeb, "both being spectacularly lavish").

Finally, Chapter 4 (pp. 243–280) turns to "the staging of Hellenistic tragedies". Although the title gives the impression that the chapter will expound on theatrical performance, its content is wider. Before turning to actual issues of staging (namely, the revamped Hellenistic theatre building and the new kind of mask and costume), the chapter summarises the current scholarly consensus on the issues of *chorēgia* and *agōnothesia* as well as on the production of "old" and "new" plays. The chapter closes with a section titled, rather vaguely, "Aspects of Hellenistic tragedy beyond the stage". The section collects information on the variety of Hellenistic festivals that included theatrical performances and on the crucial factor of the *Dionysiakoi Technitai*. Chapter 4, like Chapter 1, which would have been best placed immediately before it, does not particularly enhance our understanding of the matters it deals with. Still the compilation of the relevant material under the light of recent bibliography remains helpful, especially for the non-specialist.

The book concludes with a useful appendix (pp. 281–288) cataloguing the great number of theatres constructed in the Hellenistic period and their individual characteristics (region, dating, orchestra diameter, *cavea* diameter, and audience capacity). The three indices (of Hellenistic tragedians, of historical figures and of plays) are also quite handy.

The synopsis above should suffice to show that K.-T.'s book, despite some significant drawbacks, may well go on to become a work of reference for the study of Hellenistic tragedy, at least for the lay readership. Apart from the errors and shortcomings noted in the previous pages, the book's heavy-handed assertions of originality (a possible relic of its origins as a PhD thesis) provide the unsuspecting reader with a distorted image of the *status quaestionis*. Specifically, the author claims that her book comes to correct the misconception that tragedy in the Hellenistic period was in decline, and that it fills "a rather conspicuous gap" in scholarship (p. XIII). Nevertheless, by no means is this the prevailing opinion today; in fact, since the early 1990s hardly anybody believes anymore "that Greek drama ended as it began, in the fifth century" (p. XI). As for the bibliographical gap, this is in reality smaller than K.-T. makes it out to be. There are indeed not many comprehensive studies of Hellenistic tragedy; there is, however, a wealth of studies on individual authors and fragments. K.-T. makes ample use of these, and the fact alone that her discussions are often little more than a compendium of earlier opinions makes the bibliographical gap appear less wide. There are even some serious omissions in K.-T.'s bibliography, for example Theodoros Stephanopoulos' seminal study of Moschion (Archaiognosia IX 1995/1996, pp. 137–153; X 1997, pp. 51–63), and Paolo Cipolla's exhaustive commentary on the "minor" satyrographers, which also covers Python, Sositheus and Lycophron (Amsterdam 2003). Even Pierluigi Lanfranchi's definitive commentary on Ezekiel's *Exagogē* (2006) is acknowledged only sparsely (mostly in footnotes) and often not at all. It is somewhat disconcerting to see K.-T. emphasize her own originality in placing the *Exagoge* "against the background of other Hellenistic dramas" (p. XIII), when in fact Lanfranchi had already done as much (and more).

Language and style is this book's biggest flaw: unfortunately, the English is sloppy and unidiomatic[1] and the discussions longwinded and often forced. One wonders, for example, whether protracted argumentation on self-evident or ultimately unprovable points is indeed necessary or profitable: see, for instance, K.-T.'s remarks on the Pleiad playwrights being highly educated and familiar with each other's work, or her assertion that "theoretical knowledge of stage performances would have *certainly* [my emphasis] affected the way [they] wrote their tragedies" (p. 15). One also wonders whether a longish digression on Aristotle's *Poetics* has a place in a section on Hellenistic theories of poetry. All in all, better editing, both on the part of the author and of Bloomsbury Academic, would have significantly increased the value of a book that remains, for all its shortcomings, a worthwhile contribution to scholarship.

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[1] A few random examples: p. XIV: "such papers are usually of only a contributory nature with regard to general research"; p. 7: "Hence drama was understood, more popular and thus more influential in society"; p. 83: "a heart-trending description"; p. 86: "the sentence was commented by the entrance of John Tzetzes himself"; p. 86: "date the premiere to have occurred"; p. 132 (and elsewhere): "the choir" instead of "the chorus"; p. 223: "Even if this is an original title, one nevertheless has conceded that scholars were right to have doubts"; p. 227: "...did not attract the attention of any of the excerptators [*sic*]".

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**Włodzimierz Appel (ed.),** ***Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff i jego mała ojczyzna. W osiemdziesiątą rocznicę śmierci wielkiego kujawianina*** **["Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff and his 'Small Homeland'. On the Occasion of the Eightieth Anniversary of the Death of the Great Native of the Kujawy Region"]**, Strzelno: Polskie Towarzystwo Historyczne, Koło w Strzelnie, 2013, 76 pp., ISBN 978-83-932403-3-3.

Every established discipline has its own history – even those for which the past is the main object of research. Therefore it is right if those who are pursuing that kind of research now – reconstructing the course of bygone events or analyzing ancient texts – remember those who were formerly occupied with the same task and paved the way for them. Especially if that remembering is not restricted only to academic discussions or to bibliographical references, but concerns the people themselves: their lives, work and the whole body of their achievements. Sometimes it also happens that the fame of exceptional scholars who are now deceased exceeds the closed milieu of specialists in a given field. Then, their memory is also being maintained by other people or communities to whom they were somehow related, even though their research might not have been.

This small volume, with its reproduction of an old 19th century postcard depicting the residence of the Wilamowitz-Moellendorf family at Markowice on its cover, is the direct outcome of both these sorts of memory. And this hardly comes as a surprise, since the scholar in question is the *princeps philologorum* himself.

2011 was the eightieth anniversary of the death of Ulrich von Wilamowitz, one of the most distinguished classical philologists of all time. It was precisely this occasion that led to the special commemoration of him by his Kujawian countrymen and scholars from Polish universities. That year was officially named by the City Council of Strzelno as the Year of Wilamowitz, which was followed by a series of events organized in his honour. Flowers were ceremonially laid on the previously renovated grave of the philologist, the study room at the local school was named after him, and there were concerts, exhibitions, walking-tours. Finally, a conference also took place, which was aimed at presenting and popularizing the figure and legacy of Wilamowitz to the local community. The papers delivered there, collected, edited and foreworded by Prof. Włodzimierz Appel from the Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń, made up the publication discussed here.

The volume comprises five articles, two of which were written by classical philologists who share the same area of academic interest as Wilamowitz, while three others were prepared by historians interested in the region from which he came. Thanks to this arrangement, the narratives complement each other, creating an engaging, multi-layered picture.

In his contribution Prof. Jerzy Danielewicz from the Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań introduces Ulrich von Wilamowitz as an academic and outlines the importance of his studies to modern scholarship. The article does not provide any new details or unknown information concerning the philologist – the aim of the author was to offer a concise but exhaustive introduction for readers not necessarily familiar with the topic, and he accomplishes that aim in an interesting and accessible way. He begins by placing the scholar in the broad intellectual context of German academia in the second half of the 19th century. Danielewicz emphasizes the innovative character of Wilamowitz's research methods and pays particular attention to his interdisciplinary approach, which was at that time far from typical. Then, he moves to a chronological overview of Wilamowitz's most significant achievements, which plainly prove his academic versatility and greatness. Danielewicz uses numerous quotations from the works of other academics commenting on the importance of Wilamowitz's accomplishments in many fields of classical scholarship. By doing so, he vividly reveals the scale of Wilamowitz's authority and the unfading relevance of his theories and findings, even though they were formulated over a hundred years ago. Danielewicz concludes by listing all the names of the great pupils of the German scholar, who also, in the same way as their supervisor, stamped their mark on classical scholarship, giving the best testimony to his teaching talents.

The paper written by Prof. Włodzimierz APPEL is dedicated to Ulrich VON WILAMOWITZ's links with Poland. However, from the very beginning the author strongly emphasizes that any attempt to "Polonize" the great philologist would be preposterous. For he was a declared Prussian, identifying himself above all with his German homeland and there is no doubt about that. Nevertheless, APPEL points out many other links apart from the national one. Most of all, he writes about WILAMOWITZ's strong attachment to the region where he was born and raised and where he was buried – the Polish region of Kujawy. It was also during one of his temporary stays there that he wrote the majority of his famous *Habilitationsschrift*, signing it "Cujavus". What constitutes, however, the main subject of the author's interest are WILAMOWITZ's contacts with Polish academics and the influence he had on them. For instance, APPEL gives information about his formal admission to the Polish Academy of Learning; he writes about the Polish classicists who were mentioned by WILAMOWITZ in his *Memoirs* (*Erinnerungen*) and speculates on those with whom he might also have stayed in touch during his academic career. Moreover, the author quotes the memories of scholars who used to attend WILAMOWITZ's classes and seminars or who visited him at some point in Germany. Finally, APPEL describes the reaction of the Polish academic milieu to the news of WILAMOWITZ's death: he mentions his obituaries published in journals and the first peregrinations to the grave of the scholar at Wymysłowice.

The paper concerning the fate of the family Wilamowitz-Moellendorff living in Kujawy has been written by Dr Tomasz ŁASZKIEWICZ from the Polish Academy of Sciences. The author begins with the origins of the Wilamowitz-Moellendorff coat of arms, which – as it turns out – also contains a Polish component. Next, he chronologically reconstructs the development of the family line, also discussing the process in which it came into possession of the estate at Markowice and extensive lands in the surrounding area. Furthermore, the author describes the transmission of that property to subsequent generations of the family. Apart from that, ŁASZKIEWICZ pays great attention to the biographical details of many family members. He is interested in their education, political views, socio-cultural initiatives and efficiency in the management of the estate. He also ponders over the issue of their attitude to and relations with Polish workers, neighbours and authorities. The history of the Wilamowitz-Moellendorff family has been traced by the author up to the end of its presence in Kujawy i.e. to the late forties of the last century. It is worth mentioning that ŁASZKIEWICZ's study of the family has not been based exclusively on secondary sources. Quite the opposite, the author has made great use of primary evidence such as church chronicles, the Prussian and Polish state archives or manuscripts stored in local museums, which only increases the scholarly value of the text. Additionally, the article contains the genealogical tree of the Wilamowitz-Moellendorff family taken up to the present times.

Edmund MIKOŁAJCZAK, a local historian specializing in the history of the Kujawy region, is the author of an article dedicated to the family village of the great philologist – Markowice. MIKOŁAJCZAK, who has great knowledge about the local topography and historic monuments, vividly depicts the landscape in which WILAMOWITZ grew up, and the paths he was probably roaming in his youth. The main aim of the author is, nevertheless, to tell the story of the village itself. He traces its development from the 17$^{th}$ century onward, pointing at the events and people who influenced it the most and contributed to its unique atmosphere. MIKOŁAJCZAK pays particular attention to the specific cultural and ethnic context of the region in which people of different nationalities, languages and religion have coexisted side by side. The author also discusses the attitude of the local community to the Wilamowitz family in the past and outlines the general character of Polish–German relations there; relations so dramatically distorted by war.

In a further paper, the head of the PTTK (Polish Tourist and Sightseeing Society) section in Strzelno, Jacek STECH, in his paper gives an interesting account of the process of recovering the memory of Ulrich von WILAMOWITZ in the Kujawy region, for it was almost entirely obliterated after the Second World War. The paper concerns mainly the history of the exchange of letters between Prof. Marian Plezia from Kraków and Stech's predecessor, Antoni Słowiński, the founder and the first president of the PTTK section in Strzelno. It was the acquaintance of these two, started probably around the second half of the 1970's, that constituted the first step in the process of recovering and popularizing Wilamowitz's figure among the local community. Stech's paper provides a record of the very interesting exchange of thoughts, ideas and information between the scholar, equipped only with the *Erinnerungen* and a fondness for the great philologist, and the enthusiastic regionalist, who had access to the evidence *in situ*, as it were. The author reveals that it was Plezia's cooperation with Słowiński that indeed led to the discovery of the Polish lineage of the Wilamowitz coat of arms. It also resulted in the first important publication which shed some light on the connections between the famous German scholar and Poland[1]. Both sides from the very beginning of their correspondence expressed great concern about the state of the Wilamowitz-Moellendorff family cemetery in Wymysłowice. For many reasons its renovation was not accomplished until several years later and, as we are informed by Stech, during these works two urns containing the ashes of Ulrich and his wife Maria were found and carefully reburied in the Kujawian soil.

The publication is enriched by an afterword describing in detail the course of the Wilamowitz Year in Strzelno, with colour photographs depicting these events.

This small but valuable volume has not avoided some minor flaws: occasional typing errors can be found here and there, while some expressions used in the text do disclose that the articles were initially prepared to be delivered as conference papers. This is not, however, of any significance. The important thing is that, despite the abundance of literature concerning Wilamowitz, it was still possible to write something less known about him and present him from another angle. What remains even more important is the fact that the memory of that great German scholar is being maintained in his "small homeland", in Kujawy, and preserved by publications such as this one. It definitely may make one believe that the world of academia does not know any other borders or restrictions, apart from those related to understanding.

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[1] M. Plezia, *Ulryk Wilamowitz-Moellendorff*, Strzelno 1982.

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# *IN MEMORIAM* BEN NADEL (1918–2014)

par

JOSEPH MÉLÈZE-MODRZEJEWSKI

Le décès de Ben Nadel (Benjamin Irving Nadel pour l'état civil), le 11 décembre 2014 dans sa 96e année, a plongé dans un deuil cruel ses deux enfants, ses amis et la communauté des antiquistes dont il faisait partie. Un savant éminent, un homme courageux, un collègue fidèle nous a quittés. Helléniste de renom, grand connaisseur de la culture yiddish, inlassable militant du mouvement populaire juif (le Bund), Ben Nadel laissera à ceux qui l'ont connu et qui connaissent son œuvre le souvenir d'un homme qui à un remarquable savoir alliait la force d'un caractère droit, hostile aux concessions et compromis.

Il a connu un destin tourmenté, comme beaucoup d'intellectuels d'Europe de l'Est contraints de fuir la violence des totalitarismes qui ont enténébré le XXe siècle. Né à Petrograd – qui allait devenir Leningrad et redevenir Saint-Pétersbourg – dans une famille originaire de Wilno (lituanien Vilnius), il revient comme enfant avec ses parents dans leur ville natale et y fait ses études jusqu'à une maîtrise en philologie à l'Université Stefan Batory. Il assiste aux cours debout, refusant de s'assoir au milieu du petit ghetto universitaire réservé aux étudiants juifs. Après Wilno, il poursuit ses études à l'université de Minsk. A Leningrad, en 1941, il rencontre l'historien Solomon Yakovlevich Lurie qui devient son maître et dont il épouse la nièce ; puis il complète les études à l'Institut d'histoire de l'Académie des sciences, où il soutient, en 1947, sa thèse de doctorat en histoire ancienne sur les actes d'affranchissement du Bosphore cimmérien, un sujet auquel il consacra une grande partie de son œuvre. Il doit attendre trois ans pour qu'on lui délivre son diplôme – une sanction du soutien qu'il apporta à son maître Lurie accusé, comme lui-même, d'être un « cosmopolite sans racines » selon le terme stigmatisant les intellectuels juifs lors de la campagne antisémite des années 1949–1953.

Professeur de latin à l'Université pédagogique Herzen de Leningrad, il quitte l'Union Soviétique en 1957 et retourne avec sa famille en Pologne où vient de s’ouvrir une période de « dégel » sous le gouvernement de Władysław Gomułka. Il enseigne aux universités de Gdańsk, de Toruń et de Łódź. Son enseignement est apprécié et récompensé par la croix du mérite que le gouvernement polonais lui décerne en 1965. Mais les tracasseries recommencent avec la vague d’antisémitisme en 1968 qui pousse les rares survivants de la Shoah à quitter la Pologne, terre de leurs ancêtres. L’université de Łódź annule sa titularisation. Ben Nadel décide de partir et vient en France. Il enseigne à l’Université de Paris 8-Vincennes. Pierre Lévêque voulait lui confier un poste de professeur invité à Besançon, mais Nadel a choisi l’Amérique. Arrivé aux États-Unis en 1969, il enseigne comme *visiting professor* à l’université de Chicago, à l’université de Northern Illinois et au Franconia College, New Hampshire.

De l’enseignement universitaire, Ben Nadel passe aux Archives du Bund qui, ayant miraculeusement survécu à la barbarie nazie en Europe, ont été transférées en 1951 aux États-Unis. Ces Archives, aujourd’hui dans la gestion de l’YIVO (Institute for Jewish Research, créé à Wilno en 1925 et transporté à New York City en 1940), contiennent un inestimable trésor de documents concernant non seulement l’histoire du Bund, mais aussi celle des mouvements révolutionnaires, de la culture yiddish et de la Shoah. Nadel dirigera les Archives jusqu’en 1999, puis sera le Secrétaire Général du Bund jusqu’à sa retraite en 2004.

Ben Nadel laisse une œuvre riche de deux centaines de livres et articles couvrant un double espace : le Yiddishland et le monde grec. Pour le premier, il faut rappeler ses deux livres publiés en yiddish à Varsovie en 1960 et 1961, sur les Juifs dans l’Europe de l’Est jusqu’en 1240 et sur les plus anciens établissements juifs dans l’Europe de l’Est. Ses nombreux articles dans ce domaine se terminent par une série de dix-sept notices sur Flavius Josèphe publiés dans la revue *Forverts* en 2003 et 2004.

Dans l’espace grec, le corpus épigraphique d’actes d’affranchissement du Bosphore cimmérien lui doit des analyses et des commentaires de premier rang. Il s’agit d’inscriptions en provenance de ce royaume grec établi sur les rives du Bosphore, aujourd’hui le détroit de Kertch qui relie la mer Noire (le Pont-Euxin des anciens) à la mer d’Azov (ancien lac Méotide), enregistrant les affranchissements d’esclaves accomplis par leurs maîtres, pour la plupart Juifs hellénisés ou Grecs judaïsants (*CIRB* = V.V. Struve *et al*., *Corpus inscriptionum Regni Bosporani*, Moscou–Leningrad 1936). Depuis sa thèse de doctorat, Ben Nadel n’a cessé de scruter ces textes et de participer aux débats qu’ils suscitaient parmi les épigraphistes, les historiens du judaïsme et les historiens du droit grec. En septembre 1971, lorsque la Société d’histoire du droit grec et hellénistique, fondée par Hans-Julius Wolff en collaboration avec Arnaldo Biscardi et le soussigné, tenait ses premières assises au château de Rheda en Westphalie (Symposion 1971), il y a pris une part active avec un exposé sur les affranchissements bosphoriens et les origines de la *manumissio in ecclesia*. Il est revenu au septième Symposion, tenu à Sienne et Pise en juin 1988 (Symposion 1988), et nous a parlé d’affranchis juifs dans l’Empire romain. Parmi ses nombreuses contributions consacrées à ce sujet, « Eos » a accueilli deux substantielles publications, *Reges amici północnego nadczarnomorza i ich stosunki prawno-polityczne z Rzymem w ostatnim wieku republiki i pierwszych dwóch stuleciach cesarstwa* [« Les *reges amici* du littoral septentrional de la mer Noire et leurs relations juridico-politiques avec Rome au dernier siècle de la République et aux deux premiers siècles de l’Empire »] (Eos LI 1961, fasc. 1, pp. 119–134) et *Πόλις i ἀρχή w dziejach ustrojowych państwa bosporańskiego na Krymie (V–IV w. p.n.e.)* [« Πόλις et ἀρχή dans l’histoire du régime de l’État bosphorien en Crimée (V^e^ et IV^e^ siècles avant notre ère) »] (Eos LII 1962, fasc. 1, pp. 131–145). On peut mentionner aussi ses prises de position critiques dans la « Revue historique de droit » sous la responsabilité du soussigné en réaction à deux ouvrages exploitant les inscriptions bosphoriennes, le livre de V.F. Gaidukevič, *Das bosporanische Reich*, Berlin 1971 (RHD LIII 1975, pp. 258–267) et la thèse de doctorat d’E. Leigh Gibson avec une nouvelle édition des affranchissements bosphoriens, Tübingen 2000 (RHD LXXX 2002, pp. 451–463).

Avec tous ceux qui ont aimé Ben Nadel et apprécié son œuvre, les philologues et antiquistes polonais pleurent leur collègue disparu.

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