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THE SPARTAN FAMILY¹

by

RYSZARD KULESZA

ABSTRACT: According to many scholars in Sparta the family was marginalized, “minimized as a unit of either affection or authority, and replaced by overlapping male groups”, and “model Spartans” loved their State, not their families. The evidence does not support these opinions. They originate from the general vision of relationships in (fabulous) Sparta, not from the analysis of source material. In fact family ties played an absolutely vital role in (historical) Sparta. This is confirmed by adoptions, property-related calculations prior to marriages, diligence in furthering the careers of family members, marital manoeuvres such as “wife-sharing”, which protected the interests of the family, and even by solutions in the treatment of the *tresantes*. The author believes that a “model Spartan” did not suffer from a conflict of loyalties; he loved the Family as much as the State.

“It is well known that the family was not considered as important in Sparta as in the other Greek states, a fact which is usually explained by the special education given to young people and the military way of life of the Spartan men”². The majority of scholars, Pavel OLIVA among them, is convinced that the family was of little consequence in Sparta, even if their grounds for this theory are different than OLIVA’S³. Anton POWELL even refers to the sphere of emotions: “It seems that model Spartans did not love their families; they loved the State”⁴.

¹ This essay was written as part of the realisation of a grant from the Polish National Science Centre (NCN), entitled “The Spartan family in the Classical period” (NN 108 052038).

² OLIVA 1971: 28.

³ FINLEY 1981: 28; POWELL 1988; BLUNDELL 1995: 150; CANTARELLA 2011: 339–341. Incidentally, it is interesting that the topic of family is virtually absent from texts on Spartan women, e.g. THOMMEN 1999; PIPER 1979; REDFIELD 1978 (although here the last two pages contain interesting observations regarding the family). It is significant (just *exempli gratia*), that in ROUSSEL 1960, in the chapter *Le Spartiate – l’éducation et la famille* (pp. 45–52), the family is not mentioned at all. In the monumental work by HODKINSON (2000) even the index does not contain the entry “family”.

⁴ POWELL 1988: 228.

Was it indeed so? The question is whether the subordinate role of the Spartan family is no more than a scholarly construct, or whether in Lacedaemon the family – which in the majority of other cultures and civilisations was, after all, of no small importance⁵ – was truly marginalized and in its most crucial function practically replaced by the State.

The answer to this question begins with the recollection that, as Ernst BALTRUSCH rightly noted, not much is known about the Spartan family:

Vom Privatleben einer spartiatischen Familie ist nahezu nichts bekannt. Das verwundert nicht, denn zum Mythos Sparta gehörte ja auch, daß niemand “privat”, sondern jeder nur für den Staat lebte. Ein “normales” Familienleben gab es also praktisch nicht, denn abgesehen von der ständigen Abwesenheit der Ehemänner wurde auch die Erziehung weitgehend staatlich durchgeführt⁶.

Even so, let it be emphasised that, firstly, “almost nothing” does not mean “nothing at all”, and secondly, that whatever family life in Sparta looked like (and it must have looked like something), the dearth of materials pertaining to it is puzzling. Why are the sources so reticent on the subject of the Spartan family? Apart from the standard view that it was unimportant, another possibility must be considered, even if only as a working hypothesis: that it was just “normal”, that is similar to families known to other Greeks. Xenophon programmatically emphasises the dissimilarity between the Spartans and other Greeks and writes about various real or imagined differences; yet the fact that he is entirely silent on the topics of contracting a marriage in Sparta and family life deserves consideration. I do not think this silence was dictated by a wish to conceal those revelations which a few centuries later would be revealed by Plutarch. Xenophon quite frequently felt it incumbent on him to justify the Spartans to the rest of the Hellenes or to respond to charges against Sparta, Lycurgus or Agesilaus, not deeming it necessary to inform his reader that such charges had actually been formulated.

Therefore, what Xenophon does mention is significant. He writes about the special treatment of future mothers, to whom (quite like elsewhere in Greece, actually) the most important issue was *teknopoiia* (*Const. Lac.* 1, 3 f.). Further on, he continues (1, 5):

When he saw that the others [other Hellenes] used to spend an excessive amount of time with their wives just after they were married, he [Lycurgus] adopted a quite different custom; he laid down that a man should be ashamed to be seen entering or leaving [*scil.* his wife’s room]. Inevitably, then, they long for each other more intensely, when their contact is limited

⁵ On family in ancient Greece, e.g. LACEY 1968; POMEROY 1975 and 1997. Generally on family in Antiquity, e.g. HAWLEY, LEVICK 2004; RAWSON 2011. See also in Polish: JUNDZILL 2001; and the edited volumes: PALUBICKI, ILUK 1995; JUNDZILL 1993 and 1995.

⁶ BALTRUSCH 1998: 64.

in this way; and if a child is thus begotten it is stronger than if they were surfeited with each other⁷.

This provides an interpretation, correct or not, of the emphasis on discretion in the intimate relations between a newly married couple. Yet the point of departure of this interpretation is not at all obvious. Ostentation in marital relations was frowned upon outside Sparta as well.

As has already been mentioned, Xenophon does not enlighten us as to the manner of contracting a marriage. In his view, Spartan customs are distinct only with respect to people's age when they marry (*Const. Lac.* 1, 6):

In addition to these measures he [Lycurgus] abolished the practice allowing men and women to marry when they wanted, and decreed that the wedding should take place when they were in their prime (ἐν ἀκμαῖς τῶν σωμάτων), because he thought this too would help to produce good progeny (*eugonia*).

After this very laconic account of issues associated with *teknopoiia* (1, 10), the family is not mentioned at all, and Xenophon proceeds to a more detailed discussion of the prospect of *tekna* (2, 1 ff.).

Not so Plutarch; he has much more to say about the treatment of future mothers. He does not mention the issues of spinning wool, drinking wine or a special diet – this, albeit for varying reasons, is not relevant to the period of interest of the author, and incidentally demonstrates that with the passage of time this Spartan tradition was undergoing a selection process; yet the general remarks on physical exercise are transformed into concrete types of sports (*Lyc.* 14, 3), and in the public space young women are entrusted with new tasks associated with instilling proper values in young men (14, 4–15, 1). Having concluded the report about old bachelors (15, 2 f.), Plutarch imparts a piece of information which was destined for a great career: “They [the Spartans] used to marry by seizure – not little girls or ones unripe for marriage, but in their prime and mature” (15, 3, transl. by D.M. MACDOWELL). Afterwards comes a description of the “seizure” (*harpagē*) of a bride and the associated authentic Spartan customs, which in the 20th century were to grow a crust of fantastic scholarly interpretations. The effect is the hitherto obligatory, orthodox view of the Spartan wedding, once described by FINLEY as “the singularly joyless marriage ceremony”⁸ and currently by HODKINSON as “a mute affair”⁹. All that is left from Xenophon's account is the remark on the physical maturity of the “abducted” brides, and also the description (an “enhanced” one) of illicit sex between spouses (15, 8) rounded off with

⁷ All translations from Xenophon's *Spartan Constitution* in this paper are by M. LIPKA (2002).

⁸ FINLEY 1981: 28.

⁹ HODKINSON 2000: 23.

an astonishing communication regarding the period of their brief encounters: “They went on like this for a considerable time, so that some men even had children before they saw their own wives in daylight” (15, 9). Not a word on family, home, father and mother, husband and wife. Yet further on there are remarks on “surrogate fathers” and “surrogate mothers”, on the absence of adultery in Sparta, on the “inspection of newborns”, the upbringing of boys etc.

Considering the contents of reports by our chief informants, Xenophon and Plutarch, it is not surprising that, as a result, we are unable to say much about the relationships within a Spartan family. Existing sources focus on this exclusively from the point of view of the requirements of the state and its interference in the emotional life and intimate affairs of its citizens. The relevant information is, regrettably, mainly indirect, incoherent and incidental, susceptible to various interpretations largely dependent on the *a priori* assumptions accepted, consciously or not, by scholars. Nonetheless, it seems that the image of a Spartan husband and a Spartan wife meeting only occasionally in connection with the *teknopoiia* is not entirely true.

FAMILY RELATIONS

“The love between parents and offspring is considered to be one of the most important characteristics of upper animals”, writes Julie WILEMAN¹⁰ supported by many scholars. Yet according to not a few of them, Sparta was different. In this respect, the Spartans would have been a race of men different from the rest of humanity and unique, since, as has been mentioned at the outset, “model Spartans” loved their State, not their families. Apparently all family links were intentionally reduced in Sparta.

Let us begin with the threshold conditions related to the limit of time which a Spartiate spent in the family space. Until he left home at the age of seven, a boy spent most of his time with his mother. Before a Spartiate reached the age of thirty and went to live with his wife, his son (or sons) may have already left home¹¹. This inevitably resulted in a weak relationship with parents and especially with the father¹². After all, men spent the most of their ordinary day outside the house. Andrew G. SCOTT, who is among the most recent of many supporters of the theory regarding “the lack of cohabitation with the family” in Sparta, states (drawing, incidentally, too far-reaching conclusions from this) that “Spartiates did not live with their wives and children at the beginning of the marriage and that all Spartiates acted as fathers to all the children of fellow Spartiates”¹³. Not

¹⁰ WILEMAN 2005: 13.

¹¹ KUNSTLER 1987: 33.

¹² BLUNDELL 1995: 151.

¹³ SCOTT 2011: 423.

only SCOTT, but the majority of us almost unwittingly assume that in the life of a Spartiate there was only space for the gym, food, war and the preparations for it. Plutarch's image of fun-loving Spartans: "Choral dances and feasts and festivals and hunting and bodily exercise and social converse occupied their whole time, when they were not on a military expedition" (*Lyc.* 24, 4)¹⁴ is at odds with their celebrated severity and discipline, but there is no space for contact with the family there anyway.

Yet where does this certainly come from that a boy of seven (or even twelve) left his family home for good, and that men of twenty to thirty years of age lived permanently in the barracks? This is one of the fundamental elements of the image of Sparta, but the issue is not as clear as it might seem. Strangely, the word for those Spartan "barracks" is not known, nor are there any material traces of them. We are here, as in many other issues, hostages to Plutarch, who writes that parents were prohibited from bringing up or feeding their sons as they pleased, but "as soon as they were seven years old (ἑπταετείς γενομένουσ), Lycurgus ordered them all to be taken by the state and enrolled in companies, where they were put under the same discipline and nurture, and so became accustomed to share one another's sports and studies" (*Lyc.* 16, 4). When they were a little older, they were separated into bands and life was made hard for them (16, 6 f.):

When they were twelve years old, they no longer had tunics to wear, received one cloak a year, had hard, dry flesh, and knew little of baths and ointments; only on certain days of the year, and few at that, did they indulge in such amenities. They slept together, in troops and companies, on pallet-beds which they collected for themselves, breaking off with their hands (no knives allowed) the tops of the rushes which grew along the river Eurotas. In the winter-time, they added to the stuff of these pallets the so-called "lycophon", or thistle-down, which was thought to have warmth in it.

Evidence of the Spartiates' communal life in the barracks from their twentieth to the thirtieth year of life is even more meagre: "Then, after spending a short time with his ["abducted"] bride, he went away composedly to his usual quarters, there to sleep with the other young men" (*Lyc.* 15, 4). In any case, Plutarch (and no-one else but him!) says that boys/young men sleep together, but not that they are entirely separated from their family homes.

The location of that family home is another puzzle, as is where the furtively visited wife was living. Assuming for a moment that the theory of "wife abduction" is actually true, it seems bizarre – although this is exactly what Sarah B. POMEROY assumes – that the young man would abduct the girl to *her* home, and that she was transferred to *his* home only after having given birth to a child¹⁵.

¹⁴ All translations from Plutarch's *Lycurgus* in this section are by B. PERRIN.

¹⁵ POMEROY 2002: 56. See also PERENTIDIS 1997.

I consider it much more probable that the young bride (even, or perhaps especially, an “abducted” one) did change her place of abode. Alas, the Spartan family landscape remains an impenetrable mystery to us. Grandpas and grandmas are practically absent from the sources, although even in the strange land on the banks of the Eurotas they must have been in evidence¹⁶. The parents of newlyweds are not mentioned in the sources either, although it is known from elsewhere that in concrete cases (the betrothal, the bestowal of the *patrouchos*’s hand, the selection of future partners for both a son and a daughter) the decision rested with the father.

With regard to this issue, which is currently being widely discussed, it is noteworthy that the late age of marriage¹⁷ levelled the differences in favour of women¹⁸. Apart from the already-mentioned absence of husbands in day-to-day life, scholars have frequently pointed out that the wars must have been the reason for the chronic absence of men from Sparta. On these grounds, Aristotle had already constructed a theory regarding the origins of the Spartan women’s *anesis*: “The license of the Lacedaemonian women existed from the earliest times, and was only what might be expected. For, during the wars of the Lacedaemonians, first against the Argives, and afterwards against the Arcadians and Messenians, the men were long away from home” (Arist. *Pol.* 1269 b 40–1270 a 4, transl. by J. BARNES). One might wonder whether war truly had this influence in the 6th to 4th century. Additionally, it must be remembered that the periods of separation did not involve all couples at the same time. Yet scholars have built quite an edifice on the daily and periodical absence of husbands¹⁹, especially when it comes to the woman’s position in the family: they are supposed to have taken over control over the house²⁰ and even the *kleros*²¹. In the environment of Greece, the first can be assumed as obvious. The space of Aristotle’s “gynaecocracy” (Arist. *Pol.* 1269 b 12–1270 a 6) is, in my opinion, the house.

Setting up a family, a Spartiate, like any other Greek, was hoping for offspring. In contrast to the majority of other Greek states however, in Sparta the pertinent issues were partially regulated by law: while *agamia*, *opsigamia* and *kakogamia* were penalised, having a large progeny was rewarded²². According to Aristotle, the law-giver, wishing Spartans to multiply, encouraged citizens

¹⁶ KULESZA 2013.

¹⁷ Women married at the age of perhaps eighteen to twenty; CARTLEDGE 1981: 94 f.; HODKINSON 1989: 90; DETTENHOFER 1993: 64; THOMMEN 1999: 141. Men married at “around 30”; LIPKA 2002: 108.

¹⁸ HODKINSON 2000: 438.

¹⁹ A recent example is: “Plural marriage could allow for continual child production during these times of absence”, SCOTT 2011: 423.

²⁰ See THOMMEN 1999: 144.

²¹ E.g. DETTENHOFER 1993: 61–75.

²² To my knowledge, the best article on this topic is TURASIEWICZ 1964.

to beget children by exempting a father of three sons from military service (*aphrouros*) and a father of four sons from all duties (*ateles panton*), both military and other (Arist. *Pol.* 1270 b 1–4). Aelian mentions the same rule, associating the latter privilege (probably erroneously) with having five sons (Ael. *Var. Hist.* VI 6). This “pro-family policy” can easily be interpreted as a reaction to the increasing problem of *oliganthropia*. Yet, in connection with other data, it is equally easy to present it as a confirmation of the thesis regarding the “brotherhood of Spartan men”. I certainly do see evidence (although it is definitely not “overarching”) of “societal ideology” in Sparta, but speaking, as A.G. SCOTT does, of “plural marriage” or, worse still, of “collective parenting”²³ is a symptom of intellectual flippancy.

Lycurgus is reported to have given “every father authority over other men’s children as well as over his own” (Xen. *Const. Lac.* 6, 1). Certainly the basis for this view is the knowledge that every adult was entitled to give orders to and punish children and youths. To illustrate this “sharing of children”, Xenophon does not refer to any decreed or concrete data, but quotes an unverified tale about Spartan customs: “And if a boy is ever beaten by someone else and tells his father, it is considered disgraceful for the father not to inflict another beating on his son. To this extent they trust each other not to order their children to do anything that would incur disgrace” (*Const. Lac.* 6, 2).

There is no reason to question the reality of this custom, although Xenophon’s personal comment in the second sentence may miss the point. In Sparta, the intention was to bring up boys so as to teach them to deal with difficult situations on their own – thus, to solve their own problems. It is not implausible, therefore, that a “true Spartiate” would punish a boy who complained to his father, just like a boy caught stealing food: in both cases for failing to accomplish the aim. However, children in Sparta were definitely not considered collective property. For instance, the figure of the “surrogate mother” (see further on) is worth recalling; her offspring had a different status with respect to material goods. Xenophon clearly distinguishes “other men’s children” from the man’s own ones. Children were treated as a collective asset, but the autonomy of “ownership” was respected²⁴.

Sarah B. POMEROY observes that “the father probably enjoyed a close relationship with his daughter, in fact closer than he had with his son [...]. Children born to an older father, of course, would have had a better opportunity to develop a relationship with him”²⁵. She illustrates the existence of such close relationships between fathers and daughters with three examples. Firstly, Gorgo, the only child of Cleomenes I. Based on less than scanty source material, POMEROY constructs very far-reaching conclusions pertaining to Gorgo: “She will have acquired her skill

²³ SCOTT 2011: 419, 424.

²⁴ KULESZA 2003: 127.

²⁵ POMEROY 2002: 56.

not necessarily through formal tuition, but while in her indulgent father's presence, listening quietly or more likely (judging from what we are told about her assertiveness and self-confidence) piping up persistently to ask questions about the texts that poets, diplomats, bureaucrats, and other literate people consulted"²⁶. All this may be accurate, although it must be noted that the assumption is based on Herodotus's report of how, in the presence of the little Gorgo, Cleomenes was being tempted by Aristagoras, who was seeking help for the Ionian rebellion. Despite Aristagoras's demand, Cleomenes failed to turn his daughter out of the room, and thus she became a participant in the momentous conversation:

She was his only child, and was about eight or nine years of age. Cleomenes bade him say what he would and not let the child's presence hinder him. Then Aristagoras began to promise Cleomenes from ten talents upwards, if he would grant his request. Cleomenes refusing, Aristagoras offered him ever more and yet more, till when he promised fifty talents the child cried out, "Father, the stranger will corrupt you, unless you leave him and go away". Cleomenes was pleased with the child's counsel and went into another room; and Aristagoras departed clean out of Sparta.

(Hdt. V 51, transl. by A.D. GODLEY)

However, it is hard to see the argument that crowns POMEROY's reasoning as scientific: "Even if the veracity of this anecdote can not be tested, the general idea that a father encouraged his clever young daughter to give her opinion on serious matters rings true enough for readers who have enjoyed such dialogues"²⁷.

The second example is more obvious. It pertains to Agesilaus II, father of Archidamus (III) and daughters Eupolia and Prolyta/Proauga (Plut. *Ages.* 19, 10)²⁸: "He [Agesilaus] was unusually fond of children, and it is said that at home he used to mount astride a stick as a hobby-horse and play with his children when they were little. But when he was seen thus by one of his friends, he begged the man to tell nobody before he had children of his own" (Plut. *Apophth. Lac.* 2, 70 = *Mor.* 213 E, transl. by F.C. BABBITT). The veracity of this tale may be questioned, but on the other hand the question arises by whom, and why, it would have been invented, as it is ill-suited to the monumental image of Sparta as much as to Xenophon's super-hero²⁹.

The third example does not pertain to childhood, but to the mutual attitudes of a father and his adult daughter: Leonidas and Chilonis³⁰. When, during the *coup d'état* of Agis IV, her father and her husband, Cleombrotus, landed on opposite

²⁶ POMEROY 2002: 14.

²⁷ POMEROY 2002: 57.

²⁸ See SHIPLEY 1997: 243; CARTLEDGE 1987: 149.

²⁹ *Kannathron* of Agesilaus's daughter was no more beautiful than those belonging to other children (Plut. *Ages.* 19, 5; Xen. *Ages.* 8, 7). See SHIPLEY 1997: 243.

³⁰ On Chilonis, see BRADFORD 1986: 14.

sides of the political barricade, and her father lost his kingship to his son-in-law, Chilonis joined Leonidas when he sought sanctuary at the temple of Athena Chalkioikos (Plut. *Agis* 11, 3 f.). Yet when his luck turned and Leonidas regained control over the situation, and thus Cleombrotus found himself in mortal danger, Chilonis begged his father successfully for mercy upon her husband, with whom she went into exile:

Cleombrotus, on his part, had naught to say for himself, but sat perplexed and speechless; Chilonis, however, the daughter of Leonidas, who before this had felt herself wronged in the wrongs done to her father, and when Cleombrotus was made king had left him and ministered to her father in his misfortunes, sharing his suppliant life while he was in the city, and in his exile continually grieving for him and cherishing bitter thoughts of Cleombrotus – at this time changed back again with the changed fortunes of the men, and was seen sitting as a suppliant with her husband, her arms thrown about him, and a little child clinging to her on either side. All beholders were moved to wonder and tears at the fidelity and devotion of the woman, who, touching her robes and her hair, alike unkempt, said: “This garb, my father, and this appearance, are not due to my pity for Cleombrotus; nay, ever since thy sorrows and thine exile grief has been my steadfast mate and companion. Must I, then, now that thou art king in Sparta and victorious over thine enemies, continue to live in this sad state, or put on the splendid attire of royalty, after seeing the husband of my youth slain at thy hands? That husband, unless he persuades and wins thee over by the tears of his wife and children, will pay a more grievous penalty for his evil designs than thou desirest, for he shall see me, his most beloved one, dead before he is. For with what assurance could I live and face the other women, I, whose prayers awakened no pity in either husband or father? Nay, both as wife and as daughter I was born to share only the misfortune and dishonour of the men nearest and dearest to me. As for my husband, even if he had some plausible excuse for his course, I robbed him of it at that time by taking thy part and testifying to what he had done; but thou makest his crime an easy one to defend by showing men that royal power is a thing so great and so worth fighting for that for its sake it is right to slay a son-in-law and ignore a child”. Uttering such supplications, Chilonis rested her face upon the head of Cleombrotus and turned her eyes, all melted and marred with grief, upon the bystanders. Then Leonidas, after conference with his friends, bade Cleombrotus leave his asylum and go into exile, but begged his daughter to remain, and not to abandon him, since he loved her so much, and had made her a free gift of her husband’s life. He could not persuade her, however, but when her husband rose to go she put one of her children in his arms, took up the other one herself, and went forth in his company after an obeisance to the altar of the god; so that if Cleombrotus had not been wholly corrupted by vain ambition, he would have considered that exile was a greater blessing for him than the kingdom, because it restored to him his wife.

(Plut. *Agis* 17–18, 2, transl. by B. PERRIN)

If this were contrasted with examples of fathers’ close links with their sons (and *vice versa*), then indeed those links would be found the weaker, as maintained by some scholars (see above). In practice, there is only one such example. In 385 BC King Agesipolis was leading an expedition against Mantinea.

Heeding the plea of his father Pausanias, who had been exiled from Sparta, he spared “the Mantinean democratic leaders” (Xen. *Hell.* V 2, 3–6) and, interestingly, did not meet with any censure in Sparta because of this (or at least no such censure was noted in the sources)³¹.

I do not think, however, that such a “duel of examples” is in any way instructive here; *argumenta non numeranda sed ponderanda sunt!* Attempting to evaluate our evidence we shall, I am sure, reach the conclusion that family ties played an absolutely vital role in Sparta. I also fail to find testimonies of particularly close relationships between mothers and sons, which POMEROY suggests on the basis of Plutarch’s *Sayings of Spartan Women*. I think we should here discount the image of the dysfunctional Spartan mother³², which in any case belongs to the image of fabulous Sparta and which the power of imagination transformed into the image of a patriotic and heroic mother; I am even less ready to agree that this image indicates any particular relationship between mothers and sons. Agesistrata and Archidamia, the mother and grandmother of Agis IV, who surrendered their wealth and gave their lives for the love of their son and grandson, seem to me far more real³³. a similar example of motherly love is provided by Cratesiclea, mother of Cleomenes III³⁴. In the background there is the puzzling case of Xenopeitheia, mother of Lysanoridas, and his aunt Chryse (Athen. XIII 609 B), which may perhaps be similar to the above two³⁵.

THE FAMILY AFTER ALL?

If W.K. LACEY is right in saying that “the right to adopt a son is [...] characteristic of a family-based society, a society which thinks in terms of inheritance through the family”³⁶, the fact that in Sparta adoption was performed in front of the kings (Hdt. VI 57, 5) must be considered an expression of the family’s significance. Also the tendency to homogamy³⁷, present in the world of the *homoioi*, attests to both socio-economic variety and the importance of family. Machinations linked with inheritance (e.g. the case of Lampito³⁸), so thoroughly analysed by HODKINSON, also confirm the importance of the family and its interests.

³¹ As rightly noted by Ephraim DAVID (1991: 68): “The reasons were, no doubt, complex, but I assume that at least one of them was connected with the Spartans’ understanding and appreciation of this expression of filial obedience”.

³² KULESZA forthcoming.

³³ On Agesistrata and Archidamia, see BRADFORD 1986: 14–16; HODKINSON 1986: 402 f.

³⁴ On Cratesiclea, see BRADFORD 1986: 17.

³⁵ On Xenopeitheia and Chryse, see BRADFORD 1986: 18.

³⁶ LACEY 1968: 201.

³⁷ HODKINSON 1989: 91 ff.; HODKINSON 2000: 407.

³⁸ HODKINSON 1986: 401.

According to Moses FINLEY, however, in Sparta the family was “minimized as a unit of either affection or authority, and replaced by overlapping male groups”³⁹. On the other hand, in the same text, the same great FINLEY very perceptively observes that “there were families who were able to influence the appointment procedures in favour of their own members at the first opportunity, among the children”⁴⁰, which I think points to the importance of private interests associated precisely with the family.

As demonstrated by HODKINSON, incompetents from good families were entrusted with successive commands and important missions. The fact that interactions with the outside world, foreign missions and military commands were monopolised by a narrow group very clearly points to the formation of an elite⁴¹. HODKINSON showed that in the years 431–371, this group was small (about a hundred men in each decade) in comparison to the number of citizens. Men connected by family ties became fleet commanders and harmosts, some of them more than once (as for 21 men out of 59 cases discussed by HODKINSON, which is 36% of the total)⁴². Alkamenes and Sthenelaos, sons of the ephor Sthenelaidas⁴³, are recorded as harmosts; Klearchos, son of the Spartan commander and envoy Ramphias, was a harmost as well. The sons of Leon, a famous horserace victor of Olimpia and ephor of the year 419/418⁴⁴, are the harmost Pedaritos and Antalkidas, who commanded the fleet, was an emissary to the Persian court, and finally an ephor himself⁴⁵.

The tale of Agesilaus, who was famous for his love of his family⁴⁶, may be considered a *sui generis* “case study”: “By his relatives he was described as ‘devoted to his family’ (*philokedemon*), by his intimates as ‘an unfailing friend’, by those who served him as ‘unforgetful’, by the oppressed as ‘a champion’, by his comrades in danger as ‘a saviour second to the gods’” (Xen. *Ages.* 11, 13, transl. by E.C. MARCHANT). Agesilaus – an arch-Spartan, according to Xenophon – demonstrated very un-Spartan qualities. He played with children. It seems that not only the State (= Greece), but the Family, too, were at the forefront of his life. When as king he inherited the property of Agis, he gave half of it to “his mother’s kinsfolk” (Xen. *Ages.* 4, 5; cf. Plut. *Ages.* 4, 1)⁴⁷. We may, of course,

³⁹ FINLEY 1981: 28.

⁴⁰ FINLEY 1981: 32 f.

⁴¹ HODKINSON 1993.

⁴² HODKINSON 1993: 155.

⁴³ See RICHER 1998: 313–315, 342 f. and *passim*.

⁴⁴ RICHER 1998: 277 f.

⁴⁵ RICHER 1998: 278 f.; HODKINSON 1993: 158.

⁴⁶ On the family of Agesilaus, see CARTLEDGE 1987: 143 ff.

⁴⁷ HODKINSON 1986: 391.

be satisfied with Xenophon's diagnosis that this was because they were in need, but other questions can still be asked – and not only the ones suggested by Xenophon. Sometimes the arch-Spartan Agesilaus behaved in a very un-Spartan – or perhaps just the opposite, a very Spartan – way; for instance, in order to please his wife Cleora, he appointed her brother a nauarch (Xen. *Hell.* III 4, 27; Plut. *Ages.* 10, 9 f.)⁴⁸.

(EXTRA-)MARITAL STRATEGIES

How are these, in turn, related to the importance of the Spartan family? Ignoring the scholars' terminological contortions, which have produced such terms as "husband-doubling" and "man-doubling", "wife-lending" and "wife-sharing", "male-partner duplication", "nonexclusive monogamy" and "plural marriage", situations are at stake when (a) an old husband has a young wife and in order to procreate invites a "surrogate father", or (b) a husband, despite having a wife, invites another woman to beget a child with him as a "surrogate mother"⁴⁹. In both cases, the aim is *teknopoiia*. In both cases, we are dealing with the sphere of private interest, not the interest of the state.

The latter case in particular leaves us with an impression that the interest of one party is totally subordinate to the benefit of the other party. Yet Xenophon (*Const. Lac.* 1, 8 f.) suggests otherwise:

On the other hand he made it legal for someone who did not wish to cohabit with a woman, but desired worthy children, to beget children with a woman when he saw her to be rich in offspring and noble, provided that he had her husband's consent. And he made many such concessions. For the women want to possess two households; while for their children the men want to obtain brothers who are members of the clan and participate in its power, but do not lay claim to the property.

In my opinion, we are dealing here with truly "model Spartans", who served the elite for economic reasons (although not only for these), but in the name of the mandatory and official "societal ideology". It was an elite which shared neither the property nor the children, but offered the inferior members of the community certain advantages related to valuable family ties, prospects of advancement, and in the short term – concrete benefits arising from, for instance, relief in financing one member of the family. This, quite contrary to Xenophon's intention, reveals to us one of the many aspects of Sparta's double life.

⁴⁸ On this case and Agesilaus's possible further motives, see CARTLEDGE 1987: 146 f., 218.

⁴⁹ I present my views on various aspects of the Spartan *situation matrimoniale* in KULESZA 2008.

MARRIAGE FOR LOVE?

To believe the *opinio communis* of today's "Spartanologists", only *mariages de raison*, dictated by an uncompromising economic calculation, occurred in Sparta. The first question to ask is whether there certainly were no *mariages d'amour*? Secondly, overlooking the possible negative answer to the first question, is there really no evidence of, if not love, then at least affection between spouses? To engage in the *reductio ad absurdum*, are we to imagine Spartans as "killing machines" and Spartan women as "sex machines", or Spartans as misers obsessed with augmenting their fortunes and their women as "baby-making devices", regardless of how current fashion dictates that this is viewed as "undermining" or "underlining" their position? After all, we do have some examples of passion, as possibly in the case of Ariston⁵⁰, or jealousy, as with Cleonymus, the husband of Chilonis⁵¹. Anaxandridas's resistance to the idea of sending his first wife away may attest to the affection, maybe even the love he bore her (Hdt. V 39–41)⁵². Can we be truly certain, following Matthias WILLING, that "bestimmte Liebe oder Lustgewinn" rarely constituted a motive for marriage?⁵³ The tendency to rationalisation is an *aberration professionnelle*, so to speak, of historians; it is thus impossible to answer this question responsibly. And yet the fact that King Agis, having returned from Attica, preferred to eat supper with his wife rather than his friends from the *sysstitia*, is puzzling, as is HAMILTON's suspicion, correct or not, that Archidamus must have married Eupolia for love, because she was poor and plain (Plut. *Ages.* 2, 6; *De lib. ed.* 2 = *Mor.* 1 D; Athen. XIII 566 D)⁵⁴. Such testimonies are indeed few, but this is a fact that deserves attention. It cannot be forgotten that since Antiquity Sparta, as a creation of the *imaginaire*, has been losing its non-monumental elements.

⁵⁰ For the case of Ariston, see e.g. LUTHER 2004: 99 f.

⁵¹ DAVID 1991: 102; "a most extreme example of jealousy" – old Cleonymus accompanied Pyrrhus in the invasion of Laconia after his young wife Chilonis betrayed him with Acrotatus, son of Areus (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 26, 27; Paus. III 6, 3).

⁵² HODKINSON 1986: 401: "Although Herodotus indicates that Anaxandridas was devoted to his niece, it is likely that material considerations were also involved. Had he sent her away, her property would have gone with her and would almost certainly have been lost to his descendants. Only when he was permitted to retain her as well, did Anaxandridas agree to take another wife; and even after his second wife had borne him a son, he still ensured that his niece subsequently bore him children (three sons) to inherit her property. All this suggests that she was of some wealth". The economic approach makes HODKINSON see everything in terms of economic interest (Spartans as economists!). He is probably right to demonstrate the power of the Spartan warriors' material motivations. He is probably wrong to push other motivations into the background. See LUTHER 2004: 94.

⁵³ WILLING 1994: 257.

⁵⁴ HAMILTON 1991: 13 f. Cf. CARTLEDGE 1987: 20.

CONCLUSION

The assumption, *de rigueur* in academic circles today, that the family was of little consequence in Sparta originates from the general vision of relationships in Sparta, not from the analysis of source material. On the other hand, in the sources the family is indeed marginalized; this fact, however, results not from its insignificance in Real Sparta, but from the lack of interest of authors who wished to emphasise Sparta's originality, not its "normality". In effect, testimonies that confirm the importance of the Spartan family are largely indirect. At the same time, these testimonies indicate that the family was the main point of reference in everything. This is confirmed by adoptions, property-related calculations prior to marriages, diligence in furthering the careers of family members, marital manoeuvres such as "wife-sharing", which protected the interests of the family, and even by solutions in the treatment of the *tresantes*. "The basic unit of society, at Sparta as elsewhere, was the *oikos*, centering on a married couple and owning land"⁵⁵. I do not think that a "model Spartan" suffered from a conflict of loyalties; he loved the Family as much as the State.

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⁵⁵ REDFIELD 1978: 158.

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LOVE, AGGRESSION, AND MOURNING
IN EURIPIDES' *HERACLES*¹

by

MATEUSZ STRÓŻYŃSKI

ABSTRACT: The paper's main focus is the mourning process in Euripides' *Heracles* (1087–1428) and the approach to it is based on psychoanalytic interpretive methods. Most of the play is characterized by what can be called the splitting of good and bad images of the self and of objects to which the self relates, which means that characters are presented as either all-good or all-bad and in an unrealistic and ahistorical manner. The murder of Heracles' family is the first moment when love and aggression meet, because Heracles' violence is directed at those who are dearest to him. The process of his mourning, described in the *Exodus*, is characterized by an attempt to overcome splitting and to tolerate the coexistence of love and aggression, goodness and evil, in the heroic self. Theseus' presence enables Heracles to accept his destructive side and to move towards a hopeful resolution of this fundamental human conflict, which is one of the main dimensions of the play.

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is an analysis of the last part of Euripides' *Heracles* in terms of the conflict between love and aggression, based on psychoanalytic ideas and interpretive methods. Most scholars tend to agree that Euripides' play falls into two or three parts which seem to be rather loosely connected², even though there have been some attempts to find considerable unity or meaning

¹ I would like to express my deep gratitude to the journal's anonymous referee whose remarks and suggestions helped to give the paper its present shape. The referee's respectful, benevolent criticism allowed me to elaborate on and express many of my ideas much better than I could ever have done without such help.

² The advocates of the bipartite composition are: LESKY 1972: 379; MURRAY 1946: 112; HARSH 1948: 199 f.; NORWOOD 1964: 46 f.; RILEY 2008: 15, and of the tripartite one: SHEPPARD 1916: 7; KITTO 1966: 237; CHALK 1962: 7; KAMERBEEK 1966: 2; BURNETT 1971: 180; SILK 1985: 2.

behind this apparent fragmentation³. Commentators have also demonstrated that *φιλία* and *βία*, love and aggression, play a crucial role in the composition as well as the meaning of the tragedy⁴. Moreover, it has been noticed that the last part of the *Heracles* is much more realistic and “human” in comparison to the rest of the play and that there is a certain movement towards reality and humanity in the construction of Heracles’ character as well as in language and imagery within the text⁵. There have been also attempts to understand the suicidal wishes expressed by the hero after his coming to his senses⁶. The interpretation that I would like to present here is focused on an analysis of the way in which Euripides constructs the images of the heroic self of Heracles as well as the images of the objects to which this self relates. I am going to show that the pivotal tension of the mourning process described in the last part of the play is built on the dialectic of splitting and integration of loving and aggressive images of the self and its objects.

With regard to the work of other critics this analysis will emphasize (1) the unity of the play, (2) the psychological (not external) causes of Heracles’ madness, and (3) the unrealistic and polarized way of describing the characters and their actions in the part preceding the madness scene. The unity of *Heracles* seems now to be generally accepted, but the question of the causes of the hero’s madness remains a controversial issue and psychological explanations do not seem to be favourable. I would like to challenge this position in the paper. The last problem has been noticed and studied by scholars, but still seems to be open to interpretation; the intriguing nature of the first part of the play will be the point of departure for my reflection.

In the analysis of the conflict in *Heracles* I will use two sets of classical psychoanalytic ideas. The first are some remarks made by Sigmund FREUD in his groundbreaking paper “Mourning and Melancholia” from 1917. The other are concepts concerning early developmental phenomena and the pathological, depressive phenomena corresponding with them, which were presented by the founder of the British school of object relations, Melanie KLEIN, in her three influential papers published in the thirties and the forties of the last century.

In his paper FREUD defines mourning as “the reaction to the loss of a loved person, or to the loss of some abstraction which has taken the place of one, such as one’s country, liberty, an ideal, and so on”. In the next sentence he adds that: “In some people the same influences produce melancholia instead of mourning and

³ The unity is supposed to be primarily a thematic one. See CHALK 1962: 7; SHEPPARD 1916: 76; CHALK 1962: 8; KAMERBEEK 1966: 12; WILLINK 1988: 86; SILK 1985: 5; HAMILTON 1985: 22; FITZGERALD 1991: 92; PADILLA 1992: 1 f.; CONACHER 1967: 83; also, W. ARROWSMITH quoted in BARLOW 1982: 116.

⁴ See among others SHEPPARD 1916; CHALK 1962; WILLINK 1988.

⁵ See, for instance, BURNETT 1971: 180; BARLOW 1982: 121; SILK 1985: 117.

⁶ FITZGERALD 1991 and YOSHITAKE 1994.

we consequently suspect them of a pathological disposition”⁷. He finds important similarities between the two conditions, one healthy, and the other – pathological: “a profoundly painful dejection, cessation of interest in the outside world, loss of the capacity to love, inhibition of all activity”, but there is one thing that is not present in healthy mourning, while it is crucial in melancholia: “the disturbance of self-regard”⁸. FREUD goes on to give a vivid description of that clinical phenomenon: “The patient represents his ego to us as worthless, incapable of any achievement and morally despicable; he reproaches himself, vilifies himself and expects to be cast out and punished. He abases himself before everyone and commiserates with his own relatives for being connected with anyone so unworthy. He is not of the opinion that a change has taken place in him, but extends his self-criticism back over the past; he declares that he was never any better”⁹.

However, those were and are merely observable features of melancholia, which most clinicians (and non-clinicians, too), regardless of their theoretical proclivities, would agree upon. FREUD, on the other hand, was more interested in the hidden causes behind the fact that some people react to loss without feelings of worthlessness, while others attack their own ego with such an aggression that it sometimes leads to suicide. His answer to the question was a phenomenon of ambivalence, quite common in emotional life, but particularly severe and problematic in early phases of infantile development. The cause of a depressive reaction is, according to FREUD, a strong, unconscious ambivalence towards the loved and lost object: “So we find the key to the clinical picture: we perceive that the self-reproaches are reproaches against a loved object which have been shifted away from it on to the patient’s own ego”¹⁰. This Freudian idea, expressed in his famous and influential phrase about “the shadow of the object [that] fell upon the ego”, has inspired generations of psychoanalysts to search for the sources of melancholia and other severe emotional disorders in the conflict between love and aggression (or between Eros, the life drive, and Thanatos, the death drive), which is peculiar to the ambivalent phase of ego development.

In his 1917 paper FREUD comments that “This conflict due to ambivalence, which sometimes arises more from real experiences, sometimes more from constitutional factors, must not be overlooked among the preconditions of melancholia. If the love for the object – a love which cannot be given up though the object itself is given up – takes refuge in narcissistic identification, then the hate comes into operation on this substitutive object, abusing it, debasing it, making it suffer and deriving sadistic satisfaction from its suffering. The self-tormenting in melancholia, which is without doubt enjoyable, signifies, just like the corresponding

⁷ FREUD 1957: 243.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 244.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 246.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 248.

phenomenon in obsessional neurosis, a satisfaction of trends of sadism and hate which relate to an object, and which have been turned round upon the subject's own self in the ways we have been discussing"¹¹.

However, FREUD's succinct and revelatory remarks about the coexistence of love and hate towards the same object in melancholia posed a difficulty. Melanie KLEIN, a psychoanalyst who worked for years with very young children and deeply disturbed patients, found that even though the psychoanalyst can suspect the existence of the conflict between Eros and Thanatos in his patient, the patient not only refuses to accept the idea of loving and hating the same person – on the contrary, he defends with all his might against the simultaneous experience of ambivalent feelings.

KLEIN noticed that depressed patients organize their experience into two sets of fantasies:

The first set of feelings and phantasies are the persecutory ones, characterized by fears relating to the destruction of the ego by internal persecutors. The defences against these fears are predominantly the destruction of the persecutors by violent or secretive and cunning methods. With these fears and defences I have dealt in detail in other contexts. The second set of feelings which go to make up the depressive position I formerly described without suggesting a term for them. I now propose to use for these feelings of sorrow and concern for the loved objects, the fears of losing them and the longing to regain them, a simple word derived from everyday language – namely the “pining” for the loved object. In short – persecution (by “bad” objects) and the characteristic defences against it, on the one hand, and pinning for the loved (“good”) object, on the other, constitute the depressive position¹².

So Melanie KLEIN perceived ambivalence as a conflict between hating the bad object and pinning for the good object, but this raises a question: if the lost person is one and the same being, why in the internal world of the psyche it is divided into “good” and “bad”, so eventually we have to deal with two objects instead of one? KLEIN answered in her 1946 paper “Notes on some schizoid mechanisms”, where she pointed out that the source of this process is a fixation on very early stages of the development of the ego. KLEIN borrowed FREUD's term *Ichspaltung*, “splitting”, to describe a mechanism of active division between the relationship with the good, gratifying objects and the bad, frustrating objects, which avoids

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 251.

¹² KLEIN 1940: 130.

the pain of ambivalence¹³. In her 1946 paper, Melanie KLEIN suggested that the earliest phase of development could be called a "paranoid-schizoid position"¹⁴.

The more advanced developmental position, called the "depressive position", corresponds in Kleinian thinking with the phenomena described by FREUD in his paper on melancholia¹⁵. Melanie KLEIN basically equated working through the depressive position with the mourning process. Whenever we lose something we love the depressive position is reactivated in the mind and failure to successfully working through this position manifests itself as melancholia or depression. The Kleinian paradigm of psychological health overcomes the splitting by accepting a more ambivalent and complex experience of both the self and the other. Only then can the life-giving powers of Eros tame the destructive forces of Thanatos and the ego can achieve integration. "The very experience of depressive feelings in turn has the effect of further integrating the ego, because it makes for an increased understanding of psychic reality and better perception of the external world, as well as for a greater synthesis between inner and external situations"¹⁶.

*

In this paper I will try to show that in Euripides' *Heracles* we find something that can be understood as a dramatized expression of such a process of integration through mourning. But there is a methodological caveat that must be emphasized. The *dramatis personae* of the Euripidean play are not real people, so we can hardly understand them as having feelings, instincts and conflicts between them. Of course, there is Euripides' mind which we might – having accepted the psychoanalytic framework – treat as struggling with those universal unconscious ideas and dilemmas. There are also our minds, as readers or the audience of the drama, and if we engage in watching/reading the play, we spontaneously project our own unconscious wishes, fears and fantasies on the characters. From a psychoanalytic point of view, the meeting of the author's and audience's fantasies takes place within the theatrical space and it is this space that can be understood and interpreted. But this understanding is only analogous to the understanding that takes place in an analytic or a therapeutic situation, when the patient and the therapist can form a powerful emotional relationship based on transference, which then becomes a source of understanding.

¹³ KLEIN 1946: 101.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 101. "Paranoid", because of the fear of the persecutory, bad object, and "schizoid", because of the splitting of object and self.

¹⁵ "The loved and hated aspects of the mother are no longer felt to be so widely separated, and the result is an increased fear of loss, a strong feeling of guilt and states akin to mourning, because the aggressive impulses are felt to be directed against the loved object. The depressive position has come to the fore" (*ibid.*, 105).

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 105.

Object relations theory, which I will use here, seems to be particularly useful and inspiring when we deal with ancient tragedy, because emotional relationships between the self and the objects appear in the form of interactions of the *dramatis personae*. Naturally, the characters with which the audience identifies at a given moment embody the self and other characters reflect its objects. Psychoanalytically, the distinction between the self and the object is not dependent merely on the point of view of the subject, but primarily on the early developmental processes. “The self” in relation to “the object” can be simply seen as a “child” in relation to his “mother”, and later to both of his parents and other members of the family. This poses a problem, because in *Heracles* we have a crucial relationship of an adult man to his wife and children. The central figure is, of course, Heracles himself, so the audience tends to identify with him as the self, but because he is not present for some time during the play, other characters relate to him and he is *their* object (of love or hate).

In this paper I will describe various emotional interactions between characters, not only between Heracles and others, in terms of the splitting between love and aggression. I will try to show that in the course of the play there is, first, a strong separation of the good self-object relationships from the bad ones, while towards the end this splitting is gradually overcome. I will use the psychoanalytic terms “good/ideal (object/self)” and “love” to refer to those fantasies that are dominated by Eros, the life instinct, while “bad/persecutory” and “aggression/hate/sadism” when referring to those dominated by Thanatos, the death instinct. Among the most significant “bad” objects of the play there is certainly Lycus (to everyone in the play), but also objects which are not present, but only mentioned – like Hera and the monsters which are bad objects particularly for Heracles. When we speak of the role of Hera in the play, it should be said that there is a problem as to how are we to understand her and other gods in the play. FERGUSON is convinced, unlike CHALK or HARTIGAN, that gods can be interpreted as psychological powers and not as independent, external beings¹⁷. YOSHITAKE also calls gods “uncontrollable forces of human life”, but does not go so far as to see them mainly as symbolic images¹⁸. It seems, however, that the gods can always represent objects to which the characters relate, whether or not they are “real” or merely “symbolic” figures.

Among the good objects we can count Heracles (for Megara, Amphithryo and the chorus) and Zeus the Saviour (for everyone), but also Megara with the children and later Theseus – are good objects for Heracles himself. As I have already mentioned, the children can be understood in two ways – as a reflection of the self image or the object image. Externally, the children are always dependent on their parents, but internally parents can be emotionally dependent

¹⁷ FERGUSON 1969: 113.

¹⁸ YOSHITAKE 1994: 142. Cf. also DODDS 2004: 1–18.

on their children. It is the relationship of dependence that is crucial to the self/object distinction. The act of infanticide can thus be understood either as an attack of a powerful object on the fragile self, or as an attack of a powerful self on the fragile object. Those two meanings can coexist, so there is no point in excluding one of them from the interpretation. However, the general context of the play always tends to suggest which meaning is more significant. In my analysis of Euripides' *Medea* I proposed seeing the children as representing the fragile self attacked and destroyed by a sadistic object, because in that play we have no account of Medea's mourning after their death¹⁹. There is only one moment in which Medea experiences her children as the objects on which she depends: in her great monologue she evokes the "gerotrophic" images of being taken care of by her sons in her old age (1028–1040). But most of the time the children are pictured as dependent on other people, so their symbolic function as the self image is much more significant in the play.

In *Heracles*, however, the situation is different. First of all, the children are associated with their mother in a strong way. Heracles kills the whole family, his wife and children, and even though they are clearly dependent on him, not only emotionally, but also materially and socially, he, however powerful, is also dependent on them emotionally. When they are dead, Heracles loses the whole world, but he does not lose the whole self. Moreover, Euripides depicts the self bereft of its objects, the self in an empty world. The consequent mourning process emphasizes the function of Megara and the sons as the objects upon which Heracles depends emotionally. There is another dimension of the infanticide, which I will discuss later in the paper, but the main function of this event will be understood here as a loss of object.

It should also be mentioned that objects in object relations theory are often simply equalled with significant others of childhood. The object often stands for "the mother". It is, however, a simplification, because in the earliest phases of development, as KLEIN pointed out, the child has no understanding of the mother as a whole, but mostly of different parts of her body (the breast, the eyes, the hands etc.). Moreover, the first experiences are internalized not in the form of images of another person, but of the taste of milk, the sound of a voice, the feeling of being held, the pain of hunger or some other physical discomfort. Also FREUD in his paper on melancholia emphasized that anything could become an object of love or hate – for example, abstract entities. Euripides also uses e.g. the rays of the sun, the eyes of snakes, a house or Heracles' weapons as symbols of objects and self.

At the very beginning I mentioned the dispute between the scholars concerning the division of Euripides' *Heracles* into parts. In my earlier paper on *Heracles* I tried to show that the most important division of the play is that

¹⁹ STRÓŻYŃSKI 2013: 63–70.

between, on the one hand, the unrealistic, “psychotic” part (which is most of the play) and, on the other hand, the more realistic and considerably shorter, ending part, focused on mourning²⁰. Nevertheless, the “psychotic” part, marked by splitting, can and should be divided into two further parts – first, where there is splitting, but also contact with reality, and second, where splitting fails and there is a deeper psychotic fragmentation, expressed by Heracles’ hallucinatory-delusional episode. In that paper I also attempted to prove that this break with reality is a consequence of earlier psychotic mechanisms²¹. In the present paper I suggest taking into consideration all three parts of the play in order to show that the relation to splitting in every one of them is different and that they all belong to a long process of psychic integration. First, I will discuss the typical splitting phenomena in the first part of the play (that is, until Heracles goes mad), then I will discuss Heracles’ madness in terms of extreme splitting accompanied by the total loss of what is called in psychoanalysis “reality testing”²² (which I described earlier in terms of psychotic fragmentation, using John STEINER’s ideas²³), and finally I will analyze the process of integration through mourning in the last part of the play, namely in the Exodus, where splitting is finally overcome.

SPLITTING OF EROS AND THANATOS

In the first part of the play Euripides juxtaposes good and evil characters in a way that CHALK described as “melodramatic”²⁴. By this he meant a simplistic, unrealistic point of view as well as a rigid separation of what is good and bad in the world of the play²⁵. But this literary technique could be understood, in a psychoanalytic framework, as an attempt to show the intensity of the conflict between Eros and Thanatos, while splitting is the main defence against this conflict. FERGUSON emphasizes the presence of life and death instincts in the play, considering Zeus and Hera to be symbolic representations of what he calls “the life-force” and “the power of death and destruction”²⁶.

What CHALK calls the rigid separation of “good” and “bad” characters is accomplished by Euripides by subtle displacement and attribution of love and aggression to various human and divine personalities. One example is the juxtaposition of Lycus and Heracles’ family. Lycus is consistently described as

²⁰ STRÓŻYŃSKI 2011: 142.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 128–141.

²² FREUD’s term (FREUD 1957: 244), generally used to describe the loss of contact with reality in psychoses.

²³ STRÓŻYŃSKI 2011: 137 f.

²⁴ CHALK 1962: 17.

²⁵ Cf. STRÓŻYŃSKI 2011: 119–128.

²⁶ FERGUSON 1969: 113.

absolutely evil without possessing any good qualities whatsoever. The audience naturally takes, for instance, Amphitryon as a “good” character, opposed to the bad Lycus. But in the case of Amphitryon the problem is that we learn that he is not completely free from aggressive impulses. We hear that Amphitryon killed his wife’s father and he justifies infanticide twice in the play (39 f. and 206 f.). There are allusions to Amphitryon’s aggressiveness, but when Euripides confronts him with Lycus, he allows us to see Heracles’ step-father as weak and innocent in comparison with his sadistic adversary. This example shows that splitting is active, meaning that the author deliberately leaves aside any qualities that could show that Amphitryon and Lycus are complex personalities, possessing both good and bad features.

The second example of splitting can be seen in the way that Amphitryon and Lycus refer to Zeus and Heracles in their speeches. Initially, Zeus the Saviour represents an all-good image of the object, especially when Amphitryon wants help from him (1 f. and 48–50). We hear, however, that at other times Amphitryon perceives Zeus in an entirely different way: as a corrupt, immoral, greedy and indifferent deity, so that the audience has an impression of a powerful inconsistency:

ὦ Ζεῦ, μάτην ἄρ' ὀμόγαμόν σ' ἐκτησάμην,
 μάτην δὲ παιδὸς κοινεῶν' ἐκλήζομεν·
 σὺ δ' ἦσθ' ἄρ' ἦσσον ἢ δόκεις εἶναι φίλος.
 ἀρετῇ σε νικῶ θνητὸς ὦν θεὸν μέγαν·
 παῖδας γὰρ οὐ προύδωκα τοὺς Ἡρακλέους.
 σὺ δ' ἐς μὲν εὐνάς κρύφιος ἠπίστω μολεῖν,
 τ'ἀλλότρια λέκτρα δόντος οὐδενὸς λαβῶν,
 σῶζειν δὲ τοὺς σοὺς οὐκ ἐπίστασαι φίλους.
 ἀμαθῆς τις εἶ θεὸς ἢ δίκαιος οὐκ ἔφυς.

(339–347)²⁷

I propose to understand this inconsistency in terms of the splitting of love and aggression. Using KLEIN’s language, we could say that whenever a character desires and expects gratification from Zeus as an object, he or she perceives him as an ideal protector, but whenever a character is disappointed in Zeus or simply fears for his safety and life (a state of frustration and anxiety),

²⁷ “Zeus, it does no good that you were my wife’s lover, no good that I have called you sharer in my son’s begetting. You were, it now appears, not as near a friend as I thought. In goodness I, though mortal, surpass you, a mighty god. I have not abandoned the children of Heracles. But you, though you know well enough how to slip secretly into bed and take other men’s wives when no one has given you permission, do not know how to save the lives of your nearest and dearest. Either you are a fool of a god or there is no justice in your nature.” Text (here and elsewhere) according to K.H. LEE’s Teubner edition (Lepizig 1988), translation from D. KOVACS’s Loeb edition (Cambridge, MA–London 1998).

the image of Zeus immediately turns into a persecutory one. As I have already mentioned, Amphitryon's fear and despair make him see Zeus as corrupt and immoral (339–347), while at other times he feels comfort when he sits next to his altar (48–50). A similar situation can be seen in the scene where Megara is described as anxious and desperate, whereas Amphitryon is full of irrational hope – Megara's fear is related to her perception of Zeus (and Heracles) as bad objects, and Amphitryon's enthusiasm is based on his idealization of Zeus and Heracles as omnipotent saviours (85–106). The conflicted images of Zeus and Heracles (two figures of supposed saviours) are also presented by Euripides in a dispute between Amphitryon and Lycus. The latter devaluates Zeus and Heracles, describing them not so much as dangerous enemies, but as impotent cheaters who pretend to be powerful saviours, speaking to Megara:

τί δὴ τὸ σεμνὸν σῶ κατείργασται πόσει,
 ὕδραν ἔλειον εἰ διώλεσε κτανῶν
 ἢ τὸν Νέμειον θῆρ';

(151–153)²⁸

while Amphitryon desperately tries to defend the saviours in order not to lose his hope (170–216).

The third example of splitting can be found in the first stasimon. As I pointed out in the Introduction, splitting is accompanied by a partial diminishing of reality testing and an immersion in the internal world of unconscious fantasy. As BARLOW showed, in the first part of the play there is little temporal or historical continuity and little realism; as she succinctly put it: “Time does not matter. Order does not matter”²⁹. In the chorus' song, Heracles is described as an omnipotent saviour and is practically equated to a god. BARLOW convincingly analyzes the unrealistic, romantic, and decorative language of this stasimon and we could add that this dreamy idealization of Heracles-the-Saviour is completely opposed to what actually happens at stage at that moment. The hero's family is on the verge of death, threatened by the sadistic, all-bad persecutor Lycus, while the chorus is indulging in dreaming about Heracles as an ideal and powerful saviour who kills monsters and purifies the world of all evil. Heracles cannot protect his family at that moment, but the audience has to listen about his glorious deeds in some far distant place and time. Also Heracles' catabasis, which is mentioned towards the end of the stasimon (427–429), can be, therefore, understood as a symbolic descent into the fantasy world, protecting him from the horrible reality. At the same time, this descent is dangerous for him, since, as BURNETT points

²⁸ “What impressive deed was it that your husband performed in killing a marsh snake or that Nemean creature?”

²⁹ BARLOW 1982: 118.

out, Heracles “transgressed the most jealously guarded boundary between gods and men, that of death”³⁰.

The way that Heracles' image is constructed by Euripides in the first part of the play deserves a closer inspection. The hero is undoubtedly associated with Zeus and, at times, almost conflated with his divine father, for example, when Heracles is pictured as a divine, omnipotent and all-good protector of the world. But his image – such as it is in Megara's and Amphitryon's dialogue or in the first stasimon – is very simplistic and unrealistic. His only task is to destroy the evil in the world and this is represented by his labours. What he kills are the monsters sent by Hera; the monsters represent bad objects (persecutors) which try to destroy the ideal world of love, peace and happiness (the all-good relationship). What Heracles does then is a symbolic representation of the process described by Melanie KLEIN – not only by splitting of the good and the bad, but also a defensive attack on persecutors in order to protect the self and the good object from harm.

Heracles' actions described, for example, by the chorus, are very destructive, but Megara and Amphitryon seem to perceive the hero not as an aggressive, but as a loving, protecting figure. The reason is simple: his destructive power is directed towards persecutors, so it can be seen as good, or it can be even idealized. The justification or idealization of aggression is a common phenomenon in paranoid or narcissistic personalities (“we have to destroy the enemies, before they destroy us”), but it does not mean that love and aggression are integrated. In the play, splitting is particularly visible when we take a look at how differently the violence of Heracles and Lycus is portrayed. Heracles' violence is divine protection, while Lycus' violence is abominable cruelty.

The fourth example that I would like to consider is the way in which the very image of Heracles is split – Euripides shows that the good, protecting qualities of the hero are completely divorced from his destructive and cruel aspects. When Heracles appears for the first time on the stage, he is perceived almost as someone from a dream (517 f.) and is compared to Zeus (521 f. and 531–533) – this is his ideal aspect. Therefore, a powerful contrast is built by Euripides when Heracles starts to fantasize about his revenge. He expresses sadistic impulses to kill and destroy, but the question of how the same person can be divinely good and terrifyingly sadistic somehow does not arise in the context of his divine, “dream” status (562–582). In that scene it is Amphitryon who must help his son with reality testing and warn him not to go to war with the whole city all by himself (588–594). It seems as if Heracles were still in Hades – in the dream world. Therefore, I cannot agree with RILEY who sees only the “good” aspect of Heracles when he appears on the stage. She writes: “Herakles does not assume Olympian airs or boast of his conquest of Hades. All his concern is centred on his

³⁰ BURNETT 1971: 179.

family and, far from having any hubristic pretension to autonomy, he stresses the importance of cooperative human values (633–636) and accepts the sound advice of his father (606). Herakles' exclamation [...] reveals that he puts the welfare of his family before personal *kudos*³¹.

Another example of splitting can be found in the next stasimon, where the chorus devalues the gods and idealizes and exalts Heracles (the idealization in this song was discussed by PARRY and SILK)³². The chorus is afraid that there is no clear division between the good and the bad in the world, and it accuses the gods of being guilty of this lack of moral clarity. The chorus also demands that there be an obvious sign enabling people to tell who is truly virtuous – they should possess second youth (655–658). There is also the image of clouds, which enforces an impression that the borderline between good and evil (that is, between the conflicted realms of Eros and Thanatos) is blurred. This blurring or mixing of the good and the bad reminds of the Kleinian idea that whenever the splitting fails, with the result that love and aggression get close to each other, it results in powerful anxiety, because the good object is threatened by the bad one. The defence against this could be a withdrawal into the fantasy world of splitting and this seems to be what the chorus is trying to do – they pray to Heracles as if he were a god and praise him for eliminating all evil and aggression from the world (697–700). This prayer is, psychologically speaking, pure illusion, because – as the audience will learn very quickly – clearly not all aggression and violence has disappeared from this world. The irony is, of course, that the one who will teach the chorus and the others the painful lesson will be Heracles himself – the one who was supposed to eliminate all evil will soon become the incarnation of destruction. It is quite ironic in the light of what happens next. The split up, atemporal climate of the stasimon can also be seen in the way that the chorus, who a while ago denigrated the gods, now praises them – furthermore, the chorus praises the gods precisely for doing exactly the thing they previously were accused of *failing* to do: keeping apart the good and the bad (773–780)³³.

THE MADNESS SCENE

The madness of Heracles in the fourth epeisodion is not then a great surprise in this context. WILAMOWITZ suggested that Heracles' characteristic megalomania and pride gradually turned into madness³⁴. However, this early theory was firmly rejected by CHALK who attributed it fully to the irrational intervention of the gods³⁵.

³¹ RILEY 2008: 29.

³² PARRY 1965: 364; SILK 1985: 13.

³³ Cf. HARSH 1948: 202.

³⁴ WILAMOWITZ-MÖLLENDORFF 1895: 127–132.

³⁵ CHALK 1962: 7–17. Such was also the view of HARTIGAN 1987: 127–133.

A few years ago PAPADOPOULOU expressed her conviction that “Wilamowitz’s main interpretation of the play is nowadays hardly acceptable”³⁶. But one does not have to accept in detail WILAMOWITZ’S reading of the play in order to argue for some psychological continuity of Heracles’ character. PAPADOPOULOU adds that the hero “is not a mad megalomaniac hero when he arrives home [...] he is not presented as inherently mad”³⁷. Here, again, any theory of “inherent madness” is reduced to a caricature, while a gradual development of madness is probably a more frequent clinical phenomenon than a spectacular, sudden onset. RILEY has also tried to argue against the “Wilamowitzian theory of ‘seeds of madness’”, but her sole argument is that if Euripides wanted to portray Heracles as mad before the madness scene, he would simply have placed the epiphany of Lyssa earlier. This does not seem very convincing because it is assumed that the epiphany is the only way to symbolize the madness in the play³⁸. However, such an interpretation seems to prevail in scholarship; PROVENZA in a recent article takes it for granted that the madness was simply sent by the gods³⁹.

On the other hand, in the sixties KAMERBEEK was already trying to give a psychological explanation for Heracles’ madness, not in terms of his “megalomania” but in terms of an outbreak of the hero’s suppressed anger towards Eurystheus⁴⁰. A different psychological explanation was given recently by MEAGHER, who refers to war veterans suffering from PTSD and because of that attempting to murder their families. Here the cause of the temporary madness would be a “flashback”: the murder of Lycus causes a flashback which triggers Heracles’ psychotic state. In MEAGHER’S words: “the slaughter continues, or rather spreads [...]. In plain words, Herakles can’t stop killing”⁴¹.

I would suggest, however, a different understanding of the psychological continuity of the play⁴². Firstly, from the beginning of the play there are psychotic mechanisms and processes, expressed in the language, the imagery and the construction of the characters. The conflict between love and aggression and splitting as a defence against it are especially significant. Secondly, the climactic point of the play is when Heracles is placed in a situation in which he as well as other characters and the audience are not able to avoid the conflict between love and aggression anymore. When Heracles returns from Hades, he realizes that his family, especially his children, are in terrible danger and that he could

³⁶ PAPADOPOULOU 2005: 83.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ RILEY 2008: 30.

³⁹ PROVENZA 2013: *passim* (see e.g. pp. 84 and 93).

⁴⁰ KAMERBEEK 1966: 12–16.

⁴¹ MEAGHER 2006: 54–56.

⁴² STRÓŻYŃSKI 2011: 137–141.

not protect them by his saving activity of purifying the world from evil. At this climactic point, splitting and projection break down and Heracles loses contact with reality.

The children represent what is most precious and fragile in the psyche, either the good internal objects, constantly endangered by the sadistic assault of persecutory objects, or the fragile parts of the self, dependent on them. As I mentioned before, Megara certainly represents the good object (she is a mother). Euripides uses both dimensions of Heracles' family and the main aspect here seems to be fragility. CHALK points out that in the play the relationship with the children is depicted by Euripides as "the ideal type of human relationship"⁴³. Heracles is desperate (ὦ τλήμων ἐγώ, 550) and he confesses:

τῷ γάρ μ' ἀμύνειν μᾶλλον ἢ δάμαρτι χρῆ
καὶ παισὶ καὶ γέροντι; χαιρόντων πόνοι·
μάτην γὰρ αὐτοὺς τῶνδε μᾶλλον ἦνυσα.
καὶ δεῖ μ' ὑπὲρ τῶνδ', εἴπερ οἶδ' ὑπὲρ πατρός,
θνήσκειν ἀμύνοντ'· ἢ τί φήσομεν καλὸν
ὔδρα μὲν ἐλθεῖν ἐς μάχην λέοντί τε
Εὐρυσθέως πομπαῖσι, τῶν δ' ἐμῶν τέκνων
οὐκ ἐκπονήσω θάνατον; οὐκ ἄρ' Ἡρακλῆς
ὁ καλλίνικος ὡς πάροιθε λέξομαι.

(574–582)⁴⁴

A little further on he fully expresses the meaning of the good relationship with his family:

...καὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἀναίνομαι
τεράπεθμα τέκνων. πάντα τὰνθρώπων ἴσα·
φιλοῦσι παῖδας οἱ τ' ἀμείνονες βροτῶν
οἱ τ' οὐδὲν ὄντες· χρήμασιν δὲ διάφοροι·
ἔχουσιν, οἱ δ' οὐ· πᾶν δὲ φιλότεκνον γένος.

(632–636)⁴⁵

ZEITLIN, in her article about intimate relations in Euripides' works, gives a general description, speaking about *Ion*, of what the children symbolize: "the

⁴³ CHALK 1962: 13.

⁴⁴ "Whom shall I defend rather than my wife and my children and my old father? Farewell to my labors! It was to no purpose that I accomplished them rather than the tasks to be done here. Since these children were being put to death for their father, I must risk death in their defense. What for fine deed shall we call it to do battle with a hydra and a lion at Eurystheus' behest if I do not prevent the death of my children? In the case, I shall not be called, as I once was, Heracles glorious in victory".

⁴⁵ „I do not refuse to tend my children. Men's lot is everywhere the same. High and low alike love their children; they differ in wealth, and some are rich, others poor, but the whole human race is fond of its young".

child is a guarantor of happiness and prosperity; he is an instrument for the transmission of property to future generations; he is a saving protection for the house, an anchor for the continuity of the *genos*, a patriotic defender of the city in time of war. Missing in this list is only a mention of the value of children as support for their parents in old age (*gerotrophia*) and their obligation to attend to their parents' burial rites...⁴⁶. As we can see, ZEITLIN emphasizes the protective aspects of the children, that is, from a psychoanalytic point of view, their function as an object. I have already suggested that this aspect is only marginal in *Medea*, even though *gerotrophia* appears in a significant moment of the Great Monologue⁴⁷. Moreover, in the context of *Heracles*, the fact that the sons are associated with the father's manhood and that they continue his γένος, is also intimately linked with their status as objects on which Heracles depends. That is why the hero's attack on his wife and children can be understood in terms of a destruction of internal good objects.

Melanie KLEIN pointed out that the worst fear of the depressive position is that the aggressive impulses of the self destroyed the good object, and a little earlier, in the paranoid-schizoid position, that the bad object could destroy the good object, were it not for splitting that separates love from aggression. In the first part of the play Heracles' aggression is directed towards the monsters and towards Lycus, that is towards bad objects who "deserve" to be destroyed – that is how Heracles protects the good object. But now, in the second part, a dramatic change occurs – Heracles realizes that his activity is not enough to protect the good objects and that aggression has almost destroyed the fragile love and goodness. The worst fear of paranoid-schizoid position must be defended now not only by splitting, but by breaking bonds with reality. Heracles' powerful aggression is unleashed, not – as earlier – towards the bad objects, but instead towards the most precious and innocent ones – Megara and their sons. The children's meaning as the most precious and fragile objects is particularly significant here, as I have already pointed out. Paradoxically, by trying to deny his own aggression towards the good objects, Heracles does in reality what is the greatest fear of the depressive position: he sadistically attacks those whom he loves. But at this point – as FREUD put it – the same object is both loved and hated – it is protected in fantasy, and (unwillingly) destroyed in reality.

Another interpretation of the children's function would be the one in which their symbolic meaning is similar to that in *Medea*. From that perspective, the children would represent the good, fragile parts of Heracles' self that are destroyed by a sadistic object. The sadistic object here would be Hera, the wicked stepmother, whose agents are Lyssa and the mad Heracles. Hera destroys Heracles' self by taking control of him and the attack on the children can be seen as an attack on the fragile humanity of Heracles, already jeopardized by his earlier

⁴⁶ ZEITLIN 2008: 326.

⁴⁷ STRÓŻYŃSKI 2013: 67 f.

hubristic tendencies⁴⁸. Later in the play Heracles reminds us how he was attacked by the Gorgon-eyed snakes when he was still a supposedly helpless infant in a crib (1266–1268). During the madness scene he himself becomes Gorgon-eyed (868)⁴⁹. As ZEITLIN interestingly observes, there is in Euripides an “antithesis between two types of women – the good mother, demonstrating strong and protective maternal attachment, who is countered by a malevolent female figure, a potential if not actual child destroyer”⁵⁰, as well as a peculiar “shift from nurturant to destructive mothers”⁵¹. ZEITLIN also writes that “Heracles, in killing his own children in his maddened state, when he had just announced that he valued his domestic responsibilities over his heroic exploits, can only be compared to deadly females”⁵². Therefore, there is an important similarity between Heracles and Hera and in the scene of madness Heracles identifies with Hera as the satiric object in his assault on himself via his family: he plays the role of the bad object, while his children play the role of his own good self. But, it must be added, contrary to *Medea*, the good, fragile part of the self is later repaired and restored through mourning.

The feature that distinguishes the middle part of the play from the first part in which object relations were also, as I showed, to a certain extent “mad”, is Heracles’ loss of reality testing. His “internal” perception of what he is doing is completely contrary to what happens “externally”, or objectively. He is sure that he is still doing what he did before – that he is purifying the world from evil, at this point incarnated in Eurystheus (936 f.) and Eurystheus’ children (971, 982 f.). For Heracles, love and aggression are still split – he thinks he is protecting his beloved family by destroying the enemies. But from an objective perspective, Heracles destroys the good objects while he is possessed by a supernatural persecutory object – Lyssa, the goddess of madness, sent by the main persecutor and enemy of Heracles – Hera. In other words – for the time being he saves the objects internally (by destroying Eurystheus in his hallucinations he gets rid of a dangerous persecutor) but, at the same time, he attacks them externally and he will have to pay the price for this. In addition to splitting, there is a dissociation of the internal world of fantasy and the external world of reality. As CHALK pointed out: “the good man could only kill his children when entirely possessed by irrational forces”⁵³.

⁴⁸ On the continuity of Heracles’ aggression see BURNETT 1971: 170; WILLINK 1988: 87 f.; FITZGERALD 1991: 91–93.

⁴⁹ The motif of the eyes as well as links between looking and aggression have been analyzed by HAMILTON 1985: 19–25, PADILLA 1992: 5–8 and, most recently, PROVENZA 2013: 76–83.

⁵⁰ ZEITLIN 2008: 326 f.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 328.

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ CHALK 1962: 13.

At the beginning of the madness scene the typical split images of the ideal Zeus and the evil Hera are evoked. Iris says that previously τὸ χρήνιν ἐξέσωζεν, οὐδ' εἶα πατήρ/ Ζεὺς νιν κακῶς δρᾶν οὔτ' ἔμ' οὔθ' Ἥραν ποτέ (828 f.)⁵⁴, which emphasizes that the good object is supposed to protect the self from the bad object. Lyssa, in turn, underlines the good aspects of Heracles, as if such an aggressive deed as murder was completely alien to the hero:

ἀνήρ ὄδ' οὐκ ἄσημος οὔτ' ἐπὶ χθονὶ
 οὔτ' ἐν θεοῖσιν, οὐ σύ μ' ἐσπέμπεϊς δόμους·
 ἄβατον δὲ χώραν καὶ θάλασσαν ἀγρίαν
 ἐξημερώσας, θεῶν ἀνέστησεν μόνος
 τιμᾶς πιτνούσας ἀνοσίων ἀνδρῶν ὕπο.

(849–853)⁵⁵

But in a short while Heracles' self will become the arena of a conflict between Eros and Thanatos – he will become the cruel murderer of his beloved ones.

Euripides describes this psychological catastrophe by giving a symbolic meaning to the collapse of the very house in which Heracles goes mad. The chorus says: θύελλα σεῖει δῶμα, συμπίπτει στέγη (905)⁵⁶, and the meaning of the δῶμα here is, of course, wider than just the palace or even, I would suggest, the whole family – it is also the internal, emotional world that collapsed when the forces of Eros and Thanatos clashed.

INTEGRATION THROUGH MOURNING

The mourning section of the play begins with a defence that is common to reactions of mourning: a denial of reality. This denial, however, is presented on different levels. For example, Euripides uses poetic images of a general state of “unawareness”, such as Heracles' deep sleep, caused by Pallas (1003–1006) or his confused state when he finally wakes up (1089–1093). In the context of working through the depressive position, we can ask what exactly is the “reality” that is denied here; it is the fact that both the self and the object are whole, containing in themselves love and aggression, good and bad aspects. It is this “wholeness” of the self and object that makes the conflict so painful, because it means that Heracles' self is no longer only the ideal saviour while the sadistic murderer is split off and projected onto other characters (persecutory objects), and that the hero must face his own aggressiveness. In this context the denial of reality at

⁵⁴ “Fate preserved his life, and Zeus his father forbade Hera and me to harm him at any time”.

⁵⁵ “The man into whose house you are sending me is of great renown both on earth and in heaven. He tamed the pathless wilderness and the sea's wild waves, and he alone has restored the worship of the gods when it was being cast into oblivion by godless men”.

⁵⁶ “A mighty wind is shaking the house, the roof is falling in!”

the beginning is closely associated with splitting – another attempt to keep conflicted forces apart. This denial becomes less metaphorical when Heracles does not recognize his family, calling them “some dead people” (νεκροί, 1097).

Defences against mourning are also depicted by Euripides through Heracles’ relationship with his weapons. We see his bow and arrows, representing bad, aggressive parts of his self, lying scattered on the ground next to him. They are spatially separated from him, as if they were not a part of him. It is also a picture of projection: self’s own aggression is separated from the self and attributed to the bad object, as if the self is trying to say: “it is not I who am aggressive, it is them”. Euripides elaborates this motif further when he describes Heracles as being attacked by “the sun’s arrows” (τόξα ἡλίου, 1090). The sun, which is often metaphorically an eye of the sky, appears to be the bad object looking at Heracles in a hostile way (for links between looking and aggression see n. 49 above). The fact that Heracles feels attacked by the sun’s arrows mirrors the fact that previously he attacked his children with the bow and killed one of his sons in this way (969 f., 984 f.). Through this retaliatory image, Euripides depicts a symbolic projection: the object does to Heracles, what he did to others (as in “those who use the sword will die by the sword” in Matthew 26:52).

But the sunlight does not only represent an aggressive look – it also symbolizes awareness, particularly an awareness of emotional reality, which Heracles is trying to avoid. The hero at this point does not yet realize what he has done, but he senses that it is better not to be in the light, not to look and see. That is why he imagines he is in Hades (1101), as if he wanted to remain in a fantasy world of splitting and in the twilight of denial, not to be exposed to the “reality of daylight”. This state of denial and narcissistic withdrawal is emphasized by Euripides by a particular choice of words: ἀμηχανῶ (1105), οὐκ οἶδα (1108), δύσγνωια (1107) and συναμπίσχη κόρας (1111).

Euripides defers the moment of painful recognition. It is only in line 1133 that Heracles learns from Amphitryon that he has killed his children (ἀπόλεμον, ὧ παῖ, πόλεμον ἔσπευσας τέκνοις) and only in line 1147 does he admit that it is he who destroyed them (τῶν φιλτάτων μοι γενόμενος παιδῶν φονεύς). This last phrase marks the point at which the depressive conflict is recognized for the first time, because love (τῶν φιλτάτων) meets aggression (φονεύς).

At the same moment, however, we can see how splitting is used again to defend Heracles against this conflict. He wants to kill himself⁵⁷. FREUD, in his paper on melancholia, pointed out that suicide is actually an attack on the bad object – not externally, but in the internal world. When Heracles wants to become an

⁵⁷ For FITZGERALD (1991: 92), Heracles’ desire to kill himself is just acting according to his “system of values” and forced by the logic of his own previous, aggressive way of life.

“avenger of the blood” (δικαστής αἵματος, 1150)⁵⁸, he wants to come back to the previous splitting situation, where his aggression was separated from love and directed towards the persecutory objects, not towards the good ones. It is as if he wanted to destroy the monster he has become by killing his family. The suicide of Heracles would be a symbolic way of re-establishing the splitting, separating love from aggression and avoiding the painful conflict. By killing his “monster self”, the part of him that was associated with Hera and Lyssa during the madness scene, he could purify this time not the external world but the internal world from all evil and symbolically save the ideal relationship of the good self with the good object.

Melanie KLEIN points out that “while in committing suicide the ego intends to murder its bad objects, in my view at the same time it also always aims at saving its loved objects, internal or external. To put it shortly: in some cases the phantasies underlying suicide aim at preserving the internalized good objects and that part of the ego which is identified with good objects, and also at destroying the other part of the ego which is identified with the bad objects and the id. Thus the ego is enabled to become united with its loved objects”⁵⁹. The fantasy of purification and union with the ideal object is quite clear when Heracles speaks about his suicide in terms of liberation from a μῖασμα: ἢ σάρκα τὴν ἔμηνεν ἐμπρήσας πυρί,/ δύσκειαν ἢ μένει μ’ ἀπώσομαι βίου (1151 f.)⁶⁰. There is an irony in this passage, seen in the context of the implicit future apotheosis of Heracles, which will in fact unite him not only with his divine father, but also with Hera, his “divine mother”, transforming her from an “evil step-mother” into a loving, good mother.

The interplay between the recognition of reality on the one hand and denial and splitting on the other, which was discussed above, reaches its climax when Theseus appears. He catalyzes the process of mourning and integration, helping Heracles to overcome splitting. Theseus does this in two ways. Firstly, he initially accepts Heracles' splitting, expressed in the hero's ambivalent perception of Theseus, thus transforming split, partial objects into a whole, realistic object. Secondly, in more general terms, he is a link to external reality and thus he saves Heracles from a narcissistic state of melancholia, which, as FREUD pointed out, substitutes a relationship with real people and things with an internal relationship with the lost, loved-and-hated object.

⁵⁸ YOSHITAKE (1994: 139) interprets the use of δίκη as a reference to cultural demands and shows how Theseus later convinces Heracles that the punishment for what he has done should be banishment instead of death.

⁵⁹ Cf. KLEIN 1935: 160.

⁶⁰ “Shall I not burn their father's flesh with fire and thrust from myself the ignominy that awaits me in my life?” (I am aware that the fear of contamination by blood is culturally conditioned and cannot be reduced to individual psychology. About this obsession with the μῖασμα see DODDS 2004: 35 f.).

The first process can be seen in Heracles' first reaction. The hero perceives Theseus' eyes as hostile because he feels pain when his friend is looking at him (ὀφθησόμεσθα καὶ τεκνοκτόνον μύσος/ ἐς ὄμμαθ' ἤξει φιλτάτω ξένων ἐμῶν, 1155 f.). It evokes an image of the "persecutory sight" of Gorgo or the sun, which I have mentioned before. At the same time, Heracles calls Theseus φίλτατος. This is the sign that the splitting is beginning to lessen, since he can see both love and aggression in his friend. There is still more aggression, since Heracles tries to avoid Theseus instead of reaching out to him. In terms of Heracles' projections and splitting, it seems that Theseus stands for a good object which could be strong enough to survive aggressive attacks – unlike Megara and the children. Psychological integration will only become possible if Theseus proves stronger than the forces of destruction which were so overwhelming during the previous two parts of the play.

Euripides emphasizes this aspect of Theseus. We can understand the fact that he was released from Hades, that he "returned from the dead", as a symbolic triumph of Eros over Thanatos⁶¹. But the situation is much more refined. It is Heracles who released Theseus and brought him back to life, which now, in the process of mourning, will mean that even though Heracles' beloved external objects are dead, there is one external object who was dead and now is alive. In the internal world it seems to suggest that Heracles has the potential for integration and the potential for overcoming the power of death by using the forces of the life instinct. Theseus obviously symbolizes the life giving power of φιλία in the play⁶², but it seems to be closely connected to his ability to survive aggression and destruction, which symbolically integrates split parts of the ego into one whole.

The function of Theseus as the one who can "tolerate" the splitting, that is, two conflicted parts of the object and the self, is also reflected in the fact that he can feel sadness. He shares Heracles' pain, sym-pathizing with him (συναλγῶν, 1202) and weeping with him (κλαίω, 1236), and through this he reconciles conflicted instincts. This can be seen in a comparison between Amphitryon and Theseus. Heracles step-father is still afraid of Heracles' aggressiveness (1204–1213), whereas Theseus is not; the Athenian hero is also able to face the aggressive aspects of Heracles – he asks his friend to uncover his head, he does not avoid the μίσημα (1218–1221). In conclusion, Theseus' willingness to share both the positive and negative side of object relations is a way in which Euripides shows how the process of integration is achieved.

The second function of Theseus is bringing Heracles closer to reality and external objects. The covering of the head by Heracles (1199) can be understood as another metaphor of denial and narcissistic withdrawal – the hero is hiding in

⁶¹ SILK (1985: 3) makes an observation that Heracles is built upon a "sequence of anticipation and fulfillment". It seems to be a motif related to the fantasy of killing and reviving the object.

⁶² See CHALK 1962: 13.

the dark, avoiding external reality, refusing to look and see. It prevents Heracles from potentially healing human contact and from a more realistic perspective on things and people. Theseus is the one who is able to hear and see clearly (ἤκουσα καὶ βλέποντι σημαίνεις κακά, 1230), so he can help Heracles with his denial. He also shows that he sees things differently and that he is not afraid to be contaminated by Heracles' evil (1228 f.) – by this he demonstrates to the friend the fantastic nature of his fears. Theseus also says: οὐ μιάινεις θνητὸς ὦν τὰ τῶν θεῶν (1232)⁶³, again, confronting Heracles with reality and helping him to leave behind his omnipotent, ideal self and experience his more real self. He also brings historical continuity of the self into the atemporal, paranoid-schizoid world by mentioning the experiences that he once shared with Heracles. At the same time, he emphasizes that his friend possesses realistically good qualities: καὶ γὰρ ποτ' εὐτύχησ'. ἐκεῖσ' ἀνοιστέον/ ὄτ' ἐξέσωσάς μ' ἐς φάος νεκρῶν πάρα (1221 f.)⁶⁴.

It seems that in a relatively short episode Euripides allows Heracles to gradually overcome obstacles to mourning⁶⁵ and reach a phase in which, in Melanie KLEIN's words, "Persecution decreases and the pining for the lost loved object is experienced in full force. To put it in other words: hatred has receded and love is freed"⁶⁶. However, Euripides avoids a melodramatic "happy ending", which would look unrealistic. On the contrary, he lets Heracles come back to his suicidal wishes (1255–1264). The hero again splits the object and the self, which can be seen through his fantasies about his family. Heracles remembers that Amphitryon has murdered Alcmena's father (1258 f.) and he also blames Zeus: Ζεὺς δ', ὅστις ὁ Ζεὺς, πολέμιόν μ' ἐγείνατο/ Ἥρα, (1263 f.)⁶⁷. Both of Heracles' fathers are now "bad objects" and the most evil object is, of course, Hera. The hero evokes an image of a child in a crib who does not have good parents protecting him, but a child living in fear of persecution – in this part of Heracles' speech it is as if all love and care have disappeared from this infant crib⁶⁸ – he was attacked by the snakes which were sent by Hera. The image of the snakes seems to be a reversed (persecutory) image of maternal care: the possibility of strangling instead of a tender embrace, poisonous fangs instead of nourishing milk, piercing sight which turns things to stone instead of a loving gaze.

⁶³ "You, a mortal, cannot pollute the divine realm".

⁶⁴ "For any good fortune I have enjoyed must be traced back to the day when you brought me up from the Underworld into the light".

⁶⁵ Theseus dialogue with Heracles was called "therapeutic" by MEAGHER 2006: 58. DEVEREUX (1970: 41), however, has seen, interestingly, a therapeutic character not in this dialogue, but in an earlier dialogue with Amphitryon (1119–1121).

⁶⁶ KLEIN 1940: 143.

⁶⁷ "Then Zeus – whoever Zeus is – begot me as an object of Hera's hatred".

⁶⁸ In this context see reflections of WILLINK (1988: 87) about the double meaning of πόνος in the play.

In reaction to Heracles' split off image of evil gods, Theseus is much more realistic: οὐδεις δὲ θνητῶν ταῖς τύχαις ἀκήρατος, / οὐ θεῶν, αἰοιδῶν ἔππερ οὐ ψευδεῖς λόγοι (1314 f.)⁶⁹. His realism is in fact so strong that he views gods as equal to people in their emotional conflicts and problems. SILK sees this passage differently, emphasizing that Theseus here recognizes the unbridgeable distance between gods and men, along with the helpless position of the latter. However, Theseus' idea of accepting the fate is understood by SILK in a somewhat positive fashion, as an invitation to accept the human condition and human destiny. He also points out that Heracles accepts Amphitryon as his father (1265). Anyhow, according to SILK, these are signs that Heracles is getting closer to reality, giving up his divine omnipotence⁷⁰.

The climactic, turning point in the process of mourning and integration in the third part of *Heracles* is the offer made to Heracles by Theseus (1313–1339), although FITZGERALD is not that optimistic about Heracles' transformation. He suggests that it is cowardice and greed that make the hero accept his friend's "incentive". However, I agree with FITZGERALD observation that the hero stands here between "rejection of his former self or resurrection of that self"⁷¹, but I understand "the former self" as a split, incoherent set of self images. "Resurrection" would mean a regression into a paranoid-schizoid pattern of avoiding mourning, whereas "rejection" of that self would be rather a positive integration of conflicted self-images into a new cohesive, complex self.

This integration is symbolized in Theseus' offer. Previously I pointed out that the destruction of the house during Heracles' madness can be interpreted as the destruction of the good objects on which the structure of the ego relies. In this context Theseus' invitation to Athens seems to symbolize an opportunity for restoration, giving Heracles the chance to recreate the internal world through re-establishing libidinal links with the good external objects. Athens in Theseus' speech represents the world of goodness:

ἐκεῖ χέρας σὰς ἀγνίσας μιάσματος
 δόμους τε δώσω χρημάτων τ' ἐμῶν μέρος.
 ἄ δ' ἐκ πολιτῶν δῶρ' ἔχω σώσας κόρους
 δις ἑπτὰ, ταῦρον Κνώσιον κατακτανών,
 σοὶ ταῦτα δώσω. πανταχοῦ δέ μοι χθονὸς
 τεμένη δέδασται.

(1324–1329)⁷²

⁶⁹ "But no mortal is untainted by fortune, and no god either, if the poets' stories are true".

⁷⁰ SILK 1985: 15.

⁷¹ FITZGERALD 1991: 94.

⁷² "There I shall cleanse your hands from this taint and give you a home and a portion of my wealth. I shall give you the gifts I received from my fellow citizens for killing the bull of Knossos and saving the lives of the fourteen children. All about the country allotments of land have been given to me".

First of all, this is the place of purification of the μίσημα; then, it is a place where Heracles will have new δόμους (the psychoanalyst would probably see no mere coincidence in the plural, given the fact that Heracles murdered three people, but I would not insist on the importance of the number) and, probably most importantly, these goods will result in the act of sharing. Theseus in this picture is not only a generous, caring object, he is also a protector of his country, since he alludes to the killing of Minotaurus. The land that is mentioned evokes fertility – a positive maternal quality and the posthumous celebration of Heracles seems to symbolize the overcoming of his depressive self-criticism⁷³. RILEY points out yet another important facet of this offer: Theseus becomes symbolically a “surrogate son” to Heracles⁷⁴. In this way Heracles can internalize him as a good object.

The importance of Theseus' offer can be seen in Heracles' reaction. He says that he does not believe that gods engage in aggressive or deceitful relationships with each other, which – apart from the obvious “theological” inconsistency of the play⁷⁵ – can be understood as a sign that Heracles is thinking in a more realistic way. But I would like to focus on what Heracles says in lines 1374–1385. First he says:

οἴμοι δάμαρτος καὶ τέκνων, οἴμοι δ' ἐμοῦ,
ὡς ἀθλίως πέπραγα κάποζεύγνυμαι
τέκνων γυναικός τ'. ὦ λυγραὶ φιλημάτων
τέρψεις, λυγραὶ δὲ τῶνδ' ὄπλων κοινωνίαι.

(1374–1377)⁷⁶

We can see how Heracles for the first time experiences what KLEIN called “pining for the good object”. But, at the same time, without splitting, Heracles accepts the fact that it is he who is responsible for their death – Euripides

⁷³ RILEY (2008: 41) writes: “Theseus offers Heracles a home in Athens, purification, wealth, and posthumous honours (1322–1333), but the *philia* he represents cannot be reduced to a matter of material benefits and reciprocity”. PROVENZA (2013: 93) also points out that the protection of Athens means “a refuge in those ‘human’ institutions that can allow him to go on living over and above the evil done”.

⁷⁴ RILEY 2008: 41.

⁷⁵ This statement raised discussions among scholars. LESKY (1972: 380) thinks that it cuts the play in two parts, KITTO (1966: 246 f.) sees Hera here as a real figure in a dramatic and moral, if not – philosophical, sense. GREENWOOD (1953: 62 f. and 81) suggests that Euripides in this moment speaks through Heracles about his own personal beliefs. YOSHITAKE (1994: 146 f.) thinks that Heracles criticizes only what she calls an “idealist believer” and that he consistently, throughout the whole play, believes in Zeus and Hera as independent deities, but different from their traditional mythological images. But she still has trouble explaining why Heracles at some points perceives the gods as irrationally aggressive and responsible for his crime and suffering. She suggests that the negative image of Zeus and Hera is used by Heracles only to emphasize that he has a reason to commit suicide, but such an interpretation does not explain other places in the play where similar tensions appear.

⁷⁶ “Alas for my wife and my children, but alas for myself, for my unhappy state, my wretched separation from my children and my wife! How painful the pleasure of kissing you, how painful that I still have about me these weapons!”

poignantly joins together φιλημάτων τέρψεις and τῶνδ' ὄπλων κοινωνία, starting both phrases by the adjective λυγραί. It would be hard to express the ambivalence and conflict of mourning in a more succinct and beautiful way: the source of grief is the integration of the sweet, loving memory with the awareness of one's own aggressive feelings towards the lost object.

Euripides dramatizes Heracles' transition from splitting, denial and avoidance of mourning towards integration in terms of a choice: to reject the weapons or to keep them, while the audience is aware that the weapons symbolize the powers of destruction already present in Heracles' self:

ἀμηχανῶ γὰρ πότερ' ἔχω τάδ' ἢ μεθῶ,
 ἃ πλευρὰ τὰμὰ προσπίτνοντ' ἐρεῖ τάδε·
 Ἡμῖν τέκν' εἶλες καὶ δάμαρθ'· ἡμᾶς ἔχεις
 παιδοκτόνους σοῦς. εἴτ' ἐγὼ τάδ' ὠλέναις
 οἴσω; τί φάσκων; ἀλλὰ γυμνωθεὶς ὄπλων
 ξὺν οἷς τὰ κάλλιστ' ἐξέπραξ' ἐν Ἑλλάδι
 ἐχθροῖς ἐμαυτὸν ὑποβαλὼν αἰσχυρῶς θάνω;
 οὐ λειπτόν τάδ', ἀθλίως δὲ σφαστέον.

(1378–1385)⁷⁷

The personification of the weapons makes the audience aware that they are not mere things; they represent a part of Heracles' own self, he calls them παιδοκτόνοι. He also recognizes both their aggressive power and the heroic fame that they gave him. In this way a rejection of the weapons would symbolize a rejection of the bad aspects of Heracles' self and further splitting, whereas keeping the weapons symbolizes the integration of the bad aspects with the good ones into the whole self-image⁷⁸. Integrating the weapons (aggression) means grieving, but now Heracles is able to experience the pain in a creative way. But he does not want to mourn alone – he asks Theseus to go with him to Eurystheus with Cerberus (1386–1388)⁷⁹. Heracles' openness to Theseus' presence and friendship is also a sign that the process of integration is going on⁸⁰.

⁷⁷ “I do not know whether I should keep them or let them go, since they will hang at my flanks and say to me, ‘By means of us you killed your children and your wife: us, the slayers of your children, you still keep’. Shall I then carry them on my arm? What will be my plea? Or shall I strip myself of the weapons with whose aid I performed my glorious exploits in Greece, put myself at the mercy of my enemies and thus meet a disgraceful death? I must not let them go but must in misery keep them”.

⁷⁸ See KAMERBEEK 1966: 6 and HAMILTON 1985: 22 f.

⁷⁹ CHALK (1962: 13 f.) thinks that Theseus' φιλία was for Heracles a means of stopping him from directing aggression towards himself by killing himself. KAMERBEEK (1966: 16 f.) interprets the passage differently – according to him, Heracles is afraid that he will kill Eurystheus. It is a general idea of this author that Heracles “suppressed” his anger towards Eurystheus and that this anger drove him mad; it could still be present even after the madness episode.

⁸⁰ I disagree with CHALK (1962: 15) that Euripides wants the reader to believe that it is the gods that forced Heracles to use his βία.

The continuity between the “former” and the “new” self of Heracles is emphasized by CHALK who sees in Heracles’ weapons symbols of his ἀρετή that he now can use in a new way⁸¹. It is, however, hard to agree with PADILLA who suggests that “Ironically, it will only be in death – the defeat of which defines his greatest badge of human virtue – that he will be absorbed into a civic framework. As such, the play leaves Heracles with an oddly ill-defined and unsettled identity, one that oscillates unstably between god and mortal, loner and *philos*”⁸². Heracles’ self is not “unsettled”, but it is changing, moving towards a more integrated form, and I agree that Theseus’ vision of posthumous glory symbolizes a sort of ultimate human integration, which is far from being complete at the end of the play. For FITZGERALD, on the other hand, it is a revolution: “Herakles is made to experience the deficiencies of his own style and values”⁸³. YOSHITAKE calls this a “struggle to face grief and self-reproach, pains of the sort most fundamental to all mankind, ills that can be soothed only by *philia*, the highest virtue”⁸⁴.

In any case, the end of the play is quite hopeful. MERIDOR suggests that, since the audience knew about the hero’s apotheosis in the myth, they may have expected a positive outcome, what she calls “recompense for human suffering”⁸⁵. SILK, on the other hand, strongly denies the possibility of apotheosis, referring to Theseus’ offer of the honours Heracles is to receive after his death⁸⁶. Many scholars have noted that Heracles becomes much more human and ordinary in the last part of the tragedy and that the tragedy becomes much more “realistic” in many ways⁸⁷.

⁸¹ CHALK 1962: 14. Recently, RILEY (2008: 42 f.) emphasized that “to keep his weapons is the key passage in his rehabilitative process”, rejecting ARROWSMITH’s theory that Heracles is clinging to the old world of his labours. However, she fails to show the full significance and meaning of keeping the bow and her observation that “they will symbolize a mature and complex *arete* based on suffering and moral strength” is not further illustrated.

⁸² PADILLA 1992: 12.

⁸³ FITZGERALD 1991: 93.

⁸⁴ YOSHITAKE 1994: 153.

⁸⁵ MERIDOR 1984: 213.

⁸⁶ SILK 1985: 16.

⁸⁷ According to SILK (1985: 6): “Herakles, however, was not strictly a god, any more than he was strictly a man: he was both and neither”. He uses an anthropological concept of Mary DOUGLAS who described dangerous beings living in between two worlds, like Heracles himself: “he occupies the no-man’s-land that is also no-god’s-land; he is a marginal, transitional or, better, interstitial figure”. Heracles simply travels a road from being god to being human (*ibid.*, 12). In the last part of the play all references to the divinity of Heracles are absent or if they appear, they are immediately denied (*ibid.*, 14). BARLOW (1982: 121) demonstrates that the last part of the play stands in contrast to the first one, precisely because of its cruel realism, even at the level of poetic language. YOSHITAKE (1994: 145) points out that: “The image of Herakles that this play leaves us with at the end is not that

CONCLUSION

If we look at the play, as I have suggested, from the perspective of the conflict between love and aggression, we can see that while the first two parts of *Heracles* show the conflict of Eros and Thanatos and splitting as the main defence against this conflict along with the terrible costs of this defence, the third and last part is a picture of the creative resolution of this conflict. As in the process of mourning, seen within the psychoanalytic framework, both the object and the self are more integrated and the perception of reality is more adequate. FREUD points out that the individual is then able to invest his libido into new external objects, overcoming the dangers of narcissism – Euripides shows this perspective through the category of heroic φιλία. From this perspective, the Euripidean *Heracles* is far from being a badly composed, inconsistent play – it is rather a brilliant expression of the struggle between Eros and Thanatos in the human psyche, which FREUD and then Melanie KLEIN tend to describe in almost philosophical or religious terms.

Is it likely that Euripides could think in such a way about his own play? He would probably not use “Eros” and “Thanatos” for the creative and destructive forces within the human psyche, even though he certainly recognized the existence and importance of those forces, since – in contrast to Aeschylus and Sophocles – he focused more on the internal world of the individual in order to reflect on such existential experiences as evil, suffering or the capacity for radical goodness. A tempting idea is that *Heracles* is a response to the ordeal of the Peloponnesian War. As I pointed out earlier, MEAGHER suggested a link between the psychological and political dimensions of the play by his analysis of Heracles as a war veteran. Of course, it is hard to deny the political dimension of the majority of the great tragedies of the 5th century BC, since the genre itself was deeply rooted in the communal experience of the Athenian *polis*. The destruction of the safety of the household, the death of the family and the hard work of mourning, forgiveness and φιλία between the Athenian and the Doric heroes – all these motifs are scarcely separable from the painful history of Greece’s civil war that both Euripides and his audience witnessed and experienced. The image of a great, powerful hero who is also very destructive and, ultimately, pays the price for it, might reflect the poet’s view of the Athenian maritime empire.

However, in my analysis I suggested a more individual perspective, which does not exclude the perspective of the political community, but is complementary to it. Euripides seems to be asking questions not only about the source of aggression and destruction in times of war (is it fate? is it the gods? is it us?), but about human nature and its capacity both for destruction and for creativity. Euripides’ intuitions – at least, as far as they are dramatized in *Heracles* – seem

of a superman who is ready to endure any ill, but that of an ordinary human being who struggles and will have to continue to struggle against grief and self-reproach”.

to reveal to his audience that in every human being, even in a heroic saviour such as Heracles, there is a powerful force of destruction and a potential for murder (which FREUD called the death instinct). Audience response to the fall of the great hero and being confronted with his “monstrous” side could release a mourning process parallel to the one that Heracles is experiencing on the stage. The hope for the healing of psychological injuries, for finding a new home and new objects of love, could have been an equally powerful experience for the audience in times of war and destruction.

We can blame the gods or other people, but it does not eliminate the anxiety stemming from meeting our own worst impulses and fantasies. The hope that *Heracles* conveys and powerfully “dramatizes” for us is based on Euripides’ belief that there is an (equal?) force of creativity and love of life (which FREUD called the life instinct). The real challenge for humanity – as *Heracles* suggests – is to confront those forces and bring them into balance, to reconcile them. If we avoid it, the results are horrible, but accepting destructiveness as a part of human nature is a long and hard task, even for a great hero such as Heracles. The outcome of the hero’s confrontation with his destructiveness is quite humble, especially in contrast with the idealized pictures of the hero in the first part of the play. Probably, some time after the play was performed, the Athenian empire engaged in the Sicilian expedition, led by a highly “ambivalent” Athenian figure – Alcibiades. In this light we might wonder whether Euripides taught his fellow citizens anything about the dangers of power and narcissism.

Perhaps not, but his Heracles also accepts the limits of his humanity very slowly and only with great difficulties. It seems that Euripides wants to show that all we can hope for is a fragile compromise between our capacity to destroy and our capacity to love, and that human existence and history will always show that our desire for the complete eradication of evil is ultimately futile, if not dangerous. It is this fragile compromise between love and aggression that makes us human.

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HELENA: ÜBERGEWICHTIG ODER SCHWANGER? ZU MENELAOS' SCHERZ IN EUR. *TROAD.* 1050

von

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ABSTRACT: In Euripides' *Trojan Women*, Hecuba asks Menelaus not to travel on the same ship as Helen so as not to fall in love with her again. Menelaus dismisses this request with a joke question about Helen's potential weight increase. In this paper, it is argued that Menelaus' question is, in fact, not about Helen's physique, but about a potential pregnancy. Further, Menelaus' reply is spoken neither with naivety nor with insecurity, but with scorn and condescension, allocating to Hecuba her new position at the bottom of society.

Die *Troerinnen* des Euripides, uraufgeführt an den Grossen Dionysien im März 415 v. Chr.¹, gelten als eines der in Ton und Stimmung drückendsten und depressivsten unter den erhaltenen Stücken des Dramatikers². Mit vergleichsweise wenig Handlung, dafür umso mehr Tränen, Klagen und rhetorischer Auseinandersetzung, dürfte es sein zeitgenössisches Publikum ebenso verstört haben wie uns moderne Rezipienten. Als Höhepunkt des Dramas darf mit Fug und Recht das dritte Epeisodion (Vv. 860–1059) gelten, in welchem Euripides mit Helena, der (vermeintlichen) Verursacherin des ganzen Kriegsübels, und Hekabe, der Mutter des getöteten trojanischen Kriegshelden und zahlreicher anderer Verwandter, die beiden ärgsten Todfeindinnen aufeinandertreffen und verbal gegeneinander antreten lässt: Erst rechtfertigt sich Helena in einer sophistisch ausgeklügelten Apologie und weist den Vorwurf, am Kriegsausbruch schuld zu sein, weit von sich (Vv. 914–965), ehe Hekabe ihrerseits in einer an die xenophanische Mythenkritik anknüpfenden Anklage ihre Kontrahentin heftig

¹ Zum Aufführungskontext vgl. z.B. SIDWELL 2001; MATTHIESSEN 2002: 147; HOSE 2008: 121 f.; GOFF 2009: 17–35.

² Vgl. z.B. SCODEL 1980: 11: „rather a sad pageant than a play, a series of laments and tableaux“; GELLIE 1986: 114: „There is so much pain in *The Trojan women* that many of its admirers have been prepared to leave at that the play's purpose and meaning“.

und aggressiv angreift (969–1032)³. Dazwischen tritt und steht Menelaos, der sich vordergründig zwar für eine Bestrafung Helenas ausspricht, diese aber in Wahrheit – so spüren Hekabe wie auch die Zuschauer deutlich und bestätigt auch das nachfolgende Chorlied indirekt (Vv. 1107–1109) – gar nicht beabsichtigt auszuführen, da er den Reizen seiner Frau bereits wieder erlegen ist, womit der nominelle Kriegssieger in seiner ganzen menschlichen (bzw. fleischlichen) Schwäche erscheint und einen Kontrapunkt zu Hekabe als der im Zentrum des Stückes stehenden Leidensgestalt⁴ bildet.

Vor dem Hintergrund dieser konsistent düsteren und ernsten Tonlage mag das Ende des dritten Epeisodions umso mehr erstaunen und befremden (Vv. 1042–1059)⁵:

- Ελ. μή, πρὸς σε γονάτων, τὴν νόσον τὴν τῶν θεῶν
προσθεῖς ἔμοι κτάνης με, συγγίγνωσκε δέ.
Εκ. μηδ' οὐς ἀπέκτειν' ἦδε συμμαχούς προδῶς·
ἐγὼ πρὸ κείνων καὶ τέκνων σε λίσσομαι. (1045)
Με. παῦσαι, γεραία· τῆσδε δ' οὐκ ἐφρόντισα.
λέγω δὲ προσπόλοισι πρὸς πρύμνας νεῶν
τῆνδ' ἐκκομίζειν, ἔνθα ναυστολήσεται.
Εκ. μὴ νυν νεῶς σοὶ ταύτῳ ἐσβήτω σκάφος.
Με. τί δ' ἔστι· μείζον βρῖθος ἢ πάροισ' ἔχει; (1050)
Εκ. οὐκ ἔστ' ἔραστῆς ὅστις οὐκ αἶε φιλεῖ.
Με. ὅπως ἂν ἐκβῆ τῶν ἐρωμένων ὁ νοῦς.
ἔσται δ' ἂ βούλη· ναῦν γὰρ οὐκ ἐσβήσεται
ἐς ἦνπερ ἡμεῖς· καὶ γὰρ οὐ κακῶς λέγεις.
ἐλθοῦσα δ' Ἄργος ὥσπερ ἀξία κακῶς (1055)
κακῆ θανεῖται καὶ γυναιξὶ σωφρονεῖν
πάσαισι θήσει. ῥάδιον μὲν οὐ τόδε·
ὅμως δ' ὁ τῆσδ' ὄλεθρος ἐς φόβον βαλεῖ
τὸ μῶρον αὐτῶν, κἄν ἔτ' ὥσ' αἰσχίονες.

- Hel. Bei deinen Knien [bitte ich dich], wirf mir nicht das Übel vonseiten der Götter vor und töte mich nicht, sondern verzeihe mir!
Hek. Und verrate nicht die Mitkämpfer, welche diese da getötet hat!
Ich fliehe dich an an ihrer und ihrer Kinder Statt! (1045)
Men. Hör auf, Alte! Die da habe ich [ja gar] nicht beachtet.

³ Ein „Redestreit [...], der sich in Form einer Schiedsgerichtsszene abspielt, wobei Menelaos die Rolle des Schiedsrichters übernimmt“, so MATTHIESSEN 2002: 153. – Zur ganzen Szene, insb. zur Debatte zwischen Helena und Hekabe vgl. u.a. GRUBE 1941: 291–295; AMERASINGHE 1973; VELLACOTT 1975: 144–148; HOMEYER 1977: 28–30; LLOYD 1984; GELLIE 1986; LLOYD 1992: 99–112; HARDER 1993: 242–249; CROALLY 1994: 134–162; SIMON 1995: 253–257; WORMAN 1997: 180–200; GASTALDI 1999; MERIDOR 2000; MATTHIESSEN 2002: 152–155; STEINMANN 2004: 188–192; HOSE 2008: 130–135; GOFF 2009: 63–72.

⁴ Zu Hekabe als Hauptfigur der *Troerinnen* vgl. z.B. SEECK 2000: 139: „Hekabe, die frühere Königin, bleibt durchgehend auf der Bühne, während ihre Tochter Cassandra, die Seherin, und ihre Schwiegertochter Andromache, die Witwe Hektors, eigentlich nur auftreten, um von ihr Abschied zu nehmen“.

⁵ Der griechische Text folgt der Ausgabe von DIGGLE 1981; die Übersetzung stammt vom Verfasser.

- Ich gebiete den Dienern, sie zu den Schiffshecks
wegzubringen, wo sie [dann] übers Meer fahren wird.
- Hek. Doch soll sie [nur ja] nicht denselben Schiffshohlraum wie du betreten!
- Mel. Was ist denn? Hat sie [etwa] mehr Gewicht als vorher? (1050)
- Hek. Es gibt keinen Liebenden, der nicht immerzu liebt.
- Men. Je nachdem wie der Sinn der Liebenden sich einstellt.
Doch wird sein, was du wünschst: denn sie wird nicht in [dasselbe] Schiff einsteigen,
in das ich [einsteigen werde] – denn du sprichst [gar] nicht [mal] so übel.
Und in Argos angekommen, wird sie, wie sie es verdient, elendiglich (1055)
sterben, die Elende, und allen Frauen [ein Vorbild] sein
fürs Keuschsein. Leicht zwar [wird] dies nicht sein;
dennoch wird ihr Verderben Furcht einflößen
ihrer Torheit – und selbst wenn [die Frauen in Argos] noch schändlicher sind.

Der unausgesprochene Grund für Hekabes Bitte, doch wenigstens nicht gemeinsam mit Helena dasselbe Schiff zu besteigen (V. 1049), ist evident: Sie wünscht sich nichts sehnlicher als Helenas Tod und möchte, wenn Menelaos sie schon nicht vor Ort, sondern erst in Sparta töten lassen will, wenigstens sicherstellen, dass er nicht auf der Reise wieder ihren Reizen erliegt und von seinem Vorhaben abkommt – wohl wissend, dass Letzteres längst geschehen ist und dass ihre Todfeindin als Königin von Sparta weiterleben wird, während sie selber bestenfalls als Sklavin im Hause des von ihr so verhassten Odysseus (vgl. Vv. 274–291) ihr Dasein fristen wird.

Menelaos aber reagiert auf Hekabes Flehen – und das ist das Erstaunliche und Befremdliche, das Interpreten und Kommentatoren nach wie vor herausfordert – mit einem Witz über Helenas vermeintliche Gewichtszunahme während ihres zehnjährigen Aufenthalts in Troja. Was veranlasst den König zu diesem billigen Scherz, der weder in diesem noch in irgendeinem anderen denkbaren Kontext in irgendeiner Weise passend oder angemessen erscheint? Wir können die Reaktion des athenischen Publikums auf dieses ἀπροσδόκητον in jenem Moment im März 415 natürlich nicht rekonstruieren, doch „[d]er Zuschauer dürfte“, so SEIDENSTICKER, „jede andere Antwort eher erwartet haben als diese“⁶. Sofern wir nicht annehmen wollen, es handle sich entweder um einen für uns nicht mehr nachvollziehbaren Insiderwitz (den der Dichter z.B. mit einer im Publikum befindlichen Person oder Personengruppe geteilt hätte), oder aber Euripides habe an dieser Stelle aus irgendeinem unerfindlichen Grund ein Teufelchen geritten und er habe sich ohne Rücksicht auf den Zusammenhang der ganzen Szene einfach einen kleinen Privatscherz erlaubt – und zwar boshafterweise just an jenem emotionalen Höhepunkt der Tragödie, wo „der komische Ton des Verses [...] in schneidendem Widerspruch zum Ernst der Situation [steht]“⁷ –, so verlangt der Vers nach einer Erklärung, die Menelaos' unerwartete Replik in irgendeiner wie

⁶ SEIDENSTICKER 1982: 89.

⁷ SEIDENSTICKER 1982: 89.

auch immer gearteten Weise plausibel (oder zumindest plausibler) erscheinen lässt⁸.

Ein Blick in die einschlägigen Arbeiten und Kommentare lässt im Kern zwei unterschiedliche Deutungsansätze erkennen: einen psychologischen, der den Scherz aus Menelaos' psychischer Verfassung heraus zu verstehen versucht und der als *communis opinio* in der Forschung gelten darf, und einen philologischen, der nachzuweisen sucht, dass es sich in Wahrheit gar nicht um einen Witz handle, sondern dass Menelaos Hekabes Bemerkung wirklich missverstehe. Die gängige, psychologische Deutung sieht den Scherz in der Regel als Ausdruck von Menelaos' Unbeholfenheit, seiner peinlichen Berührtheit und Hilflosigkeit, weil er sich von Hekabe dabei ertappt fühlt, dass er es mit Helenas Bestrafung gar nicht ernst meint, sondern sie in Wahrheit immer noch – oder erneut (nachdem er sie wieder zu Gesicht bekommen hat) – begehrt und aller Unbill, aller Schmach und allem erlittenen Kriegselend zum Trotz wieder als seine Gattin zurückhaben will. Um sich vor Hekabe nicht die Blöße eines notgeilen Pantoffelhelden zu geben, suche er Zuflucht in diesem schwachen Scherz und setze dabei eine naive Miene auf in der Hoffnung, dadurch Hekabes diesbezügliche Vermutung zu zerstreuen. In diesem Sinne äussert sich beispielsweise GRUBE: „[Menelaos] will not kill Helen now, and [...] he will not kill her at all. The poor joke about Helen's weight is a further sign of the king's embarrassment, for, as his words show, he knows perfectly well what Hecuba means“⁹. In ähnlicher Weise interpretiert auch SEIDENSTICKER Menelaos' Antwort, sieht in ihr darüber hinaus jedoch auch noch einen Hinweis darauf, dass durch „den erschreckend unpassend-passenden Witz [...] von diesen griechischen Siegern kein Verständnis oder Mitleid zu erwarten ist und daß auch die letzte tröstliche Hoffnung, an die sich die Opfer klammern, nichtig ist“¹⁰. Eine ebenfalls psychologisierende Deutung bietet auch HIFT, demgemäss Menelaos, der in seinen Gefühlen für Helena zwischen Hass und Liebe hin und her gerissen ist, mithilfe seines Witzes seinen Kopf aus der Schlinge zieht, d.h. sich um eine konkrete Antwort drückt, ob er nun Helena nachgeben

⁸ Der harsche Kontrast zwischen diesem einen Vers einerseits und dem depressiven Grundtenor des ganzen Stückes bzw. der emotionalen Hochspannung im dritten Epeisodion andererseits wird dadurch noch verstärkt, dass „dies die einzige Stelle der ‚Troades‘ ist, an der eine komische Wirkung intendiert ist“ (SEIDENSTICKER 1982: 89), ja dass dies recht eigentlich die einzige Stelle in einer Tragödie überhaupt ist, an der ein tragischer Charakter (scheinbar?) einen Witz reisst (vgl. die Kommentare *ad loc.*: LEE 1976: 244; BARLOW 1986: 214; STEINMANN 2004: 155). – Zu Humor und Komik bei Euripides vgl. die Arbeiten von SEIDENSTICKER 1982: 89–241 und GREGORY 1999–2000; ferner auch KNOX 1979: 250–274.

⁹ GRUBE 1941: 294 f.

¹⁰ SEIDENSTICKER 1982: 89–91.

(und sich vor Hekabe blamieren) oder aber Hekabe folgen (und Helena gegen seinen Willen umbringen lassen) soll¹¹.

Diesen psychologischen Deutungen, die den Witz im Kontext von Menelaos' seelischer Notlage bzw. seiner emotionalen Unsicherheit verstehen wollen, steht eine philologische entgegen, die zu zeigen sucht, dass Menelaos in Tat und Wahrheit gar keinen Witz mache, sondern Hekabe wirklich missverstehe, und der komische Effekt vielmehr aus diesem Missverständnis bzw. aus Menelaos' Naivität resultiere. BUTTREY glaubt, Menelaos missdeute Hekabes Bitte, er möge nicht zusammen mit Helena dasselbe Schiff besteigen, als skurrile Anspielung auf eine mythische Tradition, dergemäss Herakles an der Argonautenfahrt nicht teilnehmen konnte, weil er bei der Besteigung der sprechfähigen Argo von dieser wegen seines Übergewichts zum Aussteigen aufgefordert wurde. Menelaos' mutmassliche Assoziation mit dieser auf Pherekydes zurückgehenden und uns nurmehr fragmentarisch fassbaren Sagenversion (vgl. *FGrHist* 3 F 111 a)¹² diene letztlich dazu, seine Verwurzelung im heroischen Denken und seine Unfähigkeit in Liebesangelegenheiten zu demonstrieren; er meine also seine Rückfrage nach Helenas Gewicht durchaus ernst, und zum Lachen wäre höchstens die Tatsache, dass er so sehr in seiner eigenen, von Ständedünkel und Heldenethos geprägten Welt lebt und selber gar nicht merkt, wie ihm geschieht¹³. An BUTTREYS Interpretation anknüpfend und diese modifizierend, stellt sodann KOVACS die Hypothese auf, Menelaos' Antwort sei (wie BUTTREY schon angenommen hat) zwar durchaus ernst gemeint, sein Missverständnis bestehe jedoch vielmehr darin, dass er Hekabes Bitte mit einem verbreiteten Topos assoziiere, demgemäss

¹¹ HIFT 1998: 74 f.: „[Menelaos] loves Helene and he hates her; he admires her and despises her. Intellectually he has made up his mind to kill her; emotionally he wants to reinstate her. [...] Torn between these extremes he appears ineffectual, fickle and easily manipulated. Helene and Hekabe are fully aware of this and try to exploit his ambivalence. Hekabe plagues him until he feels driven into a corner. He must either round on her and abuse her, which would be tantamount // to declaring Helene the winner, or give in to her and commit himself to killing his wife“. – Ähnliche psychologische Deutungen auch bei HARDER 1993: 248 f. sowie in den Kommentaren *ad loc.*, so bei LEE 1976: 244; BARLOW 1986: 214; BIEHL 1989: 379 f. Letzterer nimmt überdies (m.E. nur wenig überzeugend) an, es liege in Eur. *Troad.* 1050 eine Anspielung auf Soph. *El.* 1241 f. ἄχθος [...] / γυναικῶν vor, und Menelaos habe „die Metapher auf den konkreten Sinn zurückgeführt und auf diese Weise einer absurden Vorstellung Ausdruck gegeben“.

¹² Zeugen dieser Sagenversion sind z.B. auch Arist. *Pol.* 1284 a 17–25 oder Schol. Pind. *Pyth.* IV 303; für weitere Belege vgl. JESSEN 1896: 754.

¹³ BUTTREY 1978: 287: „When in 1049 Hecuba urges him not to take Helen with him on the same ship, Menelaus hears this as curious but serious, perhaps even oracular, and he grasps at an association with an earlier and therefore grander instance. The surface effect is to enlarge his own instance, but the deeper meaning is that he has missed the point. His response is appropriate only to the world of epic heroes striving for adventure, not to the context of love. Had he any understanding of the power which Helen still exercises over him, any sense of his own vulnerability, this interchange would be superfluous, for Hecuba had already warned him early on not to associate with Helen, μή σ' ἔλη πρόβω (891). He did not respond to this, and never understands it“.

Götter physisch schwerer sind als Menschen¹⁴, dass also Menelaos die göttliche Abkunft Helenas von Zeus (vgl. Eur. *Troad.* 398; 766–771; 1109) bzw. ihre potentielle Apotheose, die andernorts bezeugt ist¹⁵, quasi im Hinterkopf habe und sich den Grund für Hekabes Frage, die er nicht richtig verstehe, spontan dergestalt zurechtlege, dass er angesichts von Helenas göttlichen Verbindungen eine Gewichtszunahme ihrerseits tatsächlich für möglich halte¹⁶. Ebenfalls als ernst gemeinte Erwidmung deutet schliesslich GREGORY Menelaos' Replik: dieser bringe damit seine Angst vor einem überladenen Schiff zum Ausdruck. Fettleibigkeit sei in der Antike anders als in der Moderne kein Anlass für Scherze¹⁷, während die Angst vor einem überladenen Schiff einen Sitz im Leben habe; indem Menelaos Hekabes Mahnung so wörtlich nehme, zeige er ungewollt nur, dass er nichts aus ihrer eindringlichen Warnung vor der gefährlich verführerischen Helena gelernt habe¹⁸.

Während also die psychologische Deutung von einem Menelaos ausgeht, der sich naiv stellt, um sein Gesicht zu wahren, nimmt die philologische Interpretation einen tatsächlich naiven Menelaos an, der sich, Hekabes Worte missverstehend, zum Gespött macht. Letztere Interpretation krankt jedoch m.E. an einem Grundsatzproblem, dem die Anhänger der philologischen Methode (von denen der Verfasser sich durchaus nicht *a priori* absetzen will) allzu gerne erliegen: Sie mag auf dem Papier bzw. am Schreibtisch plausibel erscheinen, dürfte sich jedoch mit Blick auf den Kontext einer konkreten Theateraufführung – und Aufführung bedeutet im klassischen attischen Drama bekanntlich immer:

¹⁴ KOVACS 1998: 554–555 nennt als entsprechende Belege *Il.* V 837–839; *Hymn. Hom.* 7, 17–21 und 28, 9 f.; *Ov. Met.* II 161 f.; III 621 f.; IV 449; XV 693 f.; *Luc.* I 56 f.

¹⁵ KOVACS 1998: 555 nennt als Belege für Helenas Apotheose *Od.* IV 561–569; *Hdt.* VI 61, 3; *Isoc. Hel.* 63; *Eur. Hel.* 1666–1669 und *Or.* 1635 f. – Zu Helenas göttlicher Abkunft und späterer Aufnahme unter die Götter bzw. ihrer kultischen Verehrung vgl. den Überblick bei HARDER 1998: 278 f.

¹⁶ KOVACS 1998: 555: „Menelaus' question is [...] a puzzled response to Hecuba's request that he not allow Helen to travel on the same ship. Menelaus may not be thinking of apotheosis, but merely putting forward a possible explanation for Hecuba's urgent-sounding request. But though Menelaus may not fully understand the implications of what Euripides has made him say, his question in 1050 alludes to the apotheosis of his estranged wife“. – Anzufügen ist, dass KOVACS an einem entscheidenden Punkt BUTTREY missversteht, wenn er behauptet (KOVACS 1998: 554): „The big difficulty with Buttrey's interpretation [...] is that it is Helen's βριθός, not Menelaus' that is explicitly mentioned as the problem“. Jedoch ist bei BUTTREY nirgendwo davon die Rede, dass Menelaos die Gewichtsfrage auf sich selber beziehe.

¹⁷ Was sicher nicht stimmt – man denke nur an das in Komödie und Satyrspiel enorm beliebte Motiv des Herakles als Vielfress; vgl. dazu z.B. *Eur. Alc.* 747–802; Alexis, *Linos* fr. 140 *PCG*; HOŠEK 1963: 123–126; GALINSKY 1972: 81–100.

¹⁸ GREGORY 1999–2000: 69–72 (insb. 71 f.). Eine vergleichbare Interpretation findet sich bereits im Kommentar von SCHIASSI 1953 *ad loc.* (*non vidi*), der vermutet, dass „βριθός neben dem Körpergewicht auch die Last der Schätze meine, die Helena mit sich aufs Schiff nimmt“ (STEINMANN 2004: 155).

Uraufführung! – sowie unter Bezug auf einen gewissen *common sense* als unplausibel erweisen. Mit anderen Worten: Es scheint mir schlichtweg unwahrscheinlich, dass das Theaterpublikum die von BUTTREY und KOVACS implementierten Topoi und Intertexte assoziiert haben oder aber die von GREGORY angenommene Transferleistung vom Gewicht der Person zum Übergewicht des Schiffes aufgrund mitgeführter Ladung vollzogen haben dürfte – was jedoch im vorliegenden Fall Bedingung dafür wäre, Menelaos' Replik als echtes, naives Missverständnis deuten zu können. Doch selbst wenn, so dürfte wohl eine assoziative In-Analogie-Setzung der schönen Helena¹⁹ mit einer ‚gewichtigen‘ Gottheit wie beispielsweise der androgynen Athene in *Il.* V 837–839, unter deren Gewicht Diomedes' Wagen ächzt, oder gar mit dem burschikos-gefressigen Herakles²⁰ höchstens das Gelächter noch intensiviert haben²¹. Bezüglich einer konkreten Gewichtszunahme ist ferner zu sagen, dass Helena im ganzen dritten Epeisodion ja physisch zugegen ist, d.h. dass Menelaos sie sieht; somit ist die Annahme, er könnte seine Frage in V. 1050 ernst meinen, allein schon aufgrund der Inszenierung absurd, da er eine signifikante Gewichtszunahme ja bemerken würde, somit also nicht ungläubig und erschrocken danach fragen müsste.

Demgegenüber scheint die psychologische Deutung auf den ersten Blick durchaus plausibel, steht doch Menelaos unzweifelhaft zwischen den beiden gegensätzlichen Frauen und zeichnet sich nicht gerade durch Charakterstärke und emotionale Reife aus. Allerdings stellt sich bei näherem Betrachten die Frage, warum bzw. inwiefern der Bruder des panhellenischen Oberbefehlshabers es denn überhaupt nötig hat, vor Hekabe gut dazustehen, ist diese doch nunmehr eine Sklavin und seine Gefangene, der er keinerlei Rechenschaft schuldig ist. Kurzum: Weder ein *echt* naiver noch ein zwecks Ehrenrettung *gespielt* naiver Menelaos, weder seine tatsächliche noch seine gespielte Unsicherheit, erscheinen plausibel; beide Deutungsansätze – sowohl der psychologische als auch der philologische – sind somit nur bedingt überzeugend. Meines Erachtens wurden insbesondere zwei Aspekte bisher nicht bzw. zu wenig beachtet: einerseits wurde der fragliche ‚Scherzvers‘ in der Regel zu isoliert, d.h. ohne Berücksichtigung von Menelaos' Charakterisierung bzw. seinem Verhalten im gesamten dritten Epeisodion, betrachtet; andererseits scheint den

¹⁹ Ähnlich wie etwa Penelope und Odysseus auch nach zwanzig Jahren nichts an gegenseitiger sexueller Anziehungskraft verloren haben (vgl. *Od.* XXIII 153–163; 231–246), so ist auch in Bezug auf Helena nie von einer Attraktivitätseinbusse nach den zehn Jahren in Troja die Rede – was auch durchaus realistisch ist, müssen wir sie uns doch bei ihrer Entführung als im Teenageralter befindlich und somit bei ihrer Rückkehr nach Sparta ca. Mitte Zwanzig vorstellen.

²⁰ In Pherekydes' Sagenversion klingt das Komödienmotiv des dicken Herakles an (vgl. meine Anm. 17).

²¹ Dass die von BUTTREY und KOVACS angenommenen Assoziationen als *zusätzliche* Bedeutungsnuancen (auf einer metatheatralischen bzw. intertextuellen Ebene) durchaus mitschwingen können, ist damit selbstverständlich nicht ausgeschlossen.

bisherigen Interpreten eine zentrale Bedeutungsnuance des in V. 1050 verwendeten Wortes βρῖθος entgangen zu sein.

Beginnen wir mit dem zweitgenannten Punkt: Das Substantiv βρῖθος, dessen Bedeutung in den Wörterbüchern meistens ohne weitere Spezifizierung mit „Gewicht“ angegeben wird²², ist im 5. und 4. Jh. v.Chr. gesamthaft neunmal belegt. Vier Belege entstammen dem *Corpus Hippocraticum*, wovon wiederum drei aus der Schrift *De mulierum affectibus* stammen, woselbst βρῖθος jedesmal auf das Mehrgewicht einer Frau infolge einer Schwangerschaft (bzw. Scheinschwangerschaft) appliziert wird²³:

Ἦν δέ οἱ ρόος μὴ γίνηται, ἔσται ὥστε δοκέειν ἐγκύμονα εἶναι, καὶ μιγομένη ἀνδρὶ ἀλγείη, ὥστε δοκέειν ἐγκέεσθαι τι, καὶ βρῖθος ἐν τῇ γαστρὶ ἐγγίνεται, καὶ ἡ γαστήρ πρόκειται, καὶ ἰμείρεται ἡδελφισμένως ἐν γαστρὶ ἐχούσῃ, καὶ καρδιώσσει, ἐπὴν ἡμέραι πεντήκοντα μάλιστα ἔωσι. (Hipp. *Mul.* I 3, 8–12)

Wenn sich der [Menstruations-]Fluss bei ihr nicht einstellt, wird es den Anschein machen, als sei sie schwanger, und beim Geschlechtsverkehr mit einem Mann empfindet sie Schmerz, als ob etwas drinnen wäre, und ein **Gewicht** stellt sich ein im Bauch, und der Bauch steht vor, und sie hat Gelüste, gerade wie wenn sie [tatsächlich etwas] im Bauch hätte, und es wird ihr schlecht, nachdem etwa fünfzig Tage um sind²⁴.

Ἦν γυναικὶ τὸ χορίον ἐλλειφθῆ, ἦν μὴ εὐρύστομοι αἱ μήτραι ἔωσιν, χωρέει ἡ κάθαρις ἔλασσον τοῦ καιροῦ, καὶ ἡ γαστήρ σκληρὴ γίνεται καὶ μεγάλῃ, καὶ περίψυξις γίνεται, καὶ πυρετὸς ὀξύς, καὶ πόνος καθ' ἅπαν τὸ σῶμα, γαστρὸς δὲ τὸ κατώτερον τοῦ ὀμφαλοῦ, καὶ βρῖθος γίνεται ἐν τῇσι μήτρῃσι, καὶ στροφή ὡς ἐμβρύου ἐόντος. (Hipp. *Mul.* I 48, 1–6)

Wenn bei einer Frau das Chorion zurückbleibt, wenn die Gebärmutter keine [genug] weite Öffnung zulässt, [dann] geht die Reinigung geringer vonstatten als vonnöten, und der Bauch wird hart und gross, und es gibt eine Abkühlung [des Körpers], heftiges Fieber, sowie Schmerzen am ganzen Körper, und [insbesondere] unterhalb des Bauchnabels, und ein **Gewicht**

²² Vgl. z.B. LSJ s.v. βρῖθος: „weight“; PAPE s.v. βρῖθος: „die Wucht, Last“; BEEKES s.v. βρῖ (βρῖ): „βρῖθος [n.] ‘weight’ (Hp.), βρῖθοσύνη ‘id.’ (Il.)“.

²³ Der griechische Text folgt der Ausgabe von LITTRÉ 1853; die Übersetzungen stammen vom Verfasser. – Die anderen Belege aus dem 5./4. Jh. v. Chr. sind: Soph. fr. 286, 1 RADT; Pl. *Phdr.* 247 b 3; [Hippoc.] *Ep.* 17, 226; Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1101 a 29; [Arist.] *Mund.* 394 b 2.

²⁴ § 3 behandelt gemäss der Überschrift bei LITTRÉ 1853: „Suppression des règles chez une femme qui a eu des enfants. Énumération d’accidents très-semblables“.

stellt sich ein im Bauch, und eine Drehung wie wenn ein Fötus da wäre²⁵.

Ἦν δὲ μὴ ὁ ῥόος ἐπιγένηται, ἀλλ' αἱ μῆτραι ὑπὸ τῶν πρόσθεν παθημάτων ἀερθεῖσαι μὴ χαλάσωσι τὰ ἐπιμήνια, ἢ τε γαστήρ οἱ μεγάλη ἔσται, καὶ βρῖθος ἐνέσται ὡς τῇ ἐν γαστρὶ ἐχούσῃ, καὶ δοκέει ὡσεὶ παιδίον ἐν τῇ γαστρὶ αὐτῆς κινέεσθαι. (Hipp. *Mul.* I 61, 31–35)

Wenn sich der [Menstruations-]Fluss nicht einstellt, sondern die Gebärmutter – [unter dem Einfluss] der Schmerzen von vorher angespannt – die Monatsblutung nicht abfließen lässt, dann wird ihr Bauch gross werden, und ein **Gewicht** wird im Bauch drin sein, wie wenn sie [etwas] im Bauch hätte, und es scheint, als ob ein Kind sich in ihrem Bauch bewege²⁶.

Ist auch die Beleglage quantitativ gesehen nicht immens, so lässt die dreifache Verwendung des Wortes in einem gynäkologischen Zusammenhang doch aufhorchen. Sollte also das Wort βρῖθος in klassischer Zeit nicht bloss ein Alltagswort, sondern tatsächlich auch als medizinischer *terminus technicus* verbreitet gewesen sein – worauf die Stellen im *Corpus Hippocraticum* hindeuten –, so dürfte ebendiese Bedeutungsnuance auch in Eur. *Troad.* 1050 mitschwingen. Damit aber ändert sich der Sinn des Verses ganz entscheidend: Menelaos erkundigt sich in Tat und Wahrheit nicht danach, ob Helena dick geworden sei, sondern er quittiert Hekabes Bitte um getrennte Schiffe mit der Frage, ob seine Frau denn am Ende etwa schwanger (und infolgedessen schwerer) sei. Dass diese Frage einen viel evidenteren Sitz im Leben hat als die nach einer blossen Gewichtszunahme, liegt auf der Hand, ist es doch theoretisch durchaus denkbar, dass Helena kurz vor der Eroberung Trojas noch von Paris oder von Deiphobos schwanger gegangen sein könnte, und ist es ebenso nachvollziehbar und verständlich, dass Menelaos an einem Kuckuckskind keine Freude hätte.

Gleichwohl muss die Frage, ob Menelaos' Replik ernst gemeint sein könne, nach wie vor negativ beantwortet werden, denn es bleibt die Tatsache bestehen, dass, wie oben schon angetönt wurde, Helena das gesamte dritte Epeisodion über auf der Bühne anwesend ist, dass also Menelaos sie sieht und somit eine mit signifikanter Gewichtszunahme verbundene, sprich fortgeschrittene Schwangerschaft ihrerseits wohl längst bemerkt hätte, was eine entsprechende Nachfrage an Hekabe völlig unglaubwürdig macht. Auch die Frage, inwiefern ein absichtliches, gespieltes Missverständnis von Hekabes Bitte zwecks Gesichtswahrung sinnvoll sein könne, da doch Menelaos – der König und Sieger – gegenüber Hekabe – der Sklavin und Verliererin – keinerlei Rechenschaft ablegen muss

²⁵ § 48 behandelt gemäss der Überschrift bei LITTRÉ 1853: „Chorion retenu, empêchant les lochies de couler“.

²⁶ § 61 behandelt gemäss der Überschrift bei LITTRÉ 1853: „Hydropisie générale causée par une affection de la rate. Cette hydropisie gagne la matrice“.

und von ihr ja auch nichts zu befürchten hat, steht nach wie vor im Raum. Hier nun kommt der andere Punkt ins Spiel, der m.E. bisher zu wenig Beachtung gefunden hat: die Kontextualisierung des ‚Scherzverses‘ innerhalb der ganzen Szene und dessen Verknüpfung mit Menelaos’ Charakter und seinem Verhalten gegenüber Helena und Hekabe.

Vorausschickend ist zu sagen, dass die Grundstruktur des mythischen Verlaufs – nämlich dass Menelaos nach der Eroberung Trojas Helena nicht umbringt oder sonstwie bestraft, sondern sie mit nach Sparta nimmt und mit ihr dort wieder glücklich zusammenlebt – durch den Mythos seit archaischer Zeit klar vorgegeben ist²⁷. Somit ist *a priori* weder aus produktions- noch aus rezeptionsästhetischer Sicht mit einer entsprechenden Änderung zu rechnen; sprich: weder hätte es sich Euripides erlauben können, die *Troerinnen* mit Helenas Tod enden zu lassen, noch dürfte das zeitgenössische Publikum einen entsprechenden Traditionsbruch goutiert haben. Dennoch verkündet Menelaos zu Beginn der Szene seine (angebliche) Absicht, Helena nach Sparta mitzunehmen und sie dort zu töten (Vv. 876–879; 905) – eine Absicht, die er nach Beendigung des Redeagons und kurz vor dem ‚Scherzvers‘ noch einmal klar bekräftigt (Vv. 1039–1041). Somit spielt Euripides mit der hypothetischen Option eines ungehörigen Traditionsbruchs, und die Möglichkeit, dass die Geschichte rein theoretisch auch anders ausgehen könnte, wird Teil der theatralischen Illusion und des entsprechenden kathartischen Erlebens von φόβος und ἔλεος vonseiten des Publikums. Was aber Menelaos’ innerfiktionale Entscheidung bezüglich Helena angeht, so sind grundsätzlich zwei Möglichkeiten denkbar: Entweder ist davon auszugehen, dass er sich von Helenas Worten bzw. von ihrem hinreissenden Äusseren im Laufe der Szene umstimmen lässt und beschliesst, ihr zu verzeihen und sie nun doch wieder zurückzunehmen (vgl. Hekabes Bitte in Vv. 891–894, den Anblick der ‚Hexe‘ zu vermeiden), diesen Stimmungsumschwung jedoch (Neudeutsch gesprochen) nicht ‚offen kommuniziert‘ – oder aber wir müssen annehmen, dass er von Beginn weg gar nicht im Sinn hatte, Helena zu töten, sondern sie von Anfang an als Gattin wieder zurückwill und also all seine Beteuerungen, er werde sie in Sparta steinigen, nur vortäuscht. Letztgenannte Ansicht vertritt WILAMOWITZ in der ihm eigenen Schärfe, jedoch, wie mir scheint, in sachlich treffender Art und Weise: „Wer [...] die Versicherung des Euripideischen Menelaos ernst nimmt, und ihm glaubt, er wolle seine Frau wirklich als abschreckendes Beispiel für den weiblichen Leichtsinn hinrichten, der lässt sich ganz [...]

²⁷ In der Fassung der *Ilias parva* soll Menelaos bei Helenas Anblick das bereits gezückte Schwert angesichts ihrer Schönheit wieder geworfen haben (fr. 19 PEG = fr. 19 EpGF); gemäss *Iliupersis* habe er sie mit sich aufs Schiff genommen, nachdem er Deiphobos getötet hatte (Zusammenfassung des Proklos, PEG p. 88, 14 f. = EpGF p. 62, 21 f.). Gemäss *Odyssee* IV leben Menelaos und Helena nach der Rückkehr nach Griechenland als längst versöhntes Ehepaar wieder in Sparta, wo sie mit Hermione eine gemeinsame Tochter haben (*Od.* IV 12–14). Für einen Überblick vgl. auch WILAMOWITZ 1919: 276–279; JOUAN 1966: 181 f.; HOMEYER 1977: 1–13; HARDER 1993: 239–241.

von den Worten düpiieren und hört den Ton nicht, in dem dieser Menelaos sie spricht²⁸. In der Tat lässt Menelaos' mehrfache Wiederholung seiner (vorgebliehen) Absicht, Helena umzubringen, aufhorchen, ja man kann sich des Eindrucks nicht erwehren, dass er ebendies gerade deshalb so sehr betont, weil es nicht seiner eigentlichen Intention entspricht. Ferner findet sich ein verräterischer Hinweis in Menelaos' Antwort auf Hekabes Bitte, nach Helenas Apologie eine Gegenrede vorbringen zu dürfen (Vv. 911–913):

Με. σχολῆς τὸ δῶρον· εἰ δὲ βούλεται λέγειν,
ἔξεστι. τῶν σῶν δ' οὖνεχ', ὡς μάθης, λόγων
δῶσω τόδ' αὐτῆ· τῆσδε δ' οὐ δῶσω χάριν.

Men. [Dies ist] ein Geschenk[, das] Zeit [erfordert]²⁹; wenn sie aber sprechen will, [dann] soll es [so] sein. Damit du es aber weisst: wegen *deiner* Argumente werde ich ihr dies gewähren; nicht um ihrer willen werde ich es gewähren.

Hekabe muss Menelaos' Aussage zweifellos so verstehen, dass er lieber zügig die Heimreise antreten möchte und die Zeit für den gewünschten Redeagon eigentlich nur ungerne opfert. Der Vers kann jedoch aus Menelaos' Sicht auch so gemeint sein, dass er seinen Entschluss, Helena leben zu lassen und wieder als Gattin zurückzunehmen, längst gefasst hat und deshalb das Rededuell für eine *Zeitverschwendung* hält³⁰. Ausserfiktional betrachtet, kann die Aussage σχολῆς τὸ δῶρον als klarer metatheatralischer Indikator für Letzteres gelesen werden. Hinzu kommt, dass das gesamte dritte Epeisodion keinerlei Hinweis darauf bietet, dass Menelaos im Laufe der Szene einen Gesinnungswandel durchmacht; ein solcher Indikator wäre doch aber Voraussetzung dafür, dass wir Menelaos' anfängliche Absichtsbeteuerungen bezüglich Helenas Tötung überhaupt für bare Münze nehmen könnten. All dies – in Verbund mit dem oben genannten, sich aus der mythischen Tradition ergebenden Sachzwang – weist m.E. klar darauf hin, dass Menelaos' Worte einerseits und seine Absicht andererseits von Anfang an divergieren, sprich, dass er gar nie im Sinn hatte, Helena *nicht* wieder zur Frau zu nehmen.

²⁸ WILAMOWITZ 1919: 276. In diesem Sinne auch EBENER 1953–1954: 709–711; dagegen SIMON 1995: 273, Anm. 5.

²⁹ Zur grammatikalischen Konstruktion vgl. BIEHL 1989: 344 *ad loc.*

³⁰ In diesem Sinne auch EBENER 1953–1954: 711: „Menelaos gibt dem Ersuchen nach. σχολῆς τὸ δῶρον (911) ‚was ich gestatte, bedeutet nur einen Zeitverlust‘; das weiß er am besten; seine Haltung wird sich nicht mehr beeinflussen lassen; die Frau, die er begehrt, wird ihm nicht entgehen. Hekabe versteht die Worte anders; sie empfindet den ungeduldigen Rächer, der in dem Gewähren einer Frist zur Anklage und Verteidigung den Augenblick der Sühnevollstreckung nur zwecklos hinausgezögert sieht“. Die Ambiguität der Phrase ist in der Übersetzung von STEINMANN 2004 greifbar: „Diese Gunst ist verlorne Zeit“. Zu σχολή mit negativer Konnotation vgl. LSJ s.v. [I.]3: „idleness“; die angegebenen Belege entstammen mit Soph. fr. 308 RADT und Eur. *Hipp.* 384 ebenfalls der Tragödie.

Vor diesem Hintergrund besehen, kann dem Rededuell zwischen Helena und Hekabe also gar keine echte Entscheidungsfunktion zukommen, und zwar weder inner- noch ausserfiktional. Anders gesagt: Hier wird ein Agon in Szene gesetzt zwecks Entscheidung einer Frage, deren Antwort ausserfiktional durch die mythische Tradition bereits vorgegeben ist und die mit grosser Wahrscheinlichkeit auch innerfiktional vonseiten des Entscheidungsträgers Menelaos schon als entschieden zu betrachten ist³¹. Worin aber besteht dann die Funktion des Rededuells? Auf der metadramatischen Ebene ist es evidentermassen der Dramatiker Euripides, der – vereinfacht gesagt – keine Gelegenheit ungenutzt lässt, einen rhetorischen Agon in Szene zu setzen oder gar, wie hier, seine Protagonisten in sophistischer Manier auftreten zu lassen³². Innerfiktional gesehen aber ist der Redegaon m.E. nichts anderes als ein in nachgerade boshafter Manier inszeniertes Privatvergnügen des Menelaos, der mit Helena und Hekabe sein übles Spiel treibt, indem er die beiden Kontrahentinnen, über die er absolute Macht besitzt, gegeneinander antreten lässt. Beide wissen nicht, was sie erwartet, und dementsprechend bitten Helena um die Möglichkeit einer Apologie (Vv. 903 f.) bzw. Hekabe um die Gelegenheit zu einer Entgegnung (Vv. 906–908). Beide müssen mit ihrem Tod rechnen; entsprechend setzen sie sich in Szene und versuchen rhetorisch mit allen Mitteln, zu ihrem Ziel zu kommen – Helena, um ihr Leben zu retten; Hekabe, um durch Helenas Tod wenigstens eine gewisse Genugtuung bzw. Wiedergutmachung zu erlangen³³. Wenn

³¹ Somit ist auch die Frage müssig, wer das Rededuell denn nun eigentlich gewinne; vgl. beispielsweise CROALLY 1994: 155, Anm. 74 (mit weiterer Literatur); DOVER 2001; ausserdem LLOYD 1984: 304 (ebenfalls mit weiterer Literatur) und CROALLY 1994: 137 f. zur Frage nach der angeblichen Inversion der üblichen Reihenfolge von Sieger und Verlierer in diesem Agon; die Inversion hängt gemäss STEINMANN 2004: 150 damit zusammen, dass „die Rede mit den besseren Argumenten, vorgetragen vom sympathischen Charakter, an zweiter Stelle [folgt]“. GOFF 2009: 71 (ebenfalls mit weiterer Literatur) sieht m.E. das Entscheidende: „[T]he Homeric *Odyssey* in any case tells us that Helen ‘wins’ the long game of survival. Others respond appropriately to the sophistic conundrums by observing that the audience derive no secure impression of what will happen and cannot judge the right at all, particularly when the whole enterprise of searching out the guilty has come to seem thoroughly questionable“.

³² Eine alte Streitfrage ist bekanntlich die nach der (intertextuellen?) Beziehung zwischen Gorgias’ *Lob der Helena* (fr. 11 B) und Helenas Apologie in *Troad*. 914–965; vgl. dazu ORSINI 1956; JOUAN 1966: 185 f.; BASTA DONZELLI 1985; BUCHHEIM 1989: 159 f.; LLOYD 1992: 100 f.; CROALLY 1994: 155 f. (mit Anm. 75 für weitere Literatur); SPATHARAS 2002 (mit Anm. 1 für weitere Literatur). Damit verknüpft ist letztlich die Grundfrage nach Art und Ausmass des Einflusses sophistischer Rhetorik und ihrer Texte auf die Tragödien des Euripides generell; vgl. dazu NESTLE 1901 (veraltet, aber grundlegend); CONACHER 1998; ALLAN 1999–2000; EGLI 2003. – Ob Euripides von Gorgias konkret beeinflusst war oder nicht, ist an und für sich nur bedingt relevant; entscheidend ist, dass der Auftritt einer sich in sophistischer Manier rechtfertigenden Helena in einer euripideischen Tragödie einen Sitz im Leben hatte und vom Publikum zur Praxis der Sophisten in Bezug gesetzt wurde; vgl. z.B. CROALLY 1994: 155, Anm. 75: „The question is not one of priority, or even influence, but of similarity“.

³³ Es liegt somit eine Form der tragischen Ironie vor, indem der Zuschauer mit dem Dichter – und in diesem Fall auch mit einer *persona* des Stücks: Menelaos – ein Wissen über die Zukunft

sich Menelaos gegenüber Helena raubeinig gibt (vgl. Vv. 901 f.; 905; 911–913; 1039–1041), dann m.E. vor allem deshalb, weil er das boshafte Spiel mit ihr genießt, weil er ihre Angst machen will – und insbesondere auch, weil er sie anstacheln will, in ihrer Rede gegen Hekabe alle Register zu ziehen. Der Menelaos in den *Troerinnen* ist somit nicht, wie SIMON es formuliert, einfach nur „leicht beeinflussbar und willensschwach“³⁴, noch ist er, GELLIES Worten folgend, „an operatic hero and leader of men [...] who blusters and threatens but is transparently soft and vulnerable“³⁵; vielmehr agiert er durchaus zielstrebig und vor allem kalt berechnend und weiss von Anfang an genau, was er will.

In diese Interpretation der Gesamtszene lässt sich nun auch der fragliche ‚Scherzvers‘ integrieren: Nach dem Ende des Rededuells scheint Menelaos von der Debattiererei genug zu haben, und er drängt auf ein rasches Ende, indem er Hekabe in schroffem Ton zu schweigen heisst (V. 1046 παῦσαι, γεραία) und seine Diener anweist, Helena aufs Schiff zu bringen (Vv. 1047 f.). Hekabe aber verstummt nicht, sondern klammert sich – spürend, dass Menelaos andere Pläne hat – an einen vermeintlich letzten Strohalm, indem sie ihre Bitte um getrennte Schiffe äussert (V. 1049). Damit aber überschreitet sie eine Grenze, da sie Menelaos’ ‚Ende der Diskussion‘ nicht respektiert, sondern – sich ihrer neuen Rolle als Sklavin offenbar noch zu wenig bewusst – weiter debattiert. Der Scholiast dürfte hierbei im Kern das Richtige gesehen haben, wenn er Hekabes verzweifelte Bitte mit den Worten kommentiert: καὶ τοῦτο γέλοιον, γέλοιότερον δὲ ὁ ἀντερεῖ· [es folgt das Zitat von V. 1050]³⁶. Das Adjektiv γέλοιος bedeutet hier „lächerlich“ nicht im Sinne von „lustig, witzig“, sondern im Sinne von „absurd, grotesk“³⁷. Hekabes Bitte ist insofern absurd, als sie an den neuen Realitäten vorbeigeht, da sie nun keine Königin mehr ist, sondern sich am untersten Ende der sozialen Skala, als Sklavin, wiederfindet, und somit in keiner Weise mehr in einer Position ist, von irgendjemandem irgendetwas zu verlangen – am wenigsten jedoch von dem Mann, der sie und ihr Volk besiegt hat³⁸. Wenn Menelaos Helena und Hekabe in Rede und Gegenrede hat gegeneinander antreten lassen, so implementiert dies evidentermassen nicht, dass

(nämlich dass Helenas Tod gar nicht zur Debatte steht) teilt, das die handelnden Figuren Helena und Hekabe nicht haben.

³⁴ SIMON 1995: 273, Anm. 5.

³⁵ GELLIE 1986: 116.

³⁶ Zitiert nach der Ausgabe von SCHWARTZ 1891: 369, 24.

³⁷ Vgl. LSJ s.v. II.: „*ludicrous, absurd*“.

³⁸ So auch (allerdings zweifelnd) GREGORY 1999–2000: 70: „My best guess is that the scholiast was struck by the disparity between Hecuba’s servile status and the peremptory tone of her warning to Menelaus, where the emphatic particle *οὐν* accentuates the imperiousness of her words and the periphrasis *νεὼς σκάφος* heightens their solemnity“. So richtig diese Beobachtung m.E. ist, so halte ich die Schlussfolgerung „[t]here is indeed an incongruity here, but arguably the effect is pathetic rather than ludicrous“ (*ibid.*) für falsch.

die beiden auch nur im Geringsten etwas zu sagen haben – das Rededuell ist, wie oben dargelegt, vielmehr eine Inszenierung zum Zwecke der *delectatio*: des Menelaos auf der Bühne, der Zuschauer im ausserszenischen Raum. Hekabe aber hat ihre neue Rolle noch nicht gefunden; sie überschreitet den Rahmen des ihr Gebotenen, indem sie sich gegenüber Menelaos auf eine Art und Weise verhält und äussert, die ihrem neuen sozialen Status nicht mehr entspricht. Menelaos entlarvt die Unangemessenheit dieses Verhaltens, indem er auf ihre „absurde“ (γέλοιον) Bitte mit einer noch „absurderen“ (γελοιότερον) Replik reagiert – und damit Hekabe auf demütigende Weise in den Senkel stellt.

Menelaos' Replik ist also weder das unfreiwillige Resultat eines echten Missverständnisses noch der unbeholfene Versuch einer ausweichenden Antwort zwecks Gesichtswahrung und Überspielen eigener Unsicherheit, sondern vielmehr die schallende Ohrfeige, mit der Hekabe vom Bruder des panhellenischen Oberbefehlshabers an ihren Platz gewiesen wird. Wir müssen uns Menelaos' Worte als mit einer Mischung aus Verachtung, Spott und Sarkasmus gesprochen denken³⁹. Nur vordergründig naiv, jedoch mit einem gewollten Ton deutlich hörbarer Herablassung und bitterböser Ironie, fragt Menelaos: „Ja warum denn? Ist die gute Helena etwa schwanger?“ Was er damit aber tatsächlich sagt, ist: „Meinst *du*, Hekabe, tatsächlich, dass du mir irgendetwas zu sagen hast?“ Hekabe jedoch lässt sich davon weder aus der Ruhe bringen noch provozieren, sondern antwortet souverän mit einer nachgerade gnomischen Bemerkung (V. 1051), einem – so HOSE – „Satz, der die Diskrepanz zwischen dem Gesagten und dem Gefühlten erschließt, das [...] sich durchsetzen wird“⁴⁰, indem sie sagt: „Es gibt keinen Liebenden, der nicht immerzu liebt“. Damit gibt sie ihrem Kontrahenten zu verstehen, dass sie ihn durchschaut hat und sich von ihm nicht einschüchtern lässt. Dieser aber fährt in seinem verächtlichen Sarkasmus weiter, indem er Hekabe in zynischer Manier ‚Recht gibt‘ (V. 1054 καὶ γὰρ οὐ κακῶς λέγεις) und – in völlig überzogener und deshalb m.E. eindeutig sarkastischer Weise – ankündigt, Helena zu Hause töten zu lassen und somit ein Exempel zwecks Wahrung der Keuschheit der übrigen Spartanerinnen an ihr zu statuieren (Vv. 1055–1059).

Ein zynischer, bissiger, ja sadistischer Menelaos passt letztlich besser in ein Drama, das von der absoluten Macht der Sieger über die ebenso absolute Ohnmacht der Besiegten handelt, als einer, der sich unsicher, wankelmütig und peinlich berührt zeigt – zumal, wenn wir die *Troerinnen* als Warnung vor übertriebener Hybris und unangemessener Siegestrunkenheit vonseiten der vermeintlich Unbesiegbaren am Vorabend der für Athen folgenschweren

³⁹ Diese Möglichkeit zieht auch GREGORY 1999–2000: 72 in Betracht, ohne sie jedoch weiter zu verfolgen: „Is he speaking with dismissive sarcasm?“

⁴⁰ HOSE 2008: 135.

Sizilienkatastrophe (415–413 v. Chr.) lesen wollen⁴¹. Kommt hinzu: Menelaos ist als Kriegssieger zwar nachgerade allmächtig, und er spielt diese Macht ohne jegliches Schamgefühl aus – doch hat er keine Macht über sich selber, wenn es um die schöne Helena geht. Er kann zwar Hekabe mit groben Worten abkanzeln, doch Helenas Reizen erliegt er widerstandslos – sogar dann, möchte man ergänzen, wenn sie ihm ein fremdes Kind unterschieben sollte. Dass er Hekabe mit einer sarkastisch geäußerten Bemerkung an ihren Platz weist, deren Inhalt ausgerechnet seine grösste Angst als gehörnter Ehemann – nämlich ein Kuckuckskind von seinem Nebenbuhler untergejubelt zu bekommen – zum Inhalt hat: darin liegt die eigentliche, tiefere Ironie von Menelaos' Scherz.

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⁴¹ Vgl. z.B. SCHMID, STÄHLIN 1940: 480: „Euripides läßt keinen Zweifel darüber, daß er nicht nur den Troischen Krieg, sondern jeden Eroberungskrieg verdammt. [...] Der Dichter wollte hier als Lehrer und Warner zu seinem Volk sprechen in dem Augenblick, als er den Abgrund erkannte, in den es sich leichtsinnig zu stürzen im Begriff war, und er konnte das in keiner wirksameren Form tun, als er es in dieser Trilogie getan hat“. Man beachte allerdings den berechtigten Einwand von HOSE 2008: 122: „Was die Debatten um den Sizilienzug betrifft, so muß in Erinnerung gerufen werden, daß Euripides lange vor den Auseinandersetzungen in der Volksversammlung seine Stücke dem Archon vorzulegen hatte. So ist auch hier Vorsicht geboten“. – Zu den historischen Ereignissen um und ab 415 v. Chr., die den historischen Aufführungskontext der Troerinnen bilden, vgl. auch meine Anm. 1. Zum Grundsatzproblem einer interprétation historique der euripideischen Tragödie vgl. beispielsweise ZUNTZ 1955; DE ROMILLY 1986: 183–219; MATTHIESSEN 2004: 22–26. Zur pazifistischen Botschaft der Troerinnen vgl. insb. auch das hochberühmte Prologende des Poseidon (Vv. 95–97); dazu KOVACS 1983; MANUWALD 1989; KOVACS 1996.

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DOING THINGS WITH WORDS IN PLAUTUS' *PSEUDOLUS*

by

ŁUKASZ BERGER

ABSTRACT: The article proposes a linguistic analysis of the pragmatic component of the dialogical exchange in Plautus' *Pseudolus* in order to shed some light on the verbal behaviour of the main character. After examining two particularly important scenes in the play (*Pseud.* 1–132, 415–574) it is stated that the source of Pseudolus' influence is the illocutionary level of his speech.

While the original contributions of the Roman playwright regarding his Greek sources were identified by scholars decades ago, *Pseudolus* surely stands out for the great accumulation of Plautine elements in Plautus. *Pseudolus* presents a whole spectrum of stock characters known from other Plautine comedies: the ingenious slaves (Pseudolus, Simia), the malicious pimp (Ballio), the naïve youth (Calidorus), the severe father (Simo), the boastful cook, and even a reminiscence of a braggart warrior in the soldier's slave, *cacula* (Harpax)¹. Not only the *personae*, but also intrigue based on double deceit (of *leno* and *senex*), false identities (Pseudolus-Syrus, Simia-Harpax), and the play-within-the-play, can be considered typical of Plautus. Thus, modern scholars mostly agree on calling *Pseudolus* a masterpiece of its genre even if it was acknowledged to contain some important structural problems² and a rather simplified and inconsistent plot³.

In order to explain the inconsistencies in this late and successful Plautine play, scholars have drawn attention to its *quasi* improvised⁴, metatheatrical and

¹ BARSBY 1995: 60 f. Cf. MOORE 1998: 94 f., who stresses the way the *dramatis personae* of the play meet and even exceed the audience's expectations, being "super-versions" of the stock characters. It would not be accurate, however, to claim that *Pseudolus* elaborates on every significant Plautine figure, for the roles of the *meretrix* or *uxor* are not developed in this play (cf. *Bacch.*, *Cas.*, *Poen.*, etc.). According to Cicero (*Sen.* 50), *Pseudolus* was one of Plautus' favourite plays.

² WILLIAMS 1956.

³ WRIGHT 1975: 403.

⁴ BARSBY 1995.

metacompositional⁵ form, taking into account insights from diverse approaches, including audience-oriented criticism and gender studies⁶. Most scholars consider the language of comedy crucial. Alison R. SHARROCK argues that “difficulties in the text constitute a creative chaos, a deliberately ‘weak’ plot which is pretending to be improvised, where we are dazzled by the power of words”⁷. According to John WRIGHT, in turn, language is used in the play to carry out numerous protean transformations of Pseudolus, who through metaphors and similes becomes a general, a poet and a cook, among others⁸. Niall W. SLATER significantly entitles the chapter dedicated to *Pseudolus* in his *Plautus in Performance* with the Shakespearean “Words, Words, Words”. Rather than adopting a linguistic perspective, however, he focuses on the “tension between the merely verbal and the theatrical” aspects of the artistic text, fully controlled by the eponymous slave character⁹. To summarize those views one can conclude that it is the language, not the plot, that constitutes the main value of the play, the verbal artfulness being incarnated in the figure of Pseudolus, even if his role in the intrigue is surprisingly disappointing¹⁰.

What remains a potential problem is *how* the “power of words” he has at his disposal actually works. In this respect it is crucial to analyze the Plautine text on the level where the control of the *servus callidus* over other characters takes place – through the verbal interaction and not exclusively on the poetic (J. WRIGHT, A.R. SHARROCK) or theatrical (N.W. SLATER, T.J. MOORE) ground. Hence, in this article we undertake to explore the interpersonal on-stage communication using theories of linguistic pragmatics and conversational analysis¹¹ in order to expli-

⁵ According to SHARROCK (1996) we may speak of the metacompositional level of the play every time its character refers to the literary composition of the comedy he/she is part of, while the metatheatre consists of autoreferences to its performance (cf. SLATER 2000). Cf. n. 28 and 29 below.

⁶ BATSTONE 2005.

⁷ SHARROCK 1996: 156.

⁸ WRIGHT 1975: 406 f. By referring to the classic work of E. FRAENKEL, the scholar argues that the control Pseudolus has over the words consists in the “magic” use of the metaphors which affect the ontological status of the character and his conduct. Nevertheless, focusing on the poetic aspects of the text does not explain the mechanisms of such a control, even if this method seems sufficient for WRIGHT to state that “it is language that provides the key for understanding the comic greatness of Pseudolus, and ultimately the comic achievement of Plautus himself”.

⁹ SLATER 2000: 119.

¹⁰ As *servus callidus* Pseudolus does not seem very efficient. It takes him more than 300 verses of the play to come up with some provisional (and obvious) plan or to only suggest he has one (388), while in the end his success depends on a happy coincidence (669: *opportunitas*). Even the actions originating from his own initiative are passed over to be conducted by Simia. The apparent helplessness of Pseudolus is even more striking if we compare him to Palaestrio, who takes over the critical situation almost immediately (*Mil.* 181). Cf. WRIGHT 1975: 404.

¹¹ It must be noted that we do not intend to analyze here the linguistic forms of the pragmatic functions, i.e. what LEECH (1983: 9 f.) calls the pragmalinguistic level. Rather we concentrate on the

cate the vague notion of the “power of words” used rather intuitively by most scholars. Some of the recent concepts of human verbal behaviour combined with the theory of speech acts¹² should shed more light on how Pseudolus actually *does things with words*.

1. A MODEL OF THE COMMUNICATION ACT

The title of this article directly refers to the classic work of John L. AUSTIN¹³, the very founder of the Speech Act Theory (SAT) and pragmatics itself. He was the first to acknowledge that many utterances we produce in everyday life have an influence on the surrounding reality – they are *speech acts*, and not mere statements. Since “doing things with words” cannot be said to be either true or false, the English philosopher introduces the concept of the *felicity* of the acts, which stands for their proper and effective execution. Thanks to socially established conventions, we can express the intentions (e.g. promising, ordering, asking, etc.) we want to be fulfilled in uttering something by *illocutionary acts*, while changes to the (physical or psychological) world of the addressee are called by AUSTIN *perlocutionary effects*¹⁴.

With the growing interest in aspects of interpersonal communication, however, some critics have noted that in its classical version, SAT is based on a one-sentence utterance, which is rather potential than actually produced in its original environment: a canonical conversation¹⁵. As a result, scholars have more recently attempted to integrate SAT with the model of communication competence¹⁶,

total speech situation (cf. COHEN 1994: 176) and describe the phenomena of the socio-communicative interaction. For a systematic approach to the pragmatic component see RISSELADA 1993; KROON 1995; DICKEY 2002.

¹² The pragmatic perspective in the study of Roman comedy, and of Plautus in particular, has already gained itself an important position in modern scholarship. The application of speech act theory seems to be of great value when analyzing the erotic discourse between the Plautine characters (COHEN 1994) or in the use of the performative divorce formulae (ROSENMEYER 1995). Most recently, scholars have also chosen to refer to the linguistic politeness theory (works by R. FERRI, L. UNCETA GÓMEZ) or adopt a broader interactional view of conversational analysis (works by P. LECH, S. ROESCH). For Terence, there is an important study (MÜLLER 1997) which has a more systematic, pragmalinguistic character.

¹³ AUSTIN 1962.

¹⁴ AUSTIN 1962. The theory of AUSTIN was continued by many scholars, who mainly concentrated their work on illocutionary acts as the most conventionalized ones and, thus, more likely to be classified. For review and further bibliography cf. SADOCK 2004; KALISZ 1993.

¹⁵ Cf. LEVINSON 1983: 278–283, 475: “...speech act types are not the relevant categories over which to define the regularities of conversation”.

¹⁶ GEIS 1995. Apart from the general theory of conversational competence, GEIS bases his theory on conversational analysis and artificial intelligence research in natural language processing. Thus, his modification of classical SAT is potentially more appropriate for describing multiturn speech sequences.

functional discourse grammar¹⁷, or various sociological ideas on human interaction¹⁸. A similar point of view is shared by a Polish linguist, Aleksy AWDIEJEW, who distinguishes a special domain of grammar, the *interactional level*, which, through its conventional items, enables the speaker to enter into interpersonal communication as well as maintain and organize it¹⁹. The minimal unit of this verbal interaction is a *speech act* embedded into a *conversational exchange* with a particular goal to fulfil. In order to succeed in the interaction and reach his/her objectives the speaker intentionally performs a coherent sequence of acts in a way by which they are effectively interpreted by the addressee. In short, he/she must apply a particular *conversational strategy* which can change and is dynamic in its nature as the conversation proceeds²⁰.

Although we find many of these modern linguistic theories useful for the purpose of this article, it must be admitted here that not all of them can be easily adapted for classical languages or their literary corpora²¹. We argue, nevertheless, that it is the interactional level of the comic language of *Pseudolus* that should provide us with some more accurate explanation of the verbal superiority of the clever slave. Much has been said about the improvisational routines designed by the text of the play²², hinted at already by the lack of a conventional prologue²³ which would normally inform us of the way the plot develops and ends. Without

¹⁷ HANNAY, KROON 2005. This model, based on a fusion of Functional Grammar and Discourse Analysis, seems particularly applicable to classical languages such as Latin (cf. KROON 2009).

¹⁸ DRABIK 2010; OSIKA 2011. Among the sociological inspiration in this trend of communication study one can mention the model of interactional ritual (GOFFMAN 2005) or the theory of communicative action by J. HABERMAS (cf. OSIKA 2011: 121–150).

¹⁹ AWDIEJEW 2004: 16 f. The author takes over the tripartite distribution of grammar (i.e. informational, interactional and textual) from the functions of language proposed by M.A.K. HALLIDAY. The distinction of the level of interaction (interpersonal as opposed to representational) is also fundamental for HANNAY, KROON (2005: 91–94).

²⁰ AWDIEJEW 2004: 69.

²¹ The pragmatic perspective, and the theoretical speech-act approach in particular, is very frequently applied to literary studies – especially to analyze aspects of theatrical discourse. There are valuable works on the pragmatics of Spanish (RIVERS 1986), Shakespearean (ADAMCZYK 2006) or German (HAUENHERM 2002) drama, to mention but a few. Classical scholars also reach for some pragmatic tools in the study of Aeschylus' use of speech acts (PRINS 1991), Sophoclean language (BUDELMANN 2000) or Senecan communication patterns (SPEYER 2003). For references to Roman comedy and Plautus cf. n. 12 above.

²² BARSBY 1995: 65–69. MARSHALL 2006: 245–279 (on *Pseud.* cf. 269 f.).

²³ The commentary of WILLCOCK (1987: 96) gives a two-line prologue which the author excludes as fragmentary and post-Plautine. She suggests, however, that the comedy may have had one – given the references to the previous events (*Pseud.* 352, 406–408) – which is now lost (cf. LEFÈVRE 1997: 39). On the other hand, we may argue that the expository function of the first scene and Phoenicium's letter makes such a prologue rather superfluous.

a regular metacompositional frame including some kind of *prolepsis*²⁴, the on-stage performance is closer than ever to a canonical situation of utterance. The impression that the characters are improvising and not following any previously planned script²⁵ makes their verbal interactions seem particularly dynamic and natural. The syntactical structure of the dialogues is, indeed, mostly based on parataxis, full of lexical repetitions or pleonastic extension of the diction (e.g. 85–107²⁶) – formal features that generally may be labelled as colloquial²⁷. Even considering the very high level of metatheatricity²⁸, we would argue that the pragmatic component of the conversational exchange in the Plautine play follows the rules of natural communication²⁹ and, accordingly, may be described in terms of the linguistic theories mentioned above.

2. REVEALING THE OBVIOUS (*PSEUD.* 3–82)

Since the play begins with no off-stage introduction to the story, the exposition of the plot takes place in the first scene, between Pseudolus and his young

²⁴ Cf. SHARROCK 1996: 157, where the scholar justifies the lack of a proleptic prologue by the impromptu character of the intrigue: “a trick that is all done with words can hardly be explained beforehand”.

²⁵ Even if there is no summary of the whole story at the beginning of the play, the plot turns out to be so conventional (even for *palliata*) that the audience can easily predict the next step of the characters. Only the manipulations of Pseudolus as the poet-director may change the expected flow of events, for he is the only one to master the comic code (SLATER 2000: 128–130).

²⁶ In the very emotional verbal exchange between Pseudolus and Calidorus one may notice the numerous lexical repetitions (*drachuma*, *dare*, *lacruma*), which shows little thematic progression of the conversation (cf. *Pseud.* 91–93). Some repeated words intensify the diction (cf. the stressed indefinite sense of *unde unde* in 106), others are used as wordplay to gain some poetic meaning (“ante tenebras tenebras persequi” in 90). The pleonasm “a me abalienatur atque abducitur” (95) may be an example of a colloquial circumlocution, although it is also marked with alliteration so common in the Plautine comic style (cf. “ut me defraudes drachumam dederim tibi” in 93). The syntax in general is dominated by short sentences paratactically connected by discursive particles (*et*, *sed*, *verum*, *nam*) or interrupted by parenthetical comments and exclamations (*opinor*, *ne pave*).

²⁷ Some features that appear colloquial on the other hand may have different origins (e.g. poetic or religious diction). DE MELO (2011: 335) briefly discusses this problem with some further notes and references.

²⁸ The dramatic illusion is constantly being interrupted on the *metatheatrcial* level when Pseudolus is no longer a comic character but refers to himself as an actor aware of his technique (MOORE 1998: 96–100). Elsewhere, he suggests he is a poet (or even Plautus himself, cf. SLATER 2000: 145 f.; HALLETT 1993: 25 f.) creating *ad hoc* the script of the on-stage reality – on the *metacompositional* level, as SHARROCK (1996: 156; cf. WRIGHT 1975: 414 f.) chooses to call it.

²⁹ BATSTONE (2005: 28 f.) interprets differently the term “metatheatre” as an “interest in representing the world’s rhetoricity and staginess” according to the Shakespearean phrase “life’s a stage”. By doing so he claims to follow the original meaning of the concept once coined by L. ABEL. This view – as controversial as it may seem – gives us another level of realism applicable also to the linguistic sphere, since “one of the claims being made by the Plautine play is that farce is the truth. Rip off the façade, undo convention, stop action, and this is what you are, what you really are [...]. Polite convention and realistic dialogue are manipulations and suppression of potential, even when they are for self-interested ends”.

master in distress, Calidorus. Interestingly enough, we learn about the central problem of the comedy through a long dialogical exchange initiated by the clever slave. The *question*³⁰ by which he addresses his interlocutor triggers a whole series of adjacency pairs (mostly *question-requests* and *answers*) aimed at eliminating the informational asymmetry both between the participants and between the play and its audience. The way the main character formulates his initial intervention, however, suggests there is no real knowledge asymmetry whatsoever. Given the grandiloquent style of the words by which he first “takes” the scene, Pseudolus introduces himself not as an obliging slave, concerned about his master’s mysterious conduct, but rather as a linguistic theoretician.

Ps. Si ex te tacente fieri possem certior,
ere, quae miseriae te tam misere macerent,
duorum labori ego hominum parsissem lubens,
mei te rogandi et tui respondendi mihi. (3–6)

This part (3–6) may be “self-referentially non-communicative”, as A.R. SHARROCK³¹ once put it, but still contains the very essence of verbal interaction which, in the first place, is an exchange of information – known to one participant and potentially new to the other. This kind of communication implies an effort (*labor*) on both sides: the right formulation of the question (*labor rogandi*) by the speaker, and the corresponding reaction of the addressee (*labor respondendi*).

If one takes into account the fact that Pseudolus is a stock-character in a very predictable *palliata* plot who at the same time undergoes significant transformations into a poet (401–404) and a comedy director (546, 552, 915), the discussion on the conversational exchange (3–6) may have some theatrical interpretation³². The effort (*labor*) of being an audience of a particular performance pays off only if the complex message that has been transmitted from the stage provides our experience with something new³³. Thus a predictable spectacle, just like a well-known answer, is something Pseudolus would be gladly spared (“*parsissem lubens*”). Saying

³⁰ We choose to mark, now and further on, the speech acts’ categories with italics in order to distinguish them as conversational units of a pragmatic nature from its common language sense. By its illocutionary force *questions* are similar to *directives* (being a *request* for an *answer*), and constitute the initial element of an adjacency pair (cf. LEVINSON 1983: 303–305). In terms of AWDIEJEW (2004: 108–113) these acts are introduced by various modal-syntagmatic operators. If it seems irrelevant to the main argument of this paper, we choose not to give more extensive definitions of every speech act.

³¹ SHARROCK 1996: 158.

³² SLATER (2000: 119 f.) notes that Phoenicium’s letter is a kind of comic script which is read and criticized out loud by Pseudolus-poet (*Pseud.* 74). The interpretation of the first lines as a theoretic manifest, then, is not so unlikely.

³³ Cf. the artistic “programme” of Pseudolus, when he compares himself – as the intrigue’s architect – to a poet (*Pseud.* 401–404) whose literary objective is to find something new (“quod nusquamst gentium”) and present it in a convincing manner. Further on, as an improviser he considers himself a very good inventor of new things (568–570).

something like that to the *palliata* public in a bombastic and ironic style must have included some self-deprecating humour given the apparent “weakness” of the plot³⁴.

Ps. [...] nunc quoniam id fieri non potest, necessitas
me subigit ut te rogiem. responde mihi:
quid est quod tu exanimatus iam hos multos dies
gestas tabellas tecum, eas lacrumis lavis,
neque tui participem consili quemquam facis?
eloquere, ut quod ego nescio id tecum sciam. (7–12)

In linguistic terms, the rest of Pseudolus' initial intervention (7–12) counts as one conversational move rhetorically diffused into smaller acts. After giving the theoretical motivation for asking, he employs what S.C. LEVINSON calls a *pre-request*³⁵ (“necessitas/ me subigit ut te rogiem”) in order to prepare the ground³⁶ for the real directive act (“responde mihi”). This procedure is not enough, though, for such a master of communication as the Plautine *servus*, since he makes his verbal action as explicit as possible by providing us with a full pragmatic definition of the felicitous *question* act³⁷: “eloquere, ut quod ego nescio id tecum sciam”³⁸. As we will see further on, he formulates the conditions of a successful verbal interaction (i.e. of the Austinian *felicitas*) that he will not be able to fulfil.

The grandiloquent and slightly sarcastic entrance of Pseudolus should not inspire a positive reaction from the interlocutor as it seems an aggressive way to grant himself a dominant interactional *face* (cf. below). The self-centred response

³⁴ To resolve an amorous crisis by deceiving the boy's father is such a typical comic device that even the father himself – in a moment of self-consciousness as *senex* – is well aware of the danger (*Pseud.* 430–435; 484 f.). In general, the *déjà vu* sensation is something common throughout the play, as if all of the *personae* had met before in similar circumstances. It is not the first time Pseudolus hears out the problems of *adulescens* (16), the enmity between *servus* and *leno* lasts for a long time (233 f.; 261 f.), while Simo is afraid the “old thing” will happen again (436). Thus, the characters themselves, just like the audience, are able to see and to enjoy the series of clichés in the story. Ironically, the pleasure of the reception consists not in seeing something entirely new (402) but in mocking their expectations with the “improvised” chaos and flaws of the storyline (cf. MOORE 1998: 92 f.).

³⁵ LEVINSON 1983: 356–364. The so-called *pre-sequences* in the structure of the dialogical exchange announce the subsequent move of the speaker, enabling the addressee to collaborate in order to carry out the action or to avoid it.

³⁶ After the *pre-request* of the slave, the real conversational situation would imply some (non-verbal) reaction from the addressee which would function as feed-back for the speaker, suggesting that he can carry on with his strategy. Calidorus seems so self-centered and absent-minded that supposedly he does nothing to discourage Pseudolus from the realization of the *request*, giving him at the same time a signal to proceed with the real *request*.

³⁷ AWDIEJEV (2004: 109) formulates similar preparatory conditions for *questions*: (1) the speaker is convinced that the addressee is able to provide the requested information or opinion; (2) the speaker himself does not have complete knowledge regarding the propositional content of the *question*.

³⁸ The very phrase seems proper to the Greek epic style, which was prone to circumlocutions, e.g. Hom. *Il.* I 363 (WILLCOCK 1987: 97). Compare it also with the words of Phoenicium at the end of her letter at *Pseud.* 71: “haec quae ego scivi ut scires curavi omnia”.

of Calidorus in (13) may confirm the interpretation of the slave's first words as fairly impolite. However, Pseudolus right away launches his conversational strategy to gain the trust of his young master by showing empathy (14) and stressing a personal interest in learning about the critical situation.

- [*pre-request*]³⁹ Ps. Licet me id scire quid sit? nam tu me antihac
supremum habuisti comitem consiliis tuis.
[*confirmation*]⁴⁰ CAL. Idem animus nunc est./
[*request*] Ps. Face me certum quid tibi est,
[*promise*] iuvabo aut re aut opera aut consilio bono.
[*agreement*] CAL. Cape has tabellas, tute hinc narrato tibi
quae me miseria et cura contabefacit.
[*confirmation*] Ps. Mos tibi geretur... (16–22)

A well planned sequence of another *pre-request* (16), checking on the preparatory condition of the addressee's permission before carrying out the actual *request* (18) – both followed by positive feedback (18, 20) – is rhetorically intensified with a *promise* (19). Thus, in the psychological comfort of talking with a perfectly sympathetic and collaborative interlocutor, Calidorus agrees to respond to the initial *question* but in a comic delay he chooses an indirect way to explain his amorous problems – the letter of Phoenicium. At this stage of the interaction the communicative strategy adopted by Pseudolus is what E. GOFFMAN calls a *line* – “that is, a pattern of verbal and nonverbal acts by which he [*scil.* a speaker] expresses his view of the situation and through this his evaluation of the participants, especially himself”. Accordingly, the slave presents himself as an interlocutor personally involved in the situation, constructing his *face*, which the same sociologist defines “as the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a particular contact”⁴¹.

As soon as Pseudolus is handed the tablets, nevertheless, he intentionally aborts his cooperative *face*, striking the young master with a series of aggressive puns (23–25, 29 f., 35 f.) and (in a way) sexist criticism⁴² concerning the writing of his mistress. The communicative deceit of *servus callidus* meets a typical objection in the reaction of Calidorus (24, 27 f., 30) who can no longer expect sympathy and verbal cooperation. His “conversational” state of shock may even be compared with the very poetic image of *solstitialis herba* (38 f.), suddenly

³⁹ On the left side of the text cited we put (in square brackets) the names of the speech acts corresponding to a given proposition. Some of them, due to their position in the sequence of conversation, may have a double interpretation, which leads to some comical misunderstandings (cf. below).

⁴⁰ In the terminology of AWDIEJEW (2004: 112) the *confirmation* act is a response to assertive acts, while we choose to use the label *agreement* for the acceptance of *requests*.

⁴¹ GOFFMAN 2005: 5.

⁴² Cf. HALLETT 2006: 39–41.

withered after flourishing for a short time⁴³. Paradoxically, the only instance when Pseudolus does collaborate with *adulescens* in the production of speech is when he helps him to finish what was intended to be a curse on the slave, manipulating it into best wishes for himself (36 f.).

In general, the mocking interventions – very Plautine in tone – abruptly change the initial asymmetry of power and knowledge. Surprisingly enough, it is Calidorus who must pay attention (32) to the content of the letter, as if he did not know what it is about⁴⁴. Pseudolus has to silence him in order to read (40, 61), although – as *servus callidus* – he also gets carried away making some witty comments (47 f.). In any case, the eponymous character of the play has the initiative but he only seems to be interested in the words of Phoenicium as long as they offer him material for puns. He obviously knows from the beginning what is bothering his young master and, therefore, the *question-request* speech acts from the first lines of the play turn out infelicitous according to his own definition (12). Also the initial strategic *promise* (19) to help Calidorus seems to be invalid, since, when reminded of his previous commitment, the slave expresses only indecision. The adolescent, taking into account the abrupt change of his interlocutor's *face* and the new aggressive and pitiless *line* he adopts (cf. irony and mockery in 74–77), interprets his response (78) as an indirect *rejection* and sighs dolefully.

[<i>request</i>]	CAL. Nilne adiuuare me audes?
[<i>rejection</i>]/[<i>question</i>]	PS. Quid faciam tibi?
[<i>exclamation</i>]/[<i>answer</i>]	CAL. Eheu!
[<i>agreement</i>]/[<i>promise</i>]	PS. Eheu? id quidem hercle ne parsis: dabo. (78 f.)

Pseudolus, in turn, still feels that he is in full command of the conversation, choosing to decipher the *exclamation* of his partner (79) as a propositionally valid *answer*⁴⁵ according to the preferred sequence of an adjacency pair (*question-answer*). Thus, by repeating *eheu*⁴⁶ in the following exchanges (80–82) the slave is supposedly fulfilling the very request of Calidorus, while all he actually does is a parody of a collaborative verbal interaction.

⁴³ SLATER (2000: 119) interprets the vegetative image as an example of paratragic style contrasted to the artistic pretension of Pseudolus-reader, while SHARROCK (1996: 159) sees the passage more in a sexual context.

⁴⁴ JACHMANN (1933) was the first to notice the apparent inconsequence of *advortito animum* in the mouth of Pseudolus – cf. ZWIERLEIN 1991: 77.

⁴⁵ The actual second element of the adjacency pair initiated by Pseudolus in *quid faciam tibi?* (78) happens to be deferred in time (by the series of Calidorus' lament in 80–82) and appears in 85 f. For some modern examples of so-called *insertion sequences* see LEVINSON 1983: 304–306.

⁴⁶ According to ZWIERLEIN (1991: 82) the series of *eheu*, rather rare in the Plautine corpus, is a later interpolation.

3. THE TRANSFER OF THE ILLOCUTIONARY FORCE (*PSEUD.* 83–132)

We have learned so far that Pseudolus, as the Greek etymology of his name⁴⁷ indicates, is a deceitful speaker but also a very skillful one. Manipulating the meaning of his own verbal acts and whole conversational sequences, he turns out to be an almost invincible interlocutor, who tries another trick in order to reassure his dominant position in the rest of the play. Once again the cunning slave triggers his behavioural strategy⁴⁸ after giving up his mocking and pitiless tone in order to restore the atmosphere of trust. He formulates vague *promises* (103–107, 112 f.) focusing on the results of their fulfilment to stimulate his young master's imagination. Then, as a guarantee of the validity of his commissive acts Pseudolus crosses the boundaries of theatricality by hinting at his previous achievements (109 f.) as a stock-character, indicating his mask (107)⁴⁹. Finally, he can execute his ultimate move. In order to put the whole comic machinery into motion, a strong speech act sequence is needed which would provide him with sufficient illocutionary force to stress his superior position.

To obtain a more detailed definition of the most recurrent speech acts let us focus on four situational parameters indicated by the work of A. AWDIEJEW and Z. NĘCKI⁵⁰. After examining their distinctive features (cf. Table 1), including the benefits and limitations of the speaker (S) and the addressee (A) as well as the relation between them, we may interpret the interactional implication of the comic characters in the following lines:

[order]	Ps. [...] Roga me viginti minas, ut me effecturum tibi quod promisi scias,
[request ₁]	roga, opsecro hercle. gestio promittere.
[agreement][request ₂]	CAL. Dabisne argenti mi hodie viginti minas?
[agreement][promise ₁]	Ps. Dabo. molestus nunciam ne sis mihi. atque hoc, ne dictum tibi neges, dico prius:
[threat]/[promise ₂]	si neminem alium potero, tuom tangam patrem.
[gratitude]	CAL. Di te mihi semper servent. verum, si potest,
[request ₃]	Pietatis causa – vel etiam matrem quoque. (114–122)

⁴⁷ Cf. SHARROCK 1996: 170 (with further references).

⁴⁸ We use here the term AWDIEJEW (2004: 78–85) gives to describe a sequence of speech acts designed in order to influence the action of the interlocutors inside the interactional frame. The behavioural strategy would include *directives* and *commissives* from the classification of AUSTIN–SEARLE.

⁴⁹ SLATER (2000: 121) quite convincingly associates the mention of the twitching eyebrow with exposing the actor's mask as a reminder of his function in the play. On the theatrical level, in turn, this gesture may have been interpreted by the Romans as an omen (WILLCOCK 1987: 101). Cf. SKWARA 2001: 187.

⁵⁰ Discussed by G. OSIKA (2011: 150–158). We have decided to add to the typology the category of *threat* (in the interpretation of OSIKA included in the *orders*), closely related to *promise*.

Although the interactional ritual we witness here undoubtedly has the fixed formulaic form of *stipulatio*⁵¹, the sequence consists of simple acts which are both initial and reactive. Pseudolus makes use of this legal procedure – totally out of range for real life slaves – to trigger an illocutionary chain of commitment and control. He formulates an *order* (114), later attenuated into a *request* (116), so as to persuade Calidorus to formally ask (117) him to procure the money for Ballio. Now the main character can make a *promise* (118), accepting the commitment it implies but also enjoying the full control it gives him over the execution of the action. As a result, he can prove his dominance by warning his young master – in what seems to be more of a *threat* that he may strike his father Simo. The comic code, however, dictates Calidorus a rather peculiar reaction since the financial detriment of his family members actually eliminates the obstacles to reach his own happiness – this paradox induces him to interpret the threat of Pseudolus as a *promise* which he even tries to negotiate (122).

speech act	initial situation	perlocutionary effects	limitation of action	relation of control
<i>request</i>	assuming ability and willingness of A	benefit of S	commitment of A	certain dominance of S
<i>promise</i>	assuming positive expectations of A	benefit of A	self-commitment of S	full dominance of S
<i>threat</i>	assuming no willingness of A	disadvantage of A	very strong limitation of A	full dominance of S
<i>order</i>	assuming ability but no willingness of A	benefit of S + penalty for noncompliance	very strong limitation of A	strong dominance of S

Table 1: Contrastive typology of speech acts, based on the model of AWDIEJEW, NĘCKI (1996), in: OSIKA 2011: 159.

The illocutionary force has been transmitted from the socially superior figure (*civis Romanus*) to a slave, but in the world of the play it was originally activated by *servus callidus* who literally forces his master to transfer all the control to him. Hence, the linguistic and legal act we just have witnessed gains some kind of magical dimension, finishing the on-stage construction of the hero and providing him with his verbal armour. Self-commitment and full control (123) over the execution of the intrigue – a hyper-speech act constructed out of interdependent *promises* and *requests* – constitutes the very identity of the Plautine clever slave.

⁵¹ For details on this Roman practice see WILLIAMS 1956: 427; WILLCOCK 1987: 101; LEFÈVRE 1997: 23 f. It is worth noticing that legal procedures, religious ceremonies or economic transactions are simply speech acts with institutionally controlled conditions and sanctions – they have already been discussed as such by AUSTIN (1962).

No wonder that, after he finally takes up his mission of deceiving and extorting, he does not mind warning everybody on and off the stage not to believe any of his words (124–128).

Ps. [...] omni populo,
omnibus amicis notisque edico meis,
in hunc diem a me ut caveant, ne credant mihi. (126–128)

The sincerity condition does not seem relevant to his speech act grammar, for Pseudolus is capable of overcoming even the pragmatics of his discourse and changing reality in spite of the felicity of his illocutions⁵².

4. THE EXPLICITNESS OF THE DECEIT (*PSEUD.* 415–561)

In fact, reaching his conversational objectives without “putting his cards on the table” is no challenge for him. Thus, he has the nerve to communicate to his victim, Simo, that he will deceive him, which automatically invalidates, in the eyes of *senex*, the illocutionary force of each of his future acts (504 f.). In a certain way, by making his (perfectly predictable) plan explicit, Pseudolus is an innovator in the role of *servus callidus* who deceives fathers, pimps and soldiers in the hiding. He, in turn, is no longer willing to ask anything with a hidden agenda (507 f.) like Palaestrio, Chrysalus or Tranio would⁵³.

	SIM. Quid nunc agetis? nam hinc quidem a me non potest argentum auferri, qui praesertim senserim.
	ne quisquam credat nummum, iam edicam omnibus.
	Ps. Numquam edepol quoiquam supplicabo, dum quidem
[threat]	tu vives. tu mihi hercle argentum dabis,
[threat]	abs te equidem sumam. /
	SIM. Tu a me sumes? Ps. Strenue.
[wager]/[negation]	SIM. Excludito mi hercle oculum, si dederō. /
[threat]/[confirmation]	Ps. Dabis.
[warning]	iam dico ut a me caveas. /
	SIM. Certe edepol scio,

⁵² As simply as he devaluates his illocutionary force he retracts this (*Pseud.* 561–568), disorienting not only the other characters but also the audience.

⁵³ *Pseudolus* is a late play of Plautus’ and is believed to have been first staged in 191 BC (WILCOCK 1987: 1), when the model of the Plautine deceitful slave must have already been well established. Therefore the interplay with the public’s expectations about the character’s behaviour seems very plausible.

[wager]	{	<i>apodosis</i> ₁	si apstuleris, mirum et magnum facinus feceris.
		[<i>promise</i>]	Ps. Faciam. /
		<i>protasis</i> ₁	SIM. Si non apstuleris? /
		<i>apodosis</i> ₂	Ps. Virgis caedito.
		<i>protasis</i> ₂	sed quid, si apstulero? /
		<i>sanction</i> ₁	SIM. Do lovem testem tibi,
		<i>apodosis</i> ₃	te aetatem impune habiturum. /
		<i>sanction</i> ₂	Ps. Facito ut memineris.
			SIM. Egon ut cavere nequeam, cui praedicitur?
			Ps. Praedico, ut caveas. dico, inquam, ut caveas. cave. Em istis mihi tu hodie manibus argentum dabis. (504–518)

What we perceive as a display of extreme self-confidence and impudence is, in fact, a carefully designed interactional strategy. The key to success is to insist on repeating the *threat* as if it were some kind of magical spell, step by step (508, 510, 518), “programming” the conduct of the interlocutor with exactly the same command (*dabis*⁵⁴) which functions as something between an *assertion* about the future, a *threat* and an *order*. The climax of the sequence is an intricately designed utterance (517) as explicit syntactically as Pseudolus’ confession itself.

praedico, ut caveas.	dico	(inquam)	ut caveas.	cave!
performative verb + [warning]	performative verb / phatic operator	phatic operator	[warning] [order]	[warning] [order] [threat]

Table 2: The structure of a complex conversation move (*Pseud.* 516).

A series of different speech acts pertaining to the same (behavioural) conversational strategy seem to have been grouped (cf. Table 2) in ascending order according to their illocutionary intensity from a *warning* through an *order* to a *threat*. The presence of performative verbs (*praedico*, *dico*) helps the hearer to decipher with more accuracy what kind of interactional meaning the propositional content (*cavere*) has in each case. Along with the decreasing semantic specification of those verbs, their morpho-syntactical structure gets more simplified: the prefixed form (*prae-dico*) introducing a subordinate phrase is substituted with its compositional lexical base (*dico*) and then with a simple imperative form.

Finally, returning to the interactional level, we may notice that the contact with the hearer is maintained either by the double function of the performative *dico* or with the specialized operator *inquam* (the so-called phatic operators, cf. Table 2). The imperative form at the end of the verse is deictic and accumulates all of the above phenomena: minimal syntactical structure combined with maximal illocutionary force and interpersonal function. If the linguistic superiority of

⁵⁴ The verb, moreover, is highlighted metrically always at the end of the verse.

Pseudolus⁵⁵ has not yet been rightly appreciated, after such a display of his “power of words”, this line should easily gain him another conversational victory.

The danger of being deceived and “robbed” after the warning of the deceiver himself, however, seems to Simo so unreal and absurd that he objects to taking it seriously (516). Actually, responding with fear to such a *threat* would affect the interactional *face* of the old man as someone who, despite his perspicacious judgment (420–422, 481–489) and precaution (464 f.), is not able to prevent a foretold attack. Pseudolus, in turn, is so persuasive that he is already creating in Simo a mental image of that “robbery” by using (518) the deictic components of the context: he brings the danger close in space (*em*), in time (*hodie*) and right to the hearer (*tu, istis manibus*).

In order to defend the *face* the old man has been granted during the whole conversation, he enters into the trap of *servus callidus* and, unwilling to express any suspicion or intimidation, he feels that he is in a perfectly safe position to offer a *wager* (511–515). This act has already been suggested in the form of a formulaic pseudo-*wager* (510) by which Simo is hyperbolically expressing incredulity and *negation*. His other conditional phrase (512) is no longer rhetoric and shows that the strategy of Pseudolus is working, for *senex* formulates the first (axiological) effect of fulfilling the *wager* – the admiration (*apodosis*₁). Now the slave only needs to accept the offer to participate with a *promise* (513) and both interlocutors proceed to negotiate the actual (behavioural) consequences (*apodosis*₂, *apodosis*₃) of the satisfaction (*protasis*₂) and failure (*protasis*₁) of the *wager*⁵⁶. To regulate its execution a felicitous betting act also requires some external sanction like the authority of a god (*sanction*₁) or losing honour in the eyes of the partner (*sanction*₂). In this way the first “illocutionary” web of the intrigue has been set.

Despite that splendid performance, however, Pseudolus is not yet satisfied and proposes (522) another bet (530–546) but this time his *crescendo* of confidence inspires doubts and suspicions in Simo (538–541). Nevertheless, with another bold *promise* (541–545) and a little support from Callipho – *senex lenis* and a great admirer of the slave’s verbal art (519, 523) – the other *wager* is also accepted. As Gordon WILLIAMS explains convincingly, both bets are complementary: if Pseudolus manages to get the girl from the pimp, Simo – to fulfil the second *wager* – will give him the money, which in turn equals winning also the

⁵⁵ It must also be noted that the passage abounds in characteristic Plautine poetic features like *gradatio*, repetitions, and alliterations.

⁵⁶ *Wagers* are treated by A. AWDIJEJEW (2004: 160 f.) as a ritualized form of *promise* which function in an informal or institutionalized (e.g. sports betting) version. The syntax of the *wager* act can be compared to a conditional phrase consisting in the expected state of events (*protasis*) and the consequences of its reality (*apodosis*). The satisfaction after winning the bet may be moral (“You were right!”), material (financial benefits) or behavioural (when it includes some kind of action as a reward).

first one⁵⁷. The success of his conversational agenda, then, is achieved during the very same interaction.

5. THE TRIUMPH OF THE SPEECH

The combination of complex syntax in the betting acts seems to be another example of the significance Plautus assigned in his programmatic play to the interactional level of language. Scholars are right in stating that the whole plot is executed by words⁵⁸ but their power is not codified in the poetic or theatrical aspects of diction⁵⁹. By highlighting these few (out of many other) instances above, we claim that what really changes the comic reality is the illocutionary force of Pseudolus' discourse. The system of his control and dominance seems to depend entirely on a complex speech acts thread⁶⁰, manipulating the other participants by a dynamic mechanism of self-commitment, personal interests and limitations. The slave⁶¹ utters "Illic homo meus est" (381) with satisfaction after casting his verbal web over one of his victims. What A.R. SHARROCK calls "pulling the wool over the eyes" of Pseudolus' interlocutors⁶² has been described by us in theoretical frames of conversational analysis and *face-work*, trying to elucidate the ways in which the cunning slave manages to manipulate others. The scenes we have analyzed demonstrate his skillfulness in predicting the subsequent conversational move of his partner or inducing him to react according to his hidden agenda. Even if the interventions of the interlocutor seem not to follow his strategic line, Pseudolus is capable of imposing his own interpretation on somebody else's words in order to adjust them to his interactional goals. Apart from that, some of the dialogues suggest that the Plautine *servus* is well aware of the mechanisms of constructing

⁵⁷ WILLIAMS 1956: 436 f., 442 f. From scene to scene, however, there still seems to be some inconsistency regarding the money interchange (cf. LEFÈVRE 1997: 23–31). In this respect, we agree with SHARROCK (1996: 162 f.) that such pedantry in counting the *minae* from the wagers may be another occasion for Plautus to mock the audience (and scholars).

⁵⁸ SHARROCK 1996: 157.

⁵⁹ Cf. SLATER 2000: 127: "Pseudolus needs more than words, he needs poetry and the power of its truth-seeming fictions. He needs the power of dramatic poetry, of the theatrical". The explanation of SLATER does seem convincing, especially on the metacompositional level (141: "Pseudolus has taken words, the words of others in the form of letters, and made them into his own play through his command of theatricality", cf. WRIGHT 1975: 413). It must be stressed, however, that what turns "mere words" into reality-changing theatre is not only the artistic talent of the slave-poet but, above all, his linguistic competence when manipulating the pragmatic component of his speech.

⁶⁰ Pseudolus himself is comparing his actions to weaving (*Pseud.* 399 f.).

⁶¹ This phrase is very typical for Plautine slaves when they see their cunning plan is working (e.g. *Mil.* 334; *Curc.* 3, 61).

⁶² SHARROCK 1996: 165 f.: "It is so hard to follow the workings of the plot, not because it is a particularly involved plot, but because of all the clever talking, because Pseudolus is pulling the wool over our eyes also".

a transactional image of self (*face*) during the communicative process. As a result, he is able to use those interpersonal relations to create – whenever he considers it useful – a positive impression of himself as a collaborative interlocutor or – on other occasions – to attack the *face* of his partner in order to gain a dominant position. By aggressive puns Pseudolus sometimes simply accomplishes the artistic programme of Plautine humour, but frequently his mockery is designed specifically to disorient the interlocutor.

The superiority of *servus callidus* as a speaker comes from different sources. As A. SHARROCK suggests, he is the *owner* of the comic reality, for he is the only one who knows the actual plot and not only the *palliata* storyline conventions. Thus, paradoxically, his *promises* and *threats* – whether we believe them or not – are most likely to be fulfilled since he has already included them in the script⁶³. That is why he is so positive (565 f.) about the final success of his intrigue. On the other hand, he manifests an extraordinary pragmatic competence (as part of his general communicative abilities) and a pre-Austinian awareness of the intricacy of speech acts (cf. 3–6, 12, 517). Whether poetically transformed into Delphic oracle (483–488) or Socrates (464 f.), Pseudolus dominates the rules of both theatrical and off-stage communication, leading the play through his illocutions to the final perlocutionary effect – the triumph of speech.

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⁶³ SHARROCK 1996: 162.

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VERGIL'S *CERTISSIMA SIGNA* REINTERPRETED:
THE ARATEAN *LEPTE*-ACROSTIC IN *GEORGICS* I

by

JERZY DANIELEWICZ

cum sole et luna semper Aratus erit
Ovid, *Amores* I 15, 16

ABSTRACT: Vergil qua imitator of Aratus' art appears to be an infinite source of concealed layers of text interpretation to be explored. The author of this paper argues that at *Georgics* I 424 ff. the poet announces, and then encrypts, not only his signature, but also the Aratean ΛΕΠΤΗ-acrostic in Latin transliteration; its specificity consists in its being divided into two parts, placed in reverse order (first PTE, then LE). As regards the form, the imitation is extended to further include a reversed telestich (TOTIS). The author suggests a precedent in Aratus (*Phaen.* 783–787), where the reversed telestich ΟΣΣΑ ΙΣΗΣ ΣΑ (= ὅσσα ἴσῃς, σά, “as much as you perceive, [is] yours”) can be discerned. In the passage in question, yet another, undiscovered so far, reversed acrostic (SCIES, lines 439–443) is discussed. While tracing parallels both in Greek and Latin poets, the author additionally presents such newly detected reversed acrostics as SPES at Germanicus' *Aratea* 573–576 and ΠΑΣΑ at Aratus' *Phaenomena* 246–249. As far as the “Greek” acrostics in Latin transliteration are concerned, the author proves the possibility of such a phenomenon by indicating some further, previously undetected, reproductions of the Aratean acrostics ΠΑΣΑ and ΛΕΠΤΗ in Manilius' *Astronomica*.

Vergil's disputed *sphragis* MA(ro)-VE(rgilius)-PU(blius) at *Georgics* I 429–433, first noticed and analysed by Edwin L. BROWN in 1963¹, albeit afterwards accepted rather sceptically², or even consciously ignored by scholars³, seems to

¹ E.L. BROWN, *Numeri Vergiliani. Studies in «Eclogues» and «Georgics»*, Bruxelles 1963 (Collection Latomus LXIII), pp. 102–104.

² See e.g. Thomas HALTER's review of BROWN's book in *Gnomon* VI 1964, p. 582; R.G.M. NISBET's review of R.F. THOMAS' *Virgil. Georgics*, vols. 1–2, Cambridge 1988, in *CR* XL 1990, p. 262; M. HASLAM, *Hidden Signs: Aratus Diosemeiai 46ff., Vergil Georgics 1.424ff.*, *HSCPh* XCIV 1992, pp. 199–204; M. HENDRY, *A Martial Acronym in Ennius?*, *LCM* XIX 1994, pp. 108 f.

³ Cf. R.A.B. MYNORS, *Virgil. Georgics*. Edited with a Commentary, Oxford ²1990.

have won many supporters by now⁴. As a direct pointer to this unusual acrostic, significantly occupying a position corresponding to that of the *lepte*-acrostic in Aratus (*Phaen.* 783–787), the discoverer takes the words “namque is certissimus auctor” (432), which, he says (rightly to my mind), bear also the underlying significance “for this is the most reliable means of verification”. Denis FEENEY and Damien NELIS in a recent paper⁵ clearly share BROWN’s conviction that this parenthetical phrase glosses the poet’s name, and add a note that the words “sequentis/ ordine respicies” (424 f.) also⁶ announce this “authorial” acrostic⁷, which is in keeping with Peter BING’s wider supposition⁸ that Vergil conflated the self-identification of the *Phaenomena*’s opening and the acrostic pattern that Aratus had employed with the first letters of *lepte*⁹ – without any apparent connection with the surface meaning of the verses, clearly visible in Aratus¹⁰.

These interpretations sound generally convincing, but – in respect of form – the interrelation seems to be more complex, and the announcement “sequentis/

⁴ Among others, D.O. ROSS, JR., *Backgrounds to Augustan Poetry: Gallus, Elegy and Rome*, Cambridge 1975, pp. 28 f.; P. HARDIE, *Vergil*, Oxford 1998, p. 43; M.A.S. CARTER, *Vergilium vestigare: Aeneid 12.587–8*, CQ LII 2002, pp. 615–617 (the author adds another possible Vergil’s signature at *Aen.* XII 587 f.); G. DAMSCHEN, *Das lateinische Akrostichon: Neue Funde bei Ovid sowie Vergil, Grattius, Manilius und Silius Italicus*, Philologus CXLVIII 2004, pp. 107 f.; J. KATZ, *An Acrostic Ant Road in Aeneid 4*, MD LIX 2007, pp. 77–86; IDEM, *Vergil Translates Aratus: Phaenomena 1–2 and Georgics 1.1–2*, MD LX 2008, pp. 105–123, specifically 108 with n. 4 and 115 f., with 116, n. 1; T. HABINEK, *Situating Literacy at Rome*, in: W.A. JOHNSON, H.L. PARKER (eds.), *Ancient Literacies: The Culture of Reading in Greece and Rome*, Oxford 2009, pp. 131 f.; T. SOMERVILLE, *Note on a Reversed Acrostic in Vergil Georgics 1.429–33*, CPh CV 2010, pp. 202–209, esp. 203 f.; D.P. NELIS, *Vergil’s Library*, in: J. FARRELL, M.C.J. PUTNAM (eds.), *A Companion to Vergil’s Aeneid and its Tradition*, Malden, MA 2010, p. 22; R.A. SMITH, *Virgil*, Malden, MA 2011, pp. 16 f.; C. CASTELLETTI, *Following Aratus’ Plow: Vergil’s Signature in the Aeneid*, MH LXIX 2012, pp. 84 f.

⁵ D. FEENEY, D. NELIS, *Two Virgilian Acrostics: certissima signa?*, CQ LV 2005, pp. 644–646.

⁶ That is, on the metapoetic level (my comment).

⁷ Cf. FEENEY, NELIS, *op. cit.* (n. 5), p. 645 with n. 8. The authors of the article take the prefix *re-* in *respicies* (425) and *revertentis* (427) as pointing out that the acrostic runs backwards.

⁸ See P. BING, *A Pun on Aratus’ Name in Verse 2 of the Phaenomena?*, HSCPh XCIII 1990, pp. 284 f. The concept of “conflation, or multiple reference” is derived from R.F. THOMAS, *Virgil’s Georgics and the Art of Reference*, HSCPh XC 1986, pp. 193–198.

⁹ To use a neat recapitulation by SMITH, *op. cit.* (n. 4), p. 17.

¹⁰ It should be stressed here that nowadays the metapoetic significance of Aratus’ *lepte*-acrostic as a *critical literary* term is not taken for granted any more. For a radical negation see M. ASPER, *Onomata allotria: Zur Genese, Struktur und Funktion poetologischer Metaphern bei Kallimachos*, Stuttgart 1997, p. 192, and K. VOLK, *Aratus*, in: J.J. CLAUS, M. CUYPERS (eds.), *A Companion to Hellenistic Literature*, Malden, MA 2010, pp. 206 f. (VOLK gives a minute examination of all occurrences of the word *leptos* / *lepte* in Aratus’ *Phaenomena*). According to a compromise view the Aratean acrostic emphasises fineness that unites subject matter and poetic style, see HABINEK, *op. cit.* (n. 4), p. 129. Therefore, we should not expect, as BING, *op. cit.* (n. 8), p. 284, does, Vergil to counter Aratus’ acrostic with “a comparable literary critical term”. Rather than that, it is “an acrostic alluding to another acrostic” – to use SOMERVILLE’S (*op. cit.* [n. 4], p. 207 with n. 20) felicitous formulation.

pura neque obtunsis per caelum cornibus ibit,
 totus et ille dies et qui nascentur ab illo
 exactum ad mensem pluuiā uentisque carebunt...

It is highly improbable that precisely these three letters occur here – within the passage written in imitation of Aratus’ description of weather signs provided by the moon, where the Greek poet inserted his well-known acrostic – by pure chance. The Aratean origin of the imitated acrostic is confirmed by the adjective *pura*, corresponding to καθαρή at *Phaen.* 783, and generally by the subject matter of these lines. The fact that the sequence PTE in Vergil ends two verses beyond his signature does not mean that it comes too late. As demonstrated by Ted SOMERVILLE in his recent article¹³, the element PU, placed by Virgil at the end of the series, as a result of the Roman poet’s literary game of reversing the Aratean original, in reality corresponds to the *initial* part of Aratus’ description of the moon signs. More importantly, the phrase *ortu quarto* refers to Aratus’ τέττατον ἐκ τριτάτοιο (786), placed by him in the very middle of the element ΠΤΗ of his acrostic. If so, the position of PTE as a part of the supposed Vergilian acrostic (LE)PTE corresponds roughly to that of the Aratean ΛΕΠΤΗ.

Being aware that the idea of acrostics containing a Greek word (naturally, in transliteration) in Latin poetry may seem strange, and even hard to believe, I should like to illustrate this phenomenon with some examples. The first to take such a possibility into consideration was, to the best of my knowledge, Gregor DAMSCHEN, who in his interpretation of Ovid’s *Metamorphoses* XII 245–253 (the fight between the Lapiths and the Centaurs) discerned the acrostic PALE (RINEA), contextually justified¹⁴. Recently, Cristiano CASTELLETTI found the “Greek” acrostic AIDOS at Valerius Flaccus III 430–434¹⁵. I myself have detected a handful of further specimens of such devices in Manilius¹⁶. These, I think, are of special pertinence here because of their astral contexts and the form alluding directly to Aratus’ well-known acrostics, cf. PASA in Manilius’ *Astronomica* II 166–169, confirmed by the word *signa* beginning the third line of the passage in question, that is at the same position as σήματα in Aratus (see *Phaen.* 805)¹⁷.

¹³ SOMERVILLE, *op. cit.* (n. 4), pp. 205 f.

¹⁴ See DAMSCHEN, *op. cit.* (n. 4), p. 101, n. 44. However, to achieve the acrostic PALE, the author is forced to treat the initial “h” in *haud* (XII 246) as the spiritus asper mark.

¹⁵ C. CASTELLETTI, *A “Greek” Acrostic in Valerius Flaccus (3.430–4)*, *Mnemosyne* LXV 2012, pp. 319–323. The author argues that this acrostic can be perceived as a commentary on the narrated scene.

¹⁶ This phenomenon requires explanation. I am working on a separate paper devoted to the Aratean acrostics in Manilius’ *Astronomica*. Manilius seems to have incorporated even the famous *lepte*-acrostic at I 846–850 (visible after a justifiable conjecture in line 848).

¹⁷ The visual similarity becomes striking when these two acrostics are shown as they stand in the text, i.e. vertically:

In the light of such evidence the use of a transliterated Greek acrostic in Vergil's *Georgics* (especially in the passage alluding to Aratus) ought not come as a surprise anymore.

Now, if we accept "PTE" as the second part of the Aratean acrostic, it is logical to ask for its lacking part "LE". There is no trace of such a sequence of the initial letters close to lines 433–435¹⁸, nevertheless it seems worthwhile searching for it elsewhere, especially as a little later, just after completing the description of the moon's appearances, the poet inserts a very significant, intriguingly worded passage (438–443) which so far has not been fully explained:

sol quoque et exoriens et cum se condet in undas
 signa dabit; solem certissima signa sequentur,
 et quae mane refert et quae surgentibus astris. 440
 ille ubi nascentem maculis uariauerit ortum
 conditus in nubem medioque refugerit orbe,
 suspecti tibi sint imbres...

What is striking here, is the special stress on signs provided by the sun. The word *signa* is highlighted by repetition and additionally enhanced by the adjective *certissima*¹⁹, exactly as the word *auctor* (432) was qualified as *certissimus*. It is worth keeping in mind that these are the only two occurrences of the superlative *certissimus* within the whole corpus of the *Georgics*. Obviously, the poet wants to emphasise here not only the literal, but also the special (metapoetic) meaning of the sun's *signa*. On that secondary level, the future form of the expression *signa dabit* is not fortuitous and points to what will come later in the text – precisely to the subsequent mention of the sun "rising and setting into the waves". The metapoetic significance of *signa* is then neatly reinforced by the reversed acrostic SCIES²⁰ (note again the future tense of the verb), hidden in lines 439–443 and connected with its putative "object" by the shared letter *s*:

Manilius II 166–169: p	Aratus 803–806: π
a	α
signa	σήματα
a	α

¹⁸ We cannot assume that the syllable LE in *ille* (line 434) can substitute for the first two letters, according to the following diagram:

Pura ...
 Totus et ilLE ...
 Exactum ...

This arrangement would be contrary to the basic principle of the acrostic as a regular set of corresponding letters, usually the first in each line, taken consecutively.

¹⁹ The emphasis is much stronger than in Aratus who does not repeat the word "sign" and uses the comparative, not the superlative, see *Phaen.* 820: ἡελίῳ καὶ μᾶλλον εἰκότα σήματα κείται.

²⁰ Not detected so far.

s i g n a
e
i
c
↑ s

The encoded message reads: “you will get the most sure notice when you reach (the mention of) the sun bringing and ending the day”.

Since the use of a reversed acrostic by Vergil may seem unparalleled (although it should not surprise at least those accepting the reversed order of Vergil’s signature at 429–433), I feel obliged to confirm the possibility of its occurrence in poetry with further examples. For our discussion, an important precedent (not discerned by other scholars so far) can be found at Aratus’ *Phaenomena* 783–787, i.e. in the direct Vergil’s model, containing the famous acrostic ΛΕΠΤΗ:

λεπτὴ μὲν καθαρὴ τε περὶ τρίτον ἡμᾶρ ἐοῦσα
εὐδιὸς κ’ εἶη, λεπτὴ δὲ καὶ εὖ μάλ’ ἐρευθῆς
πνευματῆ, παχίων δὲ καὶ ἀμβλείησι κερααίαις
τέτρατον ἐκ τριτάτοιο φόως ἀμενηνὸν ἔχουσα
ἢ νότῳ ἀμβλυνται ἢ ὕδατος ἐγγύς ἐόντος.

The “frontal” acrostic is perhaps accompanied, within the same unit of text, by a telestich exploiting not one, but *two* final letters in each line. If so, Aratus points, on the metapoetical level, to both acrostic and telestich when he, a little earlier (line 778), invites the reader to observe the moon “on each side” / “on either hand”: σκέπτεο δὲ πρῶτον κεράων ἐκάτερθε σελήνην. Here is the schema of this hypothetical acroteleuton, that is the acrostic-telestich passage:

↓ λ	σα
ε	ησ
π	ισ
τ	σα
η	οσ ↑

The telestich reads: ὄσσα ἴσης, σά, “as much as you perceive²¹, (is) yours”. Formulated in the second person singular, it shares this formal feature with the encouragement expressed by Vergil in his reversed acrostic SCIES (*signa*). If

²¹ From ἴσημι = γιγνώσκω, “to know by observation”, the verb attested about fifty times in Greek grammarians and lexicographers, but in the extant texts of classical Greek poetry found only in its Doric form ἴσαμι. This fact does not exclude the use of the form ἴσημι in the learned poetry of the Hellenistic period. Interestingly, in most cases (cf. Theocr. 15, 46 and 146) the Doric forms can be regarded as linguistically (ethnically) marked – see R. HUNTER, *Mime and Mimesis. Theocritus Idyll 15*, in: IDEM, *On Coming After. Part 1: Hellenistic Poetry and its Reception*, Berlin 2008, p. 242. Such a function certainly does not apply to Aratus, hence a non-Doric form of ἴσημι is quite thinkable here. As for a similar phrasing, compare ὄσσα ἴσατι in l. 146 of Theocritus’ Idyll 15. – Mathias HANSES (personal communication) drew my attention to a similar combination of an acrostic and

one accepts, as I suggest, the coexistence of an acrostic and a telestich at *Phaen.* 783–787, an extremely interesting case of internal differentiation of the text addressees emerges. The adjective *lepte*, which programmatically refers to “subtle signs”, that is those that are hard to make out, but will nevertheless be discerned by the skilled observer of the sky (who “reads” its signs)²², when inscribed in the form of an acrostic in Aratus’ text serves as a test of perceptiveness for the reader of the poem. The reader who manages to solve the riddle gains, as it were, the status of the initiated one and is metapoetically addressed by the poet with a *gnome* alluding to such achievements.

For another Aratean device of the kind we are interested in here see *Phaen.* 246–249 (the reversed acrostic ΠΑΣΑ intertwined with σῆμα)²³:

α
σῆμα
α
↑ π

As far as Latin astronomical poets are concerned, a reversed acrostic occurs at Germanicus’ *Aratea* 573–576 (SPES)²⁴:

saepe uelis quantum superet cognoscere noctis
et spe uenturae solari pectora lucis.
prima tibi nota solis erit, quo sidere currat,
↑ semper enim signo Phoebus radiabit in uno.

That said, let us return to the signs expressly announced by Vergil in lines 439–443 (SCIES “signa [...] solem certissima signa sequentur”)²⁵, and preceded by the information that these most reliable signs will be given by the sun when it rises and when it sinks under the waves. These descriptive details reappear at 458: “at si, cum referetque diem condetque relatum”. The *lucidus orbis*, bright disc of the sun, mentioned in the next line, is a rough equivalent of the *rapidus sol*

a reversed telestich in Catullus 60, which, taken together, make up an encoded comment: “natu ceu aes” (first noted by G.P. GOOLD in his *Catullus*, London 1983, p. 248).

²² The point made by K. VOLK – see, most recently, her article *Letters in the Sky: Reading the Signs in Aratus’ Phaenomena*, *AJPh* CXXXIII 2012, pp. 209–240, especially, in connection with the *lepte*-acrostic, 227.

²³ As yet unnoticed.

²⁴ As yet unnoticed. Possible signpoints: *spes* in the text comprised by the acrostic, and, perhaps, “prima [...] nota” (= “the first letter?”), *signo*.

²⁵ Krystyna BARTOL (personal communication) pointed to the alliteration and other repetition of the sound *s* as an additional means of drawing the reader’s attention to this announcement.

occurring in the initial announcement (424)²⁶, so the reader is eventually directed by the poet to lines 459 f.:

lucidus orbis erit, frustra terrebere nimbis
et claro siluas cernes Aquilone moueri,

the first letters of which spell LE. At that point we obtain the first part of the Aratean acrostic, removed from its proper place to create a sophisticated riddle.

Only then, according to the order prescribed²⁷, the reader is invited to look back (*respicere*)²⁸ at the runs of the moon (*lunas sequentis*, 424). While doing so, one should keep in mind, in particular, what is written in the lines describing the fourth rising of the moon (*ortu quarto*), since this very moment will serve as the most reliable indicator²⁹: “namque is certissimus auctor” (432). And the first letters of the lines indicated (433–435), as I already have pointed out, spell PTE.

Let me emphasise once again that the above quoted lines 459 f. have not been taken into consideration just because they begin with the required letters LE: they evidently form the final element of a whole system of subtle signposts – from the initial announcement suggesting the desirable course of action on the part of the reader through indicating exactly (with the help of a “guiding” quotation)³⁰ when to look for the lacking part of the acrostic to its concrete realisation in the text.

Here is the whole acrostic in its reconstructed form, respecting the “sun-and-moon”- oriented system of the intratextual *deixis*:

Lucidus orbis erit, frustra terrebere nimbis	459
Et claro siluas cernes Aquilone moueri.	460
Pura neque obtunsis per caelum cornibus ibit,	433
Totus et ille dies et qui nascentur ab illo	434
Exactum ad mensem pluuia uentisque carebunt,	435

The division of the acrostic into two widely separated parts remains the most striking feature which requires further investigation. On a microscale, however,

²⁶ See *OLD* s.v. *rapidus* 3: (of the sun, fire, etc.) scorching, consuming (and not “swift”, “fleet-footed”, as FAIRCLOUGH and FALLON render it; DELLA CORTE translates “cocente”).

²⁷ As an element of the “signposting technique”, *ordine* (425) may have this very meaning.

²⁸ I take this verb to mean, metapoetically, “look backwards”, cf. FEENEY, NELIS, *op. cit.* (n. 5), p. 645, n. 8, and SMITH, *op. cit.* (n. 4), p. 17, who, however, connect it only to the suggested way of reading Vergil’s signature. SOMERVILLE, *op. cit.* (n. 4), p. 204, rightly observes the metapoetic (“almost metatheatrical”) meaning of *respicies* in this context, but identifying it simply with Aratus’ σκέπτεο (“look”) fails to notice the nuance of suggested direction.

²⁹ Not so much of the author’s name as of the acrostic to be (partly) inserted.

³⁰ Cf. “sol quoque et exoriens et cum se condet in undas/ signa dabit” (438 f., the *signa* being reinforced by the reversed acrostic SCIES), and “at si, cum referetque diem condetque relatum” (458).

this practice seems to have a certain analogy precisely in the skipped lines of Vergil's MA-VE-PU signature³¹.

Analogically to Aratus, Vergil supplements his (combined) acrostic with an accompanying reversed telestich which reads TOTIS, i.e. "when written wholly", "with all letters present", "in full". This metapoetical, explanatory telestich is confirmed by *totus* at 434³². Its function consists in reassuring the reader that the acrostic he was challenged to reconstruct now appears in a complete form, strictly echoing the Aratean original. Vergil follows Aratus also as regards the direction of both acrostic and telestich (downwards-upwards), as a result of which he presents, as his predecessor, a perfect acroteleuton.

The idea of introducing telestichs is not alien to Vergil; compare the closing *sphragis* of the *Georgics* (IV 562–565):

per populos dat iura uiamque adfectat Olympo.
illo Vergilium me tempore dulcis alebat
Parthenope studiis florentem ignobilis oti,
carmina qui lusi pastorum audaxque iuuenta,

where the final letters of each verse spell OTIA (confirmed by *otī* in line 564)³³.

To sum up: I think that at *Georgics* I 424 ff. Vergil announces, and then encrypts, not only his signature, but also the Aratean *lepte*-acrostic in Latin transliteration. In respect of form, the imitation is extended to include a reversed telestich. The way he proceeds allows us to agree fully with SMITH's statement³⁴ that Vergil in *Georgics* I wrote in code³⁵.

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³¹ As one can see, I put the problem of the skipped MA-VE-PU lines in a different way to other scholars: not as a curiosity to be explained (see KATZ, *Vergil...* [n. 4], p. 108 with n. 4), but as an existing *datum* – a stated fact which can lend credence to a comparable *novum* elsewhere in the text. For an attempt at identifying an acrostic extended over a relatively long passage (another signature of Vergil at *Aen.* VI 637–659) see DAMSCHEN, *op. cit.* (n. 4), pp. 107 f. with n. 63.

³² Robert COLBORN (personal communication) noticed that lines 433–436 (*sic*) contain an (imperfect) telestich TOTaE, echoing Aratus' acrostic ΠΑΣΑ (*Phaen.* 803–806), and observed that its intentionality is confirmed by the adjective *totus* at 434. However, in the light of the Aratean parallel, the inversed telestich TOTIS, which encompasses the whole of the reconstructed acrostic, seems more probable. – Mathias HANSES (personal communication) commented on the reconstructed acroteleuton LEPTE TOTIS, discerning therein a verbal echo of the noun λεπτότης.

³³ CARTER, *op. cit.* (n. 4), pp. 616 f., n. 4, identifies Walter SCHMIDT as the scholar who first noticed that telestich.

³⁴ See SMITH, *op. cit.* (n. 4), pp. 16 f.

³⁵ My gratitude for reading an earlier draft of this paper as well as making valuable remarks goes particularly to Joshua KATZ, Robert COLBORN, and Krystyna BARTOL. I would also like to thank them, and Jakub PIŁOŃ, for bibliographical help and moral support.

IAMQUE RUBESCEBAT: AURORA IN THE AENEID

by

LEE FRATANTUONO

ABSTRACT: The paper investigates the named appearances of Aurora in Virgil's *Aeneid*, with some consideration of other Virgilian dawns where the goddess is not explicitly named. Associations of color, mythological tales of the Dawn's husband Tithonus and her son Memnon, and Homeric parallels are considered as part of detailed analyses of the scenes where Virgil describes the coming of morning, and the specific events of the days he heralds with significant dawns. Study of these dawns and the poet's depiction of Aurora as part of the divine machinery of his epic reveals Virgil's concern with his unfolding of the ethnography of the future Rome, a city that will be Italian and not Trojan, and the related problem of the reinvention of the Homeric *Iliad* in central Italy.

The significance of the dawn goddess Aurora to the narrative of Virgil's *Aeneid* has not been studied systematically¹. Close study of the appearances of the goddess of the morning in Virgil's epic and especially the events of those days on which her advent is described will reveal a progression of images and episodes that serve in part to foreshadow and highlight key occurrences of the war in Italy, episodes that link ultimately to the final ethnographic disposition of the future settlement of Rome. In particular, we shall see how Virgil's careful uses of color in his descriptions of the goddess and her epiphanies help to illustrate the progression from the old Troy to the new Italy². Virgil's descriptions

¹ On Aurora in Virgil see especially S. FASCE in *EV I*, coll. 418 f.; C. PRATO, *Titone, EV V**, coll. 201 f.; A. KEITH, *The Dawn in Vergil*, *Studies in Philology XXII* 1925, pp. 518–521; L. WALKER, *Vergil's Descriptive Art*, *CJ XXIV* 1929, pp. 666–678, at 667 f.; C. BAILEY, *Religion in Virgil*, Oxford 1935, pp. 186 f.; W. PÖTSCHER, *Vergil und die göttlichen Mächte*, Hildesheim–New York 1977, p. 121. The present study is concerned principally with named appearances of the goddess, her husband Tithonus and son Memnon in the *Aeneid*; other Virgilian descriptions of the breaking of day are considered throughout where relevant. I am especially grateful to Jakub PIGON and the anonymous referee for their helpful corrections and suggestions and to Michael PUTNAM for his remarks and guidance.

² See KEITH, *op. cit.* (n. 1), p. 518 for Virgil's blending of the roles of Aurora, Lucifer, and Sol, and how "In one respect Aurora retains an individuality. She seems to get entire credit for the colors associated with dawn".

of the coming of dawn are not merely ornamental, but serve to introduce and delineate significant developments in the poem's movement from Troy to Rome, even as they offer commentary on the poet's reimagining of episodes and events from the epic tradition that will be reborn in Aeneas' westward journey to Italy and the war he will experience in Latium.

Aurora figures twice in *Aeneid* I, in two connected passages. Memnon, the son of the Dawn, is one of the subjects of the portraits Aeneas and Achates view in Dido's temple to Juno³:

Eoasque acies et nigri⁴ Memnonis arma⁵.

(I 489)

Later, near the close of the book, Dido refers to this artwork when she asks her dinner guest Aeneas to tell the story of both the Trojan War and the wanderings of his men:

nunc quibus Aurorae venisset filius armis.

(I 751)

Much later in the epic, Aurora's relationship with her son Memnon is allusively recalled when Venus begs arms for her son Aeneas from Vulcan:

...te filia Nerei,
te potuit lacrimis Tithonia flectere coniunx.

(VIII 383 f.)

Here, Aurora's son is linked closely to Thetis' son Achilles, who in the cyclic tradition was the slayer of Memnon⁶. The narrative of Venus' pursuit of divine

³ For Memnon see G. GARBUGINO, *Memnone*, *EV* III, coll. 474 f.

⁴ On Memnon's color and provenance, see F. SNOWDEN, *Blacks in Antiquity*, Cambridge, MA 1970, pp. 151–153; A. HARDER *ad* Callim. *Aetia* fr. 110, 52 (“in archaic and classical Greek poetry and art Memnon was not himself a black Aethiopian, although he was the Aethiopian's leader and king [...]. In Hellenistic and Latin poetry he appears as an Aethiopian himself”). In Virgil the color *niger* usually has ominous associations (see here R. EDGEWORTH, *The Colors of the Aeneid*, Frankfurt/M. 1992, pp. 138–141); in the case of Memnon, *nigri* describes his African origins but also points to his premature demise.

⁵ All quotes from Virgil are taken from M. GEYMONAT, *P. Vergili Maronis Opera*, Roma 2008 (revised edition of the editor's Torino 1973 text).

⁶ The most extensive extant account of the story = Book II of Quintus' *Posthomerica* (Book I is the *Penthesilead*); for the abduction of Tithonus by Eos, *h. Aphr.* 218–238 (where see A. FAULKNER; note also M.L. WEST *ad* Hes. *Theog.* 984 f.); for the avian metamorphosis at Memnon's funeral, see *Ov., Met.* XIII 576–622 (with N. HOPKINSON); Ovid's account may be original, but it likely owes something to the *Ornithogonia* (and note here J. POLLARD, *Birds in Greek Life and Myth*, London 1977, pp. 63, 101 f., 163). The mothers of Memnon and Achilles are also linked in the first line of *Ov., Am.* III 9 “Memnona si mater, mater plorabat Achillem” (see here GIBSON *ad loc.*). For the significance of the placement of the funeral of Memnon at the close of Ovid's *Iliad*, see S. PAPAIOANNOU,

armor for her son thus links Aeneas, Achilles, and Memnon; they are the three heroes named in the context of the request for special arms at the outset of the war in Italy⁷.

Significantly, in Aeneas' story to Dido's court – a rendition that accounts for two books, or one sixth of the epic – there is no mention of Memnon and his Ethiopians, despite the queen's explicit request. Dido asks about Priam (I 750 "multa super Priamo rogicans"), and she will be satisfied; she mentions Hector ("super Hectore multa"), whose ghostly dream appearance will be described (a nocturnal visitation that will arguably not satisfy Dido's *multa*); she will also ask what sort of horses Diomedes had (752 "nunc quales Diomedis equi")⁸, and how large Achilles was ("nunc quantus Achilles"). Of these specific tales of Troy, all were noted as subjects among the portraits in Juno's temple (the horses of Diomedes correspond at least somewhat to the mention at 469–473 of the night raid by which Diomedes absconded with the horses of Rhesus), pictures that present a decidedly dark view of Trojan history (as befitting the artwork in a shrine to the goddess who so hates the sons of Aeneas). Dido's requests involve two prominent Greeks, two prominent Trojans, and one foreign ally of Troy. In his lengthy response, Aeneas will in essence speak only of the Trojans, and of neither their Greek enemies Achilles and Diomedes, nor their Ethiopian ally Memnon⁹.

Aeneas, then, does not mention Memnon in his story, and he does not consider Achilles except in the most fleeting of references; both men are of course already dead when his tale begins, as is Hector (who is thus relegated when he does appear to the status of an apparition), though the cyclic episodes of the post-*Iliadic* tradition of Troy's last defenders could easily have been described, even *en passant*, before the narrative of the city's last night. And, too, the "horses of Diomedes" also have no place in the stories related in *Aeneid* I–III (though Sinon does relate the hero's role in the theft of the Palladium at II 163–170). (1) Memnon, (2) the horses of Diomedes, and (3) Achilles: those three stories, in that order of Dido's request, are not satisfied by Aeneas' long response to the queen. All three stories find a sort of fulfillment later in the epic, during the rebirth of the *Aeneid* in Latium. The Sibyl tells Aeneas that another Achilles has been born in Latium (VI 89 "alio Latio iam partus Achilles"), where Turnus is likely the referent; in Book VII, the Volscian Camilla is introduced; in Book VIII, the

Birds, Flames, and Epic Closure in Ovid, *Metamorphoses* 13.600–20 and 14.568–80, CQ LIII 2003, pp. 620–624, at 623. PAPAIOANNOU connects Memnon with Homer's Hector and Virgil's Turnus.

⁷ On this scene see especially W. KÜHN, *Götterszenen bei Vergil*, Heidelberg 1971, pp. 117 f., and S. CASALI, *The Making of the Shield: Image and Repression in the Aeneid*, G&R LIII 2006, pp. 185–204, at 188 f.

⁸ On the question of what is meant by the *Diomedis equi*, which has concerned commentators since Servius, see K. FLETCHER, *Vergil's Italian Diomedes*, AJP CXXXVII 2006, pp. 219–259, at 231.

⁹ Dido's questions are at least partly concerned with appearances: what sort of arms Memnon carried, what kind of horses Diomedes drove, how large was Achilles.

Arcadian Pallas, who, like Memnon, will die in battle¹⁰. The deaths of these three characters will come in reverse order of initial presentation, in Books X, XI, and XII. At the very least, Aeneas promises a triple tale that is not delivered; the poet reimagines the three stories in his description of the rebirth of the *Iliad* in Italy.

But does Camilla's story in Book XI have affinities with Dido's request to hear of the "horses of Diomedes"? The Greek hero makes his most extended appearance in the epic not in Aeneas' rendition of the Trojan War, but in the narrative of the Latin appeal for his help in Books VIII (9–17) and especially XI (225–295). Diomedes, now in retirement in the south of Italy, refuses to aid the Latins; he urges rather that they make peace with Aeneas. In the ensuing equestrian battle scenes of Book XI, it will be not the Greek veteran warrior of the conflict at Troy who will participate, but the Volscian Camilla, the heroine who was introduced in the final vignette of Book VII's gathering of the clans (803–817), just as the Amazon Penthesilea was the last picture to be described on the walls of Dido's temple to Juno (I 491–494)¹¹. Camilla will most especially distinguish herself in horsemanship and equestrian battle pursuits.

Dido did not ask to hear about Penthesilea, and she did not ask to hear about Achilles' young victim Troilus (who has affinities with both Pallas and Lausus), though both Penthesilea and Troilus figure among the portraits on the temple walls in her city. Penthesilea will be reborn in Camilla, and Troilus in both Pallas and Lausus¹².

Pallas is the son of the aged Evander (cf. Tithonus) and a nameless, deceased Samnite woman who is addressed by her husband as "most holy" (XI 158 "tuque, o sanctissima coniunx"), where a hint of divinization may be detected¹³. Memnon's paternity is not explicitly explored in the *Aeneid*, where only Tithonus is associated as a lover of the Dawn; Virgil's presumption seems to be that Aurora and Tithonus are the parents of the warrior.

The two references to Aurora in Book I, then, connect to the story of Memnon; what Aeneas does not tell Dido at her banquet will be told in emotionally charged relief by the poet in his description of the war in Latium. While there are significant differences and changes of emphasis between the cyclic episodes of Troy lore

¹⁰ On the connections between the story of Antilochus, Achilles' friend who is killed by Memnon in the cyclic tradition, and the death of Patroclus (who is reborn in the *Aeneid* as Pallas), see E. DEKAL, *Virgil's Homeric Lens*, New York–London 2012, pp. 48–51.

¹¹ Pictures: the question of whether they are engraved/carved or painted does not affect the present arguments; see further S. LOWENSTAM, *The Pictures on Juno's Temple in the Aeneid*, CW LXXXVII 1993, pp. 37–49, at 37, n. 3.

¹² In the cyclic tradition Achilles killed Penthesilea; in the *Aeneid*, Aeneas never meets Camilla – and, significantly, the Volscian huntress' Amazon model is depicted in the portrait as alive and well, in the moment of her furious rage (see here especially M. PUTNAM, *The Humanness of Heroes: Studies in the Conclusion of the Aeneid*, Amsterdam 2011, pp. 51 f.

¹³ See further N. HORSFALL *ad loc.*

and Virgil's appropriation of these stories for his description of the war in Latium, the rebirth of the *Iliad* in central Italy will also encompass the retelling of several of the more memorable events of the post-*Iliadic* tradition, even as the exact Homeric correspondences of Virgil's characters (especially Achilles) is ever shifting.

The first mentions of Aurora in the *Aeneid* come with reference to her lost son Memnon. Examination of the remaining appearances of the goddess will show that she is often associated with death, either of individual characters or, on the macrocosmic level, of the culture and world of old Troy: her connection to death is coupled with her patronage of the nativity of the future *Italian* Rome.

After an absence from *Aeneid* II, Aurora is mentioned next just as the Trojans view Italy for the first time:

Iamque rubescebat stellis Aurora fugatis
cum procul obscuros collis humilemque videmus
Italiam.

(III 521–523)

Dawn was beginning to show her ruddy countenance when the Italian mainland was first sighted; the present passage will be echoed at VII 25 f. when the Trojans land in Latium. Significantly, the verb *rubescere* will appear elsewhere in the epic only at VIII 695 (“arva nova Neptunia caede rubescunt”), of the waters off Actium that are red with blood: the naval victory of Octavian over the forces of the East will be a rebirth of Rome¹⁴. Virgilian descriptions of dawn always herald important events; the first explicit mention of the goddess comes as Italy is first glimpsed. The first sighting of Italy comes long before the ultimate landing, let alone the settlement of Rome; the adjectives *obscuros* and *humilem*, not to mention the adverb *procul*, underscore how much work remains to be done.

Later in Book III, Aurora reappears before the encounter with Achaemenides:

Postera iamque dies primo surgebat Eoo
umentemque Aurora polo dimoverat umbram...¹⁵

(III 588 f.)

¹⁴ See here M. PUTNAM, *Aeneid VII and the Aeneid*, *AJPh* XCI 1970, pp. 408–430, at 415. PUTNAM also highlights the connections between Aurora, the daughter of the sun, and the goddess' solar sister Circe, the sorceress responsible for transformations and metamorphoses; for the associations between Circe and the possibly lycanthropic Camilla (herself thus a living symbol of change in the epic – and permanent transformation, for that matter, in death), see L. FRATANTUONO, *Chiastic Doom in the Aeneid*, *Latomus* LXVIII 2009, pp. 393–401.

¹⁵ For the conceit of the morning light moving the moist shadow from the pole (or, for that matter, the moist shadows of Night), cf. Val. Fl. *Arg.* V 606; also the imitation of Sil. *Pun.* III 168 “iamque per umentem noctis Cyllenius umbram”, of Mercury as he prepares to deliver a message (I 259 “umentis [...] umbra” is rather different); and the moist wings of Sleep at Stat. *Theb.* X 148 “umentibus alis”. Virgil may have introduced the expression to Latin poetry; at *Aen.* IV 351–353 “me patris Anchisae, quotiens umentibus umbris/ nox operit terras [...] / admonet in somnis et turbida terret imago”, Aeneas mentions his father's nocturnal visitations to Dido.

This epiphany is recalled in the repeated line that describes the dawn that breaks before Dido confesses her feelings about Aeneas to her sister Anna:

postera Phoebæa lustrabat lampade terras
umentemque¹⁶ Aurora polo dimoverat umbram...

(IV 6 f.)

Achaemenides' reception by the Trojans is not unlike the Carthaginian welcome of Aeneas and his men in North Africa; in both cases a castaway is received into communion with a polity that might well be expected to be hostile to a newcomer. But there is another interesting connection between the two passages: the rare adjective *Phoebæus*. In Virgil it occurs only twice: IV 6, where it describes the sun's lamp as Dawn rises, and III 637 "Argolici clipei aut Phoebæe lampadis instar", where the eye of the Cyclops is described during the Achaemenides episode – it was as big as the sun¹⁷. Aeneas is compared to Apollo during the hunt scene (IV 142–150), just as Dido was introduced as a new Diana (I 498–504); the associations do not bode well for their successful union. Apollo was among the special patrons of the Augustan regime; in Homer, he was instrumental in Hector's slaying of Patroclus, while in Virgil, he will be the central force behind the death of Camilla (who becomes the Patroclus of the *Aeneid* for Turnus in his capacity as the Achilles in Latium). Apollo is absent from the narrative of Pallas' unequal fight with Turnus; the Arcadian prays in vain to his special patron Hercules for help before his death (X 460–463)¹⁸. Pallas is Arcadian; in the reception of Odysseus' companion Achaemenides, as in the ill-fated welcome Priam's Trojans offered to the lying Sinon, we see the beginning of the reconciliation of the Greek world with the Troy that will soon be revealed to be truly and finally dead: the advent of Rome represents in some sense the ultimate victory of the Greeks over the Trojans, and, significantly, Greeks will help to secure that victory.

The reception of Achaemenides by the Trojans, and the welcome of Aeneas by the Carthaginians: both of these mentions of Aurora connect to the morning Virgil describes at VII 148 f. "Postera cum prima lustrabat lampade terras/ orta dies", just before Aeneas and his Trojans visit Latinus and are welcomed by the

¹⁶ Virgil's *umentem* is probably inspired by Pacuvius' *ad auroram umidam* (fr. 363 WARMINGTON).

¹⁷ The attack on Polyphemus thus becomes something of an affront to the sun god; we might compare the eating of the cattle of Helios by Odysseus' companions.

¹⁸ Apollo is thus an especially complex god in the *Aeneid*, of richly varied associations; together with Jupiter he aids actively in the killing of Camilla, though his votary, the less than heroic Arruns (something of a shadowy, eerie doublet of Aeneas), poses a problematic figure as the representative of the quasi-clergy of the patron god of the Augustan order. These ambivalent associations reflect something of the poet's own diverse thoughts on the new political order in Rome.

Latins¹⁹. All of these dawns, of course, will have dark aftermaths: (1) the death of Anchises, (2) the love affair of Aeneas and Dido, and (3) the war in Italy.

And, too, the dawns that herald the reception of Achaemenides and the confession of Dido's feelings to Anna connect with the morning that sees the funeral rites for the Latin war dead:

tertia lux gelidam caelo dimoverat umbram...

(XI 210)

The shadow is now "chill" (*gelidam*) because it is associated with the Latin requiems; the phrase *dimoverat umbram* does not occur elsewhere in extant Latin. "*Dimoverat* suggests the flinging back and parting of a great curtain" (AUSTIN *ad* IV 7).

The mornings the poet announces at III 588 f., IV 6 f. and XI 210 present the only occurrences of a Virgilian description of dawn that mention *umbra*. The passage in Book XI has clear connection to death; that from Book IV heralds the fateful consequences of Aeneas' involvement with Dido. The rescue of Achaemenides ends with the celebrated cypress simile (III 679–681), just as a cypress figured near the end of Book II (713–716): in both cases, the cypress foreshadows a death (Creusa, Anchises). Achaemenides will be rescued by the Trojans, but Anchises will die soon after²⁰.

Dawn will next return as Dido and Aeneas rise for the hunt that will be the locus of the consummation of their love:

Oceanum interea surgens Aurora reliquit

(IV 129)

As we shall see below, this line will recur as the opening verse of Book XI, in the immediate aftermath of deaths of Mezentius, Lausus, and Pallas; this is the only repeated verse in the epic that serves as the first line of a book²¹.

¹⁹ The form *lustrabat* occurs four times in the *Aeneid*: once each of the dawn (IV 6; VII 148), and, significantly, once each of Anchises surveying the souls in Elysium (VI 681), and Evander looking at Aeneas (VIII 153). The underworld use may be borrowed from *Georg.* IV 519, where it describes Orpheus as he seeks Eurydice in various distant places of the earth before entering the lower regions. On the reception of the Trojans in Italy see especially C. BALK, *Die Gestalt des Latinus in Vergils Aeneis*, Heidelberg 1968, pp. 3 ff.

²⁰ The Cyclopes provide the impetus for the only similes in *Aeneid* III: the oaks and cypresses and the comparison of the lost Cyclopean eye's size to an Argolic shield or the sun.

²¹ For how Virgil combines the Homeric with the Ennian in this line and its sequel, IV 130 *iubare exorto*, see C. SEGAL, *Dido's Hesitation in Aeneid 4*, CW LXXXIV 1990, pp. 1–12, at 2; J. ELLIOTT, *Ennian Epic and Ennian Tragedy in the Language of the Aeneid: Aeneas' Generic Wandering and the Construction of the Literary Past*, HSCPh CIV 2008, pp. 241–272, at 247; also J. WILLS, *Divided Allusion: Virgil and the Coma Berenices*, HSCPh XCVIII 1998, pp. 277–305, at 282 f. See AUSTIN here on the beautiful effects of Virgil's description of colour and light that will

Later in *Aeneid* IV, Mercury warns Aeneas that he will see his ships aflame if Dawn finds him still tarrying in Carthage:

si te his attigerit terris Aurora morantem.

(IV 568)

Dawn will be a bringer of death to the Trojans if they remain in Carthage; Aeneas heeds the admonition, and with the morning comes grief for Dido as she sees the fleet proceeding out of harbour:

Et iam prima novo spargebat²² lumine terras
Tithoni croceum linquens Aurora cubile.

(IV 584 f.)

This passage provides the first mention of Aurora's husband in the *Aeneid*²³, appropriately enough just as Dido's quasi-spouse leaves her city²⁴. Macrobius (*Sat.* VI 1, 31) cites this passage as an example of Virgilian borrowing from his predecessors (here from Furius Bibaculus' "interea Oceani linquens Aurora cubile")²⁵, in this case with meaningful alteration of ocean to abandoned (if only for the day) husband²⁶. The Trojans will not suffer doom in the immediate moment if they flee Carthage, though the departure will connect directly to the curse Dido will utter on Aeneas and his children; this particular morning brings doom to both Trojans/Romans and Carthaginians, regardless of what the individual characters choose to do.

There are two mentions of Aurora or her family, then, in Book I, both of her ill-fated son Memnon, and four in Book IV, two linked to the ever more intensely passionate feelings of Dido for Aeneas, and two with the Trojan's abandonment of his lover. In Book V, as in its sister III, there are two references to the goddess, both connected to the memorial requiem rites for Anchises in Sicily, obsequies that are celebrated a year after the loss of Aeneas' father in the wake of the reception of Achaemenides:

later be transformed into images of darker register. Michael PUTNAM discusses the matter further in his *Humanness...* (n. 12), p. 110.

²² For the link between this verb and Virgil's Apollonian model, see D. NELIS, *Vergil's Aeneid and the Argonautica of Apollonius Rhodius*, Leeds 2001, pp. 167 f.

²³ Aurora's husband Tithonus was the brother of Laomedon, as the Servian commentary tradition notes *ad Georg.* III 48; *Aen.* I 489; IV 585.

²⁴ The idea that Virgil described his dawns with careful attention to the events of the day is old (cf. Servius *ad XI* 183, citing a view of Asinius Pollio); in reality some such readings work very well (the present one especially so), while others are less vividly appropriate. See here R. LYNE, *Further Voices in Vergil's Aeneid*, Oxford 1987, p. 38, with reference to HEINZE, PÖSCHL, *et al.* on the subject.

²⁵ Fr. 80 HOLLIS (15 BLÄNSDORF).

²⁶ M. PASCHALIS, *Vergil's Aeneid: Semantic Relations and Proper Names*, Oxford 1997, pp. 168–170 considers the possible associations between Dido's last dawn and her love of gold (*Aurora/aurum*).

praeterea, si nona diem mortalibus almum
Aurora extulerit radiisque retexerit orbem...

(V 64 f.)²⁷

Exspectata dies aderat nonamque serena
Auroram Phaethontis equi iam luce vehebant...

(V 104 f.)

In the second of these passages, just before the commencement of the quasi-funeral games for Anchises, the language, while normal Homeric practice for describing the sun, may also evoke the loss of Phaethon, the ill-fated boy of the sun; Phaethon has affinities with Memnon, another premature death of a child of a deity of the morning²⁸. The associations evoked by the mention of Phaethon are many. The games will begin with the ship race that corresponds to the Homeric chariot race of *Iliad* XXIII, and Virgil describes the dawn of that regatta in language that reminds the reader of the out of control chariot of the child of the sun (cf. the imagery of *Georg.* I 511–514). The loss of Phaethon connects, too, to the problem of the Augustan succession that recurs throughout the *Aeneid*. And, too, in the immediate context of *Aeneid* V, the impending loss of the helmsman Palinurus lurks.

The two appearances of Aurora in *Aeneid* V, then, both occur in a funereal context; in Book XI, the sister “penultimate” book of the epic, the two explicit appearances of Dawn will also come in a requiem context, as well as the mention of the *tertia lux* (210) that witnesses the Latin funerals²⁹. Significantly, the “ninth dawn” here is borrowed from *Georg.* IV 544 “post, ubi nona suos Aurora ostenderit ortus” (and the related IV 552 “post, ubi nona suos Aurora induxerat ortus”), during the description of the rites Cyrene enjoins on Aristaeus in order to renew his bees. After cattle sacrifices are made at four altars (cf. the same number of sacred tables at V 639 f., tables that recall the omen of the four horses at III 537 f., besides having associations with Roman triumphs)³⁰, further offerings are to be made on the ninth day to Orpheus and Eurydice; the bees are reborn from the decomposing cattle. The bee image will be used by Virgil in *Aeneid* VII and XII to describe the planned union of Trojans and Latins³¹; the funereal ninth day

²⁷ On the question of whether Aurora here and similar personifications merit the capital letter, see N. HORSEFALL, *A Companion to the Study of Virgil*, Leiden 2001, p. 138.

²⁸ On this passage see especially W. NETHERCUT, *The Horses of Phaethon*, *AJPh* CVII 1986, pp. 102–108.

²⁹ Cf. also V 42 f. “Postera cum primo stellas Oriente fugarat/ clara dies”, of the day Aeneas first announces the memorial rites and games.

³⁰ See here L. FRATANTUONO, *Roscida pennis: Iris in the Aeneid*, *BStLat* XLIII 2013, pp. 123–132.

³¹ The thesis is explored at L. FRATANTUONO, *Laviniaque venit litora: Blushes, Bees, and Virgil's Lavinia*, *Maia* LX 2008, pp. 40–50. Michael PUTNAM notes to me *per litt.* that at *Faerie Queene* III 20 Spenser combines Aurora and Tithonus with an allusion to Lavinia's blush, as he describes where Merlin has just seen through Britomart's disguise.

here, during the Sicilian games, will be associated with the birth of the Roman *gentes* that is heralded in the naming of the contestants in the first of the competitions, the regatta (V 114–123). The underworld associations of the significant “last dawn” of the fourth *Georgic* Virgil here borrows also helps to prepare for the next dawn in the *Aeneid*, which comes, perhaps surprisingly, among the dead. The two appearances of Aurora in Book V are the first of her eschatological epiphanies; they pave the way for the *katabasis* of *Aeneid* VI.

It was just past noon when Aeneas and the Sibyl prepared to visit Tartarus and Elysium; Aurora was halfway through her (that is, the sun’s) course:

Hac vice sermonum roseis Aurora quadrigis
iam medium aethereo cursu traiecerat axem³².

(VI 535 f.)

Why does Aurora make an appearance at the crossroads of Tartarus and Elysium³³? One reason is that elsewhere in the epic, the goddess often appears in funereal contexts; here, she serves as a liminal figure as Aeneas and the Sibyl prepare to visit Elysium (and Anchises), and the mention of the goddess in the seemingly incongruous environment of the underworld helps to secure her role in the epic as an overseer of both death, and the ultimate nativity of the future Rome out of the union of Trojans and Italians³⁴.

In similar language that recalls also the first sighting of their promised new home, Aurora appears as Aeneas and the Trojans prepare for the landing in Italy:

Iamque rubescebat radiis mare et aethere ab alto
Aurora in roseis fulgebat lutea bigis...³⁵

(VII 25 f.)

The colour rose is associated in Virgil mostly with divinity³⁶; the adjective is connected with Venus (I 402; II 593); Iris (IX 5); Phoebus Apollo (XI 913), while

³² *Axis* here most probably = “sky”; see here P. HARDIE, *Atlas and Axis*, CQ XXXIII 1983, pp. 220–228, at 227.

³³ See AUSTIN *ad loc.* for descriptions of morning and night in Latin poetry.

³⁴ There may also be a reminiscence here of *Georg.* I 242–251, where Virgil describes the situation in the Antipodes, as it were: the residents there are either in perpetual dark, or Aurora visits them after she is done in the northern hemisphere. The passage somewhat conflates the southern hemisphere with the Stygian darkness (I 243 f. “illum/ sub pedibus Styx atra videt Manesque profundī”).

³⁵ In the underworld passage, Aurora is *quadrigata*; on the morning of the arrival of the Trojans in Latium, *bigata*. See HORSEFALL *ad* VII 26 for the variation in the size of her chariot; as HORSEFALL notes, the *quadriga* is commonly associated with the sun, the *biga* with the moon. There may not be any particular significance to Virgil’s change between the two passages, though we might note that at VI 641 the poet notes that Elysium knows its own sun and its own *sidera*.

³⁶ See here EDGEWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 4), pp. 154–156.

the only mortal to whom it is applied is Lavinia, the erotic object of conquest for the epic (XII 606)³⁷.

The colour *luteus* here poses a problem: reddish pink or yellow³⁸? EDGEWORTH has demonstrated that either colour can be meant, and that the chromatic confusion may be linked to the botanical fact that the *lutum* plant can yield a dye of different colour shades. The present passage is the only appearance of the colour in Virgil. I would suggest that the ambiguous colour was deliberately chosen as part of a chromatic progression from the yellow of the old Troy to the red of the new Italy (see further below on *croceus* and *ruber*). Here, the inchoative *rubescibat* also serves to underscore the ethnographic metamorphosis (cf. III 521 *rubescibat*, as dawn breaks on the first Trojan sighting of Italy).

In the description of the customs surrounding the twin Gates of War, Aurora is used by metonymy to describe Rome's eastern enemies:

...seu tendere ad Indos
Auroramque sequi Parthosque repscere signa...

(VII 605 f.)

This passage is similar to Virgil's depiction of Antony's eastern forces and his victories over foreign enemies, triumphs that have been perverted into civil arms against Rome:

hinc ope barbarica variisque Antonius armis,
victor ab Aurorae populis et litore rubro...

(VIII 685 f.)

Here the cyclic associations have somewhat shifted; Achilles was a victor over the forces of the East, the Ethiopian/Asiatic warriors of the son of the Dawn, and so was Antony (at least in a sense); Augustus, of course, will be the supreme victor over the peoples of Aurora³⁹. There may be a hint in these lines of Antony's failed expedition against the Parthians (cf. the emphasis of Augustan propaganda on the recovery of the standards); certainly there is a sense that Augustus will triumph where Antony did not succeed.

A dramatic dawn heralds the day that will witness the transformation of Aeneas' ships into sea creatures:

hic primum nova lux oculis offulsit et ingens

³⁷ And note the textually vexed VII 712 *rosea rura*, with HORSEFALL *ad loc.* Virgil's accords the adjective *roseus* to Lavinia at the terrible moment where she is scratching her cheeks in emotional distress; she remains a quasi-divine figure, ever silent and enigmatic as she conveys her sentiments by non-verbal gesture and response.

³⁸ See here EDGEWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 4), pp. 137, 255–265.

³⁹ And see below on XII 76 f. for the associations of the colour *ruber* in Virgil with Turnus.

visus ab Aurora caelum transcurrere nimbus...

(IX 110 f.)

This is the only occurrence of dawn in the epic where Aurora is associated with a portent⁴⁰, in this case of the successful intervention of Cybele with Jupiter to save the vessels⁴¹. Virgil here blends imagery of light and dark⁴²; the portent will be mirrored at IX 731 “continuo nova lux oculis effulsit”, of Turnus in the Trojan camp. The image of the “new light” serves to craft a ring around the action of *Aeneid* IX; the first light comes as a herald of the divine action of Cybele in concert with Jupiter, while the second refers to the Rutulian hero who had been deprived of his chance to burn the Trojan ships. Virgil’s language deliberately connects the light from this momentous dawn with the light from Turnus’ eyes, and the narrative crafts a surprise that is only revealed once Turnus succeeds in his wish to invade the Trojan camp.

Virgil describes a second dawn in the same book, just after the deaths of Nisus and Euryalus, in language copied from the morning of Aeneas’ departure from Dido’s Carthage, where the repetition of not one but two lines serves to underscore the poet’s association of the two passages:

Et iam prima novo spargebat lumine terras
Tithoni croceum linquens Aurora cubile.

(IX 459 f. = IV 584 f.; IX 460 = *Georg.* I 447)⁴³

The dawns that connect the separation of Aeneas and Dido and the deaths of Nisus and Euryalus witness the respective breakdowns of two very different romantic relationships under vastly changed circumstances. In the case of the young lovers Nisus and Euryalus, the dawn reveals the events of the night (cf. IX 461); the morning light is especially meaningful given the context of the night raid and its shadowy events⁴⁴. Aurora’s bed is saffron; the colour has ominous associations in the *Aeneid*⁴⁵. Elsewhere it describes the colour of Helen’s veil, which Aeneas sends to Dido (I 649; 711); the yellowish wings of Iris as she prepares to snip the lock of Dido’s hair (IV 700); the *croceus fetus* of the mistletoe to which the Golden Bough is compared (VI 207); the yellow garment

⁴⁰ Not considered by B. GRASSMANN-FISCHER, *Die Prodigien in Vergils Aeneis*, München 1966.

⁴¹ See HARDIE *ad* IX 111 for the connection of Aurora with the Trojans’ eastern homeland.

⁴² “Es bleibt offen, ob hier eine mehr oder weniger dunkle Wolke vor einem leuchtenden Hintergrund erscheint oder ob die *nova lux* mit dem *nimbus* eine Einheit bildet, die Wolke also selbst – vielleicht nur an ihren Rändern – leuchtet” (DINGEL *ad loc.*).

⁴³ On the repetition, see J. WILLS, *Homeric and Virgilian Doublets: The Case of Aeneid 6.901*, MD XXXVIII 1997, pp. 185–202, at 192 f.

⁴⁴ But see also J. POE, *Success and Failure in the Mission of Aeneas*, TAPhA XCVI 1965, pp. 321–336, at 325 f.

⁴⁵ See here EDGEWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 4), pp. 122 f.

of Cybele's votary Chloereus (XI 775; cf. IX 614, of the yellow garments of the Trojan that Numanus Remulus mocks). Aurora has associations with the Trojans through her marriage to Tithonus, the brother of Laomedon; the colour *croceus*, not surprisingly, is proper to the effeminate eastern votaries of the Trojan Cybele. Virgil connects the colour with the death in the larger, ethnographic sense of the old Troy. The departure of Aeneas from Dido, and the deaths of Nisus and Euryalus, all serve as part of the epic progress from the death of Troy to the dawn of Rome.

Virgil borrowed the image of Aurora rising from Tithonus' bed from his own *Georgics* I 446 f. "aut ubi pallida surget/ Tithoni croceum linquens Aurora cubile", the grim, sole occasion where the poet describes the dawn as pale; not surprisingly, the poet employs the ominous occurrence for two of his most problematic mornings⁴⁶.

Dawn had come as Cybele prepared to beseech Jupiter to save her ships from Turnus' fire; one of the transformed ships urges Aeneas to prepare to defend his camp with the advent of morning:

surge age et Aurora socios veniente vocari
primus in arma iube

(X 241 f.)

This passage links back to the dawn that came in the aftermath of the loss of Nisus and Euryalus; the Trojan night mission to Aeneas failed, Turnus had wreaked havoc in the Trojan enclosure, and now more direct, quasi-divine intervention is needed to summon Aeneas to the aid of his beleaguered camp.

Book XI is the only book of the *Aeneid* that opens with a dawn formula, and the language is repeated *verbatim* from Aeneas' description of the morning of the hunt in Carthage:

Oceanum interea surgens Aurora reliquit...

(XI 1 = IV 129)

Virgil hereby connects the hunt that witnessed the union of Aeneas and Dido with the book that will be dominated by the huntress Camilla (Dido and Camilla are in many respects opposite images of the feminine in the epic), besides the poet's consideration of the link between Dido and Pallas (who will be buried in one of two robes the Carthaginian queen had given to Aeneas)⁴⁷. Virgil reserves a dawn formula for Book XI alone in part to highlight the two principal themes he signals by the different epiphanies of Aurora, themes that come to fruition

⁴⁶ See here especially W. BRIGGS, *Lines Repeated from the Georgics in the Aeneid*, CJ LXXVII 1981/1982, pp. 130–147, at 143.

⁴⁷ Note here L. FRATANTUONO, *Harum Unam: Dido's Requiem for Pallas*, Latomus LXIII 2004, pp. 857–863.

in the narrative of that book: (1) the pervasive concern with the Augustan succession (as symbolized in the loss of Pallas); and (2) the ultimate ethnographic victory of Italy over Troy (as embodied in the near triumph of Turnus' ambush plan and Camilla's equestrian engagement, both of which fail only through direct divine intervention). Virgilian dawns are often connected with death and the foreshadowing of doom; appropriately enough, what could well be considered the grimmest book of the epic opens with Aurora's ominous light.

The dawn that opens *Aeneid* XI will see the somber visit of Aeneas to the body of his dead young friend Pallas; the funerals for the Trojan war dead will follow another appearance of the goddess:

Aurora interea miseris mortalibus almam
extulerat lucem referens opera atque labores...

(XI 182 f.)

The language here reflects the mood of the Trojans as they prepare to observe the obsequies for their slain comrades; cf. the aforementioned XI 210, of the *tertia lux* that sees the funerals of the Latin dead⁴⁸.

The last mention of Aurora in the *Aeneid* comes at the dramatic moment where Turnus addresses Amata (in the presence of the silent Lavinia) and pledges to proceed the next day to single combat with Aeneas:

...cum primum crastina⁴⁹ caelo
puniceis invecta rotis Aurora rubebit...

(XII 76 f.)⁵⁰

Dawn's car now has red wheels; *puniceus* occurs elsewhere in the epic only at V 269, where it describes the fillets worn by the winners in the regatta (who are explicitly associated with the birth of future Roman *gentes*; the ship race itself is modelled after the Homeric *chariot* competition of *Il.* XXIII), and XII 750 "puniceae [...] formidine pennae", where Turnus is described as a stag caught in a snare of red feathers – he does not understand his own role in the ethnography of the future Rome⁵¹. The use of the future *rubebit* at XII 77 is part of

⁴⁸ On the few uses of *mortalis* in the epic, see W. NETHERCUT, *The Imagery of the Aeneid*, CJ LXVII 1971/1972, pp. 123–143, at 133.

⁴⁹ *Crastinus* is not a common adjective in the *Aeneid*; it is always used in connection with the dawn; cf. IV 118, where Venus describes to Juno the fateful hunt on the morrow; VIII 170, of Evander's promise to send help with Aeneas; X 244, of Cymodocea's pledge to Aeneas of victory over the Rutulians.

⁵⁰ On this passage see TARRANT *ad loc.*, and P. SCHENK, *Die Gestalt des Turnus in Vergils Aeneis*, Königstein 1984, pp. 162 ff.

⁵¹ On the colour *puniceus* see EDGEWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 4), pp. 42, 149. The red feathers represent the Roman future, in which the unknowing Turnus is trapped: like Aeneas (and Camilla), he is not made privy to the final ethnographic discussion between Jupiter and Juno.

the declaration of how Rome's destiny will in some sense begin on the day of the seeming victory of Aeneas over Turnus. And in the red wheels of Aurora's chariot, we see the dawn goddess' conveyance of the Roman future; the use of *puniceus* at V 269 links to the present passage.

The image of the red feathers that snare the Turnus-stag is borrowed from *Georg.* III 371–375, where the Scythians are said not to hunt deer in their adverse conditions without the aid of hounds and the fright of crimson feathers⁵². Central to Virgil's appropriation of his previous passage to describe the trapped Turnus is the ethnographic question of comparison of the Scythians to the Italians⁵³. Richard THOMAS' conclusion about the Virgilian assessment here is insightful: "In short, it is the Scythian, not the Roman of the *laudes Italiae*, who has affinities to the idealized farmer of *Georgics* 2". Aeneas is not like the Scythian, and thus comes off the worse if the Scythian is somehow better than the Italian (at least in the pursuit of rustic *otium*). But Virgil is usually ambivalent: Aeneas is not like the Scythian, and thus he can be slowly but inexorably continuing his transformation from Trojan to Italian: the red snare works with connection both to hunter and snared.

Rubere occurs four times in the epic⁵⁴: with the present use cf. IX 270, where Ascanius promises that Nisus will have Turnus' red plumes; X 273, when the fire from Aeneas' shield and crest is compared to ruddy comets; XII 68, where Lavinia's blush is compared to lilies that grow red among roses. All the uses of the verb, then, are ominous; there may be a hint in *puniceis* of the same sentiment conveyed by XII 4–9 "Poenorum [...] in arvis", of the lion simile that describes Turnus in the wake of Camilla's death, where Carthaginian associations (Dido, Hannibal) abound; Dido's curse (IV 625–629) is alive and well⁵⁵. The adjective *ruber* occurs four times in the epic⁵⁶; besides the aforementioned description of the provenance of Antony's Eastern allies (VIII 686), there are two mentions of Turnus' red plumes (IX 50; XII 89), and the red sky (it is still early morning) that serves as the canvas for Juturna's portent in which the eagle of Jupiter appears on the day of the single combat between Turnus and Aeneas (XII

⁵² On this simile see especially M. PUTNAM, *The Poetry of the Aeneid: Four Studies in Imaginative Unity and Design*, Cambridge, MA 1966, pp. 187 ff., 197 ff. For a different view, note R. HORNSBY, *Patterns of Action in the Aeneid*, Iowa City 1970, pp. 134 ff.

⁵³ See here THOMAS on the *Georgics* passage, and especially his *Lands and Peoples in Roman Poetry: The Ethnographical Tradition*, Cambridge 1982, pp. 35 ff.

⁵⁴ For *rubere* see EDGEWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 4), pp. 157 f.

⁵⁵ Each third of the *Aeneid* ends with the demise of an envisaged terrible foe of the future Roman order: Book IV with the death of Dido; Book VIII with the depiction of Antony and especially Cleopatra on the shield; Book XII with Turnus. But if *puniceus* has any Carthaginian associations, they colour both the passages in Books V and XII.

⁵⁶ EDGEWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 4), pp. 158 f.

247 “*rubra [...] in aethra*”⁵⁷. Throughout the *Aeneid*, and especially in its final movements in Book XII, the future Rome is ever seen to be coming to fruition; that destined city will have its terrible struggles against Carthage, besides the civil strife Augustus helped to resolve.

The eagle seizes a swan, only to drop its prey and flee once it is pursued by a flock of angry birds (whose species Virgil does not specify). Juturna sends the omen so that the Rutulians will be roused to defend Turnus; the difficulty of interpretation of the sign lies in the association of the swan with Venus, Jupiter’s beloved daughter. Nowhere else in the epic does the supreme god come close to seeming to challenge Venus, who would perhaps be displeased at the revelation that Troy will be suppressed and the future Rome be Italian; the omen is in part a harbinger of how Jupiter’s announcement to Juno of the future ethnographic settlement of Italy (XII 833–840) would likely not satisfy Venus’ aspirations for her Trojan son.

Juturna sends the omen in the hopes of tricking the Italians and stirring them to help her brother; no other omen, Virgil says, was more successful in deceiving them: “...quo non praesentius ullum/ turbavit mentes Italas monstroque fefellit” (XII 245 f.). In Juturna’s deceptive omen (which, as TARRANT notes *ad loc.*, the augur Tolumnius construes “correctly”), the eagle is clearly meant to represent Aeneas, and the swan Turnus; the other birds are the Italians. But in *reality* the eagle is Jupiter, the swan Aeneas/the dream of Troy, and the action of the Italians in breaking the truce nothing but a forestalling of what will prove in the end to be the victory of Italy over Troy⁵⁸. The colour red has ominous associations (especially with blood and the glow of fire and baleful comets), but in the final settlement Turnus (and Camilla) will prove more victorious than Dido, or, for that matter, Antony and Cleopatra. Venus is absent from the final colloquy between Jupiter and Juno; like her son (and Turnus and Camilla), she is ignorant of the conversation that reveals the ethnography of the future Rome.

The use of the verb *rubere* represents, in a sense, a fulfillment of the inceptive *rubescere*; of its four occurrences in the *Aeneid*, all are in some way connected to Turnus: IX 270, of the hero’s plumes; XII 68, of the comparison of Lavinia’s blush (in Turnus’ presence) to lilies amid roses⁵⁹; XII 77, of the day when Turnus

⁵⁷ Cf. XII 113–115 “*Postera vix summos spargebat lumine montis/ orta dies, cum primum alto se gurgite tollunt/ Solis equi lucemque elatis naribus efflant*”, the most “violent” of Virgilian morns, of the day of the truce that will also witness its violent breaking.

⁵⁸ See here G. WILLIAMS, *Technique and Ideas in the Aeneid*, New Haven 1983, pp. 34 ff. for an analysis of this passage that considers the immortals in the epic as a mere trope for human motivations.

⁵⁹ For lilies in the *Aeneid* see EDGEWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 4), pp. 27, 136; there are only three occurrences: the present comparison of Lavinia’s blush; VI 709, of the lilies in Elysium, and VI 883, of the lilies Anchises asks to see thrown for Marcellus: the flower always appears in the epic with some connection to death.

pledges (in Lavinia's presence) single combat with Aeneas; and especially X 272–275 “non secus ac liquida si quando nocte cometae/ sanguinei lugubre rubent, aut Sirius ardor/ ille sitim morbosque ferens mortalibus aegris/ nascitur et laevo contristat lumine caelum”, where Virgil balances the passage in Book IX, as he describes the flames that seem to come from Aeneas' head in a passage where the Trojan is focalized by the Rutulians and, more particularly, Turnus himself (X 267; 276)⁶⁰. This occurrence is the only appearance of *cometae* in the *Aeneid*; the flame portent links Aeneas to Ascanius (II 682 ff.) and Augustus at Actium (VIII 680 f.), while the use of *mortalibus aegris* connects this passage with XI 182 f. “Aurora interea miseris mortalibus almam/ extulerat lucem”, of the dawn just before the *Trojan* funeral rites: Aeneas will be a bringer of death, even as he undertakes his role as the Augustan model and distant progenitor of Rome. The colour verb first appears when Ascanius promises Turnus' plumes to Nisus and Euryalus (= a failed sentiment), and comes next with the return of Aeneas who will ultimately prove victorious in his struggle against Turnus; the next two uses, appropriately enough, are the quickly successive images of the red of Lavinia's blush and the ruddy dawn of the final contest – which Aeneas will win, even if Troy is destined to lose to Italy in the larger ethnographic sphere of which both heroes are ignorant as the epic closes.

And, too, the comet image of *Aeneid* X connects Aeneas to Homer's Achilles; it is borrowed from *Iliad* XVIII 206–214 and XXII 26–31, in both passages where it describes Achilles in battle mode. In both Homeric parallels, however, Patroclus is already dead; Virgil carefully reserves this moment of his allusive association of Aeneas to Achilles for a time prior to the death of Pallas, the Patroclus of the *Aeneid*⁶¹. Part of the point of the anticipation is to signal Aeneas' wrath, which is already in full force even before Pallas is killed, besides more generally keeping the reader in some uncertainty and confusion over the exact import of Virgil's Homeric parallels.

There are twenty-one passages in the *Aeneid*, then, that have explicit mention of Aurora (or at least her son or husband): 2x in Book I; 2x in III; 4x in IV; 2x in V (note V 42 f.); 1x in VI; 2x in VII (note VII 148 f.); 2x in VIII; 2x in IX; 1x in X; 2x in XI (note XI 210 *tertia lux*); 1x in XII (note XII 113 f.). The occurrences show some degree of balance: twice each in the opening books of the two halves of the epic; once each in the closing books, VI and XII; twice each in the penultimate books of each half, V and XI; twice each in Books III and IX; twice each

⁶⁰ Cf. Hom. *Il.* II 25 ff., where Achilles is being watched by Priam. See also here especially HARRISON *ad loc.* The corrector of the Palatinus read X 256 *rubebat* for *ruebat*, of the dawn that sees Aeneas return to the camp – *fortasse recte*; for *ruere* in descriptions of the day see S. MACK, *Vergil, Aeneid* 2.250–2, CQ XXX 1980, pp. 153–158, at 154 f.

⁶¹ See here K. KING, *Foil and Fusion: Homer's Achilles in Vergil's Aeneid*, MD IX 1982, pp. 31–57, at 41 f.

in the related Books III and V. There are no appearances in Book II, which is dominated by the reminiscence of the night Troy fell⁶², but four in book IV. There is only one occurrence in Book X, which seems to stand out of the pattern; we shall see below how the single appearance in *Aeneid* X is connected to the death of Pallas, who is associated elsewhere in the epic with Lucifer, the Morning Star⁶³.

Just before Aeneas departs Evander's presence with Pallas, Virgil explicitly links the young Arcadian hero to Lucifer, the Morning Star⁶⁴:

qualis ubi Oceani perfusus Lucifer unda,
quem Venus ante alios astrorum diligit ignis,
extulit os sacrum caelo tenebrasque resolvit.

(VIII 589–591)

The description is a fulfillment of sorts of an image from the close of Book II (the only book of the poem where Aurora is absent)⁶⁵. Lucifer was bringing light over Mount Ida as the Trojans prepared to leave on their long exile:

iamque iugis summae surgebat Lucifer Idae
ducebatque diem...

(II 801 f.)⁶⁶

These are the only occurrences of Lucifer in the *Aeneid*, with the exception of those passages where Virgil names *Eous*⁶⁷. At XI 4 “vota deum primo victor solvebat Eoo”, Aeneas is described as making offerings either at the rising of dawn (so Servius) or of Lucifer (so HEYNE)⁶⁸. Book XI thus opens with offerings to the Morning Star to whom the now dead Pallas had been compared. In Pallas we have an embodiment of the problem of the Augustan succession, a concern

⁶² The absence of Aurora from Book II may also serve to highlight how Aeneas does not respond to Dido's request for the story of Memnon.

⁶³ For Lucifer see C. SANTINO, *EV* III, col. 260. Hesperus occurs at *Ecl.* 8, 30 and 10, 77, but never in *Georg.* or *Aen.*

⁶⁴ See MALTBY *ad Tib.* I 3, 94 on the associations of Aurora and Lucifer.

⁶⁵ The Morning Star is the planet Venus; Virgil notes that Venus loved this star more than any other celestial fires both to underscore something of the goddess' special predilection for her own star, and to highlight her concern for the *gens Iulia*, which, in the person of Iulus, will survive – at the price of Pallas' life.

⁶⁶ On this book closing see especially B. NAGLE, *Open-Ended Closure in Aeneid 2*, CW LXXVI 1983, pp. 257–263.

⁶⁷ Cf. Cinna, fr. 10 HOLLIS (6 BLÄNSDORF) “te matutinus flentem conspexit Eous,/ te flentem paulo vidit post Hesperus idem”; FORDYCE on Catullus 62, 34 f.; LYNE on *Ciris* 351 f.

⁶⁸ See further here FRATANTUONO *ad XI* 4; the other relevant Virgilian passages are *Georg.* I 221; I 288; *Aen.* I 489; III 588 f. “Postera iamque dies primo surgebat Eoo/ umentemque Aurora polo dimoverat umbram” (before the appearance of Achaemenides). Achaemenides is received by the Trojans and saved from the Cyclopes (he is never mentioned again after his episode in Book III); Pallas' fate while in Trojan safeguarding will be less fortunate.

that was highlighted at the climax of the *Heldenschau*, in the image of the ghostly Marcellus (VI 860–886)⁶⁹.

The portent of the fire that seems to be emitted from Aeneas' head as he returns (with Pallas) to his camp at X 270–275 is a direct response to the flames that harmlessly flashed around the head of the young Iulus at II 679–691 (and cf. “stans celsa in puppi” with VIII 680, another association between Aeneas and Augustus). What happened to Iulus has positive connotations for his survival and future success; in the case of the fiery Aeneas head of Book X, the death of the hero's surrogate son is foretold: Aeneas will survive, and not Pallas⁷⁰. The story of Aurora's son Memnon that Dido had requested will find its incarnation in the Lucifer of the *Aeneid*, the young hero Pallas. Cymodocea had urged Aeneas to arm and prepare for battle with the coming of Aurora (X 241 “Aurora [...] veniente”); in reality, the impetuous Pallas will serve as a true *praevius Aurorae* and meet his death in place of Aeneas' son Iulus. If Aurora, for her part, is to be associated in Virgil with the birth of the new, Italian Rome, than Pallas' death is all the more appropriate as the action of the one who goes before the dawn.

We have seen that in Virgil the image of Lucifer is most particularly associated with Pallas (the bulwark Aeneas laments that his son Ascanius has lost at XI 57 f.). At the end of Book II, the Morning Star is seen to rise over *Ida*, the sacred mountain of Cybele and Troy. In the immediate context of the assembly of the Trojan exiles in preparation for the departure west, the appearance of Lucifer is full of hope of rebirth and renewal. Later, the bright promise of the Morning Star will prove to be fleeting, as Virgil associates it with the doomed Pallas. Pallas' loss is symbolic of the problem of the Augustan succession. But already at the beginning of the journey of the Trojan exile band, in the moment of seeming renaissance for the defeated sons of Aeneas, the Morning Star that rises over *Ida* will prove a bringer of death on another level. Just as the neoteric poets enjoyed the conceit that Lucifer and Hesperus were the same light, so in Virgil's epic conception the Morning Star that rises over *Ida* will spell the beginning of the last day, as it were, for Troy, and the first for Hesperia, the future western home of the Rome that will be Italian and not Trojan⁷¹.

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⁶⁹ Symbolic of the problem of the Augustan succession is the poetic conceit that the young victim of war will not be able to marry; for the strong associations of Lucifer with nuptial unions see A. CUCCHIARELLI, *Vergil on Killing Parthenius* (Aen. 10.748), CJ XCVII 2001, pp. 51–54, at 52.

⁷⁰ And compare the uses of *apex* at X 270, of Aeneas' head and XII 492, where Turnus' spear just grazes his “summum [...] apicem”.

⁷¹ This interpretation lends a refined meaning to Aeneas' words to his mother in Book I, where she appears to him disguised as a huntress: “O dea, si prima repetens ab origine pergam/ et vacet annalis nostrorum audire laborum/ ante diem clauso componat Vesper Olympo” (I 372–374): the Evening Star will indeed put the long day of Trojan labour to rest, and in the Hesperia that is Italy. On these lines note R. DOBBIN, *An Ironic Allusion at Aeneid I.374*, *Mnemosyne* LV 2002, pp. 736–738.

“LIKE SOME ODYSSEUS”:
AELIUS ARISTIDES AND PLATO’S VISITS TO SICILY

by

KATARZYNA JAŹDŹEWSKA

ABSTRACT: This article examines the comparison between Plato’s visits to Sicily and Odysseus’ *nostos* in Plato’s *Seventh Letter* and Aelius Aristides’ *Defence of Oratory* and *Defence of the Four*. It traces Aristides’ reformulation of the comparison which aims to cast a shadow on the philosopher and his encounters with Dionysius the Younger.

The Platonic *Seventh Letter*¹, much of which is dedicated to an explanation of Plato’s motivations for undertaking his three Sicilian journeys, indicates that the philosopher’s visits to Sicily and his encounters with the Syracusan tyrants provoked much discussion among his contemporaries². Extant fragments and paraphrases of Hellenistic anti-Platonic writings allow us to identify some of the charges raised against Plato: he was accused of being an associate of tyrants and a treacherous friend to Dion, he was depicted as a parasite at the court of Dionysius, and he was censured for gluttony and greed³.

The interest of Greek authors in Plato’s activity in Sicily was enduring. In the second century CE, Aelius Aristides, known for his familiarity with and employment of the anti-Platonic tradition⁴, kept referring to Plato’s Sicilian journeys in

¹ On the *Seventh Letter*, see e.g. MORROW 1962: 44–81; EDELSTEIN 1966; BRISSON 2004: 133–166; KNAB 2006. The still debated issue of the authenticity of the *Seventh Letter* has little relevance for my argument. In my discussion of the letter I will refer to “Plato” speaking in the text, by which I mean the first-person voice created by the author of the letter.

² On the much debated issue of Plato’s Sicilian voyages and their account in the *Seventh Letter*, see VON FRITZ 1968; SOUILHÉ 1977: XXXIII–CII.

³ For the depiction of Plato’s Sicilian journeys in anti-Platonic writings, see GEFFCKEN 1928: 89 f. and RIGINOS 1976: 70–92. For some modern reflection on Plato’s involvement in Sicily, see LILLA 2001: 193–216 (“Afterword: The Lure of Syracuse”).

⁴ The customarily used term “anti-Platonic tradition” is misleading since it suggests that the authors of anti-Platonic texts shared intellectual backgrounds and outlooks as well as motivation, which certainly was not the case. I retain the term, however, as a useful shorthand term for texts directed against Plato, written by authors of different backgrounds and in different historical and

his three texts concerning Plato, the so-called “Platonic discourses”: *To Plato: In Defence of Oratory* (*Def. or.* = *Or.* 45 DINDORF), *To Plato: In Defence of the Four* (*Def. quat.* = *Or.* 46), and a letter *To Capito* (*Ad Capit.* = *Or.* 47). In these texts, Aristides introduced the figure of an anonymous accuser questioning Plato’s reasons for sailing to Sicily (*Def. or.* 280; *Def. quat.* 306⁵), discussed his relationships with the Syracusan tyrants (*Def. quat.* 368–392), and hinted at Plato’s familiarity with Sicilian cuisine, thereby alluding to the portrayal of Plato as a glutton feasting at Dionysius’ court (*Def. quat.* 368 f.). Aristides’ information concerning the Sicilian episodes in Plato’s life comes from various sources: he quotes the *Seventh Letter* (*Def. or.* 285)⁶, the *Second Letter* (*Def. quat.* 587), and the *Eighth Letter* (*Def. or.* 321, 324–326; *Def. quat.* 272, 284), but also draws from anti-Platonic sources (for example, when he speaks about Plato’s slavery and makes an allusion to Plato’s enjoyment of Sicilian cuisine)⁷.

This article examines one aspect of Aristides’ discussion of Plato’s visits to Sicily, namely the comparison of Plato and his Sicilian travels to Odysseus and his *nostos*. Aristides’ inspiration is Plato himself who in the *Seventh Letter* compared his third Sicilian journey to Odysseus’ wandering. While in the *Seventh Letter*, as I will argue, the comparison is used in a manner concurrent with the disillusioned and defensive tone of Plato’s account of his Sicilian voyages, Aristides carefully reformulates it in a way which enables him to cast a shadow on the philosopher and present him as a reckless and injudicious man, a caricature rather than a likeness of the Homeric hero.

THE SEVENTH LETTER: PLATO’S ODYSSEAN WANDERING

The comparison of Plato to Odysseus did not originate in Aristides’ own imagination, but can be traced back to the *Seventh Letter* in which Plato alluded to Odysseus and compared his Sicilian journeys to Odysseus’ *nostos*. When, during his third visit to the island, Plato realized that Dionysius the Younger was not really interested in philosophy, he decided to leave. In 345d–e he comments:

cultural circumstances. On Aristides’ employment of anti-Platonic arguments, see GEFFCKEN 1928: 105–107 and DÜRING 1941: 162 f.

⁵ When referring in this paper to *Def. or.*, *Def. quat.* and *Ad Capit.*, I use paragraph numbers of the edition by BEHR, LENZ 1978.

⁶ Aristides calls the *Seventh Letter* “the long letter” (*Def. or.* 285: ἐκ τῆς μακροῦς ἐπιστολῆς). On the imperial period authors’ familiarity with the *Seventh Letter*, see TARRANT 1983: 75–103.

⁷ Writing in the intellectual ambience of the 2nd c. CE, in which Plato enjoyed the status of a cultural icon, Aristides was aware that his toying with anti-Platonic arguments would offend some of his readers. In *Def. or.* 295 he emphasized that he was discussing Plato’s Sicilian journeys without the intention of slandering the philosopher. *Ad Capit.* 9–16 reveals that Aristides’ reference to Plato in Sicily in the *Def. or.* was, indeed, met with indignation by Platonists, for whom it was apparently enough to qualify Aristides as a successor of the anti-Platonic tradition. On Aristides’ anticipation of the anger of contemporary Platonists, see FLINTERMAN 2000–2001: 32–54.

ἦν γὰρ θέρος ἤδη τότε καὶ ἔκπλοι τῶν νεῶν· ἐδόκει δὴ χαλεπαίνειν μὲν οὐ δεῖν ἐμὲ Διονυσίῳ μᾶλλον ἢ ἑμαυτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς βιασαμένοις ἐλθεῖν ἐμὲ τὸ τρίτον εἰς τὸν πορθμὸν τὸν περὶ τὴν Σκύλλαν, ὄφρ' ἔτι τὴν ὀλοὴν ἀναμετρήσαιμι Χάρυβδι, λέγειν δὲ πρὸς Διονύσιον ὅτι μοι μένειν ἀδύνατον εἶη Δίωνος οὕτω προπεπηλακισμένου.

It was summer at the time, and ships were leaving the port. Though it was clear to me that I should not to be more angry with Dionysius than with myself and those who had forced me to come for a third time to the strait of Scylla, “to measure again the length of deadly Charybdis”, yet I thought I ought to tell Dionysius that it was impossible for me to remain after this scurvy treatment of Dion⁸.

The quotation is from *Odyssey* XII 428, where Odysseus relates that he was forced to sail for the second time between Scylla and Charybdis. The comparison between Plato’s Sicilian voyages and Odysseus’ adventure is founded on an ancient interpretation of Homeric geography, which located Charybdis in the Strait of Messina (Thuc. IV 24). But there is clearly more than simply a geographic connection. The notion of the “deadly Charybdis” emphasizes the dangerous nature of Plato’s third journey to Sicily (stressed by Plato throughout his account). The comparison also highlights Plato’s unwillingness to sail to Sicily for the third time: he was, like Odysseus, forced to undertake the risk; the vague βιασάμενοι refers to people who kept urging him to visit Dionysius and instruct him in philosophy, whom Plato blames for persuading him to undertake the third journey to Sicily (cf. 338b–339d). Scylla and Charybdis symbolize the choice between two evils, which is pertinent to Plato’s perception of his situation⁹: he decides to sail to Sicily again for fear that he might incur blame in case Dionysius was really serious about his philosophical studies.

Another, more subtle reference to Odysseus appears in 350d. After his return from the third visit to Sicily, Plato met with Dion, who was enraged at Dionysius and desired to seek revenge. Plato refused to take part in Dion’s plans (350c–d):

Ἐμὲ δ' εἶπον ὅτι σὺ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων βία τινὰ τρόπον σύσσιτον καὶ συνέστιον καὶ κοινωνὸν ἱερῶν Διονυσίῳ ἐποίησας, ὃς ἴσως ἠγεῖτο διαβαλλόντων πολλῶν ἐπιβουλεύειν ἐμὲ μετὰ σοῦ ἑαυτῷ καὶ τῇ τυραννίδι, καὶ ὁμῶς οὐκ ἀπέκτεινεν, ἠδέεσθῃ δέ. [...] ταῦτα εἶπον μεμισηκῶς τὴν περὶ Σικελίαν πλάνην καὶ ἀτυχίαν.

But as for me, I said, you and the others compelled me, in a way, to become a guest at the table and hearth of Dionysius and a participant in his sacrifices; and he probably believed, from the many reports circulated against me, that I was plotting against him and tyranny – yet he did not put me to death, but respected my person. [...] I said this in disgust at my Sicilian wandering and misfortune.

⁸ All Greek quotations of the *Seventh Letter* are from BURNET’s edition. The translations are MORROW’S, adapted.

⁹ As observed by KNAB 2006: 299.

It has been noted by scholars, although with some caution, that the notion of wandering, πλάνη, may be another allusion to Odysseus and his travels¹⁰; and as we will see, ancient authors – such as Aristides – made such a connection. We can observe that the tenor of this passage and the sentiments it conveys are reminiscent of 345d–e, discussed above, in which Plato mentions Scylla and Charybdis. In both passages Plato emphasizes his unwillingness to travel and says that he was forced by other people (345d: βιασάμενοι; 350c: βίβ[α] [...] ἐποίησας) to sail to Sicily and to become Dionysius' guest. Both passages stress the danger Plato incurred: 345c–d by referring to the “deadly” Charybdis, 350c–d by stating that Dionysius could have easily killed Plato and had good reasons for it. There is also a tendency in both passages to exonerate Dionysius to some extent and blame those who forced Plato to visit him. The resemblance between both passages might be considered as an additional argument that the term πλάνη in 350c–d is indeed an allusion to Odysseus' wanderings, complementing the notion of Scylla and Charybdis in 345d–e.

In terms of literary function, Plato's comparison of his Sicilian journeys to Odyssean wandering complements his self-presentation in the *Seventh Letter*: it emphasizes his unwillingness to embark on the trip to Sicily for the third time, the perils of the voyage, and the futility of his mission¹¹. In the context of the defensive rhetoric of the letter, the Odysseus comparison takes the responsibility off Plato: his wandering, like that of the Homeric hero, was forced upon him by various external forces, both human (people under whose pressure Plato undertook his journeys) and divine (the *Seventh Letter* repeatedly refers to the divine agency behind Plato's actions)¹². It fits the heroizing tendency of the letter, which presents Plato as a solitary hero, pitted against adverse powers and circumstances.

AELIUS ARISTIDES AND PLATO'S ODYSSEAN PERSONA

Plato's comparison of his Sicilian journeys to Odysseus' wandering in the *Seventh Letter* did not go unnoticed by ancient readers. Eusebius of Caesarea informs us that, in the second half of the fourth century BCE, Aristoxenus of

¹⁰ See SOUILHÉ 1977: 63; MORROW 1962: 249, n. 65 (“quite probably intended, as Bury and Souilhé suggests, to recall the adventures of Odysseus”), also cautiously BRISSON 2004: 232, n. 194. KNAB 2006 in his commentary does not comment on the term πλάνη in 350d.

¹¹ See also MONTIGLIO 2000: 97 who observes that Plato depicts himself “as a passive traveller, an avatar of Odysseus the suffering wanderer”, while by using the term πλάνη, he emphasizes “the failure of his mission” and “the ineffectiveness of the journeys and the unwillingness of the traveller”. See also MONTIGLIO 2005: 162 f.

¹² Pl. *Ep.* 7, 326d–e, Plato's first arrival at Syracuse was conceived by some greater power; 336b Plato mentions “some daimon or a sinful man” (ἢ ποῦ τις δαίμων ἢ τις ἀλιτήριος) who overturned the political plans of Plato and Dion. Cf. MORROW 1962: 218, n. 10: “the recognition that human events are always exposed to the influence of higher powers is a recurrent theme in the Epistles”.

Tarentum referred in his *Life of Plato* to the philosopher’s Sicilian adventures as ἡ πλάνη καὶ ἡ ἀποδημία¹³. Aristoxenus’ phrase is not univocally recognized as an allusion to the *Seventh Letter*¹⁴. However, it should be noted that Aristides uses the same two nouns in *Def. or.* 280 (τὰς τῆς ἀποδημίας καὶ πλάνης) in a passage unmistakably alluding to the Odysseus comparison in the *Seventh Letter* (I discuss the passage below). It is probable that Aristides, who quotes freely from anti-Platonic sources, owes the expression to Aristoxenus and retains the context in which it was used.

It is Aelius Aristides, however, who becomes especially interested in the comparison of Plato to the Homeric hero. In the *Def. or.* he discusses Plato’s Sicilian travels in order to reveal that although Plato censured rhetoric in some of his dialogues, by his actions he showed his appreciation for it. Aristides argues that being wronged is an evil, that rhetoric has the power to prevent the suffering of both the orator and other people (*Def. or.* 261–306) and he attempts to prove that the Plato of the *Seventh Letter* agrees with him. Although Aristides professes his admiration for Plato throughout the text, he fills the speech with insinuations and hints which cast the philosopher in an unfavourable light. In paragraph 280 he imagines a person asking Plato about the purpose of his Sicilian expeditions:

Φέρε δὴ προσέστω κἀν τούτοις ἐρώτησις, οἷον εἴ τις ἤρετο αὐτόν, ἡνίκα εἰς Σικελίαν ἔπλει τὸ δεύτερον ἢ τρίτον, ἤτοι σύμπλους ἢ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ κυβερνήτης, οὐ δὲ δὴ τοῦ χάριν ἡμῖν ὧ Πλάτων εἰς Σικελίαν πλεῖς; ἢ εἰ μὴ τότε, ἀλλ’ εἴ τις οἴκαδε αὐτὸν ἐπανελθόντα ἤρετο τὰς τῆς ἀποδημίας καὶ πλάνης αἰτίας καὶ τί δὴ μαθῶν τὸ τρίτον αὐθις περὶ Χάρυβδιν ἐπραγματεύσατο, περὶ ἦν Ὀδυσσεὺς οὐ πλέον ἢ δὶς, τί ἂν ἀπεκρίνατο αὐτῷ;

Here also let us add a question: for example if someone asked him, either a fellow passenger or the helmsman himself, when he was sailing to Sicily for the second or third time: please, why are you sailing to Sicily, Plato? Or if not then, if someone asked him when he returned home, the cause for his journey abroad and his wandering and what possessed him to be bothered with Charybdis three times, while Odysseus did it no more than twice, what would he answer him?¹⁵

Aristides alludes here to the *Seventh Letter*, in which Plato acknowledges that people question his motivation for the second visit to Sicily¹⁶; he also mentions Charybdis and calls Plato’s travels “wandering”, πλάνη, alluding to the two Odysseus references in the *Seventh Letter* discussed above. He also makes the

¹³ WEHRLI 1967: 27 (fr. 64). For a discussion of extant fragments of Aristoxenus’ text, see DILLON 2012: 283–296.

¹⁴ See ADAM 1910: 37; EDELSTEIN 1966: 1, n. 4.

¹⁵ For quotations of Aristides, I use the edition by BEHR, LENZ 1978. The translation is BEHR 1986.

¹⁶ Pl. *Ep.* 7, 330c: “why I returned and what I did, with the explanation and justification of my actions, I will go into later for the benefit of those who wonder what my purpose was in going for a second time” (transl. MORROW).

link between Odysseus and Plato more explicit by actually including the name of Odysseus, which makes no appearance in the *Seventh Letter*. But while in the *Seventh Letter* the comparison of Plato's travels to Odysseus' wandering served to underline the dangerous nature of Plato's voyage and his unwillingness to undertake it, and to remove from him the responsibility for the decision to visit Sicily for the third time, Aristides re-interprets it, emphasizing above all the philosopher's lack of sound judgment. Τί δὴ μαθῶν, "what on earth were you thinking", he asks, using an Aristophanic phrase¹⁷: even Odysseus sailed past Charybdis only twice, he remarks, astutely drawing attention to the fact that Plato compares his *third* journey to Sicily to Odysseus' *second* sailing past Charybdis. It is worth noting that although Aristides alludes to the passage of the *Seventh Letter* in which Plato speaks of both Scylla and Charybdis, he chooses to mention only Charybdis. This might not be accidental: several ancient texts indicate that Charybdis was a recognizable metaphor for gluttony and immoderation¹⁸, and, as already pointed out, Aristides elsewhere in his *Defences* insinuated that Plato was a glutton at Dionysius' court¹⁹.

The Odysseus comparison reappears in the *Def. quat.*, in which Aristides defends the four prominent Athenian statesmen criticized in Plato's *Gorgias*: Miltiades, Themistocles, Pericles, and Cimon. In 306 Aristides again calls Plato's travels "wandering" and mentions Charybdis:

πρὸς Διὸς, ὦ Πλάτων, εἰ δὲ δὴ σοῦ τις λαβόμενος κατηγορεῖ λέγων ὅσα διέπλεις ἐν ὀκάσει τὴν θάλατταν καὶ πλάνην ὁπόσῃν πεπλάνησαι περὶ τὴν Χάρυβδιν...

By Zeus, Plato, if someone laid hold of you and accused you, telling of all your voyages in ships and your wanderings about Charybdis...

As in the *Def. or.*, Aristides introduces here the figure of an anonymous adversary, this time unambiguously characterized as an accuser (κατηγορεῖ), questioning Plato about the purpose of his travels. The etymological figure πλάνην πεπλάνησαι is used for emphasis: it underlines the notion of futile wandering. Again, only Charybdis is mentioned, probably insinuating that Plato enjoyed the notorious Sicilian lifestyle.

¹⁷ E.g. Ar. *Ach.* 826; *Vesp.* 251; *Lys.* 599.

¹⁸ Cf. Cratinus 397: γαστροχάρυβδης. According to Diogenes Laertius VI 51, Diogenes the Cynic called the stomach "life's Charybdis" (τὴν γαστέρα Χάρυβδιν ἔλεγε τοῦ βίου). Heraclitus in the *Homeric Problems* 70, 10 says: Χάρυβδης μὲν ἢ δάπανος ἀσωτία καὶ περὶ πότους ἄπληστος εὐλόγως ὠνόμασται ("Charybdis is a name for lavish luxury and insatiable drinking"). See also Dio Cass. XLV 28.

¹⁹ Cf. also Philostratus' *Life of Apollonius of Tyana* I 35, 6, where Apollonius enumerates wise men who proved guilty of pursuing money and the company of despots; among them is Plato, who "is said to have measured the length of Charybdis three times in pursuit of Sicilian wealth" (Πλάτων δὲ τρις ἀναμετρήσαι λέγεται τὴν Χάρυβδιν ὑπὲρ πλούτου Σικελικοῦ). Like Aristides, Philostratus combines the quotation from the *Seventh Letter* with anti-Platonic interpretation of Plato's motivations.

Plato’s Sicilian voyages become a prominent theme in an imaginary speech of the “Four” (*Def. quat.* 367–399), who are “raised from the dead” by Aristides in order that they can make their response to Plato. Aristides asks his readers to imagine Themistocles or Pericles, known for their rhetorical dexterity, speaking on behalf of the “Four”. The general point of the speech is that Plato’s repeated visits to Sicily were motivated by his misguided belief that he might have educated and morally improved the Syracusan tyrants, and that Plato utterly failed in his undertaking; therefore, he has no right to accuse the “Four” for their lack of success in political matters.

Although the “Four” claim that they do not plan to slander Plato, we find allusions to Plato’s gluttony early on in the speech (the Sicilian cookbook in 368, the Sicilian table in 369). Then, in 385, while discussing Plato’s first Sicilian journey, Aristides gives a detailed account of Plato’s misfortunes: he was handed over by Dionysius to Pollis, a Spartan, who took Plato to Aegina; there Plato narrowly escaped death, was sold as a slave²⁰ to an African man, and finally, was ransomed by Dion. In 385, Aristides summarizes Plato’s first Sicilian journey with a comparison to Odysseus: Plato, “like some Odysseus” (ὡσπερ τις Ὀδυσσεύς) escaped not only several deaths, but also slavery, and depended on other people’s mercy. In 388, as Aristides moves on to discuss Plato’s third visit to Sicily, he sneeringly calls the philosopher “the wisest of Greeks”; this is how Aristides refers to Odysseus in *Def. or.* 88. The link between Odysseus and Plato is also drawn here in order to deride the philosopher: he who compared himself to Odysseus is more deficient in understanding than a child (νήπιος). Then in the next paragraph, the “Four”, in their imaginary speech, say that Plato has no more right to accuse them of failing in their undertakings than Odysseus has of finding fault with Menelaus’ wandering (389):

ὡσπερ ἂν εἰ Ὀδυσσεύς τῷ Μενέλεω τὴν πλάνην ὠνείδιζεν, ὦ οὗτος, ἦκον μὲν οὐδ’ αὐτὸς μετὰ πάντων, μετὰ πλείονων δὲ ἢ σὺ καὶ θάττον ἢ σὺ, καὶ πλεύσας οὐκ ἴσα· καὶ πρὸς γε οὐ περιεργασάμενος, ὡσπερ σὺ καθήμενος ἐν Σικελίᾳ παρὰ τῷ Κύκλωπι.

As if Odysseus should blame Menelaus’ wanderings. Dear sir, I myself did not come with all my men, but with more than you and sooner than you, and with not the same kind of voyage. And besides, I did not have needless trouble like you idling in Sicily with the Cyclops.

In this imaginary retort, Menelaus not only defends himself, but accuses Odysseus of wasting his time and labour (περιεργασάμενος) while staying with the Cyclops. Menelaus’ words are a thinly disguised attack on Plato who

²⁰ On Plato’s alleged slavery, see RIGINOS 1976: 86–92.

is imagined as “idling in Sicily with the Cyclops” – i.e., spending time at the Syracusan court with the tyrant Dionysius.

Aristides’ employment of the figure of the Cyclops as a representation of Dionysius merits attention. As in the case of Charybdis, here there is also an underlying geographical connection: Sicily was identified by the ancients with the Homeric island of Cyclopes²¹. But there is also another source of inspiration behind this passage, namely Philoxenus of Cythera, who is mentioned twice, in *Def. quat.* 386 and 391, in immediate proximity to Menelaus’ imaginary retort to Odysseus.

Numerous ancient authors inform us that Philoxenus, a dithyrambic poet, stayed for some time at the court of Dionysius the Elder²². He was to be sent to the quarries by Dionysius for his frank speech on the low artistic value of Dionysius’ poetry or, according to an alternative version, for making advances to Dionysius’ mistress Galatea²³. In revenge, we read, Philoxenus wrote a poem entitled *Cyclops*, in which he depicted Dionysius as Polyphemus, his mistress as a nymph, and himself as Odysseus²⁴. We do not know how much truth there is in these accounts; however, it is of no importance for our reading of Aristides. From the *Def. quat.* we reckon that he was familiar with the stories about Philoxenus’ difficult relations with Dionysius. In 386 he says that Plato “did not share Philoxenus’ fate” (by which he means, presumably, being sent to the quarries) although he acted “contrary to him” (οὐ μετέσχεσ τῆς Φιλοξένου τοῦ διθυραμβοποιοῦ τύχης καίτοι πράττων μάλιστα πῶς ἀντίπαλα ἐκείνῳ). The meaning of Aristides’ words becomes clear in paragraph 391, in which he expresses astonishment that after his first experience with the tyrant, Plato put himself in Dionysius’ power twice more, something Philoxenus was wise enough to avoid after his first encounter:

φαίνεται δὲ Φιλόξενον μὲν τὸν Κυθήριον οὐ δυνηθεὶς αὐθις ὑφ’ αὐτῷ λαβεῖν Διονύσιος, ἀλλ’ οἰμῶζειν ἐκεῖνος ἐλευθέρως γράφων αὐτῷ, σοῦ δέ γε δεύτερον καὶ τρίς ἐγκρατῆς γενόμενος μετὰ τὰς πρώτας ἐκείνας διατριβάς.

²¹ Thuc. VI 2, about Sicily: παλαιάτατοι μὲν λέγονται ἐν μέρει τινὶ τῆς χώρας Κύκλωπες καὶ Λαιστρυγόνες οἰκῆσαι. On Homeric elements in Thucydides’ description of Sicily, see MACKIE 1996: 103–113.

²² Diod. Sic. XV 6; Plut. *Mor.* 334c (= *De Alex. fort.* 2, 1); 471e (= *De tranq. anim.* 12); Lucian. *Adv. indoct.* 15; Ael. *VH* XII 44; Athen. *Deipn.* I 11.

²³ Diodorus, Plutarch, and Lucian speak of Philoxenus’ frankness, cf. also Aristid. *Def. quat.* 391. Aelian does not reveal the reason for Philoxenus’ punishment. Athenaeus narrates the story about Galatea, the mistress of Dionysius. Plut. *Mor.* 622c (= *Quaest. conv.* I 5, 1) quotes a line from Philoxenus’ *Cyclops*.

²⁴ The fragments of the poem are collected in *PMG* 815–824. On Philoxenus’ *Cyclops*, see HOLLAND 1884; FERRIN SUTTON 1983; HORDERN 1999 and 2004. The poem enjoyed some popularity in antiquity: there are traces of its popularity in Aristophanes’ *Wealth*, while the motif of the enamoured Cyclops ignited Theocritus’ poetic imagination; the poem is also mentioned by Aristotle in *Poetics* 1448a.

Still it is clear that Dionysius was unable to get Philoxenus of Cythera in his hands a second time, but Philoxenus writes to him frankly to go hang, while after that first stay Dionysius got you in his power a second and third time.

Aristides does not discriminate here between Dionysius the Elder, who was the host of Philoxenus, and Dionysius the Younger, whose guest Plato was during his second and third visits to Sicily²⁵. The comparison he draws between Plato and Philoxenus suggests that the figure of the Cyclops, which represents Dionysius in 389, is inspired by the tradition associated with the poem by Philoxenus.

Aristides' association of Dionysius with the Cyclops serves to further emphasize Plato's recklessness and lack of sound judgment: it is astonishing, Aristides says, that Plato put himself in the power of such a monstrous creature three times. Dionysius' wickedness and monstrosity is emphasized throughout the *Def. quat.*: the tyrant acts with ὑβρις with respect to Plato (*Def. quat.* 385), and he does not omit any act of arrogance or insolence (ὑβρις, ἀσελγεία) directed against the philosopher (*Def. quat.* 387).

THE ODYSSEUS COMPARISON AND ARISTIDES' POLEMICAL STRATEGIES

In Plato's *Seventh Letter*, the Odysseus comparison complemented Plato's apologetic self-presentation as an unwilling traveller, forced by human and divine powers to undertake perilous, and eventually futile, journeys. In Aristides' two *Defences*, the comparison is twisted in a manner representative of the orator's overall polemical strategy. In both texts, Aristides takes pains to present himself as a diligent reader and student of Plato, well versed in the Platonic writings; and, professing his best intentions, as his ally rather than enemy. He builds his arguments against Plato by lining up passages, phrases and images from Plato's own writings²⁶. He instills the texts with explicit praise of Plato which he slyly interweaves with covert insinuations and allusions to circulating anti-Platonic gossip.

Aristides' employment of the Odysseus comparison is indicative of his close, attentive familiarity with Plato's texts and ingenious exploitation of Platonic motifs. As he compares Plato to Odysseus, he gladly agrees that the philosopher's Sicilian journeys were, indeed, a wandering, and a futile and pointless undertaking. He foregoes the heroic associations activated by the comparison in the *Seventh Letter* and betrays no intention of exempting Plato from the responsibility

²⁵ Some ancient authors mention Philoxenus and Plato in one breath as the two men who had encounters with the Syracusan tyrants. In Diodorus, the account of Philoxenus precedes the one about Plato's encounter with Dionysius (XV 6 f.). Plut. *Mor.* 471e (= *De tranq. anim.* 12) mentions Philoxenus and Plato in the same sentence. Also Plut. *Mor.* 622c (= *Quaest. conv.* I 5, 1) names Philoxenus, his *Cyclops* and Plato in the same paragraph.

²⁶ FLINTERMAN 2000–2001: 36–38.

for his decisions. He presents Plato as a caricature of Odysseus: willingly taking the risk time after time, reckless, unable to make sound judgments or to learn from his mistakes, and a glutton on top of that.

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MIDDLE PLATONISM AND THE PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY
OF PLUTARCH OF CHAERONEA.
AN INTRODUCTORY STUDY

by

KAZIMIERZ PAWŁOWSKI

MIDDLE PLATONISM AND THE DISCOVERY OF INCORPOREALITY.
THE SPIRITUAL SENSE OF HUMAN EXISTENCE

In the final part of his dialogue *De tranquillitate animi* Plutarch wrote the following words, which, in my opinion, illustrate the religious and theosophical foundation of his philosophy:

ἱερὸν μὲν γὰρ ἀγιώτατον ὁ κόσμος ἐστὶ καὶ θεοπρεπέστατον. εἰς δὲ τοῦτον ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἰσάγεται διὰ τῆς γενέσεως οὐ χειροκμήτων οὐδ' ἀκινήτων ἀγαλμάτων θεατῆς, ἀλλ' οἷα νοῦς θεῖος αἰσθητὰ μιμήματα νοητῶν, φησὶν ὁ Πλάτων, ἔμφυτον ἀρχὴν ζωῆς ἔχοντα καὶ κινήσεως ἔφηεν, ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ ἄστρα καὶ ποταμούς νεόν ὕδωρ ἐξιέντας ἀεὶ καὶ γῆν φυτοῖς τε καὶ ζώοις τροφὰς ἀναπέμπουσιν. ὦν τὸν βίον μύησιν ὄντα καὶ τελετὴν τελειοτάτην εὐθυμίας δεῖ μεστὸν εἶναι καὶ γήθους...

(*Tranq. an.* 477 C–D)

It would not be an exaggeration to say that the above quote also reflects the religious feeling that was characteristic of Middle Platonic philosophy and the philosophers belonging to this movement, including Plutarch himself. We also need to mention that this religious feeling is typical not only of Middle Platonism, but rather of all philosophy of this period, barring such movements as Epicureanism and scepticism. For this reason some historians call this philosophy “religious” or sometimes even a “religion”¹.

¹ This is an obvious overstatement because religion is a phenomenon of an entirely different nature – those authors evidently mean only to emphasise the spiritual and ethical character of this philosophy.

An interest in theology and an accompanying fascination with the spiritual and religious dimensions of human existence were very distinctive features of various schools of thought of this period – naturally, with the exception of Sceptics and Epicureans². Even Plutarch's words quoted above are not exceptional in any way – they could well have been ascribed to the Cynics or Stoics of the period. There is, however, something about the philosophy of early Platonists – such as Plutarch – that was not present in any of the other schools, and that is a trait unique to them. This is the great “discovery” made by this philosophy, the idea that became the ideological basis of Middle Platonism in each and every aspect. We are referring here to the “discovery” of incorporeality, namely the discovery of the existence of an incorporeal and therefore spiritual element in the world and in man (the element that is the source and essence of everything that makes us human). It was not really a discovery, because the idea had been known at least since the times of Plato – and Plato's philosophy was probably its source. It is no mystery that Middle Platonism was only an attempt to recover and revive the philosophy of the founder of the Academy in accordance with the conventions and forms that fitted the spiritual tendencies of the period – those tendencies naturally lead to the bringing out of particularly the spiritual and even mystical aspects of Plato's philosophy. These aspects are of special importance to Middle Platonic philosophy – they are apparent in the philosophical thought of Apuleius, Alkinous (Albinus), Maximus and other platonic philosophers, including Plutarch³.

As regards the discovery, it is not difficult to figure out that the “incorporeal” and spiritual element in man is his incorporeal soul, and in the world it is God himself (along with the World-Soul). We have to acknowledge that this “discovery” was quite revolutionary for its time; all the more so because it was connected with “discovering” the transcendence of the incorporeal God. We have to remember that almost all philosophers of the Hellenistic period, particularly the stoics, claimed that everything that exists, including God and the human soul, had to be corporeal. Also, according to the philosophers of this period, God's transcendence is out of the question – this the case especially as far as Stoic philosophy, the movement that dominated the intellectual culture of Greece and

² Let us add here that the “religious” dimension was understood in a rather specific manner; this “philosophical religiousness” – which was ofte (so to say) quite spiritual, not devoid of certain feeling and in some cases highly emotional – was often complemented by an equally passionate criticism of traditional religiousness. This was particularly often the case with contemporary Cynic philosophers (e.g. Oenomaus of Gadara and Demonax).

³ For a comprehensive discussion of Middle Platonic philosophy in general and the thought of Apuleius of Madaura, Alkinous/Albinus and Maximus of Tyre in particular Cf.: DILLON 1996, GÖRANSSON 1995, INVERNIZZI 1976, MILHAVEN 1962, MORESCHINI 1978, REALE, *Medioplatonismo e riscoperta della metafisica platonica*, in REALE 1978, vol. IV: 307–364, SINKO 1905, SPANIER 1920, SZARMACH 1985, THEILER 1930, THEILER 1966, WITT 1937 (²1971), ZINTZEN 1981, PAWŁOWSKI 2002: V–CXLVII, PAWŁOWSKI 2008: 5–137.

Rome for many years, is concerned. Stoic philosophers claimed that God is immanently present in the world (and in man), He is the world's rational, creative and dynamic nature. In other words, on this basis, divinity is to be identified with what is rational, creative and dynamic about the world and about man – and there is no other divinity to be found. We could say, to put it in more modern terms, that God is the rational, creative, dynamic and, of course, eternal “DNA” of the world. The Platonists on the other hand claim that God is incorporeal, that he exists outside the boundaries of the world and independently of it, and that the divine essence of the human soul is of a similar nature. All this is in line with the ethical ideal of Hellenistic Platonism – the ideal of “imitating God” (*homoiosis theou*), which deepens the peculiar, mystery-like and also somewhat secretive mood that is characteristic of this philosophy. Philosophy itself was slowly becoming a form of initiation, resembling the initiation rites of mysteries, because it now involved experiencing similar things to that which is experienced by those being initiated, although on a different level and certainly without the technical means, rituals or liturgy employed in religious initiation rites. Later on, philosophy understood in this way began to be treated as something akin to a revelation, an oracle where divine knowledge is revealed, and the philosopher himself became a prophet of divine wisdom.

On the other hand, a detached observer could regard the Middle Platonic “discoveries”, and especially the Middle Platonic idea of the incorporeal, divine and immortal human soul, as an ordinary, commonplace myth⁴. Nevertheless, if we consider the consequences this myth had for the philosophical life of Platonist philosophers⁵, we discover that they were not as ordinary as we might have assumed. We could even call them remarkable. Naturally, this is not the place for a detailed presentation of those consequences. I will, however, attempt to discuss the most important ones. The most significant consequence of the “discovery of incorporeality” is the “discovery” of the spiritual dimension of human existence. It was revealed that incorporeal, spiritual and ethical values (such as moral beauty, goodness and truth) also exist. These qualities are invisible and non-sensual, yet they exist and they can be experienced by man in some ways. A person who is suitably sensitive, morally and spiritually as well as intellectually⁶, is able to

⁴ The myth was well known and propagated by many widespread mystery cults. Plutarch and his wife were initiated into the mysteries of Dionysus (Plut. *Cons. ad ux.* 611 D).

⁵ Philosophical life in its ethical and spiritual dimension was an integral part of philosophy, aside from the doctrine itself, and it was by no means a part of lesser importance. It is in the ethical and spiritual dimension of philosophy in the life of the philosopher himself that the true sense of the doctrine was revealed. This ethical and spiritual trait of Middle Platonic philosophy is its defining feature. It is also an essential feature of earlier Greek philosophy. Greek philosophical wisdom always had to have some or other ethical and spiritual layers.

⁶ Such a requirement was initiated by Plato himself for the students of his Academy. Cf. Plato, *Ep.* 7, 343 E–344 B; *Rep.* 485 B–486 D).

experience them, of course not in a sensual manner, and also not by means of their intellect, but rather in a quite different way. This entirely different way of experiencing spiritual values (and ethical qualities such as moral beauty and goodness) is also something new in the philosophy of that period, although, of course, it was already present in Plato's thought. In short, what enables man to know spiritual values is spiritual experience. Spiritual and ethical values are experienced in an spiritual manner. It is through this kind of experience that moral or spiritual beauty reveals itself. In other words, such an experience of beauty is lived internally, spiritually. There is an analogy between living the spiritual experience of moral and ethical values and the experience of aesthetic values or qualities. When we see a beautiful natural phenomenon or a work of art – and, it is necessary to add, if we possess enough aesthetic sensitivity – we are able to see and take in not only beautiful things or the qualities of the things, but also something more. We experience aesthetic beauty accessible not to our physical eyes, but to the eyes of our soul. Our eyes and other senses are only able to receive sensual perceptions; they do not participate in aesthetic beauty. The sphere of human consciousness that is responsive to this type of beauty is quite different: it is our aesthetic sensitivity. Thus, the aesthetic experience cannot be reduced to the physical process of perceiving. We need to add, however obvious it seems, that people are not equally endowed with aesthetic sensitivity and in any case, they differ as regards the kinds of aesthetic values they are sensitive to. Aesthetic beauty is able to stimulate our aesthetic sensitivity via our senses which are sensitive to sensual stimuli – and moral beauty is experienced in a similar way. When we are witnessing a noble deed, we are at the same time experiencing some kind of moral beauty – although not sensually and not even intellectually. Moral and spiritual beauty stimulate an entirely different group of receptors – the receptors of the human soul, our ethical and spiritual sensitivity. This sensitivity usually expresses itself usually as a peculiar, indeterminable internal tension⁷, a mysterious, amorous longing for what is beautiful, ethically and spiritually noble, and also for absolute Truth⁸. It turns out that this mystery

⁷ This can be identified, roughly speaking, with metaphysical moral and spiritual intuition, although its emotional aspect is more important than the intellectual one.

⁸ This is the same as the knowledge (or rather: existential experience) of the meaning and the mystery of being human – the mystery of human life. Cf. Plato, *Rep.* 490 A–B: Ἄρ' οὖν δὴ οὐ μετρίως ἀπολογησόμεθα ὅτι πρὸς τὸ ὄν πεφυκὼς εἶη ἀμιλλᾶσθαι ὃ γε ὄντως φιλομαθῆς, καὶ οὐκ ἐπιμένοι ἐπὶ τοῖς δοξαζομένοις εἶναι πολλοῖς ἐκάστοις, ἀλλ' ἴοι καὶ οὐκ ἀμβλύνοιο οὐδ' ἀπολήγοι τοῦ ἔρωτος, πρὶν αὐτοῦ ὃ ἔστιν ἐκάστου τῆς φύσεως ἀψασθαι ᾧ προσήκει ψυχῆς ἐφάπτεσθαι τοῦ τοιοῦτου – προσήκει δὲ συγγενεῖ – ᾧ πλησιάσας καὶ μιγεῖς τῷ ὄντι ὄντως, γεννήσας νοῦν καὶ ἀλήθειαν, γνοίη τε καὶ ἀληθῶς ζῶη καὶ τρέφοιτο καὶ οὕτω λήγοι ὠδίνος, πρὶν δ' οὐ; Cf. also *Rep.* 500 B–C: Οὐδε γάρ που, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, σχολὴ τῷ γε ὡς ἀληθῶς πρὸς τοῖς οὐσί τὴν διάνοιαν ἔχοντι κάτω βλέπειν εἰς ἀνθρώπων πραγματείας, καὶ μαχομένον αὐτοῖς φθόνου τε καὶ δυσμενείας ἐπιμίπλασθαι, ἀλλ' εἰς τεταγμένα ἅττα καὶ κατὰ ταῦτ' αἰεὶ ἔχοντα ὀρῶντας καὶ θεωμένους οὐτ' ἀδικοῦντα οὐτ' ἀδικούμενα ὑπ' ἀλλήλων, κόσμω

cannot be solved even by the finest minds, although it can be touched upon in the spiritual experience, which is much more powerful and effective than rational and sensual cognition, because it falls deeper into the human soul. It does not provide us with rational knowledge, for it is not a rational type of experience. It does, however, arouse in us an existential feeling of meaning. The longing we have mentioned is not satisfied. On the contrary, it is intensified, but thanks to the existential experience this longing is accompanied with a feeling of sense which is never to be lost. Thus, human life becomes meaningful, although the mystery and the conundrum of human existence is not properly solved (according to Plato himself, Truth, if it can be known at all, can only be known after death⁹).

It is not difficult to deduce that this spiritual “knowing” or experiencing absolute Truth (or Beauty or Goodness) is grounded in an experience of a mystical nature. In the writings of Platonists (e.g. Apuleius, Alkinous, Maximus), this mystical experience takes two shapes – both can be traced back to the teachings and philosophy of Plato himself. Firstly, there is intellectual mysticism, which is born of a purely philosophical but passionate (even amorous) desire to know the Truth¹⁰. Secondly – there is the mysticism of the heart, which is motivated by the search for absolute Beauty and Goodness¹¹ (the name itself is of a later origin and is applied more often to Christian mystics like Gregory of Nyssa, Origen or Pseudo-Macarius, but it is also a good term to characterise Platonic mysticism). The first mysticism finds its culmination in an illumination (which was introduced into Christian mysticism by St. Augustine). The other is crowned by amorous ecstasy. It is easy to divine that the object and the intention of both mysticisms is always God, who presents himself either as absolute Truth or as absolute Beauty and Goodness¹². It is worth noting that Platonic philosophers never fail to emphasise that God as the highest Truth and the greatest Beauty is only revealed to the noblest of men – those who have purged their hearts of all egoism¹³. In this way the spiritual experience (in the act of illumination or amorous ecstasy) enables man to experience God himself, who cannot be known in any other way. We should add here that the Platonic dogma that God is unintelligible

δὲ πάντα καὶ κατὰ λόγον ἔχοντα, ταῦτα μιμεῖσθαι τε καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα ἀφομοιοῦσθαι. ἢ οἶει τινὰ μηχανὴν εἶναι, ὅτῳ τις ὀμιλεῖ ἀγάμενος, μὴ μιμεῖσθαι ἐκεῖνο; [...] Θεῖω δὴ καὶ κοσμίω ὁ γε φιλόσοφος ὀμιλῶν κόσμιός τε καὶ θεῖος εἰς τὸ δυνατόν ἀνθρώπων γίγνεται· διαβολὴ δ' ἐν πᾶσι πολλή.

⁹ Plato, *Phaedo* 66 E.

¹⁰ Cf. Apul. *De deo Soc.* III 124; Alkinous, *Didask.* X 165; Plato, *Ep.* 7, 341 C–D.

¹¹ The name itself is of later origin and is applied more often to Christian mystics like Gregory of Nyssa, Origen or Pseudo-Macarius, but it is also a good term to characterise Platonic mysticism. Cf. LOUTH 1983: 1–17.

¹² Cf. Plato, *Symp.* 210 A–E; Alkinous, *Didask.* X 165.

¹³ This is emphasised particularly by Apuleius in *De deo Socratis* III 124, but the requirement is common to all Platonic philosophers.

remains valid, because although God presents himself to man in a mystical act, he still does not reveal all the secrets of his nature.

Thus spiritual values (whose highest sublimation and essence is God) present themselves in a spiritual experience. This idea supercedes ancient Greek rationalism according to which only our mind possesses any cognitive power. It turns out that a greater cognitive power exists, which reaches much deeper, to the supernatural and moral values, and this power belongs to human moral and spiritual sensitivity¹⁴.

The spiritual experience does not consist only in connecting with the object of cognition, which can be God himself, the metaphysical sublimation of all spiritual values. When we are experiencing spiritual values, we can also experience, in a return relation or feeling, our own spiritual essence – we experience our self and live our life in its spiritual dimension. This is how we become a fulfilled human being, how we realise ourselves morally and spiritually – it is vital to emphasise this point because it is, in fact, crucial. We should also add that in this context, the commonplace myth that has been mentioned (about the spiritual or divine character of human nature) ceases to be so commonplace and ordinary and becomes an existential truth of the human soul, and, at the same time, its existential mystery. Naturally, apart from this experience, the myth remains only a myth (and in some cases even a superstition with all its irrational and often grim and dark implications which have more than once manifested themselves in the histories of various religions).

Coming back to Middle Platonism, it needs to be said that the spiritual or mystical mood of this philosophy is not only noticeable, but even dominant, particularly in the writings of thinkers belonging to the last period of the movement, like Apuleius and Alkinous. It would not be an exaggeration to state that this philosophy – independently of its rational potential (which is clearly visible, particularly in the works of Apuleius and Alkinous) – takes on the features of spiritual initiation, an initiation into the spiritual realms of human existence, and even God himself.

To sum up, the most important “discovery” – to use the standard term – of Middle Platonism which determined the ideological and spiritual essence of this philosophical movement was the “discovery” of incorporeality. This discovery was of great importance for philosophy and culture in general, especially coming after the materialistic movements of the Hellenistic period. The discovery of the spiritual element in the world and in man dominated all Middle Platonic philosophy and determined the ways in which the whole movement pursued. The main consequence of this discovery was, above all, the recognition of all spiritual relations whose subject was supposed to be the spiritual soul, including relations directed at God. In this way, the philosophical tool box available to the Platonist

¹⁴ Cf. PAWŁOWSKI 2007: 85–117.

philosophers of the period in question was expanded – it now contained not only intellectual but also spiritual experiences, including love and particularly the mystical love for God himself, and the equally mystical act of perceiving or seeing God in noetic illumination. Moreover, those spiritual and mystical experiences were granted far more importance than intellectual investigations, because the latter cannot lead a philosopher to God; at most they may provide a vague concept of God¹⁵. Mystical love, on the other hand, is the road to achieve true union with God, although of course only if certain moral and spiritual conditions have been satisfied.

This is a good place to inquire into the genesis of the discovery of the incorporeal (together with the supernatural and the transcendent): did the Platonist philosophers of that period find these ideas in Plato's writings or did they rather draw on their own spiritual experiences or perhaps even acts of mysticism? It is impossible not to notice that the writings of these philosophers contain various motifs taken directly from Plato's dialogues and letters. This is a sufficient basis for conjecture that Plato's texts are the proper source of their ideas (at least in the literary sense of the term "source"). It would be equally difficult, however, not to fall under the impression that they did trust their own sensitivity and follow their spiritual experiences. This gives us the right to suppose that their personal, existential spiritual experience of some nature served at least to reassure them in their belief about the existence of an incorporeal and supernatural realm of human existence, even if it was not the primary source of that belief. Anyhow, spiritual experience became one of the main factors of their philosophy and their way of thinking. Nevertheless, interestingly, despite possessing this tool, their knowledge of God and of the human soul does not seem to have grown much. Actually, they only learned that God was incorporeal, transcendent, that he escaped human cognitive efforts and that he was even more difficult to describe because of all the cognitive deficiencies imposed on us by our own nature. It is easy to see that all this can be found in Plato's writings.

We should also add that the Platonic philosophers of the period perfected some of Plato's ideas, or at least they made them more explicit. For example, they refined the concept of illumination as a noetic experience in which the human soul can somehow see God (Apuleius, Alkinous), although we have to admit that the phenomenon of illumination itself remained rather vague¹⁶. On the other hand, it may be that given its personal (and even partly mystical) character, it cannot actually become any clearer. Also the idea of love as a mystical experience of God was elaborated on¹⁷.

¹⁵ The idea of God's unintelligibility remained an undisputable dogma of all Platonic philosophers.

¹⁶ Apul. *De deo Soc.* III 124.

¹⁷ Alkinous, *Didask.* X 165.

Regardless of all this, the discovery of incorporeality and of the spiritual experience itself offers the philosopher a certain kind of insight into the world of values that transcend the realm of the physical and therefore are, in a way, supernatural. Thus the philosopher gains access to the supernatural dimensions of human nature. The supernatural dimension and meaning of human existence now becomes clear, at least in the spiritual sense.

Regardless of the aporias of Middle Platonism and Platonism in general, the significance of those “discoveries” has to be appreciated because they broadened the scope of philosophical inquiry to include the realm of the supernatural that was generally invisible to the prevailing movements of Hellenistic philosophy. We also need to remember that we might be dealing here with an ordinary religious superstition, such as the ones that pervade our culture and thought, and that it must remain a plain, cultural superstition while our spiritual sensitivity itself does open us to the world of supernatural values. It is only our sensitivity that can lead us into that world; even the wisest and most devout discourse cannot replace it in this role.

Also, it is worth noting, aside from the main line of our investigations, that the philosophy of Middle Platonism served to clarify some of the issues concerning Plato’s philosophy, such as the metaphysical nature of ideas and God. Alkinous, for example, brought back and refined the concept of ideas as God’s mental projections¹⁸. Perhaps more interestingly, Alkinous also explained the nature of Plato’s highest ideas – Goodness, Beauty and Truth, at the same time determining the nature of God himself. Ideas gained the status of God’s mental constructs, God’s thoughts that are ontically crystalised, independent in their actual existence, but that remain genetically dependent on God’s mental acts. Thus, ideas were defined as existing in God’s mind, generic projects of beings, although at the same time they were claimed to be independent, ontically complete beings. Plato’s three highest ideas were equalled to God. Each of them began to express some aspect of God’s nature. Let us add that it is under the significant influence of these discoveries that certain ideas of Christian thinkers and also even Christian mystics were formed. Among other Middle Platonic motifs that were absorbed by Christian thought was the well known ideal of imitating God (*homoiosis theo*); an ideal, which, in various shapes ranging from imitating Jesus to imitating Mary, still functions in the Christian culture. Regarding mysticism, it needs to be said that in a way both forms of Platonic mysticism (noetic, intellectual mysticism as well as mysticism based on the love of beauty) bore fruit in Christian mysticism – independently from other inspirations that are common to all religious experiences (like, for example, the biblical ones). Thus, Evagrius of Pontus for instance discusses intellectual mysticism grounded in the noetic

¹⁸ Alkinous, *Didaskalikos* IX 163.

perception of God in brightness, while Pseudo-Macarius's *Homilies* describe the mysticism of the heart¹⁹.

The most important and enduring input of Middle Platonism is the way it unveiled the fascinating depths of human nature in its supernatural (divine) dimension, and its greatest secrets, including the most important and most sacred mystery of human love, which is the initiation into divinity itself. Love elicits the noblest, almost godly features of man, and leads us towards divinity²⁰. It is through love that what Plato called the perfect priestly initiation can be achieved²¹.

The discovery of the supernatural dimension of human nature enforced a change from materialistic life preferences to spiritual ones – it was a consequence of accepting the supernatural aspects of human existence, but also, above all, it revealed the fascinating and mysterious depth in which divinity itself is both hidden and somehow exposed (although only to those who are initiated). Middle Platonic philosophers returned to the Platonic postulates: “follow God” and “imitate God,” which replaced the Stoic “live in accordance with nature” and “follow nature.” In the eyes of the Platonists, the new direction of human ethical development was to be found in imitating the transcendent and incorporeal divinity.

Now is the time to emphasise one other point that often causes misunderstandings, namely the issue of the so-called rational (scientific) knowledge of God and its relation to the spiritual (and in some ways mystical) experience mentioned above. It should be made very clear that rational cognition provides us with rational, logical arguments for the existence of God (although the validity of the logical arguments is debatable); it also strives to understand his nature in the ontological sense. It does not, however, offer us an insight into what God is, and therefore, if we may say so, it does not lead us to a personal encounter with God. In other words, one could be a wise and learned theologian, proficient in the metaphysics of God, and yet live without any existential, spiritual relations with the same God, that is: not having ever experienced the presence of God in one's life and soul, or kinship with him. For a spiritually inclined philosopher this would be utterly unacceptable. Such a way of pursuing philosophy – as an exercise in purely academic rationalism, without any attempt to activate the human spiritual and ethical potential (the natural spiritual and ethical sensitivity) and therefore, without referring to the very essence of humanity – would seem absurd and preposterous.

¹⁹ Cf. LOUTH 1983: 95–125.

²⁰ This is illustrated in a very particular way by Apuleius in his version of the story of Eros and Psyche presented in the *Metamorphoses*.

²¹ Cf. Plato, *Phaedr.* 249 C–250 A, 250 C–251 B; *Gorg.* 493 A; *Phaedo* 69 B.

As was said above, in the spiritual experience we discover the whole spectrum of the supernatural, together with the fact that we are immersed in it to a significant degree. This is the only way for us to experience God and our own selves in a spiritual – amorous! – relationship with him. For an existential philosopher, or, simply speaking, for a spiritual man, this is the simplest available experience, and at the same time the greatest philosophical initiation that leads him into the realm of supernatural values and God himself, and, at the same time, into the deepest secrets of the human soul and being. Those are the true priestly ordinations that open the gates to the highest happiness, as Plato used to say²².

THE GREEK THEOLOGICAL TRADITION
(THERE IS AS MUCH GOD IN THE WORLD AS THERE IS LOVE)

We can distinguish two main movements in Greek theology, or rather in Greek philosophical theosophy: there are two basic ways of seeing God and what is divine (although there are different modifications possible). The first was proposed by the Ionian philosophers. In their thought, God was identified with the essence of the world, which was rational, dynamic, creative, eternal and indestructible. Divinity was reduced to the rational, creative and dynamic element in nature, in the universe (and thus also in man who is the natural child of the physical world and inherits its essence and its laws in all their dimensions, so therefore he also inherits its rational, dynamic and creative aspects)²³. To put it in modern terms, for the Ionians God is something like a rational, dynamic and creative “DNA” of the nature of the world and, at the same time, of the eternal source of vitality and energy for all beings who exist, in fact, only on his living energy. The most interesting thing about this idea is that God evolves (in a sense) alongside his world, which is only a material manifestation of his creative dynamics. The indispensable and essential feature of divinity is above all rationality, which is an idea rooted in old tradition and written down by Homer and Hesiod.

Homer’s world is ruled by the laws of Moira. Gods’ and men’s minds are the representatives of those laws. As the mind can only represent the rational, we have to assume that the laws are also rational²⁴. Hesiod puts an even stronger emphasis on the rationality of the god who rules the world. According to his vision it is Zeus who rules the world by the power of his wisdom and righteousness. Those attributes of Zeus are personified by his wives. A wife is always an attribute of her husband, therefore it may safely be said that wisdom and righteousness are the attributes of Zeus’s rational rule. We need to emphasise here that Zeus

²² Cf. Plato, *Phaedr.* 250 C–E, 249 C–D; *Gorg.* 493 B; *Phaedo* 69 C.

²³ Cf. BIANCHI 1992: 126–135, DROZDEK 2007: 1–42 (2011: 33–94), DROZDEK 2008: 9–39, NARECKI 1999: 53–146, KROKIEWICZ 1971: 70–149.

²⁴ Cf. KROKIEWICZ 1971: 38–40.

did not create either the world or the laws that govern it in its physical and moral dimensions. Zeus is only the sentinel and the executor of those laws²⁵.

It should be added that, apart from the rational factor, both Homer and Hesiod also introduce an irrational factor beside the rational one, which turns out to be equally important. In Homer's writings, this factor is the human heart and everything that is connected with it. The fact of the matter is that although the human mind (which is the complementary constituent of a human being – for Homer, a man is made up of a mind and a heart) knows all about the rational laws of Moira which construct and support the rational order of the world, nevertheless it does not have any executive power. This power belongs to the heart, which is subject to the influence of various forces and external and internal factors. This is where all positive and negative feelings, emotions, passions, and also the external divine and demonic forces come into play. There is order in the universe and in the life of every man when the heart follows the rule of the mind – and this is the case as long as we act according to the laws of Moira and overcome the temptation to place ourselves above them and above the moral and social order which is built on those laws. In other words this means as long as our heart is not pervaded by pride, the famous Greek *hybris*. Moral pride (*hybris*) is the main source of danger for the inner moral order in man, and it can smite our hearts with the madness of hatred (*ate*). The Greeks believed that this is the punishment we receive from the gods when we let our hearts be filled with pride – we lose our mind (pride and arrogance deprive us of reason and we are struck by the madness of hatred)²⁶. A person in this state destroys everything in his reach, he also destroys universal order. Human sin is never a private matter – it always ruins not only the sinner, but also everyone and everything within reach of his hatred. Hesiod, whose temper was that of a hard working man (a farmer), finds this kind of moral arrogance (*hybris*) in sloth and in the way it dazes human hearts.

Hesiod puts even more emphasis on the role of the heart. He calls Eros the irrational force of the universe (but this does not mean that Hesiod's Eros is an enemy of rationality; he is quite the opposite). Eros is the primary, protogenic deity, the inherent, creative power of nature²⁷. Contrary to what we might expect, the force of Eros is not, however, in opposition to the rational mind of Zeus, the father of all gods and men. Moreover, paradoxically, it is Eros who ensures that the world is ordered and rational. We could even say that the world is ordered and rational only to the degree to which it is governed by Eros, that is: Love. As

²⁵ Cf. BIANCHI 1992: 49–60, KROKIEWICZ 1971: 43–47.

²⁶ This process is presented particularly clearly by Sophocles in his tragedy *Ajax* – Ajax, full of pride and overconfident in his valour and strength, rejected Athena's offer of supernatural valour (*thymos*) and for this he was struck with madness (*ate*). It is his arrogance that caused his insanity.

²⁷ Hes. *Theog.* 116–119. Cf. ALBERT 1989: 5.

we can see, Love is the true basis of the rational order of the world and in our lives.

Some philosophers from later periods, like, for example, Empedocles (who is also inspired by ideas originating from different fields of Greek religious culture, namely Orphism²⁸), developed this thought. Love – that arranges and rationalizes our whole world in all its dimensions including the ethical one – was considered to be the divine creative power which makes everything evolve in the direction of rational order. Love (Eros), rationality – and divinity – now become the same. It could even be claimed that there is as much God in the world and in our lives, as there is love in the world and in us²⁹.

In this way an interesting idea was introduced into Greek philosophical culture – the god who rationalizes the world and human life and imposes order is simply love (and there is probably no other divinity in him). He does have a powerful, dangerous rival – hatred, which does not possess any creative power, but is able to destroy. Hatred is an irrational force, like love, but contrary to love, it is purely destructive; it wrecks the rational order of the world from within. This is probably the echo of an Orphic idea – the eternal struggle between the divine (Dionysus and Eros are one here) and the rational with the titanic (evil, dreary and odious)³⁰. We can observe that this will also influence the thought of philosophers. Some time later, they will play their role in the development of Gnosticism (even its Christian versions).

Empedocles's theological and metaphysical concept presented above is probably the most sublime idea in all of Pre-Socratic Greek theology and perhaps even in Greek theology in general. The thesis that love introduces rational order into the world is invaluable. Probably it is a reflection of the deepest of human experiences. The Greeks, as we know, used to say that a man is a microcosm, therefore we are governed by the same rules and subject to the same forces as the whole universe. This was what they used to say, but they probably thought something quite different – that the world is but a giant man (*meganthropos*) and hence, its laws are probably the same as the ones of human life (namely the laws of love and hatred). Love is the true order of human life. It does perhaps sound like a paradox, but only when we let ourselves be guided by love in our

²⁸ Cf. JAEGER 1934: 208, 229, 1944: 26, 38, 254 (2001: 125, 229, 249, 750), KIRK, RAVEN, SCHOFIELD 1957: 351 (1999: 315), ROHDE 1894: 465–479 (2007: 232).

²⁹ Empedocles, frg. B 128, 130. Cf. BIANCHI 1992: 146–149.

³⁰ In Orphic mythology, Dionysus (identified with Eros) is the basis, the foundation of universal order – as a matter of fact, he himself is the ordered universe. This idea is expressed by the famous image of Dionysus looking at himself in a looking glass which is the world. What does he see? Instead of himself, Dionysus sees the whole world because, actually, he is the world (this is the first time that a disguised, mythical version of the ideas that later formed pantheism emerged in Greek thinking – according to this mythology, God and the world are perfectly identical and complementary to one another).

relations with other people and the world itself – only then is our life rational. This is probably how philosophers discovered the universal rule whose effects are experienced, sooner or later, by everyone. We may assume that this rule was applied by Empedocles, partly because it was endorsed by earlier theologies, most probably of Orphic origin. Moreover, Hesiod claimed that Love (Eros) is the protogenic and primordial God who ordered the universe and is still ordering it – we may conjecture that in order to achieve this God also uses human, loving hearts (the old rule of compassion, *sympatheia* remains valid). Perhaps, one would like to ask: it is true that there is as much God in the world, as there is in our hearts?

Coming back to the Ionian conception of divinity, the most important aspect of it is acknowledging it as an immanent, creative, rational and dynamic power of the world's nature, and as the very essence of the world (in time, this would be the basis for the idea of the rational soul of the world). In its most elaborated form, this idea is to be found in the philosophy of Heraclitus of Ephesus³¹. It was then adopted and developed by the Stoics, who never accepted the idea of a transcendent and incorporeal God. Even if they ascribed him the right to love, they would never agree that he could be a person, a being independent of the world. For the Stoics, God can only remain the rational nature of the world, its immanent law and soul³².

Nevertheless, already within the lifetime of some of the Ionian philosophers, a new image of God and divinity emerged in Greek thinking – inspired, as it would seem, by Parmenides. This idea accepts God's rationality but not his being equal to the immanent nature of the world. Divinity is associated with rationality and even reason itself (rationality and reason are always the indispensable attributes of God), but above all with perfection – this time it is a static kind of perfection, whose defining features are its invariability and immobility. This is the dawn of the idea that God is rational and perfect, but also static and immobile. God becomes an unchangeable, eternally perfect, permanent and static mind – eternal but devoid of any dynamic creative power. As a matter of fact, he does not really need any such power, because he does not have anything to do with the material world. Anaxagoras proposed a less radical theory – his Mind-God is equipped with a creative first impulse that starts the process of self-ordering in nature (in the natural primary parts) and the forming of the world. We have to assume that if God is a mind, then this impulse also has to be rational. This is probably why our world, which is formed in consequence of this impulse, has to be rational as well. The final accord of this theory is the philosophy of Aristotle, for whom God is a transcendent mind occupied solely with thinking

³¹ Cf. DROZDEK 2007: 28–42 (2011 72–94), KRÓKIEWICZ 1971: 132–148, MRÓWKA 2004: 35, NARECKI 1999: 53–94.

³² Cf. Diog. Laert. VII 134–150; DROZDEK 2007: 229–240 (2011: 411–420).

about itself and devoid of creative power³³. We need to add, however, that in Aristotle's theology the fate of God is less stern, because by some miracle he becomes a teleological cause – the tractive force of nature (although not understood in a teleological fashion), causes the birth of passionate love for this god (yet again we encounter Eros and his influence)³⁴. It is thanks to this force that all things develop towards God, although always according to their own measure and ontic status which is encoded in the form of each being, in its individual, metaphysical “DNA” – Aristotelian “form” can be understood as a kind of immanent programme of existence for each being³⁵. This programme is started by the amorous metaphysical impulse we have already mentioned, because the amorous desire for God has an effect on the metaphysical, existential “genes” of every being (form and matter – those are the metaphysical “genes” which determine the ontic structure and metaphysical development of each being). One of God's weaknesses (if we may call it so) in Aristotle's theory is that he is not entirely conscious of all these processes because they take place entirely outside of him and independently of his will.

Plato's theological inquiries lead him to a theory which is quite close to Parmenidean inspirations, but at the same time he tries to introduce some Ionian dynamism into God's life. Plato's God is perfect and invariable. He is the mind, but he also creates the world out of eternal matter, and keeps it in existence, in good metaphysical condition – all this requires some kind of dynamic activity. It is not quite clear whether Plato's God acts alone or through the Demiurge; that is: whether he himself is the Demiurge or not. Both answers are possible here³⁶. We cannot exclude the idea that Plato's God is the metaphysical sublimation of the highest ideas – Beauty, Truth and Goodness and that the Demiurge mirrors and expresses the creative dynamism and agency with respect to the world. This interpretation seems to make even more sense. We cannot, however, reject a more literal interpretation, which separates God and the Demiurge whilst it connects God with the idea of Goodness, the highest of all ideas (as Plato suggests in his *Republic*).

Middle Platonist philosophers believe without doubt that God and the Demiurge are one and the same. Demiurgic activity brings creative dynamism into God's life, but he still remains transcendent to the world, and he is also quite

³³ Arist. *De an.* 430 A; *Metaph.* 1074 B–1075 A.

³⁴ Cf. DROZDEK 2007: 169–184 (2011: 301–324).

³⁵ This is why Aristotle calls form the metaphysical act of being. It is also the essence of each being, because it encodes everything that is important for the best possible mode of existence of each being – naturally in the final stage of its development.

³⁶ Cf. REALE 1978, vol. II: 66 f., DROZDEK 2007: 151–168.

a stranger – this is why he calls up a whole crowd of demons who are his intermediaries in communicating with the world and with people³⁷.

In Middle Platonic theology, the most important role is played by the incorporeality and the transcendence of God, and, above all, his creative power over the world. For the Platonists, God is undeniably the creator. This brings some dynamism into God's life but still he remains constant and unchangeable. In other words, he does not evolve or develop. True dynamism, in the full sense of the term, can only be found in the life of the world, and of people in particular – we have to complete and fulfil God's great creation. People are similar to God the creator inasmuch as they possess incorporeal souls, but this is only a potential or a disposition. There is a risk that they might go in the wrong direction and achieve something quite opposite to what they wanted: instead of actualizing the divine potential and becoming gods, they can fall into bestiality (a subject raised in a particularly poignant way by Apuleius in the third chapter of *De deo Socratis*³⁸). Our potential for becoming similar to God is realized in moral effort, but also in spiritual relations with him. Thus, we can complete God's creation and at the same time achieve moral and spiritual fulfilment.

Such ideas are also to be found in Plutarch's works, although he attempts to create a more dynamic vision of God, who even becomes tied with the concept of social love. Plutarch does not dare to question God's constant and unchangeable nature, but he can ascribe to him various social virtues such as love, which brings dynamic social relations into God's life (a subject which will be developed later).

THE THEOLOGY OF PLUTARCH IN THE DIALOGUE *DE E APUD DELPHOS*

Plutarch's philosophy was also strongly influenced by the "discovery" of incorporeality and transcendence. This "discovery" brought a new understanding of such concepts as "God" and "divinity" – and this inevitably led to a theological conflict between Plutarch and the Stoics and Epicureans. In the dialogue *De e apud Delphos* Plutarch is a severe critic of the Stoic idea of God³⁹. According to him, God cannot be burdened by any kind of corporeality. He has to be absolutely incorporeal and indestructible, because there is not a trace of matter in his metaphysical structure – matter is always destructible and subject to death.

In the dialogue *De e apud Delphos* Plutarch describes God as a "Being" ("Existence"), the true Being as distinguished from beings like men, other physical objects and the world in general – we cannot call what the world does

³⁷ Plutarch, *Def. orac.* 414 E–418 D; *Apul. De dog. Plat.* XI 204–XII 206; *De deo Soc.* VIII 137–XVIII 162; *De mun.* XXVII 350–351; Alkinous, *Didask.* IX 163–X 166; XV 171; XXXIII 187.

³⁸ *Apul. De deo Soc.* III 125–126.

³⁹ Plutarch, *De e ap. Delph.* 393 E.

“being” – it is rather “becoming”⁴⁰. The physical world seems to be exactly like the Parmenidean non-being – it is not existing, it is becoming – it is a continuous process. God on the other hand exists beyond time, beyond all that “is” and beyond what “will be”; he is unchangeable and immoveable. According to Plutarch, this is what is expressed in the mysterious letter “E” in the Delphi sanctuary – the letter says “*ει*”, “you are”. God is the only being to whom we can say “you are,” because only he truly is and exists in the real way:

[...] οὐτ' οὖν ἀριθμὸν οὔτε τάξιν οὔτε σύνδεσμον οὔτ' ἄλλο τῶν ἐλλειπῶν μορίων οὐδὲν οἶμαι τὸ γράμμα σημαίνειν, ἀλλ' ἔστιν αὐτοτελής τοῦ θεοῦ προσαγόρευσις καὶ προσφώνησις ἅμα τῷ ῥήματι τὸν φθεγγόμενον εἰς ἔνοιαν καθιστάσα τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ δυνάμεως. ὁ μὲν γὰρ θεὸς ἕκαστον [ἡμῶν] τῶν ἐνταῦθα προσιόντων οἷον ἀσπαζόμενος προσαγορεύει τὸ “γνώθι σαυτόν,” ὃ τοῦ χαίρε δήπουθεν οὐδὲν μείζον ἔστιν. ἡμεῖς δὲ πάλιν ἀμειβόμενοι τὸν θεὸν “εἴ” φαμέν, ὡς ἀληθῆ καὶ ἀψευδῆ καὶ μόνην μόνῳ προσήκουσαν τὴν τοῦ εἶναι προσαγόρευσις ἀποδιδόντες. (*De e ap. Delph.* 391 F–392 A).

The whole world on the other hand, tossed into the realm of births and deaths, is condemned to eternal “becoming.” The world allows us only conjectures and suppositions. To attempt to know the world is like attempting to hold water in the palm of a hand – our minds cannot grasp anything that changes. This is why it remains empty for so long, until it reaches for the things that are constant and unchangeable. It is impossible to experience the same situation twice – as it is impossible to step twice into the same river:

Ἡμῖν μὲν γὰρ ὄντως τοῦ εἶναι μέτεστιν οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ πᾶσα θνητὴ φύσις ἐν μέσῳ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς γενομένη φάσμα παρέχει καὶ δόκησιν ἀμυδρὰν καὶ ἀβέβαιον αὐτῆς. ἂν δὲ τὴν διάνοιαν ἐπερείσῃς λαβέσθαι βουλόμενος, ὥσπερ ἢ σφοδρὰ περιδραξίς ὕδατος τῷ πιέζειν καὶ εἰς ταῦτ' οὐκ ἀπολείπειν διαρρέον ἀπόλλυσι τὸ περιλαμβανόμενον, οὕτω τῶν παθητῶν καὶ μεταβλητῶν ἕκαστου τὴν ἄγαν ἐνάργειαν ὁ λόγος διώκων ἀποσφάλλεται τῇ μὲν εἰς τὸ γινόμενον αὐτοῦ τῆ δ' εἰς τὸ φθειρόμενον, οὐδενὸς λαβέσθαι μένοντος οὐδ' ὄντως ὄντος δυνάμενος. “ποταμῷ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐμβῆναι δις τῷ αὐτῷ” καθ' Ἡράκλειτον (fig. 91) (*De e ap. Delph.* 392 A–B).

Only God does not ever change. The concepts that express temporal relations do not refer to him. Moreover, to use such concepts with reference to God would be to commit sacrilege, because they only relate to physical reality, which in a metaphysical sense has absolutely nothing to do with God. He possesses a different metaphysical structure, he is one of a kind and he is filled with unity:

Ἄλλ' ἔστιν ὁ θεός, εἴ χρὴ φάναι, καὶ ἔστι κατ' οὐδένα χρόνον ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν αἰῶνα τὸν ἀκίνητον καὶ ἄχρονον καὶ ἀνέγκλιτον καὶ οὐ πρότερον οὐδὲν ἔστιν οὐδ' ὕστερον οὐδὲ μέλλον οὐδὲ παρωχημένον οὐδὲ πρεσβύτερον οὐδὲ

⁴⁰ *Ibid.* 391 F–393 B.

νεώτερον, ἀλλ' εἷς ὢν ἐνὶ τῷ νῦν τὸ αἰετὸν πεπλήρωκε, καὶ μόνον ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ τοῦτ' ὄντως ὄν, οὐ γεγονὸς οὐδ' ἐσόμενον οὐδ' ἀρξάμενον οὐδὲ παυσόμενον. οὕτως οὖν αὐτὸ δεῖ σεβομένους ἀσπάζεσθαι [καὶ] προσεθίζειν, “εἶ”, καὶ νῆ Δία, ὡς ἐνιοὶ τῶν παλαιῶν, “εἶ ἔν”. οὐ γὰρ πολλὰ τὸ θεῖόν ἐστιν, ὡς ἡμῶν ἕκαστος ἐκ μυρίων διαφορῶν ἐν πάθει γινομένων ἄθροισμα παντοδαπὸν καὶ πανηγυρικῶς μεμιγμένον, ἀλλ' ἓν εἶναι δεῖ τὸ ὄν, ὥσπερ ὄν τὸ ἔν. ἢ δ' ἑτερότης διαφορᾶ τοῦ ὄντος εἰς γένεσιν ἐξίσταται τοῦ μὴ ὄντος. (*De e ap. Delph.* 393 A–B).

THE “SOCIAL” CONCEPT OF GOD IN THE DIALOGUE *DE DEFECTU ORACULORUM*. GOD AND LOVE

Such theological theses suit the traditional spirit of Middle Platonism. All in all, they are not really novel or innovative, if we can use those terms. There is, however something about Plutarch's theology that deserves to be called innovative and we have already signalled the fact. As has been said already, Plutarch ascribes various social virtues to God, above all the virtue of love, the ability to love that makes God capable of entering social relations. Plutarch mentions this in the dialogue *De defectu oraculorum* (423 D), when discussing demons and the number of worlds:

ἀγαθὸς γὰρ ὢν τελέως οὐδεμιᾶς ἀρετῆς ἐνδεής ἐστιν, ἥκιστα δὲ τῶν περὶ δικαιοσύνην καὶ φιλίαν. κάλλισται γὰρ αὗται καὶ θεοῖς πρέπουσαι. μάτην δ' οὐδὲν ἔχειν οὐδ' ἄχρηστον θεὸς πέφυκεν. εἰσὶν οὖν ἐκτὸς ἕτεροι θεοὶ καὶ κόσμοι, πρὸς οὓς χρῆται ταῖς κοινωνικαῖς ἀρεταῖς [...] (*Def. orac.* 423 D)

Plutarch finds love in God. Although he does not consider it God's essence or nature, still this virtue or natural disposition empowers God enough to build dynamic amorous relations with other divine creatures (from different worlds). Also, as we might have guessed, this love explains why God is also able to maintain amorous relationships with people – our souls also belong to the divine sphere.

Considering the fact that we bear an inherent resemblance to God, we might expect that we are also predisposed and able to enter into such amorous relations. One could even say that the ability to love is, aside from intellectual sensitivity, the most divine of all natural human dispositions. We need to add that according to the Greek way of thinking this disposition is only actualized by loving – and not by being loved. Thus, love is not about being loved, it is about loving. Love is always an act (something active) because, as Plato wrote in the *Symposium*⁴¹ it is the lover who has something divine in him, not the one who is loved (who is, so to speak, the object of love). Phaedrus, who expresses this thought in the *Symposium*, also adds that because of the love Achilles had for Patroclus, the

⁴¹ Plato, *Symp.* 180 A–B.

gods have sent him – one of the most valiant knights among all Greek princes – to the Islands of the Blessed⁴². Plutarch includes in his notion of divine love also the love between spouses, and adds that it is love that protects a man and wife from the mistakes that could destroy their marriage⁴³.

Considering that love is an issue of great importance in Platonic philosophy, it merits further attention.

We might say that love releases the divine potential in people, that is: activates the divine element and leads us to achieve divinity. We should ask where this peculiar, mysterious power of love comes from? The answer seems simple. Love is always the fruit of divine inspiration, it is a madness sent by the gods – the happiest madness of all. Plato considers this question in *Phaedrus*⁴⁴, Plutarch seconds him faithfully in his dialogue *Amatorius (Dialogue on Love)*⁴⁵. However, inspiration alone, and even the amorous madness, is not enough to explain in a satisfactory way why it is that love's power can change a man into a god. The explanation is, however, even less complicated. Love simply is a god (Eros is a god) and this is why he has so much power. In other words, if we are capable of loving, god gives himself to us in the act of divine inspiration, and it is then that we begin to experience this mysterious feeling that makes us love someone else. Thus, god himself⁴⁶ begins to live in us and his presence is manifested in the feeling of love – the feeling experienced by people in love. We could even say, in consequence, that a person in love endows another with love that is god himself (Eros).

A person in whom god lives (and let us repeat this is what love means), becomes a god themselves. Love actualizes divinity in human beings – the divinity that we are endowed with and that is our mission for life. In doing so, love provides us true fulfilment.

In *Symposium*, Plato claimed that love can bring mystic ecstasy, including amorous ecstasy, in which a man whose soul is reigned over by ceaseless love can see God as absolute Beauty and be united with him⁴⁷. Plutarch, in his *Amatorius*, compares, in a similarly mystic mood, amorous ecstasy to the experiences of those who are initiated in a mystery rite, and, in Chapter Twenty of this dialogue, he also adds that people in love (loving) after death become initiated into the mystery of their god⁴⁸.

⁴² Plato, *Symp.* 180 A–B.

⁴³ Plutarch, *Amat.* 23. Cf. KORUS 1978: 15–31.

⁴⁴ Plato, *Phaedr.* 244 A, 245 B, 265 B.

⁴⁵ Plutarch, *Amat.* 16.

⁴⁶ Plato, *Symp.* 180 A–B.

⁴⁷ Plato, *Symp.* 210 E–211 B.

⁴⁸ Plutarch, *Amat.* 18 and 20.

Love brings out all that is the most divine in us – and it is, at the same time, also most human, all-too-human. As Socrates said in the *Republic*⁴⁹, love leads us to divinity. This would not be possible, however, if the ability to love was not an essential feature of human nature. God only “activates” this disposition, so to speak. Where does this ability come from? This question remains unanswered, at least as far as Plato is concerned. Considering that, according to Plato, man, or at least our spiritual and intellectual elements, was created by God, we may expect that our ability to love is also inherited from God the Creator. This is by no means obvious, however, and even Plato does not say anything about this disposition (the ability to love) with respect to God or the Demiurge. Everything becomes much clearer when we turn to Plutarch, because he ascribes this mysterious ability to God, and, moreover, this disposition turns out to be one of God’s essential features. Since God, the father of all gods and men, is also the father of man, we may suspect that our ability to love is a divine inheritance and an enduring spiritual disposition of the human soul. Like all dispositions, however, it needs to be activated – and it is activated, as we know, by divine inspiration. A man who follows divinely inspired love fulfils his divine vocation (this is the idea of “imitating God” that we have mentioned before). Man becomes similar to God in that he loves other men.

Perhaps this “social” concept of God, who is essentially capable of love, could serve as a theological basis for the unique and even revolutionary way Plutarch approached the subject of marital love, including erotic love and familial love in general. It is enough to say that in an epoch when marriage was a matter of an ordinary contract, Plutarch claims that it is love that should unite the married couple. His views on erotic love in marriage are equally revolutionary (especially since at this time, the Greeks still associated love mainly with a homosexual relationship⁵⁰). He treats love as a binder and a source of mutual love and respect in marriage and, moreover, considers it a factor of personal development for both spouses⁵¹. We have to emphasise that Plutarch is adamant in ascribing the ability to love to women as well as to men.

In the concluding part of this essay, I would like to present one more of Plutarch’s thoughts – one that represents his attitude towards gods worshipped by other nations. This time, I shall quote from *De Iside et Osiride*, where, in Chapter 67, Plutarch claims that only one mind exists, which orders the whole universe, and only one providence that rules everything. Similarly, in every nation and everywhere the same powers take care of their appointed tasks and are

⁴⁹ Plato, *Rep.* 501 B.

⁵⁰ Plutarch is quite clear on this subject (*Amat.* 4, 5). Plato often speaks of love in the context of homosexuality, but in *Laws* homosexual love is proclaimed unnatural (Plato, *Leg.* 636 C, 836 C, 838 E).

⁵¹ Plutarch, *Amat.* 23.

duly worshipped for it. Thus, distinguishing gods with respect to boundaries between peoples is irrational. In fact, the only differences between gods are the names that are given to them in different lands. Ultimately, people worship the same gods everywhere, only they know them under various names:

[...] οὐ γὰρ ἄνουν οὐδ' ἄψυχον <οὐδ'> ἀνθρώποις ὁ θεὸς ὑποχείριον· ἀπὸ τούτων δὲ τοὺς χρωμένους αὐτοῖς καὶ δωρουμένους ἡμῖν καὶ παρέχοντας ἀέναα καὶ διαρκῆ θεοὺς ἐνομίσαμεν, οὐχ ἑτέρους παρ' ἑτέροις οὐδὲ βαρβάρους καὶ Ἑλληνας οὐδὲ νοτίους καὶ βορείους, ἀλλ' ὡσπερ ἥλιος καὶ σελήνη καὶ οὐρανὸς καὶ γῆ καὶ θάλασσα κοινὰ πᾶσιν, ὀνομάζεται δ' ἄλλως ὑπ' ἄλλων, οὕτως ἐνὸς λόγου τοῦ ταῦτα κοσμοῦντος καὶ μιᾶς προνοίας ἐπιτροπευούσης καὶ δυνάμεων ὑπουργῶν ἐπὶ πάντα τεταγμένων ἕτεροι παρ' ἑτέροις κατὰ νόμους γεγόνασαι τιμαὶ καὶ προσηγορίαι, [...] (*De Iside et Osiride*, 377 E–378).

In light of Plutarch's theological ideas, it is tempting to ask whether they were reflected in any way in Plutarch's own religious attitude and piety. Let me answer with a quote from the dialogue *De superstitione* (166 B):

ἡμεῖς δὲ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀξιούμεν ὀρθῶ τῷ στόματι καὶ δικαίῳ προσεύχεσθαι, καὶ μὴ τὴν ἐπὶ τῶν σπλάγχχνων μὲν γλῶτταν εἰ καθαρὰ καὶ ὀρθῆ σκοπεῖν, τὴν δ' ἑαυτῶν διαστρέφοντας καὶ μολύνοντας ἀτόποις ὀνόμασι καὶ ῥήμασι βαρβαρικοῖς καταισχύνειν καὶ παρανομεῖν τὸ θεῖον καὶ πάτριον ἀξίωμα τῆς εὐσεβείας.

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PROKOPIOS VON KAISAREIA UND DIE ABGARLEGENDE*

von

DARIUSZ BRODKA

ABSTRACT: The article discusses the famous story of King Abgar's letter to Jesus and Jesus' reply which Procopius tells in *Wars* II 12. By telling this story Procopius explains why it was by the will of God that Edessa was saved in 540 and 544. The analysis shows that this story draws on some anonymous sources and a local Edessan tradition but not on the Church History of Eusebius of Caesarea though Procopius might have consulted this work. Against the objections which recently have been raised the story of Abgar must be viewed as one of the most important arguments for Procopius' Christianity.

In der Forschung, die sich mit der literarischen Tätigkeit des Prokopios von Kaisareia befasst, gab es seit langem die *communis opinio*, dass Prokopios ein Christ war, und sich die deutlichen Spuren seines christlichen Glaubens in den *Bella* erkennen lassen. Im Jahr 2004 trat A. KALDELLIS gegen diese Meinung auf, indem er argumentierte, dass Prokopios zu den heidnischen Intellektuellen gehört habe¹. In seinem Buch hat KALDELLIS jedoch einige bedeutende Passagen nicht berücksichtigt, die durch die Forschung als klares Indiz für das Christentum des Prokopios interpretiert wurden². Im Jahr 2010 hat KALDELLIS seine Thesen wiederholt, wobei er sich auf diejenigen Stellen bezog, die in seinem Buch unbeachtet blieben. Unter diesen Passagen spielt die Erzählung über die wundersame Rettung der Stadt Edessa eine besonders wichtige Rolle³. KALDELLIS geht davon

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¹ A. KALDELLIS, *Procopius of Caesarea. Tyranny, History and Philosophy at the End of Antiquity*, Philadelphia 2004, S. 56 ff., 165 ff.

² Die radikalen Thesen von KALDELLIS wurden von vielen Forschern abgelehnt. Vgl. insbesondere die Rezensionen von M. MEIER (HZ CCLXXX 2005, S. 721 f.) und H. LEPPIN (Sehepunkte VI 2006, Nr. 1, <http://www.sehepunkte.de/2006/01/5486.html>) sowie den Aufsatz von M. WHITBY, *Religious Views of Procopius and Agathias*, in: D. BRODKA, M. STACHURA (Hgg.), *Continuity and Change. Studies in Late Antique Historiography*, Kraków 2007 (Electrum 13), S. 73–94.

³ A. KALDELLIS, *Procopius' Persian War: A Thematic and Literary Analysis*, in: R. MACRIDIS (Hg.), *History as Literature in Byzantium*, Farnham 2010, S. 271–273.

aus, dass dieser Abschnitt nicht für das Christentum des Prokopios spreche, sondern eine polemische Aussagekraft habe, worauf die Ironie hinweise, die in diesem Bericht enthalten sei⁴. Im Folgenden soll also der Bericht des Prokopios über die wundersame Rettung der Stadt Edessa untersucht werden, wobei die so genannte Abgarlegende im Fokus der Untersuchung stehen wird. Es handelt sich hier sowohl um die Quellen dieses Berichts und seine Verankerung in der Tradition, als auch um seine Deutung⁵. Dabei soll auch die Frage beantwortet werden, welche Bedeutung diese Passage für Prokopios' Religion hat.

Die Abgarlegende erzählt Prokopios im zweiten Buch seiner Kriegsgeschichte im Zusammenhang mit dem ersten Angriff des Perserkönigs Chosroes gegen Edessa im Jahr 540 (Procop. *Bell.* II 12, 7–30). Insgesamt berichtet Prokopios über zwei Belagerungen Edessas durch die Perser – im Jahr 540 und 544. In beiden Fällen wird Chosroes durch den Glauben der Christen, dass Edessa un- einnehmbar sei, zum Angriff veranlasst (II 12, 7; II 26, 1–4). Die Erzählung über Abgar erklärt die Gründe für diesen Glauben. Sie besteht aus einer kurzen Einführung und zwei Teilen: Der erste berichtet über einen Aufenthalt Abgars in Rom zur Zeit des Kaisers Augustus (II 12, 8–19), der zweite über den Briefwechsel zwischen Abgar und Christus (II 12, 20–30).

Im Eingangsabschnitt wird Abgar kurz und allgemein dargestellt: Er sei in alten Zeiten ein Territorialherrscher von Edessa gewesen. Dem Prinzip der Klarheit gemäß erklärt Prokopios den Begriff *τοπάρχης* (Territorialherrscher) als den König einer Volksgruppe (*κατὰ ἔθνος*): *τοπάρχης (οὕτω γὰρ τοὺς κατὰ ἔθνος βασιλεῖς τηνικαῦτα ἐκάλουν)* (II 12, 8). Man vermutet manchmal,

⁴ Auf ähnliche Weise interpretiert KALDELLIS auch die Apameia-Episode. Die Feststellung des Prokopios, Gott habe Apameia gerettet, hält KALDELLIS für ironisch, denn, wie er argumentiert, sei das Schicksal der Stadt in Wirklichkeit von einer arbiträren Entscheidung des Perserkönigs Chosroes abhängig gewesen (KALDELLIS, *op. cit.* [wie Anm. 3], S. 272). Für Prokopios ist aber Gott ein annehmbare Faktor bei der Erklärung der historischen Prozesse und ein vollberechtigter Beteiligter an den Ereignissen. Deswegen sind die klaren Worte des Prokopios: „ich bin der Meinung, dass Chosroes die ganze Stadt versklavt und unbedenklich ausgeplündert hätte, wenn ihn nicht eine göttliche Kraft daran gehindert hätte“ (*Bell.* II 11, 25) auf keinen Fall als ironisch zu betrachten. Zu Gott als Faktor des historischen Prozesses bei Prokopios vgl. D. BRODKA, *Die Geschichtsphilosophie in der spätantiken Historiographie. Studien zu Prokopios von Kaisareia, Agathias von Myrina und Theophylaktos Simokattes*, Frankfurt/M. 2004, S. 22 ff.

⁵ Zur Abgarlegende vgl. A. MIRKOVIC, *Prelude to Constantine. The Abgar Tradition in Early Christianity*, Frankfurt/M. 2004; M. ILLERT, *Doctrina Addai. De imagine Edessena (Die Abgarlegende. Das Christusbild von Edessa)*, Turnhout 2007, S. 18 ff.; M. GUSCIN, *The Image of Edessa*, Leiden–Boston 2009, S. 141 ff. Zu den ältesten erhaltenen Zeugnissen der Abgarlegende gehören: Die Kirchengeschichte des Eusebios von Kaisareia (324/325) (Euseb. *HE* I 13, 1–21), der lateinische Reisebericht der Egeria *Itinerarium Egeriae* (384) (*Itiner. Egeriae* 17–19) und der syrische Text *Doctrina Addai* (um 400); zu den ältesten Fassungen der Abgarlegende vgl. auch S.P. BROCK, *Eusebius and Syriac Christianity*, in: H.W. ATTRIDGE, G. HATA (Hgg.), *Eusebius, Christianity and Judaism*, Detroit 1992, S. 212 ff.; A. DESREUMAX, *Histoire du roi Abgar et de Jésus*, Paris 1993, S. 13 ff.

dass diese Erklärung ein Nachhall der Feststellung des Eusebios sein könnte⁶, dass Abgar über die Völker jenseits des Euphrat geherrscht habe⁷. Eine solche Vermutung geht aber wohl zu weit.

Der Bericht über den Aufenthalt Abgars in Rom bei Augustus hat kein nachweisbares Vorbild⁸. Einige Forscher sind der Meinung, dass diese Geschichte eine Reminiszenz des Besuchs von Abgar VIII. bei Kaiser Septimius Severus in Rom um 202 sei. Dies ist möglich, aber nicht zu beweisen. In Prokopios' Anekdote wird vor allem die Weisheit Abgars versinnbildlicht (vgl. II 12, 8: ξυνετώτατος ἐγγεγόνει τῶν κατ' αὐτὸν ἀνθρώπων ἀπάντων). Die Frage, woher Prokopios diese Anekdote hat, lässt sich zwar nicht beantworten, das Hauptthema der Anekdote ist jedoch tief in der Tradition verhaftet. In der Kirchengeschichte des Eusebios wird auf die Weisheit Abgars angespielt⁹, während Egeria in ihrem *Itinerarium* explizit darauf hinweist: „in cuius Aggari vultu parebat de contra vere fuisse hunc virum satis sapientem et honoratum“ (*Itiner. Egeriae* 19, 6).

In gewisser Hinsicht steht diese Anekdote in einem anderen Traditionsstrang, als die syrische *Doctrina Addai*, in der hervorgehoben wird, dass Abgar selbst das römische Territorium nicht betreten durfte, weil er dem römischen Kaiser nicht Untertan war – gerade aus diesem Grund habe Abgar Christus in Palästina nicht besucht (*Doctr. Addai* 3). Bei Prokopios hingegen kam Abgar nach Rom, um ein Bündnis mit den Römern zu schließen (II 12, 9). Hier steht nichts im Wege, dass Abgar das römische Territorium betritt. Die *Doctrina Addai* hat wohl in diesem Punkt eine ältere Tradition, deren ursprüngliche Form noch Eusebios bezeugt, stark modifiziert. Laut Eusebios hätte Abgar gern eine Streitmacht mit sich genommen, um die Juden, die Christus kreuzigten, zu bestrafen, wenn er durch das Römische Reich nicht davon abgebracht worden wäre (*HE* I 13, 16)¹⁰. Bei Eusebios geht es also um eine Militäraktion, die die Juden für die Kreuzigung Christi bestrafen sollte, und nicht um die Erklärung, warum Jesus keinen Besuch vom kranken Abgar erhielt. Die frühe griechische und lateinische Überlieferung vertrat wohl die Ansicht, dass Abgar durch eine Krankheit und nicht durch die politischen Umstände daran gehindert wurde, persönlich zu Jesus zu kommen¹¹, wobei sich dies mittelbar aus dem Bericht des Eusebios ablesen lässt (vgl. *HE* I 13, 2).

Der zweite Teil der Geschichte Abgars bezieht sich auf die Korrespondenz zwischen Abgar und Christus. Weil sich Prokopios hier auf eine Auffassung des

⁶ In diesem Sinn B. RUBIN, *Prokopios von Kaisareia*, Stuttgart 1954, S. 115.

⁷ Euseb. *HE* I 13, 2: βασιλεὺς Ἀβγαρος, τῶν ὑπὲρ Εὐφράτην ἔθνων ἐπιστημότατα δυναστεύων. Der Begriff τοπάρχης erscheint bei Eusebios im Brief Abgars an Christus (*HE* I 13, 6).

⁸ RUBIN, *op. cit.* (wie Anm. 6), S. 115.

⁹ Vgl. Euseb. *HE* I 13, 2: Ἀβγαρος [...] ἐπιστημότατα δυναστεύων.

¹⁰ Vgl. auch *Trans. Mariae* 110 f. CURETON.

¹¹ Vgl. Darius, *Ep. August.* 5 (CSEL LVII 502). In diesem Sinn Procop. *Bell.* II 12, 20.

Christusbriefes beruft, die noch kein Schutzversprechen für Edessa enthielt, gehen manche Forscher davon aus, dass Prokopios hier wahrscheinlich auf die Kirchengeschichte des Eusebios zurückgeht und dessen Überlieferung mit lokalen edessenischen Tradition ergänzt¹². Allerdings resultiert diese Meinung nur aus der Tatsache, dass Eusebios den Christusbrief ohne den apotropäischen Schluss kennt. Eine genaue Analyse beider Überlieferungen zeigt aber zahlreiche bedeutende Unstimmigkeiten zwischen Prokopios und Eusebios, die meines Erachtens gegen die Abhängigkeit des Prokopios von Eusebios sprechen. Bei Prokopios schrieb Abgar an Jesus, als er bereits in vorgerücktem Alter stand (II 12, 20). Bei Eusebios ist hingegen keine Rede vom Alter Abgars. Weder Eusebios noch die durch die *Doctrina Addai* vertretene Tradition bestimmen die Krankheit Abgars näher. Eusebios gibt sich nur mit der vagen Feststellung zufrieden, dass Abgar mit einem schlimmen körperlichen Leiden darniederlag, das nach menschlichen Maßstäben unheilbar war (*HE* I 13, 2). Prokopios hingegen diagnostiziert, dass Abgar von schwerer Fußgicht befallen sei und die Schmerzen eine Gehbehinderung zur Folge gehabt hätten. Deswegen habe er sich an Ärzte und Fachleute aus der ganzen Welt gewandt. Weil sie aber nicht imstande gewesen seien, ihm zu helfen, habe er auf sie verzichtet (II 12, 20). Die Fußgicht erscheint in den ältesten erhaltenen Versionen der Legende: Von dieser Krankheit wurde aber Abdu, der Sohn Abdus, und nicht Abgar befallen (Euseb. *HE* I 13, 18; *Doctr. Addai* 10). Es liegt nahe, dass diese Diagnose noch vor Prokopios auf Abgar übertragen wurde, worauf die Tatsache hinweisen könnte, dass Abgar in einer späteren syrischen Fassung der Abgarlegende, die von Prokopios unabhängig ist, an Fußgicht leidet (vgl. *Acta Mar Maris* 2)¹³. Dieser Teil der Erzählung des Prokopios weist also keine Parallelen zum Bericht des Eusebios auf.

Anschließend folgt in den *Bella* eine eindeutige Deklaration, die die Forschung für einen schlüssigen Beweis für das Christentum des Prokopios hielt¹⁴. Prokopios bekennt sich hier als Christ und nimmt ohne Vorbehalte das Gottmenschentum Christi an, indem er diese Ereignisse auf jene Zeit datiert, als sich Jesus, der Sohn Gottes in Menschengestalt, unter der Bevölkerung von Palästina aufhalten und durch seine völlige Sündenlosigkeit und seine Wundertaten deutlich bewiesen habe, dass er in Wahrheit der Sohn Gottes sei¹⁵. Daraufhin folgt

¹² S. RUNCIMAN, *Some Remarks on the Image of Edessa*, CHJ III 1931, S. 244; RUBIN, *op. cit.* (wie Anm. 6), S. 115; AV. CAMERON, *Procopius and the Sixth Century*, London–New York 21996, S. 116; ILLERT, *op. cit.* (wie Anm. 5), S. 57.

¹³ Auch die spätere griechische Tradition überliefert ähnliche Diagnose (Arthritis); vgl. Ps.-Const. *Narr. de imagine Edessena* 6.

¹⁴ Vgl. dazu CAMERON, *op. cit.* (wie Anm. 12), S. 113 ff.

¹⁵ II 12, 22: Ἰησοῦς ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ παῖς ἐν σώματι ὢν [...] τῶν τε μηδὲν τὸ παράπαν ἁμαρτεῖν πώποτε, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἀμήχανα ἐξεργάζεσθαι διαφανῶς ἐνδεικνύμενος ὅτι δὴ τοῦ θεοῦ παῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς εἶη. Vgl. auch *Aed.* I 3, 12; V 7, 3; dazu O. VEI, *Prokops Verhältnis zum Christentum*, in: *Überlieferungsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen*, Berlin 1981, S. 581.

eine Liste der Wundertaten Christi (II 12, 23) und nur diese Liste findet ihre Entsprechung im Text der Kirchengeschichte des Eusebios (vgl. *HE* I 13, 6), wobei es in diesem Fall um den Text des Briefes von Abgar an Christus geht. Die Kenntnis der Abgar-Christus-Korrespondenz ist jedoch nicht mit der Kenntnis der Kirchengeschichte des Eusebios gleichzusetzen, weil der Brief Abgars und das Antwortschreiben Christi, wie zahlreiche Inschriften mit dem Text beider Briefe bezeugen (z.B. Inschriften von Ephesos, Philippi u.a.), unabhängig von der Kirchengeschichte des Eusebios im Umlauf waren¹⁶.

Den Inhalt der Briefe gibt Prokopios nicht wieder. Er deutet nur an, dass Abgar an Jesus schrieb und ihn bat, die in Judäa lebenden unverständigen Menschen zu verlassen und fortan mit ihm zusammenzuleben. In der Bezeichnung „unverständlich“ (ἀγνωμόνων ἀνθρώπων) darf vielleicht ein ferner Widerhall des ursprünglichen antijüdischen Schlusses des Briefes gesehen werden: Bei Eusebios, d.h. im frühesten Zeugnis der Abgarlegende, schreibt Abgar in seinem Brief, dass die Juden gegen Jesus murrten und ihm etwas Schlimmes antun wollten (*HE* I 13, 8, vgl. auch *Doctr. Addai* 4). Insgesamt aber gibt Prokopios' knappe Zusammenfassung des Abgarbriefes keine Hinweise auf seine Vorlage. Aufschlussreicher ist hingegen die Antwort Christi, wie sie vom Historiker wiedergegeben wird. Laut Prokopios habe Jesus zwar ausdrücklich abgelehnt, (nach Edessa) zu kommen, er habe aber dem König in dem Brief die Heilung versprochen (II 12, 26). Nachdem Abgar das Schreiben Jesu empfangen hatte, wurde er bald darauf von seiner Krankheit geheilt (II 12, 28). Mit Stillschweigen übergeht Prokopios einen wichtigen Aspekt der Legende: Sowohl bei Eusebios, als auch bei Egeria und in der *Doctrina Addai* versprach Jesus, dass er dem König einen seiner Jünger senden werde, der Abgar von der Krankheit befreien werde. So wurde Abgar nach Eusebios vom Apostel Thaddäus, nach Egeria vom Apostel Thomas und nach der *Doctrina Addai* vom Apostel Addai geheilt. Die Apostelmission in Edessa bleibt aber in den *Bella* unberücksichtigt. Von Bedeutung ist hingegen die Bemerkung, dass Jesus in seinem Brief zusätzlich gesagt habe, dass Edessa niemals von den Barbaren erobert werden könne¹⁷. Ausdrücklich verweist aber Prokopios darauf, dass diese Information auf die edessenische Lokaltradition zurückgeht. Er sagt, dieser Schlussteil des Briefes sei den Geschichtsschreibern jener Zeit völlig unbekannt geblieben, weil sie ihn nirgends erwähnt hätten. Die Einwohner von Edessa sagten jedoch, dass sie ihn mit dem Brief zusammen

¹⁶ Aus den Wundertaten Christi, die im Brief Abgars erwähnt werden, hat Prokopios nur die Vertreibung der unreinen Geister ausgelassen.

¹⁷ Procop. II 12, 26: φασὶ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο αὐτὸν ἐπειπεῖν, ὡς οὐδὲ ἡ πόλις ποτὲ βαρβάροις ἀλώσιμος ἔσται. Ursprünglich enthielt der Christusbrief kein Schutzversprechen für Edessa. Es muss spätestens in der zweiten Hälfte des 4. Jahrhunderts entstanden sein, weil seine Existenz bereits von Egeria im Jahr 384 bezeugt wird. Zur Entstehung dieser Tradition vgl. A. PALMER, *Les Actes de Thaddée*, Apocrypha XIII 2002, S. 74; MIRKOVIC, *op. cit.* (wie Anm. 5), S. 36; H.J. DRIJVERS, *Edessa*, TRE IX 1982, S. 279.

aufgefunden und den Brief anstelle eines anderen Schutzmittels auf die Stadttore gesetzt hätten: τοῦτο τῆς ἐπιστολῆς τὸ ἀκροτελεύτιον οἱ μὲν ἐκείνου τοῦ χρόνου τὴν ἱστορίαν συγγράψαντες οὐδαμῆ ἔγνωσαν· οὐ γὰρ οὖν οὐδέ πη αὐτοῦ ἐπεμνήσθησαν· Ἐδεσσηνοὶ δὲ αὐτὸ ξὺν τῇ ἐπιστολῇ εὐρέσθαι φασίν (II 12, 26). Nicht bestimmt wird aber, welche Historiker hier gemeint sind. Es geht wenigstens um zwei Geschichtsschreiber, da der Plural benutzt wird. Der Kirchenhistoriker Euagrios Scholastikos hat keine Zweifel daran, dass es sich an dieser Stelle um Eusebios von Kaisareia handelt, der das Antwortschreiben Christi noch ohne das Schutzversprechen für Edessa überliefert¹⁸. Es stellt sich jedoch die Frage, ob Prokopios hier wirklich auf Eusebios zurückgreift. Unsere bisherige Untersuchung hat gezeigt, dass Prokopios' Erzählung über Abgar deutlich von der des Eusebios abweicht. Das Einzige (abgesehen von der Liste der Wunder Christi), was Prokopios mit der Kirchengeschichte des Eusebios verbindet, ist die Tatsache, dass Prokopios, ähnlich wie Eusebios, die Fassung des Christusbriefes ohne das Schutzversprechen für Edessa kennt. Prokopios kann sich also lediglich bei der Wiedergabe des Inhalts beider Briefe auf Eusebios gestützt haben. Sonstige Elemente der Abgarlegende hat er zweifelsohne aus anderen Quellen geschöpft. Bemerkenswert ist aber, dass sich Prokopios an der genannten Stelle auf mehrere Geschichtsschreiber beruft, die diese Periode dargestellt haben. Selbst wenn hier neben anderen Autoren Eusebios gemeint wäre, könnte er nicht als einzige Quelle für den Inhalt der Briefe betrachtet werden. Wenn man nun die zahlreichen bedeutenden Unterschiede zwischen dem Bericht des Prokopios und des Eusebios in Betracht zieht, liegt es nahe, dass Prokopios die Erzählung über Abgar in der Kirchengeschichte des Eusebios zwar gelesen und sogar konsultiert haben könnte, aber nicht als Vorlage für seine Erzählung benutzte. Weitaus plausibler ist es, dass er hier auf einen anderen Text bzw. Texte, vielleicht chronographischen Charakters, zurückging¹⁹. Nicht auszuschließen ist auch, dass sich diese vermeintliche Vorlage in gewissem Maß auf Eusebios' Kirchengeschichte stützte. In jedem Fall vertrat diese Vorlage (bzw. Vorlagen) noch die ältere Tradition, die auf Eusebios zurückging und die Fassung des Christusbriefes noch ohne das Schutzversprechen für Edessa kannte.

Obwohl die Kirchengeschichte des Eusebios eine bedeutende Rolle bei der Entwicklung der Abgarlegende in der griechisch-römischen Welt spielte, war die Kenntnis des Eusebios-Textes nicht notwendig, um den Inhalt des Briefwechsels zwischen Jesus und Abgar kennen zu lernen. Bereits im 4. Jahrhundert waren

¹⁸ Evagr. *HE* IV 27: ...ὡς οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἡ Ἔδεσσα ὑπὸ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς γενήσεται· ὅπερ τοῖς γραφεῖσι μὲν πρὸς Ἀγβαρον παρὰ Χριστοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ ἡμῶν οὐκ ἔγκειται, ὡς ἔστι τοὺς φιλοπόνους ἐλεῖν ἐκ τῶν ἱστορηθέντων Εὐσεβίῳ τῷ Παμφίλου, αὐτὴν πρὸς λέξις τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ἀναγνόντι.

¹⁹ Zu erwägen ist noch, ob die Kirchengeschichte des Eusebios aus der Perspektive der klassischen Geschichtsschreibung als ἐκείνου τοῦ χρόνου τὴν ἱστορίαν bezeichnet werden konnte.

zumindest zwei Fassungen der Christus-Abgar-Korrespondenz im Umlauf, worauf das Zeugnis der Egeria von 384 eindeutig hinweist. Egeria erhielt in Edessa eine längere Version des Christusbriefes als jene, die in ihrer Heimat verbreitet war²⁰. Es ist nicht klar, ob die kürzere Fassung auf den Text des Eusebios zurückging. Die moderne Forschung vermutet aber bisweilen, dass diese kürzere Version mit dem Text des Eusebios zu identifizieren sei²¹. Möglicherweise gab es aber auch eine voreusebianische Fassung der Abgarlegende, wovon die griechischen Fragmente der Abgar-Christus-Korrespondenz aus dem 7. Jahrhundert, die die Papyri *P. Cair. 10736* und *P. Oxf. Bodl. Ms. gr. th b1 (P)* überliefern, zeugen könnten²².

Daraus kann man schließen, dass eine unmittelbare Benutzung von Eusebios' Kirchengeschichte durch Prokopios sehr fraglich ist. Klar ist nur, dass seine Ausführungen zu Abgar zum einen auf unbekannte historiographische Quellen, zum anderen auf die edessenische Lokaltradition zurückgehen.

Sehr kontrovers ist auch die Frage nach dem Verhältnis des Prokopios zum Schutzversprechen Christi für Edessa. Auszugehen ist hier davon, dass Prokopios die Authentizität des Christus-Briefes an Abgar nicht in Frage stellt, während zahlreiche Christen den Brief für nicht authentisch hielten²³. Unklar bleibt hingegen Prokopios' Meinung über den Schlussteil des Christusbriefes und das Schutzversprechen für Edessa. Prokopios erklärt die Herkunft beider Fassungen des Briefes: Die kürzere Version (ohne das Schutzversprechen) gehe auf die Historiker zurück, die längere Version (mit dem Schutzversprechen) auf die edessenische lokale Tradition. Anschließend erwähnt er ein Ereignis, das gegen die Authentizität des Schutzversprechens zu sprechen scheint. Nach dem Tod Abgars sollte nämlich Edessa unter persische Herrschaft kommen. Die Stadt sei aber nicht erobert worden, sondern ihr Herrscher, der Sohn Abgars, sei freiwillig zu den Persern übergetreten, denn er habe die römische Strafe für seine Freveltaten gefürchtet (II 12, 28)²⁴. Bei näherem Hinsehen erweist sich diese Geschichte aber

²⁰ *Itiner. Egeriae* 19, 19: „Illud etiam satis mihi grato fuit, ut epistolas ipsas sive Aggari ad Dominum sive Domini ad Aggarum, quas nobis ibi legerat sanctus episcopus, acciperem mihi ab ipso sancto. Et licet in patria exemplaria ipsarum haberem, tamen gratius mihi visum est, ut et ibi eas de ipso acciperem, ne quid forsitan minus ad nos in patria pervenisset; nam vere amplius est, quod hic accipi“.

²¹ Vgl. z.B. ILLERT, *op. cit.* (wie Anm. 5), S. 25.

²² Vgl. R. PEPERMÜLLER, *Griechische Papyrusfragmente der Doctrina Addai*, *Vigiliae Christianae* XXV 1971, S. 289–301.

²³ Sowohl Augustinus als auch Hieronymus lehnen die Authentizität des Christusbriefes an Abgar ab (vgl. August. *Contra Faust. Manich.* 28, 4; *Cons. Evang.* I 7, 11; Hieron. *In Ezech.* 44: 29–30). Der Papst Gelasius hat in seinem Dekret von 494 die Abgar-Christus-Korrespondenz zu einer Apokryphe erklärt (*Decr. Gelas.* 8, vgl. dazu E. von DOBSCHÜTZ, *Das Decretum Gelasianum de libris recipiendis et non recipiendis in kritischem Text*, Leipzig 1912, S. 319).

²⁴ Diese Geschichte ist allerdings nicht authentisch. Im 1. Jahrhundert konnten die Perser die Stadt nicht erobern, weil es das Perserreich noch nicht gab. Einige Forscher meinen hingegen, dass

nicht als völlig eindeutig. Prokopios verfährt hier wie ein erfahrener Redner und Jurist und schwächt ihre Aussagekraft auf subtile Weise ab, indem er mit dem Wort *άλίσκομαι* und dessen Abwandlungen spielt. Laut den Edessenern sollte Christus versprechen: *οὐδὲ ἡ πόλις ποτὲ βαρβάρους ἀλώσιμος ἔσται* (II 12, 26; vgl. auch II 12, 30: *φυλάξαι διὰ τοῦτο ἀνάλωτον*)²⁵. Dementsprechend wurde Edessa nicht erobert: *οὐκ ἀλοῦσα μέντοι*, obwohl die Stadt unter persische Herrschaft kam²⁶. Es kam also zu keiner militärischen Auseinandersetzung, in der die Edessener von den Persern besiegt wurden. In einer späteren Periode hingegen hätten die Edessener die persische Besatzung in der Stadt niedergemacht und die Stadt den Römern übergeben (II 12, 29). Leider enthält der erhaltene Text an dieser Stelle eine Lacuna und deswegen bleibt unklar, in welche Richtung die Argumentation des Prokopios ging. Insgesamt erweckt die Erzählung von der persischen Einnahme der Stadt den Eindruck, dass sie wirklich ursprünglich als ein Beweis gegen die Authentizität des Schutzversprechens für Edessa diente. Prokopios scheint hier einen intertextuellen Dialog mit einem anonymen Text (bzw. Tradition) zu führen, der die Authentizität des Schutzversprechens in Frage stellte, und sucht die dort angeführten Argumente in gewissem Maß zu entkräften bzw. zu relativieren. So muss man hier zwischen zwei Sachverhalten differenzieren: Dem Inhalt des Briefes und dem göttlichen Schutz der Stadt, den Prokopios für real hält. Der Historiker hat also gewisse Zweifel an der Authentizität des Schlussteils des Christusbriefes, ihnen liegen die fehlenden Zeugnisse der alten Historiker zugrunde. Der Schutz Gottes über Edessa wird aber von Prokopios nicht bestritten. Gerade in diesem Sinn äußert sich der Historiker zum Schluss seiner Erzählung über Abgar. Diese Aussage löste allerdings in der modernen Forschung eine Kontroverse aus²⁷: „Auch kam mir einmal der Gedanke, dass Christus, mag er das erwähnte Schreiben nicht

die Perser Edessa im Jahr 260 eingenommen hätten; vgl. A. MARICQ, E. HONIGMANN, *Recherches sur les Res Gestae Divi Saporis*, Bruxelles 1953, S. 145; DRIJVERS, *op. cit.* (wie Anm. 17), S. 279. Die Überlieferung des Petros Patrikios scheint aber gegen diese Meinung zu sprechen (Petr. Patric. Fr. 11, FHG IV, p. 187); vgl. B. BLECKMANN, *Die Reichskrise des III. Jahrhunderts in der spätantiken und byzantinischen Geschichtsschreibung. Untersuchungen zu den nachdionischen Quellen der Chronik des Johannes Zonaras*, München 1991, S. 118, Anm. 229.

²⁵ Zahlreiche griechische Inschriften mit dem Text des Christusbriefes (z.B. Inschriften von Edessa: *πρὸς τὸ μηδένα τῶν ἐχθρῶν κατισχύσαι αὐτήν*, von Gurdja, von Philippi und von Ephesus: *καὶ τῇ πόλι τῇ σῆ <πρὸς τὸ> μηδένα τῶν ἐχθρῶν τῶν σῶν ἐξουσίαν ταύτης ἔχιν ἢ σχῖν ποτέ*; s. dazu ILLERT, *op. cit.* [wie Anm. 5], S. 180, 184, 188, 192) sind kategorischer und lassen keinen Spielraum für Spekulationen, indem sie überliefern, dass die Feinde keine Macht über die Stadt haben würden.

²⁶ Trotz des Glaubens an den Schutz Gottes waren zahlreiche Edessener der Meinung, dass Gott die Stadt wegen der Sünden ihrer Bewohner bestrafen und den Feinden übergeben könne. Diese Meinung wurde von Jakob von Sarug bekämpft (vgl. Iacob. Sarug. *Ep. ad Edessenos* 129–134 OLINDER).

²⁷ Vgl. dazu KALDELLIS, *op. cit.* (wie Anm. 3), S. 272 f.; A. PALMER, *Procopius and Edessa*, *AntTard* VIII 2000, S. 127; CAMERON, *op. cit.* (wie Anm. 12), S. 116.

verfasst haben, sondern nur die Menschen zu dieser Ansicht gekommen seien, dennoch die Stadt deshalb vor Eroberung bewahren will, um ihnen niemals einen Vorwand für Zweifel zu geben²⁸. Prokopios geht hier zwar davon aus, dass der Schlussteil des Christusbriefes nicht authentisch sein kann, gleichzeitig aber drückt er seine feste Überzeugung davon aus, dass die Stadt Edessa unter dem Schutz Gottes ist. Die Ansicht, dass die Menschen an den Schutz Gottes glaubten, und dass Gott auf ihren Glauben antwortete (unabhängig von den Motiven Gottes), ist weder absurd noch ironisch. Es geht hier nicht darum, wie KALDELLIS argumentiert, dass Gott ein Opfer oder Sklave menschlicher Fehler sei und alle menschlichen Erfindungen unterstützen müsse, um den Menschen keinen Vorwand für Skeptizismus zu geben²⁹. Prokopios hebt an mehreren Stellen hervor, dass Gott nicht ein gefühlloses, gleichgültiges Wesen ist. Obwohl die Ratschlüsse Gottes unerforschlich seien, sind jedoch die Menschen manchmal imstande, Gott zu bestimmten Handlungen oder Entscheidungen zu veranlassen³⁰. Es handelt sich also in dieser Geschichte nicht um falsche menschliche Vorstellungen oder Erfindungen, sondern um den Glauben, der sich in Edessa herausgebildet hat. Prokopios hat zwar gewisse Zweifel an der Authentizität der Schutzverheißung Christi für Edessa, gleichzeitig aber verweist er auf die zeitgenössischen Ereignisse, die er als klare Belege dafür deutet, dass Gott auf den Glauben der Edessener antwortet und ihre Stadt tatsächlich schützt.

Man muss daran erinnert werden, dass Wunder und Interventionen Gottes für die Menschen des 6. Jahrhunderts, darunter auch für den Geschichtsschreiber Prokopios, nichts Außergewöhnliches sind, sondern ein typisches Element der damaligen Weltanschauung. Prokopios geht davon aus, dass Gott immer einem λόγος gemäß handelt und demzufolge Gottes Handeln immer sinnvoll, begründet und zweckvoll ist. Die Menschen sind aber häufig nicht imstande, die Gründe für bestimmte göttliche Entscheidungen zu begreifen und zu erklären³¹. So ist die Erzählung über Abgar nicht als ironisch zu betrachten, wie KALDELLIS meint, sondern als eine Geschichte über die Stärke des Glaubens. Sehr instruktiv ist in dieser Hinsicht der Kommentar des Kirchenhistorikers Euagrius, der die Ausführungen des Prokopios gut kannte (Evagr. *HE* IV 27). Euagrius beruft sich in seinem parallelen Bericht auf Prokopios, aber er formuliert seine Ansicht deutlicher als Prokopios: Euagrius betrachtet das Schutzversprechen für Edessa als nicht authentisch, indem er feststellt, dass es im Text des Christusbriefes nicht

²⁸ Procop. II 12, 30: καί μοί ποτε ἔννοια γέγονεν ὡς εἰ μὴ ταῦτα ἄπερ ἐρρήθη ὁ Χριστὸς ἔγραψεν, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐς τοῦτο δόξης ἄνθρωποι ἦλθον, φυλάξαι διὰ τοῦτο ἀνάλωτον ἐθέλει τὴν πόλιν, ὡς μήποτε αὐτοῖς πλάνης τινὰ σκῆψιν διδοίη. Die Übersetzung nach O. VEH, *Prokop. Perserkriege. Griechisch-deutsch*, München 1970.

²⁹ Gegen KALDELLIS, *op. cit.* (wie Anm. 3), S. 272 f.

³⁰ Vgl. dazu BRODKA, *op. cit.* (wie Anm. 4), S. 21 ff.

³¹ BRODKA, *op. cit.* (wie Anm. 4), S. 26 ff.

enthalten sei, wie Eusebios, der Sohn des Pamphilus, bezeuge³². Dies werde hingegen von den Gläubigen immer wieder gesagt und geglaubt. Anschließend folgt eine bedeutende Aussage: die Überzeugung der Edessener davon, dass Edessa niemals in die Gewalt der Feinde kommen würde, habe ihre Erfüllung gefunden, weil der Glaube die Verwirklichung der Prophezeiung herbeigeführt habe³³. Euagrius zeigt also, wie die Beweisführung des Prokopios im 6. Jahrhundert verstanden wurde. In beiden Berichten kommt derselbe Gedanke zum Ausdruck: Der Glaube ist eine Kraft, die Gott zu einem bestimmten Handeln veranlassen könne³⁴.

Die Berichte des Prokopios über die persischen Belagerungen Edessas im Jahr 540 und 544 betonen vor allem, dass Chosroes den Glauben der Edessener habe entkräften wollen, dass die Stadt uneinnehmbar sei (II 12, 37; II 26, 1–3). Die Schilderung des Angriffs im Jahr 540 besteht nur aus wenigen Informationen, weil es damals zu keinen Kämpfen kam. Stattdessen konzentriert sich Prokopios auf die wundersamen Ereignisse, die es den Persern unmöglich machten, die Stadt anzugreifen. Als das persische Heer gegen Edessa aufbrach, soll es sich zuerst verirrt haben. Nachdem es endlich mit Mühe vor Edessa eingetroffen war, soll den Perserkönig Chosroes ein Ausschlag im Gesicht befallen haben und sein Kiefer angeschwollen sein. Deswegen wollte Chosroes auf keinen Fall die Stadt angreifen und gab sich mit Lösegeld zufrieden (II 12, 32–34). Aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach geht hier Prokopios auf die lokale mündliche Tradition zurück, wobei er auf seine Vorlagen nur mit vagen Bemerkungen λέγουσι, φασιν hinweist (II 12, 32 f.). Auffallend ist, dass beide Geschichten gewisse Parallelen zur früheren Tradition aufweisen. Das Thema der „Verirrung“ bzw. „Verwirrung“ der Feinde gehört wohl zu der Kategorie der ältesten „Wunder“, die dann den konkreten Umständen gemäß stets modifiziert wurden. Hinzuweisen ist hier auf eine andere Geschichte, die die Ratlosigkeit der Perser vor Edessa thematisiert. Sie wurde der Pilgerin Egeria im Jahr 384 vom Bischof von Edessa erzählt: Als nämlich die Perser die Stadt hätten angreifen wollen, sei eine große Finsternis hereingebrochen. Dies habe bei den Persern eine so große Verwirrung hervorgerufen, dass sie nur mit Mühe ihr Lager aufgeschlagen hätten und dann nicht gesehen hätten, an welcher Stelle sie in die Stadt eindringen könnten (*Itiner. Egeriae* 19, 9 f.). Das Motiv der „Anschwellung“ des Kopfes erscheint hingegen

³² Evagr. *HE* IV 27: Ἀναγράφει ὁ αὐτὸς Προκόπιος καὶ τὰ περὶ Ἐδέσης καὶ Ἀγβάρου τοῖς παλαιοῖς ἱστορημένα, καὶ ὡς ὁ Χριστὸς πρὸς Ἀγβαρον ἐπέστειλεν, εἶτα καὶ ὡς ἐς ἑτέραν ἔφοδον πολιορκίαν τῶν Ἐδεσηνῶν ὁ Χοσρόης κατέστη, παραλύειν οἰόμενος τὰ παρὰ τοῖς πιστοῖς θρυλούμενα, ὡς οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἡ Ἐδεσα ὑπὸ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς γενήσεται ὅπερ τοῖς γραφεῖσι μὲν πρὸς Ἀγβαρον παρὰ Χριστοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ ἡμῶν οὐκ ἔγκειται, ὡς ἔστι τοὺς φιλοπόνους ἐλεῖν ἐκ τῶν ἱστορηθέντων Εὐσεβίῳ τῷ Παμφίλου, αὐτὴν πρὸς λέξιν τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ἀναγνόντι.

³³ Vgl. auch Evagr. *HE* IV 27: οὕτω δὲ παρὰ τοῖς πιστοῖς ἄδεται τε καὶ πεπίστευται καὶ τὸ πέρασ ἐδέξατο, τῆς πίστεως ἔργον προρρήσεως ἀγαγούσης.

³⁴ Vgl. auch Evagr. *HE* IV 27: τῆς θείας δυνάμεως τῇ πίστει τῶν δεδρακότων ἐπιφοιτησάσης.

in der syrischen Chronik des Pseudo-Josua Stylites, die um 518 veröffentlicht wurde. Als man den Perserkönig Kavadh vor dem Angriff gegen Edessa mit dem Hinweis auf das Schutzversprechen Christi gewarnt habe, sollte der Araberfürst Nu'man gegen Gott lästern³⁵. Sodann habe Christus an ihm ein deutliches Zeichen gesetzt, denn in dem Moment, als er lästerte, habe sich seine Wunde entzündet und sein ganzer Kopf sei angeschwollen. Nach zwei Tagen sei der Gotteslästerer gestorben. Kavadh verzichtete zwar nicht auf die Belagerung, aber er wurde von den Verteidigern zurückgeschlagen (Ps.-Jos. Styl. 58 = Ps.-Dion. *Chron.* 60, 288 CHABOT). Dass die Ereignisse bei Edessa im Jahr 540 von den Zeitgenossen in religiösen Kategorien gedeutet wurden, bezeugt auch die bald nach 544 entstandene Chronik von Edessa, in der die Rettung der Stadt im Jahr 540 dem christlichen Gott zugeschrieben wird (vgl. *Chron. Edessenum* 105, p. 11 GUIDI).

Weitaus umfangreicher ist hingegen Prokopios' Bericht über die Belagerung Edessas durch die Perser im Jahr 544. Weil sie von dem Historiker in Zusammenhang mit dem Scheitern des persischen Angriffs im Jahr 540 gebracht wird, wird auch in diesem Fall der religiöse Aspekt des Geschehens betont: Chosroes' Feldzug habe sich nicht gegen den Kaiser Justinian und auch nicht gegen sonst einen Menschen, sondern gegen den Gott der Christen gerichtet, von dem auch die Perser bei ihrem ersten Vorstoß gegen Edessa besiegt worden seien (II 26, 2 f.). Die detaillierte Schilderung der Belagerung selbst ist hingegen sehr sachlich und enthält keine wundersamen Ereignisse mehr (II 26, 5–27, 46).

Prokopios erwähnt noch nicht das bekannte Christusbild von Edessa (das Mandyllion). Erst Euagrius, der seine Kirchengeschichte kurz nach 594 verfasst hat, betonte die große Rolle des Mandyllions in der erfolgreichen Verteidigung Edessas im Jahr 544. In seinem Bericht über die Belagerung Edessas 544 geht Euagrius vor allem auf Prokopios zurück, wobei er dessen Bericht um die Darstellung der wundertätigen Wirkung des Christusbildes ergänzte. Seit langem fragt die Forschung danach, warum Prokopios über das Mandyllion schweigt. Es geht in dieser Hinsicht weder um den Zweifel des Historikers an der Authentizität der Mandyllion-Episode³⁶, noch um eine negative Einstellung zu derartigen Geschichten, weil er ja an anderen Stellen seines Werkes gern über solche Wunder berichtet. Anzunehmen ist, dass Prokopios noch nichts von der Bedeutung des wundertätigen Christusbildes wusste. Die Tradition, die dem Christusbild die entscheidende Rolle im Sieg im Jahr 544 zuschrieb, muss also erst später, nach der Verfassung der *Bella*, entstanden sein³⁷. Überzeugend ist dabei die Erklärung von M. WHITBY, der vermutet, dass die Verteidiger während

³⁵ Zu dieser Gotteslästerung vgl. F.R. TROMBLEY, J.W. WATT, *The Chronicle of Pseudo-Joshua the Stylite*, Liverpool 2000, S. 71 f., Anm. 339.

³⁶ Gegen RUNCIMAN, *op. cit.* (wie Anm. 12), 244.

³⁷ AV. CAMERON, *The Sceptic and the Shroud*, London 1980 (Inaugural Lecture at King's College), S. 6 ff.; CAMERON, *op. cit.* (wie Anm. 12), S. 116 f. Die Verfasserin deutet dabei auch an, dass

der Kämpfe im Jahr 544 nach allen in der Stadt bestehenden Heiligkeiten gegriffen haben können. Es liegt nahe, dass unter diesen Heiligkeiten auch die Ikone Christi war, aber ihre Rolle erst in späteren Jahren hervorgehoben wurde. Vielleicht wurde erst Euagrius zum Schöpfer der Idee, dass das Christusbild von Edessa die Stadt im Jahr 544 gerettet hat³⁸.

Man kann also davon ausgehen, dass Prokopios für seine Abgarlegende sowohl literarische Quellen, als auch lokale mündliche Tradition benutzte. Es ist zwar möglich, dass Prokopios die Kirchengeschichte des Eusebios konsultierte, aber insgesamt lässt sich kein größerer Einfluss des Eusebios auf Prokopios' Darstellung feststellen. Trotz der jüngst durch die Forschung vorgebrachten Einwände kann man deshalb davon ausgehen, dass die Abgarlegende einen wichtigen Beweis für die christliche Konfession des Prokopios liefert.

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auch die Chronik von Edessa, die um 544 entstand, nicht von dem Mandylion weiß (vgl. CAMERON, *op. cit.* [wie Anm. 12], S. 117, Anm. 29).

³⁸ M. WHITBY, *The Ecclesiastical History of Evagrius Scholasticus*, Liverpool 2000, S. 227, Anm. 73. Vgl. auch GUSCIN, *op. cit.* (wie Anm. 5), S. 212.

Marc STEINMANN, *Alexander der Große und die „nackten Weisen“ Indiens. Der fiktive Briefwechsel zwischen Alexander und dem Brahmanenkönig Dindimus. Einleitung, lateinischer Text, Übersetzung und Kommentar*, Berlin: Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur, 2012 (Klassische Philologie, Bd. IV), XII + 383 S., 18 Abb., ISBN 978-3-86596-461-8, € 68.00.

STEINMANN (= St.) befasst sich seit längerer Zeit mit der Schrift *Alexandri Magni, regis Macedonum, et Dindimi, regis Bragmanorum, de philosophia per litteras facta collatio* (solchen Titel gibt die Mehrheit von Manuskripten an)¹. Im Jahre 2000 veröffentlichte er eine zweisprachige Ausgabe der *Collatio*, mit einem grammatisch-lexikalischen Kommentar versehen². Ein Jahr später erschien seine annotierte Bibliographie zur *Collatio*³. Das zu rezensierende Buch ist eine umgearbeitete und erweiterte Fassung der Dissertation, die St. an der Ruhr-Universität Bochum im Wintersemester 2010/2011 vorlegte.

Das Werk, das drei Briefe Alexanders des Großen und zwei des Brahmanen Dindimus enthält, erfreute sich im Mittelalter großer Beliebtheit, wovon die Tatsache zeugt, dass über 80 Manuskripte erhalten blieben. Trotzdem wurde die handschriftliche Tradition bisher nicht eingehend erforscht. Bernhard KÜBLER (1859–1940) stützte seine Teubnerausgabe lediglich auf drei Kodexen (Lipsiae 1888, S. 169–189; Nachdruck in: PLS I 1958, coll. 679–690). Telfryn PRITCHARD dagegen machte nur von neun Manuskripten Gebrauch⁴. St. kollationierte 77 Handschriften (die ältesten stammen aus dem 9. Jh.), deshalb konnte er einen verlässlichen Text des Werkes veröffentlichen. Er gibt dem Text jedoch kein klassisches Stemma bei, weil die Tradition, seines Erachtens, kontaminiert ist. Er hält die *Collatio* für „den offenen Text“ bzw. *texte vivant*. Ein ausgebauter kritischer Apparat lässt den Leser, der keinen Zugang zu Manuskripten hat, solche Lesart zu wählen, die ihm mehr angebracht vorkommt. Unter der deutschen Übersetzung gibt es einen umfangreichen Similienapparat, der klassische und spätantike, und manchmal sogar mittelalterliche Schriftsteller umfasst. Er soll den Sprachgebrauch des *Collatio*-Autors erläutern und das Themenrepertoire, auf das er zurückgriff, sowie sein geistiges Milieu beleuchten. St. fügt jedoch mit Recht hinzu: „Keinesfalls soll durch den Similienapparat jedoch jeweils eine unmittelbare oder mittelbare Abhängigkeit unterstellt werden – sei es in die eine Richtung oder von der anderen Seite“ (S. 5 f.). Einen wichtigen Teil der Arbeit macht ein kritischer und exegetischer Kommentar aus (S. 191–334). Der Ausgabe der *Collatio* geht eine Einleitung voran (S. 1–124), und das Buch wird durch die Bibliographie (S. 339–355) und Indices (S. 357–383) geschlossen.

¹ Es gibt auch *Collatio II*, die als „vor allem syntaktisch vereinfachte sowie im Hinblick auf die Vokabeln ‚romanisierte‘ Fassung von *Collatio I*“ gilt (St. S. 28). Ausgabe: F. PFISTER, *Kleine Texte zum Alexanderroman [...] nach dem Bamberger Handschrift herausgegeben*, Heidelberg 1910 (Sammlung vulgärlateinischer Texte IV), S. 10–20. Dagegen *Collatio III* gibt es in drei Fassungen (J¹, J², J³) als Teil des Werkes *Historia de preliis*. Verschiedene Editionen nennen R. STONEMAN, *Alexander the Great. A Life in Legend*, New Haven–London 2008, S. 237 und St. S. 342

² M. STEINMANN, *Die Collatio Alexandri et Dindimi (lateinisch-deutsch). Übersetzung und Kommentar*, Göttingen 2000 (Göttinger Forum für die Altertumswissenschaft. Beiheft III). Zweite Auflage Göttingen 2011 ist mir unzugänglich.

³ M. STEINMANN, *Die Collatio Alexandri et Dindimi. Eine annotierte Arbeitsbibliographie*, Göttinger Forum für die Altertumswissenschaft IV 2001, S. 51–84.

⁴ T. PRITCHARD, *The Collatio Alexandri et Dindimi: a Revised Text*, C&M XLVI 1995, S. 255–283.

Als eine Streitfrage ist die Datierung von *Collatio* anzusehen. *Terminus ante quem* bildet ein Epigramm Alkuins († 804), eines Leiters der Hofschule Karls des Großen, in dem die *Collatio* und der apokryphische Briefwechsel zwischen Seneca und dem Apostel Paulus dem Herrscher dediziert wird⁵. St. stellt eingehend den Forschungsbericht dar (S. 74–79) und schlägt vor, das Werk auf die Jahre 410–420 zu datieren. Ich bezweifle jedoch, ob man die Entstehungszeit von *Collatio* so genau bestimmen kann. Mehr wahrscheinlich kommt mir die These vor, dass das Werk zwischen Ende des 4. Jh. und Anfang des 5. Jh. entstand. Ich bin dagegen geneigt damit übereinzustimmen, dass die *Collatio* ein originelles lateinisches Werk ist, und nicht eine Übersetzung des griechischen Textes (S. 26–28)⁶. Glaubwürdig kommt mir auch die Idee von St. vor (S. 51–53, 305 f.), laut deren die *Collatio* von Anfang an Form eines Briefwechsels hatte⁷. Der Entstehungszweck des Werkes ist Gegenstand einer regen Diskussion (S. 60–64). St. weist entschieden die Anschauung zurück, dass es sich hier um ein in einer Rhetorenschule entstandenes Schrift handelt⁸ und vermutet, dass der *Collatio*-Autor einige allzu radikale Askeseformen missbilligen wollte (S. 54, 64, 337)⁹. Zwar ist ein solcher Standpunkt wahrscheinlich, doch meines Erachtens kann man nicht absolut sicher sein, dass es tatsächlich die Absicht des Autors war. Dagegen bin ich der Ansicht, dass man die Hypothese im Geringsten nicht begründen kann, dass der *Collatio*-Autor auf ein Werk von Palladius oder dessen lateinische Fassung *De moribus Brachmanorum* von Pseudo-Ambrosius antwortete, der eine strenge Askese entschieden befürwortete. St. selbst ist sich dessen übrigen völlig bewusst, während er schreibt: „eine Abhängigkeit scheint mir aber, zumal bei der derzeitigen Forschungslage, keinesfalls zwingend zu sein“ (S. 66).

Ich bin der Meinung, dass St. richtig handelte, indem er in der Einleitung u.a. folgende Probleme besprach: die Alexanderliteratur, der Alexanderroman, Alexander und die „nackten Weisen“ Indiens. Seine Ausführungen sind kompetent und lassen die Leser sicherlich die *Collatio*, die im Umfelde des Alexanderromanes entstand, besser verstehen. Ich muss jedoch einräumen, dass ein Forscher, der sich seit längerer Zeit mit der Problematik des Alexanderromans und jener von *Graeco-Indica* befasst, ab und zu ein gewisses Unbefriedigtsein empfindet. Es kommt mir vor, dass man manche Probleme mehr eingehend hätte besprechen können, und zwar mit Angabe umfassender wissenschaftlicher Literatur. Besonders merkwürdig ist das Weglassen von P.M. FRASER, *The Alexander-Romance*, in: IDEM, *Cities of Alexander the Great*, Oxford 1996, S. 205–226, wie auch J.P. OLIVER SEGURA, *Diálogo del rey Alejandro con el brahmán Dándamis* (PGen. 271), in: F. GASCÓ, J. ALVAR (Hgg.), *Heterodoxos, reformadores y marginados en la antigüedad clásica*, Sevilla 1991, S. 107–136 (der griechische Text: S. 126–136; die Übersetzung ins Spanische: S. 117–125). Der Artikel stützt sich auf eine nicht veröffentlichte Dissertation *Los diálogos entre*

⁵ Alcuinus, *Carm.* 81 (in: *Monumenta Germaniae Historica. Poetae Latini Medii Aevi*, t. I, ed. E. DÜMMLER, Berolini 1881, p. 300).

⁶ Für das griechische Original sprachen letztens PRITCHARD, *op. cit.* (Anm. 4), S. 257 und STONEMAN, *op. cit.* (Anm. 1), S. 105, 201.

⁷ Dagegen A. KURFESS, *Zur Collatio Alexandri et Dindimi*, Mnemosyne ser. 3, IX 1940, S. 150, Anm. 14 und G. Chr. HANSEN, *Alexander und die Brahmanen*, Klio XLIII–XLV 1965, S. 374 meinten, dass das Werk am Anfang Form eines Dialogs hatte, die später in die eines Briefwechsels umgewandelt wurde.

⁸ So z.B. J. MAKOWSKY, *De Collatione Alexandri Magni et Dindimi*, Diss. Vratislaviae 1919, S. 35: „Auctor autem collationis rhetor fuisse videtur“; J. ANDRÉ, J. FILLIOZAT, *L’Inde vue de Rome. Textes latins de l’Antiquité relatifs à l’Inde*, Paris 1986, S. 388, Anm. 314: „On y retrouve les traits d’un exercice d’école“.

⁹ So z.B. schon HANSEN, *op. cit.* (Anm. 7), S. 373: „Sein eigentliches Anliegen war es jedoch den Auswüchsen einer weltfeindlichen Askese entgegenzutreten“. Vgl. A. FÜRST, in: A. FÜRST *et al.*, *Der apokryphe Briefwechsel zwischen Seneca und Paulus* [...], Tübingen 2012 [=2006] (SAPERE XI), S. 55, Anm. 142: „in der es um eine Absage an asketische Weltflucht geht“.

el rey y el sabio en la época helenística, Murcia 1988, bei der ich leider nicht angelangt bin. Es sei hinzugefügt, dass Bd. 2 des Werkes *Il romanzo di Alessandro* von R. STONEMAN und T. GARGIULO im September 2012 erschien. Ich möchte noch zwei Einzelfragen ansprechen:

1) Die Forscher machen sich seit langem Gedanken, in welche Sprachen man die Worte des Brahmanen Dandamis, der mit Onesikritos gesprochen hatte, übersetzte (Str. XV 1, 64, p. 716). St. (S. 33, Anm. 162) führt einen Standpunkt von A. DEMANDT, *Alexander der Große. Leben und Legende*, München 2009, S. 253 an: „Der erste übersetzte aus dem Griechischen ins Aramäische, der zweite aus diesem ins Baktrische oder Sogdische, der dritte aus dieser Sprache ins Indische“. St. ist sich aber dessen nicht bewusst, dass solche These haben früher schon andere Forscher aufgestellt¹⁰. Außerdem wurden auch andere Lösungen dieses Problems bereits vorgeschlagen. Den Übersetzungen aus Fremdsprachen ins Griechische gewidmete Arbeiten werden von M. WINIARCZYK angegeben (*Die indischen Weisen bei den Alexanderhistorikern*, Eos CXVI 2009, S. 37, Anm. 49).

2) St. nennt (S. 37) nur sieben Autoren, die über die an Gymnosophisten durch Alexander den Großen gestellte Fragen schreiben. Er übersah jedoch *Hermeneumata Stephani*, in: *Corpus Glossariorum Latinorum*, vol. III: *Hermeneumata Pseudodositheana*, ed. G. GOETZ, Lipsiae 1892, S. 385 f. Man hätte auch Übersetzungen ins Armenische, Syrische, Hebräische und Äthiopische, die P.H. THOMAS (Lipsiae ²1966) im kritischen Apparat zur Ausgabe der *Epitoma Mettensis 78–84* anführt, berücksichtigen sollen. NB St. behauptet zu Unrecht, dass es die Fragen nur in *Epit. Mett.* 79 gäbe.

St. beruft sich oft auf patristische und mittelalterliche Werke, wobei jedoch seine Zitierweise dem Leser schnelle Verifikation des Zitats unmöglich macht. Ich muss einräumen, dass das Aufsuchen von manchen Zitaten ziemlich viel Zeit in Anspruch nimmt. Deshalb sollten der Band und die Seite/Spalte der Editionsreihe unbedingt angegeben werden. Bei lateinischen Werken sollte man Abkürzungen PL, CSEL, CCL oder CC Cont. Med. anführen, und im Falle von griechischen Kirchenvätern PG, GCS oder PTS. Es kommt mir auch vor, dass das Buch von St. mit einem Verzeichnis von Ausgaben versehen werden sollte, die der Autor benutzt hatte. Der Rezensent weiß aus eigener Erfahrung, dass das Vorbereiten einer solchen Bibliographie einen großen Zeitaufwand bedeutet, doch ich halte es für eine Pflicht des Autors.

Es versteht sich von selbst, dass man in der umfangreichen Arbeit von St. verschiedenartige Fehler, Versehen und editorische Unzulänglichkeiten finden kann. Sie zu nennen, halte ich für die Pflicht eines Rezensenten, die dem Autor die Vorbereitung der zweiten, verbesserten Auflage erleichtern sollte.

1. Sachfehler

a) S. 111: Laktanz ist nicht der Autor von *De opificio hominis*, sondern von *De opificio Dei*. *De opificio hominis* schrieb Gregor von Nyssa.

b) Nach St. (S. 310, Anm. 511) wurde der Gedanke von der Erschaffung der Welt für die Menschen verworfen, und zwar „von Epikur und seiner Schule sowie später z.B. als christliche Lehre durch Cels. orig. 4, 74 + 99“. In dem *index locorum* (S. 367) gibt es ein Lemma „Celsus, Orig. 4, 74: 310; 4, 99: 310. Der Leser kann hier zu Unrecht schlussfolgern, dass ein gewisser Celsus das Werk *Orig.* schrieb. In der Tat handelt es sich hier um das Werk von Origenes *Contra Celsum*, der Argumente von Celsus, Autor des *Ἀληθῆς λόγος*, widerlegt.

2. Werkstattfehler

a) Eine unprofessionelle Zitierweise der *RE* – S. 239, Anm. 201: *RE*, 2. Reihe, 4 Halbband, Sp. 2025 f. *pro RE II A 2*, 1923, Sp. 2025 f.; S. 349 Kurfuß 1949: *RE 36 pro RE XVIII 2*, 1949.

b) St. nennt im Kommentar Autoren, bei denen eine Redewendung vorkommt, doch er gibt keine genaue Lokalisierung an, z.B. S. 194, 197, 263, 303, 309, 310.

¹⁰ P. PÉDECH, *Historiens compagnons d'Alexandre* [...], Paris 1984, S. 105, Anm. 4; C. WIOTTE-FRANZ, *Hermeneus und Interpres. Zum Dolmetscherwesen in der Antike*, Saarbrücken 2001 (Saarbrücker Studien zur Archäologie und Alten Geschichte XVI), S. 149, 164.

c) St. gibt manchmal keine Seiten eines Artikels an, in dem es die Rede von einem Problem ist, z.B. S. 64, Anm. 296.

d) Im Falle von Historikern (Alexander Polyhistor, Megasthenes, Nearchos, Onesikritos) fehlt die Nummer in den *FGrHist*, was schnelles Aufsuchen des Zitats in der Ausgabe von F. JACOBY erschwert.

e) Einige Male bin ich auf ungenaue Zitate aus Werken von Kirchenvätern gestoßen, z.B. Aug. *Serm.* 243; Aug. *Serm.* 349; Caes. Arel. *Serm.* 213; Leo M. *Tract.* 61. Man muss die ganze Predigt lesen, um das von St. angeführte Zitat zu finden. Außerdem sollte die Zitierweise bei Clemens von Alexandria verbessert werden. So findet man bei St.: Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 3, 7 *pro* Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 3, 60, 3; Clem. Alex. *Paedag.* 2, 10 *pro* Clem. Alex. *Paedag.* 2, 10, 90, 3 (NB das Kapitel 2, 10 umfasst über zwanzig Seiten [S. 208–226] in der Ausgabe von O. STÄHLIN). Es gibt auch ungenaue Zitate aus der heidnischen Literatur, z.B. Ps. Hippocr. *De aëribus* (S. 257, Anm. 286) ohne Kapitelangabe. Die Schrift *De aëre aquis locis* zählt in: CMG I 1 (ed. I.L. HEIBERG) mehr als zwanzig Seiten (S. 56–78).

f) Bei zwölf Dialogen von Seneca sollte man den Titel, und nicht die Dialognummer angeben. Dasselbe gilt auch für Claudians Gedichte. NB im Kommentar gibt St. richtige Titel von Werken dieses Dichters (S. 175, 204, 248 f.), doch in dem *index locorum* befinden sich nur Nummern aus der Ausgabe von J.B. HALL (Leipzig 1985).

g) auch kleine Unzulänglichkeiten sollten beseitigt werden¹¹.

3. Ich habe größere Vorbehalte, was Indexe anbelangt.

a) Der umfassende *Index nominum, rerum, verborum* sollte man in drei getrennte Indexe teilen, da sie dann mehr übersichtlich sein werden.

b) In dem *index locorum* solle es nur Stellen aus den Werken von Autoren geben, Autorennamen dagegen, die in der Einleitung und im Kommentar vorkommen, sollen sich in dem *index nominum* befinden. NB Onesikritos (S. 33) tritt in beiden Indexen auf.

c) Ich prüfte stichprobenartig den *index locorum* und stellte fest, dass dort über zwanzig in der Einleitung, im Similienapparat und im Kommentar vorkommende Belegstellen fehlen¹². Ich bemerkte auch, dass viele Namen auch in dem *index nominum* fehlen: z.B. Ampelius, Maximus Planudes, Poseidonios, Pythagoras, Vibius Sequester. Daraus ergibt sich, dass St. Indexe ergänzen soll.

¹¹ S. 40: Winiarczyk (2007: 202) – aus dem Zitat fiel die Redewendung „zur Sprache“ aus; S. 60, Anm. 264: André-Filliozat (1982) *pro* André-Filliozat (1986); André (1983) *pro* André (1982); rhétor *pro* rhéteur (NB das Ende des französischen Zitats fehlt); S. 72: André (1983) *pro* André (1982); S. 83: F. Dümmmler *pro* E. Dümmmler; S. 129: Tatian. *or.* 5, 2 *pro* 5, 4; S. 204: Apul. de Plat. 2, 2, 25 *pro* 2, 25 (in dem *index locorum* ist das Zitat korrekt); S. 236 und 333, Anm. 597: Stenzelberger *pro* Stelzenberger; S. 344: Textes latines *pro* Textes latins; S. 349: Lacrosese *pro* Lacrosse; Kurfeß, Mnemosyne 9, 1941 *pro* Kurfeß, Mnemosyne 9, 1940; S. 350: Muckensturm 1993, 225–280 *pro* Muckensturm 1993, 225–239; S. 351: Powers, Onesicritus [...] and the Cynic's Alexander *pro* Powers, Onesicritus [...] and the Cynics' Alexander; S. 355: Winiarczyk, Onesikritos von Stypalaia *pro* Winiarczyk, Onesikritos von Astypalaia; S. 359: Ambros. in psalm. 7, 3 *pro* Ambros. in psalm. 17, 3. Ich bemerkte auch die Auslassung des Akzents in dem französischen Wort *Bibliothèque pro* *Bibliothèque* (S. 98, 99, 104 [dreimal]).

¹² Boeth. *Cons.* 2 m. 5, 11 (S. 226); Cassiod. in psalm. 62 l. 247 (S. 55, Anm. 255); Cic. *Cat.* 26 (S. 197); Cic. *Lig.* 14 (S. 205); Claud. *rapt. Pros.* 2, 219 (S. 296); Claud. Mamert. *Paneg.* 3, 28, 5 (S. 328, Anm. 582); Dracont. *de laud. Dei* 3, 689 ff. (S. 285); Epict. *diatr.* 1 9 tit. (S. 279, Anm. 391); Grattius, *Cyng.* 463 (S. 318); Hippol. *ref. omn. haer.* 1, 24, 1–7 (S. 279); 1, 24, 2; 1, 24, 5–6 (S. 278, Anm. 386); 8, 20, 1–3 (S. 279); Isid. 13, 21, 8 (S. 49); Leo M., *epist.* 4 (S. 290, Anm. 436); Liv. 1, 4, 1 (S. 318); Manilius 2, 453–465 (S. 283); Ps.-Pelag. *div.* 20, 2 (S. 277); Pl. *Crat.* 400 C; Gorg. 493 A; *Phaedr.* 250 C (S. 227 Anm. 141); Quodvultdeus, *serm. symb.* 1, 3–5 (S. 260, Anm. 297); Ruf. *Clement.* 8, 15, 5 (S. 309); Verg. *Aen.* 8, 333 (S. 318).

d) In dem *index locorum* sollen die Formen griechischer Namen vereinheitlicht werden. Manche gibt es in der lateinischen Form (z.B. Diodorus Siculus, Epictetus, Gregorius Nyssenus), aber oft treten auch griechische Formen auf (z.B. Homeros, Lukianos, Plutarchos). Manchmal kann man auch griechisch-lateinische Formen treffen: Hekataios Milesius *pro* Hecataeus Milesius, Philon Alexandrinus *pro* Philo Alexandrinus. Außerdem bemerkte ich einen grammatischen Fehler – Iustinus Martyrus *pro* Iustinus Martyr.

4. Die Bibliographie ist vorwiegend sorgfältig, aber die Titel werden manchmal gekürzt (z.B. FÜRST, KOULAKIOTIS). St. gibt nicht immer Editionsreihen an (z.B. BRELOER–BÖMER, DIHLE, FÜRST, GATZ, MERKELBACH, OPELT, SCHRÖDER, THRAEDE) und Nachdrucke (z.B. BERVE, HECKEL, NOCK). Unrichtig ist die bibliographische Beschreibung des Buches von FÜRST, *Der apokryphe Briefwechsel*. Es ist ein Werk von vier Autoren, deren Namen es auf der Titelseite gibt (wie „unveränderte Studienausgabe“ 2012). Mir scheint, dass es gut wäre, all die zitierten Artikel und Bücher in der Bibliographie am Ende des Buches zu plazieren, und in der Einführung und im Kommentar nur Abkürzungen anzugeben. Dadurch werden die Anmerkungen in der Einleitung mehr übersichtlich, und der Benutzer wird auf Anhieb feststellen können, ob St. von einem Werk Gebrauch machte. Auf der Seite 310 gibt es eine Abkürzung „Geffcken (1907: 36)“, die es in der Bibliographie nicht gibt. Es handelt sich natürlich um das bekannte Buch *Zwei griechische Apologeten*, Leipzig–Berlin 1907 (Sammlung wissenschaftlicher Kommentare zu griechischen und römischen Schriftstellern) [Nachdruck Hildesheim 1970].

St. selbst räumt ein (S. 338), dass sein Buch nicht alle Fragen erforschte. Auf umfassende Bearbeitung warten folgende Probleme: (a) „Klauselgebrauch des *Collatio*-Autors“, (b) „eine erschöpfende Untersuchung des *Collatio*-Prosarhythmus“, (c) „eine intensivere rhetorisch-stilistische Untersuchung, eventuell bereits einhergehend mit einem Vergleich mit *Collatio II* [...]“. Als Vorarbeit dazu könnte eine synoptische Edition der verschiedenen *Collatio*- Fassungen dienen“, d) „der geistesgeschichtliche Hintergrund und die (inter-)religiösen Interdependenzen der *Collatio*“.

Es ist ein zweifelloses Verdienst von St., dass er seine Ausgabe auf fast alle Manuskripte stützte und so einen verlässlichen Text konstituierte, der als eine Grundlage für weitere Studien über die *Collatio* fungieren wird. Wertvoll ist auch der Kommentar zur Ausgabe, obwohl man manche Probleme mehr eingehend hätte darstellen können, mit umfassender Angabe von Fachliteratur. Ich glaube, dass Forscher des Alexanderromans, die von *Graeco-Indica*, und die der spätlateinischen Literatur und des Frühchristentums nach dem Buch von St. greifen sollten.

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Mario VARVARO, *Le istituzioni di Gaio e il Glücksstern di Niebuhr*, Torino: Giappichelli, 2012 (Annali del Dipartimento di Storia del Diritto, Università degli Studi di Palermo, Monografie 11), 204 S., ISBN 978-88-3482859-5, € 22.00.

Das Buch VARVAROS gehört nicht der Altertumswissenschaft, sondern ihrer Geschichte an. In deren Rahmen gilt das erste Viertel des 19. Jahrhunderts als Blütezeit der Palimpsestforschung. Einer ihrer Protagonisten war der italienische Kardinal und Philologe Angelo MAI (1782–1854), der 1812 das Werk von Johannes Lydus „Über die Ämter des römischen Staates“ (*De magistratibus populi Romani*) entdeckte. MAI, der seit 1813 in der Mailänder Biblioteca Ambrosiana tätig war, hob dort weitere literarische Schätze. 1815 fand er die Briefe Frontos und 1820, nachdem er Präfekt der Römischen Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana geworden war, entdeckte er unter anderem die juristisch überaus wichtigen *Fragmenta quae dicuntur Vaticana* (S. 100–103)¹.

Noch vor seiner Italien-Reise kritisierte der deutsche Althistoriker Barthold Georg NIEBUHR (1776–1831) jedoch sehr scharf die von MAI nachlässig besorgte *editio princeps* Frontos (S. 37–38). Auf seinem Weg nach Rom als Gesandter Preußens beim Heiligen Stuhl fand NIEBUHR seinerseits im September 1816 in der Stiftsbibliothek zu Verona einige Manuskripte juristischen Inhalts: Das *folium singulare de praescriptionibus et interdictis* und die beiden Folia des *fragmentum de iure fisci* sowie ein längeres Palimpsest, dessen *scriptura inferior* ebenfalls juristischen Inhalts war. Zuerst glaubte NIEBUHR irrtümlich, sie enthalte einen Text Ulpian (S. 26, 120). Als er jedoch eine Probeabschrift an Friedrich Carl von SAVIGNY (1779–1861) schickte, mit dem er als Professor in Berlin befreundet war, erkannte dieser sofort, dass es sich um die „Institutionen“ des Gaius handeln musste.

Die Bedeutung von NIEBUHRS Entdeckung beruht darauf, dass die um 160 n. Chr. entstandenen „Institutionen“ eine der wenigen Rechtsquellen sind, die außerhalb von Justinians Kompilation überliefert wurden und von den byzantinischen Kompilatoren nicht durch Interpolationen verunstaltet worden sind². Zwar weisen auch andere Rechtsquellen diesen Vorzug auf, die jedoch entweder Florilegien, wie die erwähnten *Fragmenta Vaticana*, oder aber bloße Bruchstücke sind. Demgegenüber enthält der auf das 5. Jh. zurückgehende *Codex Veronensis*, der übrigens das *einzig* Manuskript der „Institutionen“ darstellt, die *einzig* fast vollständig, d.h. zu etwa neun Zehnteln überlieferte Schrift eines römischen Juristen. Zudem bietet sie die *einzig* erhaltene römische Gesamtdarstellung des Privatrechts. Dennoch war der Veronesischen Entdeckung NIEBUHRS zunächst kein rauschender Erfolg beschieden. Ende Dezember 1816 wurde der Gelehrte in Preußen durch eine unbedeutende Zeitschrift „Ernst und Scherz oder der alte Freimuthige“ halb seriös beschuldigt, die vier Blätter, die er SAVIGNY zugeschickt hatte, aus der Bibliothek des Veroneser Domkapitels entwendet zu haben. Obgleich bereits Anfang Januar 1817 auf Anweisung des preußischen Innenministers die Anschuldigung widerrufen wurde, sah sich NIEBUHR gezwungen, mit einer Injurienklage gegen den Verfasser dieser Notiz, einen gewissen Garlieb Helwig MERKEL (1769–1850), vorzugehen (S. 28–36). Aus sicherer Entfernung in Riga konnte MERKEL jedoch im Nachhinein spotten:

Giebt es eine Wissenschaft, in welcher das literarische Lumpensammeln, besonders in historischer Rücksicht, läppisch ist, so ist es die Jurisprudenz. In dieser kommt es ja nur auf richtige philosophische Begriffe vom Recht und auf die dem Lande,

¹ Dazu auch U. MANTHE in seiner Rezension vom Buch VARVAROS, *Iuris Antiqui Historia V* 2013, S. 199.

² Zur östlichen Überlieferung der „Institutionen“ U. MANTHE, *Das Fortleben des Gaius im oströmischen Reich*, *Orbis Iuris Romani XII* 2008, S. 23–43.

in welchem sie gelten sollen, angemessene Eigentümlichkeit der Gesetze an: Welche Wichtigkeit kann es aber haben, noch nicht gekannte Abschriften von bekannten Gesetzen zu finden, die vor anderthalb tausend Jahren in einem fremden Lande galten?³

MERKELS Ausführung nimmt den Stil der um dreißig Jahre späteren Skandalbroschüre eines Julius von KIRCHMANN (1802–1884) „Die Werthlosigkeit der Jurisprudenz als Wissenschaft“ vorweg.

Andererseits wurde NIEBUHR in Italien nur wenig später, nämlich im Jahre 1820, anonym beschuldigt, den Veroneser Fund als seine eigene Entdeckung ausgegeben zu haben, obwohl er doch den vom italienischen Dichter und Gelehrten Scipione MAFFEI (1675–1755) mehrfach veröffentlichten Bericht über die Bibliothek des Veroneser Domkapitels hätte kennen müssen. Darin habe MAFFEI bereits ein gutes Jahrhundert zuvor mitgeteilt, dass sich in jener Bibliothek außer den beiden kürzeren Fragmenten auch ein längeres Palimpsest befunden habe (S. 37–57, 66–68, 82 f.). Als treibende Kraft hinter diesen anonymen Anschuldigungen gegen NIEBUHR stand höchstwahrscheinlich der durch die scharfe Kritik seiner Editionsarbeiten gekränkte Kardinal Angelo MAI.

Die meisten dieser Peripetien des Gaius-Fundes und seiner unmittelbaren Nachgeschichte waren schon früher bekannt, und zwar teilweise durch Arbeiten desselben Verfassers, der sich um die Aufklärung der Beziehungen zwischen den Gelehrten der frühen historischen Schule der Rechtswissenschaft verdient gemacht hat. Das hier besprochene Buch, das eine Edition bisher unbekannter Briefe ihrer Mitglieder enthält, geht weiter in diese Richtung⁴. Die im historischen Kontext der Palimpsestforschung geschriebenen Briefe werden vom Verfasser, einige von ihnen zum ersten Mal, nach allen Regeln der editorischen Kunst publiziert, wobei sie als Anhang (*Appendice*) des Buches fast dessen Hälfte einnehmen (S. 113–196).

Inhaltlich ist die Frage nach Zufall oder Notwendigkeit des NIEBURSchen Fundes der rote Faden der Untersuchung (S. 58–86)⁵. Der Verfasser polemisiert in dieser Hinsicht mit einem anderen italienischen Rechtshistoriker, Gaiuskenner sowie Gründer und Leiter des *laboratorio gaiano*, Filippo BRIGUGLIO (S. 58), dem zufolge NIEBUHRS Entdeckung kaum zufällig war⁶. In einem Brief an Dore HENSLER (1770–1860) beteuerte ja NIEBUHR selbst, „dass ich die Entdeckung nicht zufällig, sondern forschend gemacht habe“ (S. 79). Im Übrigen hat man eine ähnliche Frage nach Zufall oder Notwendigkeit bereits in Bezug auf die sogenannte (Wieder)Entdeckung der justinianischen Digesten im 11. Jahrhundert gestellt⁷, ohne dass sich daraus für die Forschung etwas Konkretes ergeben hätte.

Der Verfasser beweist jedoch überzeugend, dass weder MAFFEI, noch ein Anderer vor NIEBUHR den juristischen Inhalt des Verona-Palimpsestes Nr. XIII je erwähnt hat (S. 71–75). Konsequentermaßen konnten weder der Heidelberger Professor für römisches Recht, Christian HAUBOLD (1766–1824), noch der juristische *enfant prodige* jener Zeit, Carl WITTE (1800–1883), die noch vor NIEBUHRS Reise über die Schätze der Veronesischen Bibliothek spekulierten, Kenntnis vom *Codex XIII* haben. In den ihnen zugänglichen Verzeichnissen wurde nur das *folium singulare de praescriptionibus* und

³ G.H. MERKEL, *Über Deutschland, wie ich es nach einer zehnjährigen Entfernung wieder fand*, Riga 1818, S. 127 f.

⁴ M. VARVARO, *Una lettera inedita di Bluhme*, *Iuris Antiqui Historia* I 2009, S. 237–257; DERS., *Fünf unveröffentlichte Briefe Savignys*, *ZRG CXXVIII* 2011, S. 464–487; DERS., *Zwei wiederentdeckte Briefe Niebuhrs*, *Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis LXXX* 2012, S. 171–209.

⁵ Unzugänglich war mir S. MEDER, *Die Entdeckung der Institutionen des Gaius: Zufall oder Notwendigkeit?*, *Annaeus. Anales de la Tradición Romanística X* 2013, S. 55–67.

⁶ F. BRIGUGLIO, *Barthold Georg Niebuhr und die Entdeckung der Gaius-Institutionen*, *ZRG CXXVIII* 2011, S. 263–297.

⁷ T. GIARO, *Zufall in Pisa, Quart als Quintessenz und Einheit durch Kanones*, *Rechtshistorisches Journal XV* 1996, S. 446.

die beiden Folia des *fragmentum de iure fisci* erwähnt (S. 73). Das Glück spielte also bei NIEBUHRs Entdeckung mit, doch konnte sie nur durch einen vorbereiteten Forscher gemacht werden und war deshalb nicht zufällig⁸, was der Verfasser mit der feinen Distinktion zwischen *ritrovamento fortunato* und *riscoverta casuale* deutlich macht (S. 78).

Ein gesondertes Kapitel ist der Feindseligkeit der Italiener gegenüber NIEBUHR gewidmet (S. 37–57). Zusammen mit einem der wenigen Gerechten jener Zeit, dem Orientalisten Amedeo PEYRON (1785–1870), macht der Verfasser den Eindruck, sich deshalb für seine Vorfahren zu schämen (S. 112). In der Tat muss das Thema bei jedem, dem die europäische *res publica litterarum* ein Begriff ist, etwas Befremden hervorrufen. Freilich fand NIEBUHR in Kardinal Angelo MAI einen besonders mächtigen Gegner, den man nicht straflos angreifen konnte. Trotzdem erscheint es als merkwürdig, wie schnell diese persönliche Feindschaft in einen Krieg der Nationen ausartete. Allerdings darf man nicht verschweigen, dass die Feindseligkeit der Italiener gegenüber NIEBUHR auf herzlicher Gegenseitigkeit beruhte.

„Die Italiener haben kein anderes Gefühl als Eitelkeit“, berichtet NIEBUHR 1820 stark verallgemeinernd an Dore HENSLER im Kontext der Intrigen MAIS (S. 40). In einem 1816 vor seiner Italien-Reise geschriebenen Brief an Goethe möchte NIEBUHR bei der Palimpsestforschung den erhofften Fund „würdiger benutzen als der Italiener, welcher in den ciceronischen Reden wie im Fronto die Blätter in ganz unrichtiger Folge geordnet hat“ (S. 80). Eigentumsrechtlich auffällig ist schließlich der 1815 von NIEBUHR erdachte Plan, aus der in Paris befindlichen napoleonischen Kriegsbeute alte Handschriften auszusondern, um sie nicht zurück nach Italien, sondern direkt nach Berlin als „Mittelpunkt philologischer Gelehrsamkeit“ zu schaffen: „Gern würde ich einen solchen Auftrag ausführen“ (S. 105).

NIEBUHRs Benehmen mutet weniger skandalös an, wenn man bedenkt, dass die Altertumswissenschaften noch in der Zwischenkriegszeit im internationalen Wettbewerb betrieben wurden. „Es droht uns die Gefahr – warnte 1922 Otto LENEL (1849–1935) – auf dem Gebiet der Romanistik die führende Stellung, die wir einst im unbestrittenen Alleinbesitz hatten und heute mit den Italienern teilen, gänzlich zu verlieren“⁹. In einem einzigen Absatz der 1925 gedruckten Rektoratsrede Leopold WENGERS (1874–1953) wird die „Weltgeltung“ der deutschen Romanistik gut viermal erwähnt¹⁰. Im Nachruf auf Josef PARTSCH (1882–1925) lobt ihn LENEL, da er in der Pariser Reparationskommission beim Auftritt gegen französische Anwälte, „ihre Sprache handhabte wie sie selbst, schlagfertig darin zu replizieren wusste, als Jurist aber ihnen weit überlegen war“¹¹.

In Bezug auf die Gaius-Forschung hat sich die Prophezeiung LENELs inzwischen erfüllt. Als Pionierarbeit gilt auf diesem Gebiet das Buch der Neapolitanerin Cristina VANO, *Il nostro autentico Gaio. Strategie della scuola storica alle origini della romanistica moderna*, Napoli 2000, das mittlerweile sogar in einer 2008 in Frankfurt am Main veröffentlichten deutschen Fassung vorliegt: „Der Gaius der Historischen Rechtsschule. Eine Geschichte der Wissenschaft vom römischen Recht“. Daraufhin wurde der romanistische Markt von Arbeiten italienischer Gelehrter zum Fund NIEBUHRs und seinen Folgen geradezu überschwemmt. Das bald fällige 200-jährige Jubiläum der (Wieder)Entdeckung des *Gaius Veronensis* wird mit VARVARO und seinem Kontrahenten BRIGUGLIO als Protagonisten begangen werden.

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⁸ Ähnlich bereits M. AVENARIUS, *L'„autentico“ Gaio e la scoperta del Codice Veronese*, in: F. LAMBERTI (Hg.), *Quaderni Lupiensi di Storia e Diritto*, Lecce 2009, S. 15–18.

⁹ O. LENEL, *Selbstdarstellung*, nun in: *Gesammelte Schriften*, Bd. V, Napoli 1994, S. 332; dazu T. GIARO, *Aktualisierung Europas*, Genova 2000, S. 15.

¹⁰ L. WENGER, *Von der Staatskunst der Römer*, München 1925, S. 4 f.

¹¹ O. LENEL, *Nachruf auf Josef Partsch*, nun in: *Gesammelte Schriften* (Anm. 9), S. 369.

PROTOKÓŁ CV WALNEGO ZGROMADZENIA
POLSKIEGO TOWARZYSTWA FILOLOGICZNEGO
(26–27 WRZEŚNIA 2013)

1. SESJA ADMINISTRACYJNA 26 WRZEŚNIA 2013

Sesja administracyjna odbyła się według następującego programu:

1. Sprawy bieżące.
2. Przygotowanie sesji sprawozdawczo-wyborczej Walnego Zgromadzenia PTF.
3. Przyznanie nagrody dla najlepszego nauczyciela języka łacińskiego ufundowanej przez fundację *Traditio Europae*.
4. Wnioski Kół Terenowych o nadanie tytułów Członków Honorowych PTF.
5. Wolne wnioski.

Obrazy otworzył i przewodniczył im prezes Zarządu Głównego PTF prof. Andrzej Budzisz. Na protokolanta obrad wyznaczył dr Agatę Łukę. Prezes przedstawił zebrany opracowane przez Zarząd zmiany w statucie PTF do zatwierdzenia przez Walne Zgromadzenie. Propozycje przyjęto jednogłośnie. Przedyskutowano propozycję wyznaczenia wysokości składki członkowskiej na 25 zł oraz przygotowania uchwały w tej sprawie. Propozycja została przyjęta jednogłośnie. Prezes odczytał sprawozdanie z działalności Zarządu Głównego PTF za ostatnie cztery lata. Sprawozdanie kierownika Olimpiady Języka Łacińskiego przedstawił przewodniczący Komitetu Głównego Olimpiady Języka Łacińskiego prof. Marian Szarmach, dziękując jednocześnie Zarządowi Głównemu PTF za wspólne lata pracy w Komitecie Głównym Olimpiady Języka Łacińskiego i proponując na swoją następczynię prof. Agnieszkę Dziubę. Przewodnicząca Komisji Rewizyjnej dr Aleksandra Klęczar odczytała sprawozdanie Komisji i zarekomendowała zgromadzeniu udzielenie absolutorium Zarządowi Głównemu. Redaktor „Eos” prof. Jakub Pigoń zaprezentował sprawozdanie wraz z dwoma zeszytami „Eos” za rok 2011, dwoma za rok 2012 oraz jednym za 2013. Zeszyt ten jest pierwszym zeszytem setnego numeru „Eos” i został opublikowany z datą bieżącą, bez opóźnienia wydawniczego. Drugi zeszyt jest również gotowy, redakcja oczekuje jedynie na sprawozdania Kół Terenowych oraz na sprawozdanie prezesa ZG PTF z działalności w ostatnich dwóch latach; do zeszytu tego zostanie również włączony protokół CV Walnego Zgromadzenia PTF 26–27 września

2013 w Gdańsku. Prof. Pigoń poinformował o możliwości wprowadzenia „Eos” do bazy internetowej CEEOL (Central and Eastern European Online Library). „Eos” jest najlepiej funkcjonującym czasopismem polskim za granicą, dociera do 140 bibliotek na świecie, ale warto też wprowadzić je do baz internetowych. Propozycję przyjęto jednogłośnie. Pan profesor przypomniał członkom ZG o możliwości płacenia składki członkowskiej wraz z dodatkowymi 20 zł na prenumeratę „Eos”.

W wyniku głosowania przyznano nagrodę dla najlepszego nauczyciela języka łacińskiego w Polsce ufundowaną przez fundację *Traditio Europae*. Koło Gdańskie zgłosiło do nagrody mgr Ewę Lenz, Koło Krakowskie mgr Marię Prucnal, Koło Lubelskie mgr Alinę Dejnekę, Koło Łódzkie mgr Małgorzatę Lisowską, Koło Poznańskie mgr Karolinę Szybkę-Kmieciak, Koło Toruńskie mgr Elżbietę Skórcz. W głosowaniu wzięło udział 17 osób, wszystkie głosy były ważne, jedna osoba wstrzymała się od głosu. Poszczególne kandydatki do nagrody otrzymały następującą liczbę głosów: mgr Ewa Lenz 1 głos, mgr Alina Dejneka i mgr Małgorzata Lisowska po 2 głosy, mgr Maria Prucnal 5 głosów, mgr Karolina Szybka-Kmieciak 6 głosów. Nagrodę dla najlepszego nauczyciela języka łacińskiego przyznano więc mgr Karolinie Szybce-Kmieciak, nauczającej łaciny w I Liceum Ogólnokształcącym w Ostrzeszowie.

Kolejnym punktem programu posiedzenia było zgłoszenie wniosków Kół Terenowych o nadanie tytułów Członków Honorowych PTF. Koło Poznańskie przygotowało wniosek o nadanie tytułu prof. Sylwestrowi Dworackiemu, Koło Toruńskie wnioskowało o członkostwo honorowe dla prof. Mariana Szarmacha. Mgr Teresa Macjon przypomniała o tradycji zapraszania Członków Honorowych na walne zgromadzenie ZG PTF.

Prof. Budzisz jako prezes ZG PTF poinformował zgromadzenie o swej rezygnacji z kandydowania na kolejną kadencję i zaproponował na stanowisko Prezesa prof. Przemysława Nehringa, prof. Jakuba Pigionia oraz prof. Huberta Wolanina, prosząc zebranych o zastanowienie się nad wyborem któregoś z kandydatów, po czym zamknął obrady.

2. SESJA SPRAWOZDAWCZO-WYBORCZA 27 WRZEŚNIA 2013

Spotkanie odbyło się według następującego programu:

1. Otwarcie sesji przez prezesa Zarządu Głównego PTF.
2. Uczenie pamięci zmarłych członków PTF.
3. Wybór protokolanta obrad.
4. Wybór komisji skrutacyjnej.
5. Sprawozdanie z działalności Zarządu Głównego PTF.
6. Dyskusja i głosowanie w sprawie uchwały o przyjęciu sprawozdania ZG PTF.
7. Sprawozdania z działalności Kół Terenowych PTF.
8. Sprawozdanie redaktora „Eos”.

9. Sprawozdanie z działalności Fundacji *Traditio Europae*.
10. Wnioski o nadanie tytułu członka honorowego; głosowanie nad wnioskami.
11. Sprawozdanie finansowe Zarządu Głównego PTF.
12. Sprawozdanie Komisji Rewizyjnej; wniosek w sprawie absolutorium dla ZG PTF.
13. Dyskusja i głosowanie nad uchwałą w sprawie absolutorium dla ZG PTF (głosowanie bez udziału członków ZG PTF).
14. Wybór przewodniczącego obrad i Komisji-Matki dla przeprowadzenia wyborów władz PTF.
15. Zgłaszanie kandydatur do funkcji prezesa Zarządu Głównego PTF.
16. Głosowanie nad wyborem prezesa Zarządu Głównego PTF.
17. Ogłoszenie wyników głosowania nad wyborem prezesa ZG PTF.
18. Zgłaszanie kandydatur do pozostałych funkcji w Zarządzie Głównym PTF:
 - trzech wiceprezesa;
 - skarbnik i sekretarz zamieszkali w miejscu siedziby Zarządu Głównego;
 - przewodniczący Komitetu Olimpiady Języka Łacińskiego;
 - przewodniczący Komisji Nagród;
 - od sześciu do dziewięciu członków ZG PTF.
19. Głosowanie nad kandydaturami do funkcji w ZG PTF.
20. Ogłoszenie wyników głosowania nad kandydaturami do funkcji w ZG PTF.
21. Głosowanie nad przyjęciem uchwały w sprawie wyboru ZG PTF.
22. Zgłaszanie kandydatur do Komisji Rewizyjnej PTF.
23. Głosowanie nad kandydaturami do Komisji Rewizyjnej PTF.
24. Ogłoszenie wyników głosowania nad kandydaturami do Komisji Rewizyjnej PTF.
25. Głosowanie nad przyjęciem uchwały w sprawie wyboru Komisji Rewizyjnej PTF.
26. Zgłaszanie kandydatur do Sądu Koleżeńskiego.
27. Głosowanie nad kandydaturami do Sądu Koleżeńskiego.
28. Ogłoszenie wyników i przyjęcie uchwały w sprawie wyboru Sądu Koleżeńskiego.
29. Wystąpienie nowo wybranego prezesa ZG PTF; przejęcie przewodnictwa obradom.
30. Głosowanie nad przyjęciem uchwały w sprawie zmian w statucie PTF.
31. Głosowanie nad przyjęciem uchwały w sprawie wysokości rocznej składki członków PTF.
32. Interpelacje i wolne wnioski.
33. Zamknięcie obrad przez prezesa ZG PTF.

Posiedzenie otworzył prezes PTF prof. Andrzej Budzisz, dziękując za współpracę Zarządowi Głównemu i Kołom Terenowym PTF, a jednocześnie oznajmiając, że ustępuje ze stanowiska. Prezes odczytał nazwiska zmarłych członków PTF.

W ostatnich dwóch latach odeszli od nas: z Koła Krakowskiego mgr Danuta Zazulowa (Członek Honorowy PTF) i dr Edmund Polaszek, z Koła Lubelskiego ks. prof. Henryk Wójtowicz (Członek Honorowy PTF), z Koła Łódzkiego prof. Jerzy Starnawski i dr Monika Szafrńska-Sienkiewicz, z Koła Poznańskiego prof. Kazimierz Liman i mgr Maria Wikarjakowa, z Koła Wrocławskiego prof. Ludwika Rychlewska (Członek Honorowy PTF), dr Władysława Jamróż, prof. Hanna Wałkowska, prof. Janina Ławińska-Tyszkowska (Członek Honorowy PTF) oraz mgr Ewa Greber. Zgromadzenie uczciło pamięć Zmarłych chwilą ciszy. Następnie Prezes wyznaczył dr Agatę Łukę na protokolanta obrad i zaproponował powołanie komisji skrutacyjnej, która wyłoniła się w składzie: dr Rafał Toczko (przewodniczący), dr Małgorzata Cieśluk i dr hab. Bartosz Awianowicz (członkowie). Prezes odczytał sprawozdanie z działalności Zarządu Głównego PTF za ostatnie cztery lata. Ponieważ sprawozdanie za okres 19 września 2009–13 września 2011 zostało przedstawione podczas CIV Walnego Zgromadzenia PTF we Wrocławiu i opublikowane w „Eos” (XCVIII 2011, fasc. 2), prezes zwrócił uwagę głównie na działalność ZG w okresie 14 września 2011–25 września 2013. Zgromadzenie głosowało w sprawie uchwały o przyjęciu sprawozdania ZG PTF. Komisja skrutacyjna stwierdziła, że z 40 osób uprawnionych do głosowania 39 głosowało za przyjęciem sprawozdania, nikt nie głosował przeciw, 1 osoba wstrzymała się od głosu. Kolejnym punktem przewidzianym w programie posiedzenia było odczytanie sprawozdań z działalności Kół Terenowych PTF, jednak na życzenie zgromadzenia przekazano owe sprawozdania do protokołu (dostarczono sprawozdania Kół: Krakowskiego, Lubelskiego, Łódzkiego, Poznańskiego, Warszawskiego, Wrocławskiego). Prof. Marian Szarmach przedstawił, po czym przekazał do protokołu sprawozdanie przewodniczącego Komitetu Głównego Olimpiady Języka Łacińskiego, podobnie uczynił ze sprawozdaniem redaktora „Eos” prof. Jakub Pigoń. Sprawozdanie z działalności Fundacji *Traditio Europae* przedstawił i do protokołu przekazał dr Rafał Toczko. Następnie dr Teodozja Wikarjak w imieniu Poznańskiego Koła PTF, a prof. Przemysław Nehring w imieniu Koła Toruńskiego odczytali wnioski o nadanie tytułu Członka Honorowego PTF odpowiednio prof. Sylwestrowi Dworackiemu i prof. Marianowi Szarmachowi. Zgromadzenie nie wyraziło życzenia, by głosowanie odbyło się w sposób tajny, głosowano więc jawnie. Uchwałę o przyznaniu tytułu Członka Honorowego prof. Dworackiemu przyjęto jednogłośnie, w głosowaniu dotyczącym prof. Szarmacha 39 osób głosowało za, 1 osoba wstrzymała się od głosu. Skarbnik ZG PTF dr Iwona Wieźel przedstawiła i przekazała do protokołu sprawozdanie finansowe Zarządu Głównego PTF, wyjaśniając, że PTF nie jest zadłużone, a zaistniały deficyt finansowy jest deficytem księgowym, a nie faktycznym. Wyjaśnienie to, udzielone dnia poprzedniego Komisji Rewizyjnej, nie zadowoliło dwóch z czterech jej członków, w związku z czym Przewodnicząca Komisji Rewizyjnej dr Aleksandra Klęczar, odczytawszy sprawozdanie Komisji Rewizyjnej poinformowała zebranych, że Komisja rekomenduje zgromadzeniu postawienie wniosku o nieudzielenie Zarządowi

Głównemu absolutorium z powodu zaistniałego deficytu finansowego. Prezes PTF przypomniał, że rok finansowy 2013 trwa, więc Zarząd Główny nie dysponuje ostatecznymi danymi dotyczącymi stanu finansów PTF, natomiast do istniejących szczegółowych informacji księgowych członkowie Komisji Rewizyjnej mieli dostęp, jednak nie prześledzili ich ani odpowiednio wcześniej nie zapytali o te kwestie, co do których mieli wątpliwości. Rozmowa z Komisją Rewizyjną nie była możliwa, ponieważ żaden z członków nie był na zgromadzeniu obecny. Odbędzie się dyskusja nad stanem finansowym PTF, po czym zgromadzenie przystąpiło do głosowania nad uchwałą w sprawie absolutorium. Prof. Przemysław Nehring zaproponował, by głosować tajnie. Ażeby uniknąć nieporozumień, komisja skrutacyjna uściśliła, że wpisanie na kartach do głosowania słowa „za” lub „tak” oznacza głos za udzieleniem absolutorium Zarządowi Głównemu, przeciw udzieleniu absolutorium należy głosować wpisując słowo „przeciw” lub „nie”. W wyniku głosowania udzielono Zarządowi Głównemu absolutorium przeważającą liczbą głosów. W głosowaniu brały udział 24 osoby uprawnione, z których 13 głosowało za udzieleniem absolutorium, 5 przeciw, 6 wstrzymało się od głosu. Kolejną część posiedzenia przewidywała wybór przewodniczącego obrad oraz Komisji-Matki dla przeprowadzenia wyborów władz PTF. Prof. Andrzej Budzisz poprosił o przewodniczenie obradom prof. Mariana Szarmacha, który z kolei zaproponował dobrowolne wyłonienie się Komisji-Matki. Komisja-Matka wyłoniła się w składzie: dr Aneta Kliszcz, dr Michał Bzinkowski i dr Rafał Rosół. Przystąpiono do zgłaszania kandydatur na Prezesa Zarządu Głównego PTF. Wśród zgłoszonych osób znaleźli się prof. Agnieszka Dziuba (Lublin), prof. Joanna Usakiewicz (Białystok), prof. Gościwit Malinowski (Wrocław), prof. Przemysław Nehring (Toruń), prof. Jakub Pigoń (Wrocław), prof. Hubert Wolanin (Kraków). Wszyscy zgłoszeni z wyjątkiem prof. Gościwita Malinowskiego odmówili kandydowania. W głosowaniu na Prezesa Zarządu Głównego PTF brało udział 40 spośród 41 uprawnionych do głosowania; oddano dwa głosy nieważne, 31 osób głosowało za, 5 przeciw, 2 osoby wstrzymały się od głosu. Następnie zgłaszano kandydatury do pozostałych funkcji w Zarządzie Głównym PTF i głosowano nad nimi. Wiceprezesami zostali: prof. Tadeusz Aleksandrowicz (36 głosów za, 4 przeciw, 1 wstrzymujący się), prof. Przemysław Nehring (38 za, 3 wstrzymujące się), prof. Hubert Wolanin (36 za, 4 przeciw, 1 wstrzymujący się). Funkcję skarbnika objął dr Sławomir Torbus (37 głosów za, 1 przeciw, 2 wstrzymujące się), a funkcję sekretarza dr Katarzyna Ochman (38 za, 1 przeciw, 1 wstrzymujący się). Na Przewodniczego Komitetu Olimpiady Języka Łacińskiego wybrano jednogłośnie (40 głosów za) prof. Agnieszkę Dziubę, natomiast funkcja Przewodniczącego Komisji Nagród pozostała przy prof. Marianie Szarmachu (głosowało 39 osób; 37 głosów za, 1 wstrzymujący się, 1 nieważny). Następnie zgromadzenie poddało pod głosowanie kandydatury na członków ZG PTF, którymi zostali: dr Idaliana Kaczor (38 głosów za, 2 przeciw, 1 wstrzymujący się), prof. Joanna Usakiewicz (40 za, 1 przeciw), dr Małgorzata Wróbel (36 za, 3 przeciw, 2 wstrzymujące się), prof. Krzysztof

Głombiowski (39 za, 1 przeciw, 1 wstrzymujący się), prof. Krzysztof Narecki (40 za, 1 wstrzymujący się), dr Rafał Rosół (41 za), dr Rafał Toczko (40 za, 1 wstrzymujący się). Zgromadzenie zgłosiło również kandydaturę dr Aleksandry Kłęczar, która jednak nie zgodziła się kandydować. Dr Toczko jako przewodniczący komisji skrutacyjnej został wyłączony z liczenia głosów, zastąpiła go dr Kłęczar. Zgromadzenie jednogłośnie przyjęło uchwałę w sprawie wyboru Zarządu Głównego PTF, po czym zgłaszano kandydatury do Komisji Rewizyjnej PTF. W wyniku głosowania w jej skład weszli: dr Aneta Kliszcz (35 głosów za, 2 przeciw, 2 wstrzymujące się, 1 nieważny), dr Iwona Wieżel (34 za, 5 przeciw, 1 wstrzymujący się), dr Teodozja Wikarjak (39 za, 1 przeciw), dr hab. Bartosz Awianowicz (36 za, 1 przeciw, 3 wstrzymujące się), mgr Janusz Ryba (38 za, 1 przeciw, 1 wstrzymujący się). Komisja Rewizyjna odbyła posiedzenie i ukonstytuowała się w składzie: przewodniczący – dr hab. Bartosz Awianowicz, członkowie komisji – dr Aneta Kliszcz, dr Iwona Wieżel, dr Teodozja Wikarjak, mgr Janusz Ryba. Uchwałę w sprawie wyboru Komisji Rewizyjnej PTF zgromadzenie przyjęło jednogłośnie i przystąpiło do zgłaszania kandydatur na przewodniczącego i członków Sądu Koleżeńskiego. W wyniku głosowania powierzono funkcję przewodniczącego prof. Jerzemu Danielewiczowi (40 głosów za), członkami zaś zostali prof. Krystyna Bartol (40 głosów za), prof. Joanna Rostropowicz (40 głosów za), dr Michał Bzinkowski (40 głosów za) oraz prof. Jakub Pigoń (38 głosów za, 1 nieważny, 1 osoba wstrzymała się od głosu). Uchwałę w sprawie wyboru Sądu Koleżeńskiego przyjęto jednogłośnie. Kolejnym punktem obrad było wystąpienie nowo wybranego prezesa ZG PTF prof. Gościwita Malinowskiego, który jednocześnie przejął przewodnictwo obradom. W głosowaniu jawnym zgromadzenie jednogłośnie przyjęło uchwałę w sprawie zmian w statucie PTF. Przyjęto również uchwałę w sprawie wysokości rocznej składki członkowskiej PTF w wysokości 25 złotych (25 głosów za, 2 przeciw, 7 osób wstrzymało się od głosu). W punkcie „Interpelacje i wolne wnioski” prezes ZG PTF zwrócił się do prezesów Kół Terenowych z zapytaniem, które z kół podejmie się zorganizowania zjazdu PTF w roku 2015. Prof. Przemysław Nehring oznajmił, że być może będzie to Koło Toruńskie, prosząc jednocześnie zgromadzenie o czas do namysłu, po czym prof. Gościwit Malinowski zamknął obrady.

Protokołowała Agata Łuka

SPRAWOZDANIE Z DZIAŁALNOŚCI ZARZĄDU GŁÓWNEGO POLSKIEGO TOWARZYSTWA FILOLOGICZNEGO W OKRESIE 14 WRZEŚNIA 2011–25 WRZEŚNIA 2013

W okresie sprawozdawczym Zarząd Główny Polskiego Towarzystwa Filologicznego działał w składzie: prezes – dr hab. Andrzej Budzisz, prof. KUL, wiceprezesa – prof. dr hab. Krystyna Bartol, prof. dr hab. Kazimierz Korus, prof. dr hab. Jerzy Styka, skarbnik – dr Iwona Wieźel, sekretarz – dr Agata Łuka, kanclerz – dr hab. Hubert Wolanin, prof. UJ, członkowie – dr Tamara Roszak, prof. dr hab. Elżbieta Wesołowska, prof. dr hab. Krzysztof Głombiowski, dr Przemysław Marciniak, dr hab. Cyprian Mielczarski, prof. UW, dr Krzysztof Morta, dr hab. Krzysztof Narecki, prof. KUL, dr Rafał Rosół, dr hab. Sławomir Wyszomirski, prof. UMK, przewodniczący Komisji Nagród i Wyróżnień – prof. dr hab. Marian Szarmach, przewodniczący Komitetu Głównego Olimpiady Języka Łacińskiego – prof. dr hab. Marian Szarmach, kierownik organizacyjny Komitetu Głównego Olimpiady Języka Łacińskiego – mgr Anna Zawalska; redaktor „Eos” – dr hab. Jakub Pigoń, prof. UW, przewodniczący Komisji Rewizyjnej – dr Aleksandra Klęczar, członkowie Komisji Rewizyjnej – dr Barbara Bibik, dr Sławomira Brud, dr Małgorzata Górską, dr Mariusz Zagórski, przewodniczący Sądu Koleżeńskiego – prof. dr hab. Jerzy Danielewicz, członkowie Sądu Koleżeńskiego – dr hab. Jadwiga Czerwińska, prof. UŁ, prof. dr hab. Wanda Popiak, dr hab. Tadeusz Aleksandrowicz, prof. UŚ, prof. dr hab. Juliusz Domański, prezesa Kół Terenowych: dr Tomasz Mojsik (Białystok), dr Agnieszka Witeczak (Gdańsk), dr Anna Kucz (Katowice), dr hab. Antoni Bobrowski, prof. UJ (Kraków), dr hab. Agnieszka Dziuba, prof. KUL, a od 28.05.2013 dr Agata Łuka (Lublin), mgr Teresa Macjon (Łódź), dr Magdalena Stuligrosz (Poznań), dr Małgorzata Cieśluk (Szczecin), dr hab. Przemysław Nehring, prof. UMK (Toruń), prof. dr hab. Adam Tadeusz Łukaszewicz (Warszawa), dr Małgorzata Wróbel, a od 19 czerwca 2013 dr Barbara Hartleb-Kropidło (Wrocław).

W okresie sprawozdawczym odbyły się cztery posiedzenia Zarządu Głównego: 14 kwietnia i 15 września 2012 oraz 20 kwietnia i 15 czerwca 2013 r. Posiedzenia miały miejsce w Warszawie.

Podczas posiedzenia 14 kwietnia 2012 Zarząd Główny przyjął sprawozdanie z olimpiady języka łacińskiego 2011/2012 sporządzone przez mgr Annę Zawalską. W olimpiadzie 2011/2012 wzięło udział ok. 10% mniej szkół niż

w roku poprzednim (2011: 138 szkół, 2012: 125 szkół) i 20% mniej uczniów, niż rok wcześniej (2011: 653 osoby, 2012: 552 osoby). Pierwsze miejsce zajął uczeń Liceum Ogólnokształcącego Marynarki Wojennej w Gdyni z wynikiem 112 punktów na 115 możliwych. Do Arpino pojechało 5 osób (w roku poprzednim 8 osób). Wzrosły koszty organizacyjne olimpiady, ale suma przyznanych pieniędzy była taka sama, jak przed rokiem. Dwukrotnie podróżował wyjazd do Arpino (z 50 do 100 euro od osoby). Prof. Przemysław Nehring przypomniał działania fundacji *Traditio Europae*, mające na celu zmianę sytuacji łaciny w liceach i wprowadzenie jej w gimnazjach. Podczas posiedzenia omówiono również planowane zmiany w statucie PTF, przedstawiając propozycje zmian nadesłane przez ośrodek poznański oraz sugestie i wątpliwości ośrodków warszawskiego, krakowskiego i lubelskiego. Została ponadto zaprezentowana aktualizowana strona internetowa (www.ptf.edu.pl). Padła propozycja stworzenia logo czy też emblematu PFT, a prof. Wesołowska poinformowała zebranych o możliwości nieodpłatnego zlecenia tego zadania zaprzyjaźnionemu grafikowi komputerowemu. Zarząd przyjął również sprawozdanie z działalności „Eos”, zaprezentowane przez prof. Jakuba Pigionia, który omówił działalność wydawnictwa i przedstawił najbliższe plany „Eos”, przypominając o projekcie wydania na płycie CD dwudziestu pięciu wybranych artykułów w przekładzie na język angielski, z okazji zbliżającej się publikacji setnego numeru czasopisma. Prof. Krystyna Bartol przedstawiła pismo z 2 kwietnia 2012, będące odpowiedzią na skierowany do ministerstwa 18 lutego 2012 wniosek o zmniejszenie minimum kadrowego, który to wniosek złożono z załącznikiem dotyczącym efektów kształcenia na kierunku filologia klasyczna i studia śródziemnomorskie (ang. Classics). W odpowiedzi tej poinformowano Panią Profesor jako Przewodniczącą Komitetu Nauk o Kulturze Antycznej, że propozycje zostały przekazane do zaopiniowania Radzie Głównej Nauki i Szkolnictwa Wyższego. Prof. Nehring natomiast poinformował zebranych, że propozycję utworzenia kierunku filologia klasyczna i studia śródziemnomorskie oraz proponowane przez PTF efekty kształcenia na tym kierunku zostały przyjęte przez Komisję Senacką UMK w Toruniu. Prezes ZG PTF prof. Andrzej Budzisz poinformował zebranych o skierowanych do MEN i KRASP pismach protestujących przeciw projektowi Konferencji Rektorów Akademickich Szkół Polskich, zagrażącemu i tak osłabionej pozycji języka łacińskiego w szkołach średnich i na studiach wyższych. Propozycja wystosowania takiego pisma padła podczas spotkania ZG PTF z Dyrektorami Instytutów, Kierownikami i Kuratorami Katedr Filologii Klasycznej dnia 19 marca 2011 w Warszawie. Pismo, przygotowane przez prezesa PTF, prof. Andrzeja Budzisz, a uzupełnione przez prof. Przemysława Nehringa, wysłano w maju 2011. Autorzy podkreślili w nim, że mała popularność łaciny wśród uczniów szkół średnich wynika przede wszystkim z tego, iż nauczanie tego przedmiotu odbywa się w bardzo nikłym procencie polskich szkół średnich, a i to w bardzo ograniczonym zakresie godzinowym,

a w związku z tak małą liczbą maturzystów zdających egzamin z tego przedmiotu znajduje się on też rzadko wśród wymogów rekrutacyjnych ustalanych przez szkoły wyższe. Przypomniano również, że Polskie Towarzystwo Filologiczne w rozmowach z przedstawicielami odpowiednich ministerstw wielokrotnie podejmowało wysiłki, aby przywrócić łacinie należną jej rolę, jaką cieszy się dotąd w większości krajów Unii Europejskiej, zwłaszcza w krajach zachodnich, podczas gdy w Polsce cały czas następuje wycofywanie łaciny ze szkół. Wskazano, że tylko zdecydowane działanie Ministerstwa może ten szkodliwy proces zatrzymać. Na przykładzie innych państw widać, iż nauczanie łaciny nie stoi w sprzeczności z nowoczesną edukacją, a argument ekonomiczny w tym wypadku jest całkowicie nie na miejscu, tym bardziej, że w dobie obowiązywania Deklaracji Bolońskiej, której sygnatariusze ogromną wagę przywiązują do mobilności studentów, także międzynarodowej, absolwenci polskich szkół średnich pragnący podjąć studia humanistyczne na europejskich uczelniach stawiani są przez nasz system edukacyjny na wyraźnie gorszej pozycji od ich kolegów wykształconych w szkolnictwie większości krajów Unii Europejskiej. Dlatego zdaniem polskich filologów klasycznych nie tylko należy utrzymać możliwość zdawania języka łacińskiego i kultury antycznej jako przedmiotu na maturze, ale wyraźnie dowartościować łacinę traktując ją jako przedmiot obligatoryjny dla wszystkich uczniów liceów ogólnokształcących wybierających profile humanistyczne. Zarząd Główny PTF zebrał również podpisy od pracowników Uniwersytetu Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu, Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego, Muzeum Narodowego w Szczecinie, Książnicy Pomorskiej, Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, Uniwersytetu Opolskiego, Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku, Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego, Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Uniwersytetu Pedagogicznego w Krakowie, Narodowego Centrum Nauki, Polskiej Akademii Umiejętności, PAN Biblioteki Gdańskiej oraz Prezydenta Miasta Gdyni. Podpisy wysłano wraz z pismami zawierającymi apel o wprowadzenie łaciny do szkół. Jednakże ani MEN, ani KRASP nie odniosły się merytorycznie do tej akcji.

26 lipca 2012 nastąpiła rejestracja sądowa Zarządu Głównego PTF. Procedura uaktualnienia danych ZG PTF okazała się żmudna i czasochłonna głównie z powodu długotrwałego oczekiwania na rozpatrzenie wniosku i kilkakrotne żądanie przez sąd kolejnych poprawek i uzupełnień. Ostateczna rejestracja nastąpiła po tym, jak sprawę wzięła w swoje ręce mec. Katarzyna Pecyna-Bądos, radca prawny KUL, która po już którymś z rzędu odrzuceniu wniosku ZG PTF przez sąd w Krakowie udała się tam osobiście i wykryła, że sąd nigdy nie przeczytał składanych Zarząd dokumentów do końca, przy czym za każdym razem wytykał inne błędy. 26 lipca 2012 Sąd Rejonowy dla Krakowa-Śródmieścia w Krakowie wpisał PTF w Krajowym Rejestrze Sądowym, a 30 listopada 2012 korekty błędu popełnionego przez sąd krakowski dokonał Sąd Rejonowy Lublin-Wschód w Lublinie (nr KRS: 0000129663).

O rejestracji ZG PTF w sądzie poinformowano Zarząd podczas spotkania 15 września 2012. Omówiono również zmiany w statucie PTF, następnie sytuację PTF w stowarzyszeniu Euroclassica oraz sprawy finansowe PTF. Dofinansowanie do „Eos” wyniosło 36 tysięcy złotych (tyle samo, ile przed rokiem). Zarząd zaproponował zwiększenie kwoty składki rocznej we wszystkich Kołach Terenowych (taki wniosek upadł podczas Walnego Zgromadzenia PTF w 2009), zachęcał również do starania się o granty, które są dla PTF ratunkiem finansowym. Dr Rafał Rosół poinformował zebranych o możliwości uzyskania pieniędzy (ok. 8 tysięcy złotych) na popularyzację nauki; o granty tego typu nie może się starać uniwersytet, ale może się starać stowarzyszenie. W przypadku PTF o taki grant występuje prezes PTF. Przedstawiono propozycję terminu i tematu Walnego Zgromadzenia ZG PTF w Gdańsku w roku 2013 („Epika antyczna i jej kontynuacje w literaturze nowołacińskiej i bizantyńskiej”). Na prośbę prof. Huberta Wolanina Zarząd podjął uchwałę dotyczącą zgłoszenia za pośrednictwem PTF powieści Jacka Hajduka „Pliniusz Młodszy” do konkursu „Nagroda Literacka Gdynia 2013”, jako książki wpisującej się w popularyzację antyku. Prawo do zgłaszania książek do tej nagrody mają wydawnictwa i instytucje kultury. Prof. Krystyna Bartol przypomniała, że wniosek skierowany w lutym 2012 r. przez Komitet Nauk o Kulturze Antycznej do Ministerstwa Edukacji Narodowej, dotyczący zmniejszenia minimum kadrowego, złożony wraz z załącznikiem dotyczącym efektów kształcenia na kierunku filologia klasyczna i studia śródziemnomorskie (ang. Classics) został przekazany do zaopiniowania Radzie Głównej Nauki i Szkolnictwa Wyższego. W lipcu 2012 Komisja Kształcenia zarekomendowała opracowane przez PTF efekty kształcenia jako wzorcowe. Nie obligują one poszczególnych ośrodków do ich wprowadzania, ale można je wykorzystywać. Natomiast w sprawie zmniejszenia minimum kadrowego Ministerstwo się nie wypowiedziało.

Podczas posiedzenia 20 kwietnia 2013 Zarząd Główny przyjął sprawozdanie z olimpiady języka łacińskiego przedstawione przez mgr Annę Zawalską. Prezes przekazał Zarządowi informację prof. Mariana Szarmacha o jego rezygnacji z funkcji przewodniczącego Komitetu Głównego Olimpiady Języka Łacińskiego wraz z nową kadencją władz PTF. Odczytano komunikat dr Iwony Wieźel dotyczący międzynarodowej wymiany studentów w ramach programu Erasmus. Prof. Przemysław Nehring i dr Barbara Bibik poinformowali o przyznaniu przez fundację *Traditio Europae* nagrody dla najlepszego nauczyciela języka łacińskiego w Polsce. Nagroda zostanie przyznana po raz drugi, jej wysokość to tysiąc złotych. Ustalono, że każde koło terenowe może zgłosić jednego kandydata, nadsyłając propozycje kandydatów wraz z opisem ich osiągnięć.

Podczas posiedzenia 15 czerwca 2013 zgromadzeni omówili zmiany wprowadzone do statutu PTF. Propozycje zmian zostały uprzednio nadesłane przez Koło Gdańskie, Katowickie, Krakowskie, Poznańskie i Toruńskie i wprowadzone przez prof. Andrzeja Budzisa wraz z jego własnymi propozycjami zmian

po konsultacji z prawnikiem, mec. Katarzyną Pecyną-Bądos. Omówiono również porządek obrad ZG PTF podczas walnego zgromadzenia PTF w Gdańsku w dniach 26–28 września 2013. Z powodu braku quorum nie odbyło się planowane głosowanie na najlepszego nauczyciela języka łacińskiego w Polsce. Kandydatów do nagrody zgłosiło sześć kół terenowych: Koło Gdańskie mgr Ewę Lenz, Koło Krakowskie mgr Marię Prucnal, Koło Lubelskie mgr Alinę Dejnekę, Koło Łódzkie mgr Małgorzatę Lisowską, Koło Poznańskie mgr Karolinę Szybkę-Kmieciak, Koło Toruńskie mgr Elżbietę Skórcz. Głosowanie zostało przełożone na czas walnego zgromadzenia w Gdańsku.

W ramach współpracy międzynarodowej Zarząd Główny PTF utrzymywał kontakt z organizacją Euroclassica, dbającą o podtrzymywanie tradycji nauczania języków klasycznych i kultury antycznej oraz ugruntowanie jej pozycji wśród innych dyscyplin humanistycznych. Zarząd współpracuje też z polską fundacją *Traditio Europae*, odnoszącą liczne sukcesy w swych różnorodnych działaniach mających na celu popularyzację wiedzy o kulturze antycznej i eksponowanie jej roli w kształtowaniu wspólnej tradycji europejskiej. PTF pozyskiwało również środki na dofinansowanie czasopisma „Eos” oraz na realizację grantów naukowych. Są to: grant mgr Ałły Brzozowskiej „Edycja spuścizny literackiej biskupa płockiego Erazma Ciołka”, grant prof. Piotra Beringa „Dofinansowanie konferencji i imprez towarzyszących: 14th Triennial Colloquium of the Société Internationale pour l’Étude du Théâtre Médiéval (SITM)” oraz grant dra Rafała Rosoła „Organizacja finału VII oraz edycji VIII Konkursu Wiedzy o Antyku, adresowanego do uczniów gimnazjów oraz liceów z terenu Wielkopolski”. Z pozyskanych przez PTF środków na dofinansowanie czasopisma „Eos” opublikowano jego tom 97 w dwóch zeszytach, tom 98 w dwóch zeszytach oraz tom 99 w dwóch zeszytach, trwa proces wydawniczy wkładki do setnego numeru „Eos” („Wkładka do jubileuszowego rocznika Eos. Przekład i publikacja 25 artykułów ogłoszonych w języku polskim od założenia czasopisma w 1894 r.”). W marcu 2013 r. PTF złożyło wniosek o przyznanie środków finansowych na publikację tomu 100 „Eos” w dwóch zeszytach.

Prezes Zarządu Głównego PTF
dr hab. Andrzej Budzisz, prof. KUL

Sekretarz Zarządu Głównego PTF
dr Agata Łuka

SPRAWOZDANIA Z DZIAŁALNOŚCI KÓŁ TERENOWYCH
POLSKIEGO TOWARZYSTWA FILOLOGICZNEGO
W OKRESIE 14 WRZEŚNIA 2011–25 WRZEŚNIA 2013

1. SPRAWOZDANIE KOŁA GDAŃSKIEGO

W roku 2012 Koło Gdańskie partycypowało w finansowaniu V Międzynarodowego Przeglądu Teatrów Studentów Filologii Klasycznej (25–26 kwietnia). Oprócz tego we współpracy z Katedrą Filologii Klasycznej UG oraz PAN Biblioteką Gdańską zorganizowano cykl dwunastu wykładów, zatytułowany *Gdańszczanie znani i nieznan*. Wśród prelegentów znaleźli się:

1. Dr Agnieszka WITCZAK, *Ioh[annes] P[etrus] Titius, Immortalis nominis viro Iohanni Hevelio* (25 I 2012).
2. Dr Zbigniew BRZOSTOWSKI, *Przeor Filip Adler i jego „Annales monasterii Olivienensis ab a[nn]o 1549 [usque ad annum] 1621”* (15 II 2012).
3. Dr Maria OTTO, *Andrzej Hunefeldt* (14 III 2012).
4. Dr Piotr KOCIUMBAS, *Retoryka muzyczna* (18 IV 2012).
5. Mgr Elżbieta STAREK, Krzysztof BEHR, *„De muris Urbis Romae”* (16 V 2012).
6. Mgr Agata LARCZYŃSKA, *Wykształceni gdańszczanie i ich sztambuchy* (17 X 2012).
7. Mgr Ewa LICHNEROWICZ, *Zainteresowanie mieszczan Gdańska Wschodem na przykładzie księgozbioru Jana Uphagena* (21 XI 2012).
8. Dr Jacek POKRZYWNICKI, *Gottlieb Wernsdorf – osiemnastowieczny uczyony gdański* (12 XII 2012).

Z kolei w roku kalendarzowym 2013 zorganizowano cykl wykładów i prelekcji dotyczących tematyki antycznej. Zgodnie z planem do czerwca 2013 roku wystąpiło pięć osób:

1. Mgr Klaudia PALMAKA, *Schola Latina – kurs języka łacińskiego i kultury antycznej dla uczniów klas piątych* (16 I 2013).
2. Mgr Anna SZYMAŃSKA-BUDZIŃSKA, *Sofiści w twórczości Apulejusza (Flor. IX, XVIII)* (20 III 2013).
3. Dr Jacek POKRZYWNICKI, *Dwie twarze Antyfonta z Ramnus* (17 IV 2013).
4. Mgr Agnieszka WAŚIK, *Gemmologia w łacińskich świadectwach literackich. Fakty i mity o kamieniach szlachetnych* (15 V 2013).

5. Dr Agnieszka WITCZAK, „*Cynthia mnie pierwsza...*”. *Miłość w starożytnym Rzymie* (19 VI 2013).

Równolegle do prelekcji i wykładów, które są prezentowane na zebraniach w obecności Członków PTF, Zarząd Koła Gdańskiego od końca roku 2012 i w 2013 organizuje popularnonaukowe wykłady w szkołach na terenie Trójmiasta. Pomysł ten realizowany jest w dwóch formułach. Pierwsza to „wykłady dla jednorodnej wiekowo grupy słuchaczy (młodzież albo dorośli)”, druga zaś – „wykłady dla grupy wiekowo zróżnicowanej (dorośli wraz z dziećmi)”. I tak np. dla młodzieży licealnej z XIX Liceum Ogólnokształcącego im. M. Mokwy w Gdańsku Wrzeszczu przygotowane zostały dwie prelekcje:

1. Mgr Aleksandra HOŁOMEJ, *Ubrania starożytnych Greków i Rzymian* (12 XII 2012).
2. Dr Jacek POKRZYWNICKI, *Architektura antyczna i jej współczesne reminiscencje* (4 IV 2013).

Tymczasem w Samorządowej Szkole Podstawowej nr 17 im. Wiceadmirala Józefa Unruga w Gdyni dla dorosłych albo też dla dzieci wraz z dorosłymi wygłoszono pięć popularnonaukowych wykładów:

1. Mgr Aleksandra HOŁOMEJ, *Moda w starożytności* (6 II 2013).
2. Dr Zbigniew BRZOSTOWSKI, *Wokół Adriatyku śladami Antyku* (25 III 2013).
3. Dr Jacek POKRZYWNICKI, *Architektura antyczna i jej reminiscencje* (5 IV 2013).
4. Dr Tatiana KRYNICKA, *Rzymianie przy stołach: 'ab ovo usque ad mala'* (16 V 2013).
5. Dr Agnieszka WITCZAK, *'Amor omnia vincit'. Miłość w Wiecznym Mieście* (4 VI 2013).

Warto przy okazji podkreślić, że Przewodnicząca Koła Gdańskiego PTF pozostaje w kontakcie z Wydziałem Edukacji Urzędu Miejskiego w Gdyni jako osoba, która opiniuje działania, mające na celu modyfikowanie programów szkolnych w taki sposób, aby uwzględniały one elementy wiedzy o kulturze grecko-rzymskiej. Koło Gdańskie PTF ufundowało również nagrody dla gdyńskich uczniów biorących udział w prowadzonym przez mgr Klaudię Palmąkę autorskim kursie języka łacińskiego i kultury antycznej „Schola Latina”.

W ramach przygotowań do CV Ogólnopolskiego Zjazdu Walnego PTF, który zaplanowano w Gdańsku na 26–28 września 2013 roku, członkowie Koła Gdańskiego PTF dokonali wyboru delegatów na Zjazd. Na mocy głosowania w dniu 11 września 2013 roku na reprezentantów Koła Gdańskiego podczas Walnego Zgromadzenia PTF wyznaczono mgr Aleksandrę Hołomej, mgr Annę Kosacz oraz dra Grzegorza Kotłowskiego.

Sekretarz Koła Gdańskiego PTF
dr Jacek Pokrzywnicki

2. SPRAWOZDANIE KOŁA KATOWICKIEGO

W okresie sprawozdawczym 2011–2013 Koło Katowickie działało pod kierunkiem Zarządu w następującym składzie¹: przewodnicząca – dr Anna Kucz, wiceprzewodniczący – dr Jan Kucharski, skarbnik – dr Katarzyna Lesiak, sekretarz – mgr Andrzej Wilanowski, członkowie Zarządu – mgr Katarzyna Warcaba, mgr Katarzyna Wójcik-Owczarek, członkowie komisji rewizyjnej – dr hab. Tomasz Sapota, dr Anna Szczepaniak, dr Patrycja Matusiak.

We wspomnianym okresie sprawozdawczym odbyło się 11 zebrań członków Koła. Na zebraniach tych wygłoszono 11 referatów oraz 1 komunikat (tematy referatów w załączeniu). Cztery referaty zostały wygłoszone przez zaproszonych gości z innych ośrodków uniwersyteckich w tym gości zagranicznych:

1. Mgr Przemysław PIWOWARCZYK, *Kształtowanie się koncepcji herezji w chrześcijaństwie II w. n.e.* (17 XI 2011).
2. Dr hab. Przemysław MARCINIAK, prof. UŚ, *Sequel w bizantyńskim stylu – wyprzedaż żywotów Teodora Prodrmosa* (12 I 2012).
3. Prof. dr hab. Dorota ZYGMUNTOWICZ (IFiS PAN), *Czy Platon chciał wygnać poetów z państwa?* (23 I 2013).
4. Dr Jakub MORAWIEC, *Alexander's Saga. Saga o Aleksandrze Wielkim* [wykład współorganizowany z Kołem Młodych Klasyków i Forum Nordystycznym SKNH UŚ] (19 II 2013).
5. Dr hab. Tomasz SAPOTA, *Samobójstwo Dydony oraz Dlaczego warto uczyć łaciny* (1 III 2012).
6. Dr Krzysztof RZEPKOWSKI (UW), *August i teatr. Rewolucja rzymska – ciąg dalszy* (29 III 2012).
7. Dr Patrycja MATUSIAK, *Hannibal w Troi. Poszukiwania na marginesie Petroniusza* (26 IV 2012).
8. Dr hab. Zbigniew KADŁUBEK, *Zostań z nami – wprowadzenie do teologii dionizyjskiej* (14 VI 2012).
9. Prof. dr hab. Marian SZARMACH (UMK), *Twórczość Filostrata* (16 X 2012).
10. Dr Adam GOLDWYN (Uppsala), *Achaean, Athenians and Americans in the Post 9/11 Era: Comparing Empires in The New York Times* (30 X 2012).
11. Dr Joanna ALEKSANDROWICZ, *Saturn Goi – przeobrażenie mitu* (21 XI 2012).

W dniach 17 kwietnia 2013 oraz 15–16 maja 2013 odbyły się dwie konferencje organizowane przez Katowickie Koło PTF wspólnie z Kołem Młodych Klasyków UŚ oraz Katedrą Filologii Klasycznej UŚ. Pierwsza z konferencji zatytułowana „Antyk na nowo odczytywany” objęła 8 referatów o tematyce odnoszącej się do zagadnienia recepcji antyku:

¹ Wszystkie stopnie naukowe członków PTF odzwierciedlają stan dzisiejszy.

1. Dr hab. Tadeusz ALEKSANDROWICZ, prof. UŚ, *Stan i perspektywy rozwoju studiów nad kulturą antyczną w Uniwersytecie Śląskim w Katowicach.*
2. Grzegorz BARTUSIK, *Starogreckość w nowogreckości? Starożytna Grecja a współczesny grecki nacjonalizm.*
3. Dr Patrycja MATUSIAK, *Od Vargi do Papużanki. Łacina w najnowszej literaturze polskiej.*
4. Mgr Monika MANSFELD, *Między tradycją a recepcją, czyli o późno-średniowiecznych komentarzach do pism Arystotelesa.*
5. Mgr Przemysław PIWOWARCZYK, *Narodziny tradycji chrześcijańskiej.*
6. Mgr Piotr POCHEL, *Motywy antyczne w poezji Jana Lechonia. Próba odczytań intertekstualnych.*
7. Dr Iwona SŁOMAK, *'Attice dicere est optime dicere' – attycyzm z perspektywy XVII-wiecznej teorii wymowy (casus Kwiatkiewicza).*
8. Łukasz TOMANEK, *Opera theologica Mariusza Wiktoryna jako przykład chrześcijańskiej recepcji neoplatonizmu w IV wieku.*

Kolejna konferencja pt. „Bios, Biograf, Biografia. Człowiek starożytny w perspektywie biograficznej na przestrzeni wieków”, pozwoliła na prezentacje odczytów 23 prelegentom reprezentującym różne ośrodki uniwersyteckie:

Wykład inauguracyjny (15 V 2013):

Prof. dr hab. Krzysztof Tomasz WITCZAK (UŁ), *Biografia, autobiografia, epitafium i autoepitafium w perspektywie genologicznej.*

Panel pt. „Obrazy z czasów przełomów” (15 V 2013):

1. Mgr Michał Norbert FASZCZA (UW), *W cieniu Cezara. Tytus Labienus, antyczna biografistyka i nowożytne nurty badawcze.*
2. Kacper KARDAS (UŚ), *CV na kamieniu? Problem statusu genologicznego Monumentu z Ankary.*
3. Mgr Kamil KOPIŃ (UJ), *Kiedy Pompejusz Wielki został rzymskim Aleksandrem?*
4. Dr Patrycja MATUSIAK (UŚ), *Kartagińczyk, Punijczyk, Fenicjanin? Rozważania wokół obrazu Hannibala.*
5. Mgr Paulina PIETRZYK (UJ), *Biografie Cezara autorstwa Swetoniusza i Plutarcha jako źródła dla analizy propagandy w 'De Bello Gallico'.*

Panel pt. „Cesarz w oczach jego współczesnych” (15 V 2013):

6. Mgr Przemysław CHUDZIK (UMK), *Rola i znaczenie anegdot w antycznej biografii politycznej na przykładzie Żywotów Cezarów Swetoniusza.*
7. Dr Adrian SZOPA (UP), *Elementy biograficzne w twórczości panegirycznej Flawiusza Merobaudesa.*
8. Mgr Anna Magdalena WOLEK (UJ), *Cesarz Klaudiusz w oczach biografów, historyków i wybitnych postaci swojej epoki.*

Panel pt. „Wybrańcy bogów” (15 V 2013):

9. Mgr Damian KALITAN (UJ), *Antybiografia Aleksandra z Abonuteichos.*
10. Adam MARCISZ (UŚ), *Konstantyn Wielki – nie taki święty jak go piszą.*

11. Mgr Joanna SZWED-KOSTECKA (UJ), *'Kocham wszystkich świętych, najbar-dziej jednak Pawła'*. *Żywot św. Pawła w pismach św. Jana Chryzostoma*.
12. Mgr Romuald ŻUREK (UŚ), *Orygenes. Dlaczego nie święty?*
Panel pt. „Starożytni na przestrzeni epok” (16 V 2013):
13. Mgr Maciej GAŹDZICKI (UJ), *August – Karol – Bolesław. Wzorzec sweto-niański a obraz władcy u Einharda i Anonima zwanego Gallem*.
14. Mgr Ewa KUREK (UŚ), *Juliusz Cezar w średniowiecznej literaturze angielskiej*.
15. Mgr Monika MANSFELD (UŚ), *Sokrates, Platon, Arystoteles. Sylwetki filo-zofów prezentowane na kartach średniowiecznych komentarzy filozoficz-nych*.
16. Aleksander MUSIAŁ (UW), *'Aut ille aut iste alexander fuisse opina-tur'*. *Postać bohatera tytułowego w 'Le Roman d'Alexandre' autorstwa Aleksandra z Paryża*.
17. Dr Iwona SŁOMAK (UŚ), *Postać Aleksandra Macedońskiego w przestrzeni jezuickiej dydaktyki – rekonesans*.
18. Łukasz TOMANEK (UŚ), *'Neque solum ad id pietatis officium Plato noster ceteros adhortatur'*. *Wokół postaci Platona w twórczości Marsilia Ficina*.
Panel pt. „Starożytni Grecy i biografie” (16 V 2013):
19. Mgr Bartłomiej BEDNAREK (UJ), *Kobiety Eurypidesa, Eurypides Arysto-fanesa*.
20. Mgr Jakub KUCIAK (UJ), *Biografia Pittakosa z Mityleny autorstwa Dioge-nesa Laertiosa. Zbiór legend i zmyślonych opowieści czy wartościowe źród-ło historyczne?*
21. Mgr Marcin KURPIOS (UWr), *Znaczenie elementu biograficznego u Tukidydesa na przykładzie ekskursu o Kilonie, Pauzanaszu i Temi-stoklesie (I 126, 2–138)*.
22. Paweł SKOWROŃSKI (UŚ), *Cyrus II Wielki w perspektywie Cyropedii Kse-nofonta*.

Katowickie Koło liczy obecnie 30 członków z terenu całego województwa śląskiego. Są wśród nich filologowie klasyczni, historycy, kulturoznawcy, nauczyciele akademicy pracujący w Uniwersytecie Śląskim i Śląskim Uniwersytecie Medycznym, nauczyciele licealni oraz sympatycy. Członkowie PTF zaangażowani byli w działania propagujące kulturę antyczną takie jak wykłady popularnonaukowe w szkołach średnich, konkursy antyczne, mitologiczne. W ramach starań o zwiększenie zainteresowania nauczaniem języka łacińskiego członkowie Katowickiego Koła brali również udział w akcji „Polska w Europie – Łacina w Szkole”, której pomysłodawcą jest fundacja *Traditio Europae*.

*Przewodnicząca Koła Katowickiego PTF
dr Anna Kucz*

3. SPRAWOZDANIE KOŁA KRAKOWSKIEGO

Krakowskie Koło PTF liczy 42 członków. W okresie sprawozdawczym pracami Krakowskiego Koła początkowo kierował Zarząd w składzie: przewodniczący – dr hab. Antoni Bobrowski, wiceprzewodnicząca – dr hab. Joanna Komorowska, sekretarz – dr Michał Bzinkowski, skarbnik – mgr Janusz Ryba, członkowie – dr Krystyna Woś, dr Anna Wasyl, dr hab. Maria Maślanka-Soro, dr Krzysztof Pawłowski. W skład Komisji Rewizyjnej wchodzi: dr Aleksandra Klęczar, dr hab. Joanna Janik, mgr Wiesława Hajda, dr hab. Marek Hermann, dr Aneta Kliszcz.

W wyżej wymienionym okresie członkowie Krakowskiego Koła PTF spotkali się na 6 posiedzeniach, podczas których wygłoszono i przedyskutowano następujące referaty naukowe:

1. Dr Aleksandra KLĘCZAR, *Aleksander Wielki jako bohater opery* (15 XI 2011).
2. Dr Joanna RYBOWSKA, *Motywy herkulejskie w renesansowych zbiorach emblematów* (6 XII 2011).
Dr Magdalena KOŻLUK (UŁ), *Prawo natury Arystotelesa* (6 XII 2011).
3. Dr hab. Agnieszka DZIUBA (prof. KUL), *Retoryka militarna w deskrypcji zachowań kobiet – na podstawie tekstów Cycerona i Liwiusza* (10 I 2012).
4. Prof. dr hab. Stanisław STABRYŁA, *Literackie satyry Horacego* (27 XI 2012).
5. Dr hab. Dariusz BRODKA (prof. UJ), *Prokopiusz z Cezarei: legenda Abgara* (12 III 2013).
6. Dr Krzysztof BIELAWSKI, *Pean czy pajan?* (14 V 2013).

Podczas całego okresu sprawozdawczego Członkowie Krakowskiego Koła PTF zajmowali się organizacją Olimpiady Języka Łacińskiego na szczeblu szkolnym i okręgowym. W pracach Komitetu Głównego Olimpiady Języka Łacińskiego udział wzięli dr hab. Antoni Bobrowski oraz dr Aleksandra Klęczar.

*Sekretarz Koła Krakowskiego PTF
dr Michał Bzinkowski*

4. SPRAWOZDANIE KOŁA LUBELSKIEGO

W okresie sprawozdawczym w skład Zarządu Koła wchodziły następujące osoby: przewodnicząca – dr hab. Agnieszka Dziuba, prof. KUL, wiceprzewodnicząca – mgr Alicja Narecka, członek Zarządu ds. kontaktu z nauczycielami – mgr Helena Błazińska, sekretarz – mgr Katarzyna Socha, skarbnik – dr Małgorzata Siwicka. W skład Komisji Rewizyjnej wchodzi: przewodniczący – dr hab. Jolanta Malinowska, prof. KUL, członkowie: dr hab. Krzysztof Narecki, prof. KUL i dr Marian Babiński.

W okresie sprawozdawczym Koło pożegnało zmarłego ks. prof. Henryka Wójtowicza. Po przyjęciu pięciu nowych członków Koło liczy obecnie 52 osoby.

Koło prowadziło działalność statutową w następujących formach:

I. Działalność naukowa:

Koło zorganizowało następujące spotkania z odczytami naukowymi:

1. Prof. dr hab. Juliusz DOMAŃSKI, *Obecność dziedzictwa antycznego w polskim średniowieczu* (28 X 2011).
2. Mgr Aleksandra KRAUZE, Arkadiusz KOŁODZIEJ, *Rzym jako jeden z głównych celów siedemnasto- i osiemnastowiecznego Grand Tour, czyli śladami pierwszych „badaczy” po antycznych zabytkach Wiecznego Miasta* – prezentacja multimedialna połączona ze sprawozdaniem z objazdu naukowego Rzymu w dniach 20–27 VII 2011 (21 XI 2011).
3. Dr Mariusz ZAGÓRSKI (UW), *Medea – antyczny portret psychopatki* (12 XII 2011).
4. Dr Małgorzata SIWICKA, *Relacja lekarz-pacjent według zasad szkoły hippokratejskiej* (29 II 2012).
5. Dr Paweł MADEJSKI, *Ara Pacis Augustae: mity, modele, paradygmaty i zdrowy rozsądek* (27 III 2012).
6. Dr Hanna APPEL (UMK), *Senatus consultum ultimum – kontrowersje i interpretacje* (29 V 2012).
7. Dr Ewa OSEK, *Święte prawo. Tabu pokarmowe w starożytnej Grecji* (23 I 2013).
8. Dr Małgorzata GÓRSKA, *Partykula w gramatyce łacińskiej od starożytności do dzisiaj* (27 II 2013).
9. Dr Agata ŁUKA, *De mortuis nil nisi bene? Inwektywa i żart w epitafiach renesansowych* (20 III 2013).
10. Prof. Ireneusz MIKOŁAJCZYK (UMK), *‘Geoponika’ – bizantyńska encyklopedia rolnicza* (23 IV 2013).

II. Współpraca z nauczycielami języka łacińskiego:

1. Wzorem lat wcześniejszych, we współpracy z Instytutem Filologii Klasycznej KUL oraz Studium Praktycznej Nauki Języków Obcych, członkowie Koła uczestniczyli we wrześniu 2012 w przygotowaniu i przeprowadzeniu programów o kulturze antycznej w ramach Lubelskiego Festiwalu Nauki. Mgr Edyta Michałek przedstawiła młodzieży gimnazjalnej i licealnej prezentację pt. *Dokąd prowadzi nie Ariadny? Czyli rzecz o pochodzeniu i znaczeniu frazeologizmów antycznych*.

2. W kwietniu 2012 członkowie Koła przygotowali dla maturzystów „Repetytorium maturalne” (prof. Jadwiga Czerwińska, prof. Jolanta Malinowska, prof. Krzysztof Narecki, dr Ewa Osek, dr Iwona Wieżel), osobą odpowiedzialną była mgr Dorota Marciniuk. Repetytorium spotkało się z ogromnym zainteresowaniem.

3. W maju 2012 odbyły się lekcje pokazowe języka łacińskiego pt. „Kto nie umiał po łacinie, musiał pasać świnie”, przygotowane przez dr Agatę Łukę i mgr Grażynę Łabęcką oraz lekcje pokazowe języka greckiego, przygotowane przez dr Małgorzatę Siwicką mgr Dorotę Marciniuk.

4. Członkowie Koła aktywnie włączyli się w organizację Dnia Kultury Greckiej w maju 2012 i kwietniu 2013.

5. Lektorzy języka łacińskiego pracujący w Studium Praktycznej Nauki Języków Obcych co roku organizują Wielki Konkurs z języka łacińskiego dla studentów KUL.

III. Współpraca z wykładowcami innych uniwersytetów i szkół wyższych oraz działalność popularyzatorska:

1. W roku akademickim 2011/2012 oraz 2012/2013 dr Agata Łuka kontynuowała prowadzenie autorskich otwartych warsztatów poetycko-interpretacyjnych. Trzecia edycja warsztatów (2011/2012) nosiła tytuł *Ja minę, ty miniesz... Amor vitae, pulsus mortis*, w jej trakcie odbyło się 7 spotkań: *Jestem, więc mnie nie będzie* (12 III 2012), *Życiodajna śmierć* (19 III 2012), *Życie – zwierzę niepochwytne* (26 III 2012), *Spem longam reseces, carpe diem* (2 IV 2012), *Pulvis et umbra sumus* (16 IV 2012), *Transit aetas, volant anni* (7 V 2012), *Labuntur anni* (14 V 2012).

W ramach edycji odbyło się również spotkanie z psychologiem (wykład i prezentacja mgr Justyny Mazurkiewicz o psychologii egzystencjalnej pt. *Życiodajna śmierć – zagadnienia śmierci w psychologii egzystencjalnej*, IFK KUL, 19 III 2012) oraz warsztaty translatorskie połączone z odczytem prof. Juliusza Domańskiego (UW) pt. *Safona – Katullus – Kochanowski. Przekład tekstów i przekład kultur*, IFK KUL, 11 V 2012.

2. 22 V 2012 w Kawiarni&Księgarni „Między słowami” miał miejsce wieczór autorski połączony z promocją książki pt. *Przekładnia, czyli jak spolszczyć łacinę*, będącej antologią przekładów, parafraz, parodii i trawestacji wybranych łacińskich utworów antycznych i renesansowych, dokonanych podczas zajęć i warsztatów interpretacyjno-translatorskich prowadzonych przez dr Agatę Łukę (ss. 148, nakładem autorki, Lublin 2012). Głównym punktem wieczoru było czytanie poezji łacińskiej i jej przekładów przez obecnych na spotkaniu autorów tekstów opublikowanych w *Przekładni*.

3. W sierpniu 2012 ukazał się artykuł dr Agaty Łuki pt. *Marudny paw i cwanny lew, czyli matematyczne bajki Fedrusa*, napisany dla Czasopisma Bibliotek Warszawskich Sowa Mokotowa (nr II (19), 15 VIII 2012, s. 18–19).

4. 29 listopada 2012 odbyły się warsztaty interpretacyjno-translatorskie pt. *‘Nunc desiderium curaque non levis’: miłość ojczyzny u Horacego*, które dr Agata Łuka poprowadziła dla Studenckiego Koła Naukowego Epigrafików UMCS Exploratio.

5. W kwietniu i maju 2013 miał miejsce czwarty cykl otwartych warsztatów interpretacyjno-translatorskich dr Agaty Łuki pt. *Fama crescit eundo* składający się z dwóch spotkań: *‘Rumores unius aestimemus assis’*. *Plotki u Katullusa* (24 i 25 IV 2013), *‘Fama, malum qua non aliud velocius ullum’*. *Plotka według Wergiliusza* (7 V 2013).

6. 21 V 2013 w ramach IV edycji warsztatów odbyły się warsztaty poświęcone aktorskiej interpretacji tekstu, dykcji i emisji głosu prowadzone przez prof. Marcina Przybylskiego, wykładowcę Akademii Teatralnej, reżysera, aktora Teatru Narodowego w Warszawie.

IV. Patronat nad Olimpiadą Języka Łacińskiego:

Zorganizowano i czuwano nad przebiegiem I i II etapu Olimpiady w Województwie Lubelskim. Głównym organizatorem była mgr Helena Błazińska.

V. Ponadto członkowie Koła uczestniczyli w następujących sympozjach: konferencja pt. „Szaleństwo w starożytnej Grecji i Rzymie”, Poznań, 21–22 IX 2011; Ogólnopolska Konferencja Starożytnicza, Ustroń, 22–24 IX 2011; LXIX Zjazd Polskiego Towarzystwa Językoznawczego pt. „Gramatyka i słownik – centrum języka i językoznawstwa”, Toruń, 26–27 IX 2011; Kolokwia Orfickie III, Nieborów, 5–8 X 2011; XIV Międzynarodowy Kongres Polskiego Towarzystwa Neuropsychologicznego, Krakowska Akademia im. Andrzeja Frycza Modrzewskiego, 23–25 X 2011; Międzynarodowa Konferencja Naukowa z okazji Jubileuszu 70. Urodzin Ks. Prof. Dra hab. Augustyna Eckmanna pt. „*Christo parata via est...* Prekursorzy i twórcy kultury europejskiej”, Lublin, 21–22 III 2012; Międzynarodowa Konferencja Naukowa pt. „*Paideia sive institutio moralis et civilis omnium terrarum civium*”, Lublin, 15 V 2012; Międzynarodowa Konferencja Naukowa pt. „Słowa – Obrazy – Dźwięki. Baśń w terapii i wychowaniu”, Warszawa, 1 VI 2012; VII Ogólnopolska Konferencja Epigraficzna, Zielona Góra, 17 X 2012; Konferencja naukowo-edukacyjna pt. „Okupacja i prawo”, Lublin, 20 III 2013; Konferencja Naukowa Colloquium Neolatinum V, Gdańsk, 9–10 V 2013; IV Seminarium Kazimierskie z Prawa Rzymskiego pt. „Prawo w poezji, poezja w prawie. Refleksje antyczne”, Kazimierz Dolny, 17–19 V 2013; Ogólnopolskie Sympozjum pt. „Zbiory Biblioteki Uniwersyteckiej KUL warsztatem pracy badacza antyku”, Lublin, 28 V 2013.

VI. Udział w zebraniach Zarządu Głównego PTF:

Przewodniczący i członkowie Zarządu Koła uczestniczyli systematycznie w odbywających się w Warszawie zebraniach Zarządu głównego PTF.

*Sekretarz Koła Lubelskiego PTF
mgr Katarzyna Socha*

5. SPRAWOZDANIE KOŁA ŁÓDZKIEGO

Koło Łódzkie PTF liczy 41 członków. Honorowym Prezesem Koła jest dr Józef Macjon. Od 20 X 2011 Zarząd Koła Łódzkiego PTF pełnił funkcje w następującym składzie: przewodnicząca – mgr Teresa Macjon, wiceprzewodnicząca – prof. UŁ dr hab. Hanna Zalewska-Jura, sekretarz – dr Anna Maciejewska, skarbnicy – mgr Yvonne Borowski, mgr Helena Sygnet, członkowie Zarządu – prof. UŁ dr hab. Zbigniew Danek, dr Idaliana Kaczor (przewodnicząca Sekcji Indoeuropejskiej), mgr Dorota Żuchowska (przewodnicząca Sekcji Dydaktycznej), Komisja Rewizyjna – dr Wanda Amarantidou, mgr Anna Borowska-Lorenc, mgr Katarzyna Głogowska.

W okresie sprawozdawczym odbyło się 13 zebrań Koła: 8 z odczytami i prezentacjami, jedno sprawozdawczo-wyborcze, 4 o charakterze informacyjnym i/lub popularyzatorsko-artystycznym:

1. Zebranie sprawozdawczo-wyborcze (20 X 2011).
2. Spotkanie Zarządu; informacje o przedsięwzięciach z kręgu łaciny żywej (12 XI 2011).
3. Mgr Y. BOROWSKI, dr A. MACIEJEWSKA, mgr Z. RZEŹNICKA, *Podróże śladami starożytnych* – prezentacja i prelekcja na temat Rzymu, rzymskich miast na Cyprze i Konstantynopola (15 XII 2011).
4. Prof. dr hab. M. WICHOWA, *Imperatyw 'Nosce te ipsum' w literaturze staropolskiej* (23 II 2012).
5. Dr K. BIELAWSKI, *Moda na orfizm* (29 III 2012).
6. Dr M. CZAPIŃSKA, *Francesco Guicciardini w świetle swoich swoich 'Wspomnień'*; podsumowanie III Międzyszkolnego Konkursu Języka Łacińskiego (26 IV 2012).
7. Dr K. CHIŻYŃSKA, *Inspiracje grecko-rzymskie w ideologii nazistowskiej; sprawy organizacyjne* (25 X 2013).
8. Dr A. GRZELAK-KRZYMIANOWSKA, *Park archeologiczny w Scolacium w Kalabrii* (29 XI 2012).
9. Wieczór Kolęd Europejskich (16 I 2013)
10. Mgr H. SYGNET, *Co by było, gdyby... 'Anabaza' oczami dzisiejszej kultury masowej* (28 II 2013).
11. Mgr Y. BOROWSKI, *Komizm u Arystofanesa i Terry'ego Pratchetta* (21 III 2013).
12. Podsumowanie Konkursu Wiedzy o Kulturze Antycznej; odtworzenie obrzędu Pariliów; spektakl pt. „Faunus postmeridianus – Popołudnie Fauna” (16 IV 2013).
13. Omówienie i podsumowanie konkursu translatorskiego dla studentów filologii klasycznej; sprawy organizacyjne (25 IV 2013).

W dalszym ciągu działa Sekcja Indoeuropejska Koła Łódzkiego PTF; w omawianym okresie odbyło się 6 zebrań z 8 odczytami:

1. Dr W. AMARANTIDOU, *Greckie Święta Narodowe OXI*; Mikis JERPOULOS, *Wspomnienie o ojcu, ś.p. Stasisie Jeropoulosie* (22 X 2011).
2. Prof. dr hab. I.R. DANKA, *Pismo runiczne* (25 XI 2011).
3. Dr Joanna MIELCZAREK, *Dlaczego współcześni Czesi są dwujęzyczni* (24 II 2012).
4. Mgr Eleonora NOSZCZYŃSKA, *Żywioły jako kreatywny i destrukcyjny aspekt życia człowieka*; Tatiana i Janusz CHOJNACCY, *Psychosystemologia jako wiedza o rozwoju współczesnego człowieka* (13 IV 2012).
5. Mgr Małgorzata RZĄDKIEWICZ, *Inskrypcja tracka z Ezerova* (11 V 2012).
6. Dr Wanda AMARANTIDOU, 1. *Święto Narodowe Grecji OXI. Wojna włosko-grecka* (20 X 1940–16 III 1941); 2. *Ikaria – wyspa 'młodych starców'. Relacja z podróży do Grecji* (26 X 2012).

Sekcja Dydaktyczna w okresie sprawozdawczym zorganizowała konkursy dla uczniów szkół średnich z Łodzi i regionu: w roku szkolnym 2011/12 III Międzyszkolny Konkurs Języka Łacińskiego (w II etapie 45 uczniów), w roku szkolnym 2012/13 Międzyszkolny Konkurs Wiedzy o Kulturze Antycznej (w I etapie 60 uczniów).

Członkowie Koła uczestniczyli też w organizowaniu imprez naukowych, popularyzatorskich i kulturalnych odbywających się zarówno w Katedrze Filologii Klasycznej, jak i we współpracy z innymi jednostkami UŁ w ramach sesji naukowych (m.in. *Concilium Latinum Lodziense*), koncertów, Festiwalu Nauki, Techniki i Sztuki w Łodzi. Członkowie Koła pracują również co roku przy organizacji i przeprowadzaniu Olimpiady Języka Łacińskiego.

*Przewodnicząca Koła Łódzkiego PTF
mgr Teresa Macjon*

6. SPRAWOZDANIE KOŁA POZNAŃSKIEGO

I. W okresie sprawozdawczym Koło działało pod egidą zarządu w następującym składzie: przewodnicząca – dr hab. Magdalena Stuligrosz, wiceprzewodnicząca – dr Teodozja Wikarjak, sekretarz – dr Anna Lasek/dr Aleksandra Arndt, skarbnik – mgr Ewa Nowak, członkowie zarządu – dr Sławomira Brud, Komisja Rewizyjna – prof. dr hab. Krystyna Bartol, prof. dr hab. Elżbieta Wesołowska, dr Radosław Piętka.

II. Działalność naukowa i statutowa

W okresie sprawozdawczym odbyło się 18 zebrań naukowych, których tematyka przedstawiała się następująco:

1. Prof. dr hab. Elżbieta WESOŁOWSKA, *Korespondencja sztuk w Klaudiana 'De raptu Proserpinae'* (18 X 2011).
2. Mgr Łukasz BERGER, *'Equus mythicus'. Konie w mitologicznych korzeniach kultury śródziemnomorskiej* (15 XI 2011).
3. Dr Sławomira BRUD, *You Tube Latine* (20 XII 2011).
4. Dr Aleksandra KLĘCZAR (UJ), *Postać Aleksandra Wielkiego w tradycji żydowskiej*; prof. dr hab. Jerzy DANIELEWICZ, *Obchody 80-lecia śmierci Wilamowitza w Strzelnie* – komunikat (17 I 2012).
5. Mgr Romana LIPOŃSKA, *Motywy antyczne w liryce Jarosława Iwaszkiewicza* (21 II 2012).
6. Mgr Magdalena KARAMUCKA, *Bogini Nyx i jej antyczne przedstawienia* (20 III 2012).
7. Dr Radosław PIĘTKA, *Filologia klasyczna w XXI wieku* (17 IV 2012).
8. Prof. UAM dr hab. Piotr BERING, *Teatr a retoryka w świetle pism starożytnych i współczesnych teorii* (15 V 2012).
9. Dr Mateusz STRÓŻYŃSKI, *Zawiść, gniew i głód miłości: narcystyczna dynamika w 'Medei' Eurypidesa* (19 VI 2012).

10. Dr Mateusz STRÓŻYŃSKI, *Kraina śmierci jest gorsza od samej śmierci: szaleństwo i dzieciobójstwo w 'Herkulesie' Seneki* (16 X 2012).
11. Dr Monika SZCZOT, *Echa menipejskie w staropolskich dialogach zmarłych* (20 XI 2012).
12. Dr Justyna ZABOROWSKA-MUSIAŁ, *Korespondencja sztuk. Rola i znaczenie tradycji literackiej i artystycznej w kreacji wizerunków postaci symbolicznych w 'De actione scenica' F. Langa SI* oraz spotkanie świąteczno-noworoczne (18 XII 2012).
13. Dr Rafał ROSÓŁ, *Z antycznego bestiariusza: kilka uwag na temat sepsa* (15 I 2013).
14. Dr Radosław PIĘTKA, *Języki antyczne w filmie* (19 II 2013).
15. Prof. UAM dr hab. Piotr URBAŃSKI, *Rienzi i 'Rienzi, der letzte der Tribunen': Petrarka, Rienzi i Wagner* (26 III 2013).
16. Prof. UW dr hab. Katarzyna MARCINIAK, *Czy Katylinarki to filologiczne fałszerstwo? Szczęśliwy Rzym bez Cycerona w XXI wieku* (16 IV 2013).
17. Prof. dr hab. Adam ŁUKASZEWICZ (UW), *Aleksandryjskie zagadki epigraficzne i archeologiczne* (21 V 2013).
18. Prof. dr hab. Marian WESOLY, *O nierozumnej wzgardzie Arystotelesa* (18 VI 2013).

Odbyły się też cztery spotkania świąteczno-noworoczne połączone z zebraniem naukowym (w styczniu i grudniu 2010, grudniu 2011 i 2012).

Dla uczczenia zmarłych członków Koła Poznańskiego Koło zorganizowało wspólnie z IKF UAM dwa otwarte zebrania: 30 III 2010 poświęcone pamięci prof. Kazimierza Limana oraz 4 V 2010 poświęcone pamięci członka honorowego PTF – mgr Marii Wikarjakowej.

III. Działalność popularyzacyjna:

Członkowie Koła powołani do Okręgowej Komisji Olimpiady Języka Łacińskiego: dr T. Wikarjak (przewodnicząca), dr Elżbieta Zakrzewska-Gębka (sekretarz), oraz członkowie Okręgowej Komisji Egzaminacyjnej: dr Aleksandra Arndt, dr Sławomira Brud, dr Anna Lasek, dr Marlena Puk, dr Magdalena Stuligrosz, dr Justyna Zaborowska-Musiał przeprowadzili eliminacje I i II stopnia XXVIII, XXIX, XXX i XXXI Olimpiady.

Członkowie Koła: dr Justyna Zaborowska-Musiał i dr Marlena Puk pod egidą IFK UAM zorganizowały w latach 2011/2012 i 2012/2013 kolejne edycje Konkursu Wiedzy o Antyku dla uczniów gimnazjów i liceów województwa wielkopolskiego.

Członkowie Koła: prof. dr hab. Krystyna Bartol, prof. dr hab. Elżbieta Wesołowska, dr Anna Lasek, dr Magdalena Stuligrosz, mgr Łukasz Berger, mgr Anna Chlewicka, mgr Magdalena Karamucka uczestniczyli w działaniach promujących akcję „Polska w Europie, łacina w szkole”

Członkowie Koła: prof. dr hab. Elżbieta Wesołowska, prof. UAM dr hab. Piotr Bering, dr Sławomira Brud, dr Monika Miazek-Męczyńska, dr Mateusz Stróżyński, dr Magdalena Stuligrosz włączyli się w akcję promowania łaciny w mediach.

IV. Działalność organizacyjna:

W dniach 14–16 IX 2011 dr Anna Lasek, dr Radosław Piętka, dr Marlena Puk, mgr Romana Lipońska, mgr Ewa Nowak reprezentowali Koło na Walnym Zgromadzeniu PTF we Wrocławiu.

V. Obecnie Koło liczy 56 członków; w okresie sprawozdawczym 11 osób zapisało się do Koła, 2 osoby zmarły.

*Przewodnicząca Koła Poznańskiego PTF
dr hab. Magdalena Stuligrosz*

7. SPRAWOZDANIE KOŁA TORUŃSKIEGO

W okresie sprawozdawczym w skład Zarządu Koła wchodziły następujące osoby: przewodniczący – dr hab. Przemysław Nehring, prof. UMK, wiceprzewodnicząca – dr Alicja Brusewicz, skarbnik/sekretarz – dr Magdalena Nowak, członkowie Zarządu – dr Anna Głodowska, mgr Aleksandra Kłopotowska, mgr Anna Osielska.

W roku 2011 składki członkowskie zapłaciło 19 osób, zaś w 2012 roku 25 osób.

W okresie sprawozdawczym odbył się szereg spotkań Koła, podczas których zaproszeni goście oraz członkowie Koła wygłosili następujące wykłady:

1. Prof. Stephanie WEST (Oxford University), *Why Homerists should pay more attention to Alpamysh* (15 XI 2011).
2. Dr Robert WIŚNIEWSKI (UW), *Niebiańscy patroni, czyli o tym, jak święci i ich relikwie bronili miast późnego cesarstwa* (6 XII 2011).
3. Dr Marina HAWORTH (Harvard University), *Athletes in the Greek Symposium* (4 IV 2012).
4. Prof. dr hab. Tomasz DERDA (UW), *Ostraka z Marei, czyli jak w V wieku budowano wielką bazylikę* (26 X 2012).
5. Dr Łukasz NIESIOŁOWSKI-SPANO (UW), *Filistyni w Jerozolimie, czyli ile było plemion hebrajskich?* (27 XI 2012).
6. Dr Nevena PANOVA (Uniwersytet w Sofii), *Plato's Concept of Mimesis between Aesthetics and Politics* (9 IV 2013).
7. Dr hab. Bartosz AWIANOWICZ, *Specyfikacja legend na monetach Septymiusza Sewera i jego synów bitych w Mezji i Tracji* (14 V 2013).

Koło Toruńskie PTF wraz z Katedrą Filologii Klasycznej UMK oraz Fundacją *Traditio Europae* (Fundacja powstała w 2007 roku, jej działalność koordynują pracownicy Katedry Filologii Klasycznej i członkowie Koła Toruńskiego PTF, patronat nad nią objął Zarząd Główny PTF) jest organizatorem Ligi starożytnej, czyli odbywających się raz w miesiącu spotkań młodzieży szkolnej, podczas których uczniowie słuchają wykładów popularyzujących antyk i jego dziedzictwo. Po każdym wykładzie słuchacze wypełniają krótki test zawierający pytania dotyczące właśnie przedstawionych zagadnień. Wyniki testów są przez

organizatorów Ligi sumowane i na zakończenie każdej edycji Ligi zwycięzcy otrzymują nagrody książkowe.

Od roku 2009 realizacja Ligi starożytniczej jest dotowana z Urzędu Marszałkowskiego Województwa Kujawsko-Pomorskiego, zaś od roku szkolnego 2009/2010, rokrocznie, Kujawsko-Pomorski Kurator Oświaty sprawuje nad nią honorowy patronat.

W okresie sprawozdawczym odbyły się dwie pełne edycje Ligi. W edycji 2011/12 odbyły się następujące wykłady i spotkania:

1. Dr hab. Przemysław NEHRING, prof. UMK, *Święty Augustyn – asceta, mnich, biskup* (29 X 2011).
2. Prof. dr hab. Danuta MUSIAŁ, *Czy Grecy wierzyli w mity?* (19 XI 2010).
3. Dr Magdalena NOWAK, *Proces poety Archiasza* (17 XII 2011).
4. Mgr Damian JASIŃSKI, *Jak starożytne teksty przetrwały do naszych czasów? O pamięci i przepisowywaniu, od antyku do dzisiaj* (21 I 2012).
5. Dr Barbara BIBIK, *Ostatnie pożegnanie* (24 III 2012).
6. Mgr Elżbieta CHRULSKA, *Śladami grecko-rzymskiego antyku w Toruniu* (21 IV 2012).
7. Dr Robert WIŚNIEWSKI (UW), *Druidzi i druidomania w Galii rzymskiej* (12 V 2012).
8. Dr hab. Przemysław NEHRING, prof. UMK, *Zakończenie* (2 VI 2012).

W ramach edycji 2012/13 odbyły się następujące wykłady i spotkania:

1. Dr hab. Tomasz DERDA, prof. UW, *Piaski egipskie mówią po grecku* (27 X 2012).
2. Dr hab. Przemysław NEHRING, prof. UMK, *Kto, kiedy i jak prześladował starożytnych chrześcijan* (24 XI 2012).
3. Dr Robert WIŚNIEWSKI (UW), *Święci, cuda i pielgrzymki czyli o tym, jak w późnym antyku rodziła się nowa religijność chrześcijańska* (5 I 2013).
4. Mgr Agnieszka SCHREIBER, *Barbarzyńcy oczyma starożytnych Rzymian* (2 II 2013).
5. Ks. dr Stanisław ADAMIAK, *Znaki na niebie, skłócenie biskupi i zamordowana żona, czyli dlaczego Konstantyn Wielki został chrześcijaninem?* (9 III 2013).
6. Dr Andrzej WYPUSTEK, *Wykopaliska w rejonie Wezuwiusza: okno na świat starożytności* (13 IV 2013).
7. Dr Rafał TOCZKO, *Co się starożytnym śniło?* (18 V 2013).
8. Dr hab. Przemysław NEHRING, prof. UMK, *Zakończenie* (8 VI 2013).

Kolejna edycja Ligi Starożytniczej (już VII) rozpocznie się w październiku 2013. Liga Starożytnicza jest adresowana uczniów szkół ponadpodstawowych województwa kujawsko-pomorskiego, w roku szkolnym 2011/12 zgłosiło się do niej 213 uczniów, zaś w roku szkolnym 2012/13 166 uczniów.

*Sekretarz Koła Toruńskiego PTF
dr Magdalena Nowak*

8. SPRAWOZDANIE KOŁA WARSZAWSKIEGO

I. W okresie sprawozdawczym Zarząd KW PTF działał w następującym składzie: przewodniczący – prof. dr hab. Adam Łukasiewicz, wiceprzewodniczący – prof. dr hab. Juliusz Domański, sekretarz – dr Magdalena Zawadzka, skarbnik – dr Magdalena Popiołek, przewodnicząca Sekcji Popularyzacji Wiedzy o Antyku – mgr Maria Poszepczyńska, członkowie Zarządu: mgr Lech Bobiatyński, dr Jan Kozłowski, dr Jan Kwapisz, dr Krzysztof Rzepkowski, Komisja Rewizyjna: mgr Ludmiła Bohdanowicz (przewodnicząca), mgr Mikołaj Antczak, mgr Krystyna Turska.

II. W okresie sprawozdawczym odbyło się 9 zebrań KW PTF. W części naukowej spotkań uczestnicy wysłuchali następujących referatów:

1. Anna SZYMAŃSKA-BUDZIŃSKA, *Wizerunki filozofów w twórczości Apulejusza z Madaury* (2 XII 2011).
2. Dr Jerzy MAŃKOWSKI, *Czy można dziś wracać jeszcze do dyskusji nad dniem urodzin św. Jadwigi królowej?* (13 IV 2012).
3. Mgr Katarzyna PIETRUCZUK, *Jak tragicy ateńscy trafili do Aleksandrii* (18 V 2012).
4. Mgr Monika BŁĄSKIEWICZ (UWr), *'Hippoi kai hippomorphoi' w 'Kynegetika' Oppiana z Apamei* (1 VI 2012).
5. Prof. Dorota ZYGMUNTOWICZ (PAN), *Czy Platon chciał wygnać poetów z państwa?* (16 XI 2012).
6. Dr Katarzyna JAŹDŹEWSKA (UKSW), *Trup na uczcie. Motyw śmierci w Plutarcha 'Uczcie siedmiu mędrców'* (7 XII 2012).
7. Witali MICHALCZUK, *Formuła Antyku Aleksego Łosiewa* (12 IV 2013).
8. Prof. Juliusz DOMAŃSKI, *Epilog do wykładu Witalego Michalczuka* (25 IV 2013).
9. Prof. Adam ŁUKASZEWICZ, *Tajemnica grobu Aleksandra Wielkiego* (28 V 2013).

III. Bardzo istotnym elementem działalności koła warszawskiego jest popularyzacja znajomości języków klasycznych i wiedzy o antyku wśród uczniów szkół ponadpodstawowych (Konkurs Kultury Klasycznej dla gimnazjalistów, etap okręgowy OJŁ) oraz organizowanie bezpłatnych kursów łaciny i greki dla wszystkich chętnych. Sekcji Popularyzacji Wiedzy o Antyku od lat niestrudzenie przewodniczy mgr Maria Poszepczyńska.

W okresie sprawozdawczym odbyły się odpowiednio VII i VIII edycja KKK. W każdej z nich wzięło udział ponad stu gimnazjalistów z województwa mazowieckiego.

W ramach otwartych kursów języków antycznych słuchacze mieli do wyboru 4 grupy łacińskie i 3 greckie o różnym stopniu zaawansowania. Tradycyjnie kursy prowadzą studenci ostatnich lat studiów IFK UW, a także absolwenci i doktoranci.

Członkowie koła warszawskiego aktywnie uczestniczyli również w pracach komitetu okręgowego Olimpiady Języka Łacińskiego, jak również

w Laboratorium Filologii Klasycznej – cyklu wykładów dla licealistów organizowanym przez IFK UW.

*Sekretarz Koła Warszawskiego PTF
dr Magdalena Zawadzka*

9. SPRAWOZDANIE KOŁA WROCŁAWSKIEGO

Koło liczy 56 członków. W okresie sprawozdawczym Zarząd Koła pracował w następującym składzie: przewodnicząca – dr Małgorzata Wróbel, skarbnik – dr Sławomir Torbus, sekretarz – dr Agnieszka Wojciechowska, członkowie Zarządu – dr Przemysław Szczurek (wiceprzewodniczący), dr Sławomir Torbus, dr Agnieszka Wojciechowska, dr Emilia Żybert-Próchnicka, dr Krzysztof Morta, dr hab. Gościwit Malinowski, mgr Ewa Pobiedzińska, członkowie Komisji Rewizyjnej – dr Danuta Łowicka (przewodnicząca), mgr Duklana Piskorska, mgr Grażyna Rolak. Działającą w ramach Koła Komisją Dydaktyki Języka Łacińskiego kierowała mgr Ewa Pobiedzińska, a od stycznia 2013 zastępowała ją mgr Anna Jaworska. 19 VI 2013 w wyniku wyborów wyłoniono nowy Zarząd w składzie: przewodnicząca – dr Barbara Hartleb-Kropidło, wiceprzewodniczący – dr Krzysztof Morta, skarbnik – dr Hanna Urbańska, sekretarz – mgr Anna Jaworska, członkowie Zarządu – dr hab. Jakub Pigoń i dr Małgorzata Wróbel, członkowie Komisji Rewizyjnej: dr Barbara Szubert, dr Agnieszka Wojciechowska i mgr Duklana Piskorska, przewodnicząca Komisji Dydaktyki Języka Łacińskiego – mgr Anna Jaworska.

W okresie sprawozdawczym odbyło się 15 posiedzeń ogólnych Koła Wrocławskiego PTF, w których uczestniczyło przeciętnie 15 osób. Wygłoszono na nich następujące odczyty:

1. Dr Agnieszka LEW (UW), *Ustalenie kwestii merytorycznych za pomocą aparatu krytycznego na przykładzie 'Poetyki' Marka Hieronima Vidy (19 X 2011)*.
2. Dr Mariusz PLAGO, *Fokalizacja – modna acz problematyczna (23 XI 2011)*.
3. Dr Karol ZIELIŃSKI, *Spór Achillesa z Agamemnonem w perspektywie odbioru oralnego (14 XII 2011)*.
4. Ks. prof. dr hab. Mariusz ROSIK, *Zamknięty raj i otwarty grób, czyli o tym, jak pustynię przemienić w ogród: Rdz 2, 4 b–3, 23; J 20, 1–18 (18 I 2012)*.
5. Dr Agnieszka KOTLIŃSKA-TOMA, *Hellenistyczne dramaty o tematyce biblijnej – zapomniana forma popularyzacji tradycji i religii żydowskiej (15 II 2012)*.
6. Prof. dr hab. Alicja SZASTYŃSKA-SIEMION, *Strabon o środowisku naturalnym Grecji (21 III 2012)*.
7. Dr Grażyna URBAN-GODZIEK (UJ), *Elegia na progu – paraklausithyron w renesansowej poezji elegijnej (18 IV 2012)*.
8. Dr Małgorzata ZADKA, *Relacje pomiędzy starogreckimi nazwami owoców granatu i maku (16 V 2012)*.

9. Dr Angelika MODLIŃSKA-PIEKARZ (KUL), *Łacińska poezja biblijna na Śląsku w XVI i XVII wieku. Zarys problematyki i perspektywy badań* (17 X 2012).
10. Dr Stefan NOWICKI, *Przedmiot czy podmiot? Status społeczny kobiety w świetle mezopotamskich inskrypcji królewskich* (21 XI 2012).
11. Dr Maria CHANTRY, *Jak kochankę zamienić na żonę? 'De amore coniugali' Giovanniego Pontana jako aemulatio z cyklami rzymskich elegii erotycznych* (12 XII 2012).
12. Dr Anna LASEK (UAM), *Rola aniołów w 'Visio Dorothei'* (16 I 2013).
13. Prof. dr hab. Gościwit MALINOWSKI, *Jakovos Miloitis. Tajemniczy Grek w Polsce Stefana Batorego* (20 III 2013).
14. Dr Igor WYPIJEWSKI, *Adriatycka Oenotria, czyli kilka słów o antycznej rewolucji winiarskiej* (17 IV 2013).
15. Dr Małgorzata ZADKA, *Tarcza Achillesa jako przykład greckiego protopisma* (15 V 2013).

W dniach 15 i 16 września 2011 Koło nasze było gospodarzem CIV Walnego Zjazdu PTF. Referaty na sesji naukowej wygłosili:

1. Prof. dr hab. Alicja SZASTYŃSKA-SIEMION, *Poeci w służbie cesarzy*.
2. Dr Małgorzata WRÓBEL, *Strabon i Rzym*.
3. Prof. dr hab. Gościwit MALINOWSKI, *Globalizacja epoki augustowskiej w literaturze*.
4. Dr Barbara HARTLEB-KROPIDŁO, *Lar familiaris i jego rodzina. Kult Larów w Rzymie republikańskim*.
5. Dr Krzysztof MORTA, *'Nabun Aetiopes vocant' – problem atrybucji nazwy*.
6. Mgr Justyna RUDNICKA, *Laudes Europae: świat, Europa i Rzym (Maniliusz, 'Astronomica' IV 658–695)*.
7. Dr Joanna PIECZONKA, *Prawo rzymskie na wyspie Kos – Lex Fonteia i zagadnienia przekładu prawniczego*.
8. Dr hab. Ilias WRAZAS, *Konstandinos Kawafis i metropolia basenu Morza Śródziemnego*.

A na sesji dydaktycznej:

1. Mgr Beata MACHALSKA, *Tituli Wratislavienses. Wykorzystanie wrocławskich napisów łacińskich do nauczania języka łacińskiego*.
2. Dr Katarzyna OCHMAN, *Dwa lata nowych metod nauczania języka łacińskiego w Instytucie Studiów Klasycznych, Śródziemnomorskich i Orientalnych Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego*.

Ponadto na tej sesji mgr Anna Jaworska zaprezentowała podręcznik pt. „Porta latina nova”, a mgr Aleksandra Krajczyk i mgr Dorota Kubica – podręcznik „Prima via” przeznaczony dla różnych kierunków studiów.

Na tym Walnym Zgromadzeniu trojgu naszym członkom przyznano tytuł „Honorowego Członka PTF”: prof. dr hab. Alicji Szastyńskiej-Siemion, prof. dr hab. Janinie Ławińskiej-Tyszkowskiej, mgr Ewie Pobiedzińskiej.

Podobnie jak w latach ubiegłych członkowie Koła Wrocławskiego brali aktywny udział w pracach Olimpiady Języka Łacińskiego zarówno na szczeblu okręgowym, jak i ogólnopolskim. W skład Komitetu Okręgowego Olimpiady wchodził: dr Krzysztof Morta, dr Barbara Hartleb-Kropidło (sekretarz), mgr Magdalena Józwiak, mgr Aleksandra Krajczyk, mgr Maria Kulewska, mgr Maria Oboron, dr Karol Zieliński. W pracach Komitetu Głównego Ogólnopolskiej Olimpiady Języka Łacińskiego brał udział dr Krzysztof Morta.

W ramach działalności Komisji dydaktycznej Koła Wrocławskiego PTF zorganizowano 6 konferencji metodycznych dla nauczycieli i lektorów języka łacińskiego. Uczestników Konferencji gościli: Zespół Szkół Urszulańskich we Wrocławiu i Instytut Studiów Klasycznych Śródziemnomorskich i Orientalnych Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego. Podczas konferencji dwie lekcje pokazowe w języku łacińskim przeprowadziła dr Katarzyna Ochman.

W ramach konferencji metodycznych ogłoszono następujące referaty:

1. Mgr Justyna RUDNICKA, *'Hortus gemmans floribus' – refleksje na temat Maniliuszowego świata barw i kolorów* (8 X 2011).
2. Dr Małgorzata WRÓBEL, *Rzym Strabona* (8 X 2011).
3. Dr Mariusz PLAGO, *Siedemnastowieczne testamenty łacińskie i polsko-łacińskie. Kilka uwag o języku* (11 II 2012).
4. Mgr Beata MACHALSKA, *Tituli Wratislavienses – część II. Łacińskie napisy na pomnikach* (11 II 2012).
5. Prof. dr hab. Jakub PIGOŃ, *Przypisywana Senecę tragedia 'Oktawia' – próba charakterystyki* (26 V 2012).
6. Dr Małgorzata WRÓBEL, *Strabon jako historyk* (26 V 2012).
7. Dr Krzysztof MORTA, *Paralelizm członów w starożytnej translatoryce biblijnej* (20 X 2012).
8. Mgr Stanisław WILCZYŃSKI, *Jaki cel stawiam sobie nauczając języka łacińskiego* (20 X 2012).
9. Dr Emilia ŻYBERT-PRUCHNICKA, *Apolonios Rodyjski, 'Argonautika'. Uwagi tłumacza* (20 X 2012).
10. Mgr Kamil PAWŁAK, *Dytyramb i kryptodytyramb – recepcja wpisana w poetykę lekcji* (23 II 2013).
11. Dr Magdalena WOLF, *Relacje z wędrówek po Rzymie Mistrza Grzegorza. Uwagi tłumacza* (23 II 2013).
12. Prof. dr hab. Jakub PIGOŃ, *Autobiografia poety. Owidiusz, 'Tristia' IV 10* (25 V 2013).
13. Dr Barbara HARTLEB-KROPIDŁO, *Kult Lara – opiekuńczego bóstwa Rzymian* (25 V 2013).
14. Mgr Maciej DĄBROWSKI, *Ewangelia św. Jana jako wzorzec spersonalizowanego podejścia w procesie dydaktycznym* (25 V 2013).

Podczas konferencji metodycznych prezentowano też nowości bibliograficzne (dr Małgorzata Wróbel i mgr Kamil Pawlak).

23 II 2013 dr Katarzyna Ochman przeprowadziła z uczennicami klasy I LO Sióstr Urszulanek lekcję pt. *Amicus tuus iam te non amat* (23 II 2013), na którą zaproszono media wrocławskie. Jako zapowiedź tego wydarzenia Radio Rodzina wyemitowało 20 II 2013 rozmowę z dr Ochman na temat nauczania łaciny. Relacje z konferencji ukazały się w „Gościu Niedzielnym” (24 II 2013) i w „Polskiej Gazecie Wrocławskiej” (25 II 2013). Dr Ochman udzieliła też wywiadu na temat przydatności łaciny, który ukazał się w „Polskiej Gazecie Wrocławskiej” 14 VI 2013 (Hanna Wieczorek, *Czy dziś ktoś powie: kto łaciny nie zna, ten nieuk?*).

Z inicjatywy lektorów języka łacińskiego zorganizowano cykl warsztatów metodycznych dla nauczycieli języka łacińskiego, podczas których uczestnicy poznawali różne sposoby prowadzenia lekcji po łacinie. Odbyły się cztery całonociowe spotkania (19 XI 2011, 7 I 2012, 17 III 2012 i 21 IV 2012). Warsztaty prowadziła dr Katarzyna Ochman, sprawami organizacyjnym zajęła się mgr Dorota Kubica. Wzięło w nich udział 9 uczestniczek.

Koło prowadziło też działalność popularyzatorską. Dr Krzysztof Morta w programie edukacyjnym wyprodukowanym przez Telewizję Kablową Proart w 2011 wygłosił pogadankę pt. „Zagadka Trzech Króli” oraz w III LO im. Mikołaja Kopernika w Kaliszu w ramach III Szkolnych Spotkań z Nauką „Copernicus Science” wystąpił z odczytem pt. „Poznać Kalisz po starych inskrypcjach”.

W okresie sprawozdawczym odeszły od nas dr Władysława Jamróż (17 V 2012), prof. dr hab. Hanna Wałkowska (18 III 2013) i Członek Honorowy, prof. dr hab. Janina Ławińska-Tyszkowska (1 VI 2013).

*Przewodnicząca Koła Wrocławskiego PTF
dr Małgorzata Wróbel*

OUR MYTHICAL CHILDHOOD...
CLASSICS AND CHILDREN'S LITERATURE
BETWEEN EAST & WEST

Final Debates, May 23–26, 2013
Centre for Studies on the Classical Tradition (OBTA),
Faculty of “Artes Liberales”
University of Warsaw

The magic of books permits us to travel across time and space, to feel a welter of emotions, and to live exciting adventures along with the protagonists. These are such marvellous experiences that we wish to repeat them again and again, each time becoming more aware of the power of literature – whether written down on ancient papyri scrolls or digitalized as the most advanced ebooks. And there is one period of human life when the charm of literature has a particularly strong impact – childhood. The young human being, when introduced into the realm of books, is presented with a priceless gift for the future: the knowledge of the magic of words – something which gives him or her the strength to face the challenges of adulthood. Thus does literature shape and support us. Moreover, the act of reading binds generations.

Exceptional bonds beyond time and geographical borders are established by the books for children and young adults inspired by Graeco-Roman Antiquity – ancient myths, culture, and history. The tales of the Greeks and Romans build our common heritage – a unique legacy, and one which is in constant evolution as ever new authors reach for ancient motifs and threads to create ever new, contemporary stories, globally understandable thanks to these timeless components. The adventures of Harry Potter, who happens to chant in Latin: *Expecto patronum!*, or of Percy Jackson, who discovers himself to be a demigod – Poseidon's son to be precise – are but a few of the most recent examples from the rapidly growing library of references to Classical Antiquity.

In the Centre for Studies on the Classical Tradition (OBTA) at the Faculty of “Artes Liberales”, University of Warsaw, we are carrying out research on this library within the framework of the international team project “Our Mythical Childhood... Classics and Children's Literature Between East & West”, supported by the Loeb Classical Library Foundation Grant, the University of Warsaw Funds for Research, and the “Artes Liberales” Institute Foundation.

The reception of Antiquity in literature for young readers is a new, fascinating field of studies, and in our venture, additionally, we have adopted a particular perspective. We analyze books for children and young adults inspired by Classical Antiquity in regional contexts, treating a region not as a periphery to be dismissed, but as an extremely interesting filter for the reception of a given cultural text. Thus, using a comparative approach we study how the image of Antiquity changes in response to the social, cultural, and political transformations underway in various parts of our globe. Ancient culture thereby becomes a mirror which permits us to better understand post-ancient epochs. We look upon ourselves in this mirror also today¹.

Scholars from all over the world are taking part in this project – from North America to Africa, and from Europe to Australia and New Zealand. They represent sundry disciplines: classics, archaeology, modern philologies, philosophy, psychology, etc. From May 23 to 26, 2013 we met at the University of Warsaw to conclude the first stage of our research work, with joint debates under the Honorary Patronage of the Spouse of the President of the Republic of Poland, Anna Komorowska. At the inauguration of the debates Prof. Wilfried STROH (Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich) delivered a lecture in Latin on the books for children and young adults translated into Latin in various countries, though the potential of the language makes them globally accessible in the milieu of Latin admirers. Next, a total of six panels took place, moderated by Prof. Mark O'CONNOR (Boston College, USA), Prof. Farouk GREWING (University of Vienna), and by the members of our team.

Panel I, “In Search of Our Roots: Classical References as a Shaper of Young Readers' Identity”, was dedicated to the childhood exercises in rhetoric of Poland's King Jan III Sobieski – Prof. Barbara MILEWSKA-WAŻBIŃSKA (University of Warsaw); and to ancient motifs in texts by authors crucial in global or regional, or both, contexts: J.M. Barrie and Astrid Lindgren – Prof. Katarzyna JERZAK (University of Georgia, USA); Rudyard Kipling – Prof. Jerzy AXER (University of Warsaw); Tadeusz Zieliński – Dr. Michał MIZERA (University of Warsaw); Saul Tchernichowsky – Prof. Jörg SCHULTE (University College, London) and Agata GRZYBOWSKA (University of Warsaw); and Laura Orvieto – Dr. Valentina GARULLI (University of Bologna).

Panel II, “The Aesop Complex: The Transformation of Fables in Response to Regional Challenges”, was opened with a discussion on the psychological and

¹ The presentation of the project can be found in K. MARCINIAK, *In the Mirror of Antiquity*, Academia. The Magazine of the Polish Academy of Sciences XXXVI/4 2012, pp. 36–39, Polish version available at: http://www.portalwiedzy.pan.pl/images/stories/academia_2012/42012/36-39_marciniak.pdf. For more details please contact: Katarzyna Marciniak, Elżbieta Olechowska, or the research secretaries for the project: Joanna Kłos and Michał Kucharski. See also the volume *Antiquity and We*, ed. K. MARCINIAK, Faculty of „Artes Liberales” UW, Warsaw 2013, available at <http://al.uw.edu.pl/pl-426>.

philosophical approach to the phenomenon of fables – Prof. Szymon WRÓBEL (University of Warsaw); next, the panel dealt with the reception of Aesop’s fables in various parts of the world: in Africa – Prof. Peter SIMATEI (Moi University, Eldoret, Kenya); Japan – Prof. Beata KUBIAK HO-CHI (University of Warsaw); Great Britain – Prof. Edith HALL (King’s College, London); Slovenia – Dr. David MOVRIN (University of Ljubljana); and Poland – Prof. Adam ŁUKASZEWICZ (University of Warsaw).

Panel III, “Children Dealing with Change: The Reception of Classics in Ideological Contexts”, comprised the reception of Antiquity in American fictions of Ancient Rome – Prof. Deborah H. ROBERTS (Haverford College, USA) in collaboration with Prof. Sheila MURNAGHAN (University of Pennsylvania, USA); in children’s literature in the Soviet Union – Dr. Elena ERMOLAEVA (Saint-Petersburg State University); in post-WW2 Hungary – Prof. György KARSAI (University of Pécs; Academy of Drama and Film in Budapest); in socialist Romania – Dr. Cristian-Nicolae GAȘPAR (Central European University, Budapest); in 1970s Polish literature of a feminist cast – Prof. Robert A. SUCHARSKI (University of Warsaw); and in Modern Greek literature – Dr. Przemysław KORDOS (University of Warsaw).

Panel IV, “Daring the Darkness: Classical Antiquity as a Filter for Critical Experiences”, included the motif of *katabasis* in New Zealand fictions – Prof. Elizabeth HALE (University of New England, New South Wales); in Philip Pullman’s *His Dark Materials* trilogy – Dr. Owen HODKINSON (University of Leeds); and the motif of Orpheus and Eurydice in German, French, and English literature – Prof. Bettina KÜMMERLING-MEIBAUER (Eberhard Karl University of Tübingen).

Panel V, “New Hope: Classical References in the Mission of Preparing Children to Strive for a Better Future”, focused on the role of Antiquity in supporting the youngest in their liminal life experiences on the basis of literary examples from the United States – Prof. Sheila MURNAGHAN (University of Pennsylvania, USA) in collaboration with Prof. Deborah H. ROBERTS (Haverford College, USA); from the People’s Republic of Poland – Joanna KŁOS (University of Warsaw); and from Russia after the fall of the Soviet Union – Dr. Hanna PAULOUSKA (University of Warsaw).

Panel VI, “Rediscovering the Magic of Words: From the 21st c. Onwards”, was dedicated to the most recent phenomena – Caroline Lawrence’s series *Roman Mysteries* – Prof. Helen LOVATT (University of Nottingham); J.K. Rowling’s *Harry Potter* novels – Dr. Elżbieta OLECHOWSKA (University of Warsaw); the reception of Classical Antiquity in lexicography for young readers – Dr. Ewa RUDNICKA (University of Warsaw); and the phenomenon of mythological fan fiction – Prof. Katarzyna MARCINIAK (University of Warsaw).

The debates also offered an opportunity for graduate and post-graduate students to show their research themes as poster presentations: the *Odyssey*

in Charles Lamb's work – Francesca M. RICHARDS (Durham University); the reception of Hercules in computer games – Sylwia CHMIELEWSKA (University of Warsaw); and the role of mythology in the Polish railway – Adam CIOLEK (University of Warsaw).

The debates were complemented by a cultural programme. As children's literature is usually accompanied by illustrations which enhance the power of words, we initiated cooperation with the Illustration Studio under the direction of Prof. Zygmunt Januszewski from the Academy of Fine Arts in Warsaw. The students' works of art, prepared during a year long course thematically linked to the project, were presented at a special exhibition during the conclusion of the debates. Furthermore, Jan Czarnecki – a graduate of the Frédéric Chopin State Music School in Warsaw and student on the programme of the Inter-Faculty Individual Studies in Humanities – and his ensemble gave a concert *Modulamina puerilia*, arranged for harpsichord, which included works by Jan Novák (1921–1984), a composer writing music to ancient Latin poems. The cultural patronage of the project was assumed by the Foundation ABCXXI – “All of Poland Reads to Kids”, Polish Radio Channel 2, and the web portal Qlturka.pl.

At the culmination of the debates we scheduled a discussion panel on the role of books inspired by Classical Antiquity for children and young adults. Our aim was to reach out beyond the academic milieu. Thus, we invited to the discussion not only scholars and students, but also teachers (a group coordinated by Barbara Strycharczyk presented the results of a very promising school curriculum which could be applied at various levels), editors, translators, illustrators, and last but not least – authors. Thus, we were happy to welcome as participants to the panel Jacek Bocheński, Grzegorz Kasdepke, Prof. Franciszek Kobryńczuk, Anna M. Komornicka, Barbara Ludwiczak, Eliza Piotrowska, and Monika Rekowski. Bound by the common experience of reading, a Community came into being at the University understood as a place where people striving for knowledge could meet to talk and learn from each other.

At the end of the debates there was also a panel entitled *Tadeusz Zieliński Between East & West* with Prof. Jerzy Axer, Adam Pomorski (President of the Polish PEN Club), and Prof. Piotr Mitzner (Member of the Board of the Polish PEN Club), who together presented a trilingual editorial project dedicated to Zieliński's texts, recently completed by Professors Jerzy Axer, Michael von Albrecht, and Alexander Gavrilov.

The “Our Mythical Childhood...” project has already resulted in some publications. To recall Zieliński's activity as a popularizer of ancient culture, one of his *Attic Tales (Klechdy attyckie)* was specially published for the debates (*The Queen of the Wind Maidens*, with an introduction by Michał Mizera, Polish translation from the Russian original by Katarzyna Tomaszuk, English translation and textual notes by Elżbieta Olechowska). Furthermore, one of the most vital aspects of the project was to involve students in the research work. To

this end we established a special experimental seminar within the framework of the Mediterranean Civilization curriculum at the Faculty of “Artes Liberales”. The participants – BA, MA, and PhD students – were collecting and elaborating texts from Polish literature for young readers with references to ancient culture. As a result, *Polish Literature for Children & Young Adults Inspired by Classical Antiquity. A Catalogue* was published, with the stated mission (and our hope) of stimulating research into the subject and at the same time popularizing Polish literature abroad. The *Catalogue* is freely available to download from the project’s website, along with Zieliński’s tale and the students’ poster presentations (www.omc.al.uw.edu.pl, in the bookmark *Publication of Research Results*). A volume with the research cases, the results of which were presented during the debates, is being prepared for publication. The volume will also include a text on the reception of Greek mythology in Israeli children’s literature – Prof. Lisa MAURICE (Bar-Ilan University); and another one on classical references in the *Harry Potter* series – Prof. Christine WALDE (Johannes Gutenberg University of Mainz).

On behalf of the organizers and participants I wish to express the deepest gratitude to all people and institutions supporting our research, which has opened so many new and fascinating perspectives that it is possible for us to immediately develop the next stages of the project, and to do so with child-like joy and curiosity.

Katarzyna Marciniak
Faculty of “Artes Liberales”, University of Warsaw

FORMER EDITORS OF "EOS": BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES*

ĆWIKLIŃSKI, Ludwik (b. 1853 in Gniezno, d. 1942 in Cracow), founder of "Eos" and editor of vols. I 1894–VII 1901.

Ć. studied classical philology, ancient history, history of philosophy and Slavic studies first in Breslau (now Wrocław) and later in Berlin (1870–1873). Also in Berlin, he submitted a thesis *Quaestiones de tempore, quo Thucydides priorem historiae suae partem composuerit* and received his PhD (1873). He worked as a classics teacher in Berlin and in 1876 was appointed extraordinary professor at the University of Lwów (Lviv). Ć. was head of the II Department of Classics (1876–1902); he was made *ordinarius* in 1879. He was twice dean of the Faculty of Philosophy and (in 1893/1894) rector of the University of Lwów. In 1902 Ć. moved to Vienna where he worked at the Archaeological Institute and as a senior official in the Austrian Ministry of Education; in 1917–1918 he was Minister of Education in the last Austro-Hungarian government. (Earlier, in 1899–1902, Ć. was a member of the Austrian parliament.) After the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the regaining of independence for Poland in 1918 Ć. settled in Poznań where he taught at the newly founded university; in 1928 he was awarded an honorary professorship. Ć.'s last years were marked with sadness: after the outbreak of the Second World War he was detained in a German concentration camp, then stayed at a hospital in Poznań and, finally, in an almshouse for the elderly in Cracow, where he died aged 89. His main areas of research were Greek historiography (especially Thucydides) and poetry as well as Polish-Latin poetry of the Renaissance; he produced the first full edition of Klemens Janicki (*Clementis Ianicii poetae laureatis carmina*, 1930). During his Lwów years, Ć. was very active at promoting classical studies; his most important achievement in this field was the establishment of the Classical Association in 1893 (Societas Philologa, renamed Societas Philologa Polonorum in 1919). A year later, he

* To mark the centenary volume of this journal, and to underline the present-day editors' debt to their predecessors, we are giving below some basic information on the lives and academic achievements of former editors. The biographical notes are arranged alphabetically; the chronological order would be as follows: Ludwik ĆWIKLIŃSKI, Stanisław WITKOWSKI, Tadeusz SINKO, Jan SAJDAK, Ryszard GANSINIEC, Tadeusz ZIELIŃSKI, Franciszek SMOLKA, Jerzy KOWALSKI, Wiktor STEFFEN, Władysław STRZELECKI, Jerzy KRÓKOWSKI, Jerzy ŁANOWSKI, Jan WIKARJAK, Andrzej WÓCIK, Sylwester DWORACKI, Jerzy DANIELEWICZ, Leszek MROZEWICZ and Herbert MYŚLIWIEC.

founded the Association's journal, "Eos". He was president of the Classical Association (1893–1902) and in 1902 he became its first honorary member.

DANIELEWICZ, Jerzy (b. 1942 in Pobiedziska near Poznań), editor (firstly with S. DWORACKI and J. WIKARJAK, then with S. DWORACKI) of vols. LXVII 1979–LXX 1982 and of vols. LXXII 1984, fasc. 2–LXXV 1987, fasc. 1.

D. studied classical philology at the University of Poznań (1959–1964). In 1969 he submitted a thesis on Ovid's descriptive techniques in the *Metamorphoses* (supervised by M. SWOBODA) and received his PhD. In 1976 D. obtained his post-doctoral degree (Pol. "habilitacja") on the basis of a study on the morphology of the ancient hymn. He became *extraordinarius* in 1986 and *ordinarius* in 1995. D. was dean of the Faculty of Letters at the University of Poznań. For 25 years he has been head of the Poznań Department of Greek Studies (1987–2012). As a visiting scholar/visiting professor D. conducted research at universities in Germany, Great Britain, France, Italy, Hungary and Romania. D.'s main research topics are Greek poetry of the archaic, classical and Hellenistic period (especially melic/lyric poetry), Greek and Latin hymns, Greek metrics, Athenaeus and ancient acrostics. Among his recent book publications are the first Polish translation of *The Learned Banqueters* by Athenaeus and an anthology of fragments of Greek comedy with extensive commentary (2010 and 2011, respectively; both co-authored with K. BARTOL). He writes occasional poems in Latin and Greek. Since 1978 D. has been a member of the Committee on Ancient Culture of the Polish Academy of Sciences; he was president of the Committee (2003–2011) and now is its honorary president (since 2012). He is a member of the Polish Academy of Arts and Sciences.

DWORACKI, Sylwester (b. 1937 in Ziemiń near Gostyń), editor (either as sole editor or together with, firstly, J. DANIELEWICZ and J. WIKARJAK, then A. WÓJCIK and, finally, L. MROZEWICZ, J. AXER and H. MYŚLIWIEC, later joined by M. BOROWSKA) of vols. LXVII 1979–XC 2003; since vol. LXXXIII 1995 editor-in-chief. With 24 volumes prepared by him, D. is the longest-standing editor of "Eos".

D. studied classical philology at the University of Poznań (1957–1962) where he submitted his MA thesis, supervised by W. STEFFEN, on Menander's *Dyscolus*. Six years after his graduation he received his PhD on the basis of a dissertation, also supervised by STEFFEN, on the role of scenic accessories in Menander's comedies (later published in *Eos* LVIII 1969/1970 and LIX 1971). He taught at the University of Poznań until his retirement in 2008 (he became *ordinarius* in 1999). Since 2011 D. has been teaching at the State Higher Profession School in Gorzów Wielkopolski. D. spent the academic year 1973/1974 at the Center for Hellenic Studies in Washington, D.C. and since then has been a guest lecturer at several American and European universities. In 1993–1999 D. was vice-rector

of the University of Poznań. D.'s main areas of research are Greek drama – both tragedy (especially Aeschylus) and comedy (Menander and Eupolis; to this latter playwright he devoted his monograph published in 1991, *Eupolis i fragmenty jego komedii*), and two Greek prose authors, Heliodorus and Diodorus of Sicily. In 2000 he published the first modern Polish translation of Heliodorus' *Aethiopica*. In 2013 D. was elected honorary member of the Polish Classical Association, partly in recognition of his long service as editor of "Eos".

GANSINIEC, Ryszard (b. 1888 in Siemianowice Śląskie in Upper Silesia, d. 1958 in Cracow), editor (first with T. SINKO and T. ZIELIŃSKI, afterwards with T. ZIELIŃSKI) of vols. XXV 1921/1922–XXXV 1934.

G. studied classical philology in Münster and Berlin under W. KROLL, H. DIELS, E. NORDEN and U. VON WILAMOWITZ-MOELLENDORFF (1911–1915). In 1917 he received his PhD on the basis of a thesis *De Agathodaemone*, written under the supervision of WILAMOWITZ. Even before his doctorate he was appointed at the newly organized University of Warsaw (1915). In 1919 G. taught at the University of Poznań and a year later he accepted a professorship at the University of Lwów (Lviv). He stayed in Lwów till 1946; during the Soviet occupation of 1939–1941 he taught at the Ukrainian university and during the German occupation he worked in a bookstore and as a clerk. In 1946 he moved to Wrocław and two years later he became a professor of the Jagiellonian University in Cracow, where he stayed for the rest of his life. During his Lwów years he was particularly active at promoting classical studies, also at secondary school level; he edited a number of journals (apart from "Eos") and book series designed to serve this aim. He also founded the series "Eus Supplementa" of which 13 volumes were published during his term as editor of "Eos". In the earlier part of his life G.'s main research interest was in Greek religion, magic, folklore and anthropology, issues which he usually approached from a comparative perspective going as far as the Middle Ages and early modernity. He published, among other studies, some 50 *RE* entries, e.g. *Agathodaimon*, *Katabasis*, *Ritus* and *Ringe* (on the magical function of rings). Later he became more interested in mediaeval and renaissance Latin literature, especially in Poland; he dealt with such authors as Gallus Anonymus, Nicolaus Copernicus, Jan Dantyszek (Ioannes Dantiscus) and Andrzej Krzycki (Andreas Cricius). In 1946 G. was elected member of the Polish Academy of Arts and Sciences. (NB. In the interwar period, when he was editor of "Eos", G. used another form of his name, Ganszyniec. His early publications, e.g. his *RE* entries, are signed Ganschinietz.)

KOWALSKI, Jerzy (b. 1893 in Cracow, d. 1948 in Wrocław), editor of vols. XL 1939, XLI 1940–1946 (the first volume published after the Second World War, with Latin obituaries of Polish classicists who died or were killed during the war) and XLII 1947.

K. studied classical philology and archaeology at the Jagiellonian University in Cracow (1911–1917). In 1917, having submitted a thesis (supervised by T. SINKO) on rhetorical elements in the early writings of Plutarch, he received his PhD. Three years later K. was appointed extraordinary professor at the University of Lwów (Lviv); he also became head of the III Department of Classics. In 1929 he received an ordinary professorship. During the Second World War (till 1943, when he moved to Warsaw) K. lived in Lwów, where he had to earn his living running a tea-room (with his wife and another classicist, J. MANTEUFFEL); he was also active in secret university education and co-operated with the underground press. In 1945 he was briefly professor at the Catholic University in Lublin and later that year he moved to Wrocław, where he was one of the founders of the Faculty of Humanities at the newly organized Polish university (he was the first dean of this faculty, 1945/1946). K.'s main research focus was on Greek rhetorical theory. He published *De artis rhetoricae originibus quaestiones selectae* (1933), *De arte rhetorica I* (1937) and an edition of Hermogenes' *De statibus* (1947). K. was also interested in ancient mythology, ethnography, history and geography (e.g. *Quaestiones hydrographicae*, 1934). Some of his works were devoted to classical influences on Polish culture; his 1936 edition of Adam Mickiewicz's *Wykłady lozańskie* (Lausanne lectures) is of particular importance. K. was also a writer of fiction. Together with his wife (Anna Kowalska) he published four novels, a collection of short stories and memoirs.

KRÓKOWSKI, Jerzy (b. 1898 in Cracow, d. 1967 in Wrocław), editor (firstly with W. STEFFEN and W. STRZELECKI, then with J. ŁANOWSKI and W. STRZELECKI, finally with J. ŁANOWSKI) of vol. XLV 1951, fasc. 1 and of vols. XLVI 1952/1953–LVI 1966.

K. studied at the Jagiellonian University in Cracow (1916–1920) mainly classical philology under K. MORAWSKI, L. STERNBACH and T. SINKO, but also archaeology under P. BIENKOWSKI, Polish philology under I. CHRZANOWSKI and T. GRABOWSKI and history under W. SOBIESKI. In 1922 he obtained a PhD on the basis of a thesis *De Propertio ludibundo*, written under the supervision of K. MORAWSKI. Before the Second World War he taught as a junior member at the Jagiellonian University (till 1927) and worked as a classical languages teacher at several high schools in Cracow, Warsaw and Dąbrowa Górnicza. During the Second World War he was active in clandestine education. In 1946 K. moved to Wrocław to teach at the newly organized university. He received his post-doctoral degree (Pol. “habilitacja”) in 1950; in 1954 was appointed extraordinary professor and became *ordinarius* in 1959. In 1957 he founded the Department of Neo-Latin Studies in the Wrocław Institute of Classics, the first establishment of this kind in Poland. His two main areas of research were classical Latin poetry, especially of the Augustan period, and Polish-Latin literature of the Renaissance. His works on classical subjects include *Quaestiones epicae* (1951) and a book in

Polish on the didactics of love in Augustan elegy (1949) as well as several journal papers (e.g. *Ars amatoria – poème didactique*, Eos LIII 1963; *Die Regulus-Ode des Horaz*, Eos LVI 1966). In the Neo-Latinist area, his editions of the Latin poems by Andrzej Trzecieski (Andreas Trecesius, 1958) and Klemens Janicki (Clemens Ianicius, 1966) are particularly valuable. In his early years, K. was active as an alpinist, and made some first winter ascents in the Tatra Mountains, but he gave up climbing after his sister Zofia (also an alpinist) died in the mountains in 1928. K. was a member of numerous learned societies, including the Renaissance Society of America. In 1956 he was awarded the Officer's Cross of the Order of Polonia Restituta.

ŁANOWSKI, Jerzy (b. 1919 in Lwów/Lviv, d. 2000 in Wrocław), editor (firstly with J. KRÓKOWSKI and W. STRZELECKI, then with J. KRÓKOWSKI, finally as the sole editor) of vol. XLIX 1957/1958, fasc. 2 and of vols. L 1958/1959–LVII 1967/1968.

Ł. started studying classical philology at the University of Lwów in 1937. After Lwów had been incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1939 he continued his studies at the Ukrainian university and later (under the German occupation) he studied at the Polish underground university. During the Second World War Ł. earned his living as a physical worker, doorkeeper and Latin teacher. After the war Ł. graduated from the Ivan Franko National University of Lviv. In 1945 he came to Wrocław and began working at the newly organized Polish university. In Wrocław he wrote his second MA thesis in order to also get a Polish degree; in fact, he was the first post-war university graduate in Wrocław. In 1950 he obtained his PhD, having submitted a thesis *De monostichis Menandri q.d. quaestiones selectae* (published in Eos XLIV 1950). Ł. became extraordinary professor in 1964 and was made *ordinarius* only in 1981 (his nomination was delayed for political reasons). He was twice head of the Institute of Classics (1967–1972 and 1981–1990), dean of the Faculty of Letters (1964–1969) and vice-rector of the University of Wrocław (1956–1959). Ł.'s main topic was Greek classical and Hellenistic poetry, especially drama (Euripides, Menander), but he occasionally dealt also with Latin writers (Livius Andronicus). He was also interested in the history of classical civilisation, particularly in Greek sport (publishing a book in Polish on the Greek Olympic games, 1981) and catalogues of the wonders of the ancient world (a *RE* entry on *Weltwunder*, a paper on Philo of Byzantium in Eos LXXIII 1985). Ł. had a rare gift for translating Greek poetry (all the tragedies of Euripides, Menander and Hesiod). Ł. was a prolific popularizer of ancient culture (talks, newspaper publications, TV and radio broadcasts). Among his friends and associates he was also known as an author of humorous occasional poetry which he signed with his Latin pen-name Georgius Arvalis. Ł. was elected president of the Polish Classical Association (1986–1992) and was its honorary member. In 1993 he was awarded the Officer's Cross of the Order of Polonia Restituta.

MROZEWICZ, Leszek (b. 1951 in Myślubórz), editor (with S. DWORACKI as editor-in-chief and with J. AXER and H. MYŚLIWIEC, later also with M. BOROWSKA) of vols. LXXXIII 1995–XC 2003; earlier (from 1982) the journal's editorial assistant.

M. studied history at the University of Poznań under S. PARNICKI-PUDELKO, W. PAJAŁOWSKI and J. KOLENDO. From 1974 he has been working at the University of Poznań. In 1979, after submitting a thesis on the Romanisation process in Moesia Inferior (supervised by S. PARNICKI-PUDELKO), he received his PhD. In 1988 M. obtained his post-doctoral degree (Pol. "habilitacja") on the basis of a thesis on the municipal aristocracy in the Rhine and Danube provinces of the Early Empire. He became *ordinarius* in 1996. M. headed the Department of the History of the Ancient Societies at the University of Poznań (1997–2012). Since 2009 he has been research director of the University's Collegium Europaeum Gnesnense, and since 2013 of the Institute of European Culture. He took part in Polish archaeological expeditions to Novae in Bulgaria (1976–1988). M. was visiting professor and guest lecturer at several universities in Austria, Germany, Italy, France, Slovakia and Switzerland. M.'s main research area is the history of the Early Roman Empire; in particular he deals with the Rhine and Danube provinces, urbanisation, municipalisation and Romanisation processes as well as with early imperial prosopography and epigraphy. His recent book publications include *Palaeography of Latin Inscriptions from Novae (Lower Moesia)* and *Roman Empire during the Reign of the Flavians* (both 2010). M. is editor of the series "Balcanica Posnaniensia", "Fontes Historiae Antiquae", "Opuscula Gnesnensia", "Studia Europaea Gnesnensia", and "Xenia Posnaniensia". a member of many research societies (including the Association Internationale d'Épigraphie Grecque et Latine), for many years he was president of the Ancient History Commission of the Polish Historical Society.

MYŚLIWIEC, Herbert (b. 1926 in Kochłowice in Upper Silesia, d. 1998 in Wrocław), editor (with S. DWORACKI as editor-in-chief and with J. AXER and L. MROZEWICZ) of vols. LXXXIII 1995 and LXXXIV 1996.

M. studied classical philology at the University of Wrocław under W. STEFFEN, J. KURYŁOWICZ and, in particular, W. STRZELECKI (1948–1952). In 1952 he was appointed as an assistant at the Institute of Classics of this university and he was teaching there, holding various posts (finally he became an extraordinary professor in 1991), for 46 years. M. was interested in the Latin language, especially phonology (phonological changes occurring in late and vulgar Latin), prosody and metrics. Another area of his research was textual criticism, also when applied to fragments of early Latin authors transmitted by grammarians. M. dealt also with Latin-Polish and Polish authors of the early modern period trying to establish their debt to classical tradition; his studies on Walenty Roździeński's *Officina ferraria* are especially important. He did not publish widely, but all

his works show a great deal of diligence, learning and acumen. Most of them are now available in a posthumous collection *Prace filologiczne / Opuscula philologica* (2006).

SAJDAK, Jan (b. 1882 in Burzyn near Tarnów, d. 1967 in Poznań), editor (with T. SINKO) of vols. XXIII 1918 and XXIV 1919/1920; he also co-edited vol. XXXVI 1935 as a member of a 9-person editorial board.

S. studied classical philology as well as classical archaeology, history of philosophy and history of Polish literature at the Jagiellonian University in Cracow (1904–1908) under A. MIODOŃSKI, K. MORAWSKI and L. STERNBACH; in 1909 he continued his studies in Munich. In the same year he submitted a dissertation *Quaestiones Nazianzenicae. Pars prima: Quae ratio inter Gregorium Nazianzenum et Maximum Cynicum intercedat* (see *Eos* XV 1909, pp. 18–48) and obtained his PhD. He worked as a high school teacher and in 1912, after returning from his research stay abroad, received his post-doctoral degree (Pol. “habilitacja”) on the basis of a thesis *De codicibus Graecis in Monte Cassino*. Afterwards S. taught at the Jagiellonian University and, in 1916, he received a professorship at the University of Lwów (Lviv). In 1919 he moved to the newly established University of Poznań where he organized the Department of Classics and where he stayed for the rest of his life. He was rector (1931/1932) and vice-rector (1932/1933) of the University of Poznań and dean of the Faculty of Humanities (twice). His main research focus was Gregory of Nazianzus; apart from his doctoral dissertation his work on this author includes several papers published in “*Eos*” as well as *Anonymi Oxoniensis Lexicon in orationes Gregorii Nazianzeni* (1927) and *Die Scholiasten der Reden des Gregor von Nazianz* (*ByzZ* XXX 1929–1930). S. is one of the pioneers of Byzantine studies in Poland; he published an outline of Byzantine literature (*Zarys literatury bizantyńskiej*, 1933) and studies on John Geometres (*Que signifie Kyriotes Geometres*, *Byzantion* VI 1931). He was the first editor of the series “*Pisma Ojców Kościoła*” (Polish translations of patristic texts, 23 volumes appeared under his direction in 1924–1949, including two volumes personally edited by S.). As a patrologist, he published a large-scale monograph on Tertullian (*Tertulian. Czasy – życie – dzieła*, 1949). He played an important part in the Polish Classical Association, especially as co-founder and long-time president of its Poznań branch (1932–1961). In 1950 he was granted honorary membership of the Association. S. was a corresponding member of the Polish Academy of Arts and Sciences (from 1934) and a member of other academic societies. During the Second World War he was active in underground education. S. was awarded the Officer’s Cross of the Order of Polonia Restituta.

SINKO, Tadeusz (b. 1877 in Mała near Ropczyce in south-eastern Poland, d. 1966 in Cracow), editor of vols. XVI 1910–XXVII 1924 (first seven volumes as sole editor, next five firstly with J. SAJDAK, afterwards with R. GANSINIEC and T. ZIELIŃSKI).

S. studied classical philology, linguistics and history of Polish literature at the Jagiellonian University in Cracow under K. MORAWSKI, L. STERNBACH and A. MIODOŃSKI (1896–1900). In 1900 he submitted his PhD dissertation *De Gregorii Sanocei studiis humanioribus*, written under the supervision of Father S. PAWLICKI and published in *Eos* VI 1900. Later S. pursued his studies abroad, staying in Berlin (1900–1901), Bonn (1901–1902), Munich (1902) and Paris (1905). While in Munich, he worked at the *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae* writing some entries for the early volumes of this dictionary (*bonus* among others). In 1903 he received his post-doctoral degree (Pol. “habilitacja”) on the basis of a thesis *De Romanorum viro bono*. Between 1907 and 1913 he worked at the University of Lwów (Lviv), becoming *ordinarius* in 1911. In 1913 he moved back to Cracow to hold a professorship of classics at the Jagiellonian University; he retired as late as 1960 (when he was 83) and died six years later. S. published extensively in many different fields. He was interested in Hellenic studies (e.g. Herodotus, Alexandrian poetry, Greek novelists), Latin literature (e.g. Vergil, Apuleius), Polish-Latin poetry, classical influences on Polish literature, lexicography, comparative literature, patrology and editorship. His major work is an extensive synthesis of the history of ancient Greek literature, published between 1931 and 1954 in three volumes (3054 pages), *Literatura grecka*. During the interwar period S. was very active as a literary and theatrical critic, but his reviews were usually superficial (he is believed to have served as a prototype for the old-fashioned teacher Professor Pimko, a character in Witold Gombrowicz’s novel *Ferdydurke*). S. was a member of the Polish Academy of Arts and Sciences and the Polish Academy of Sciences; in 1954 he was awarded the Commander’s Cross of the Order of Polonia Restituta.

SMOLKA, Franciszek (b. 1883 in Dąbrowa near Tarnów, d. 1942 in Lwów/Lviv), editor of vols. XXXVII 1936–XXXIX 1938.

S. studied classical philology at the University of Lwów in 1900–1904, then worked as a teacher. In 1908 he obtained a PhD on the basis of a thesis *Quid de Ovidii tragoediae, quae inscripta erat “Medea”, argumento atque compositione statuere liceat*. Afterwards he continued working as a teacher in several high schools in Lwów. Public support made possible his research trips to Greece, Italy and Egypt (1913) as well as papyrology studies in Paris under P. JOUGUET at the École des Hautes Études. He also studied epigraphy in Vienna under A. WILHELM and papyrology under K. WESSELY. Back in Lwów he submitted (in 1924) a thesis on the commercial policy of the Ptolemies (*Zarys polityki handlowej Ptolomeuszów*) and obtained a post-doctoral degree (Pol. “habilitacja”). He was later appointed extraordinary professor of papyrology at the University of Lwów (an ordinary professorship from 1935). One of the first papyrologists in Poland, he published several papers in this field (mainly in “Eos” and “Kwartalnik Klasyczny”) and, together with J. MANTEUFFEL, the first Polish

book-length introduction to papyrology (*Papyrologia*, 1933). He was an active member of the Polish Classical Association (1913–1924 as its secretary, from 1928 as a vice-president).

STEFFEN, Wiktor (b. 1903 in Sząbruk near Olsztyn, d. 1997 in Poznań), editor (with W. STRZELECKI, joined later by J. KRÓKOWSKI) of vols. XLIII 1948–XLVIII 1956 and of vol. XLIX 1957/1958, fasc. 1; also, editor (with J. WIKARJAK) of vols. LVIII 1969/1970–LXVI 1978.

S. studied classical philology at the University of Poznań under J. SAJDAK and W. KLINGER (1924–1927). Appointed junior member of the Department of Classics in Poznań in 1928, three years later he submitted a thesis *De Vergilio in Ioannis Cochanovii carminibus Latinis expresso* and obtained his PhD. He spent the two following years on a scholarship from the Polish National Culture Fund in Berlin studying under E. NORDEN and W. JÄGER. Back in Poznań, he worked as a high school teacher and taught at the university. S. obtained his post-doctoral degree (Pol. “habilitacja”) in 1936. After the outbreak of the Second World War, he took part in the Polish September campaign of 1939, receiving the Cross of Valour. He was captured by the Nazis and detained in a prisoner-of-war camp (where he was active in clandestine university teaching). S. returned to Poznań in 1945 and in the following year he moved to the University of Wrocław where he helped to organize the Institute of Classics. He was appointed extraordinary professor in 1946 and *ordinarius* in 1956. In 1958 S. came back to Poznań where he remained until his death, being active i.a. as head of the Institute of Classics and dean of the Faculty of Letters (1959–1961). His research topics include Greek satyr drama (*Satyrographorum Graecorum reliquiae*, 1935, and a fuller edition published as *Satyrographorum Graecorum fragmenta*, 1952; a monograph *De Graecorum fabulis satyricis*, 1979), Greek tragedy and comedy (including New Comedy), Greek poetry of the archaic and Hellenistic period as well as Polish-Latin literature of the Renaissance. Many of his papers are now available in a three-volume collection *Scripta minora selecta* (1973, 1998). Apart from his classical interests, S. was a keen expert on the Warmian dialect (*Słownik warmiński*, 1984). He also published an autobiography (*Moja droga przez życie*, 1976). S. was elected to the Polish Academy of Sciences (corresponding member since 1967, ordinary member since 1976) and was active in many learned societies. He was elected to honorary membership of the Polish Classical Association and became its honorary president. In 1981 he received an honorary degree from the University of Wrocław. S. was awarded the Officer’s and Commander’s Cross of the Order of Polonia Restituta.

STRZELECKI, Władysław (b. 1905 in Lwów/Lviv, d. 1967 in Cracow), editor (firstly with W. STEFFEN, joined later by J. KRÓKOWSKI, afterwards with J. KRÓKOWSKI and J. ŁANOWSKI) of vols. XLIII 1948/1949–LI 1961.

S. studied classical and Polish philology firstly at the Jagiellonian University in Cracow and later at the University of Warsaw under T. ZIELIŃSKI and G. PRZYCHOCKI (1924–1929). Also in Warsaw, he submitted a thesis *De tragicorum Romanorum memoria apud Nonium servata* in 1929 and received his PhD. On a scholarship from the Polish National Culture Fund he spent some time in Berlin, Göttingen and St. Andrews, establishing contacts with such scholars as E. NORDEN, E. FRAENKEL and, especially, M.W. LINDSAY. In the thirties S. worked as a classical languages teacher in Warsaw secondary schools; in 1934 he received his post-doctoral degree (Pol. “habilitacja”) on the basis of a thesis *Quaestiones Verrianae*. In 1939 S. was appointed extraordinary professor at the Catholic University of Lublin, an appointment which he never took up due to the outbreak of the Second World War. Deprived of his library and research notes (which were destroyed when his Warsaw flat was bombed by Germans in September 1939), he spent the war years living in his family’s house in a village in southern Poland. In 1946 he moved to Wrocław to teach at the newly organized Polish university – firstly as an extraordinary professor, then from 1948 as *ordinarius* and head of the Institute of Classics (1948–1958). In 1958 he moved to Cracow to work at the Jagiellonian University where he remained until his premature death nine years later. During his Cracow years he was dean of the Faculty of Letters (1960–1964). S. worked on early Latin poetry, especially Naevius and tragedy (his *De Naeviano belli Punici carmine quaestiones selectae* of 1935 was a landmark in Naevian studies), Roman metrics (*De Senecae trimetro iambico quaestiones selectae*, 1938) and grammarians (Verius Flaccus, Flavius Caper, Nonius Marcellus). He published two Teubner editions, of Naevius’ *Bellum Punicum* (1964) and of Ateius Capito (1967). S. was awarded the Officer’s Cross of the Order of Polonia Restituta.

WIKARJAK, Jan (b. 1914 in Michałków near Ostrów Wielkopolski, d. 1983 in Poznań), editor (firstly with W. STEFFEN, then with S. DWORACKI and J. DANIELEWICZ, finally with S. DWORACKI) of vols. LVIII 1969/1970–LXXI 1983.

W. studied classical philology, philosophy and Polish philology at the University of Poznań under W. KLINGER, J. SAJDAK and J. DZIECH (1931–1935) and obtained his MA on the basis of a thesis *De abstractionibus personatis apud Graecae comoediae poetas*. After graduating, he worked as a high school teacher. During the Second World War W. organised secret teaching. From 1945 he worked at the University of Poznań; in 1947 he submitted a thesis *De Menedemo a Lycophrone in fabula satyrica irriso*, written under the supervision of W. KLINGER, and obtained a PhD. He became *ordinarius* in 1971. W. was dean of the Faculty of Letters (1956–1958 and 1965–1968), vice-rector of the University of Poznań (1968–1978), he also headed the Department (later Institute) of Classics (from 1974). He published on both Greek and Latin literature, e.g. on Herodotus (a monograph in Polish *Historia powszechna Herodota*, 1961)

and on Cicero (a book on his literary workshop *Warsztat pisarski Cyserona*, 1976), also on the so-called *Commentariolum petitionis*. Another field of his interest was post-classical literature in Latin. Some of his papers are now available in a collection *Od Grecji Herodota i Rzymu Cyserona do średniowiecza i renesansu w Polsce* (2007). Together with K. LIMAN he co-edited *Monumenta Poloniae Historica*. W. was the first editor of the Poznań-based classical journal “Symbolae Philologorum Posnaniensium” (1973–1984). He was a member of the International Commission of the *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae*. W. was awarded the Officer’s and Commander’s Cross of the Order of Polonia Restituta.

WITKOWSKI, Stanisław (b. 1866 in Andrychów near Wadowice, d. 1950 in Warsaw), editor of vols. VIII 1902–XV 1915; he also co-edited vol. XXXVI 1935 as a member of a 9-person editorial board.

W. studied classical and Slavonic philology in Cracow under K. MORAWSKI and M. ISKRZYCKI (1887–1891). He obtained a PhD in 1893 at the Jagiellonian University in Cracow after submitting a dissertation *De vocibus hybridis apud antiquos Romanos*, supervised by K. MORAWSKI. In 1894–1897 he continued his studies in Berlin under H. DIELS and in Göttingen under F. KIELHORN, F. LEO and U. VON WILAMOWITZ-MOELLENDORFF (classics, archaeology, comparative grammar and Sanskrit). W. firstly worked as a high school teacher in Cracow, then as an education official in Lwów (Lviv); in 1899 he obtained his post-doctoral degree (Pol. “habilitacja”) and in 1902 became a professor at the University of Lwów where he was active till his retirement in 1935. Among his many publications there are large monographs on Greek historiography (*Historiografia grecka i nauki pokrewne*, 3 vols., 1925–1927) and Greek tragedy (*Tragedia grecka*, 2 vols., 1930); he also published on the history of Greece, especially of the Hellenistic period. With his early work *Prodromus grammaticae papyrorum Graecorum aetatis Lagidarum* (1897) he established himself as the pioneer of papyrology in Poland; there followed papyrological papers published in “Eos”, “Archiv für Papyrusforschung”, “Glotta”, “Wiener Studien”, as well as his most significant achievement, a Teubner edition of *Epistulae privatae Graecae, quae in papyris aetatis Lagidarum servantur* (1906). Another area of his interest was the history of the Greek language, especially *koine*; in 1936 he published a handbook on Greek historical syntax (*Historyczna składnia grecka na tle porównawczym*). Apart from antiquity, he worked also on Polish-Latin writers of the Middle Ages and Renaissance such as a thirteenth-century doctor Mikołaj of Poland (*Lekarz Mikołaj z Polski, nowo odkryty pisarz łaciński XIII w.*, 1919), Jan of Wiślica and Paweł of Krosno. W. was a member of the Polish Academy of Arts and Sciences and Warsaw Scientific Society. In 1919–1924 he was president of the Polish Classical Association and in 1926 he was granted honorary membership. In 1929 W. was awarded the Commander’s Cross of the Order of Polonia Restituta.

WÓJCIK, Andrzej (b. 1926 in Babice near Oświęcim, d. 2009 in Poznań), editor (with S. DWORACKI) of vol. LXXV 1987, fasc. 2 and of vols. LXXVI 1988–LXXIX 1991.

During the Second World War W. worked as a laboratory assistant (1943–1945) and attended clandestine education courses. After the war, he studied classical and Polish philology at the University of Poznań under J. DZIECH, W. KLINGER, J. SAJDAK, W. STEFFEN, F. DUBAS, J. STAHR and R. POLLAK (1945–1949). W. obtained his MA on the basis of a thesis *Quatenus Catullus differat ab Horatio*, written under the supervision of J. DZIECH. From 1949 W. worked at the University of Poznań (firstly as a junior member, then a lecturer, and finally a professor). In 1962, after submitting a thesis on the formation of the legend of Cato the Elder in antiquity (supervised by J. WIKARJAK), W. obtained his PhD. In 1977 he obtained his post-doctoral degree (Pol. “habilitacja”) on the basis of a thesis on Horace’s views on literature. He also dealt with Cato the Elder, Horace and other Augustan poets in his other publications; one of the most important is an extensive monograph on Horace (*Talent i sztuka. Rzecz o poezji Horacego*, 1986). W. was one of the contributors to the four-volume Greek-Polish dictionary edited by Z. ABRAMOWICZÓWNA. Together with K. LIMAN he co-edited “Symbolae Philologorum Posnaniensum”, a Poznań-based classical journal (1985–2001). W. was awarded the Knight’s Cross of the Order of Polonia Restituta.

ZIELIŃSKI, Tadeusz (b. 1859 in Skrzypczyńce near Humań/Uman in central Ukraine, d. 1944 in Schondorf am Ammersee in Upper Bavaria), editor (firstly with R. GANSINIEC and T. SINKO, afterwards with R. GANSINIEC) of vols. XXV 1921/1922–XXXV 1934; he also co-edited vol. XXXVI 1935 as a member of a 9-person editorial board.

Z. studied classical philology, archaeology and epigraphy in Leipzig, Munich and Vienna (1876–1881); while in Leipzig he obtained his PhD on the basis of a dissertation on the last years of the second Punic war (1880). Before the First World War he worked at the Petersburg State University (he became *ordinarius* in 1890). He taught also in the University of Dorpat (Tartu). In 1922 Z. moved to Poland and was appointed professor at the University of Warsaw (in 1935 he was awarded honorary professorship). Following the outbreak of the Second World War Z. (whose flat in Warsaw was destroyed by a German bomb) was taken by his son, a teacher in Bavaria, to his house in Schondorf am Ammersee where he stayed until his death, finishing his multi-volume history of classical religions. Z.’s research covered a vast area of topics, e.g. Greek tragedy and comedy (*Die Gliederung der attischen Komödie*, 1885), the reception of Cicero (*Cicero im Wandel der Jahrhunderte*, 1897), comparative literature, Greek and Roman religious history, classical influences on Polish literature. His two arguably most important works deal with Homer’s method of narrating

simultaneous events (*Die Behandlung gleichzeitiger Ereignisse im antiken Epos*, 1901) and the prose rhythm of Cicero's speeches (*Das Clauselgesetz in Ciceros Reden*, 1904). Z. was a member of many academies of arts and sciences, he received a number of honorary doctorates (e.g. of the universities of Athens, Brussels, Oxford and Paris), and was awarded the Commander's Cross with Star of the Order of Polonia Restituta. He was also an honorary member of the Polish Classical Association. In a Latin obituary published in the first post-war volume of "Eos" Z. is described as "ingenium vix in singula saecula cadens".

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