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MAŁGORZATA BOROWSKA

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EDITORES  
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COMMENTARII EDUNTUR ADMINISTRANTUR

PL-50-139 WROCLAW, UL. SZEWSKA 49  
INSTYTUT FILOLOGII KLASYCZNEJ I KULTURY ANTYCZNEJ  
UNIwersytetu WROCLAWSKIEGO  
e-mail: eos@uni.wroc.pl

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DID SOPHOCLES KNOW THE *PROMETHEUS BOUND*?

By

ROBERT R. CHODKOWSKI

This seemingly naive question whether Sophocles knew the *Prometheus Bound* entails some essential implications with regard to one of the issues most debated among classical scholars, namely, the authenticity of the *Prometheus Bound* as a work of Aeschylus. A positive answer to this question would considerably make the old tragic the author of this drama<sup>1</sup>. Working on a translation of Sophocles' *Electra* I analysed this play. My attention then focused on a clear likelihood of its compositional structure to the structure of the *Prometheus Bound* and a likelihood of the scenic status of the titular heroes. Ultimately, I noticed a similarity of the dramatic situations of the two heroes in which the two great tragedians placed them.

Let us begin with a compositional structure. Briefly speaking, we may present it in the following way:

A. The compositional structure of the *Prometheus Bound*:

<i>praxis</i> (1–87): basic action	<i>pathos</i> (88–943): intrusive action	<i>praxis</i> (944–1093): basic action
The beginning of Zeus' action towards Prometheus	The picture of the Titan's sufferings and hesitations	Zeus' completion of his revenge on Prometheus

B. The compositional structure of the *Electra*:

<i>praxis</i> (1–85): basic action	<i>pathos</i> (88–1325): intrusive action	<i>praxis</i> (1325–1509): basic action
The beginning of Orestes' action as the avenger	The picture of Electra's sufferings and hesitations	Orestes' completes his action as the avenger

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<sup>1</sup> The case for authenticity is well put by Herington 1970. See also Griffith 1977; Pattoni 1987; West 1990; Zawadzka 1966.

This compositional structure may undoubtedly be called a frame structure. Charles Paul Segal<sup>2</sup> wrote about this structure of Sophocles' *Electra* already in 1966. His thought was continued by Albin Lesky who claimed that in Sophocles' tragedy "schliessen sich die Vorbereitung der Tat im Prolog und ihre Durchführung rahmend zusammen"<sup>3</sup>. It is my belief that the *Prometheus Bound* has a frame composition as well, although I understand it differently than Segal, because in this tragedy action initiated in the prologue is interrupted and resumed at the end. This action, similarly as in the *Electra*, overarches another action.

In order to make my considerations clearer I assume the term "basic action" for the main actions, whereas for the events within their frameworks I take the name "intrusive (included) action". The subjects of basic actions are respectively Zeus and Apollo, whereas of intrusive actions Prometheus and Electra. Only these two dramas have such exceptional compositional structure.

Among the thirty two Greek tragedies that have been preserved we find several compositional structures, or the organisational forms of the presented world. The majority of plays have a linear composition, as for instance *Oresteia* of Aeschylus, *Antigone* of Sophocles or *Medea* of Euripides. Action here runs the course of a chronological order of events. We also have plays, however, that are regarded as clearly double, as *Seven against Thebes* of Aeschylus, *The Women of Trachis* of Sophocles or *Andromache* of Euripides. Now *The Women of Troy* by Euripides represent of composition of loosely linked scenes of lamentation or a series of tragic pictures that show the fortune of Trojan captive women. Eventually, we have also Sophocles' *King Oedipus*, a tragedy of inverse composition that resembles Homer's *Odyssey*. Therefore let us repeat: only the *Prometheus Bound* and Sophocles' *Electra* have a frame composition. In this composition basic action, initiated in the prologue, is for a time interrupted or removed into the world beyond the stage<sup>4</sup>, to leave place for a new action and new figures. These new, intrusive actions organically stem from the basic actions, but at the same time they are autonomous in the whole structure of the dramas under discussion. Their autonomy is determined by formal delimitation, withdrawal, and then reappearance of the persons involved in the basic action. This autonomy is also expressed by different contents: the central parts of the two dramas show not so much action as sensation, therefore they are not *praxeis*, but rather *pathea* of the titular heroes' (Prometheus' and Electra's, respectively) sufferings, if we use the terminology from Aristotle's *Poetics*. Furthermore, in the two cases sufferings are presented in a narrative rather than in dramatic form: the viewer does not watch those *pathea* in the act of their sensation, but above

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<sup>2</sup> Segal 1966: 480.

<sup>3</sup> Lesky 1972: 236.

<sup>4</sup> Some Orestes' actions in the *Electra*, as the offerings on Agamemnon's tomb, take place in the space that is not accessible to the viewer.



all while the narrants experience them. The narrants are obviously Prometheus and Electra. They both mainly report on their sufferings and persecutions they experience from their enemies. In order to break the monotony of this form of presenting the *pathea* of the two heroes, both poets introduce some outsiders; the heroes enter into dialogue with them and thereby they gain new possibilities by which to express their pain and sense of harm. In this manner of presenting intrusive actions I notice a certain similarity, and in consequence Sophocles' dependence on the author of the *Prometheus Bound*, this time with regard to dramatic technique. I shall return to this issue.

In the tragedy ascribed to Aeschylus, Zeus suspends persecuting Prometheus, the action started in the prologue, at the moment when the oppressors leave. And in the same prologue this action leaves place to the presentation of the Titan's sufferings and quandaries. Zeus is not alone on the stage, but acts through the executor of his will: Hephaestus, Strength (Kratos) and Violence (Bia). The suspended action will be resumed at the end of the play, when the Titan is hurled down to Tartarus for long-lasting tortures. And here again Zeus, although still absent, takes action through his envoy, Hermes.

Sophocles uses a similar compositional structure in the *Electra*. The prologue to this play opens with an act of revenge that Orestes orders to Apollo. This action is also suspended for a longer time and resumed only at the end of the play<sup>5</sup>. Within such frameworks, Sophocles, following the pattern of his predecessor, places the scenes of Electra's suffering and quandary, i.e. the intrusive action. It is only after them that he allows Orestes to fulfil his revenge anticipated in the prologue.

Now let us proceed to a more detailed justification of our thesis. In the prologue to the *Prometheus* the main figure, apart from the Titan, is the absent Zeus. He is absent from the stage, but is constantly alluded to (10, 34, 50, 62, 67). Hephaestus, Kratos and Bia are instrumental figures, the executors of his will. Bia is mute (*kophon prosopon*). The same Zeus, although still physically absent, will return in the form of his envoy, Hermes, when the action of persecution is again resumed. The sending of the Titan to Tartarus for horrible tortures in the act of the final catastrophe is not the work of Hermes, but of Zeus himself.

Prometheus is indeed physically present in the opening scene, but he is not the subject, but rather the object. He is not the subject to such an extent that some even assume that he was replaced by a dummy<sup>6</sup>. He starts speaking at the end of

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<sup>5</sup> The figures of Orestes, Pylades and the Paedagogus are subjects to functional decomposition: they also appear in the intrusive action, but the reason is that the playwright could show further stages of Electra's suffering. In contrast to the *Libation Bearers* of Aeschylus and *Electra* of Euripides, the main action of the play in Sophocles' tragedy is possible without the scene of recognition. The scene with the urn is mainly supposed to expose Electra's seeming failure. In Sophocles such scenes, therefore, are important because of Electra's *pathea*, not Orestes' *praxis*.

<sup>6</sup> The "dummy" theory is presented by Taplin 1977: 243–245.

the prologue, a fact that introduces a new and intrusive action that is supposed to present his sufferings and quandaries.

The situation in the *Electra* is similar. First we see the executors of Apollo's will, while he is physically absent. Orestes points to his order expressed in the oracle (38): ὅτ' οὖν τοιόνδε χρησμὸν εἰσηκούσαμεν<sup>7</sup>. Here we also have three figures that fulfil the will of the absent person: the Paedagogus, Orestes, and Pylades. Pylades is mute. These figures, like in the *Prometheus* Hephaestus, Kratos and Bia, originated the basic action, and then they disappear to return as late as in the second part of the play<sup>8</sup>. The Paedagogus' calling to action from the prologue (22): ἴν' οὐκέτ' ὀκνεῖν καιρός, ἀλλ' ἔργον ἀκμή, and Orestes' words, closing the initial action, when the plan of action is revealed (75 f.): νῶ δ' ἔξιμεν καιρός γάρ, ὅσπερ ἀνδράσι/ μέγιστος ἔργου παντός ἐστ' ἐπιστάτης, are reminded by the Paedagogus. In the second part he calls the brother and sister to take action, and he reminds the audience that the act of revenge, anticipated in the prologue, will eventually be resumed. Here are his callings (1337–1339): εἴσω παρέλθεθ' ὡς τὸ μὲν μέλλειν κακὸν/ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἔστ', ἀπηλλάχθαι δ' ἀκμή, and 1368: νῦν καιρός ἔρδειν.

The words highlighted in the text make a bridge between two separate parts of the basic action. The fact that the Paedagogus so clearly draws on the formulations from the prologue indicates that the intrusive action is coming to an end. The basic action is resumed and the repeated calling to action is a clear border for the intrusive action. In the *Prometheus* there is no such a verbal delimitation, a fact that may indicate that Sophocles, who is the imitator, wants to be more perfect than his model<sup>9</sup>. I think, however, that the fact that the figures of the basic action in the *Electra* occur in the intrusive action also calls for a formal delimitation (see n. 5 above).

In both plays the figures that take part in the basic action of the prologues fulfil similar functions: they provide expositional information while they introduce themselves and define the place of action and anticipate its further course. Two first elements are nothing extraordinary. They are in accord with the convention. What is unconventional is the third element: the anticipation of the further course of action (*praxis*). The remaining plays of the poets do not contain this element. In Aeschylus Hephaestus expresses compassion for Prometheus, provides an extended picture of the future tortures that the Titan will experience by the will of the cruel Zeus (21–25 and 31–34):

Nor sound of human voice nor shape of man  
Shall visit thee; but the sun-blaze shall roast

<sup>7</sup> “Since, then, we have had such oracle addressed to us” (trans. by J.H. Kells).

<sup>8</sup> In the *Prometheus Bound* the figures from the prologue in the second part of *praxis* no longer appear. They are replaced by another agent of Zeus' will, Hermes.

<sup>9</sup> In this kind of conduct we may notice a motive of competition (*zelos*).

Thy flesh; thy hue, flower-fair, shall suffer change;  
 Welcome will Night be when with spangled robe  
 She hides the light of day; welcome the sun  
 Returning to disperse the frosts of dawn.

[...]

Wherefore thy long watch shall be comfortless,  
 Stretched on this rock, never to close an eye  
 Or bend a knee; and vainly shalt thou lift,  
 With groanings deep and lamentable cries,  
 Thy voice; for Zeus is hard to be entreated... (trans. by E.D.A. Morshead).

Sophocles' *prologidzontes* also anticipate the future. In his *rhesis* Orestes presents the Paedagogus with a detailed plan of revenge on the father's murderers: he accurately describes what the old servant is supposed to do and to say; he also establishes a role for himself and for Pylades (38–58). Someone might say: well, this is Euripides' technique! Indeed, such anticipations of the further course of action are frequently present in the prologues to Euripides' tragedies (*Hippolytus*, *Hecabe*, *Orestes*, *Iphigenia among the Taurians*, *The Bacchantes*). But what is the difference? In Euripides this procedure is something artificial because from the point of view of dramatic technique it is entirely futile and additional. H.D.F. Kitto claims even that "if anything is foreshadowed [*scil.* in Euripides], it is something that is destined not to be fulfilled"<sup>10</sup>.

In the two plays of Aeschylus and Sophocles discussed here, this anticipation is necessary because the poets suspend for a long time the action anticipated and initiated in the prologues in order to concentrate on the intrusive action. Owing to such anticipations, the viewer may be certain that the suspended action will be continued.

In both plays the titular heroes appear already in the prologue, but at the same time they do not take part in a dialogue with other figures. Prometheus is by necessity on the proscenium since the beginning as the figure that is being chained and then chained to the rock. Aeschylus removes him from the dialogue by silence, an act by which the Titan shows his contempt for the oppressors. It is true that Electra appears only in the second part of the prologue, but she does not converse with the *prologidzontes* (Orestes and the Paedagogus) as well, for Sophocles does not wish here premature encounter with her brother: Orestes, Pylades, and the Paedagogus hear Electra's lamentation that comes from within, but before she leaves the palace they leave the proscenium. Therefore both playwrights allow their heroes (Prometheus and Electra) to speak only after the earlier conversing figures have gone.

When Prometheus and Electra are finally allowed to speak, their utterances are comparable with regard to the number of lines (41 and 35), they have a twofold

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<sup>10</sup> Kitto 1961: 281.

composition, they are delimited by emotional exclamation marks and metrically marked (*Prom.* 113 f.: ᾗ ᾗ/ ἔα ἔα, *El.* 103: ἀλλ' οὐ μὲν δή). Having informed the viewer as to the nature and position of the main figures in the first part of those presentations, in the second part the poets make their heroes concentrate on the wrongs they have experienced from their persecutors. Eventually, they express their anxiety. Prometheus have some fears about his future (127): πᾶν μοι φοβερὸν τὸ προσέρπον. Electra is also afraid of her solitude (119 f.): μούνη γὰρ ἄγειν οὐκέτι σωκῶ/ λύπης ἀντίρροπον ἄχθος.

When the author of the *Prometheus Bound* and Sophocles in the final parts of their prologues allow their heroes to speak, their utterances are similar also from the point of view of literary form: Prometheus and Electra use a lyrical monologue. As R.W.B. Burton writes:

*Electra* is the only extant play of Sophocles which introduces the principal actor with a monody before the entry of the chorus. This technique appears first in Aeschylus' *Prometheus* where Prometheus' first utterance is a mixture of spoken iambs and recited anapests with a burst of lyric as he hears the chorus' approach [...]. The use of song or a mixture of song, recitation, and speech for the principal actor's first utterance in a play isolates his personality, increases the pathos of his situation, and evokes a heightened emotional response from audience and reader<sup>11</sup>.

Both Prometheus and Electra open their utterances with an apostrophe to the elements and forces of nature. They summon them as witnesses of their respective harm and misery. Here are Prometheus' words (*Prom.* 88–92):

O divine ether, and swift-winged winds,  
And river-fountains, and of ocean waves  
The multitudinous laughter, and thou Earth,  
Boon mother of us all, and thou bright round  
Of the all-seeing Sun, you I invoke!  
Behold what ignominy of causeless wrongs  
I suffer from the gods, myself a god (trans. by J.S. Blackie).

Sophocles puts in the mouth of his pained heroine an analogous appeal (*El.* 86–90):

O holy light and air that has an equal share of earth, how many dirges have you heard me sing, and how many blows have you heard me aim against my bleeding breast, when dusky night has been left behind! (trans. by H. Lloyd-Jones).

Obviously, any analogy between the two texts does not consist in exactly the same formulations, although the most important words, “the elements from the

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<sup>11</sup> Burton 1980: 189.

cosmology of Empedocles”, as J. Ferguson defines it<sup>12</sup>, i.e. φάος/ἥλιος, αἰθήρ/ἀήρ and γῆ recur in both playwrights. Rather, it consists in the fact that the heroes’ utterances both begin with an apostrophe in which the external forces are summoned to be witnesses of the speaker’s misery. As those who suffer persecution, they also turn the attention of the play’s other figures (internal audience) on themselves and make their suffering the main theme of this part of the tragedies. We have a kind of the theatre within the theatre. They both as if call to the audience: “behold what [...] I suffer” and make a show of their torment. The theatre within the theatre indeed consists in introducing a kind of show into the presented world in a dramatic work<sup>13</sup>.

From that moment onwards both Prometheus and Electra stand on the proscenium all the time through the successive episodes and stasima as the figures approached by others. They constantly persist in their protest against the violence of their respective persecutors<sup>14</sup>. The Titan is indeed chained to the rock, but if he had given in and humbled himself before Zeus, he could have been released (cf. *Prom.* 339). His stubbornness therefore results from his free choice and becomes a visible sign of his protest against Zeus’ tyranny and injustice that he had to face for the good he made for people. Electra left a royal house and would remain outside out of her own will. Thus she wanted to protest against the tyranny of Aegisthus and Clytaemnestra. Therefore both playwrights through their heroes make us, the audience in the theatre, see the victims who suffer punishment imposed on them by the tyrants who thus punish the good made to others: Prometheus saved people from a sure extermination from Zeus’ hands (cf. *Prom.* 231–235) and through his gift of fire he ensured for them dignified life standards and development. Now he is waiting to be rescued thanks to his mystery (*Prom.* 168 f.); Electra saved Orestes from a sure death at the hands of Agamemnon’s assassins and she is waiting for him as her saviour and avenger of her father (cf. *El.* 13 and 296) which is the reason why she is being persecuted by her mother and her lover (*El.* 294–303). Neither Prometheus nor Electra hide their deeds and plans. On the contrary, they boast of them before all. The dramatic situation of the two heroes is thus almost identical.

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<sup>12</sup> Ferguson 1972: 115.

<sup>13</sup> The call to the forces of nature in Greek tragedy is frequent (*locus communis*), but its character is nowhere comparable to that in the two plays under discussion in which the forces are called upon to be witnesses of injustice.

<sup>14</sup> Knox 1964: 45 observes some similarity between the situation of Prometheus and the situations of Philoctetes and Oedipus when he writes: “The hero, like Philoctetes, like Oedipus at Colonus, is fixed, in his case literally, in one place; the action is a sequence of visits by others who come to deceive, persuade, or threaten”. This kind of resemblance is purely external. Philoctetes and Oedipus remain in one place of the action, but they do not put a special meaning on it, they do not make of it the theatre within the theatre, as it is the case in the *Prometheus* and *Electra*. Moreover, unlike Prometheus and Electra, Philoctetes and Oedipus do not stay constantly on the proscenium.

Another trait that makes the two figures, Prometheus and Electra, similar is their awareness of solitude. The Titan thus complains that he alone stood to defend people and opposed Zeus' injustice (*Prom.* 234–236):

And these designs none contravened but me.  
I risked the bold attempt, and saved mankind  
From stark destruction and the road to hell (trans. by E.D.A. Morshead).

In like manner Electra acts on behalf of her father's honour and again she alone stands to defend her father mourn after him (*El.* 100–102):

And from none but me does your due of lamentation come, father, though your death was so dreadful and so pitiful! (trans. by H. Lloyd-Jones).

Aeschylus' *καὶ τοῖσιν οὐδεὶς ἀντέβαινε πλὴν ἐμοῦ* echoed in Sophocles' *κ(αὶ) οὐδεὶς τούτων οἶκτος ἀπ' ἄλλης/ ἢ μοῦ φέρεται*.

Now let us proceed to the *parodoi*. In the two plays the initial songs have an untypical and at the same time similar (though not identical!) structure of a lyrical dialogue between the chorus and the titular heroes. It is not a uniform song, as in most plays of Aeschylus and Sophocles. Such a structure of the *parodos* appears in Sophocles for the first time in the *Electra*. The last two preserved tragedies, the *Philoctetes* and the *Oedipus in Colonus*, will show a further development of this form<sup>15</sup>. The choruses in the two plays are on the side of the suffering heroes, they support them and show solidarity with their attitudes. In the *Prometheus* and the *Electra* the lyrical dialogues of the *parodos* continue, as far as their content is concerned, the monody of the heroes from the prologues: they develop the motives which have been signalled then. Therefore they show their tragic situation with more details, i.e. their helplessness and the omnipotence of their persecutors. In the two plays "the chorus and the actor are brought into contact with each other through the medium of sung dialogue", hence the choreuts can make an attempt to lessen the stubbornness of their interlocutors. They are ineffective in both plays.

After the lyrical dialogue (*amoibaion*) the two poets allow their heroes to present their reasons by way of extended speeches. In his long *rhexis* (*Prom.* 197–241), Prometheus reaches far back to the past to the rebellion of tyrants, the revolt he commanded on the side of Zeus and helped him defeat the rebels. He also tells us how he rescued mankind when the father of gods wanted to destroy them. Finally, he speaks about his undeserved punishment for his friendly help he showed to people. In like manner Electra goes back to the past (*El.* 254–309). She brings to mind the circumstances of her father's death at the hands of Aegisthus and Clytaemnestra. Then she tells us how Orestes was rescued from

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<sup>15</sup> See Burton 1980: 190.

the hands of oppressors and informs about the consequences of this situation that were tragic for her. Prometheus closes his speech with a complaint that he himself took pity on people and now nobody is willing to have pity on him (*Prom.* 239). Electra has similar complaints that she saved her brother, and today Orestes delays in his return and destroys her hopes to revenge her father's death<sup>16</sup>.

In the first episode Oceanus, a relative of the suffering Titan, comes to Prometheus. His attitude is not unambiguous. A. Lesky is right in claiming that it is difficult to evaluate "Wie weit ist Okeanos bei dem leidenden Gott einer verwandtschaftlichen Verpflichtung entledigen?"<sup>17</sup>. A similar figure in Sophocles' play is Chrysothemis. Her attitude is also not unambiguous. On the one hand she sympathises with her sister and her standpoint. At the same time, however, she attempts (not unlike Oceanus addressing Prometheus, *Prom.* 304–329), to persuade Electra to give up her unwavering attitude of revolt against the tyrants and to make her stop her lamenting protests (*El.* 328–340). They both also warn their respective interlocutors that they will have to pay for their stubbornness with an even fiercer punishment (*Prom.* 311–314; *El.* 379–384). Eventually, both Oceanus and Chrysothemis appeal to the rebels' prudence (*Prom.* 328: "albeit thy brain is subtle" – ὦν περισσόφρων; *El.* 384: "now you have the chance to show good sense!")<sup>18</sup>.

Some similarities can be observed in the interventions of Hermes (*Prom.* 944 ff.) and Clytaemnestra (*El.* 516 ff.). Hermes arrives at Prometheus to break his rebellious stubbornness at the last attempt. Clytaemnestra comes with a similar goal in view. She wants to force Electra to come back home and abandon her public protest. Both encounters are characterised by an extremely heated exchange. Hermes and Clytaemnestra act ruthlessly: from the position of power they demand absolute subordination to the will of the ruler, namely to Zeus and Aegisthus, respectively. Both these interventions fail, and the playwrights take advantage of them to enhance the cause of their titular heroes and to emphasise their indomitable spirit and determination.

The *Prometheus Bound* was probably the first part of a trilogy. It closes with the catastrophe of the titular hero who in the exodus is sent to Tartarus. In the second, lost part of this trilogy, the tyrant was liberated in accordance with his earlier predictions (see *Prom.* 187–192)<sup>19</sup>. Sophocles' play, on the other hand, is not a part of a trilogy. It is a completed work with regard to its composition

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<sup>16</sup> Romilly 1970: 91–96 writes that the common trait of Sophocles' heroes is their solitude ("tous se débattent dans la solitude", p. 93), but Electra's solitude is the closest to Prometheus' solitude. They both feel abandoned by those to whom they showed kindness.

<sup>17</sup> Lesky 1972: 137.

<sup>18</sup> It is usually assumed that Chrysothemis plays a similar role to that played by Ismene in the *Antigone*, but this is only partially true because her figure is much complex. She is a messenger of Clytaemnestra and actually accepts her mother's point of view. Ismene, on the other hand, has nothing in common with Creon.

<sup>19</sup> See Griffith 2000: 33.

and contents, but it also has a catastrophe and then liberation – *apallage ponon*. Electra faces a catastrophe when in the second part of the play she learns about the death of her brother. Later on, however, she is released, like Prometheus, from her suffering and fears with which she lived. She is liberated from the tyrannous power of her father’s murderers, a fact that takes place in the exodus of the same tragedy. To her question: τέθνηκεν ἡ τάλαινα; Orestes responds: μηκέτ’ ἐκφοβο μητρῶιον ὡς σε λῆμ’ ἀτιμάσει ποτέ (*El.* 1426 f.).

Thus despite these and many other differences which result, for instance, from different plots, one can notice clear similarities between the *Prometheus Bound* and the *Electra*. They are found in their basic compositional structure and in the presentation of the titular heroes and the episodic figures.

The similarities I have found do not exhaust the influence of Aeschylus’ play on the tragedy of his younger fellow-playwright. We may observe this similarity also in the theatrical dimension, namely, in the scenic status of the two titular heroes. Prometheus and Electra, as it has been said, remain on the proscenium from the prologue onward until the end of the play. In like manner they attract our attention as the most important element of the scenic tableau and focus the interest of the other *dramatis personae* and, obviously, of the audience. Their continuous and dominant presence in the scenic space is by itself significant as a sign of harm. As I have already said, it is the theatre within the theatre. Prometheus several times turns our attention to this. Here are the most characteristic examples. Hearing the sound of the coming Oceanids he cries to us, although he does not know yet who they are (119): ὁρᾶτε δεσμώτην με δύσποτμον θεόν. In a similar manner, but with bitter irony, he says to Oceanus (304–306):

δέρκου θέαμα, τόνδε τὴν Διὸς φίλον,  
τὸν συγκαταστήσαντα τὴν τυραννίδα,  
οἴαις ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ πημοναῖσι κάμπτομαι.

Look on this sight – thy friend, the friend of Jove,  
Who helped him to the sway which now he bears,  
Crushed by the self-same god himself exalted (trans. by J.S. Blackie).

Electra also attracts our attention with her harm and her protest before the royal house. It is already in the prologue that she sings woefully and she indicates her stubborn persistence before the palace and its significance as a protest (103–109). Later she is convinced that she has lost her brother, so she persists in her protest and still refuses to go back to the palace (817–819):

ἀλλ’ οὗ τι μὴν ἔγωγε τοῦ λοιποῦ χρόνου  
ξύνοικος εἶσεμι’ ἀλλὰ τῆιδε πρὸς πύλῃ  
παρεῖσ’ ἑμαυτὴν ἄφιλος ἀνανῶ βίον.

But in the future I shall not live with them, but by this gate I shall let myself go and  
without a friend waste away my life (trans. by H. Lloyd-Jones).



In both plays the basic unchangeable scenic picture is exposed as an element that is supposed to speak to the audience together with the word. It is supposed to show what is the most important content of the central parts of the two works: the suffering and quandary of the two heroes persecuted by the tyrants<sup>20</sup>. At the same time the heroes are both equally haughty and staunch towards the tyranny. The words written by A. Lesky to characterise Sophocles' *Electra* may equally well be used in reference to the figure of Prometheus:

Leid und Not, Behauptung und Befreiung eines großen Herzens wollte der Dichter zeigen. Daß Elektra mit geringen Ausnahmen nicht von der Szene weicht, erweist sie deutlich als Mitte des Spieles. In diesem Drama vor allen erkennen wir, wie sehr der große, das Durchschnittsmaß der Choreuten überragende Mensch das zentrale Anliegen sophokleischen Dichtens ist<sup>21</sup>.

Prometheus and *Electra* are also linked by the similarity of their fortune. They both lost their hitherto social status. Prometheus, a god and friend of the highest god and his benefactor, was bound in chains and exposed to derision for his enemies (*Prom.* 119 and 157 f.). *Electra*, the daughter of Agamemnon, the conqueror of Troy, was made a servant (*El.* 187–192) and is also maligned and derided (*El.* 288 and 299 f.). She is in such a condition that even her own brother could not believe that “the famous *Electra*” had such a “miserable figure” (*El.* 1177–1179).

Therefore the compositional structure of the two works is exceptional and has no parallels in earlier tragic writing. The stage status of their titular heroes is equally exceptional. Apart from the *Prometheus* and *Electra* there is no other play in which the titular figures would remain on the proscenium from the prologue to the exodus and would thus present their personal drama as a kind of protest<sup>22</sup>. In the case of Prometheus it resulted from necessity: the hero was chained to the rock and he had to remain in one place. The author has transformed this necessity into the play's chief asset: what is here important is not action understood as a change of the situation, but the Titan's attitude and experience. The figures who come to Prometheus stress the duration of his passion: everything around him is changing, while he himself persists unchangeable in suffering and protest. For Sophocles there was no such necessity, yet he chose to present his titular figure in the same way. Probably while seeking a new form of the presentation of the Orestes the matricide story, already after Aeschylus' *The Libation Bearers* and Euripides' *Electra*, the plays well-known to the audience, he found

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<sup>20</sup> Lesky 1972: 236 writes: “Die Elektra des Sophokles scheidet sich von den Stücken des Aischylos und Euripides dadurch, daß in ihr nicht die Problematik des Muttermordes das tragende Thema bildet”.

<sup>21</sup> Lesky 1972: 236 f.

<sup>22</sup> Lesky 1972: 237: “Elektras Behauptung und nicht der Muttermord ist sein (= des Dramas) Thema”.

it in his master's another tragedy, the *Prometheus Bound*. The structure used by Aeschylus out of necessity appeared to Sophocles to suit perfectly his goal because it ensured two benefits. The first one was to be faithful to the traditional plot, and the second was to present at the same time Electra's drama in such a way that it could become a central theme of the play and the central tableau of the theatrical work.

These structural and various other similarities which I have noticed in the *Prometheus Bound* and *Electra* indicate that Sophocles apparently sought inspiration in his predecessor. Obviously, one may say that these similarities are accidental. I think, however, that there are too many similarities to regard them as merely accidental. They could be regarded as such if they concerned things of lesser importance, as for instance similar linguistic formulations, but even they are often sufficient for philologists to assume some relation between two works<sup>23</sup>. In our case the similarity, or even identity, concerns the structure of the two works and that at three levels: the compositional structure, the dramatic structure of the figures, and the structure of the stage status (the mode of the stage existence) of those figures. Such a profound similarity cannot be accidental. It forces us to accept the hypothesis that Sophocles not only knew the work of his predecessor, but even used its structure to present the old story of Orestes the matricide in an innovative way. He made Electra's sufferings and quandaries the main theme of his work in the same way as Prometheus' sufferings and quandaries are the main theme of the *Prometheus Bound*, thus making his own innovative contribution to the traditional story.

If, however, Sophocles knew the *Prometheus Bound*, this fact becomes a strong argument in favour of its authenticity as Aeschylus' work. On the one hand it is difficult to assume that the (anonymous) author of the *Prometheus* modelled his tragedy on the *Electra* because the structure of the *Prometheus* results of necessity from an imposed situation in which the Titan found himself. This necessity consists, above all, in the fact that the hero was immobilised already in the beginning of the play. Moreover, the myth of Prometheus is not so rich in events as the myth of the Atridae. Presenting it in his trilogy, the author of the *Prometheus Bound* of necessity had to supplement his modest *praxis* with a picture of the hero's sufferings. This necessity, as is well-known, he used in a masterly fashion. It is the other way round in the *Electra*: Sophocles sought such a compositional structure and such a form of the figure's stage status so that he could confer a new form on the old plot. We may presume with justification that he had found such structure in the *Prometheus*. On the other hand it is next to impossible that the great Sophocles drew on a work written by a poet

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<sup>23</sup> For instance Knox 1964: 45 f. proves similarities between Sophocles' *Philoctetes* and the *Prometheus Bound*. Whitman 1951: 162 notices in Electra's calling for a second blow some Aeschylean inspirations from the *Agamemnon* (1345 and 1384).

whose name we do not even know, were it not Aeschylus the author of this play. It is usually assumed that Sophocles in the third so-called “ethical stage” of his literary activity became entirely independent of his master. My research on Sophocles’ writing does not confirm this. In the introductions to the translations of his plays I indicate that there are many Aeschylean elements in Sophocles’ tragedies. For example, the *Antigone*’s parodos is to a great extent modelled on that of the *Agamemnon*<sup>24</sup>; the plot structure of the *Women of Trachis* is almost identical with the structure of the first part of the *Oresteia*, and the technique of Aeschylus’ suppletive audiodescription is continued in Sophocles’ works, even in such late works as the *Philoctetes* and *Oedipus in Colonus*<sup>25</sup>.

Summing up, I would like to mention the earlier attempts to prove similarities between the *Prometheus Bound* and Sophocles. Gerhard Müller pointed out that the dialogical form of the prologue had been introduced by Sophocles. Therefore the dialogue in the beginning of the *Prometheus Bound* would be one of the arguments in favour of the influence of Sophocles on this play, and, consequently, against the authorship of Aeschylus<sup>26</sup>. Bernard Knox also sought to find some relations between the *Prometheus* and Sophocles, as he noticed “the resemblances to Sophoclean character, situation, and language in the *Prometheus Bound*”<sup>27</sup>. He wrote among other things: “It is possible that the play was written by Aeschylus very late in his career under the influence of Sophoclean innovations in the drama”<sup>28</sup>. For G. Müller and B. Knox, however, the similarities pointed to the *Prometheus*’ non-authenticity or to the late composition of the play. They did take into account neither structural similarities nor the possibility that the influence could have run in the opposite direction, i.e. that Aeschylus could have influenced Sophocles, because they took it for granted that such an influence was impossible. When we look at their valuable remarks from a new perspective, we shall find in them support in favour of my thesis, namely, that Sophocles knew the *Prometheus Bound* and was inspired by this play mainly in his *Electra*, but perhaps also in his other preserved tragedies.

*John Paul II Catholic University, Lublin*

Translated by J. Kłós

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<sup>24</sup> See Chodkowski 2003.

<sup>25</sup> On the suppletive audiodescription, see Chodkowski 2007.

<sup>26</sup> Müller 1967: 26.

<sup>27</sup> Knox 1964: 45.

<sup>28</sup> Knox 1964: 49.

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THE EXISTENTIAL DIMENSION OF PHILOSOPHICAL WISDOM  
IN PLATO'S *THEAETETUS*.  
MORAL AND SPIRITUAL ASPECTS OF SOCRATES' MAIEUTICS

By

KAZIMIERZ PAWŁOWSKI

The question about what it is that makes one a philosopher is certainly not less intriguing than the questions posed by the philosopher himself. We may reasonably assume, if only for a start, that what makes one a philosopher is a specific way of experiencing reality (living the world, receiving stimuli). This kind of experience is only possible thanks to a special mode of sensibility – let us call it the *philosophical sensibility*. It is not easy to provide a clear definition of this notion, just as it is not easy to clarify what is really meant by “the philosophical way of experiencing reality”. It appears that the matter is puzzling even for the philosopher himself and that the puzzle is nearly as great as the ones he is trying to solve. However, one thing seems to be sure: the subject of our query is not one of the philosopher's purely intellectual or, widely speaking, cognitive skills, although the *philosophical sensibility* is certainly based on such skills. The crucial factor is the moral and spiritual sensibility.

It may be said that what we might call the *philosophical experience* – or better, the *philosophical way of experiencing reality* (it is a process rather than a single act, although such acts may also happen to some philosophers, at least under certain circumstances), together with the specific mode of sensibility (intellectual, moral and spiritual), are the source of the philosopher's whole creative activity, or, at least, its most essential part. This experience determines the way the philosopher grasps the world as well as the categories he employs, but also, which is not unimportant, the way he forms his personality and his whole life. The authenticity of the philosopher's work stems from the authenticity of the philosophical experience. The task of analyzing the experience and the corresponding sensibility is probably the most difficult challenge for a historian of philosophy, but also the most fascinating, because it seemingly touches the very living core of philosophy. Both the difficulty and the fascination increase when Plato's case is considered. Plato's philosophy unravels the greatest mysteries of

reality and human existence, it reaches beyond what may be seen, or even what might be known. Therefore: what is the philosophical experience and the sensibility which lay at the basis of Plato's work?

#### PHILOSOPHICAL WISDOM

Any Greek philosopher, regardless of the specific school of philosophy he belonged to, if asked to define the kind of philosophy he professes, would answer that it was only the love of wisdom. Such definition of philosophy functioned well in the ancient Greece right from the beginning (Diog. Laert. I 12). There remains the problem of specifying what is to be understood by such "wisdom" and how it may be acquired. We know that what is meant exceeds the modern interpretation of the concept, confining wisdom to something of an almost purely cognitive nature, generally speaking – of some kind of an intellectual skill enabling one to know and to understand various facts about the reality (however one chooses to define it). The ancient understanding of philosophical wisdom is broader and undoubtedly entails a way of solving the mystery of the world and of the human being (as far as the sense of human existence is concerned). However, it is not all. It is impossible to reduce the philosophical wisdom to any intellectual or cognitive skill matched with the corresponding functions and abilities to understand the mysteries I mentioned, although such skills are important, if not, as one might say, constitutive to the Greek understanding of wisdom. By *philosophical wisdom* we mean also something without which philosophy would become only a pure theory, or rather ideology, and we must remember that none of the Greek philosophical ideas deserve to be thus reduced. The Greeks themselves, the creators of such broadly understood philosophy, were perfectly aware of the danger. The "other element" that is essential for the Greek philosophical wisdom had been best explained by the legend about the fisherman and the tripod. The story is about Attic (or Ionian, depending on the version) fishermen who fished out a tripod with an inscription saying: "for the sage". Because in the Greek tradition a tripod was typically a votive object, it seemed natural to treat the strange catch as a sign from god. Therefore, the fishermen sought after the sage mentioned. In one of the versions of this anecdote, the tripod was given to Bias of Priene, which should not cause any special interest – Bias was indeed a famous sage (Diog. Laert. I 82–88; cf. also Plut. *Conv. sept. sap.* 6) – if it were not for the reasons to which he owed the honour. Bias was considered to be a sage not so much for his intellectual achievements (although they surely influenced the decision), as for the fact that he acted nobly towards some poor girls from Messina. Bias bought them out of slavery, raised them as his own daughters and then sent them back home, with a small dowry (Diog. Laert. I 82; cf. also I 28). Thus, "wisdom" gains a new, ethical dimension besides the intellectual one. From that time in Greece, noble conduct became essential to philosophical wisdom. Also,

it was demanded that philosophers not confine themselves to solving the puzzles of reality and the abstract problem of the nobility of mind, but also demonstrate a nobility of heart. The latter condition was in some cases crucial and those who were not able to satisfy it could at most be called scholars, intellectuals or sophists – never philosophers.

A Greek philosopher had to possess a great mind, but also – a great heart. He was striving to examine and solve the puzzles of reality, and the deepest sense of human existence (in all its instances: in the realms of the visible and natural as well as the invisible and supernatural). However, at the same time the philosopher examined his own self and tried to form his own morality and spirit. It is in the philosopher's nature to be naturally drawn towards the aforementioned nobility of heart and to the Beauty, which is organically connected with the nobility itself. The nobility of heart, therefore also the moral nobility and, let us add, the nobility of spirit, feed on the moral and spiritual Beauty, which, although mysterious, somehow lets itself be felt in the deepest recesses of the human being, and the Goodness, equally mysterious and equally palpable – and to be found in the same recesses. Only in connection with such kinds of nobility can the nobility of mind generate what was called by the Greeks "philosophical wisdom" (Pl. *Rep.* 490A–D; 500D). Wisdom is not solely an intellectual feature: it is a state of the heart and the spirit.

At this stage a question comes to mind: why does philosophical wisdom require intellectual sensibility and skills to be joined with moral and spiritual virtues? What is the connection between the thought and the heart, between philosopher's intellectual capacities and his moral and spiritual sensibility? The answer comes from Plato himself, who addressed the issue on multiple occasions. In the *Seventh Letter* he states:

But if a man is ill-constituted by nature (as the state of the soul is naturally in the majority both in its capacity for learning and in what is called moral character) – or it may have become so by deterioration – not even Lynceus could endow such men with the power of sight. In one word, the man who has no natural kinship with this matter cannot be made akin to it by quickness of learning or memory; for it cannot be engendered at all in natures which are foreign to it. Therefore, if men are not by nature kinship allied to justice and all other things that are honourable, though they may be good at learning and remembering other knowledge of various kinds – or if they have the kinship but are slow learners and have no memory – none of all these will ever learn to the full the truth about virtue and vice (Pl. *Epist.* 7, 343E–344A, trans. by J. Harward; cf. also *Rep.* VI 485B–486D; 490A–D; *Phaedo* 79D).

There seems to be a certain tie linking the subject of philosophical inquiries and the philosopher himself or his soul. Only those could throw light on the deepest mysteries of reality (at least – on the aspects which are most interesting for a philosopher) and therefore to know its Truth who are already somehow congenitally united with this Truth. The Truth philosophers seek and even desire

is something extremely elusive, almost mythical, but at the same time real, moving and enticing. To precise: what is moved by the Truth is that which the philosopher considers to be his best part, somehow close to the Truth itself. Any philosopher belonging to the Platonic tradition would claim, naturally, that he does not know what the Truth is, but he may sense that its nature is not purely intellectual and spiritual, but that it is rooted far deeper. The Truth influences not only the philosopher's intellect, but also stimulates his moral and spiritual sensibility, evoking a secret and strange desire for the moral and spiritual Beauty. The Beauty is not less mysterious than the desire, which seems to be the reason why philosophers are famously disposed to become *atopic* (aloof, weird). Reducing the Truth to its intellectual aspect leads to losing the moral and spiritual dimensions, which are at least as important (and perhaps of far greater value) than the achievements of the philosopher's cognitive skills. In sum: the Truth should be understood not only as rational, but also moral and spiritual. It belongs to the moral and spiritual orders, as well as the cognitive one. Hence, it is not to be seized by intellect only, no matter how sharp and fit. A philosopher has to head for the Truth with all his soul and heart, engage not only the mind, but also his moral and spiritual sensibility – the sensibility for Beauty and Goodness, still oblique for the intellect, but already somehow wanted.

The Truth may be known only to those who already commune with it on the spiritual and moral level, before he even comes to understand it in a more or less rational fashion. Philosopher, a true lover of Truth, is able to sense it before he even starts to reason about the notion. This secret sensation – because this is the best term to employ here – the sensation of Truth, and at the same time of Beauty and Goodness, has two powers. Firstly, it works as a sort of appeal to seek deeper knowledge of the Truth (and this is the philosophical love – the love of Truth, love that is the moving power of the philosophical reasoning). Secondly, it awakes the need for moral and spiritual nobility, that is the need to feast on the moral and spiritual Beauty. There is a hidden intuition behind this twofold appeal, an intuition that has not yet been rationally proved, suggesting a kinship or even an identity relation tying moral and spiritual Beauty with the intellectual Truth. Because of the connection between Truth and Beauty, the philosopher who climbs up successive levels of moral and spiritual nobility, constantly driven by the want of Beauty, is at the same time nearing to the intellectual Truth, which he gradually desires more and more strongly (Pl. *Symp.* 210E–211B; *Phaedr.* 248A–B; cf. also *Rep.* VI 500 B–D). And this is probably the greatest secret of philosophy and philosophical thought in general: Beauty and Goodness, in their moral and spiritual aspects, or rather the process of aspiring for them enables the philosopher to near the Truth itself. This secret was well known to the Greek philosophers, or at least to some of them, for example to Socrates.

It is not difficult to observe, that such variety of (ancient) philosophy acquires a mystic air that seems untypical of any of the modern philosophies. It may be



said that the philosophical investigations of the mystery of reality in its ultimate phase takes form of an initiation – the initiation into the most deeply hidden Truth (as well as Beauty and Goodness). It is an existential initiation, an intensive experience which is not purely intellectual in character. Such experience should in any case be called existential rather than cognitive. The philosopher does not only grasp the Truth using the powers of intellect, but he also penetrates it spiritually, through the powers of his intricate humanity, activating the deepest, secret dispositions of his soul, which are unintelligible to others. In the same process, his humanity and soul are being shaped (in a moral and spiritual manner), which in turn increases the moral and spiritual potential of the world<sup>1</sup>.

Let us turn back to the story about the tripod. It should be added that it does not end in honouring Bias' ethical virtue (and, of course, his rationality, for we should never forget that rationality, warranted by various intellectual skills and talents is also an essential element of the philosophical wisdom, besides moral nobility: see Pl. *Epist.* 7, 343E–344A, quoted below). Bias (or Solon or Thales in other versions of the legend, see Diog. Laert. I 28) offered the tripod to Apollo of Delphi, judging that it is only god himself who is truly wise (Diog. Laert. I 82). Thus, wisdom in general and philosophical wisdom in particular seems to be even more astounding. It reveals its supernatural, godly potential and genesis. Wisdom comes naturally only to god, humans may be endowed with wisdom only through god's grace. The Greeks had always known that it was so. They were aware that the wisdom possessed by sages (especially the great Seven Wise Men described in various writings) is a gift from god. However, wisdom was not the only thing that was ascribed such status – the Greeks believed that also the poetic gift came from the gods, as well as love (including the philosophical love of wisdom). Divine gifts were divine madness. The Greeks knew well that everything of real value (wisdom, love, virtue) stems from divine inspiration – therefore we should treat it as belonging to the realm of the supernatural (see Pl. *Phaedr.* 244A–E; 265B). The greatest sage of Greece was, of course, Homer, but the mythical archetype of a wise man is represented by Oedipus, the hero of the Theban myth. Oedipus is the one who solved the puzzle posed by Sphinx, the hybrid of lion and woman. As Sphinx was sent to Thebes by Apollo, we should assume that her puzzle was in fact a challenge from the god himself. This was, after all, the only way to gain wisdom, or rather, divine wisdom: it had to come straight from the god, as a gift. At the same time, solving the puzzle was a clear

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<sup>1</sup> See Pl. *Rep.* 500C–D: “For he, whose mind is fixed upon true being, has surely no time to look down upon the affairs of earth, or to be filled with malice and envy, contending against men; his eye is ever directed toward things fixed and immutable, which he sees neither injuring nor injured by one another, but all in order moving according to reason; these he imitates, and to these he will, as far as he can, conform himself. Can a man help imitating that with which he holds reverential converse? [...] And the philosopher holding converse with the divine order, becomes orderly and divine, as far as the nature of man allows...” (trans. by B. Jowett).

sign of possessing divine wisdom, because non other could cope with the problem. And woe to those who dare attack the puzzle without being endowed with the wisdom by god! They are soon to meet their doom, which in the Theban myth means nothing less than death.

The puzzle solved by Oedipus serves as an archetype for every puzzle of divine origin. Such is also the puzzle which every philosopher strives to solve: the mystery of reality. If there is any way the philosopher could throw light upon this mystery, it is by perusing the divine wisdom, which was ascribed to Apollo by Bias of Priene. The divine wisdom may enable philosophers to acquire knowledge about the mystery of reality and of human existence. These puzzles are insoluble without such wisdom. Therefore woe to the philosopher who attempts to deal with them! He shall perish without achieving his aim, just as Oedipus' unsuccessful predecessors did<sup>2</sup>.

It is quite obvious that not everyone can participate in the divine wisdom. Only those who have reached sufficient level of spiritual and intellectual development are able to absorb it. One cannot acquire it in the regular manner, like any standard skill, professional or other. It comes as a sudden touch of god, a wave of inspiration (like poetic talent or any kind of genius). Philosophical wisdom is, therefore, a kind of madness, like the poetic genius and inspiration. It is the breath of the supernatural, that introduces a new perspective into philosopher's life, a perspective which makes the philosopher see all worldly things in a different way than other people do<sup>3</sup>. For that reason (i.e. because of its supernatural genesis and nature) complete wisdom is attainable only after death, as we well know<sup>4</sup>. Only after death all the extraordinary powers of the soul start to

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<sup>2</sup> See *Pl. Rep.* 491A: "...they who aspire after a profession which is above them and of which they are unworthy, and then, by their manifold inconsistencies, bring upon philosophy, and upon all philosophers, that universal reprobation of which we speak" (trans. by B. Jowett). See also *Phaedo* 69C: "...he who passes unsanctified and uninitiated into the world below will live in a slough" (trans. by B. Jowett).

<sup>3</sup> *Pl. Phaedr.* 249C: "And therefore the mind of the philosopher alone has wings; and this is just, for he is always, according to the measure of his abilities, clinging in recollection to those things in which God abides, and in beholding which He is what He is. And he who employs aright these memories is ever being initiated into perfect mysteries and alone becomes truly perfect. But, as he forgets earthly interests and is rapt in the divine, the vulgar deem him mad, and rebuke him; they do not see that he is inspired. Thus far I have been speaking of the fourth and last kind of madness, which is imputed to him who, when he sees the beauty of earth, is transported with the recollection of the true beauty; he would like to fly away, but he cannot; he is like a bird fluttering and looking upward and careless of the world below; and he is therefore thought to be mad. And I have shown this of all inspirations to be the noblest and highest and the offspring of the highest to him who has or shares in it, and that he who loves the beautiful is called a lover because he partakes of it" (trans. by B. Jowett).

<sup>4</sup> *Pl. Phaedo* 66D–E: "...all experience shows that if we would have pure knowledge of anything we must be quit of the body, and the soul in herself must behold all things in themselves: then I suppose that we shall attain that which we desire, and of which we say that we are lovers, and that is wisdom, not while we live, but after death, as the argument shows; for if while in company with

flourish, freed from the burden of the flesh (see Pl. *Phaedo* 65C). This is the key to understand why the life of a philosopher is dominated by constant “practicing death”<sup>5</sup>, as Plato once remarked. It must be emphasized, though, that the process cannot begin if the philosopher does not reach the sufficient level of moral and spiritual development, to say nothing of the intellectual skills. This is why any philosopher has to endeavour to reach that level when he is still alive and within the bounds of his “mortal coil”<sup>6</sup>.

Accepting the divine and supernatural character of philosophical wisdom justifies and explains the need for supernatural, spiritual and even mystical relations with the reality of what is the main aim of every philosopher: Truth, Beauty and Goodness.

To sum up: wisdom is a form of initiation and the philosopher is “initiated into a mystery which may be truly called most blessed”<sup>7</sup>.

One of the philosophers who experienced such initiations was, of course, Socrates. Socrates fully realised the Platonic ideal but he was not the only one to achieve it. In Plato's *Theaetetus* there appears another person who managed to satisfy Plato's requirements for philosophers and students. It is the young Theaetetus.

#### THEAETETUS AS AN IDEAL PHILOSOPHER

Theaetetus, the main character of Plato's dialogue under the same title, is as special and as *atopic* as Socrates. His various unusual features are emphasised by

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the body the soul cannot have pure knowledge, one of two things seems to follow – either knowledge is not to be attained at all, or, if at all, after death” (trans. by B. Jowett).

<sup>5</sup> See *Phaedo* 64A–B; 65A; 67E. I allude here to the famous *meletē thanatou*.

<sup>6</sup> See Pl. *Phaedo* 69C: “...but in the true exchange there is a purging away of all these things, and temperance, and justice, and courage, and wisdom herself are a purgation of them. And I conceive that the founders of the mysteries had a real meaning and were not mere triflers when they intimated in a figure long ago that he who passes unsanctified and uninitiated into the world below will live in a slough, but that he who arrives there after initiation and purification will dwell with the gods” (trans. by B. Jowett). See also *ibid.*, 81A–82C.

<sup>7</sup> Pl. *Phaedr.* 249C, 250C: “There was a time when with the rest of the happy band they saw beauty shining in brightness – we philosophers following in the train of Zeus, others in company with other gods; and then we beheld the beatific vision and were initiated into a mystery which may be truly called most blessed, celebrated by us in our state of innocence, before we had any experience of evils to come, when we were admitted to the sight of apparitions innocent and simple and calm and happy, which we beheld shining impure light, pure ourselves and not yet enshrined in that living tomb which we carry about, now that we are imprisoned in the body, like an oyster in his shell” (trans. by B. Jowett). The picture drawn by Plato is an allegory of spiritual initiation into the mysterious spheres of reality. Plato often employs the language of Orphic mysteries, using terms such as purifying, initiation, ordination, dying and practicing death with regard to philosophy and truth. One may even say that he brings philosophy into the domain of mysteries. He even peruses the typical mystic tool, love. Plato's philosophy and the Platonic tradition in general (including Neoplatonism) is a heiress of the Greek mysteries (especially Orphic), at least as regards its spiritual dimension.

Plato at the very beginning of the text not because the author could not find a better way to introduce the main subject, but probably because of their significance for Theaetetus' future development as a philosopher. Firstly, one of the speakers, Euclid the Mathematician, praises Theaetetus' nobility. According to Euclid, the boy is beautiful and good. In order to better illustrate his claims, Euclid describes the admiration expressed by many with respect to Theaetetus' bravery in battle. The most interesting aspect of this passage is that Euclid's interlocutor, Terpsion, is not in the least surprised. He states even that he would be astonished if things were otherwise, that is, were Theaetetus *not* brave:

ΕΥ. Καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθόν, ὦ Τερψίων, ἐπεὶ τοὶ καὶ νῦν ἤκουόν τινων μάλα ἐγκωμιαζόντων αὐτὸν περὶ τὴν μάχην. ΤΕΡ. Καὶ οὐδέν γ' ἄτοπον, ἀλλὰ πολὺ θαυμαστότερον εἰ μὴ τοιοῦτος ἦν (*Theaet.* 142B–C).

Euc. Yes, Terpsion, he is a noble fellow; only to-day I heard some people highly praising his behaviour in this very battle. Terp. No wonder; I should rather be surprised at hearing anything else of him (trans. by B. Jowett).

We might expect that bravery is a natural component of moral nobility (one of the virtues). A noble man cannot be a coward – this is what we have already learned elsewhere<sup>8</sup>.

The best proof of Theaetetus' worth is, of course, Socrates' high opinion of the young man together with the prophecy of his great future. The specifically philosophical characteristics of Theaetetus are clearly demonstrated in the conversation between the boy, Socrates and Theodorus, the geometrician. At Euclid's request, the dialogue is read aloud by Terpsion. Right at the beginning, Theodorus, asked by Socrates whether he had any exceptional students worth talking about, answers, describing Theaetetus, who at the time was in fact Theodorus' student. He starts with plain facts: Theaetetus is not beautiful. Beauty has always been, as we know today, an important part of the classical Greek ideal of *kalokagathia*, furthermore – it was supposed to promise more than the pure beauty of the flesh. For example, one might expect the moral beauty to be connected with the philosophical, (although Alcibiades' example from Plato's *Symposion* is enough to show us how unreasonable such expectation was). Perhaps this is the reason why Theodorus starts thus his characteristic of Theaetetus, although his main aim was probably to contrast the illusory beauty and the authentic, internal one. Socrates knows, of course, that appearances are deceptive, therefore he demands quite another kind of beauty. Theaetetus is not beautiful, he is downright ugly, like Socrates himself. Theodorus is not afraid to speak out this truth, knowing that Socrates would not feel offended. And indeed, Socrates is not offended,

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<sup>8</sup> See Pl. *Rep.* VI 486B: "Then the cowardly and mean nature has no part in true philosophy? Certainly not" (trans. by B. Jowett).

because ugly Theaetetus turns out to be someone special. He does not satisfy the requirement of “having beautiful looks”, which was important even to Socrates, but he does not fail to satisfy the other, crucial ideal of “having beautiful character”. It is interesting to know what it was about the young man that delighted both Theodorus and Socrates. Well, above all, Theaetetus was an exceptionally talented student. But that is not all. Theodorus had many good students who did not awake any admiration in him. Theaetetus had one special virtue, though. He was of a nobler character than any of the others, especially as far as bravery and gentility were concerned; also, no other student could equal him in indifference to money and material goods (see Pl. *Theaet.* 144A–D). Theaetetus demonstrated this kind of attitude especially when his legal guardians wasted the whole of his legacy (*ibid.*, 144D). Theaetetus’ virtues are the same as those which Socrates would later ascribe to all philosophers:

τί γὰρ ἄν τις τούς γε φαύλους διατρίβοντας ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λέγοι; οὗτοι δὲ που ἐκ νέων πρῶτων μὲν εἰς ἀγορὰν οὐκ ἴσασι τὴν ὁδόν, οὐδὲ ὅπου δικαστήριον ἢ βουλευτήριον ἢ τι κοινὸν ἄλλο τῆς πόλεως συνέδριον· νόμους δὲ καὶ ψηφίσματα λεγόμενα ἢ γεγραμμένα οὔτε ὀρώσιν οὔτε ἀκούουσι· σπουδαὶ δὲ ἑταιριῶν ἐπ’ ἀρχὰς καὶ σύνοδοι καὶ δεῖπνα καὶ σὺν αὐλητρίσι κῶμοι, οὐδὲ ὄναρ πράττειν προσισταται αὐτοῖς. εὖ δὲ ἢ κακῶς τις γέγονεν ἐν πόλει, ἢ τί τῷ κακὸν ἐστὶν ἐκ προγόνων γεγονὸς ἢ πρὸς ἀνδρῶν ἢ γυναικῶν, μᾶλλον αὐτὸν λέληθεν ἢ οἱ τῆς θαλάττης λεγόμενοι χῶες. καὶ ταῦτα πάντ’ οὐδ’ ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν, οἶδεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτῶν ἀπέχεται τοῦ εὐδοκιμεῖν χάριν, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι τὸ σῶμα μόνον ἐν τῇ πόλει κεῖται αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐπιδημεῖ, ἡ δὲ διάνοια, ταῦτα πάντα ἠγησαμένη σμικρὰ καὶ οὐδὲν, ἀτιμάσασα πανταχῇ πέτεται κατὰ Πίνδαρον “τὰς τε γὰς ὑπένερθε” καὶ τὰ ἐπίπεδα γεωμετροῦσα, “οὐρανοῦ θ’ ὑπὲρ” ἀστρονομοῦσα, καὶ πᾶσαν πάντη φύσιν ἐρευνημένη τῶν ὄντων ἐκάστου ὄλου, εἰς τῶν ἐγγύς οὐδὲν αὐτὴν συγκαθειῖσα. [...] Τοιγάρτοι, ὦ φίλε, ἴδια τε συγγινόμενος ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐκάστῳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος ἔλεγον, ὅταν ἐν δικαστηρίῳ ἢ που ἄλλοθι ἀναγκασθῇ περὶ τῶν παρὰ πόδας καὶ τῶν ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς διαλέγεσθαι, γέλωτα παρέχει οὐ μόνον θράτταις ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ ὄλῳ, εἰς φρεάτια τε καὶ πᾶσαν ἀπορίαν ἐμπίπτων ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας, καὶ ἡ ἀσχημοσύνη δεινή, δόξαν ἀβελτερίας παρεχομένη· ἔν τε γὰρ ταῖς λοιδορίας ἴδιον ἔχει οὐδὲν οὐδένα λοιδορεῖν, ἅτ’ οὐκ εἰδὼς κακὸν οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς ἐκ τοῦ μὴ μεμελετηκέναι· ἀπορῶν οὖν γελοῖος φαίνεται. ἔν τε τοῖς ἐπαίνοις καὶ ταῖς τῶν ἄλλων μεγαλαυχίαις οὐ προσποιήτως ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι γελῶν ἔνδηλος γινόμενος ληρώδης δοκεῖ εἶναι. τύραννόν τε γὰρ ἢ βασιλέα ἐγκωμιαζόμενον, ἕνα τῶν νομέων, οἷον συβώτην ἢ ποιμένα ἢ τινα βουκόλον, ἠγεῖται ἀκούειν εὐδαιμονιζόμενον πολὺ βδάλλοντα· δυσκολώτερον δὲ ἐκείνων ζῶον καὶ ἐπιβουλότερον ποιμαίνειν τε καὶ βδάλλειν νομίζει αὐτούς, ἄγροικον δὲ καὶ ἀπαιδεύτον ὑπὸ ἀσχολίας οὐδὲν ἦττον τῶν νομέων τὸν τοιοῦτον ἀναγκαῖον γίνεσθαι, σηκὸν ἐν ὄρει τὸ τεῖχος περιβεβλημένον. γῆς δὲ ὅταν μυρία πλέθρα ἢ ἔτι πλείω ἀκούσῃ ὥς τις ἄρα κεκτημένος θαυμαστὰ πλήθει κέκτηται, πάνσμικρα δοκεῖ ἀκούειν εἰς ἅσασαν εἰωθῶς τὴν γῆν βλέπειν. τὰ δὲ διὰ γένη ὑμνούοντων, ὡς γενναῖός τις ἐπὶ πάππους πλουσίους ἔχων ἀποφῆναι, παντάπασιν ἀμβλὺ καὶ ἐπὶ σμικρὸν ὀρώντων ἠγεῖται τὸν ἔπαινον, ὑπὸ ἀπαιδευσίας οὐ δυναμένων εἰς τὸ πᾶν αἰεὶ βλέπειν οὐδὲ λογίζεσθαι ὅτι πάππων καὶ προγόνων μυριάδες ἐκάστῳ γεγόνασιν ἀναρίθμητοι, ἐν αἷς πλούσιοι καὶ πτωχοὶ καὶ βασιλεῖς καὶ δοῦλοι βάρβαροί τε καὶ Ἑλληνες πολλάκις μυριοὶ γεγόνασιν ὄψωρον· ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι καταλόγῳ προγόνων σεμνυνομένων καὶ ἀναφερόντων εἰς Ἡρακλεῖα τὸν Ἀμφιτρυῶνος ἄτοπα αὐτῷ καταφαίνεται τῆς σμικρολογίας, ὅτι

δὲ ὁ ἀπ' Ἀμφιτρύωνος εἰς τὸ ἄνω πεντεκαικεκοστὸς τοιοῦτος ἦν οἷα συνέβαινεν αὐτῷ τύχη, καὶ ὁ πεντηκοστὸς ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, γελᾷ οὐ δυναμένων λογίζεσθαι τε καὶ χαυνότιτα ἀνοήτου ψυχῆς ἀπαλλάττειν. ἐν ἅπασι δὴ τούτοις ὁ τοιοῦτος ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν καταγελάται, τὰ μὲν ὑπερηφάνως ἔχων, ὡς δοκεῖ, τὰ δ' ἐν ποσὶν ἀγνοῶν τε καὶ ἐν ἐκάστοις ἀπορῶν (*Theaet.* 173C–175B).

In the first place, the lords of philosophy have never, from their youth upwards, known their way to the Agora, or the dicastery, or the council, or any other political assembly; they neither see nor hear the laws or decrees, as they are called, of the state written or recited; the eagerness of political societies in the attainment of office-clubs, and banquets, and revels, and singing-maidens – do not enter even into their dreams. Whether any event has turned out well or ill in the city, what disgrace may have descended to any one from his ancestors, male or female, are matters of which the philosopher no more knows than he can tell, as they say, how many pints are contained in the ocean. Neither is he conscious of his ignorance. For he does not hold aloof in order; that he may gain a reputation; but the truth is that the outer form of him only is in the city: his mind, disdainful of the littlenesses and nothingnesses of human things, is “flying all abroad” as Pindar says, measuring earth and heaven and the things which are under and on the earth and above the heaven, interrogating the whole nature of each and all in their entirety, but not condescending to anything which is within reach. [...] And thus, my friend, on every occasion, private as well as public, as I said at first, when he appears in a law-court, or in any place in which he has to speak of things which are at his feet and before his eyes, he is the jest, not only of Thracian handmaids but of the general herd, tumbling into wells and every sort of disaster through his inexperience<sup>9</sup>. His awkwardness is fearful, and gives the impression of imbecility. When he is reviled, he has nothing personal to say in answer to the civilities of his adversaries, for he knows no scandals of any one, and they do not interest him; and therefore he is laughed at for his sheepishness; and when others are being praised and glorified, in the simplicity of his heart he cannot help going into fits of laughter, so that he seems to be a downright idiot. When he hears a tyrant or king eulogized, he fancies that he is listening to the praises of some keeper of cattle – a swineherd, or shepherd, or perhaps a cowherd, who is congratulated on the quantity of milk which he squeezes from them; and he remarks that the creature whom they tend, and out of whom they squeeze the wealth, is of a less traitable and more insidious nature (trans. by B. Jowett).

Soon Socrates would add that the same features which distinguish a philosopher from other people are also the ones that make him free. Strictly speaking, only philosophers are totally free of the pressure to strive for money and social splendour of some kind.

A philosopher does not care about material goods, lucrative positions, fame and all the other things that awake such great emotions in their fellow men. All this appears to him useless and empty in comparison with his own purposes in life, like, for instance, the understanding of happiness and misery of human

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<sup>9</sup> Socrates had already given the example of Thales, who was laughed at by some servant girl from Thracia. The philosopher tumbled into a well because he wanted to see what was high up in the sky instead of watching his step.

existence (*Theaet.* 175C). Freedom, as described here by Socrates, is an inalienable feature of every Greek philosopher. Such view was later defended especially by Socrates' students, particularly those belonging to the Cynic school, but it remained equally dear to all the others. It might be said that the intrinsic freedom from social prejudices and cultural pressure is an inherent element of the spiritual equipment of every philosopher.

A philosopher, as it follows from Socrates' opinion, is not the same as other men. He uses a totally different hierarchy of values, which in practice resembles precisely the common scale, only in reverse. What is precious for others becomes worthless in the eyes of the philosopher (and *vice versa*). A philosopher is someone who managed to find the very thing that brings him the sense of purpose in life and general happiness (*Theaet.* 176C).

Socrates' lecture about philosophers ends with a strong accent, introducing one of the crucial ethical ideals of Plato's, namely the idea of "assimilation to God"<sup>10</sup>.

#### THE IDEAL OF BECOMING LIKE GOD

The motive of assimilation to god is present throughout Plato's works<sup>11</sup>. For Socrates, as he expresses himself in the *Theaetetus*, to become like god means to become just and saint, without losing one's reason, as is added (176B). In order to achieve it, one has to "fly away from earth to heaven" (176A–B) as soon as possible. To fly away is to "become like god", as far as it is possible for a human being (176B).

Therefore, to "become like god", according to Socrates, is to become just and saint. Similarly, in the last book of the *Republic*, Socrates would say:

In the first place, the just man is known to the Gods, and he is therefore the friend of the Gods, and he will receive at their hands every good, always excepting such evil as is the necessary consequence of former sins. All things end in good to him, either in life or after death, even what appears to be evil; for the Gods have a care of him who desires to be in their likeness (*Rep.* X 613A–B, trans. by B. Jowett; see also V 500B–D).

The very expression "to become like God" is explained in the *Laws* (Book IV):

[ATHENIAN:] God, as the old tradition declares, holding in his hand the beginning, middle, and end of all that is, travels according to His nature in a straight line towards the accomplishment of His end. Justice always accompanies Him, and is

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<sup>10</sup> *Theaet.* 176A–177A. This passage is one of the most important texts expressing Plato's key ethical ideal.

<sup>11</sup> See Pl. *Theaet.* 176A–B; *Rep.* II 360C; VI 500C; X 613A; *Leg.* IV 716A–D; *Phaedr.* 246B–E; 253A; *Tim.* 90D.

the punisher of those who fall short of the divine law. To justice, he who would be happy holds fast, and follows in her company with all humility and order; but he who is lifted up with pride, or elated by wealth or rank, or beauty, who is young and foolish, and has a soul hot with insolence, and thinks that he has no need of any guide or ruler, but is able himself to be the guide of others, he, I say, is left deserted of God; and being thus deserted, he takes to him others who are like himself, and dances about, throwing all things into confusion, and many think that he is a great man, but in a short time he pays a penalty which justice cannot but approve, and is utterly destroyed, and his family and city with him. Wherefore, seeing that human things are thus ordered, what should a wise man do or think, or not do or think? CLEINIAS: Every man ought to make up his mind that he will be one of the followers of God; there can be no doubt of that. ATHENIAN: Then what life is agreeable to God, and becoming in His followers? One only, expressed once for all in the old saying that “like agrees with like, with measure measure”, but things which have no measure agree neither with themselves nor with the things which have. Now God ought to be to us the measure of all things, and not man as men commonly say: the words are far more true of Him<sup>12</sup>. And he who would be dear to God must, as far as is possible, be like Him and such as He is (*Leg.* IV 715E–716C, trans. by B. Jowett).

A similar motive of “following god” is to be found also in the *Phaedrus*, where it is expressed through a very imaginative myth about chariots of souls following gods (248A–C).

The basis of Plato’s ideal of “becoming like god” is the contemplation of god in all the aspects: theoretical, as well as moral. Such contemplation constitutes the fundamentals of the moral order in a philosopher’s life. This is what Plato means when he says to Adeimantus in the *Republic*:

For he, whose mind is fixed upon true being, has surely no time to look down upon the affairs of earth, or to be filled with malice and envy, contending against men; his eye is ever directed toward things fixed and immutable, which he sees neither injuring nor injured by one another, but all in order moving according to reason; these he imitates, and to these he will, as far as he can, conform himself. Can a man help imitating that with which he holds reverential converse? [...] And the philosopher holding converse with the divine order becomes orderly and divine, as far as the nature of man allows... (*Rep.* 500B–D, trans. by B. Jowett)<sup>13</sup>.

<sup>12</sup> Plato alludes here to the famous thesis of Protagoras: “Man is the measure of all things”.

<sup>13</sup> The ideal of “becoming like god” is one of the crucial principles of Plato’s ethics. It should be understood as the process of spiritual and moral perfecting of the philosopher’s soul and life. The ideal of “becoming like god” concerns the spiritual and moral dimension of man and introduces this dimension into his existence. It was accepted by all philosophers within the Platonic tradition. It took special place in the Platonic philosophy in the first and second centuries AD, when it gradually became the most celebrated ethical doctrine which was to oppose the non-Platonic, Stoic theory of natural law. The most famous Neoplatonic philosopher of that time, Plutarch, describes the ideal in his *On the Delays of the Divine Vengeance* (550D–E): “Consider that according to Plato god, who presents himself as the model of all perfection, endows anyone capable of following him with human virtue, which is in a way an assimilation to god [...]. Man cannot draw any greater good from the divinity than this that in following god’s example and aiming at the beauty and truth of god’s nature, he achieves moral



Also in the *Theaetetus* Socrates implies that becoming like god is something rather in the line of any philosopher. It is a natural outcome of the internal tension characteristic of any philosopher, the tension that is generated by the natural pursuit of justice and all moral beauty. Everything that is beautiful and noble finds its essential fulfillment in God. God is the essence of Truth, Beauty and Goodness. These are the three aspects of God's nature. Goodness and Beauty are in fact only the spiritual and moral faces of Truth. Hence, philosophers on quest for Truth are at the same time seeking after Goodness and Beauty. On the other hand, the natural process of gravitating towards Beauty and Goodness leads them straight to Truth (for the same reasons). Truth, Goodness and Beauty are naturally unified in God. Therefore, the natural desire for them, the philosophers' love is bringing them closer to God. In effect, philosophers become like the object of their desire, according to the rule that anyone assimilates to the object of his love. One of the symptoms of the philosopher's love for God is his uncommon righteousness and moral nobility.

However, the natural love for God is also somewhat mysterious. The innermost structures of any human being, deeply hidden beneath the material and biological surface, are divine (immortal). Only externally does the man resemble all the other earthly creatures. This awkward, mysterious truth is to be found in Plato's myth about the creation of man in the *Timaeus*, in which it is said that man was created by the highest God (41B–44A). To be precise, God is the maker of what is essential for our humanity and, at the same time – divinity (the common essence lies in the Soul of the world), because God can only create what is

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perfection". Apuleius of Madaura, one of the most important representatives of Neoplatonism in the second century AD, analyzes the ideal in ch. 23 of the second book of *On Plato and his Doctrine*. He presents his ideal of the sage. "The purpose of wisdom is that the wise man might achieve divine dignity. He would strive to match gods in his deeds, to follow their example in his life. But he can only succeed if he is thoroughly just, prudent and pious. He should not only ponder in his mind what is god, but also pursue through his actions everything that is dear to gods and men. For even the greatest of gods not only contemplates his creation, but also examines them carefully, the first ones, the middle and the last, and having learned them well, he becomes their governor according to the universal and unchangeable laws of Providence. Only such man can be called truly happy who is not wanting in virtues and knows how to get rid of vices. One kind of happiness comes with the ability to act successfully in life. Another stems from the sense that we are lacking nothing that makes life perfect, and we are able to satisfy ourselves with contemplation. The source of both kinds of happiness lies in virtue. The bridal bed of virtues, in which they are to be conceived, does not need any worldly decorations, which we sometimes consider to be goods. It suffices to care for the health of the flesh and use well all things that we draw from the external world in order to render them noble. Virtue should serve us to combine these things with goods that really lead to true happiness, because without them none of the worldly things might be called 'good'. It is not without reason that virtue is said to be the only thing that can make people happy, because without it it is impossible to find happiness in lucky events. A wise man is then a servant and an imitator of god and we say that he follows god in his life". A very similar account of "becoming like god" is given by Alcinous, a philosopher from the second century AD, who dedicated to this subject ch. 28 of his *Handbook of Plato's Doctrine*. Slightly different formulations of the concept are to be found in the Stoic philosophy.

equal to himself (the rest was created by lesser gods). The next part of the myth describes how the creator places human souls on the stars and preaches to them about the nature of the world and the laws of destiny. The message is quite obvious: man is in the essence an immortal god, moreover, somewhere in the recesses of the human mind there exist encoded moral laws, as natural as the biological mechanisms, only not as clear and self-evident. Nevertheless, the moral law is necessary in the same way as the biological law is, although it requires human conscious activity to manifest itself in the world. Thus, Plato reveals to us the greatest mystery of mankind – the source of the desire for Beauty and nobility. We know, of course, that it was not his original concept, but an old idea taken out from the Orphic myths<sup>14</sup>. Doubtlessly though, the old truth was rediscovered and relived by Plato, it became an intrinsic truth of his soul – and only in such way, as a truth of the soul, can it be accepted by others. It cannot be asserted just the way all scientific laws are, because it cannot be scientifically verified nor falsified. It may only be experienced by the inner senses, lived through the same way other existential truths are – who knows what love is without having personally experienced it? In other words: the assertion of this truth comes as an effect of an initiation process, an existential initiation, experienced beyond the boundaries of what is rational. Plato called such initiations the perfect ordinations<sup>15</sup>.

Such initiations are nothing else than a state of the perfect (or in any case somehow modified) spiritual and moral self-consciousness, they cannot occur as a result of any kind of indoctrination. It is impossible to plant such experiences into another man's soul. A philosopher may, however, try to launch the inner processes needed for them to occur. This is how Socrates saw this matter. He knew that none of the most important (moral) truths can be planted into the human soul, but he knew also that he could stir up other people's moral sensibility, which may enable them to discover and grasp these truths. His role as an educator was not to force young men to adopt certain moral assumptions, but to wake their inner moral sensibility, in order to render it useful in understanding moral values, moral nobility and the common good. Such is Socrates' art of *maieutics* – the art of midwifery.

#### SOCRATES' MAIEUTICS

In the *Theaetetus* Socrates compares his educational practice to that of his mother, who was a midwife. She helped young women deliver their babies. He helped young men deliver wisdom. Socrates' mother could not make women pregnant, she only assisted them in bringing their offspring to the world. Socrates

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<sup>14</sup> Plato seems to go deeper into the Orphic conventions, comparing the earthly, material state of man to death and grave, as well as to the condition of an oyster closed in its shell. See *Gorg.* 493A; *Phaedr.* 250C.

<sup>15</sup> See Pl. *Phaedr.* 250C. See also *Gorg.* 493A–B; *Phaedo* 69C.

also could not conceive wisdom in his students' souls. He could, however, assist them in giving birth to what they knew, to the treasure that every one of them bore in his womb.

Τῆ δέ γ' ἐμῆ τέχνῃ τῆς μαιεύσεως τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ὑπάρχει ὅσα ἐκείναις, διαφέρει δὲ τῷ τε ἀνδρᾶς ἀλλὰ μὴ γυναίκα μαιεύεσθαι καὶ τῷ τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν τικτούσας ἐπισκοπεῖν ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ σώματα. μέγιστον δὲ τοῦτ' ἐνὶ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ τέχνῃ, βασανίζειν δυνατὸν εἶναι παντὶ τρόπῳ πότερον εἶδωλον καὶ ψεῦδος ἀποτίκτει τοῦ νέου ἢ διάνοια ἢ γόνιμόν τε καὶ ἀληθές. ἐπεὶ τότε γε καὶ ἐμοὶ ὑπάρχει ὅπερ ταῖς μαιαίς· ἄγονός εἰμι σοφίας, καὶ ὅπερ ἤδη πολλοὶ μοι ὠνείδισαν, ὡς τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἐρωτῶ, αὐτὸς δὲ οὐδὲν ἀποφαίνομαι περὶ οὐδενὸς διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν σοφόν, ἀληθές ὠνειδίζουσιν. τὸ δὲ αἴτιον τούτου τόδε· μαιεύεσθαι μὲ ὁ θεὸς ἀναγκάζει, γεννᾶν δὲ ἀπεκάλωσεν. εἰμι δὴ οὖν αὐτὸς μὲν οὐ πάνυ τι σοφός, οὐδέ τί μοι ἔστιν εὐρημα τοιοῦτον γεγονὸς τῆς ἐμῆς ψυχῆς ἔκγονον· οἱ δ' ἐμοὶ συγγιγνόμενοι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον φαίνονται ἐνίοι μὲν καὶ πάνυ ἀμαθεῖς, πάντες δὲ προῖουσης τῆς συνουσίας, οἷσπερ ἂν ὁ θεὸς παρείκη, θαυμαστὸν ὅσον ἐπιδιδόντες, ὡς αὐτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκοῦσι· καὶ τοῦτο ἐναργές ὅτι παρ' ἐμοῦ οὐδὲν πώποτε μαθόντες, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ παρ' αὐτῶν πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ εὐρόντες τε καὶ τεκόντες, τῆς μέντοι μαιείας ὁ θεὸς τε καὶ ἐγὼ αἴτιος (*Theaet.* 150 B–D).

Well, my art of midwifery is in most respects like theirs; but differs, in that I attend men and not women; and look after their souls when they are in labour, and not after their bodies: and the triumph of my art is in thoroughly examining whether the thought which the mind of the young man brings forth is a false idol or a noble and true birth. And like the mid-wives, I am barren, and the reproach which is often made against me, that I ask questions of others and have not the wit to answer them myself, is very just – the reason is that the god compels me to be a midwife, but does not allow me to bring forth. And therefore I am not myself at all wise, nor have I anything to show which is the invention or birth of my own soul, but those who converse with me profit. Some of them appear dull enough at first, but afterwards, as our acquaintance ripens, if the god is gracious to them, they all make astonishing progress; and this in the opinion of others as well as in their own. It is quite dear that they never learned anything from me; the many fine discoveries to which they cling are of their own making. But to me and the god they owe their delivery (trans. by B. Jowett).

What is the art of Socrates, after all? Surely, it does not lie in indoctrinating young men – Socrates never forced any of his disciples to agree with his notions and opinions. He only helped them develop the capacities they already possessed. And he took care to make this point absolutely clear. It may be said that Socrates intended to wake the natural (therefore human) talents, but above all – the natural moral sensibility with the help of which the young men might comprehend, to a certain extent, Truth, and, especially, moral values. In the *Gorgias*, Socrates suggests that the moral values form a circular frame within which the sense and happiness of human existence may be developed<sup>16</sup>.

<sup>16</sup> Pl. *Gorg.* 506E–509D: “And that which makes a thing good is the proper order inhering in each thing? Such is my view. And is not the soul which has an order of her own better than that which has no order? Certainly. And the soul which has order is orderly? Of course. And that which

Socrates' maieutics harmonizes with his ethical intellectualism. According to Socrates, one who really understands what it means to harm other people, would never be able to commit such an evil deed. He would know that whenever he causes somebody's physical or psychical pain (thereby harming something that is essentially of a passing and contingent nature), he destroys his own moral soul (the essence of human existence)<sup>17</sup>. Of course, it is not enough to memorize the thesis word by word. Such truth has to be experienced deeply in one's own heart. Its root should lay deep in the existential consciousness of human moral standing. And whoever understands this truth as a simple law of morality (and does not confine himself to remembering its wording) may be said to have experienced the most important initiation of his life, the initiation into the moral dimension of being human and of human existence. The awakening of the moral sensibility needed to achieve this is the primary goal of Socrates' maieutic educational art<sup>18</sup>.

*Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University, Warszawa*

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is orderly is temperate? Assuredly. And the temperate soul is good? No other answer can I give [...] therefore, Callicles, the temperate man, being, as we have described, also just and courageous and holy, cannot be other than a perfectly good man, nor can the good man do otherwise than well and perfectly whatever he does; and he who does well must of necessity be happy and blessed, and the evil man who does evil, miserable: now this latter is he whom you were applauding – the intemperate who is the opposite of the temperate” (trans. by B. Jowett).

<sup>17</sup> Pl. *Gorg.* 506E–509D (see last note). See also 483A–B; 474B; 477E; 522E and elsewhere.

<sup>18</sup> The best proof for the thesis that Socrates never indoctrinated any of his students is simply this that among his pupils we find people of various opinions and moral ideals, like Antisthenes, the founder of the Cynic school, glorifying virtue and moral effort, and Aristippus, the future teacher of the Cyrenaics, who valued hedonism in its sensual and later also spiritual dimension.

SUPPLEMENTS TO MARANGONI'S *SUPPLEMENTUM  
ETYMOLOGICUM*: THE COMMENTATORS ON TERENCE

By

NEIL ADKIN

ABSTRACT: Etymology has recently become one of the most vibrant spheres of classical scholarship. Maltby's epoch-making *Lexicon* has now been complemented by Marangoni's *Supplementum Etymologicum*. The present article offers addenda to both. It restricts itself to the commentaries on Terence.

The new interest in etymologizing continues with unabated momentum. For such investigation Maltby's *Lexicon* is an "ouvrage inestimable"<sup>1</sup>. The same reviewer opined that "rien, ou presque rien n'a échappé aux minutieux relevés de M.". Such confidence has regrettably turned out to be misplaced. Two articles have already been published by the present writer in an attempt to supplement Maltby's documentation<sup>2</sup>. Now a whole book has been devoted to the same task by Marangoni<sup>3</sup>. It would seem nonetheless that further work is still needed in this field<sup>4</sup>. Maltby states in his "Introduction" that the source for his material has been "mainly [...] commentators"<sup>5</sup>. Marangoni has likewise exploited "glossioliasti"<sup>6</sup>. The present article limits itself just to commentaries on Terence: since it only presents material that has been missed by both Maltby and Marangoni, it accordingly constitutes a supplement to the latter's own *Supplementum* of the former. The use of asterisks follows the practice of the present writer's two earlier articles: three (\*\*\*) signify that the lemma is absent from both Maltby and

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<sup>1</sup> So Flobert 1993: 356, reviewing Maltby 1991.

<sup>2</sup> Adkin 2005 and 2006.

<sup>3</sup> Marangoni 2007.

<sup>4</sup> For some shortcomings in Marangoni's work cf. Adkin 2009.

<sup>5</sup> Maltby 1991: IX.

<sup>6</sup> Marangoni 2007: XX–XXI. His second volume, which has still to appear, will deal exclusively with Keil's *Grammatici*.

Marangoni, while two (\*\*) denote a new etymology and a single one (\*) indicates that the *testimonium* would seem to be earlier than theirs<sup>7</sup>.

\*\*\***accido**, -ere: Don. *Hec.* 378, 2 “accidere est gestu corporis ostendere humilitatem cadentis, propter ad, quod est iuxta, et cadere”.

\*\*\***addo**, -ere: Don. *An.* 694, 1 “ad auctiva particula est, ut [...] addo”.

\*\*\***admodum**: Don. *An.* 586, 2 “propemodum [...]: hoc est: prope modum, cuius auctivum est admodum”.

\*\*\***adorior**, -iri: Don. *Ad.* 404, 2 “adorimur ex insidiis et ex proximo. nam adoriri est quasi ad aliquem oriri, id est exsurgere”.

\*\*\***adversitor**, -oris *m.*: Don. *Ad.* 27, 2 “adversum: proprie locutus est, nam adversitores dicuntur”.

\*\*\***adversus**: Don. *An.* 42, 2 “adversus et participium potest esse ab eo quod est adverto”.

\*\*\***affecto**, -are: Schol. Bemb. *Haut.* 301 “adfectare e<st> [...] ad se velle facere”.

\*\*\***affectus**, -us *m.*: Don. *Hec.* 325 “affici, unde affectus dicuntur, propter quos afficimur”.

\*\*\***ain**: Don. *An.* 875, 1 “quaerit Probus ain quae pars orationis sit et an una sit. est autem ain quasi aisne” (*sim. Phorm.* 373, 2).

**amator**, -oris *m.*: Don. *Eun.* 148, 1 “amator qui ad tempus, amicus qui perpetuo amat”.

**ambitio**, -onis *f.*: Don. *An.* 373, 2 “ambis: magnarum rerum desiderium [...] ambitio dicitur”.

\*\***ambulo**, -are: Schol. Bemb. *Ad.* 713 “ambulare e<st> ambire quaerendo”.

\*\***amicus**, -i *m.*: Don. *Eun.* 148, 1 *sub* amator.

\*\***amolior**, -iri: Eugraph. *An.* 707 “molior est conor vel excogito, unde amolior et demolior”.

\*\*\***Andria**, -ae *f.*: Don. *An.* 85, 4 “Andriae [...]: Attico more peregrinis meretricibus a patria nomen imponit”.

**angiportum**, -i *n.* (-us, -us *m.*): Eugraph. *Ad.* 578 “angiportum: vicus angustus”. *Eun.* 845 “angiportum dicimus vicum et angustum et tortuosum, nam anguis modo flectitur”. Schol. p. 110, 6–8 “angiportus vel angiportum est compendiosa et rector via ducens ad portum (*sim.* p. 157, 14). ponitur et pro angusto portu”.

\*\*\***antehac**: Don. *An.* 187, 2 “antehac pro ante haec consuetudine quam ratione dicitur”.

\*\*\***apage**: Schol. Bemb. *Eun.* 756 “apage: [...] hoc [...] graece dixit”.

\*\*\***appello**, -ere: Don. *An.* 1, 6 “appellere proprie dicitur, cum ex pelago [...] quis ad litus accesserit”.

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<sup>7</sup> Citation of texts follows *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae: Index librorum scriptorum inscriptionum*, Leipzig<sup>2</sup>1990, except that “Ter.” has been omitted. Hence “Don.” = Donatus (ed. Wessner I–II: 1902–1905); “Eugraph.” = Eugraphius (ed. Wessner III 1: 1908); “Schol. Bemb.” = the Terentian scholia edited by Mountford 1934; “Schol. + p.” = the Terentian scholia edited by Schlee 1893.

- \*\***Areopagites**, -ae *m.*: Schol. Bemb. *Ad.* 502 “Areo[pa]gitae dicti sunt qui com[mo]rabantur in Martio pa[go]”.
- \*\***ariolus**, -i *m.*: Schol. p. 133, 29 “ariolus dicitur ab ararum inspectione”.
- \***asellus**, -i *m.*: Don. *Ad.* 786 “asinus asellus (*scil.* hypocoristicos)”.
- \*\***asinus**, -i *m.*: Eugraph. *Haut.* 877 “asinus dicitur quasi sine mente, quia वोῦς mens”.
- \*\*\***asperor**, -ari: Don. *Phorm.* 371, 2 “aspernari [...] est [...] dictum ab a et sperno”.
- \*\***assertor**, -oris *m.*: Don. *Ad.* 194 “liberali causa manu adsero. et sunt iuris verba, a quibus etiam adsertores dicuntur vindices alienae libertatis”. Schol. p. 152, 2 f. “adsero: sancio illam liberam esse, id est affirmo vel in libertatem vindico; inde assertores”.
- \*\***astus**, -us *m.*: Eugraph. *Eun.* 924 “astu: [...] per astutiam”.
- \*\*\***attigo**, -ere: Schol. p. 91, 7 f.: “attigas: [...] tangere”.
- \*\***ausculto**, -are: Schol. Bemb. *Ad.* 806 “[aus]cultare e<st> [...] au[re]m callide admovere”.
- \*\*\***beo**, -are: Eugraph. *Eun.* 279 “beo [...]: hoc est beatum reddo”.
- \*\*\***cadaverosus**, -a, -um: Schol. p. 145, 16 “cadaverosa: similis cadaveri”.
- \*\***caesius**, -a, -um: Eugraph. *Haut.* 1062 “caesiam: [...] caesuras id est rugas habentem” (*sim.* Schol. p. 145, 15 f.).
- \*\***calamitas**, -atis *f.*: Schol. Bemb. *Eun.* 79 “calamitas: dixit grando ab eo quod calamos frangat”. Schol. p. 140, 13 f. “a verbo calvo, id est decipio, venit calamitas id est deceptio vel miseria”.
- \*\***calleo**, -ere: Don. *Ad.* 533 “calleo: callide scio”. Schol. p. 156, 29 f. “calleo: [...] callide provideo”.
- \***canicula**, -ae *f.*: Don. *Ad.* 584 “canis canicula”.
- \*\*\***Canthara**, -ae *f.*: Schol. p. 90, 27 “Cantharam id est corbem”.
- capitalis**, -e: Schol. Bemb. *Ad.* 723 “capitalia: capituli pericu[lum] signantia”.
- \*\***caprificus**, -i *f.*: Schol. p. 157, 15 “caprificus: arbor caprarum id est caprifolium”.
- \*\*\***captus**, -us *m.*: Don. *Ad.* 480, 2 “captus [...]: quantum capit animus servilis”.
- \*\***caudex**, -icis *m.*: Eugraph. *Haut.* 877 “caudex est truncus arboris: conversa o in au fit pro codex caudex, sicut pro cote cautis”.
- \*\***cautis** (-es), -is *f.*: Eugraph. *Haut.* 877 *sub* caudex.
- ensor**, -oris *m.*: Don. *Eun.* 217, 1 “censen [...]: arbitraris, ut censores, qui morum aliorum sunt summum arbitrium”.
- centuria**, -ae *f.*: Schol. p. 130, 23 f. “centurias [...] dicimus partes exercitus in centenos milites distributas”.
- centurio**, -onis *m.*: Schol. pp. 108, 32–109, 2 “centurio dicitur, qui centum praeest militibus, qui graece ἑκατόνταρχος dicitur”. p. 130, 25 “qui his (*scil.* centuriis) praesunt, centuriones dicuntur”.
- \*\*\***certamen**, -inis *n.*: Don. *Ad.* 212, 4 “certamen est ipsa res, de qua certatur”.

- \*\*\***certatio**, -onis *f.*: Don. *Ad.* 212, 4 “certatio ipse actus [...] certantium est”.
- \*\***cetarius**, -i *m.*: Eugraph. *Eun.* 257 “cetarii sunt qui salsamenta vendunt, nam cetariae dicuntur bolonae: cete enim genere neutro pisces sunt, qui ad salsamenta proficiunt”. Schol. p. 99, 16–18 “cetus est genus marinae beluae. ab hoc genere abusive piscatores cetarii dicuntur et qui tractant ea quae ex piscibus fiunt”.
- \*\*\***chirographum**, -i *n.*: Eugraph. *Phorm.* 922 “per scripturam [...] quae vocabatur chirographum”.
- \*\*\***colaphus**, -i *m.*: Schol. p. 151, 25–27 “κολάπτειν dicunt Graeci cudere vel percutere. inde colaphus dicitur incussio colli”.
- \*\*\***commeto**, -are: Schol. Bemb. *Haut.* 444 “commetare [...] venit [a verbo] commeare; nam [commet]are frequentativu<m> e<st>”.
- \*\***comminiscor**, -i: Eugraph. *Haut.* 674 “est comminiscor invenio vel recorder. sic reminiscor, cuius simplex in usu non est”.
- \*\***compos**, -tis: Don. *Ad.* 310, 2 “compos animi: id est competentis animi [...]. alii compotem animi compositum animi intellegunt”.
- \*\*\***concilio**, -are: Eugraph. *Eun.* 669 “conciliate: [...] empte, nam concilium nundinas dicimus”.
- \*\*\***confectus**, -a, -um: Don. *An.* 167, 3 “confore: [...] unde confectum negotium dicitur vel confecta res, quae ad plenum perficiuntur”.
- \*\*\***confore**: Don. *An.* 167, 2 “ab eo quod est confit, id est perficitur, futurum tempus infinitivi modi confore facit, id est perfectum iri”.
- \*\***congruo**, -ere: Schol. Bemb. 511 “congruere: [...] [cum aliqu]o agere”<sup>8</sup>.
- \*\*\***consisto**, -ere: Don. *Ad.* 156, 6 “consistere est [...] constanter stare”.
- \*\*\***contentus**, -a, -um: Don. *Phorm.* 363, 5 “continebat, unde contenti dicuntur in malis durantes”.
- \*\***contumax**, -acis: Don. *Hec.* 504, 1 “proprie contumax dicitur contemptor potiorum”.
- contumelia**, -ae *f.*: Schol. Bemb. *Eun.* 48 “c[ontu]melia (*scil.* est) quae de contem<p>tu nascitur”.
- \*\*\***convaso**, -are: Don. *Phorm.* 190, 1 “convasissem: figuratum est a colligendis vasis”.
- \*\***corollarium**, -i *n.*: Schol. p. 111, 4 f. “corollarium, quod in corona meretur”.
- \*\*\***Cuba**, -ae *f.*: Don. *Phorm.* 49, 3 “Cubae, d[ae] [...] cubandi”.
- \*\***cup(p)edenarius** (-dinarius), -i *m.*: Schol. Bemb. *Eun.* 256 “cuppedenarii: [...] ideo eos sic appellavit [qu]asi quod nummorum cupiditate teneantur. aliter cupedinari<i> cupidita[t]ibus populi servientes”. Schol. p. 99, 14–16 “cupedia, cupiditas, unde cotiones et alii cupidi, ut sunt telonearii et mercibus insistentes, cupedinarii vocantur”.
- \***curriculum**, -i *n.*: Eugraph. *Haut.* 733 “curriculo dixit a curru, vel a cursu”.

<sup>8</sup> Mountford 1934: 72 appends the following note: “[compact]o is possible”.



\*\*\***deamo**, -are: Eugraph. *Haut.* 825 “deamo: valde amo (*sim.* Schol. p. 123, 17), compositum sicut redamo”.

\*\***decrepitus**, -a, -um: Schol. *Bemb. Eun.* 231 “decrepito: q<u>i per aetatem crepare, id est loqui, non possit. [de]crepiti dicuntur [qui]a decrepant longam aetatem [qu]erentes et accusantes ipsam”. Schol. p. 98, 25 f. “decrepitus dicitur, qui propter senectutem [...] nec ullum potest facere crepitem”.

\*\*\***deditio**, -onis *f.*: Schol. p. 93, 1 f.: “dedere est sponte se alicui tradere, unde deditio spontanea traditio”.

\*\*\***defetigatus**, -a, -um: Eugraph. *An.* 669 “defetigatus id est fessus. et venit a fatigor”.

\*\***defrudo**, -are: Schol. p. 152, 29–31 “fraudo fraudas, inde componitur defrudo defrudas. inde defrutum vinum dicimus coctum”.

**defrutum**, -i *n.*: Schol. p. 152, 30 f. *sub* defrudo.

\*\***deiero**, -are: Schol. *Bemb. Eun.* 331 “deierare: dixit valde vel sancte iurare. deierare: denegare iurando”.

\*\***demensum**, -i *n.*: Eugraph. *Phorm.* 43 “demensio suo: [...] quod sibi sit demensum, a metiendo”. Schol. *Bemb. Phorm.* 43 “demensio: vel a mense vel a mensura”. Schol. p. 128, 2 f. “de demensio suo: de eo, quod sibi demensio minuerat parce vivendo”.

**demolior**, -iri: Eugraph. *An.* 707 *sub* amolior.

\*\*\***depecisor**, -i: Eugraph. *Phorm.* 166 “pacisor, id est pactum ineo, unde depecisor”.

\***desertor**, -oris *m.*: Don. *Ad.* 458, 1 “patronus deserit. [...] hinc et milites, qui defensores patriae debent esse, desertores dicuntur”.

\*\***designo**, -are: Eugraph. *Ad.* 86 “designare proprie dicitur aliquid signatum legibus rumpere”.

\*\*\***despicatus**, -a, -um: Don. *Eun.* 384, 1 f. “despicatam: [...] despectam. et est παρένθεσις μεταπλασμός. vel certe alterius verbi declinatio, ab eo quod est conspicio despicio”.

\*\*\***despicio**, -ere: Don. *An.* 622, 2 “despicere deorsum aspiciere”.

\***deverticulum**, -i *n.*: Eugraph. *Eun.* 635 “deverticulum: [...] locum, ex quo ad villam deverteret”.

\*\*\***dicax**, -acis: Don. *Eun.* 6, 2 “dictum: [...] nomen, a quo etiam dicaces dicuntur, qui malignis iocosis salibus maledicunt”.

\*\*\***dilapidator**, -oris *m.*: Eugraph. *Phorm.* 897 “dilapidet: [...] unde dilapidatores dicuntur prodigi et luxuriosi”.

\*\*\***dilatio**, -onis *f.*: Don. *Eun.* 1020 “dilatio est dicta diei prolatio”.

\*\***dim(m)inuo**, -ere: Schol. *Bemb. Ad.* 571 “dimminuetur: [i]n diversum mi[n]uetur”.

\*\*\***dis**, -tis: Eugraph. *Ad.* 770 “dis [...]: dives” (*sim.* Schol. *Bemb. Ad.* 770. Schol. p. 159, 23).

\*\***Dis**, -tis *m.* (*deus*): Schol. *Bemb. Ad.* 770 “[dis: di]ves unde dis pater Orcus [dicit]ur, dives animarum”.

- \*\*\***discessio**, -onis *f.*: Don. *An.* 148, 1 “discedo: [...] unde discessio”.
- \*\*\***dispergo**, -ere: Schol. Bemb. *Ad.* 782 “dispergam: in diversum spargam”.
- \*\*\***dirumpo**, -ere: Schol. Bemb. *Ad.* 369 “dirumpor: in diversum rumpor”.
- \*\*\***divino**, -are: Don. *Hec.* 696, 2 “proverbium ‘aiunt divinare sapientem’, quia qui dicit verum divinus est”.
- \*\*\***ecastor**: Eugraph. *An.* 817 *sub pol* (cf. also 486).
- \*\*\***eccum**: Don. *An.* 580 “eccum quasi ecce eum (*sim.* Eugraph. *An.* 580) veteres dixerunt, <ut> eccillum, quod apertius significat ecce illum et obscurius ellum”.
- \*\*\***edictum**, -i *n.*: Don. *Hec.* 563, 2 “edicimus [...], interdicimus [...]. itaque praetoris edicta et interdicta dicuntur”.
- \*\*\***edo**, -ere: Don. *Hec.* 1, 5 “edidit a dato descendit”.
- \*\*\***educio**, -are: Don. *Ad.* 48, 1 “quod nos educare dicimus, educere veteres dixerunt”.
- \*\*\***Eduulia**, -ae *f.*: Don. *Phorm.* 49, 3 “Eduuliae [...] d[ae] edendi”.
- egregius**, -a, -um: Schol. Bemb. *Haut.* 420 “egregii tauri appellantur [...] q<uod> sacris eminent grege”.
- ellum**: Don. *An.* 580 *sub eccum* (*sim.* Schol. p. 92, 23).
- \*\*\***eloquentia**, -ae *f.*: Don. *Ad.* 325, 1 “eloquere obsecro: bene eloquere, nam conatur tantum, quod nec explicatur nec intellegitur; cui vitio contraria virtus est eloquentia”.
- \*\*\***ephebia**, -ae *f.*: Don. *An.* 51, 3 “ephebia prima aetas adolescentiae est”.
- \*\*\***ephebiium** (-ion), -i *n.*: Eugraph. *An.* 51 “ephebi sunt pueri, unde et ephebion locus ubi discunt”.
- Epicurei**, -orum *m.*: Eugraph. *Eun.* 263 *sub Platonici* (*sim.* Schol. Bemb. *Eun.* 263).
- \*\*\***erratio**, -onis *f.*: Don. *Ad.* 580, 3 “erratio pedum, error animi est et loci in quo erratur”.
- \*\*\***error**, -oris *m.*: Don. *Ad.* 580, 3 *sub erratio*.
- \*\*\***eventus**, -us *m.*: Don. *Hec.* 653, 1 “evenit. ideo et bonorum eventus dicitur”.
- \*\*\***expiscor**, -ari: Don. *Phorm.* 382 “expiscari [...] tractum [...] a piscatoribus”.
- \*\*\***exsequiae**, -arum *f.*: Don. *An.* 127, 3 “sequimur [...] unde et exsequiae dicuntur”.
- \*\*\***fabrica**, -ae *f.*: Schol. p. 157, 18 f. “fabrica: officina fabri carpentarii”.
- \*\***facinus**, -oris *n.*: Eugraph. *Phorm.* 869 “facinus pro bono et pro malo facto accipitur”.
- facundus**, -a, -um: Schol. Bemb. *Haut.* 13 “facundus dicitur qui bene fari potest”.
- \***fartor**, -oris *m.*: Eugraph. *Eun.* 257 “fartores dicimus, qui gallinas farciunt, ut in meliorem usum sagina pinguescant”. Schol. p. 99, 21 “fartores: a farciendis carnibus”.
- \*\*\***faustitas**, -atis *f.*: Schol. p. 94, 4 f. “faustus dicitur felix, inde faustitas”.
- \*\*\***fideiussor**, -oris *m.*: Don. *Eun.* 139, 3 f. “si fidem habeat: [...] id est si credat: unde fideiussor dicitur, hoc est auctor credendi”.

- \*\*fides**, -ei *f.*: Don. *An.* 34, 1 “fides est commendatorum fida exsecutio”.
- \*\*fidicina**, -ae *f.*: Eugraph. *Eun.* 457 “fidicina: quae fidibus scit”. Schol. Bemb. *Ad.* 405 *sub* psaltria. 759 “fidicina [fidibus] (*scil.* canit)”.
- \*\*flagitium**, -i *n.*: Schol. Bemb. *Ad.* 408 “flagitium a flagellando e<st> dictum. pati autem huiusmodi despiciat[um so]lebant corrupti pudoris”.
- frugi**: Don. *Ad.* 959, 1 “frugi [...]: utilis ut fruges”.
- \*\*\*funambulus**, -i *m.*: Schol. p. 140, 15 f. “in funambulo: ubi per funem graditur; funambulus graece σχοινοβάτης dicitur”.
- fundus**, -i *m.*: Schol. p. 114, 32 f. “fundus [...] dicitur ager a fundendo, eo quod fundat fructus” (*sim.* p. 96, 31).
- funus**, -eris *n.*: Schol. p. 81, 11 f. “funus dicitur a funibus, qui cera illiti ad exequias mortuorum incendebantur”.
- furcifer**, -i *m.*: Schol. p. 88, 11 f. “furcifer [...] est furcarum patibulo dignus, vel furcam poenarum ferens”.
- fut(t)ile**, -is *n.*: Schol. p. 88, 6 f. “futile [...] vas a fundendo hoc quod continere non potest”.
- fut(t)ilis**, -e: Don. *Phorm.* 746, 2 “[...] a vase futili nomine, quod patulo ore, fundo acuto instabile nihil per se continet, unde et futilis dicitur eiusmodi homo, qui nihil intra se contineat et semper inanis sit” (*sim.* Schol. p. 88, 8).
- \*\*gaudium**, -i *n.*: Eugraph. *An.* 964 “gavisurum gaudia coniugata sunt”.
- \*\*gerro**, -onis *m.*: Eugraph. *Haut.* 1033 “gerro [...]: levis. gerras pisces dicunt nullius vel saporis vel momenti ad cibos. tractum hoc autem est a Syracusanis, qui omnia machinamenta, quae a Marcello adversus civitatem fiebant, <ut> magno impetu eam deiceret, eadem gerras appellabant” (*sim.* Schol. p. 126, 6–10).
- \*\*\*Gnatho**, -onis *m.*: Schol. Bemb. *Eun.* 228 “Gnatho: nomen fictum ex gula; nam (γνάθος) dicimus malas quibus mandimus [...]. ergo qui parcit mandendo, id est parasitus, merito vocatur Gnat<h>o quod vulgo dic[i]mus manducio”.
- \*gravo**, -are: Don. *Ad.* 942, 2 “ne gravare: [...] quia gravem se dicitur praestare, qui id facile non praestat in beneficio quod potest”.
- \*gynaecium**, -i *n.*: Eugraph. *Phorm.* 859 “γυνή graece, latine mulier: inde gynaecium locus, ubi mulieres operantur”.
- \*\*\*hic**, haec, hoc: Don. *Phorm.* 290, 2 “horunc [...]: <τὸ> πλήρες horunce. sic nos hunc et hanc dicimus”.
- \*\*\*horripilatio**, -onis *f.*: Schol. p. 97, 8–10 “horror est membrorum commotio, unde horripilatio dicitur, cum videlicet pili prae timore eriguntur”.
- \*\*\*horsum**: Schol. Bemb. *Eun.* 219 “horsum: huc versum”.
- \*\*\*ideo**: Don. *Hec.* 368, 1 “id [...]: deest propter [...] ac per hoc ideo”.
- \*\*ilicet**: Schol. p. 130, 5 “ilicet: ire licet, vel i, licet”.
- \*\*\*iligneus**, -a, -um: Eugraph. *Ad.* 585 “iligneis pedibus: hoc est pedibus de ilice” (*sim.* Schol. p. 157, 20 f.).
- \*\*illicio**, -ere: Don. *An.* 911 “inlicis: inligas [...]; licia enim dicta sunt quasi ligia”.

\*\***impertio**, -ire: Schol. p. 100, 2 f. “inpertire proprie est de suo proprio partem dare alicui”. p. 154, 18 “impertire: participem facere”.

\*\*\***imploro**, -are: Don. *Ad.* 489, 2 “implorare est [...] cum ploratu aliquem rogare”.

**impluvium**, -i *n.*: Schol. p. 105, 19 f. “impluvium est hoc, quod per pluviam venit et non est vera pluvia”.

\*\***impos**, -tis: Eugraph. *Ad.* 310 “compos [...] est suae voluntatis effector, unde et impos”.

\*\*\***imprudens**, -entis: Schol. Bemb. *Eun.* 430 “inprudenti: valde prudenti. hic auget vim praepositio” (but cf. *ibid.* “inprudenti: dixit innocenti”).

\*\*\***incogitans**, -antis: Schol. p. 133, 31 f. “incogitantem: valde cogitantem (*sim.* p. 129, 16 f.) vel nihil cogitantem id est stultum”.

**incus**, -udis *f.*: Eugraph. *Haut.* 740 “cudo [...] est et compono vel tundo, unde incus, ubi tunditur ferrum”.

\*\*\***indicens**, -entis: Schol. Bemb. *Ad.* 507 “indicente: [...] nove. immo potius cata arc<h>aismon; [...] indicentem [...] dixerat non dicentem”.

\*\*\***indico**, -are: Don. *An.* 132, 5 “indicat: indicium” (*sim.* *Eun.* 1014, 2).

\*\*\***indotatus**, -a, -um: Eugraph. *Phorm.* 938 “indotatis: [...] quae sine dote nupserat”.

**ineptus**, -a, -um: Eugraph. *Eun.* 311 “ineptum prorsus est, quod non aptum est”.

**iners**, -tis: Don. *Ad.* 481, 1 “neque iners: et artem habens”. Schol. Bemb. *Ad.* 481 “iners: [sin]e arte”.

\*\*\***infitias** *f.*: Schol. Bemb. *Ad.* 339 “infitias [...]: a non fando”.

\*\*\***infortunium**, -i *n.*: Schol. p. 140, 3 “infortunio: mala fortuna”.

\*\*\***ingenium**, -i *n.*: Schol. Bemb. *Ad.* 683 “ingenium [...] dicitur quasi ingenitum”.

\*\*\***ingratis**: Don. *Eun.* 220, 3 “ingratis non ultro significat, quia ultronea grata sunt, ingrata quae ab invitis fiunt aut recusantibus”.

**iniuria**, -ae *f.*: Schol. Bemb. *Eun.* 48 “iniuria est quae non iure inferitur”.

\*\*\***insolens**, -entis: Schol. p. 93, 13 “insolens: [...] non solitus venire”.

\*\***insulsus**, -a, -um: Don. *Eun.* 1079, 9 “insulsum qui non sit salax et cupidus coitus”.

\*\*\***interdictum**, -i *n.*: Don. *Hec.* 563, 2 *sub* edictum.

\*\***interficio**, -ere: Schol. Bemb. *Haut.* 448 “inter et de tantundem significat ad au<g>mentum ostendendum; hinc dicitur interfectus”.

\*\*\***intrita**, -ae *f.*: Don. *Phorm.* 318, 2 “bene intristi: proprie enim intrita dicitur huiusmodi cibus”.

\*\*\***intuor**, -i: Schol. Bemb. *Haut.* 403 “ab eo quod est intueor intuetur, et intuor intuitur”.

\*\*\***istic**, -aec, -uc: Schol. Bemb. *Haut.* 380 “istic: pro iste, ut hic illic. est enim integrum istece”.

\*\*\***iunceus**, -a, -um: Eugraph. *Eun.* 316 “iunceas: [...] iunco similes”.

- \*\***iurgium**, -i *n.*: Schol. Bemb. *Ad.* 404 “iurgium proprie dicitur iusta contio”.
- \***lacrima**, -ae *f.*: Schol. Bemb. *Eun.* 67 “lacrima dicta quod mentis [la]ceratione nascatur”.
- \*\***lacto**, -are: Eugraph. *An.* 648 “lactasses [...] dictum est decepisses, per metaphoram tractum a pueris. et est [...] lacto lactas lac praebeo” (cf. 912).
- \*\***lanista**, -ae *m.*: Schol. p. 99, 20 “lanistae a laniandis carnibus dicti”.
- \*\*\***lectus**, -a, -um: Don. *Phorm.* 53, 5 “lectum: bonum vel splendidum [...]. quamvis quidam putant lecta ab eo quod est lego dicta”.
- \*\***lepidus**, -a, -um: Eugraph. *An.* 948 “lepidum [...]: id est dulcem, suavem: tractum a suavitate leporinae carnis, quae metaphora est a gustu” (*sim.* Schol. p. 93, 33 f.).
- \*\***liberalis**, -e: Don. *Ad.* 194 “causa ipsa liberalis dicitur, quae actionem in se continet libertatis”.
- libertinus**, -i *m.*: Schol. p. 105, 32 “libertinus filius liberti”.
- \*\***libertus**, -i *m.*: Schol. p. 105, 31 f. “libertus dicitur, qui cum sit servus, libertati donatur”.
- limen**, -inis *n.*: Eugraph. *Eun.* 601 “quidam intelligunt limis obliquus, quod ipsum limen, cum ambulamus, itineri nostro obliquum est”.
- \*\*\***limus**, -a, -um: Eugraph. *Eun.* 601 “alii intelligunt limis (*scil.* oculis) coniunctis ad flabellum, ut Plautus dixit ‘numquam cum ea limavi caput’, quod est coniunxi”. Schol. p. 105, 27–29 “limis: tortis oculis et transversis, a limine in transverso posito. limos oculos dicimus in transversum aspicientes”.
- liquaminarius**, -i *m.*: Schol. p. 99, 18 f. “liquaminarii, qui ex corporibus piscium humorem liquant”.
- locuples**, -tis: Schol. p. 116, 27 f. “locuples dicitur, qui in multis locis possessiones habet et villas”.
- \*\***logus**, -i *m.*: Schol. p. 133, 30 f. “logi: sermones et verba sunt, quae loqueris”.
- lorica**, -ae *f.*: Schol. p. 151, 29–31 “lorum dicitur genus verberis, id est corrigia. hinc et lorica dicitur, quia antiqui ex loris munimentum pectoris faciunt”.
- \*\***Lucina**, -ae *f.*: Eugraph. *An.* 473 “[Lucina] lucem nascentibus dat”. Schol. p. 86, 9 f. “Iuno Lucina dicitur eo quod in lucem praeest nascentibus ipsa et Luna”.
- luculentus**, -a, -um: Schol. Bemb. *Haut.* 523 “luculenta: pulcra, a luce splendida”.
- \*\*\***ludificor**, -ari: Eugraph. *Eun.* 645 “ludificatus est: per ludum [...] inlusit”. *Phorm.* 948 “me ludificamini: me luditis”.
- \*\*\***macellarius**, -i *m.*: Schol. p. 99, 20 f. “macellarii a carnibus mactandis”.
- \*\***macellum**, -i *n.*: Schol. p. 99, 13 “macellum dicitur a macerandis carnibus”.
- \*\*\***macero**, -are: Schol. Bemb. *Eun.* 187 “macerabo: [...] macrum faciam”.
- \*\***manipulus**, -i *m.*: Schol. p. 109, 5–7 “manipulus triginta militibus impletur, vel quod mane ineat proelium, vel a manipulis feni, quos in lanceis suis antiqui ferebant”.
- \*\*\***mastigia**, -ae *m.*: Schol. p. 160, 1 “mastigia: mastix graece, latine dicitur corrigia”.

**memor**, -oris: Don. *Ad.* 251, 3 “memor est, qui apud se meminit”.

\*\*\***mi** (adj.): Don. *Ad.* 269, 1 “mi: meus, sed vocativo casu dixit” (*sim.* 336, 2; 935, 2; *Eun.* 95, 1; 536, 3). Schol. p. 91, 6 f. “mi: vocativus, quia antiqui mius dicebant”.

**mina**, -ae *f.*: Schol. p. 127, 9 “μνᾶ graece, mina dicitur latine”.

\*\*\***Misargyrides**, -ae *m.*: Don. *Ad.* 26, 1 “per ἀντίφρασιν ioculariter nomen imponit (*scil.* poeta), ut Misargyrides in Plauto dicitur trapezita”.

\*\***moderor**, -ari: Schol. *Bemb. Haut.* 216 “[mo]derari est [m]odum dare alteri”.

\*\*\***modeste**: Don. *Phorm.* 170, 2 “modeste: cum modo”.

**monstrum**, -i *n.*: Schol. *Bemb. Ad.* 714 “[m]o<n>strum a monstrando dictum est”.

\*\*\***morigeror**, -ari: Schol. p. 83, 7 f.: “morigerari id est mores portare”.

\*\*\***morigerus**, -a, -um: *Eugraph. An.* 293 “morigera id est [...] mores gerens”.

**mugilis**, -is *m.*: Schol. p. 111, 16–18 “mugilis [...] dicitur quasi multum agilis, qui per anum ingrediebatur in ventrem et ita adulterum necabat”.

\*\***naufragus**, -a, -um: *Eugraph. An.* 923 “quia fuerit naufragus, ait definiendo ‘nave fracta est eiectus’”.

**nebulo**, -onis *m.*: Schol. p. 107, 23–25 “nebulo ideo vocatur mendax, quia sicut nebula densa obscurat aliquid, ita mendax obscurat veritatem”.

**negotium**, -i *n.*: Schol. p. 149, 18 f. “negotium dicitur quasi nec otium”.

\*\***nemo**, -inis: *Eugraph. Ad.* 259 “significat [...] nemo non homo”.

\*\***nequam**: Schol. *Bemb. Ad.* 358 “nequam dicitur qui ni[hil] aequitatis <h>abet”.

\*\*\***nequid**: Schol. p. 120, 16 “nequid quasi non aliquid”.

\*\*\***nimirum**: Don. *Eun.* 508, 1 “solve nimirum et fac non est mirum [...]. nam ni ne significat et ne non”.

\*\***nobilis**, -e: Schol. *Bemb. Eun.* 1021 “nobilitas: defamas; unde nobiles dicuntur noti”. Schol. p. 112, 5 f.: “nobilitas est cognitio multorum, unde etiam nobiles dicuntur noti”.

**noxia**, -ae *f.*: Don. *Eun.* 852 “trissyllabo nomine noxiam dixit quasi noxam”.

\***nuntius**, -i *m.*: Schol. *Bemb. Haut.* 427 “nuntius et ipse e<st> qui nuntiat (*sim.* 176) et ipsum q<uod> nuntiatur”.

\*\*\***obitus**, -us *m.*: *Eugraph. Hec.* 859 “obitus [...] accessus est ab eo quod est obeo”.

\*\***obsero**, -are: *Eugraph. Eun.* 763 “serare est claudere, ita compositum obserare. contrarium est vero reserare, quod est aperire”.

\*\*\***obsono**, -are: Schol. p. 84, 5–7 “obsonium generaliter dicuntur omnes cibi, quos indifferenter accipimus, unde obsonatum est dicimus, id est coenatum est”.

\*\***obstetrix**, -icis *f.*: Schol. p. 83, 8 f. “obstetricem: eo quod obstat ventri”. P. 87, 1–3 “obstetrix dicitur ab obstando, eo quod obstat puerum ab uno in aliud”.

**occido**, -ere: Don. *Ad.* 559, 2 “occidere et praecidere ad caedem referebantur apud veteres”.

\*\***occipio**, -ere: Schol. Bemb. *Ad.* 289 “occipiunt: [oc]culte capiunt; do[lor]es enim muliebres [int]eriora pertemp[an]t”. 327 “occepit: occulte coepit”.

\*\***oppidum**, -i *n.*: Schol. Bemb. *Ad.* 715 “oppidum: ab opibus dandis dictum est”.

\*\*\***oppignero**, -are: Schol. p. 123, 2 f. “oppignerare: pro pignore accipere vel habere”.

\*\*\***optimates**, -ium *m.*: Don. *Phorm.* 115, 1 “superlativus gradus optimates facit, quia bonus melior optimus dicitur”.

\***paelex** (pell-), -icis *f.*: Eugraph. *Phorm.* 68 “pellexit: [...] unde pellex, id est meretrix”.

\*\***p(a)enuria**, -ae *f.*: Schol. Bemb. *Ad.* 442 “paenuria: [...] proprie [...] dicta est [inopia in penu, id] e<st> cellario; unde V<e>rg<ilius> (*Aen.* I 704): cura [penum struere]”.

\*\***palaestra**, -ae *f.*: Schol. p. 103, 14 f. “palaio graece luctor, unde palaestra luctatio dicitur”.

**palliatu**s, -a, -um: Don. *Phorm.* 844 “pallio: recte, quia palliata fabula est” (*sim.* Eugraph. *Phorm.* 844).

\*\***palmarium**, -a, -um: Don. *Eun.* 930, 2 “palmarium: palma dignum”. Eugraph. *Eun.* 930 “idem est palmarium quod palma”. Schol. p. 111, 1–4 “palmarium: remuneratio palmae. captionem, ingenium, dolum, unde mihi palma meretur. nam palmarium est, quod in palma meretur”.

\*\***pantomimus**, -i *m.*: Schol. p. 124, 16 f. “pantomimus omnium imitator vultuum est”.

\*\***panucla**, -ae *f.*: Schol. p. 117, 16 “panuclas, quas dicunt eo quod a pectine subter caedatur”.

\*\*\***parasitaster**, -tri *m.*: Schol. p. 159, 29 “parasitaster: parvus parasitus”.

\*\*\***parasitus**, -i *m.*: Schol. p. 98, 18–21 “parasitus sonat mecum cibus vel apud me, quia παρὰ apud, σῖτος cibus dictus est. vel parasiti dicuntur a parendo et assistendo eo quod assidentes ipsi maioribus personis illorum voluptati per adulationem obsequuntur”.

\*\*\***Parmeno**, -onis *m.*: Don. *Ad.* 26, 1 “nomina personarum, in comoediis dumtaxat, habere debent [...] etymologiam. [...] hinc servus fidelis Parmeno”.

\*\***patrisso**, -are: Eugraph. *Ad.* 564 “patrissas: patri similis es”.

\*\*\***pauxillulum**: Don. *Phorm.* 37, 2 “pauxillulum quartus gradus diminutionis: paulum paululum pauxillum pauxillulum” (*sim.* Schol. Bemb. *Phorm.* 36 f.).

\*\*\***pavito**, -are: Don. *Hec.* 321, 2 “pavitare: [...] quasi [...] palpitare venis”.

\***pellax**, -acis: Don. *Phorm.* 68, 1 “pellexit: [...] sic [...] pellacis” (*sim.* Eugraph. *Phorm.* 68).

\*\*\***permano**, -are: Schol. p. 153, 14 f. “mano, id est curro ac duco, unde permano, as, at”.

\*\*\***perspicax**, -acis: Eugraph. *Haut.* 874 “perspicacem: hoc est [...] perspectatorem rerum”.

- \*\*pervicax**, -acis: Don. *Hec.* 532, 3 “pervicax est perseverans cum quadam vi”.
- Phormio**, -onis *m.*: Schol. Bemb. *Phorm.* 26 “formon dicitur gr<a>ece saccus sparteus; ab hoc parasito nomen est, vel ex [ventris] capacitate; [... non a for]mula ut quidam putant. [...] si enim a formula esset nomen comoediae protra<h>eremus primam syll[abam, si a formi]one corripere debemus”.
- \*\*\*Phrygia**, -ae *f.*: Don. *Ad.* 973, 1 *sub* Syrus.
- \*\*\*Piraeus** (-um), -i *m.*: Schol. Bemb. *Eun.* 290 “Pyr<a>eum dicitur promuntorium Athenarum quod frequenter temptatum sit a piratis; περιῶν autem dicimus temptare”.
- \*\*\*piscator**, -oris *m.*: Don. *Eun.* 257, 3 “piscatores: qui recentem piscem praebent”.
- \*\*pistrilla**, -ae *f.*: Don. *Ad.* 584 “veteres absolute dicebant pistrinam [...], ad tabernam referentes; nam pistrino pistrilla non convenit”.
- Platonici**, -orum *m.*: Eugraph. *Eun.* 263 “nomina disciplinae apud philosophos saepe ab auctoribus videntur imposita, ut a Platone Platonici, ab Epicuro Epicurei” (*sim.* Schol. Bemb. *Eun.* 263. Schol. p. 99, 23).
- \*\*\*plumbeus**, -a, -um: Eugraph. *Haut.* 877 “plumbeus a plumbo, id est gravis”.
- \*\*\*pol**: Eugraph. *An.* 817 “pol [...] iuratio est per Pollucem, quomodo ecastor per Castorem”.
- \*\*\*Polemon**, -onis *m.*: Don. *Ad.* 26, 1 “hinc (*vide sub* Parmeno) [...] miles [...] Polemon”.
- \*\*popularis**, -e: Eugraph. *Phorm.* 35 “popularis: [...] qui in populo sunt”. Schol. Bemb. *Ad.* 155 “populares: [e]iusdem po[p]uli cives”. *Phorm.* 35 “popularis: [...] populo amatus est, [...] populoque factus”. Schol. p. 127, 28 “popularis: populo gratus”.
- \*\*portitor**, -oris *m.*: Schol. p. 129, 11 “portitores: custodes portus, praepositos portui”.
- \*\*\*Potica**, -ae *f.*: Don. *Phorm.* 49, 3 “Poticae [...] d[ae] [...] potandi”.
- \*\*\*potin**: Don. *An.* 437 “potin es [...]: integrum potisne <es>, id est potes”.
- \*\*\*potior**, -ius: Don. *An.* 437 “est [...] nomen potis et facit potis potior potissimus” (*sim.* 453; cf. *Ad.* 296, 5 “potissimum [...] superlativum est ab eo quod est potis et potius”).
- \*\*\*potissimus**, -a, -um: Don. *An.* 437 *sub* potior (*sim.* 453; cf. *Ad.* 296, 5).
- \*\*\*praecido**, -ere: Don. *Ad.* 559, 2 *sub* occido.
- \*\*\*praegnans**, -antis: Don. *Hec.* 641 “praegnans est ante gnatum vel ante genitricem: est enim prae ante”.
- \*\*\*praesagus**, -a, -um: Schol. Bemb. *Haut.* 236 “sagus: sciens doctus, unde pr<a>esagus pr<a>escius. sagare e<st> enim satis agere, hoc est multa scire”.
- \*\*praesens**, -entis: Don. *Phorm.* 345, 2 “praesentes di sunt [...] qui statim praestant”.
- \*praestolor**, -ari: Don. *Eun.* 975, 2 “praestolari est praesto esse”.
- \*\*\*principium**, -i *n.*: Eugraph. *Eun.* 781 “principia dicuntur [...] frons prima exercitus”.



**procax**, -acis: Eugraph. *Haut.* 227 “procax a procando, hoc est petendo dictum est, unde et proci nuptiarum petitores”.

\*\*\***proclivis**, -e: Don. *An.* 78 “proclive est porro inclinatum vel pronum inclinatumque”.

\*\***procus**, -i *m.*: Eugraph. *Haut.* 227 *sub* procax. Schol. Bemb. *Haut.* 227 “procax: instans in petendo. unde proci matrimoni<i>”.

\***prodo**, -ere: Don. *Hec.* 672, 1 “prodemus: [...] porro dabimus” (*sim.* Schol. Bemb. *Haut.* 479).

\*\*\***produco**, -ere: Don. *Ad.* 402 “produxi [...], id est porro duxi”. Schol. Bemb. *Ad.* 561 “produx: porro deduxisse”.

**pronuba**, -ae *f.*: Eugraph. *An.* 473 “[Iuno] pronuba est, hoc est nubentibus praeest”.

**pro(r)sa**, -ae *f.*: Schol. Bemb. *Haut.* 140 “inde (*scil.* a prorsus) et prorsa oratio dicitur quae recta proferatur neq<ue> inflexa cantilenis”.

\*\***prorsus**: Schol. Bemb. *Haut.* 140 “prorsus e<st> priorsus”.

\*\*\***proviso**, -ere: Schol. Bemb. *Eun.* 394 “proviso: procedo visendo”.

\*\***psaltria**, -ae *f.*: Schol. Bemb. *Ad.* 405 “psaltria: fidicina. nam Gra<e>ci a voce nomen inposuerunt, Latini a manu; psal<l>in enim cantare dicimus. fides vero c<h>ordae su<nt> quae manu temperantur”.

\*\***puerpera**, -ae *f.*: Schol. Bemb. *Ad.* 921 “puerperam: quae p[uerum pe]perit”.

**pugil**, -is *m.*: Schol. p. 100, 31 f. “pugiles dicuntur, qui pugnis proeliantur”.

\*\*\***pulto**, -are: Schol. Bemb. 275 “pultat: frequentativum e<st> a verbo pulsat”.

\***quaestus**, -us *m.*: Don. *Eun.* 210, 2 “a praecedenti (*scil.* acquirere) etiam quaestus dicuntur”.

\*\*\***qui** (abl. sing.): Don. *Ad.* 254, 2 f. “abs quivis homine: [...] qui secundum regulam dixit, quia dicimus quibus”.

\*\*\***quidni**: Don. *Eun.* 328 “est [...] quidni aut quid nisi (*sim.* 674, 2. *Ad.* 573 “correptive quidni pro quid nisi”) aut cur non, quia veteres ni pro ne ponebant et ne pro non”.

\*\*\***quis** (abl. plur.): Don. *Ad.* 254, 3 “a quo quis facit et non quibus”.

\***ranunculus**, -i *m.*: Don. *Ad.* 584 “rana ranunculus”.

**rapina**, -ae *f.*: Schol. Bemb. *Ad.* 356 *sub* raptio.

\*\*\***raptio**, -onis *f.*: Schol. Bemb. *Ad.* 356 “raptio dicitur rapiendi officium vel actus, rapina crimen raptoris”.

\*\*\***redamo**, -are: Eugraph. *Haut.* 825 *sub* deamo.

\*\*\***refello**, -ere: Don. *Phorm.* 132, 2 “refellere est redarguere falsitatem”. 401 “refellere est arguendo falsum ostendere”.

\*\***reliquiae**, -arum *f.*: Don. *Ad.* 444 “reliquias pro relictis [...] dicunt”.

\*\*\***reminiscor**, -i: Eugraph. *Haut.* 674 *sub* comminiscor.

\*\*\***rescribo**, -ere: Eugraph. *Phorm.* 922 “quoniam argenti acceptio per scripturam fiebat, ideo rescribi, quod est renumerari” (cf. Don. *Phorm.* 922, 1–3. Schol. p. 139, 14).

- \*\***resero**, -are: Eugraph. *Eun.* 763 *sub* obsero.
- \*\*\***respicio**, -ere: Don. *An.* 975, 4 “respicere est proprie retro aspicere”.
- \*\***respondeo**, -ere: Don. *Ad.* 499, 2 “spondere [...] proprie est priorem loqui [...], respondere posteriore loco dicere”.
- \*\*\***retineo**, -ere: Don. *Ad.* 58 “retinet, qui adversum aliquem tenet”.
- \*\***rictus**, -us *m.*: Eugraph. *Phorm.* 341 “ringor id est os aperio. unde rictus”.
- \*\***rursus**: Schol. Bemb. *Haut.* 140 “rursus (*scil.* est) retrorsus”.
- \*\***sacellum**, -i *n.*: Eugraph. *Ad.* 576 “sacellum: sacer locus”. Schol. p. 157, 12 f. “sacellum: parvum sacrum. sacer locus”.
- \*\*\***saevidicus**, -a, -um: Schol. p. 130, 7 “saevidicis: saeva dicentibus”.
- \*\*\***sago**, -are: Schol. Bemb. *Haut.* 236 *sub* praesagus.
- \*\*\***salsamentum**, -i *n.*: Schol. p. 155, 23 “salsamenta: carnes sale conditas”.
- \*\*\***Sanga**, -ae *m.*: Schol. p. 109, 2–4 “Sanga vocatur eo quod esset sanguisugarius, unde et peniculum ferebat, id est spongiam”.
- savium**, -i *n.*: Schol. Bemb. *Eun.* 456 “savium meretricibus [tan]tum quod causa suavitatis datur”.
- \*\***sceleratus**, -a, -um: Don. *Eun.* 643, 4 “sceleratus in quo scelus sit constitutum aut commissum”.
- \*\***scelerosus**, -a, -um: Don. *Eun.* 643, 4 “scelerosus proprie auctor est sceleris”.
- scilicet**: Don. *An.* 85, 1 “scilicet scias <licet>”. Schol. Bemb. *Ad.* 729 “scil<icet>: scire licet” (*sim.* 791. *Haut.* 358).
- \*\***scitus**, -a, -um: Schol. Bemb. *Eun.* 254 “scitum: scientiae plenum”.
- scortum**, -i *n.*: Schol. p. 102, 13–16 “scortum dicitur quasi scortum, id est solea. sicut solea omnibus subigitur, ita et illa pellicula, et sicut illa omnes in se terendo recipit sordes, ita et illa omnium libidinum inmunditias”.
- scriptor**, -oris *m.*: Don. *Ad.* 1, 3 “indifferenter omnis qui aliquid scriberet scriptor a veteribus dicebatur” (*sim.* Eugraph. *An.* 947).
- \*\***scrupulosus**, -a, -um: Schol. p. 93, 25–27 “scrupulus: calculus est, lapillus brevis, qui calcantibus molestiam infert, unde et scrupulosa quaestio valde difficilis”.
- scrupulus**, -i *m.*: Eugraph. *An.* 940 “scrupuli dicuntur lapilli admodum leves et parvi, diminutivum a scrupo”.
- \***scutella**, -ae *f.*: Don. *Ad.* 584 “scutum scutella”.
- secta**, -ae *f.*: Schol. Bemb. *Eun.* 262 “sectari: ideo et sect<a>e dicuntur filosoforum quia sequuntur magistrum dis[ciplinam]”.
- \*\***sedulo**: Don. *Ad.* 50, 1 “sedulo: secus a dolo, id est sine dolo”. Eugraph. *Ad.* 251 “sedulo [...]: sine dolo” (*sim.* Schol. Bemb. *Eun.* 138).
- sedulus**, -a, -um: Schol. p. 133, 6 f. “sedulum [...] sine dolo”.
- \*\***serpens**, -entis *f.* (*m.*): Schol. Bemb. *Ad.* 715 *sub* serpillam.
- \*\***serpilla**, -ae *f.*: Schol. Bemb. *Ad.* 715 “herba quae paulatim per [terr]am crescit serpilla dici[tur]. r]eptare autem gr<a>ece di[citur] CEPPEIN unde erpeton serpens [dici]tur”.

**servitium**, -i *n.*: Eugraph. *An.* 675 “a nota argumentum elicit dicendo servitium a servo”.

**silicernium**, -i *n.*: Schol. Bemb. *Ad.* 587 “silicernium: incurve dum silices cernis”. Schol. p. 157, 22 f. “silicernium: vetulum et curvum, quasi silices sepulcrorum iam intendentem”.

**\*\*sis**: Don. *Eun.* 312, 4 “sis si vis” (*sim. Hec.* 753, 3; Schol. Bemb. *Eun.* 756; *Haut.* 369). Schol. Bemb. *Eun.* 311 “sis: sic vi[va]s”. Schol. p. 108, 19–22 “sis quidam dicunt si vis, sed aliud est, scilicet: si vivas. [...] et est amatorium verbum et comicum”.

**\*\*\*situs**, -a, -um: Don. *Ad.* 331 “sitae positae” (*sim.* Schol. Bemb. *Ad.* 331).

**socordia**, -ae *f.*: Eugraph. *An.* 206 “socordiae [...], ut ea quae sunt necessaria corde inveniantur”.

**\*\*\*socors**, -dis: Schol. p. 82, 3 f. “socors dicitur quasi sine corde, id est sine intellectu”.

**\*\*sodes**: Don. *An.* 85, 1 “sodes: [...] est [...] si audes, [...] nam delirat, qui σωος ζῆς interpretatur sodes”. Schol. p. 80, 32 f. “sodes: id est si audes, ut quidam dicunt, vel comicum verbum blandientis”.

**\*\*sollemnitas**, -atis *f.*: Schol. p. 103, 16–20 *sub* sollers.

**\*\*sollers**, -tis: Schol. Bemb. *Eun.* 478 “sollertem: dixit peritum et ide<o> quod solus in arte sit sollers dictus”. Schol. p. 103, 15–20 “sollers ingeniosus dicitur. sollon enim dicunt Graeci multum. unde et sollemnitas dicta eo quod ibi multitudo hominum conveniat, non a sole, ut quidam volunt. unde fallunt illi, qui dicunt per unum I scribendum esse, quia potest esse sollemnitas non apparente sole”.

**sollicito**, -are: Schol. Bemb. *Haut.* 251 “sollicitare est valde movere a solo et citare. V<e>rg<ilius> (*G.* II 418): sollicitanda tamen tellus”.

**\*\*sollicitus**, -a, -um: Eugraph. *Haut.* 460 “sollicitos [...]: hoc est ebrios. significat enim sollicitos in solo citatos, quod ebriis contingit, quibus non sunt firma vestigia, sed motu corporis citi sunt”.

**spongia**, -ae *f.*: Schol. Bemb. *Eun.* 777 “[spon]giam [latine, nam spongos graece dicitur]”<sup>9</sup>.

**sponsa**, -ae *f.*: Eugraph. *Haut.* 779 “spondere est promittere, unde et sponsa dicitur”.

**stamen**, -inis *n.*: Schol. p. 117, 17 “stamen [...] a stando”.

**\*\*\*stataria**, -ae *f.*: Eugraph. *Haut.* 36 “quidam statariam genus esse putant comoediae, ut statariae comoediae sint, in quibus sunt stantes [...]. mihi autem videtur ‘statariam agere ut liceat per silentium’ ideo dixisse, ut perpetuo et stabiliter agatur haec comoedia neque populi adversis suffragiis foras pellatur”.

**\*\*statim**: Don. *Phorm.* 790 “statim [...] quasi uno statu”.

<sup>9</sup> Apropos of this lacunose scholium Mountford 1934: 48 reports that “Umpf[enbach] and Stud[emund] could read almost the whole”.

\*\***stomachor**, -ari: Schol. Bemb. *Eun.* 323 “[stomach]abar: furore[m] [sto]-mac<h>i digerebam”.

\*\*\***storacinus**, -a, -um: Schol. p. 150, 2-4 “storax [...] nomen est ligni, unde legimus storacinam virgam”.

\*\*\***Storax**, -acis *m.*: Don. *Ad.* 26, 1 “hinc (*vide sub* Parmeno) [...] puer [...] ab odore Storax”.

\*\*\***Strato**, -onis *m.*: Don. *Eun.* 414, 2 “Strato nomen accommodatum militiae”.

\*\*\***studeo**, -ere: Schol. Bemb. *Haut.* 382 “a satisdando studere dicitur, nam rei studere e<st> satisda[re]”.

\*\*\***styrax**, -acis *m.*: Schol. p. 150, 6 f. “storax [...] lignum est, cuius resina stirax vocatur”.

\*\***subtemen**, -inis *n.*: Schol. Bemb. *Haut.* 293 “subtemen: dictum ab eo quod subeat stami[ni]”. Schol. p. 117, 17 “subtemen, quasi sub stamine”.

\*\***succenturiatus**, -a, -um: Schol. p. 130, 13-20 “duae erant centuriae apud antiquos Romanorum, maior habebat centum centenarios et mille decanos, minor vero decem centenarios et centum decanos. haec itaque in insidiis semper ponebatur, ut si maior deficeret, ab illa iuicaretur, unde et subcenturiatus dicitur dolosus, callidus, in insidiis praeparatus. succenturiati sunt non qui in prima, sed qui in secunda centuria consistunt, quasi sub prima centuria constituti”.

\*\*\***suffarcino**, -are: Eugraph. *An.* 769 “subfarcinari dicitur quasi sarcina aliqua fulciri. siquidem [...] farciore fartus, unde suffarcinor, facit”.

\***suillus**, -a, -um: Don. *Ad.* 786 “suinus suillus (*scil.* hypocoristicos)”.

\*\*\***sumptus**, -us *m.*: Don. *Ad.* 854, 2 “sumamus: [...] unde et sumptum dicimus pecuniam, quae insumenda est” (*sim. Phorm.* 681, 2).

\*\***supremus**, -a, -um: Don. *Ad.* 196, 2 “ab eo quod est superum et superius, fit supremum”.

\*\***sycophanta**, -ae *m.*: Eugraph. *An.* 919 “sycophanta: calumniator. hoc verbum est ab his, qui apud Athenas accusabant eos, qui ficos extra civitatem ferebant”.

\*\*\***Syriscus**, -i *m.*: Don. *Ad.* 763, 3 “Syriscum se dicit, non Syrum, τῶ ὑποκορίσματι” (*sim. Eun.* 774, 3).

**Syrus**, -i *m.*: Don. *Ad.* 973, 1 “ut ipse Syrus, ita Phrygia uxor secundum veteres, qui servis nomina a nationibus imponebant”.

\*\*\***tandem**: Don. *An.* 521, 3 “apud veteres tamenidem integrum fuit, unde apud nos [...] tandem [...] natum est”.

\*\*\***techna**, -ae *f.*: Schol. Bemb. *Eun.* 718 “technam: artem dixit; hoc autem graece dixit”.

\***temetum**, -i *n.*: Schol. Bemb. 655 “[te]me[tu]m vinum [es]t q<uod> eo acta mens [t]itubet”.

\*\***temulentus**, -a, -um: Schol. p. 106, 21 f. “temulentus dicitur temetolentus, id est vino plenus. lentum enim dicitur plenum”.

\*\*\***tribulis**, -is *m.*: Eugraph. *Ad.* 438 “tribulis [...] significat ex eadem tribu, hoc est ex eadem curia” (*sim. Schol.* p. 156, 4).

- \***triclinium**, -i *n.*: Schol. Bemb. *Ad.* 285 “lecti sternibantur (*sic*) tres unde triclinium dictum”.
- \*\***tuber**, -eris *n.*: Don. *Ad.* 245 “tuber cibi genus est collectum ex tumentibus [...] harenis”.
- \*\***turba**, -ae *f.*: Don. *Hec.* 43, 2 “turba: id est θόρυβος”.
- \*\***ullus**, -a, -um: Don. *Ad.* 786 “unus ullus (*scil.* hypocoristicos)”.
- \*\*\***unciatim**: Eugraph. *Phorm.* 43 “unciatim: hoc est paulatim, velut per singulas uncias” (cf. Don. *Phorm.* 43, 4).
- \***usura**, -ae *f.*: Don. *Ad.* 981, 1 “utatur: vivat, quia usura vita dicitur”.
- \*\***v(a)ecors**, -dis: Schol. p. 88, 20 f. “vaeors dicitur non bene cordatus, nam vae pro non ponitur”.
- \*\*\***vagitus**, -us *m.*: Don. *Hec.* 517, 1 “vagitus [...]. et est ὀνοματοποιία, nam vox ipsa (*scil.* pueri vagientis) sic est, ut quasi vagitus saepius sonet”.
- \*\*\***vallatum**, -i *n.*: Schol. Bemb. *Ad.* 302 “vallata [...] dicimus terrae aggerem intra quem latentes figimus vallos”.
- \*\***vallus**, -i *m.*: Don. *Ad.* 786 “vannus vallus (*scil.* hypocoristicos)”.
- venustas**, -atis *f.*: Schol. p. 81, 8 f. “venustas dicitur a Venere, dea libidinis”.
- venustus**, -a, -um: Schol. Bemb. *Eun.* 457 “venuste: dixit pulchre; hoc autem a Venere tract[u]m est” (*sim.* Schol. p. 81, 9 f. “quia pulchritudine Venus delectatur”).
- \*\***versipellis**, -is *m.*: Eugraph. *Phorm.* 780 “versuram solves: id est pro calliditate poenas lues. unde versipellis”.
- Vertumnus**, -i *m.*: Don. *Ad.* 728, 2 “quam potestatem rerum vertentium semet in utramque partem Vertumno deo superesse veteres existimabant”.
- \*\***vesperasco**, -ere: Eugraph. *Haut.* 248 “vesperascit: [...] a vespere factum verbum est”.
- vestibulum**, -i *n.*: Eugraph. *An.* 726 “Romanis omnibus mos est in atrio, hoc est in vestibulo, habere Vestam – quippe cum inde vestibulum nominarint”.
- \*\***veterator**, -oris *m.*: Eugraph. *An.* 457 “veteratorem [...], hoc est [...] astutia vetusta roboratum”.
- \*\***vetulus**, -a, -um: Don. *Eun.* 688, 5 “vetus est, cuius diminutivum est vetulus”.
- \*\***vieo**, -ere: Don. *Eun.* 688, 3 “viere ligare dicitur, quia vietis virgis ligare possumus quidlibet”.
- vimen**, -inis *n.*: Schol. Bemb. *Eun.* 688 “proprie [...] vietus dicitur lentus, unde et vimen dicimus”.
- \*\***vitupero**, -are: Don. *An.* 15, 2 “vituperant: vitium rei parant”.
- \*\*\***vos**, vestrum: Don. *Hec.* 240, 1 “vestrum [...] venit ab eo quod est vester”.

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## ΣΥΝΕΙΔΗΣΙΣ IN ROMANS 2, 12–16

By

PIOTR LOREK

“What precisely Paul had in mind in these verses [i.e. Rom. 2, 14–16] has been a subject of much debate”<sup>1</sup>. “What is specially intended in the use of the word συνείδησις [...] is a matter of debate”<sup>2</sup>. “Nowhere does [Paul] give a definition of conscience”<sup>3</sup>.

The three quotes above express in a negative way the aims of this essay. On the basis of exegetical analysis of Rom. 2, 12–16, Paul’s understanding of συνείδησις in this passage will be defined, which will subsequently help to understand his idea of conscience. Paul nowhere in his letters defines συνείδησις. Rather, he uses it assuming that his audience knows its basic meaning. Consequently, the reader today has difficulties and frequently either does not understand or sees in συνείδησις its contemporary meaning. As we try to reconstruct the meaning of συνείδησις, lexical study is avoided. Consequently, historical research will be restricted to necessary information, since Paul, though certainly influenced by secular Greek, because of his non-Hellenistic philosophical standpoint, re-defined terminology<sup>4</sup>. The main stress is put, as will be observed by measuring the scope of the exegesis of 2, 12–16, on the contextual approach. Verses 14–16 form one sentence, so the meaning of συνείδησις must especially be sought in their grammar. Also the immediate context (2, 12 f.) of the sentence has to be examined.

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<sup>1</sup> Dunn 1998: 136.

<sup>2</sup> Schreiner 1998: 123.

<sup>3</sup> Opperwall 1979: 763.

<sup>4</sup> Unfortunately, Pierce has not avoided that. For example, proving that συνείδησις in the NT is used only with reference to past events (Pierce 1955: 81) he can say (1955: 82): “We were not able to discover in *Greek usage* a single case of the reference of any of the συνείδησις group of words to the future. *This alone should be enough*” (emphasis added).

## INTERPRETATION OF ROMANS 2, 12–16

The passage 2, 12–16 is placed in the first main part of the letter, namely 1, 18–3, 20, which aims to prove the universality of sin and condemnation for every person (the Jew as well as the Greek). Paul demonstrates that there is no one righteous, for every one has sinned and is thus under condemnation. As it will be seen it is very important to remember this main theme of 1, 18–3, 20 during the exegesis of 2, 12–16. Roughly speaking, the whole section is normally divided by commentators into two main parts. The first refers to the sin and condemnation of the Gentile (1, 18–32), while the second refers to the sin and condemnation of the Jew (2, 1–3, 20). Paul in 2, 12–16 continues his thought from 2, 1–11 (γάρο), so his addressee remains the same, namely a Jew (directly, yet not exclusively). In 2, 12–16 Paul speaks about the value of the possession of the law by a Jew in the light of judgement. He aims to say that mere possession of the law by a Jew will not help him to escape the condemnation of the judgement, for the law must be realised. The law will be used not as a protector but as a judge<sup>5</sup>. Attempting to prove that the mere possession of the law gives no salvific advantage, he shows that Gentiles also have some parts of the law.

Detailed presentation of 2, 12–16 is provided below. Now only an outline is shown. Paul picks up the main thought of 2, 1–11, namely God's impartial judgement according to the works of every person, and links it with *the law*. In v. 12b he states his main thesis (the mere possession of the law will not save) clarifying in v. 13 that not listening to but doing the law will provide justification. In order to shake Jewish assumptions, which come from possessing the law, Paul presents his observation. In v. 14b and v. 15a he states that the Gentiles *also* have some parts of the law. Paul proves this by pointing to external proof in v. 14a (Gentile's moral behaviour), to internal proof in v. 15bc (Gentile's possession of conscience), and to the ultimate proof in v. 16a (God's judgement of the Gentiles). Even though 2, 12–16 needs to be treated separately, it is also directly connected with both 2, 1–11 (the continuation of the theme of God's impartiality; the thematic *inclusio* between 2, 1–5 and 2, 16) and 2, 17–29 (in 2, 12 f. the theme of the law is introduced which is continued in 2, 17 f.; 2, 12–16 has a similar purpose to 2, 25–29, which denies that the possession of the law and circumcision saves from condemnation)<sup>6</sup>.

- 12a** For all who have sinned without the law, will also perish without the law,  
**b** and who have sinned under the law, will be judged by the law.

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<sup>5</sup> Schlatter 1995: 56.

<sup>6</sup> Moo 1996: 144.



Γάρ indicates a continuation of thought from v. 11. It does not provide confirmation of v. 11<sup>7</sup>, but rather further explanation<sup>8</sup>. Paul continues his accusation against a Jew. He has already established the main principle of judgement, namely *all* will be judged according to the *works* (vv. 6, 11), and now he applies it to the fact of Jewish possession of the law, using also the Gentiles as his foil<sup>9</sup>.

Jews believed that “the Gentile [...] could experience God’s favour only by taking on ‘the yoke of the law’. Outside Israel, the sphere of the law, there is no salvation. The Jews who live within the domain of the law [...] often considered themselves virtually assured of salvation”<sup>10</sup>.

In his response, Paul in v. 12 divides all humanity between those who are outside the pale of special revelation (ἀνόμωζ; 12a – Gentiles) and those who possess the divine law (ἐν νόμω; 12b – Jews). It is a typical Jewish division, and Paul does agree with it. He does not however agree that this division automatically determines, as it was assumed by Jews, the eschatological verdict, namely condemnation for the Gentiles and vindication for the Jews.

Paul states that the mere possession of the law is irrelevant in the light of the judgement, with which the Jews must agree.

The emphasis in this verse is on 12b<sup>11</sup>. Paul urges a Jew that he should not only accept that the Gentiles will be condemned (12a), which was not difficult for him (cf. 2 Bar. 48, 38–40), but also that he himself will be condemned (12b)<sup>12</sup>, since the possession of the law does not guarantee salvation, because it is only the eschatological *criterion* and *instrument* of judgement (διὰ νόμου κριθήσονται)<sup>13</sup>. He states that all “people will be condemned, not because they have the law or do not have the law, but because they have sinned”<sup>14</sup>. “The gifts granted to the Jew in salvation history do not protect him against universal judgement”<sup>15</sup>. No one can escape the judgement, for every one has sinned. Paul recognises the distinction between the Gentiles and the Jews (ἀνόμωζ *contra* ἐν νόμω), “but his main emphasis is that there is *no* distinction so far as the final outcome of a sinful life is concerned”<sup>16</sup>. To show that, he emphatically repeats ἥμαρτον referring it to both the Gentile and the Jew. The main point of this verse

<sup>7</sup> *Contra* Murray 1968: 68 f.

<sup>8</sup> Schreiner 1998: 116.

<sup>9</sup> Schreiner 1998: 119.

<sup>10</sup> Moo 1996: 146.

<sup>11</sup> Cranfield 1986: 153.

<sup>12</sup> Stuhlmacher 1994: 43.

<sup>13</sup> Stuhlmacher 1994: 43.

<sup>14</sup> Morris 1992: 123.

<sup>15</sup> Käsemann 1982: 61.

<sup>16</sup> Dunn 1988: 95.

is thus that the Jew has no excuse in the possession of the law; he will be condemned, simply because he has sinned.

Similarly, the Gentile also has no excuse because he lacks the Torah, since he has also sinned. He will not be able to say on the last judgement that he could not do well, because he did not have the law. He will be righteously judged by God (cf. 2, 5), which assumes that he also has ‘a law’ as a norm, as is proven by Paul in vv. 14 f. Murray rightly writes concerning this case: “While it is true that there is no respect of *persons* with God, it is also true that he has respect to the different situations in which men are placed in reference to the knowledge of his law” (cf. Luke 12, 47 f., Luke 11, 22–24)<sup>17</sup>.

- 13a** For not the hearers of a law *are* righteous before God,  
**b** but the doers of a law will be declared righteous.

In v. 12 Paul has stated that lack of the law or possession of the law is irrelevant in the light of judgement. For what is important is the presence of sin which determines eschatological condemnation. In v. 12 Paul has agreed with the Jew concerning his understanding of the division of humanity (those outside the Torah and those within the Torah), though he has stated that this division does not determine the verdict of eschatological judgement. Now in v. 13 Paul states his argument against the Jew and says why that division in v. 12 has no value in the light of divine judgement. He does it by presenting his own division of humanity. This division, in contrast to the Jewish one, has its eschatological implications; it shows the true principle of judgement and a proper understanding of the value of law. Paul sees the people as those who only have ‘law’ and as those who fulfil ‘law’<sup>18</sup>.

V. 13 is Paul’s main thesis in 2, 12–16<sup>19</sup>. Not those who have the Torah, but those who fulfil a law which they have been given, whether it is the Torah for the Jews or a law for the Gentiles, will be declared righteous.

- 14a** For whenever Gentiles who do not have the law, do by nature parts of the law,  
**b** *so though* they do not have the law, they are a law to themselves.

V. 14 includes a similar problem to that of vv. 7, 10, 13. Namely, it seems to suggest that there are some people who fulfil the law. This difficulty requires separate discussion. Furthermore, vv. 14–16 contains some difficult exegetical

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<sup>17</sup> Murray 1968: 69.

<sup>18</sup> This interpretation of v. 13 assumes that Paul talks here about the whole humanity (so Sanders 1985: 126) and not only about the Jews as most of the commentators assume (e.g. Cranfield 1986: 154; Dunn 1988: 135).

<sup>19</sup> So e.g. Stuhlmacher 1994: 42.

(the content), structural (connection with what precedes), and thematic (aim) problems. All these difficulties culminate in the question as to about whom Paul writes in 14–16. His object is described by ἔθνη (singular: ἔθνος), which has been interpreted in many different ways<sup>20</sup>. (1) Some Gentiles fulfil (*the whole or some of*) the law and will be justified<sup>21</sup>. (2) Some Gentiles hypothetically fulfil the law<sup>22</sup>. (3) Some Gentiles have hidden faith (described as τὰ τοῦ νόμου ποιῶσιν) known only to God. (4) Some Gentiles do what the law requires (described as τὰ τοῦ νόμου) which expresses their hidden faith known only to God. (5) Gentile Christians have faith (described as τὰ τοῦ νόμου ποιῶσιν). (1) – (5) will not be considered below, for (1) is too superficial; while (2) – (5) are too speculative. The two main possibilities are: (6) Gentile Christians do some imperfect works (τὰ τοῦ νόμου) which express their hearts' faith, and will be justified<sup>23</sup>. (7) Gentiles sometimes do what the law requires, but their obedience is occasional and not sufficient to obtain salvation<sup>24</sup>. Position (7) is assumed here as correct.

So far, Paul has shown that mere possession of the Torah by the Jew is not sufficient to avoid judgement (v. 12b). Also its lack gives no excuse to the Gentile (v. 12a). All will be condemned for they have sinned (v. 12). The Jew as well as the Gentile can only be justified by complete fulfilment of the law, which every one of them has been given (v. 13).

In vv. 14–16 Paul does two main things. (1) In vv. 12 f. he has only assumed that the Gentiles have a law according to which they will perish, but now (vv. 14 f.) he proves that the Gentiles really have that law to show that his main thesis in v. 13 is true<sup>25</sup>. Proving, however, that the Gentiles have their own standards for future righteous judgement in this passage is not enough for Paul. (2) His main purpose is to show the Jew that the Gentile knows some commandments of the Torah, so not only the Jews have access to the Torah, but also the Gentiles. Paul's proof aims to weaken the Jewish pride and belief that God is partial and will judge, not according to deeds, but according to possession of the law.

<sup>20</sup> Extensive summary: Cranfield 1986: 155 f.; 1985: 50; Kruse 1996: 179 f.

<sup>21</sup> So e.g. Räisänen 1983: 105.

<sup>22</sup> The purpose of this rhetorical speech is to show essential equality between Jew and Greek before God. Martens suggests, as Kruse sums up (1996: 180) that “Paul adopts the Stoic view, according to which it is theoretically possible to keep the law of nature, but practically it is out of the question” (see Martens 1994: 66 f.).

<sup>23</sup> Barth 1956: I/2, 304; II/2, 242, 604; IV/1, 33, 369, 395; 1959: 36–39; Cranfield 1985: 50; 1986: 155 f.; 1998: ch. 8 (*Giving a Dog a Bad Name. A Note on H. Räisänen's "Paul and the Law" (Tübingen, 1983)*, first published in *Journal for the Study of the New Testament* XXXVIII 1990, pp. 77–85); Schlatter 1995: 65.

<sup>24</sup> This position is assumed by most scholars. For example: Dodd 1959: 62; Dunn 1988: 98 f.; Romaniuk 1978: 104; Schreiner 1998: 120; Yates 1986: 222 ff.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. Morris 1992: 134. Räisänen 1983 sees the contradiction between 2, 12 and 5, 13.

Thus, Paul in v. 14 by γάρ (“for”) refers to all that he has said in 12 f.<sup>26</sup> He constructs his proof by observing that *sometimes*<sup>27</sup> *some Gentiles*, although they do not have the Torah, do *some parts*<sup>28</sup> of the Torah. This is the external proof, so every Jew could observe it as well<sup>29</sup>.

Paul specifies and emphasises the fact that the Gentiles do some parts of the law φύσει (“by nature”)<sup>30</sup>. This phrase repeats the meaning of τὰ μὴ νόμον ἔχοντα (“those who do not have the law”), and at the same time, by contrast, presents two means of receiving the law from God: *natural* and *special*<sup>31</sup>. Although the Jews have received the Torah on Mount Sinai by special revelation, it does not mean that only they have access to its content, since the Gentiles also have by nature access to some parts of the Torah, which may be observed by their behaviour. Φύσει, thus, could be translated also as “instinctively” (New American Standard Bible).

The first part of 14b: “so though they do not have the law” is a repetition of the first part of 14a: “Gentiles who do not have the law” which underlines the situation of the Gentiles. The second part of 14a: “they do by nature the parts of the law” is Paul’s proof, while the second part of 14b: “they are a law to themselves” presents Paul’s conclusion, on which the emphasis of the whole v. 14 is put<sup>32</sup>. Thus, the conclusion states that the Gentiles also have the law; “they are their own law” (NEB renders ἑαυτοῖς as dative of possession)<sup>33</sup>. “This expression [i.e. ‘they are a law to themselves’] should not be understood in the same sense

<sup>26</sup> *Contra* NIV (“Indeed”) and JB (“For instance”), which take 14 f. as parenthesis. In 14 f. there is a continuation of argument (rightly KJV). *Contra* those who assume v. 13 as referring only to the Jews, and now unnaturally have to link γάρ from v. 14 with 13a. For example, Schreiner 1998: 117. Moo (1996: 148) rightly links 14 with 12a as an explanation and qualification of ἀνόμως. This is, however, structurally unnatural unless v. 13 is also understood as referring to the Gentiles, and not only to the Jews. Cranfield (1986: 155; 1985: 49) links γάρ with 13b and suggests that 14–16 confirms 13b. It is structurally correct. Assuming that in vv. 14–16 Christian Gentiles are meant, he contrasts their doing of the law with the Jewish mere having the law. His assumption of Gentile Christians, however, causes that the main purpose of the passage, namely God’s impartiality between the Jews and Gentiles, is neglected. Kruse 1996: 180.

<sup>27</sup> Greek ὅταν suggests that Gentiles do not always do what the law requires (Käsemann 1982: 62). So they are still sinners (2, 12), which does not contradict with the message of 1, 18–32 (Stein 1989: 108).

<sup>28</sup> If Paul meant the whole law, he would simply write νόμον instead of τὰ τοῦ νόμου. Cf. Fitzmyer 1993: 309. It implies that Gentiles by their deeds still do not fulfil the law.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. Moo 1994: 1125.

<sup>30</sup> In 2, 14 φύσει may be rendered (1) adverbially with what follows (“do *by nature* parts of the law”) or (2) as adjectival with what precedes (“who *by nature* do not have the law”). Most of scholars take position (1). So does this essay.

<sup>31</sup> Poole 1963: 484.

<sup>32</sup> Schreiner (1998: 121) rightly observes that ἑαυτοῖς εἰσιν νόμος utters a main point of 14 f.

<sup>33</sup> I assume that in the phrase ἑαυτοῖς εἰσιν νόμος Paul sees νόμος not as a general law, but as the parts of Torah. It can be observed by parallelism with the phrase τὰ τοῦ νόμου from 14a.

as popular current usage when we say that a man is a law to himself. It means almost the opposite, that they themselves, by reason of what is implanted in their nature, confront themselves with the law of God. They themselves reveal the law of God to themselves – their persons are the medium of revelation”<sup>34</sup>.

- 15a** Those show the work of the law written in their hearts,  
**b** *to which* their conscience *also* bearing witness  
**c** and *their* thoughts mutually accusing and perhaps excusing *them*,

V. 15a is the main part of 14–16. Paul here repeats, emphasises and relines his argument, which has already been stated in v. 14<sup>35</sup>. He still aims to show that the Gentiles know what the law requires<sup>36</sup>.

Paul begins with “those”, suggesting that he continues his description of the Gentiles<sup>37</sup>. Unlike v. 14, he omits the fact that the Gentile does not have the law, and only presents the positive aspect of this matter.

By the words “those show” (the allusion is to 14a: “they do by nature parts of the law”) the external argument is repeated<sup>38</sup>. The Gentiles by their moral behaviour show that “the work of the law is written in their hearts”. This phrase presents the conclusion of Paul’s proof in a detailed way (the detailed repetition of the words “they are a law to themselves” from 14b).

The phrase τὸ ἔργον τοῦ νόμου (lit. the work of the law; only here in NT) has been understood in many ways as<sup>39</sup>: (1) the sum (core) of the law (cf. Rom. 13, 8–10); (2) the office of the law (which directs what to do, and what to leave undone); (3) the work which the law requires (i.e. some requirements of the law)<sup>40</sup>.

<sup>34</sup> Murray 1968: 75.

<sup>35</sup> Dunn 1988: 100.

<sup>36</sup> Schreiner 1998: 122.

<sup>37</sup> Pronoun οὗτινες (cf. 1, 25) refers to ἔθνη (14a) and οἱτοί (14b).

<sup>38</sup> The verb ἐνδείκνυται ‘to demonstrate, to give proof of’ is used in present tense and refers to the present time (Cranfield 1986: 158). *Contra* Schlatter 1995: 60 who renders ἐνδείκνυται as referring to the future judgement (cf. vv. 12 and 13). The verb ἐνδείκνυται is situated in 14 f. which presents the proof on the basis of every day observation (ὄταν), so refers to the present.

<sup>39</sup> See for example Poole 1963: 485.

<sup>40</sup> Position (3) is the most popular among the scholars and seems to be right. Barrett, however takes (2) and writes about the “stamps”, “efforts” of the law as the synonym to conscience (see Cranfield 1986: 158). It is, however, incorrect to compare τὸ ἔργον τοῦ νόμου with συνείδησις, for the syntax between the 15a and 15b shows that these two concepts differ. The phenomenon of συνείδησις – by the syntax and the whole Paul’s argumentation – confirms (but not equals) ἔργον τοῦ νόμου, which should be paralleled with τὰ τοῦ νόμου from 14a and νόμος from 14b. Furthermore, worth observing is the fact that “work of law” is in singular (ἔργον). This whole phrase denotes something commendable, and it is not a synonym to “works of law” (3, 20; 3, 28). See Dunn 1988: 100.

Assuming the third rendering, Paul means that the Gentiles have “some of the prescriptions of the Mosaic Law”<sup>41</sup>.

It is said that this law is “written”. It is not stated who has written the parts of the law on Gentile hearts, but Paul alluding to the doctrine of creation (φύσει) implies the subject of this activity is God<sup>42</sup>. This law is written on Gentile *hearts*, so the word “heart” here must be understood as the seat of knowledge<sup>43</sup>.

Fitzmyer has rightly pointed out that:

because Paul uses the unbiblical and specially Greek contrast of φύσις and νόμος, the Greek idea of people being a law to themselves, and the distinctively Greek ideas of γραπτὸς νόμος and [also later] συνείδησις in this paragraph, it would seem that he is tributary to Greek philosophical thinking (Fitzmyer 1993: 306).

The question is if Paul believed in so called “natural law”, since he assumes the presence of the law in the Gentiles in creation. Here it is sufficient to state that “possibly Paul is merely reflecting elements of the popular Greek philosophy of his day”<sup>44</sup>.

Already having proved in v. 14–15a that the Gentiles by their moral acts show that they know the requirements of the Torah, Paul in v. 15b and 15c utters his second, additional and subordinate proof<sup>45</sup>. Now Paul refers not to the external, but to the internal observation.

<sup>41</sup> So, e.g., Fitzmyer 1993: 129, 131. *Contra* Clark 1960: 240 who writes: “In a sense the Gentiles too have the law of God, not the Mosaic law to be sure, but from their creation in the image of God they have the moral law written on their hearts”. The phrase τὸ ἔργον τοῦ νόμου is the last one in 2, 12–16 which contains word νόμος. Thus, the short summary of Paul’s understanding of the Gentiles possession of the law is necessary here. It is stated in v. 14 that the Gentiles have νόμος and also that they have to do νόμος (v. 13). Paul, however, very carefully describes what he means by that. First of all he says that the Gentiles do not have like the Jews the whole Torah (v. 12: ἀνόμως used two times; v. 14: τὰ μὴ νόμον ἔχοντα and νόμον μὴ ἔχοντες). He also states that even though the Gentiles do not have the whole Torah they still “have” some parts of the Torah (v. 14: τὰ τοῦ νόμου and its parallel in v. 15: τὸ ἔργον τοῦ νόμου). It is, however, not precised in 2, 12–16 to which parts of the Torah the Gentiles have an access. Paul talks here about the moral laws of the Torah, but it is not stated about which exactly, for it is not important for his argument. The following verses (i.e. 2, 17 ff.), and also that of what Paul has already accused the Gentiles in 1, 18–32, may give some light to the proper understanding of the precise content of τὸ ἔργον τοῦ νόμου.

<sup>42</sup> Morris 1992: 128.

<sup>43</sup> Cf. Calvin 1995: 48. The whole phrase: ἔργον τοῦ νόμου γραπτὸν ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις αὐτῶν has caused some problems. Cranfield (1986: 159; 1985: 51 f.; 1998: 103) who assumes that vv. 14–16 talk about the Gentile Christians, sees here the fulfilment of the eschatological promise from Jer. 31, 33. Jeremiah talks about *the law*, which is written. Here, however, not *the law* but *the work* of the law is written; see Schreiner 1998: 122. It is proper to repeat after Käsemann (1982: 64) that in 2, 15 there is no Jeremiah’s promise stated, but rather an analogy to Jewish γραφή. Paul says by using an analogy that the Gentiles also have the parts of the law *written*.

<sup>44</sup> Fitzmyer 1993: 306; cf. Dunn 1988: 105.

<sup>45</sup> The additional value of proof can be observed by the participial construction used here. There are some possibilities how to reconstruct these three participles (i.e. συμμαρτυρούσης;

The idea of συνείδησις is picked up<sup>46</sup>. The conscience, similar to the actions, also suggests that the Gentiles know some of the law. Here Paul talks about the conscience of the Gentiles, not about the conscience of the Jews. It may be seen by the use of αὐτῶν which is connected with οἵτινες which in turn points to ἔθνη.

The conscience is connected with the participle συμμαρτυρούσης, which by its ambiguity has led to various interpretations. This verb is unknown in the LXX; in the NT it appears only three times (Rom. 2, 15; 8, 16; 9, 1).

Συμμαρτυρούσης literary means: ‘bearing witness along with (συν)’<sup>47</sup>. Normally, there is another witness expressed in the dative form like in 8, 16: αὐτὸ πνεῦμα συμμαρτυρεῖ τῷ πνεύματι ἡμῶν or in 9, 1: συμμαρτυρούσης μοι τῆς συνειδήσεώς μου. 2, 15, however, lacks the dative form. (1) Some scholars, retaining this literal translation, have tried to link the testimony of the conscience *with* different objects in 2, 15<sup>48</sup>. (2) Because 2, 15 lacks the dative form (i.e. the object to which the testimony is borne) most scholars have understood the prefix συν (lit. with) only as strengthening and emphasising the simple verb μαρτυρέω, and translate συμμαρτυρούσης simply as ‘bearing witness, testifying, assuring’. Consequently, since no other witness is mentioned, the object would then be implied as ‘to them’, ‘to the Gentiles’: “their conscience bearing witness to them”<sup>49</sup>. This interpretation seems to be the most natural. Moo also takes this position. However, he sensitively adds: “Paul uses ‘bear witness’ of this process and the meaning of ‘conscience’ would imply that this ‘witness’ is first of all to the individuals themselves. In the light of v. 16, however, there may be a secondary reference to a witness before the heavenly judgement seat” (Moo 1996: 153).

Two other interesting interpretations are as follows. Conscience bears the witness not *to them*, but to the whole *process* described in 2, 14 f.<sup>50</sup> Morris even though he takes that position (2), also proposes the interpretation that the con-

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κατηγορούντων; ἀπολογουμένων). The syntax of 15b and 15c widely asserted by scholars is as follows. The first participle in 15b should be connected with the συνείδησις in genitive absolute as subject, while the second and the third participle (closely connected by ἢ καί) should be linked with the λογισμός in genitive absolute as subject.

<sup>46</sup> Here συνείδησις is simply translated as ‘conscience’ or ‘moral consciousness’. The next main part of this paper (after the exegesis of 2, 12–16) provides the detailed discussion on the meaning of συνείδησις in general and particular in 2, 14–16. The exegesis of 2, 12–16 aims to present the main relations of συνείδησις with the whole context and other particular expressions in 2, 14–16.

<sup>47</sup> Cf. Strathmann 1967: 508 f.

<sup>48</sup> Conscience bears witness / *with* the thoughts / *with* the good life (Hodge) / *with* heart, which gives its own decision (Leenhard) / *with* “the requirements of the law”, Harrison 1976: 31. Concerning Harrison’s interpretation it should be said that in this passage Paul does not assume the requirements of the law, but rather proves them. The logical connection, thus, between the conscience and the requirements of the law is that the conscience does not bear witness *with*, but rather *to*, the requirements of the law.

<sup>49</sup> Schlatter 1995: 61.

<sup>50</sup> Käsemann 1982: 65.

science witnesses *with* “the act that shows that the work of the law is written on people’s hearts”<sup>51</sup>. These two last interpretations, although grammatically debatable, rightly explain that the role of conscience here is to prove along with moral behaviour that the Gentiles have the law.

The relation (καί) between 15b and 15c is not clear. (1) Some render 15c as a clarification of 15b<sup>52</sup>. (2) Others treat 15c as an alternative witness to conscience. The first interpretation, by virtue of its simplicity, is correct<sup>53</sup>. The work of conscience (15b) is thus described in 15c by accusing and excusing thoughts.

The next exegetical problem appears with the phrase μεταξὺ ἀλλήλων, which may be rendered either as (1) “between themselves” (RSV) or as (2) “between one another” (KJV). (1) then suggests the internal debate of thoughts within oneself<sup>54</sup>, while (2) the external debate of thoughts among people<sup>55</sup>. (3) Murray sensitively observes that both (1) and (2) suit the context: “there is not much in the text to show which of these thoughts [i.e. (1) or (2)] the apostle intended” (Murray 1968: 76). 15c is not precise and thus one can see (2) here, as might be observed in 2, 1 ff. Also (1) can be noticed in the previous context 2, 4 ff. where Paul persuades his interlocutor to admit his own sin, by appealing to his moral awareness, and not only accusing others. Thus, still assuming that 15b is detailed by 15c, it may be said that someone may pass the judgement of conscience either on himself or others.

In 15c both the order of the participles (i.e. κατηγορούντων and then ἀπολογουμένων) and the conjunction between them (ἢ καί) is intentional. The conjunction ἢ καί may be translated as ‘or even’, ‘or perhaps’, which automatically

<sup>51</sup> Morris 1992: 126.

<sup>52</sup> E.g. Cranfield 1986: 161 f.

<sup>53</sup> Scholars who assume (2) are not sharp enough in their distinctions. Käsemann (1982: 65 f.) makes distinction between the conscience, which, according to him, has “only the task of a witness” (similarly to secular usage) and the thoughts, which has accusing and excusing role, and writes: “One must not lose the nuances in the sharply differentiated materials of vv. 14b–15 by laying all the stress from the outset, in modern style, on the role of conscience [...] and then constructing the introductory καί of v. 15c explicatively”. Käsemann, however, does not seem to state those “nuances”. Furthermore, the question arises as to in which different way than by *accusation* and *execution* may the conscience witness? Dunn (1998: 102) renders 15c not as an explanation of how conscience works (15b) but as “a third [along with heart and conscience] indication or way of speaking about the moral consciousness evident among those outside the law”. He sees conscience as not merely a synonym to mind or heart (the conflicting thoughts). On this basis he divides 15b and 15c. 15c, according to him, has here “sense of moral confusion of self-contradiction (cf. 7: 14–25)” or a “Jewish concept of the struggle between the evil and good impulses” (עֲוֹן) (1998: 102, 106). He still, however, retains the *moral* sense of 15c, so his distinction between 15b and 15c is not clear.

<sup>54</sup> E.g. Maurer 1971: 916 f.; Moo 1994: 153; Morris 1992: 127.

<sup>55</sup> E.g. Gutbrod 1967: 1057 f.; Heidland 1967: 288. This interpretation may be supported by G which reads διαλογισμῶν instead of λογισμῶν.



implies that the second participle ἀπολογουμένων is an exception for Paul<sup>56</sup>. The Gentiles' conscience, by their thoughts, more frequently accuses than excuses. This interpretation supports the content of 12a. Although Paul sees the reality of the Gentiles' goodness, this still does not change his general view of 1, 18–32.

Summing up, in 15a the main evidence and the conclusion is uttered, while 15b and 15c also provide additional evidence for that conclusion. The Gentiles have some of the Torah.

Indirectly, 15b and 15c also suggests that the Gentiles have no excuse when they do wrong, for they have the law and can evaluate it.

- 16a** on the day when God will judge the secrets of men  
**b** according to my gospel by Jesus Christ.

Between v. 15 and v. 16 an unexpected switch from present to future judgement may be observed. Scholars have widely debated how to relate 15 to 16. Cranfield well defines this difficulty: “it implies that the witness of the conscience is to take place at the time of the final judgment, whereas [...] it needs to be a phenomenon of the present” (Cranfield 1986: 161). The variety of solutions reflects the confusion among scholars<sup>57</sup>. The principle of *lectio difficilior* suggests taking the text as it stands, and linking v. 15 directly with v. 16. Paul sees continuity between present and future<sup>58</sup>. He thus understands the work of

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<sup>56</sup> Cranfield 1986: 162. Even though there are more accusations than excuses, according to Cranfield's interpretation, the Gentile Christians still have the consciousness of their salvific faith, Cranfield 1985: 54.

<sup>57</sup> E.g. (1) Weber sees in 16a the earthly day of encounter with the Word of God. (2) Reicke understands 16a as the earthly day of conversion. (3) Dodd (1959: 57) suggests that originally v. 16 was just after v. 13. He has rearranged the whole passage to preserve, according to him, the sequence of thought: 13>16>14>15. He writes that Paul “inserted verses 14–15 parenthetically when he *adapted* it to an epistle meant for Gentile as well as Jewish readers” (1959: 60, italics added). According to him, 13 and 16 was originally the part of a Jewish sermon. (4) KJV takes vv. 13–15 as parenthesis. Also Brown (1948: 203) takes v. 16 as “the conclusion of the unfinished statement of v. 12”. Clark (1960: 484) understands 13–15 as parenthesis obviating an objection against what was said in 12. (5) NIV takes vv. 14 f. as parenthesis. (6) Weiss takes vv. 14 f. as a gloss. (7) Mundle takes 15b–15c as parenthesis. (8) Sahlin strikes ἡμέρα, as an insertion, and then connects ἐν ἡ with συνέιδησις. (9) Some propose an addition of καὶ δικαιοθήσονται before ἐν ἡ ἡμέρα. (10) Hendriksen (1982: 967) proposes an addition of “All this will become clear” before ἐν ἡ ἡμέρα. He suggests to link v. 16 with main verbs of the whole paragraph: “God's righteous judgement *will be revealed* (verse 5); all who sin under the law *will be judged* (verse 12); while those who obey the law *will be declared righteous* (verse 13), all this is to take place and to become clear ‘on the day when ... God will judge men's secrets’ (verse 16)”. (11) Bultmann (1947) sees v. 16 as an interpolation. (12) NJB presents v. 15 as unfinished. (13) Schmithals (1988: 204 f.) takes vv. 13 and 16 as interpolations. (14) According to Murray (1968: 76 f.), v. 16 needs to be loosely treated with the whole paragraph. (This summary of the scholars' views follows mainly Käsemann 1982 on Rom. 2, 16).

<sup>58</sup> Dunn 1988: 102.

conscience 15b–15c in the dimension *now/then*<sup>59</sup>. On this basis the aims of v. 16 may be presented. V. 16 continues the thought of 12–15. Paul has already proved by his external (moral deeds) and internal (conscience) proof, that the Gentiles have the law, and now culminates his argument by referring to his ultimate proof, namely God’s eschatological judgement of all, which, being undoubtedly just, assumes the possession of the law by Gentiles. For Paul in this verse, this ultimate proof is not, however, the most important. He comes back to his main thread of thought (2, 6. 11. 12) and confirms both God’s impartial judgement of all according to their deeds and universal condemnation.

If the above interpretation of the connection between v. 15 and 16 is correct, the conscience will have an important role on the day of the judgement. Consequently, the words τὰ κρυπτά (‘hidden things, secrets’) from 16a must be related to συνείδησις from 15b (described in 15c).

First of all, however, τὰ κρυπτά must be understood *in general*<sup>60</sup>. This is suggested by the addition of τῶν ἀνθρώπων. Thus Paul says that *every human* (the Jew and the Gentile) will be judged<sup>61</sup>, which is the goal of Paul’s argument (cf. 2, 6). Since God will judge not only what is seen, but also what is hidden, it points to *God’s impartiality* (cf. 2, 11). Then the words τὰ κρυπτά, by both the logic of Paul’s argument (his ultimate proof) and the syntax of the sentence, must be related to the συνείδησις *in particular*. Moo correctly writes that the ‘hidden things’ refer to the “inner witnesses of conscience [which] are known to God and will be revealed” (Moo 1996: 154). In another place he adds that “verse 16 [...] is [...] to be connected to verse 15b: the conflicting ‘thoughts’ of people will be revealed and used as evidence at the judgement”<sup>62</sup>.

In v. 16a the verb κρίνει may be accented as present κρίνει (RSV) or as future κρίνει (NIV). The context suggests a future connotation, even if a present tense is used (BDF 323)<sup>63</sup>. Thematic similarity (even verbal similarity: ἐν ἡμέρᾳ) between v. 16 and v. 5 may be observed. Also the continuation and culmination of thought in v. 16 from vv. 12 f. is clear. Thus, as has been assumed above, Paul talks in v. 16 about the final judgement.

V. 16b contains two prepositional closures [i.e. κατὰ τὸ εὐαγγέλιόν μου and διὰ Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ] which are difficult to relate. The main problem is with διὰ Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ, which ends the whole sentence (14–16). To which words

<sup>59</sup> Cf. Morris 1992: 128; Romaniuk 1978: 105. Cranfield (1985: 53 f.) rightly observes that “for those who take ‘conscience’ as an inward law or law-giver a future reference is unacceptable”, since God will judge not the law but through the law.

<sup>60</sup> Murray 1968: 77 writes that “‘the secrets of men’ are not to be restricted [...] to the thoughts and intents and dispositions of the heart but include also the deeds that are performed in secret”.

<sup>61</sup> Hendriksen 1982: 97; Käsemann 1982: 67 f.

<sup>62</sup> Moo 1994: 1125.

<sup>63</sup> See Dunn 1988: 102; Morris 1992: 129.

of v. 16 should this phrase be related? (1) Käsemann suggests that it should not be connected with anything and treated separately as a literary conclusion<sup>64</sup>. (2) Murray suggests that it should be connected with *κατὰ εὐαγγέλιον* and rendered as “according to my Gospel *which is* through Christ Jesus”<sup>65</sup>. (3) It should be connected with *κρίνει*. The conclusion, therefore, is that Christ is seen here as the Judge<sup>66</sup>. This interpretation, however difficult because of the strange placement of *διὰ Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ*, seems to be correct.

From the above observations we may (*inter alia*) sum up that at the last judgement God (v. 16a) will judge *by* Christ Jesus (v. 16b) *using* the verdicts of Gentiles’ own consciences (v. 15b–16a)<sup>67</sup>.

#### GENERAL MEANING OF ΣΥΝΕΙΔΗΣΙΣ

##### Secular Greek

Before the meaning of *συνείδησις* in Romans 2, 15 is provided, a brief sketch of both its meaning and origin in secular Greek must be presented<sup>68</sup>. *Συνείδησις* was derived from the verb *σύννοιδα* (etym. *σύν* ‘with’ + *οἶδα* ‘to know’), which was used in both non-reflexive (‘to know something with another person’) and reflexive (‘to know with oneself’) form. The reflexive form consisted of two different *egos*, which were found in one person. The non-reflexive form was used in a non-moral sense, while the reflexive form was used in both a non-moral and a moral sense. Its non-moral sense occurred from the 7<sup>th</sup> century BC and was connected with one’s judgement of one’s own perception<sup>69</sup>. Clear examples of the moral use of *σύννοιδα* *ἐμαυτῶ* can be seen from the 4<sup>th</sup> century BC. The moral reflection appeared “when reflection extends to one’s own deeds assessed in connection with human responsibility”<sup>70</sup>. It had negative, rarely positive use<sup>71</sup>.

<sup>64</sup> Käsemann 1982: 68.

<sup>65</sup> Murray (1968: 77) proposing this position says that the notion that God will judge through Jesus is made known *only* through the Gospel.

<sup>66</sup> The majority takes this position, e.g. Dunn 1988: 103.

<sup>67</sup> *Contra* Dunn (1998: 137) who writes: “Gentiles were also aware of the law. The law could thus be said to stand as the measure of God’s requirement and judgement for the world of humankind as a whole (2:16; 3:6)”. Gentiles will be rather judged according to their understanding the law, not the perfect law itself.

<sup>68</sup> For detailed discussion see Pierce’s excellent study of the use of *συνείδησις* in secular Greek (Pierce 1955).

<sup>69</sup> Maurer 1971: 901 f.

<sup>70</sup> Maurer 1971: 900.

<sup>71</sup> Pierce (1955: 132 f.) shows that there are only three such quotes which suggest positive moral connotations: Xenophon, *Cyr.* I 5, 11 (410 BC), Sophocles, fr. 669 (460 BC), and Demosthenes, *Epit.* 2, 20. The last text is, however, as many scholars think, spuriously attributed to Demosthenes. See Maurer 1971: 901. For further discussion see Pierce 1955: 23 f. He concludes

In the 5<sup>th</sup>–3<sup>rd</sup> century BC both *συνειδός* (the neuter particle used as a noun) and *συνείδησις* (a noun) appeared<sup>72</sup>, and from the 1<sup>st</sup> century BC their use was common and frequent<sup>73</sup>. They were both the substantival equivalents of *σύννοιδα* and *σύννοιδα ἐμαυτῶ*<sup>74</sup>. They were treated synonymously<sup>75</sup>. Like *σύννοιδα ἐμαυτῶ* they had two basic meanings. One is a broad and primitive: ‘self-consciousness’, while the second is narrower and derivative: ‘moral self-consciousness’ i.e., ‘conscience’<sup>76</sup>. In its second meaning *συνειδός* and *συνείδησις* were referred to the bad (rarely good) conscience<sup>77</sup>. Its judgement was related with the past, not future acts and had a notion of pain<sup>78</sup>. Dunn sums up the secular usage:

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(p. 28): “*σύννοιδα ἐμαυτῶ* in Secular Greek expects the content *bad*; unless, as it is very rarely, the opposite is explicitly stated”.

<sup>72</sup> The oldest example of *συνείδησις* comes from Democritus, in which Pierce (1955: 34) sees “moral awareness of one’s own bad deeds”. Maurer (1971: 902) however proposes non-moral sense of “knowledge or experience of the distressing situation of life”.

<sup>73</sup> Dunn 1988: 101; Wall 1992: 1128.

<sup>74</sup> Cranfield 1986: 160.

<sup>75</sup> Hahn 1986: 348. “If there is any significant difference between τὸ *συνειδός* and *συνείδησις*” – writes Pierce 1955: 19 – “it appeared to be that the latter is wider in its scope than the former, being capable of standing for any sense of *σύννοιδα* besides its main usage as representing *ἐμαυτῶ* *σύννοιδα*: while τὸ *συνειδός* is far more rigorously, although not quite entirely, confined to representing *ἐμαυτῶ* *σύννοιδα* only”. *Συνειδός* unlikely *συνείδησις*, does not, however, appear in the NT. Jewett (1971: 411), basing on Pierce, suggests: “The word *συνείδησις* is identical with *συνειδός* [...] and its preference by the NT writers is explained by the fact that it is the form most often used by Asiatic Hellenism”. 1 Corinthians and Romans were however written to European Greek speakers, so it is better to state that it is not known why NT prefers *συνείδησις* to *συνειδός*.

<sup>76</sup> Similar meaning had in that time also *σύνεσις* (from *σύνιημι*). Although it prevalingly meant simply ‘understanding’, ‘knowledge’, sporadically could be translated as ‘bad conscience’. In NT *σύνεσις* is used 7 times (Mk. 12, 33; Lk. 2, 47, 1 Cor. 1, 19; Eph. 3, 4; Col. 1, 9; 2, 2; 2 Tim. 2, 7). Here, however, it means only ‘understanding’ or ‘ability to understand’ without any moral connotations. Pierce (1955: 19) observes: “If it [*σύνεσις*] has only special nuance it is that of *understanding in detail* as contrasted with *σοφία* – *understanding in general principle*”.

<sup>77</sup> Wall 1992: 1128, Maurer 1971: 901. Pierce (1955: 38) sums up his observations: “They [i.e. *συνειδός* and *συνείδησις*] too [as *σύννοιδα ἐμαυτῶ*] expect the content *bad* unless, as is found very rarely, the opposite is explicitly stated”. Maurer (1971: 903) adds: “The first unequivocal instance of *καθαρὰ συνείδησις* in paganism is in Egypt [...] (136 A.D.). It refer[s] to a conscience clear of concrete charges”.

<sup>78</sup> Pierce (1955: 38 ff.) on the basis of his studies in secular Greek states that since ‘conscience’ refers only to the past acts, and judges by pain only when wrong acts were committed, automatically when one acts rightly one has ‘good conscience’ not as judging positively, but as being empty. Good conscience is a lack of conscience: no bad acts = no pain = no conscience. See also Maurer 1971: 901. There are, however, similar to the use of *σύννοιδα ἐμαυτῶ*, two examples of *συνείδησις* in sense of ‘good conscience’ not as ‘empty, silent conscience’ but as ‘active, positive judgement of conscience’. Pierce points to Periander and Bias (6<sup>th</sup> cent. BC), quoted by Stobaeus, but views them as doubtful examples (for reasons, see Pierce 1955: 33, 37, 143). Furthermore, the earliest positive use of *συνειδός* is later than the latest NT writing. See Pierce 1955: 35; also Maurer 1971: 1901.

“It [*scil.* conscience] normally denoted a painful or disturbing awareness of the wrongness of what one had done”<sup>79</sup>.

There was a debate concerning the origin of *συνείδησις*. (1) Some argued that *συνείδησις* has a Stoic origin<sup>80</sup>. (2) The majority, however, rightly assume a non-philosophical popular Hellenistic origin of *συνείδησις*<sup>81</sup>. Pierce persuasively argued against a Stoic origin pointing to (a) the lack of Stoic evidences<sup>82</sup>, and (b) the discordance of the idea of conscience with the Stoic philosophy<sup>83</sup>. Consequently he concluded: “It is therefore in general at the level, not of technical philosophy, but of the commonplaces of everyday colloquial usage that his [Paul’s] meaning must be sought”<sup>84</sup>.

### Masoretic Text

The Old Testament has neither a special equivalent to *συνείδησις* nor a distinctive concept for the idea of conscience<sup>85</sup>. The function of conscience is ascribed to the general idea of heart (לֵב, לִבָּ) <sup>86</sup>. The concept of conscience is not, however, absent in the OT<sup>87</sup>. The guilty painful conscience (Gen. 3, 11 f.; Gen. 42, 21; 1 Sam. 24, 6; 25, 31<sup>88</sup>; 2 Sam. 24, 10; Ps. 32, 1–5) as well as the ‘empty’ conscience (Job 27, 6), similar to Greek secular usage, is known to the OT writers<sup>89</sup>.

Maybe the lack of necessity to develop an idea of conscience arises from the Hebraic theocentric anthropology in contrast to Hellenistic introspective and autonomous anthropology<sup>90</sup>. The OT relativises the self-accusations of human beings. The moral paradigm is the Word of God – the Law. For example, Cain’s anxiety does not come from the judgement of his conscience, but a curse from God (Gen. 4, 11 ff).

<sup>79</sup> Dunn 1988: 101.

<sup>80</sup> For example Dodd 1959: 61. Also C.K. Barrett and J. Moffatt argued for this position, see Smalley 1993: 226.

<sup>81</sup> Bruce 1994: 86.

<sup>82</sup> Pierce analyses the three quotes (by Chrysippus, Marcus Aurelius, and Epictetus) which could point to the Stoic origin of *συνείδησις*, simultaneously proving their uselessness. Further discussion: Pierce 1955: 13 f.

<sup>83</sup> The idea of moral conscience stands against a Stoic negative attitude to emotions. Cf. Opperwall 1979: 762.

<sup>84</sup> Pierce 1955: 16.

<sup>85</sup> Cf. Dunn 1988: 101; Hahn 1986: 349.

<sup>86</sup> Cf. Rehwinkel 1985: 267.

<sup>87</sup> *IDB*, p. 671.

<sup>88</sup> RSV translates לֵבָב by ‘conscience’ here.

<sup>89</sup> Smalley 1993: 227.

<sup>90</sup> Wall 1992: 1129; Meadors 1996: 113 f.

The OT knows the idea of a *clean heart*, similar to the positive use of conscience (Ps. 24, 4; 51, 12; 73, 1; Prov. 22, 11)<sup>91</sup>, which is the background for the NT idea of a clean and good conscience (Jer. 31, 31 ff.; Ez. 36, 26 ff.; 37, 14; Is. 31, 15–19; Za. 12, 10; cf. Heb. ch. 8–10)<sup>92</sup>.

### LXX

The Septuagint normally translates the OT כֹּחַ and כֹּחַת as καρδία and διάνοια. There are, however, a few instances, where σύννοια and its derivatives are used. The non-reflexive σύννοια in its normal non-moral sense appears in Leviticus 5, 1. It is also found in: 1 Mac. 4, 21; 2 Mac. 4, 41; 3 Mac. 2, 8<sup>93</sup>. The reflexive σύννοια ἐμαυτῷ appears only once in Job 27, 6 as a translation of the Hebrew כֹּחַת. Σύννοια ἐμαυτῷ is used here in a moral sense as ‘empty, silent conscience’. The conscience does not accuse Job, but it does not automatically mean that it says something positive (typical Greek usage)<sup>94</sup>.

The noun συείδησις is used three times. (1) In Ecclesiastes 10, 20 the Hebrew מַדַּע ‘knowledge, thought’ is translated by συείδησις: “Even in your *thought*, do not curse the king, and do not curse the rich in your bedchamber”<sup>95</sup>. (2) In Ecclesiasticus 42, 18 (*varia lectio*; Codex s)<sup>96</sup>: “For the Lord knows every *thought*”<sup>97</sup>. (3) In Wisdom 17, 11: “For wickedness, condemned by her own witness, is very timorous, and being pressed with *conscience*, always forecasteth grievous things”<sup>98</sup>. In cases (1) and (2) συείδησις is used in its primitive, non-moral sense as ‘consciousness’, while in the case of (3) in its moral sense as ‘moral consciousness, conscience’ with a negative connotation<sup>99</sup>. (1), (2), and (3) present a typical Greek usage.

The noun σύνεσις, although it appears frequently in the LXX, has only a non-moral meaning ‘understanding’<sup>100</sup>. Συειδός is absent from the LXX.

<sup>91</sup> Cf. McGrath 1988: 169.

<sup>92</sup> Maurer 1971: 908 f.

<sup>93</sup> Pierce 1955: 55.

<sup>94</sup> Pierce 1955: 55 f.

<sup>95</sup> My translation. Maurer (1971: 909), on the basis of parallelism with “bedchamber” in second colon wants to translate מַדַּע as ‘bed’. It would, however, require unnecessary emendation of MT. The word מַדַּע is elsewhere used in 2 Ch. 1, 10.11.12; Dn. 1, 4 with a clear meaning of ‘knowledge’; see BDB, p. 396. LXX translates these passages by σύνεσις, which also right translation of מַדַּע by συείδησις.

<sup>96</sup> Other versions read instead of συείδησις simply εἶδησις ‘knowledge’.

<sup>97</sup> My translation.

<sup>98</sup> Translated by L.C.L. Brenton.

<sup>99</sup> Dunn 1988: 101; BAGD, p. 786; Hahn 1986: 349.

<sup>100</sup> Pierce 1955: 54.

### New Testament

In the Gospels *σύννοιδα* and its derivatives are not present. The exception is the use of *συνείδησις* in John 7, 53–8, 11 (at 8, 9). The idea of conscience is, however, clearly present in the teachings of Jesus. He, similarly to the OT prophets, focuses not so much on human acts but first of all on man himself. Consequently, he measures an act not so much in the light of the law, but rather in the light of human intentions and motives. The law is directed not at human activity but at man himself. Jesus turns to the investigation of man's heart and motives, which inevitably causes the valorisation of that which is internal<sup>101</sup>.

The verb *σύννοιδα* is only used once in the NT. Acts 5, 2 reads: *συνειδύης καὶ τῆς γυναικός*; lit. “(Ananias’) wife also being aware (of it)”. RSV has: “with his wife’s knowledge”. It is a typical non-moral use of *σύννοιδα* in the sense of ‘knowing something with another person’. The reflexive *σύννοιδα ἑμαυτῶ* is only once used in the NT. 1 Cor. 4, 4 reads: *οὐδὲν γὰρ ἑμαυτῶ σύννοιδα*, “I am not aware of anything against myself” (RSV); “For I have nothing on my conscience” (NEB). It is a typical moral use of *σύννοιδα ἑμαυτῶ* in the sense of a silent, empty conscience. The noun *συνείδησις* is used 31 times in the NT: once in John 8, 9; twice in Acts – in Paul’s speeches<sup>102</sup>; 20 times in Paul’s letters<sup>103</sup>; 5 times in Hebrews<sup>104</sup>; 3 times in Peter’s letter<sup>105</sup>. There is no ultimate consensus in the understanding of particular uses of *συνείδησις*. Generally, however, it is said that *συνείδησις* is used in its traditional double meaning: (1) consciousness; (2) moral-consciousness, conscience.

*Συνείδησις* in its first sense is used twice. Heb. 10, 2 has *συνείδησις ἁμαρτιῶν*, which should be read as *genetivus obiectivus*: ‘consciousness of sins’<sup>106</sup>. 1 Pet. 2, 19 reads *συνείδησις θεοῦ*, which also should be rendered as *genetivus obiectivus*: ‘consciousness of God, awareness of God’<sup>107</sup>. *Συνείδησις* in its moral sense is normally read in the remaining instances.

*Συνειδός* does not appear in the NT.

<sup>101</sup> *Inter alia*: Mt. 5, 8; 6, 22 f.; Mk. 3, 5; 6, 52; 7, 21; Lk. 11, 33–36; 12, 57; 18, 13; 21, 34.

<sup>102</sup> Acts 23, 1; 24, 16.

<sup>103</sup> Rom. 2, 15; 9, 1; 13, 5; 1 Cor. 8, 7.10.12; 10, 25.27.28.29a.29b; 2 Cor. 1, 12; 4, 2; 5, 11; 1 Tim. 1, 5; 1, 19; 3, 9; 4, 2; 2 Tim. 1, 3; Tit. 1, 15.

<sup>104</sup> Heb. 9, 9.14; 10, 2.22; 13, 18.

<sup>105</sup> 1 Pet. 2, 19; 3, 16.21.

<sup>106</sup> Lüdemann 1993: 302; Selby 1985/1986: 147. Pierce (1955: 62) sees in Heb. 10, 2 the moral meaning of *συνείδησις*.

<sup>107</sup> BAGD, p. 786; Lüdemann 1993: 302; Pierce 1955: 62. McCartney (1997: 242) wants to read *συνείδησις θεοῦ* in moral sense as ‘a godly sense’. He understands ‘godly conscience’ as synonym to ‘good conscience’. *Συνείησις* in its first sense is present in 1 Cor. 8, 7a, *varia lectio* (original has *συνήθεια* i.e. ‘custom’). *Συνείησις*, by its context, would be read here as ‘consciousness (that this is an idol)’; BAGD, p. 786. Pierce (1955: 87) wants to read also 1 Cor. 4, 2 and 5, 11 in the non-moral sense as ‘knowledge of (others) about Paul’s conduct’. He cannot see here *συνείδησις* as

There is a discussion concerning the precise meaning of *συνείδησις* in its moral sense as ‘conscience’. Pierce has argued, against the modern definitions of conscience, that the NT conscience refers only to past acts or to present acts having their beginning in the past; that it refers only to wrong acts and does not pass judgement on others<sup>108</sup>. The majority, however, view the NT conscience as not only retrospective (the instrument of judgement), but also prospective (the means of guidance); not only guilty, but also innocent; not only passing judgements on one’s self, but also on others<sup>109</sup>. The convincing proof is found in 2 Cor. 1, 12<sup>110</sup>.

Scholars have debated the source of *συνείδησις* in Paul’s vocabulary. (1) Some assume that *συνείδησις* came to the NT *via* the Corinthian church<sup>111</sup>. The Corinthians used *συνείδησις* to justify their behaviour (1 Cor. 8, 1–11, 1), and Paul picked up their term. (2) Romaniuk believes that Paul became familiar with *συνείδησις* by lecture of Wisd. 17, 11<sup>112</sup>. (3) *Συνείδησις* is loosely used in the NT without precise explanation or comment. It is present in Pauline writings other than the letters to the Corinthians. Independently from Paul, other NT writers also use this term. On this basis it is better to assume that by that time *συνείδησις* was a commonly known term. No one had a problem with its undefined meaning<sup>113</sup>.

#### MEANING OF ΣΥΝΕΙΔΗΣΙΣ IN ROMANS 2, 12–16

After both an extensive exegesis of Romans 2, 12–16 and a general sketch of *συνείδησις* throughout Hellenism, MT, LXX, NT have been provided, conclusions concerning Paul’s understanding of *συνείδησις* and the concept of conscience in Romans 2, 12–16 are possible.

#### **Συνείδησις Itself**

As it has been already underlined, in Romans 2, 14–16 Paul wants to prove to the Jews that not only they have access to the law. Gentiles also, though in

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conscience, since he assumes that *συνείδησις* in the NT has the same meaning as in secular Greek, where conscience could not pass judgements on others.

<sup>108</sup> Pierce 1955: 115, 117. Morris (1992: 127 f.) follows Pierce. He believes that the mistake in understanding of the conscience in the NT was caused by Latin *conscientia* which was used to translate the NT *συνείδησις*. *Conscientia* had a broader sense than *συνείδησις*, as it was understood as a *common sense*, when applied to moral questions.

<sup>109</sup> E.g. Cook 1988: 161.

<sup>110</sup> Even Pierce himself (1955: 62) understands conscience in 2 Cor. 1, 12 as morally positive, not merely silent and empty.

<sup>111</sup> E.g. Gundry-Volf 1993: 153; Pierce 1955: 60 ff.

<sup>112</sup> Romaniuk 1978: 104.

<sup>113</sup> Cf. Horsley 1978: 581; Jewett 1971: 420.



not such a full way, have access to the law. Paul proves it on three grounds: (1) The Gentile's moral actions; (2) their conscience; and (3) ultimately, God's just eschatological verdict.

In order to present the second argument Paul uses the word *συνείδησις*. First of all it must be observed that, if the sentence (vv. 14–16) consisted only of vv. 14–15b without vv. 15c–16, then the word *συνείδησις*, by its context, could be simply translated in its first, general meaning as 'consciousness'. Paul says that Gentiles are "conscious of the parts of the law". It is Paul's main aim to show that Gentiles are *aware of the law*. However, in the light of the moral content of verses 15c–16 in particular and the strain of thought in ch. 2 in general, it must be observed that Paul understands *συνείδησις* here in its second moral meaning as 'moral-consciousness; conscience'. Thus, it may be summarised that Paul views *συνείδησις* here as 'moral-consciousness; conscience', and his main emphasis, for the sake of his aim, is on *consciousness* itself: *moral-consciousness*.

Now, having in mind Paul's main way of thinking in ch. 2 and the structure of vv. 14–16, some more observations concerning Paul's understanding of *συνείδησις* and *conscience* as such are as follows.

### **Συνείδησις and Creation**

Paul in vv. 14–16 talks about Gentiles – ἔθνη who have *συνείδησις*<sup>114</sup>. Furthermore, he assumes the Jews' moral-consciousness in 2, 1–3 when he talks about a Jew who judges – ὁ κρίνων – others. Thus it may be said that every human, Jew and Gentile, has *συνείδησις*. It can be also confirmed by the content of 2 Cor. 4, 2 where Paul talks about *πάσαν συνείδησιν ἀνθρώπων*.

Since in 14a by the use of *φύσει* Paul describes all human moral activity including both moral acts and, automatically, moral-awareness, *συνείδησις* must be viewed not as *vox Dei* in human, but rather as a natural human ability<sup>115</sup>.

### **Συνείδησις and Consciousness**

The relationship between *συνείδησις* as moral consciousness and human consciousness may be observed in v. 15b and 15c. Some do not treat 15c as explanatory to 15b, but as two different concepts: *συνείδησις* and *λογισμοί*. Consequently, trying to distinguish between the activity of conscience (*συνείδησις*) and the activity of consciousnesses (*λογισμοί*), they write about two different *egos*, two different consciousnesses of man. This distinction is, however, artificial and illogical<sup>116</sup>.

<sup>114</sup> Paul has already implicitly assumed Gentiles' moral awareness in 2, 6–11. See Dunn 1998: 136.

<sup>115</sup> Cf. Lüdemann 1993: 302.

<sup>116</sup> Jewett (1971: 442–444, see Pierce 1955: 85 ff. for similar position) assumes that 15b and 15c talk about different human abilities (15b – function of conscience; 15c – function of mind) and argues for the independence of conscience from the person. Jewett believes that a human is able to

15c explains 15b. Thus, moral consciousness should be viewed as a part of the whole human consciousness<sup>117</sup>. The inward distinction between two *egos* in man, provided by the concept of *συνείδησις*, is not on the level of man's double consciousness. Man has only one consciousness. It must be viewed on the level of the human ability to *discuss within himself*, which Paul expresses in v. 15c by talking about one's accusing and excusing thoughts.

Furthermore, the notion of *thoughts* strictly connected with the concept of *νοῦς* suggests that Paul understands human conscience as a part of human intellectual ability. Moral consciousness works at the intellectual level of man.

### **Συνείδησις and the Law**

Concerning the relationship between conscience and the law, three main facts are present in Romans 2, 14–16. Firstly, as it has been already discussed, moral consciousness confirms (*συμμαρτυρούσης*) the presence of the law in man. Man knows that he has the law because of his conscience. Secondly, since Paul uses conscience to prove the presence of the law, conscience cannot be and is not the law itself<sup>118</sup>.

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control his *mind* but he is not able to control his *conscience*. On the basis of this distinction Jewett wants to establish the independent work of conscience. Discussing Rom. 9, 1 he writes: "The conscience provides independent confirmation for a matter which has *already* been affirmed" (emphasis added). Jewett in this statement makes the *temporal* distinction (using 'already') between the judgement of mind and the judgement of conscience. In reality (on the level of one's consciousness) this temporal distinction is not present, however. How can one distinguish in his consciousness between the dependent judgement of mind and the independent judgement of conscience? Thus, it is better to understand the independence of conscience not by distinction of its work from the work of human mind, but simply as an ability to compare an act or motive with the norm of heart. In this sense also mind is independent from the person, since it is able to distinguish and compare, for example, his time of running from one day with his time of running another day. Käsemann (1982: 65, referring to Bultmann 1952: vol. 1, 216 ff.) writes: "[συνείδησις] is distinguished from *νοῦς* by the fact that this claim is absolutely obligatory and enforces critical testing of one's own action". But, is the understanding of the mind not naturally obligatory for the person? If one is aware that he has not correctly solved the mathematical task, automatically he will try to do it once again. Richardson (1915: 48) adds: "Intellectual questions are fundamentally moral questions, for the love of truth is presupposed in the mind's work; this alone gives the needful stimulus to the student even of, e.g., Mathematics, which would seem most independent of morals". Harris (1962: 178) presents correct distinction between the mind and conscience by words: "Νοῦς is that which creates a purpose or act: *συνείδησις* is that judges a purpose or act".

<sup>117</sup> Fitzmyer (1993: IX) correctly describes conscience as the "capacity of the human mind".

<sup>118</sup> Scholars frequently confuse conscience with the law. For example, Bruce (1994: 84) writes: "The will of God is known by the Law of Moses or by the voice of conscience". But every human knows the law (of Moses or of nature) not by law, but by consciousness. Calvin (1995: 6): "Their conscience [...] was their law". Harrison (1976: 31): "It can be maintained that the function of conscience in the Gentile is parallel to the function of the law for the Jew". But the Jew also has conscience and this conscience is not the law, but only uses the law. For the right relation between the law and conscience: Gundry-Volf 1993: 154; Harris 1962: 177; Meadors 1996: 114. Murray (1968: 75) writes that the law "is antecedent of the operations of conscience and the cause of them".

Thirdly, conscience is not viewed here as the lawgiver<sup>119</sup>, but only as consciousness of the law<sup>120</sup>. The law in man was γραπτόν in man, which implicitly suggests that the ultimate lawgiver, by his creational activity, is God<sup>121</sup>. Thus, by the relationship of conscience with law the basic meaning of **συνείδησις** is provided as ‘the knowledge of something’<sup>122</sup>.

### **Συνείδησις and Moral Evaluation**

V. 15c describes the work of conscience, which is expressed by the notion of accusing and excusing thoughts. The notion of the battle of the thoughts provides the next meaning of **συνείδησις**. In 15c Paul talks about the *process* of formulating judgements. Thus, it may be said that conscience is the *moral capacity of evaluating particular acts*<sup>123</sup>. The precise use of the phrase μεταξύ ἀλλήλων is ambiguous. Although, Paul is concentrating in vv. 14–16 on someone’s own acts, it cannot be, however, excluded, as it has already been noted, that the ability of **συνείδησις** consists also of accusing and excusing actions of others. Concerning **συνείδησις** viewed as a moral ability to evaluate acts, one more observation is as follows. **Συνείδησις** is a natural human ability, so, in some sense, man cannot escape from it. Since he is able to evaluate his own actions, he automatically cannot escape his own judgements, especially those which may be morally negative. In this sense one can talk about moral consciousness as working independently of one oneself.

### **Συνείδησις and Verdict**

V. 15bc is directly connected with v. 16a where Paul mentions τὰ κρυπτά, which will be judged by God in the eschatological judgement. The concept of τὰ κρυπτά provides another feature of conscience. V. 15c speaks about the moral ability to judge, while 16a talks about the judgements themselves (of course, the notion of judgements can already be observed in 15c). Thus, Paul views

<sup>119</sup> *Contra* Gooch (1987: 240) who, *inter alia*, describes the conscience as “the legislator [...] of moral principles and actions”. Morris (1992: 125) confused the consciousness of the norms with the source of the norms.

<sup>120</sup> Cf. Cranfield 1986: 160; Dodd 1959: 61. Modern understanding of the meaning of the word ‘conscience’ and its activity views conscience as legislator, a source of moral norms, and automatically its voice is treated as being above all and to be realised. Cf. Meadors 1996: 114.

<sup>121</sup> This connection of the conscience with the law of *God* goes beyond the usage of **συνείδησις** in secular Greek. See Oppewall 1979: 761; Smalley 1993.

<sup>122</sup> In this sense of the **συνείδησις** passages in 1 Corinthians 8, 10 should be read. “The weak conscience” is a conscience which lacks necessary knowledge; it is not informed enough and automatically provides negative verdict (see the section “**Συνείδησις** and Verdict” below).

<sup>123</sup> This meaning of **συνείδησις** and also the previous one (i.e., **συνείδησις** as consciousness of the law) are known in systematic theology under terms: *synderesis* (a corruption of Greek **συνείδησις**) ‘human consciousness of universally binding rules or principle of conduct’, and *conscientia* ‘the ability to relate general rules to particular cases’. See Cook 1988: 161.

συνείδησις also as a moral consciousness of verdict<sup>124</sup>. The conscience bears the judgements on itself, which will ultimately be judged in the future by God himself<sup>125</sup>. Furthermore, moral consciousness produces both positive and negative verdicts, as may be observed in 15c<sup>126</sup>. Although 2, 14–16 does not explicitly say so, the lecture of 1, 18–32 makes clear that the moral verdict of a Gentile’s conscience may be wrong<sup>127</sup>. **Συνείδησις** in 15b is used as an activity of the present. However, by the structure of the sentence and συνείδησις’s connection with the future role of τὰ κρυπτά, it may be said that the verdicts of the conscience will be used by God in his judgement. Thus, according to Paul, conscience’s verdicts point out to and announce God’s eschatological verdict.

### **Συνείδησις and Responsibility**

In vv. 14–16 Paul treats the voice of conscience as having an obligatory character. Since the conscience is a part of human broad consciousness its voice is *all* that man knows and can know. For Paul, the obligatory nature of conscience is derived from the fact that conscience is viewed as the moral consciousness of *God’s* law written on one’s heart. The obligation of the voice of conscience has a horizontal and vertical dimension. On the horizontal level, a human being instinctively “feels” that he should do what he himself understands as good. On the vertical plane Paul assumes that man’s deeds and verdicts will have significance in God’s eschatological judgement. Thus, συνείδησις must be understood not only as merely moral (horizontal dimension) but also as religious (vertical dimension) conception. Man is not only responsible before himself, but first of all before God, whether he knows it or not.

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<sup>124</sup> This sense of συνείδησις is helpful to understand the usage of συνείδησις in Hebrews 9 f. See Selby 1985/1986, who views the συνείδησις in Heb. 9 as ‘painful consciousness of guilt’. Gooch (1987) is able to argue that all occurrences of συνείδησις in 1 Cor. 8 and 10 mean ‘internal witness of bad feeling’ (245), ‘awareness of the self’ (246) and must not be understood in the sense of a ‘judge of moral principles and actions’ (249) (this sense of συνείδησις is similar to the sense of συνείδησις presented in the previous section: “**Συνείδησις** and Moral Evaluation”). It seems that most of the NT texts in which συνείδησις appears, can be understood as moral consciousness of verdict (positive or negative). Some of them talk about the verdict of conscience in relation with other persons (like 1 Cor. 8; 10), others (like Heb. 9 f.) about the relation of one’s verdict of conscience with God.

<sup>125</sup> The relation of the judgement of the conscience with the ultimate eschatological judgement goes beyond the usage of συνείδησις in secular Greek. See Behm 1968: 810; Käsemann 1982: 66; Opperwall 1979: 761.

<sup>126</sup> Cf. Dunn 1988: 101. Even though Paul goes beyond the negative use of conscience, this aspect, and not positive one, is still more present in his use of συνείδησις.

<sup>127</sup> Rehwinkel (1985: 267) treating, probably, conscience only as the ability of evaluating writes that “Conscience does not err, but the standard in the basis of which conscience acts might be in error”. He rightly understands the law as content, and the conscience as form. However, as it has just been shown, conscience should not only be understood as the ability to judge, but as the judgement itself, so, in this sense of conscience, it can err.

### Conscience in Romans 2, 14–16: Definition

Thus, generally, for Paul in Rom. 2, 14–16 a conscience (expressed primarily by συνείδησις) is a natural ability of every man which consists of consciousness of the law, an ability for the moral evaluation of deeds, and a moral consciousness of the verdict. The voice of conscience is everything that man knows as morally right or wrong. The voice of conscience is obligatory in its character and will ultimately be judged by God.

### Additional Comments

Of course, there are several other aspects of conscience, which are not present in Romans 2, 12–16. The meaning of συνείδησις proved on the basis of the exegesis of Romans 2, 14–16 is certainly not exhaustive for the concept of conscience seen in the NT as a whole. The other main aspects of conscience, which are normally discussed by scholars, are as follows.

Romans 2, 14–16 is not precise as to which of one's acts are evaluated by moral consciousness: past, present, or future. One may argue, by the context and aims of 1, 18–3, 20 that Paul means here that the past acts and the present acts began in the past are evaluated by conscience. 2, 14–16 is itself<sup>128</sup>, however, more general concerning this problem. Romans 2, 14–16 says that a moral consciousness, evaluating, compares its own moral consciousness of the law with consciousness of a particular act and then produces a verdict. The text does not say, however, whether the observation and perception of the acts belongs to the activities of moral consciousness or human consciousness in general. This distinction may be, however, artificial. The text does not say whether a moral consciousness produces pain or pleasure with the verdict<sup>129</sup>. Paul touches in Romans 2, 14–16 only an intellectual and voluntary aspect of conscience. He says nothing about its emotional aspect<sup>130</sup>. The text itself does not provide an answer to the question as to whether the power of a moral capacity for evaluating may be changed. It is, however, clear in 1, 18–32 that it may<sup>131</sup>. 2, 12–16, because of its placement in the whole letter to the Romans, does not deal with the relationship between the nature of conscience and its transformation and role in the economy of the

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<sup>128</sup> Dunn (1988: 105) sees in 2, 15 conscience as refereed only to past acts. When one sees in 2, 15 only the retrospective activity of conscience, where nothing of it is stated, it suggests one's being influenced by the secular concept of conscience.

<sup>129</sup> Pierce (1955), attempting to apply the Hellenistic usage of συνείδησις to the entire text of the NT, argues that in 2, 15 συνείδησις denotes 'pain'.

<sup>130</sup> The emotional aspect of conscience exists, however. See Harris 1962: 173. He also presents the conscience as the whole personality: will, feelings, reason (186).

<sup>131</sup> It may be observed that conscience viewed as the ability to judge cannot be completely deafened. A human being will always have the moral ability to judge. So, in this sense one may say that conscience is infallible. See Harris 1962: 180. Also Hallesby 1950, ch. V: *The Conscience of Fallen Man*.

Christian life. This aspect may be highlighted up by exegesis of the two other occurrences of *συνείδησις* in Romans (9, 1; 13, 5) which are clearly connected with the Christian condition of the believer. Paul is very clear in 1, 18–3, 20 stating that no one can be saved by his own works, since every one has sinned. 2, 14–16 must be read in this light. No one can be saved by the realisation of the requirements of one's own conscience. Paul presents the voice of conscience, first of all, as being accusatory. No one can fulfil what his own conscience requires of him, which automatically announces God's future condemnation (2, 12). Paul, by making his argument against the Jews, implicitly proves that Gentiles also will have no excuse in the eschatological judgement, since they, like Jews, have access to the law<sup>132</sup>. God's judgement is therefore just. It may also be observed that Gentiles will be judged relatively on the basis of their own acquaintance with the law, not on the basis of "the perfect law" (2, 12).

*Evangelical School of Theology, Wrocław*

#### ABBREVIATIONS

- ABD* *The Anchor Bible Dictionary*, ed. by D.N. Freedman, vols. I–VI, New York 1992.  
*BAGD* W. Bauer, W. Arndt, F.W. Gingrich, F.W. Danker, *A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature*, Chicago–London<sup>2</sup>1979.  
*BDB* F. Brown, S.R. Driver, C.A. Briggs, *Hebrew and English Dictionary of the Old Testament*, Oxford 1907.  
*EDNT* *Exegetical Dictionary of the New Testament*, ed. H. Balz, G. Schneider, vols. I–III, Grand Rapids, Mich. 1990–1993.  
*IDB* *The Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible: An Illustrated Encyclopedia*, ed. by G.A. Buttrick [et al.], vols. I–IV, Nashville 1962.  
*ISBE* *The International Standard Bible Encyclopaedia*, ed. by G. Bromiley, vols. I–IV, Grand Rapids, Mich. 1979–1988.  
*JB* Jerusalem Bible  
*KJV* King James Version  
*NBD* *New Bible Dictionary*, ed. by J.D. Douglas, Leicester<sup>2</sup>1993.  
*NEB* New English Bible  
*NJB* New Jerusalem Bible  
*NIV* New International Version  
*RSV* Revised Standard Version  
*TDNT* *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament*, ed. by G. Kittel, trans. and ed. by G.B. Bromiley, vols. I–X, Grand Rapids, Mich. 1965–1976.

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<sup>132</sup> Cf. Dunn 1998: 101.

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MERCHANTS, SOLDIERS AND SLAVES.  
THE SOCIAL AFFILIATION OF THE PROPAGATORS OF ISIS  
AND SARAPIS CULT IN THE ROMAN EMPIRE,  
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

By

PRZEMYSŁAW SIEKIERKA

Although much has been said about the Egyptian gods in the Graeco-Roman world, there is still a significant lack of works concerning their worshippers. We know rather well people who have been referred to in literary texts, like Lucius of Corinth, the protagonist of Apuleius' *Golden Ass*. Yet this article concentrates on all those people who have been passed over in silence, the authors of inscriptions addressed to the gods of the Nile and the ones who are only mentioned once in our evidence.

My inquiry has focused on material coming from Italy and the European and African provinces of the Roman Empire – with the exception of Greece and Egypt. The cult of the Egyptian gods in Egypt was an effect of thousands of years of religious tradition, so it needs special studies. The Egyptian religion arrived in Greece much earlier and under different circumstances than in Rome. The Hellenic culture so influenced the incoming cult that it took a very different shape than the cult of Egyptian deities in Italy, where it started proliferating in the 2<sup>nd</sup> century BC. Some scholars have even stated that the *interpretatio Romana* of the cult in question was closer to its original than *interpretatio Graeca*<sup>1</sup>.

Within the so defined limits the research material consists of 645 inscriptions, most of them published in a recent work of L. Bricault, *Recueil des inscriptions concernant les cultes isiaques (RICIS)*. However, they must be supplemented by several *tituli* published in *L'Année Épigraphique*, and by some published by L. Vidman in his *Sylloge inscriptionum religionis Isiacae et Sarapiacae (SIRIS)* that were omitted by Bricault.

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<sup>1</sup> Vidman 1970: 17 f.; Wild 1981: 4, 150.

F. Cumont was the first to present the hypothesis that the merchants, sailors, slaves, artists, Egyptian sages and ex-legionaries from the garrisons in the Valley of the Nile were the most ardent propagators of the Egyptian gods in the West Mediterranean<sup>2</sup>. Many scholars interested in the proliferation of the Egyptian cults in the Roman world have referred to this opinion<sup>3</sup> which in time became a dogma in the Isiac studies. In this article, I intend to discuss Cumont's hypothesis and confront his statement with the epigraphical evidence on the three most important social groups mentioned by the Belgian scholar.

#### MERCHANTS

The case of merchants is the most significant, since many scholars after Cumont have underlined the great role of this social group in the proliferation of the Egyptian cults in the Roman world<sup>4</sup>. I do not intend to contest this thesis, on the contrary, I will give arguments corroborating it. However, it seems that many scholars have taken it for granted, in fact overestimating the role of merchants in the cult proliferation.

As the Egyptian cults appeared in the city of Rome in the first half of the 1<sup>st</sup> century BC, the *Iseum* in Pompeii and *Serapeum* in Puteoli were most certainly constructed in the 2<sup>nd</sup> century BC, being the oldest evidence for the cult of Isis and Sarapis in Italy<sup>5</sup>. A hypothesis which has gained most followers is that Isis was brought to Italy, especially to Campania, by Roman merchants from Delos. The process was intensified after 88 BC when Archelaos, one of Mithridates VI's army commanders, raided the island killing 20 thousand people, mostly Romans<sup>6</sup>. Of course, frequent trade contacts between Campania and Delos had lasted long before Archelaos' invasion, and the trade route came through Athens, Boeotia, Euboea and Cyclades, wherein the Egyptian cults were attested at least in the 3<sup>rd</sup> century BC<sup>7</sup>. Among the Italian people who were murdered by Archelaos, those of Greek origin made up only 10%, and the majority of *gentilicia* came from Campania<sup>8</sup>.

M. Malaise underlined the role of merchants, especially for the first phase of the cult's proliferation in Roman cultural space, when republican politicians

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<sup>2</sup> Cumont 1909: 125.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Malaise 1972: 67 and 1984: 1618; Takács 1995: 5 f.; Le Bohec 2000: 129.

<sup>4</sup> García y Bellido 1967: 106; Takács 1995: 6; Le Bohec 2000: 130; Cibu, Rémy 2004: 137; Alvar, Muñiz 2004: 69; Bricault, Le Bohec, Podvin 2004: 232; Bricault 2007: 251; Bugarski-Mesdjian 2007: 293, 303.

<sup>5</sup> Wild 1984: 1809 f.; Malaise 1972: 255.

<sup>6</sup> App. *Mithr.* 28; cf. Malaise 1972: 259, 265, 270; Takács 1995: 5, 30; Turcan 1997: 85.

<sup>7</sup> Catling 1996: 443; Casson 1954: 178 f.; Malaise 1972: 264, 266.

<sup>8</sup> Malaise 1972: 271.

were strongly opposed to the introduction of Isis and Sarapis into Rome<sup>9</sup>. Apart from Delos, where the remains of three sanctuaries of Sarapis have been found and where the cult of Egyptian gods was one of the most popular on the island, Romans were practically absent in the Aegean before the war with Mithridates<sup>10</sup>. This fact clearly demonstrates where the Egyptian cults came from and who was active in their introduction to Italy. It might be added that, despite diplomatic contacts between Rome and Egypt under the Ptolemies (both states exchanged ambassadors in 273 BC<sup>11</sup>), these contacts had nothing to do with the diffusion of Egyptian cults in Italy<sup>12</sup>. So, the only way to propagate the cult was by trade routes.

The role of merchants and sailors in the proliferation of the cult cannot be overestimated, particularly in the case of such towns as Puteoli and Pompeii, Ravenna, Misenum, Aquileia, and, later on, Ostia. Egyptians were usually among their inhabitants<sup>13</sup>. Malaise tried to estimate the Egyptian presence in Misenum and Ravenna. In Misenum, for the years 71–211 AD, he found 33 sailors serving in Roman fleet with names suggesting their origin from Egypt, and 21 from Alexandria itself (that is, respectively, 15% and 10% of the total number of sailors attested). In Ravenna he found 5 sailors from Egypt (6% of the total number) and 3 from Alexandria (4%)<sup>14</sup>. Nevertheless, even if we can prove someone's origin from Egypt it is not certain whether or not he was a worshipper of Egyptian deities. Did he propagate their cults? The case gets more complicated with the evidence found in the last 30 years. Four further inscriptions were uncovered, all of them funerary, of the soldiers of the fleet from Misenum who served on a trireme "Isis"<sup>15</sup>. Apart from the name of the ship nothing connects them to the cult. Of course, the namegiver for this ship supposedly had some deeper relation with the goddess, but it would be rash to interpret his decision to name the ship "Isis" as an element of the cult propagation. Perhaps it was just a good omen, as the goddess was famous of her power over the seas. Moreover, this decision had presumably nothing to do with the marines serving on that ship.

It is again symptomatic that when the unloading point of grain for Italy changed from Puteoli to Ostia under Trajan, Puteoli observed regress in the Egyptian cults' activity, while Ostia witnessed the flourishing of these cults. 55 inscriptions concerning the Isis and Sarapis cult were found in Ostia and its port,

<sup>9</sup> Malaise 1972: 259; Hayne 1992: 144–146; Versluys 2004: 427 f.; Turcan 1997: 86.

<sup>10</sup> Malaise 1972: 264, 276.

<sup>11</sup> See Casson 1954: 184.

<sup>12</sup> Malaise 1972: 315.

<sup>13</sup> Malaise 1972: 327.

<sup>14</sup> Malaise 1972: 325.

<sup>15</sup> *RICIS* 501/0218 (= *CIL* VI 3123), 504/0501 (= *CIL* X 3615); 504/0502 (= *CIL* X 3618); 504/0503 (= *CIL* X 3640).

which places Ostia in the second position after the city of Rome in the number of *tituli* related to these deities found in a single place in the Roman state<sup>16</sup>.

From the harbour cities, along the Roman roads (specifically *Via Postumia*, *Via Annia*, *Via Claudia*, *Via Aemilia*, *Via Flaminia* and *Via Appia*<sup>17</sup>) these cults spread to the whole territory of Italy and further<sup>18</sup>. Or, as in the case of Pompeii and Aquileia, the cults came first to the cities along the seashore, and then they were propagated deeper in the land<sup>19</sup>.

It is symptomatic that these cults flourished where the trade did. This is the reason why Isis and Sarapis are practically absent in South Italy where economical performance was far behind the potential of the North. We know only 15 inscriptions from Calabria, Apulia, Bruttium and Lucania put together<sup>20</sup>.

Conclusions reached on the basis of Italy correspond to those relating to the Alpine provinces. S. Cibu and B. Rémy have noticed that the Egyptian cults flourished there mainly along the Alpine travel routes and near the capital city of Raetia, i.e. in places of the most intense trade activity<sup>21</sup>. In Gallia, the evidence for Isiac cults is concentrated in the province's centre, in areas adjacent to the Mediterranean Sea and along main rivers, especially Rhône, but it is scanty for the North and hardly present in the West<sup>22</sup>. Not surprisingly, the distribution of evidence for the cult is the same as for trade activity.

Unfortunately, in most cases we are unable to define the profession of the people named in inscriptions. M. Malaise has argued that only actors and merchants had a manner to mention their profession in *tituli*<sup>23</sup>. In all probability merchants appear in 4 inscriptions. In the first one, from Rome, we find Lucius Mecius Rusticus who called himself *lanarius*, a wool merchant or, alternatively, a craftsman making products of wool, but the first possibility seems more probable<sup>24</sup>. Yet this supposed wool merchant was a founder of a tombstone for his brother, and Isis is mentioned there incidentally because the grave was placed near a small shrine (*sacellum*) of the Egyptian goddess. The second inscription was founded by *pausarii* together with *argentarii*, and the latter may be understood as a professional body of bankers/bill-owners<sup>25</sup>. The third *titulus* was

<sup>16</sup> *RICIS* 503/1101–503/1223 {*SIRIS* 532–562} + *AE* 2001, 621 and 630a. For inscriptions previously published in *SIRIS*, I shall refer to this edition giving the relevant number within braces {}.

<sup>17</sup> Malaise 1972: 343–345, 354.

<sup>18</sup> Malaise 1972: 353.

<sup>19</sup> Malaise 1972: 347; 1984, 1669 f.

<sup>20</sup> *RICIS* 505/0101–507/0101.

<sup>21</sup> Cibu, Rémy 2004: 155 f.

<sup>22</sup> Leclant 2004: 95.

<sup>23</sup> Malaise 1972: 101 f.

<sup>24</sup> *RICIS* 501/0133 {397}; cf. *OLD* s.v. *lanarius*.

<sup>25</sup> *RICIS* 501/0136 {400}; cf. *OLD* s.v. *argentarius*.

founded by Tiberius Veturius Fuscus, a *vestiarius tenuarius* (sic!), which may mean that he was either a merchant or a tailor of delicate vestments (L. Bricault opts for the second meaning)<sup>26</sup>. The fourth person, some Kosmikos known from a graffito from Berenice (modern Benghazi) in Cyrenaica, could be a merchant because he mentioned that he had travelled a lot<sup>27</sup>. Four merchants at most is rather a tiny result for a basis composed of 645 inscriptions. If merchants really played an important role in the cult's proliferation, we should expect more of their inscriptions.

Maybe we are able to trace merchants using other methods, and other characteristics of their dedications to gods could be of some help. We cannot presume that every single merchant was like Decimus Fabius Florus Veranus from Ostia who was so famous that he did not need to introduce himself in his inscription, because everybody in the local community knew him<sup>28</sup>. If Isis-Pelagia or Isis-Pharia functioned as a fleet protectress<sup>29</sup>, we can with greater or lesser certainty identify the people that revered that goddess' *avatar* as sea merchants and sailors<sup>30</sup>. However, R. Turcan supposes that these people could be also soldiers who were transported to their place of service by sea<sup>31</sup>. Unfortunately, the epigraphy does not confirm the significant role of merchants in the cult in this way as well. Isis-Pelagia is known from only three inscriptions, two from Rome and one from Saguntum in Hispania Tarraconensis<sup>32</sup>. The first one of them is a funerary inscription of Ser. Sulpicius Alcimus, but he was presumably not a merchant, merely a servant in the temple of Isis-Pelagia. Isis-Pharia is known from two inscriptions, one from Rome and the other from Portus Ostiae<sup>33</sup>, although in the first one (a tombstone of Flavius Agricola) it was the wife of the departed, Flavia Primitiva, who admitted having been a worshipper of Dea Pharia.

Another method is to check how many inscriptions in honour of Isis also mention Hermes/Mercury, a traditional protector of trade and merchants, and Poseidon/Neptune, a patron god of seafarers, especially professional sailors. Hermes as a name of the founder has been attested in three inscriptions two from Rome and one from Carthago Nova (modern Carthage) in Hispania Tarraconensis<sup>34</sup>. However, in the second one the only connection of C. Iulius

<sup>26</sup> *RICIS* 515/0103 {601}; cf. *OLD* s.vv. *vestiarius* and *tenuarius*.

<sup>27</sup> *RICIS* 701/0301 (= *SEG* XXVIII [1978] 1555).

<sup>28</sup> *RICIS* 503/1115 {536}; see Malaise 1972: 102; see *PIR*<sup>2</sup> F 458.

<sup>29</sup> See Versnel 1990: 45.

<sup>30</sup> Malaise 1972: 186; 2000: 10.

<sup>31</sup> Turcan 1995: 95.

<sup>32</sup> *RICIS* 501/0132 {396}; 501/0137 (= *AE* 1991, 278 = *AE* 1981, 76); 603/0401 {764}.

<sup>33</sup> *RICIS* 501/0177 {451}; 503/1204 {403}.

<sup>34</sup> *RICIS* 501/0130 {393}; 501/0161 {448}; 603/0202 (= *AE* 1982, 636).

Hermes to Isis was by means of the sistrum held in her hand by a woman shown on a relief of his wife's grave. The case seems controversial, since the people who were named after the god Hermes could only prove their parents' reverence for this god, not their own reverence. In an inscription on the basis of Hermes' statue Statilia, one of its founders, claimed that she had been nourished by Isis (Εἰσιὼς θερεπτή)<sup>35</sup>. It is, surprisingly, the only case where the founder showed reverence for both Isis and Hermes. Beside that, a grave of Sosia Iuliana and Tetratia Isias has been found in Ravenna, with a verse epitaph in which the god Hermes is mentioned<sup>36</sup>. However, this god is not invoked there as a protector of trade, so this *titulus* will not be taken into consideration.

Mercury received only one dedication, from L. Lucretius Zethus, already discussed, in which the god of trade was named in the first place among 12 other gods and supernatural powers, including Isis-Pelagia<sup>37</sup>. Mercury is also present on the relief of an inscription of Atius Euhemerus, but he is not named in the text<sup>38</sup>.

Poseidon found his place in one inscription from Olbia from the times of Severus Alexander, but the monument was dedicated at the same occasion to 4 other gods, Isis and Sarapis among them<sup>39</sup>. Neptune is attested in two *tituli*: in the first from Csev in Pannonia Inferior Neptune, as a syncretic deity Iuppiter Optimus Maximus Neptunus, is a partner of Sarapis<sup>40</sup>: in the other he is identified with Sarapis in the form Sarapis Neptunus Augustus<sup>41</sup>.

To sum up, even if we accept the hypothesis that placing Hermes/Mercury and Poseidon/Neptune beside Isis and Sarapis on inscriptions proves the status of their founders as merchants or sailors (which is open to doubt anyway), we have only 8 or 9 inscriptions to confirm the great role of this social group in the proliferation of the Isiac cults in the Roman Empire. This argument is hard to defend against the whole epigraphical material of 645 inscriptions from the territories discussed in this paper.

If we try to identify merchants by other characteristics, new problems arise. The terms *nauclerus* or *nauarchus*, used to define a ship captain, provide an example. They may mean a merchant ship captain<sup>42</sup>. S.A. Takács even assumed that these sea merchants could organize themselves into associations with Isis

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<sup>35</sup> *RICIS* 503/1107 {533d}.

<sup>36</sup> *RICIS* 512/0101 {586}.

<sup>37</sup> *RICIS* 501/0137.

<sup>38</sup> *RICIS* 613/0302 {673}.

<sup>39</sup> *RICIS* 115/0201 {713}.

<sup>40</sup> *RICIS* 614/0201 {670}.

<sup>41</sup> *RICIS* 703/0102 {770}.

<sup>42</sup> Malaise 1972: 103; 1984: 1671; see *RICIS* 615/0401 {677}.

or Sarapis as patron gods<sup>43</sup>. These merchants might have specialized in grain trade, especially delivering *annona* from Africa to Rome, as is suggested by two inscriptions found in Ostia and Portus Ostiae<sup>44</sup>. In the first one the founder, M. Aurelius Domnion, came from Alexandria and made dedication to the gods from his fatherland. Yet the terms *naulerus/nauarchus* can also be understood as a ‘warship commander’, like the commanders Valerius Verus Thiasus and P. Aelius Iunianus from Misenum, the harbour of Roman navy, in two inscriptions from the 3<sup>rd</sup> century AD<sup>45</sup>. What is more, the terms in question may have cultic significance, meaning the commander of a sacred ship during the festival of *Nauigium Isidis* on the 5<sup>th</sup> of March, described in detail by Apuleius<sup>46</sup>. Y. Le Bohec even argued that the term *nauarchus* could be used in both meanings, professional and cultic, but he did not adduce any proof, except for his remark that “the Romans liked linguistic games”<sup>47</sup>. This hypothesis, though very tempting, cannot be proven.

M. Malaise has underestimated the arguments against the thesis of merchants and sailors’ great role in the diffusion of the cult. He provides an example of Piraeus, where Egyptian merchants appeared as early as the 4<sup>th</sup> century BC and founded a temple. But the first temple of Egyptian gods in Athens was not founded before 215/4 BC, a fact which we know from a decree of the Athenian assembly for a group of Σοραπιστοί<sup>48</sup>. Considering that the Egyptian merchants were present in Piraeus and in the Athenian agora, it is striking that it took Egyptian gods so much time to make the distance of 10 km from Piraeus to Athens.

Another counterargument comes from Sicily where Agathocles, the tyrant of Syracuse (proclaimed king in 304 BC) married Ptolemy I’s daughter in 306 BC<sup>49</sup>, but there is no evidence of Egyptian cults’ coming to the island with the princess. Furthermore, later on another tyrant of Syracuse, Hieron II (*ca* 271–216 BC, proclaimed king in 265), kept up a very intense trade with Egypt under the rule of Ptolemy II Philadelphos (282–246 BC). Yet there is no evidence of Isis and Sarapis’ presence in Sicily before 210 BC, when the island became a Roman province<sup>50</sup>.

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<sup>43</sup> Takács 1995: 160; see also Bricault 2007: 251.

<sup>44</sup> *RICIS* 503/1213 (= *IG* XIV 924); *RICIS* 503/1215.

<sup>45</sup> *RICIS* 501/0175 {428}; *RICIS* 504/0501 {500}. See Le Bohec 2000: 136.

<sup>46</sup> See ἱεροναῦτοι in *RICIS* 618/1007 {709}; cf. Bricault 2007: 253; Apul. *Met.* XI 16; see Griffiths 1975: 259 f.; Witt 1997: 177; Solmsen 1979: 91.

<sup>47</sup> Le Bohec 2000: 137.

<sup>48</sup> *RICIS* 101/0101 {1} et 101/0201 {2}; cf. Dow 1937: 188–197; Malaise 1972: 266; Parker 1997: 160.

<sup>49</sup> Amelino 2001; Meister 1996.

<sup>50</sup> Meister 1998; Malaise 1972: 261; Sfameni Gasparro 2000: 38.

In a paper devoted to the presence of *Aegyptiaca* in the province of Dalmatia, A. Bugarski-Mesdjian stated that the evidence of a cult did not simply correspond to the province's trade centres and trade routes, so the distribution of archaeological and historical material was not simply an effect of a *logique commerciale*<sup>51</sup>. Following on Bugarski-Mesdjian's suggestion one can only partially accept M. Malaise's standpoint.

### SOLDIERS

The second social group which is thought by many to have contributed to the propagation of the cult of Isis and Sarapis were soldiers. It is often maintained that the Isiac religion played an extraordinary role in their life<sup>52</sup>. However, during the 2<sup>nd</sup> International Conference on Isiac studies in Leiden in 2002 A. Perissin-Fabert commenced her paper on soldiers with a sharp criticism of this point of view:

Les études portant sur les divinités orientales réservent une place paradoxale aux membres de l'armée. D'une part, on considère que les soldats n'ont pas une culture suffisamment développée pour comprendre la richesse des théologies et qu'ils simplifient les doctrines, créant ainsi une version plus rudimentaire des cultes, centrée sur les idées de lutte contre le mal et de puissance invincible de dieux dont ils attendent la victoire et le salut personnel. D'autre part, il est fréquent de considérer les dieux orientaux comme des dieux de militaires et les soldats comme leur clientèle privilégiée...<sup>53</sup>

The main argument used to explain soldiers' alleged great influence on the cult proliferation is based on a fact that they were frequently transported from place to place<sup>54</sup>, yet Y. Le Bohec has proven that it was not true<sup>55</sup>. Indeed, the auxiliary forces were dislocated, but when an army unit finally got to the place of service it enlisted new soldiers from the local people. This kind of recruitment is already attested in the times of Augustus, it became provincial with the beginning of the 2<sup>nd</sup> century AD, and from the 3<sup>rd</sup> century AD it was completely local<sup>56</sup>.

At the outset, let us focus on F. Cumont's thesis. I have already mentioned his opinion that soldiers garrisoned in the Nile Valley were the most ardent propagators of the cult. There were four legions that most certainly stationed in Egypt from the times of Julius Caesar up to about 125 AD. This latter date indicates the last attestation of the stationing of Roman legions in Egypt. These were: *legio*

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<sup>51</sup> Bugarski-Mesdjian 2007: 291.

<sup>52</sup> Haynes 1993: 143.

<sup>53</sup> Perissin-Fabert 2004: 449.

<sup>54</sup> See Haynes 1993: 144, 146; cf. Hoey 1939: 474.

<sup>55</sup> Le Bohec 2000: 129; cf. Bugarski-Mesdjian 2007: 305.

<sup>56</sup> Le Bohec 1989: 495; 2000, 144.



*II Traiana Fortis*<sup>57</sup>, *legio III Cyrenaica*<sup>58</sup>, *legio XII Fulminata*<sup>59</sup>, and *legio XXII Deiotariana*<sup>60</sup>. Surprisingly, *Legio II Traiana* is the only one of them which can be epigraphically connected to the cult of Isis, and this connection is attested in only one inscription<sup>61</sup>. Moreover, there are eight other legions attested in the discussed *tituli*, of which we have no information as to whether they stationed in Egypt or not. These are: *legio I Minervia*<sup>62</sup>, *legio III Augusta*<sup>63</sup>, *legio III Gallica*<sup>64</sup>, *legio V Macedonica*<sup>65</sup>, *legio VI Victrix*<sup>66</sup>, *legio X Gemina*<sup>67</sup>, *legio XIII Gemina*<sup>68</sup>, *legio XIV Gemina*<sup>69</sup>.

Our view has been distorted not only by scholars' opinions on the character of evidence but by other factors as well. It is obvious that the geography of the cult in the Roman army is a geography of legionary camps that have been surveyed or excavated. The sites that have been researched provide us with a good number of dedicatory inscriptions, but it is impossible to imply from this the notion of a great piety of soldiers<sup>70</sup> and to suppose that they took their favourite gods to other regions of the Roman world<sup>71</sup>.

Scholars agree, on the basis of the proportion of dedications to the Egyptian gods to dedications to the other gods, that Isis and Sarapis were not very popular among soldiers<sup>72</sup>. But no other aspect of the cult of Isis and Sarapis has been as much discussed as the role of soldiers in the proliferation of the Egyptian religion. The adherents of the thesis of their great role often argue that there is not much evidence on the imperial cult in the army as well, but this does not mean that soldiers were averse to that cult<sup>73</sup>.

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<sup>57</sup> Kubitschek 1924–1925: 1485.

<sup>58</sup> Kubitschek 1924–1925: 1506.

<sup>59</sup> Kubitschek 1924–1925: 1706.

<sup>60</sup> Kubitschek 1924–1925: 1793.

<sup>61</sup> Puteoli in Campania: *RICIS* 504/0404 {498}.

<sup>62</sup> Forum Hadriani (Voorburg) in Germania Inferior: *RICIS* 610/0401 {724}.

<sup>63</sup> Thamugadi (Timgad) in Numidia: *RICIS* 704/0201 {784}; Lambaesis in Numidia: *RICIS* 704/0301 {786}.

<sup>64</sup> Ostia in Latium vetus: *RICIS* 503/1116 {536a}.

<sup>65</sup> Neapolis in Campania: *RICIS* 504/0301 {496}; Potaissa in Dacia: *RICIS* 616/0101 {697}.

<sup>66</sup> Eburacum (York) in Britannia: *RICIS* 604/0101 {750}.

<sup>67</sup> Vindobona (Vienna) in Pannonia Superior: *RICIS* 613/0801 {667}.

<sup>68</sup> Apulum in Dacia: *RICIS* 616/0403 {691}; 616/0405 {693}.

<sup>69</sup> Carnuntum in Pannonia Superior: *RICIS* 613/0703 (= *AE* 2000, 1209).

<sup>70</sup> Le Bohec 2000: 130.

<sup>71</sup> Perissin-Fabert 2004: 450.

<sup>72</sup> Hoey 1939: 456; Malaise 1972: 93; Perissin-Fabert 2004: 450.

<sup>73</sup> Le Bohec 2000: 142.

A. García y Bellido underlines the primary role of soldiers in the cult propagation in Roman Spain<sup>74</sup>, but M. Malaise comes to an opposite opinion<sup>75</sup>. Research on Numidia suggests that the cult there was introduced by the *legio III Augusta*<sup>76</sup> (two legionary inscriptions out of total of ten found in the province), but J.-P. Laporte warns against drawing premature conclusions when such a small number of *tituli* has been found at all<sup>77</sup>. For Gallia it has been already stated that the cities and colonies of veteran troops played the role of regional cult centres<sup>78</sup>. It has been also concluded that the Roman legionary camps were very important for the cult propagation in Britain and Germania Inferior<sup>79</sup>. On the other hand, M. Malaise argues that the case of Germania Superior was precisely opposite to what has been previously presented, because nearly all places where inscriptions relating to Isis and Sarapis have been found (except for Kastell Zugmantel) were civil settlements<sup>80</sup>. This conclusion needs to be revised since four cult inscriptions have been found, three of them from Mogontiacum (Mainz) where a large military storehouse has been excavated, and one found in Le Rondet beside a Roman bridge built for military purposes<sup>81</sup>.

Y. Le Bohec, basing on R.A. Wild's work from 1984, states that for 37 sanctuaries of Isis and Sarapis from the Roman period a constant presence of Roman military forces was proven for merely six places: three legionary camps (Lambaesis<sup>82</sup>, Poetovio<sup>83</sup>, and Eburacum<sup>84</sup>), one city owning a garrison (Rome) and two other military centres (Savaria<sup>85</sup>, Mons Claudianus)<sup>86</sup>.

The article of S. Cibu and B. Rémy seems crucial in this case. They put emphasis on the role of the Romanisation process in the cult proliferation. Though many roads to distant regions of the Roman Empire went through the Alpine provinces, which caused these provinces to be visited often by Roman troops, scholars maintain that the army did not play any role in the cult propagation there. S. Cibu and B. Rémy explain this fact by the absence of larger, cosmopoli-

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<sup>74</sup> García y Bellido 1967: 125.

<sup>75</sup> Malaise 1984: 1651.

<sup>76</sup> See n. 61 above; cf. Laporte 2004: 254, 292.

<sup>77</sup> Laporte 2004: 303 f.

<sup>78</sup> Leclant 2004: 96–98.

<sup>79</sup> Le Bohec 2000: 131.

<sup>80</sup> Malaise 1984: 1665.

<sup>81</sup> *RICIS* 609/0501–03; 609/0201.

<sup>82</sup> Lambaesis (Tazoult) in Numidia, *RICIS* 704/0301–04 {785–788}.

<sup>83</sup> Poetovio (Ptuj) in Pannonia Superior, *RICIS* 613/0301–07 {654–660}.

<sup>84</sup> Eburacum (York) in Britain, *RICIS* 604/0101 {750}.

<sup>85</sup> Savaria (Szombathély) in Pannonia Superior, *RICIS* 613/0501–03 {661–663}.

<sup>86</sup> Le Bohec 2000: 132.

tan cities in the area serving as epicentres from which the cult might have spread outwards<sup>87</sup>. This problem will be discussed further on.

Y. Le Bohec analysed all known inscriptions that soldiers during the imperial period had dedicated to the Egyptian gods. He found 31 *tituli* which consisted of the name of the Egyptian deity and the name of a soldier or that of an army unit. From this group he excluded two inscriptions, from Tibur (Tivoli) in Latium Vetus and from Florence in Etruria, because it is not certain that a legionary mentioned in the first one was a worshipper, and a worshipper mentioned in the second one was a soldier<sup>88</sup>. At the beginning we must also exclude already mentioned navy soldiers from Misenum, who were not dedicators of inscriptions to Isis or Sarapis, but only served on the warship “Isis”<sup>89</sup>. Le Bohec also separated centurions from ordinary soldiers and officers from centurions. Moreover, he separated individual dedicatory inscriptions from group dedications. After this preliminary work he found among ordinary soldiers: one *frumentarius*<sup>90</sup> (the provider of food for the legion), two *beneficarii consulares*<sup>91</sup> who worked in military administration of the province and cared about the field works (e.g. building of roads, transport and founding of votive offerings<sup>92</sup>), one *veteranus*<sup>93</sup> and one soldier of an unknown rank<sup>94</sup>. In addition, four inscriptions have been found in which a whole military unit was presented as a founder. Le Bohec states that they should not be necessarily taken as proving the piety of the whole group of soldiers; rather, in the case of these inscriptions, there were individuals directly responsible for choosing Isis and/or Sarapis as the addressee(s) of votive offerings<sup>95</sup>. So we should consider at least four men from the units: the *ala I Hispanorum* from Campago<sup>96</sup>, some group of *equites*<sup>97</sup>, *vexillatio*<sup>98</sup> of the *legio III Cyrenaica*<sup>99</sup>, and the whole *legio VI Ferrata fidelis constans*<sup>100</sup>.

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<sup>87</sup> Cibu, Rémy 2004: 155.

<sup>88</sup> *RICIS* 503/0701 {529}; 511/0208 {573}; cf. Le Bohec 2000: 133.

<sup>89</sup> *RICIS* 501/0218; 504/0501–03.

<sup>90</sup> *RICIS* 503/1116 {536a}; see *OLD* s.v.

<sup>91</sup> *RICIS* 610/0101 {715}; 610/0301 {717}; see *OLD* s.v. *beneficiarius* 2; cf. Malaise 1984: 1665.

<sup>92</sup> Takács 1995: 134.

<sup>93</sup> *RICIS* 511/01–02 {563–564}.

<sup>94</sup> Possibly a centurion: *RICIS* 616/0101 {697}.

<sup>95</sup> Le Bohec 2000: 134 f.

<sup>96</sup> *RICIS* \*616/0303 {688}.

<sup>97</sup> *SIRIS* 680 (not in *RICIS*).

<sup>98</sup> See *OLD* s.v.; cf. Schumacher 2005: 106.

<sup>99</sup> *RICIS* 403/0801 {362}.

<sup>100</sup> *RICIS* 403/0201 {361}.

Le Bohec also advises to divide the centurions into those who served their whole life in the army to eventually become centurions, and those who treated this rank only as a step to higher grades in the equestrian career<sup>101</sup>. Working on the epigraphical material, I have soon discovered that we have to deal with people whose social affiliation can only be identified by the *tria nomina Latina*. In that case, we must put all nine known centurions in one category: a centurion of the 16<sup>th</sup> legion *Flavia*<sup>102</sup>, a *princeps castrorum peregrinorum*<sup>103</sup>, a *primipilaris* of the 2<sup>nd</sup> legion *Traiana*<sup>104</sup> and another centurion of the same legion<sup>105</sup>, a centurion of the 5<sup>th</sup> cohort of praetorians<sup>106</sup>, a *primus pilus* of the 13<sup>th</sup> legion *Gemina*<sup>107</sup>, a centurion of the 1<sup>st</sup> legion *Minervia*<sup>108</sup>, and two centurions of an unknown legion<sup>109</sup>.

J. Kolendo argues that if a dedication was founded by a *primus pilus*, he often did so in the name of a whole legion, even if other soldiers did not appear in the text of an inscription<sup>110</sup>. The scholar also argues that *primi pili* “had inclinations to search for unpopular deities or to give deities rare epithets”, because every one of these soldiers “wanted to be original in his choice of god to whom he founded a monument”<sup>111</sup>. The question should be asked whether this hypothesis can also be applied to other centurions, not only centurions of the first legionary cohort. Furthermore, was the supposed “exoticism” of Isis and Sarapis the only criterion for the soldiers’ choice, or more serious reasons were decisive? One of the centurions gave Isis the epithet *Isis Regina*<sup>112</sup> which is attested in other (non-military) inscriptions 33 times. Sarapis was named *Dominus Sarapis* by another centurion<sup>113</sup> which is really a unique epithet across the Roman state<sup>114</sup>, because it was much more common for Isis to be given the epithet *Domina*, attested in 12 or 13 *tituli*<sup>115</sup>. In

<sup>101</sup> Le Bohec 2000: 137.

<sup>102</sup> *RICIS* 402/0901 {360}.

<sup>103</sup> *RICIS* 501/0101 {370}.

<sup>104</sup> *RICIS* 504/0404 {498}.

<sup>105</sup> *AE* 1974, 664.

<sup>106</sup> *RICIS* 515/1101 {635}.

<sup>107</sup> *RICIS* 616/0405 {693}.

<sup>108</sup> *RICIS* 610/0401 {724}.

<sup>109</sup> *AE* 1989, 758.

<sup>110</sup> Kolendo 1993: 67.

<sup>111</sup> Kolendo 1993: 68.

<sup>112</sup> *RICIS* 501/0101 {370}.

<sup>113</sup> *RICIS* 504/0404 {498}.

<sup>114</sup> See *Dominus Osiris*: *RICIS* 511/0101 {563}.

<sup>115</sup> *RICIS* 501/0133 {397}; 502/0701 {510}; 511/0102 {564}; 512/0502 {588}; 515/0110 {608}; 601/0101 {752}; 601/0301 {754}; 602/0102 (= *AE* 1984, 531); 602/0103 (= *AE* 1984, 530); 602/0201 (= *AE* 1983, 521); 602/0202; 602/0301; 706 /0301 (?) (= *AE* 1998, 1599).

another inscription, from Forum Hadriani in Germania Inferior, the epithet *Isis Frugifera*<sup>116</sup> appears which is attested in only two more inscriptions, one from Rome and the other from Sarmizegetusa (modern Grădiştea Muncelului) in Dacia<sup>117</sup>. In six other inscriptions set up by centurions Isis and Sarapis appear without any epithets. For these reasons Kolendo's thesis, confirmed in two cases out of total of nine, cannot be substantiated.

A. Perissin-Fabert points out that some military units had their "favourite" gods, and she gives an example of the *legio I Adiutrix* and *II Adiutrix* whose soldiers founded dedications most often in honour of *Iuppiter Dolichenus*<sup>118</sup>. Are we able to find such a unit in which the Egyptian gods had a privileged position? Some traces seem to indicate that these gods were very popular in the *legio III Augusta* which was garrisoned in Numidia. From an inscription we learn that this legion founded a porch (*pronaos*) to the temple of Isis and Sarapis in Lambaesis in 158 AD, to which a colonnade was added by Lucius Matuccius Fuscinus, a *legatus Augusti pro praetore* of the province<sup>119</sup>. It is possible that building of the porch was a political gesture to gain the governor's favour, but this would not explain a dedicatory inscription set up by an unknown military tribune from the same legion in honour of *Iuppiter Sarapis Augustus*<sup>120</sup>. The second case is much more controversial. In an inscription from Naples, dated to the 1<sup>st</sup> century AD, there appears a senator Marcus Opsius Navius Fannianus who was a military tribune in the *legio V Macedonica*<sup>121</sup>. On the other hand, in a *titulus* from Potaissa (modern Turda) in Dacia, erected after 180 AD, Gaius Julius Antigonus, a centurion of the same legion, is mentioned<sup>122</sup>. A gap of time and place between these two inscriptions is huge, but it is tempting to ask whether it is probable that Isis and Sarapis were constantly revered in this military unit. Perissin-Fabert argues that the *legio V Macedonica* "liked oriental gods", because out of a total of nine inscriptions from the whole Roman Empire honouring the Arabian deity *Aziz Bonus Puer*, no less than three came from this legion<sup>123</sup>.

With proportions of known four or five ordinary soldiers and nine to ten confirmed centurions from the principate period, the number of four officers of equestrian<sup>124</sup>

<sup>116</sup> *RICIS* 610/0401 {724}; cf. Budischovsky 2007: 281; Takács 1995: 137.

<sup>117</sup> Rome: *RICIS* 501/0111 {379}; Sarmizegetusa: *AE* 1998, 1088.

<sup>118</sup> Perissin-Fabert 2004: 465; cf. Haynes 1993: 145 f.

<sup>119</sup> *RICIS* 704/0301 {785}; see Le Bohec 2000: 139 f.

<sup>120</sup> *RICIS* 704/0101 {783}; cf. Perissin-Fabert 2004: 459.

<sup>121</sup> *RICIS* 504/0301 {496}.

<sup>122</sup> *RICIS* 616/0101 {697}.

<sup>123</sup> Perissin-Fabert 2004: 459.

<sup>124</sup> A decorated member of the Roman cavalry: *RICIS* 204/1005 {249}; a *praefectus cohortis*: *RICIS* 309/0401 {332} and two tribunes of the cohort: *RICIS* 614/0401 {674}; 615/0801 {679a}; see Le Bohec 2000: 138.

and seven officers of senatorial rank<sup>125</sup> seems to be over-representative. It should be added that one legion had one legate and one tribune of senatorial rank, one *praefectus castrorum* and five tribunes of equestrian rank as against one *primus pilus* and 59 other centurions<sup>126</sup>. The amount of evidence reflects well the social hierarchy<sup>127</sup>, pointing to people who had more money to spend on votive offerings as well as to those who were expected to found votive offerings. As J.P. Haynes observes, “only the wealthier, more senior, and therefore more Romanised soldiers within a regiment could afford to make religious dedications”<sup>128</sup>. Finally, if we accept the presence of Isis and Sarapis in the army, there remains a question, posed by Le Bohec, as to whether the Egyptian cults were propagated from top to bottom of the military hierarchy or *vice versa*. He assumes that a sign of piety from a high rank officer might have influenced a lower rank officer, and through him the cult might have even reached ordinary soldiers. But we may come to an opposite opinion as well, that those caring about the acts of piety, according to their “religious sentiment”, were only at the top of the hierarchy<sup>129</sup>.

#### ROMANISATION

It is commonly thought that the trade was the most important factor in the Romanisation. M.-Ch. Budischovsky has shown on the example of Dacia a correlation between the intensity of Romanisation and the role played by the oriental gods in this process<sup>130</sup>. A. Perissin-Fabert also argues that the cult diffusion in a given region was often possible only when the region in question became conquered<sup>131</sup>. Yet this was not an indispensable condition, as M. Bénabou has shown that the Roman cultural influences spread in Africa despite military resistance to the Roman presence by the local tribes<sup>132</sup>. At the same time, however, he notices that Romanisation often took place when the Roman settlers founded colonies after the military conquest<sup>133</sup>. The settlement of veteran colonies was “the most obvious Romanizing force” in the opinion of Ch. Ebel<sup>134</sup>. The case of Carthage,

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<sup>125</sup> Four tribunes of the legion: *RICIS* 504/0301 {496}; 613/0801 {667}; 616/0403 {691}; 704/0101 {783}; and three legates of the legion: *RICIS* 604/0101 {750}; 704/0301 {785}; 613/0703 (= *AE* 2000, 1209 = *AE* 1992, 1412).

<sup>126</sup> Liebenam 1909: 1606.

<sup>127</sup> Le Bohec 2000: 138.

<sup>128</sup> Haynes 1993: 145.

<sup>129</sup> Haynes 1993: 138 f.

<sup>130</sup> Budischovsky 2007: 267; cf. Laporte 2004: 254.

<sup>131</sup> Perissin-Fabert 2004: 452.

<sup>132</sup> Bénabou 1976: 256.

<sup>133</sup> Bénabou 1976: 33 f.

<sup>134</sup> Ebel 1988: 576.

where a temple of Isis was built in the 3<sup>rd</sup> century BC, if not earlier, is significant here<sup>135</sup>. But the Egyptian cults in the Carthaginian state did not gain popularity, not to mention their incorporation into the official pantheon. After the city had been destroyed by the Romans in 146 BC, the Egyptian cults disappeared from Carthage. And it was due to new Roman settlers' religious interests that a new temple of Isis in Carthage was founded. From that time the religion of Isis flourished in Africa without any obstacles until the victory of Christianity<sup>136</sup>.

It is very tempting to suppose that the merchants and soldiers could not institute Isis and Sarapis in new places automatically, but they must have felt a demand in local communities for the *Aegyptiaca* and other Egyptian cultural products. Furthermore, the army secured the cities from outer attacks and inner unrests, it protected the trade but also the cultural movements – in a word, the army guarded the safety of Romanisation. However, this simple model does not always work. The case of Romanisation and its connection to the diffusion of Isis and Sarapis is more complex.

Apart from Carthage, an indecisive case, we can only find one valid example of the local community members' engagement in the introduction of the religion of Isis and Sarapis into the city, namely Athens. We know only few Athenian aristocrats who may be considered as the propagators of the Egyptian cults. Beginning with Lycurgus son of Lycomedes, ridiculed by Aristophanes for his fascination with the Egyptian religion<sup>137</sup>, there were Timotheus of the priestly family of the Eumolpidae<sup>138</sup>, Demetrius of Phalerum<sup>139</sup> and even the comic playwright Menander<sup>140</sup> who treated Egyptian gods with great respect. However, Menander's reference to them in one of his plays may be ironic, and Timotheus was well-paid by Ptolemy I to propagate the cult, so the only people indisputably interested in the Egyptian religion were Lycurgus and Demetrius. On the other hand, all of them were members of the Athenian elite, so it is impossible to determine their influence on the cult reception among the common people. The case of Athens, therefore, remains unclear.

In all this discussion one point is constantly omitted. M. Bénabou indicates that the point of view may vary depending on how we define the very term "Romanisation". It may be understood as a "transfer of people"<sup>141</sup>, namely Roman citizens to the outskirts of the known world; in this perspective only the

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<sup>135</sup> See *RICIS* 703/0101.

<sup>136</sup> Bricault, Le Bohec, Podvin 2004: 222–224; see Wild 1984: 1763.

<sup>137</sup> Ar. *Aves* 1296; Pherecr. fr. 11 (Kock I 148); cf. Dow 1937: 185.

<sup>138</sup> Plut. *Mor.* 362 A; Tac. *Hist.* IV 83; cf. Dow 1937: 186.

<sup>139</sup> *IG* XIV 1034.

<sup>140</sup> *P. Oxy.* XV 1803.

<sup>141</sup> Bénabou 1976: 28.

geographical distribution of inscriptions to Isis and Sarapis should be enough to demonstrate the presence of the Egyptian gods in Romanisation. However, if we define the term as a “transfer of civilisation”<sup>142</sup>, a “political, cultural, and psychological change”<sup>143</sup>, the problem becomes more complex. If we take this meaning, the presence of Isis in Romanisation could be confirmed only in two instances: (a) the syncretism of a local deity with an Egyptian god, (b) the full reception of the Egyptian cult in its pure Roman form.

Bénabou suggests that the greatest success of Romanisation was for a Roman deity to be syncretised with a local god<sup>144</sup>. Let us consider this thesis. Sarapis was several times identified with a god called *Theos Megas*<sup>145</sup> or *Deus Magnus*<sup>146</sup>. The name of this deity should be distinguished from the adjective “great” which was often given to Zeus Helios Sarapis. S.A. Takács thinks that we should see in this epithet the greatest local deity who was so commonly recognized that he did not even need to be named by his proper name. She notes that in Dionysopolis (modern Balčik) it was Dionysus, the city’s patron deity, who was hidden under such title. Takács views this hypothesis as very probable since both gods were connected to vegetation, mysteries and the image of a bull<sup>147</sup>. Yet, as we look closely, only two of five inscriptions mentioned came from outside of Italy. One would think that Romanisation had been well established in Italy long before Isis and Sarapis came there, so the *tituli* with *Theos Megas* seem to have no closer relation to Romanisation.

In four inscriptions from Noricum Isis was identified with the goddess Noreia<sup>148</sup> who was the holy protectress of the Celtic tribe of the Norici<sup>149</sup>. Both goddesses were connected to the underworld, a fact which might have furthered the syncretism. There is also one inscription from Rome attesting the syncretised goddess *Isis Lydia Educatrix*<sup>150</sup>. I can only suppose that the freedman Mucianus who founded the *titulus* joined together a goddess of his country of origin with Isis. His reasons for such syncretism remain unclear but it is tempting to think that his act had something in common with Romanisation, that it was a sign of his new Roman identity.

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<sup>142</sup> Bénabou 1976: 30; Cherry 1997: 71.

<sup>143</sup> Ebel 1988: 575 f.

<sup>144</sup> Bénabou 1976: 261–264.

<sup>145</sup> *RICIS* 501/0141 {417} (Rome); 503/1117 {537} (Ostia); 618/0801 {703} (Dionysopolis, Moesia Inferior).

<sup>146</sup> *RICIS* 504/0405 {499} (Puteoli); see *Deus Maximus* – *RICIS* 703/0105 {773} (Carthage).

<sup>147</sup> Takács 1995: 186.

<sup>148</sup> *RICIS* 612/0101; 612/0201 {647}; 612/0301 {648}; 612/0501 {650}; cf. Cibu, Rémy 2004, 151.

<sup>149</sup> Takács 1995: 151.

<sup>150</sup> *RICIS* 501/0102 {371}.



As J. Elsner has shown, the gods did not have to be fully syncretised. On the contrary, it was much more common to add some aspects of the other deities to our favourites, and to create various local forms of the cult in this way<sup>151</sup>.

Contrary to this, we should not underestimate the size and role of the pure reception of the cult in its Roman form. The preservation of the original characteristics of a given religion and not mixing it with the others could be a proof for “Roman religious pluralism” and does not attest the absence of Romanisation processes<sup>152</sup>. As the majority of inscriptions indicate, the cult of Isis and Sarapis proliferated in the Roman area in more or less the same form. The epigraphical evidence makes clear that the Egyptian gods were given the same epithets in multiple locations and were worshipped with the same devotional formulas, attested in only few variants. However, the invariable form of the cult may be adduced in favour of the hypothesis that the group most interested in the Egyptian religion were Roman colonists.

This is the point where we touch the essence of the problem. Elsner writes that every Roman cultural product raised resistance, whether conscious or not, among the conquered people who were tied to their traditions<sup>153</sup>. This opinion suggests that we should not see Isis, Romanisation and the cultural reception as a trilinear, but as a bilinear structure, in which the Egyptian deities were treated by the conquered people as a coherent part of the Roman cultural system, and as such they provoked the same resistance as the remaining Roman cultural products. In this perspective, viewing Isis and Sarapis in the provinces of the Roman empire as separate from the Roman civilisation is just a methodological mistake.

As we have seen, the active participation of merchants and soldiers in the cult proliferation is not sufficiently borne out by the evidence. The cults might have been propagated by the two groups discussed, but they also might have diffused independently from trade fluctuation or Roman military activity. Nevertheless, the Egyptian cults, once adopted, remained a regular part of the Roman civilisation. This supposition goes against many scholars who would like to see Isis, just like Lucius does in the *Golden Ass*, as an exceptional deity in the ancient world.

#### SLAVES AND FREEDMEN

L. Hayne, who was interested in the proliferation of the Egyptian cults in the times of the Republic, has demonstrated that Isis was very popular among the slaves and ex-slaves who then constituted the majority of Rome’s population.

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<sup>151</sup> Elsner 2001: 278.

<sup>152</sup> Elsner 2001: 299.

<sup>153</sup> Elsner 2001: 271; cf. Bénabou 1976: 258.

This fact made the *populares* with Publius Clodius Pulcher (92–52 BC) play the role of worshippers' defenders, just to gain support of the masses in the time of political scandal and riots occasioned by consular and praetorian elections in 52 BC<sup>154</sup>.

G. Sfameni Gasparro has recently argued that scholars' task is to show oriental origin of Isis in one big ethnic, sociocultural and religious amalgam<sup>155</sup>. The task is not simple and raises many questions. M. Malaise writes that, even if the merchants (Roman or other) played a primary role during the first phase of the cult proliferation, in the second phase, the "imperial" phase beginning with the establishment of the principate, the most important were people arriving to Italy, either voluntarily or not, from Egypt<sup>156</sup>.

We should then consider the role of the slaves in the cult, looking closely at dedicatory inscriptions as well as at graves and other types of monuments. L. Schumacher states that if slaves were rather difficult to identify in Greek epigraphy<sup>157</sup>, they were much more common in Latin inscriptions. He writes that votive offerings made by slaves were numerous, especially to the gods of the official pantheon<sup>158</sup>. He also considers the case of the mystery cults, but takes a closer look only at the cults of Mithra, Cybele and Bona Dea<sup>159</sup>. He says nothing about Isis and about the slaves as her worshippers. Did they play an important role in her religion, and were they important propagators of her cult?

In the case of Isis and Sarapis in the territories discussed in this paper, we deal with six *servi Augusti* mentioned in four inscriptions<sup>160</sup>, one public slave belonging to *Aequiculi*<sup>161</sup>, nine inscriptions of private slaves<sup>162</sup> and one dedicated by an association (*sodalitium*) of slaves, though we do not know to whom they belonged<sup>163</sup>. It gives us at least 20 slaves (the association of slaves must have assigned at least one of them to found the *titulus*) in 15 inscriptions out of a total of 645.

M. Malaise cites arguments most frequently adduced by the opponents of the thesis of the great role of slaves in the cult propagation. They say that much less slave dedications, both from the republican and from the imperial periods,

<sup>154</sup> Hayne 1992: 143, 145.

<sup>155</sup> Sfameni Gasparro 2007: 46.

<sup>156</sup> Malaise 1972: 259.

<sup>157</sup> Schumacher 2005: 241.

<sup>158</sup> Schumacher 2005: 245.

<sup>159</sup> Schumacher 2005: 246–249.

<sup>160</sup> *RICIS* 501/0116 {382}; 501/0195; 616/0501 {695}; 703/0501 {782}.

<sup>161</sup> *RICIS* 508/0601 {477}.

<sup>162</sup> *RICIS* 501/0134 {398} (4 people); 502/0301 {506}; 515/1401 {638}; 515/1402 {639}; 603/0302 {763}; 610/0113 (= *AE* 1999, 1097); 613/0301 {654}; 613/0303 {656}; 613/0304 {657}.

<sup>163</sup> *RICIS* 603/0302 {762}.

made to the Egyptian gods have been found as compared to the number of slave inscriptions set up in honour of other gods of the Roman pantheon. Malaise points out that the opponents of the thesis in question consider a large number of freedmen's dedications as slave dedications and include them into that supposed 'great number' of inscriptions in honour of other gods<sup>164</sup>.

The problem with interpretation begins with the question of whether we should consider people appearing in inscriptions with one name only as slaves<sup>165</sup>. With all the evidence from Italy and the European and African provinces of the Empire we find 38 such people. Moreover, 10 people are attested who named themselves according to the Greek custom, by their surname and another name in the genitive<sup>166</sup>. L. Schumacher argues that this may be treated as a *patronimikon*, giving the name of one's father – in that case the *patronimikon* would identify a free person, since a slave did not have parents. Schumacher indicates that it may also mean that the person in question was a freedman or a slave of someone whose name appears in the genitive<sup>167</sup>.

In 24 cases among 38 mentioned we deal with a name of Graeco-Oriental origin<sup>168</sup>, nine single names indicate Latin origin<sup>169</sup> and one is most certainly German<sup>170</sup>. Also, there are four single *nomina loquentia* which suggest servile status of the people concerned: Onesimus, Servius, Privata, and Cinnamus<sup>171</sup>. According to I. Kajanto, the first three of them were even "proper" slave names<sup>172</sup>. Onesimus is even described in the inscription as *actor*, which supports the theory of his servile origin. If those four last people can be considered slaves, the rest remains uncertain.

When we add these four men to the group of 20 affirmed slaves, we have a group of 24 slaves in 19 inscriptions. That is really a representative minority

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<sup>164</sup> Malaise 1972: 89.

<sup>165</sup> Malaise 1972: 35; Schumacher 2005: 241.

<sup>166</sup> *RICIS* 115/0101 {712}; 501/0164 {462}; 515/0125 (= *IG XIV* 2338); 603/0701 {767}; 608/0101 {749}; 618/1002 {705}; 618/1003 {706}; 618/1005 {708}; 701/0101 (= *SEG IX* [1944/46] 125); *SIRIS* 768 (not in *RICIS*).

<sup>167</sup> Schumacher 2005: 242.

<sup>168</sup> *RICIS* 204/0401 {810}; 501/0105; 501/0122 {387}; 501/0126 {389}; 501/0127 {390}; 501/0130 {393}; 501/0197 (= *AE* 1992, 92.91); 501/0199 {461}; 503/1132; 508/0701 {478}; 504/0217 {493}; 504/0218 {494}; 503/1128 {548}; 518/0602 (= *IG XIV* 6); 602/0203; 613/0305 {658}; 605/1001 {742}; 607/0101 {744}; 607/0201 {746}; 703/0110 {777}; 701/0104 {804}; 701/0110 {808}; 701/0301 (= *SEG XXVIII* [1978] 1555).

<sup>169</sup> *RICIS* 503/1204 {403}; 501/0151 {411}; 501/0153 {414}; 503/0401 {525}; 609/0201; 613/0101 {651}; 613/0302 {655}; 613/0701 {665}; 703/0302 {781}.

<sup>170</sup> Iulia daughter of Afeugus from Colonia Agrippina in Germania Inferior: *RICIS* 610/0108 (= *AE* 1990, 730).

<sup>171</sup> *RICIS* 503/1219 {419}; 503/1124 {544}; 602/0205; 605/0102 {729}.

<sup>172</sup> Kajanto 1965: 134.

among the 645 inscriptions on Isis and Sarapis in the Roman Empire<sup>173</sup>, taking into consideration that slaves mainly performed dedications to the gods from the official pantheon<sup>174</sup>. We cannot forget that slaves often did not have the funds to buy a monument and erect an inscription. The financial situation of those who dedicated to Isis and Sarapis was rather good, evidenced by the fact that four out of 19 inscriptions were made in marble, and one of them was even metrical. Also, four inscriptions were set up *pro salute*, and three of them for the “health” of higher instances, the owner or the Roman state. This discussion suggests that we should expect greater share of the poorer slaves in donations of other types, such as terracotta figures etc. However, we should remember that they were not the only group that made such offerings. The problem is that we are not able to estimate the extent of those other types of evidence and, consequently, the presumable scale of slaves’ engagement in the cult.

The problem of slaves is strongly connected to that of freedmen, because in the epigraphical material there were most certainly some ex-slaves among the people named by *tria nomina Latina*. Malaise argues that a *cognomen* of Greek appearance should stir up scholars’ doubts, because such a person was most probably a freedman or a child of a freedman<sup>175</sup>. Malaise takes his clue from L. Ross Taylor who thinks that those who setting up an inscription did not state therein their social affiliation should be recognized as *liberti*<sup>176</sup>.

In the group of 645 inscriptions discussed, 53 *tituli*, in which 66 freedmen are attested, were dedicated by freedmen or were put on freedmen’s graves. We have no doubt about it because their social affiliation is mentioned in the text of these *tituli*. This is a strikingly big group. The great majority of them were private freedmen, 57 people in 44 inscriptions<sup>177</sup>, as against only eight *liberti Augusti*<sup>178</sup> and one public freedman<sup>179</sup>. There is also the case of L. Rubrius Verna

<sup>173</sup> García y Bellido 1967: 125; Malaise 1984: 1670, 1671; Takács 1995: 168.

<sup>174</sup> Cf. Schumacher 2005: 245 f.

<sup>175</sup> Malaise 1972: 36.

<sup>176</sup> Cited after Malaise 1972: 36.

<sup>177</sup> *RICIS* 501/0109 {377} (6 people); 501/0137 {401}; 501/0138 {402}; 501/0146 {407}; 501/0147 (= *AE* 1978, 46); 501/0160 {437}; 501/0163 {444}; 501/0165 {436}; 501/0166 {442}; 501/0167 {449}; 501/0168 (= *AE* 1994, 115) (5 people); 501/0170; 501/0183 {426} (2 people); 501/0184 {427} (2 people); 501/0189 {441}; 503/1112 {533i}; 505/0301 {467}; 506/0101 {481}; 508/0401 {474}; 509/0101 {479}; 511/0205 {570} (2 people); 511/0212 (= *AE* 1991, 659 a–d); 511/0301 {577}; 511/0701 (= *AE* 1985, 394); 512/0502 {588} (2 people); 512/0701 {594}; \*513/0201; 515/0116 {614}; 515/0602; 515/1201 {636}; 516/0301 {642}; 519/0201 {520}; 601/0101 {752}; 603/0202 (= *AE* 1982, 636); 603/0601 {766}; 605/0106 {730}; 605/0107 {734}; 605/0201 {735}; 613/0601 {664}; \*616/0202 {682}; \*616/0203 {683}; 703/0201 {779}; 706/0101 {793}; 706/0201 {794}.

<sup>178</sup> *RICIS* 501/0102 {371}; 501/0119; 501/0125 {388}; 501/0131 (= *AE* 1977, 28); 501/0132 {396}; 501/0162 {423}; 501/0169 {422}; 702/0101 {797}.

<sup>179</sup> A freedman of Municipium Tarvisium: *RICIS* 515/0301 {619}.

from Aquileia who did not inform of his social status in the text, but his *cognomen* clearly suggests that he was born as a slave<sup>180</sup>.

T. Frank asks whether it was some sort of trend among the freeborn Romans to name their children with Greek *cognomina*. From a base of 13 900 inscriptions he found 1 347 in which both father and son were attested. 46% of fathers with a Greek *cognomen* chose a Latin *cognomen* for their sons, but only 11% of fathers with a Latin *cognomen* gave their sons a Greek one. Frank also remarks that among those 11% (53 people) he found 17 people whose mothers had Greek names, and other 10 people whose *gentilicium* was different from that of the father, proving the son was adopted<sup>181</sup>. The obvious conclusion of this evidence is that there was no such thing like a trend among the Romans for naming their children with Greek *cognomina*. Frank continues: “For these reasons, therefore, I consider that the presence of a Greek name in the immediate family is good evidence that the subject of the inscription is of servile or foreign stock”<sup>182</sup>.

Frank also questions how many freeborn foreigners were among people with Greek *cognomina*. A passage from Seneca attests that there were many foreigners who came to Rome. Seneca describes them as coming from “their” municipia and colonies: “ex municipiis et coloniis suis, ex toto denique orbe terrarum confluerunt”<sup>183</sup>. But Frank states that most of the people owning *tria nomina Latina* with a Greek *cognomen* must have been freedmen: “Nor need we assume that many persons of this kind [*scil.* freeborn foreigners] are concealed among the inscriptions that bear the *tria nomina*, for immigrants of this class did not often perform the services for which the state granted citizenship”<sup>184</sup>. More recently, I. Kajanto supports Frank’s theory. He writes that “most slaves bore Greek names, which were consequently a characteristic feature of the nomenclature of this class”<sup>185</sup>.

I wanted to find in the evidence people with Greek *cognomen* and *tria nomina*. I excluded from this group individuals whose social affiliation has already been discussed. 58 inscriptions provide us with people who fulfil these criteria<sup>186</sup>.

<sup>180</sup> *RICIS* 515/0108 {606}; cf. Kajanto 1965: 82.

<sup>181</sup> Frank 1916: 692 f.

<sup>182</sup> Frank 1916: 693.

<sup>183</sup> Sen. *Dial.* XII 6, 2.

<sup>184</sup> Frank 1916: 694.

<sup>185</sup> Kajanto 1965: 133.

<sup>186</sup> *RICIS* 501/0107 {375}; 501/0118 {384}; 501/0145 {406}; 501/0149 {408}; 501/0154 (= *AE* 1998, 196); 501/0172 {464}; 501/0190 {443}; 501/0192 {455}; 501/0193 {465}; \*501/0201; 502/0702 {511}; 502/0801 {512}; 503/0201 {523}; 503/0502 {526}; 503/0601 {527}; 503/1106 {533c}; 503/1107 {533d}; 503/1111 {533h}; 503/1113 {534}; 503/1117 {537}; 503/1121 {541}; 503/1205 {550}; 504/0205 {485}; 504/0206 {486}; 504/0215 {491}; 505/0201; 505/0601 {468}; 509/0301 {480}; 511/0204 {569}; 512/0601 {591}; 512/0602 {592}; 513/0101 {644}; 513/0102 {645}; 515/0101 {599}; 515/0104 {602}; 515/0107 {605}; 515/0108 {606}; 515/0109 {607};

Although we will never be absolutely sure that they all had been slaves before they were granted Roman citizenship, it is very probable.

If we add 66 attested freedmen to 58 supposed freedmen found by their *cognomina*, we can estimate the size of the group to 124 people. This is a very cautious assessment which probably should be lowered a bit, nevertheless it makes the freedmen the largest group of individuals bound to the Egyptian gods for any reasons among the 645 inscriptions discussed. It proves their exceptional financial situation if they were able to found a monument with a *titulus*. Indirectly, they provide the evidence for the slaves' piety, since it seems to me unlikely that they began to worship Isis only after their liberation<sup>187</sup>.

Specific religious engagement of the freedmen should not cause our surprise. The situation was probably not as dramatic as in the account of Tacitus who writes that in 19 AD there were four thousand effective freedmen on Sardinia "infected" by superstitions of the Egyptian and Jewish origin ("quattuor milia libertini generis ea superstitione infecta")<sup>188</sup>. It has often been acknowledged that participating in the Egyptian cults increased one's prestige and could open the door to the aristocracy<sup>189</sup>, because the religious career, as far as one's social origin is concerned, was not as demanding as the political career<sup>190</sup>. For this reason the cult of Isis and Sarapis attracted those people who felt excluded from the official state cults or, in Takács' words, "social outsiders"<sup>191</sup> who still wanted to be close to the political life of the Empire. The further career seemed possible, as the cult was protected and taken care of by the emperors<sup>192</sup>. This mechanism worked also in the opposite direction; the freedmen could become *spiritus moventes* of the cult propagation in the Roman area, because the emperors raised the rank of the freedmen<sup>193</sup>.

In the early principate, when the imperial cult was established, some new functions appeared in the social hierarchy, such as *Augustales*, the priests of the imperial cult in local communities. It has been pointed out that many of those

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515/0112 {610}; 515/0117 {615}; 515/0601 {621}; 515/0808 {630}; 516/0201 {641}; 518/0301 {513}; \*518/0401; 519/0101 {519}; 602/0204; 602/0301 {756}; 602/0801 (= *CIL* II 180b\*); 603/0501 {765}; 605/0601 {737}; 607/0102 {745}; 615/0201 {676}; 616/0406 {694}; 616/0101 {697}; 618/0201; 702/0102 {798}; *AE* 2002, 967.

<sup>187</sup> Cf. Malaise 1972: 90.

<sup>188</sup> Tac. *Ann.* II 85, 5.

<sup>189</sup> Malaise 1972: 86.

<sup>190</sup> Alvar, Muñiz 2004: 88.

<sup>191</sup> Takács 1995: 6.

<sup>192</sup> About the relations of the Egyptian gods with the emperors, see the detailed discussion in Takács 1995: 27–129; cf. Alvar, Muñiz 2004: 87.

<sup>193</sup> Alvar, Muñiz 2004: 76.

priests were *peregrini* and freedmen<sup>194</sup>. Malaise wrote about *seviri Augustales* and their role in the cult of Isis and Sarapis, but he did not make a proper distinction between those two functions, though often merged in one hand<sup>195</sup>, as it has been suggested by A.D. Nock<sup>196</sup>. *Sevir* was an eponymic municipal function, with a possibility to prolong it; he was connected to the imperial cult, but his main duties were to organise games and sacrifices and to repair public edifices. *Augustalis*, on the other hand, held a position analogous to other purely religious functions<sup>197</sup>. Nock has shown on the example of Ostia how these two functions started mingling during the 1<sup>st</sup> century AD<sup>198</sup>.

In the epigraphical material I researched we can find dedicatory inscriptions from five *seviri*<sup>199</sup>, all coming from the Roman provinces. Two of them were certainly *liberti*, and another had a Greek *cognomen*. There are four *Augustales*<sup>200</sup> as well, three of them from Italy, and all having “traditional” Latin names. Of course, the number of four inscriptions is insufficient to draw conclusions, but it is surprising how different the locations of their presence were. The majority of inscriptions on this topic were founded by *seviri Augustales* in which we find three attested *liberti*<sup>201</sup>, three more had Greek *cognomina*<sup>202</sup>, and three other with no distinctive characteristics<sup>203</sup>. There are also two *seviri Augustales*, L. Figillius Fortunatus and C. Telegennius Speratus, who claimed to be *sacerdotes*, probably the priests of Isis and/or Sarapis<sup>204</sup>. This group of 20 officials is not the largest group of worshippers I have found, nevertheless their presence in the epigraphical evidence is significant and supports the thesis of the good financial situation of the freedmen since every candidate for the post of *sevir* or *Augustalis* had to pay high *summa honoraria*.

## CONCLUSIONS

I have argued that in the epigraphical sources we deal with a strikingly small number of merchants and an insufficient number of soldiers to confirm their

<sup>194</sup> Nock 1972: 354; Duthoy 1978: 1267; Le Bohec 2004: 324.

<sup>195</sup> Malaise 1972: 92.

<sup>196</sup> Nock 1972: 350.

<sup>197</sup> Nock 1972: 350.

<sup>198</sup> Nock 1972: 353.

<sup>199</sup> *RICIS* 515/0103 {601}; 515/0104 {602}; 515/0116 {614}; 706/0101 {793}; 706/0201 {794}.

<sup>200</sup> *RICIS* 501/0194 {446}; 502/0702 {511}; 503/0701 {529}; 616/0203 {683}.

<sup>201</sup> *RICIS* 506/0101 {481}; 508/0401 {474}; 605/0201 {735}.

<sup>202</sup> *RICIS* 503/0502 {526}; 503/1129 {549}; 503/1130.

<sup>203</sup> *RICIS* 511/0402 {580}; 514/0401 {597}; 515/0802 {624}.

<sup>204</sup> *RICIS* 502/0302 (= *AE* 1988, 268); 512/0201 {587}.

supposed great role in the proliferation of the Egyptian cults. Merchants could, for purely economical reasons, import some Egyptian monuments on the far reaches of the Roman world which could have further been used to propagate the cult. The army, as an element of protection and a stabilising factor for local economical and cultural life, could have played a significant role in the Egyptian cults diffusion, but I have also presented the evidence that the cultural import in the Romanised territories went despite military activity. The legions were not indispensable for the cult diffusion.

It is true to say that Romanisation was responsible for the propagation of the Isiac religion, but the term “Romanisation” needs to be defined more precisely. In this meaning the cults were not parallel to Romanisation, but they constituted an integral part of the Romanising processes, no matter how exotic they seemed to be.

It should also be stated that freedmen, as the largest group of worshippers, appeared only in those territories where the Roman social system had been introduced, in other words, only where the Romanisation had been implanted. The same was the case with the slaves, though they were rarely present in the epigraphical material. A high number of freedmen in the epigraphical sources certifies that the slaves took an important part in the cult, even if it cannot be traced in the evidence.

We should also not forget that the emperors helped in the proliferation of the cult of Isis, giving it a political and ideological support. However, it could only be effective in the territories which were being Romanised.

*University of Wrocław*

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## PORPHYRY'S INTERPRETATION OF CATEGORIES – THE NEOPLATONIC APPROACH TO NOMINALISM?\*

By

ANNA ZHYRKOVA

ABSTRACT: According to some opinions, because of Porphyry's account of categories as *lexeis*, his teaching has been regarded as a type of nominalism. In my opinion, however, in Porphyry the categories constitute generic concepts of things. Porphyry's doctrine rather is a version of realism that allows him to unite the Aristotelian categorical doctrine with the Plotinian ontology.

Porphyry's interpretation of Aristotle's categories is of special importance for inquiry in the field of history of philosophy, as it influenced not only the Neoplatonic philosophy, but also had impact upon Medieval philosophy. On the one hand, it is commonly believed that Porphyry's interpretation of Aristotle's notion of categories corresponds to the one offered by Middle Platonists, in subsuming the Peripatetic categories under the second Academic genus, i.e. the Sensible Realm. However, according to another opinion, Porphyry's treatment has been influenced by Plotinus' critique of Aristotle's doctrine of categories. Yet, what is more interesting is that despite the above viewpoints, his teaching has often been regarded as a kind of nominalism. This opinion is usually supported by Porphyry's view of categories *qua* *lexis*. In the light of such different and in some way opposite standpoints, I propose discussion on Porphyry's conception of categories as significant expressions relating to the genera of the realities signified by those expressions. Before discussing Porphyry's view, I find it useful to outline briefly the accounts of the above relation in the doctrines of Middle Platonists and Plotinus.

### ARISTOTLE'S CATEGORIES IN THE INTERPRETATION OF PORPHYRY'S PREDECESSORS

The Peripatetic as well as Stoic categories were already adopted in the 5<sup>th</sup> Academy by precursors of the Middle Platonism. The ten Aristotelian categories

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were subsumed either under two Academic categories, namely, Absolute (καθ' αὐτό) and Relative being (πρός τι)<sup>1</sup>, or only under Relatives relating to the Sensible Realm (κόσμος αἰσθητός)<sup>2</sup>. Similarly, the Platonic dichotomy of Absolute and Relative being was embraced by the next generation of Middle-Platonists<sup>3</sup>. The Sensible was considered as the realm where the Stoic and Peripatetic (Philo) or only the Peripatetic categories were to be applied (Clement of Alexandria)<sup>4</sup>. However, in most cases, it is difficult to reconstruct explicitly the Middle-Platonic conception of the Peripatetic categories *qua* categories. Remaining evidence suggests that the representatives of the above philosophical movement did not pay special attention to this subject. However, in the works of Clement of Alexandria and Alcinous we can find interesting remarks on the issue.

Clement of Alexandria's opinion on the nature of language presents the problem of the categories in a different light. In Book 8 of the *Stromata* Clement introduces the Aristotelian categories in the semantic context. It is significant that he discerns the categories from the genera *sensu stricto*<sup>5</sup> as well as from the sensible subject-things. Namely, he maintains that there are three things in language: Names (τὰ ὀνόματα), Conceptions (τὰ νοήματα) and Things that are their subjects (τὰ ὑποκείμενα πράγματα). Names are primarily the symbols of conceptions (σύμβολα ὄντα τῶν νοημάτων), and inferentially also of subjects. Conceptions are the likenesses and figures of the subjects, which are impressed in us by the things. According to Clement, philosophic research is occupied with Conceptions and Real subjects. Following Aristotle, the categories are characterized by Clement as non-composite expressions (Arist. *Cat.* 1b25–29). He connects the categories with a kind of 'elements' that are apparently identical with universals (τὰ καθόλου), according to which every subject of investigation is to be considered (*Strom.* VIII 8, 23, 1–24, 2). This seems to be one of the first signs of a new interpretation of the Aristotelian categories in the Platonic tradition. Accordingly, Clement treats the categories not as real genera of sensibles but as kinds of epistemological classes of things, according to which sensibles are considered. Therefore, the categories appear to be moved from the ontological domain to the semantic one. This resembles the Neoplatonic attempt to interpret the Aristotelian categories as related first and foremost to logic. However, it is hard to decide whether the text reflects Clement's own ideas or is just a testi-

<sup>1</sup> Berchman 1984: 24 f.

<sup>2</sup> See Berchman 1984: 24 f. and Dillon 1977: 133 f.

<sup>3</sup> Philo, *De Op. Mun.* 16; *Heres.* 133–226; Clem. Al. *Protr.* X 98, 4; *Strom.* IV 26, 162, 5; V 12, 82, 1; Alcinous, *Did.* 4; Orig. *C. Cels.* VII 38, p. 188, 11.

<sup>4</sup> Philo, *De Abrah.* 31, 163; Clem. Al. *Strom.* III 95, 4 ff.; VIII 24, 1 ff.

<sup>5</sup> In *Strom.* VIII 6 the categories seem to be classes of species, which are different from genera of entities in the strict sense. See *Strom.* VIII 6, 20, 1 ff. and 21, 4.

mony of such ideas already existing somewhere around him. In any case, it bears witness to the intellectual currency of those ideas.

Alcinous, in his so-called *Didaskalikos*, discussing the nature of intellection, distinguishes two kinds of its objects, namely primary and secondary intelligibles. The primary intelligibles (τὰ πρῶτα νοητά) are an equivalent of 'separate' forms that correspond to the Platonic Ideas. The secondary intelligibles (τὰ δεύτερα νοητά) constitute the inseparable forms in matter<sup>6</sup>. Those intelligibles are consistent with the Aristotelian εἶδος ἔνυλον or λόγος ἔνυλον. Additionally, Alcinous discerns intellection in the strict sense (αὐτὸ τοῦτο νόησις) from intellection that he calls 'natural conception' (φυσικὴ ἔννοια). The former is related to contemplation of the objects of intellection by the soul before its incarnation; while the latter is an intellection stored up in the incarnate soul (*Did.* IV 6, 1–7). According to Alcinous, this kind of intellection is called by Plato 'simple knowledge' (ἐπιστήμη ἀπλή), 'the wing of soul' (πτέρωμα ψυχῆς), and 'memory' (μνήμη)<sup>7</sup>.

The roots of the doctrine of 'natural concepts' in mind can be traced in the Medio-platonic tradition to Antiochus of Ascalon. In his doctrine, perceptions, which are collected according to their likenesses ("cetera autem similitudinibus construit"), constitute the concepts of thing (*notitiae rerum*) termed by the Greeks ἔννοια ('concepts') or προλήψεις ('preconceptions'); cf. Cic. *Luc.* 30 f. These concepts are innate and represent an immanent standard of truth, the precise nature of which remains obscure. Cicero identifies them with the so-called 'common notions' (*communes notiones*; *Tusc.* IV 53). On the other hand, true knowledge is based on eternal and immutable intellectual forms (*species*). Things are judged in fact by the mind, since it alone "perceives that which is eternal, simple, uniform, and invariable" ("quia sola cerneret id quod semper esset simplex et unius modi et tale quale esset"; Cic. *Acad.* 30 f.). The mind appears to be directly associated with the perception of the forms. Those intellectual forms seem to correspond to a modified version of Platonic Ideas or Forms. Plato's Ideas are pure existing Forms, which are in themselves separately subsistent principles and as

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<sup>6</sup> Alcinous, *Did.* IV 7, 5–8. A similar distinction between the transcendent and immanent forms can also be found in Seneca, *Epist.* 58, 20 f.: "The Form is in the work whereas the Idea is outside it, and not only outside it but prior to it" ("idos in opere est, idea extra opus, nec tantum extra opus est, sed ante opus"). These forms diverge as the pattern contained in a natural object differs from the outline derived from that pattern embodied in another object that imitates the first one. See Hadot 1968: 158 ff. Therefore, it seems that Seneca's view is not equivalent to the one which accepts first and second intelligibles, and which occurs in Alcinous' *Didascalicus*. According to Alcinous, there is an ontological difference between the transcendent Idea and immanent species. The former is not only the pattern but also the ontic source for the latter, while the latter constitutes the essence of a particular.

<sup>7</sup> Alcinous, *Did.* IV 6, 12; Pl. *Phdr.* 246b.

such are objects, but not the subjects of intellection<sup>8</sup>. By contrast, the intellectual forms of Antiochus are not transcendent Ideas, but immanent forms *of* the mind of their beholder<sup>9</sup>.

In Alcinous, however, the doctrine of natural concepts occurs in the context of division of intelligibles into primary and secondary. That seems to form a tenet of different kinds of universals. The primary and secondary intelligibles might be considered, as Lloyd (1955: 59 ff.) says, as kinds of separable and inseparable universals, respectively. The ‘natural concept’, then, appears to be the third kind of universals distinct from both of the above. It is worth mentioning that a similar division of universals occurs also in Plotinus, but in a modified form: as a distinction of transcendent *logoi/forms*, immanent *logoi/forms*, and natural concepts<sup>10</sup>.

The three-fold division as well as the mentioned above conception of language opened the door for a new interpretation of Aristotelian categories and their relation to the genera. This, as it will be shown later, was achieved by Porphyry.

Distinctively from Middle Platonism, Plotinus criticizes and rejects the Peripatetic treatment of the categories as genera of being<sup>11</sup>. At the beginning of the Sixth Ennead, Plotinus claims that he is going to consider whether the well-known ten genera are to be ranged under the common name of Being (κοινοῦ ὀνόματος τυχόντα τοῦ ὄντος) or ten predications<sup>12</sup> (κατηγορίας δέκα; *Enn.* VI 1, 1, 15–19). As it follows from his critique of the Aristotelian categorical schemes, these genera should be termed ‘categories’ i.e. *predications* because of lack of their truly generic meaning and unity<sup>13</sup>.

In his opinion, the real genera of being (γέννη τοῦ ὄντος) correspond to the ‘highest kinds’ (μέγιστα γένη) of Plato (cf. *Soph.* 254a–256e) and are applied only to the Intelligible Realm (κόσμος νοητός). Those genera are: being (ὄν), movement (κίνησις), rest (στάσις), sameness (ταύτόν) and difference (θάτερον).

<sup>8</sup> Significantly, in Plato’s *Timaeus* the Demiurge (divine mind) is distinct from the Paradigme which he contemplates. See Pl. *Tim.* 30c–d.

<sup>9</sup> Cic. *Acad.* 30 f.; *Orat.* 7 ff.; 101; *Tusc.* I 57 f. On the subject of concepts and intellectual forms in Antiochus and Cicero, see also Gersh 1986: vol. I, 132 ff.

<sup>10</sup> See for instance *Enn.* IV 3, 5; 23–27. On this subject, see Strange 1981: 133 ff.; Lloyd 1955/1956: 61 ff.; Philips 1987: 33 ff.; contrast Merlan 1963: 74 ff.

<sup>11</sup> See Anton 1976: 83 ff.; Evangelidou 1982: 73 ff.; Gerson 1994a: 79 ff.; 1994b: 3 ff. However, in my opinion, Plotinus does not reject the whole Aristotelian categorical doctrine, but its Peripatetic interpretation, especially in the line of Alexander Aphrodisias. See also Strange 1981: 25 ff.

<sup>12</sup> Being convinced by M. Frede’s argumentation for rendering κατηγορία in Aristotle, I accept the rendering of this term as ‘predication’ in Plotinus and his Neoplatonic successors. By ‘predication’ I mean a particular mode of signification, naming, and designation. See Frede 1987: 32 ff.; Cf. Rijk 2002: 364 ff.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. De Haas 2001: 503 ff.

The above genera constitute the aspects of the Intelligible Hypostasis (*Enn.* VI 2, 1–8) and are the principles of Being (ἀρχαὶ τοῦ ὄντος; *Enn.* VI 2, 2, 11–14). They are not concepts derived from reality, but they form reality and are real beings by themselves.

According to Plotinus, entities of the Sensible realm differ significantly from the real Intelligible beings. Sensible particulars are in permanent alteration, in other words they are in 'flux'. Therefore, the proper name for the sensible domain is 'coming into being' or 'becoming' (γένεσις; *Enn.* VI 3, 2, 1–4). For this kind of entities Plotinus adopts the so-called 'genera of becoming' (γένη τῶν γιγνομένων), i.e. substance (οὐσία), motion (κίνησις), quantity (ποσόν), quality (ποιόν) and relation (πρός τι)<sup>14</sup>. Their subjects, namely sensible particulars, relating to the Real Substance of the Intelligible Realm, can be named οὐσία only by homonymy (ὁμωνύμως). To be sure, the sensible substance is a sort of metaphysical union constituted by matter, form and composite. The essence and existence of such a particular is caused by its *logos* – i.e. Reason-principal. However, a sensible particular *as such* is not an essence but only a qualified something. Thus, a particular, in Plotinus' doctrine, can be interpreted rather as a logical subject than as a kind of being. It is a being only with reference to its cause<sup>15</sup>. In this light, the genera of sensibles can be named genera only by analogy with the real 'genera of being'<sup>16</sup>. The sensible genera are derived from common features of sensible particular substances. The mentioned features, however, neither constitute generic unity nor reveal the real nature of individual (*Enn.* VI 1, 3, 19–22). In other words, the sensible genera possess an accidental character. Therefore, the 'genera of becoming' are nothing more than κατηγορίαι – predications, or in other words external denominations, which are ascribed to the sensible object<sup>17</sup>.

Thus, there are no real genera except those of Plato, which constitute the Intelligible. The 'genera of becoming' are not real genera, but are named so only by homonymy and analogy with the real 'genera of being'. According to Plotinus, the genera of sensibles are predications. And a sensible genus is an accidental and external denomination, which discursive intellect ascribes to phenomena.

<sup>14</sup> Plotin. *Enn.* VI 3, 3, 25–32. The substance is considered as matter (ύλη), form (εἶδος) and composite (συναμφότερον).

<sup>15</sup> In fact, the sensible substance, which is the primary substance of the Aristotelian *Categories*, is relegated to the status of pseudo-substance (Plotin. *Enn.* VI 2, 4, 7: οἷον οὐσία; VI 3, 5, 1: ἐνθάδε οὐσία). However, Plotinus applies the Aristotelian notion of substance to the sensibles. The above mentioned notion denotes the proper subject for assertions of real existence or ascriptions which presuppose real existence. With this, substance is neither present in a subject nor predicated of a subject. (Arist. *Cat.* 5, 3a21–28; Plotin. *Enn.* VI 3, 4, 20–27; VI 3, 5, 13–16, see also Anton 1976: 86 ff.). Yet, because *becoming* is not a uniform nature, even the notion of substance, seen this, is insufficient. See also Rist 1967: 107 ff.; Wagner 1996: 134 ff., 157.

<sup>16</sup> Plotin. *Enn.* VI 1, 1, 23–28; VI 3, 1.6–7; VI 3, 2, 1–4; VI 3, 5, 1, 2 f.

<sup>17</sup> See Rutten 1961: 49 ff.; De Haas 2001: 507 ff.

This account of the sensible genera presented by Plotinus in *Ennead VI 3* [44] seems to be assumed in his treatment of Aristotle's categories in *Ennead VI 1* [42]. His interpretation of the sensible genera completes his criticism of the Aristotelian categories in *Ennead VI 1* [42]. While there, Plotinus focuses on denying the status of the genera of being to the Aristotelian categories, the analyzed text of the *Ennead VI 3* [44] allows determining what Aristotle's categories actually are. *De facto*, they, like the sensible genera of Plotinus, are nothing more than predications<sup>18</sup>.

To conclude: the categories were treated by Middle Platonists as genera of being applied to the Sensible Realm. Additionally, we may observe sporadic attempts to interpret the Aristotelian categories as a kind of significant expressions. In contrast, Plotinus rejects the existence of real genera for the Sensible Realm. In his doctrine, the 'genera of becoming' as well as the Aristotelian categories are only predications of particulars.

#### PORPHYRY'S TREATMENT OF ARISTOTLE'S CATEGORIES

Porphyry continues his predecessors' inquiries into the nature of genera of being and the categories. Yet he focuses on the question of categories *as such*. His view of this subject may be reconstructed on the basis of his works *Isagoge*, *Commentary on Aristotle's Categories* and some passages of Simplicius' *Commentary on Aristotle's Categories* as well. The latter work, according to the opinion of the researches, contains Porphyrian ideas uttered in the lost *Commentary to Gedalius*<sup>19</sup>.

In Porphyry's *Isagoge*, genus is defined as that which is predicated essentially of many things that differ in species<sup>20</sup>. This definition gives room for more than one interpretation of the above term. Genus can be treated as a kind of predication as well as identified with the essence of a subject. On the one hand, genus is an expression that designates objects. In the *Commentary on Categories*, expressions of this type are called expressions of first imposition, while the expressions of second imposition apply to words<sup>21</sup>. Thus, any specific genus as an expression of first imposition does not indicate a part of essence of some object, but it denotes a class of things predicated in common. Accordingly, 'animal' as a genus is predicated of more than one species and certainly of more than one individual, but no actual animal is a genus. As indicated by Porphyry, to say that man is

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<sup>18</sup> The interpretation of the sensible genera and of Aristotle's categories as a kind of predications indicates possible connection with the Stoic doctrine of genera and of their ontological status. See Rutten 1961, 52 ff.

<sup>19</sup> Simplicius. *In Cat.* 2, 9–15; 3, 2–4. See also Chase 2003: 7.

<sup>20</sup> Porphyry. *Isag.* 2, 15–17; Aristotle. *Top.* 102a31 f.

<sup>21</sup> Porphyry. *In Cat.* 57, 22–58, 3. See Lloyd 1990: 36 ff.



a species “is to distinguish it as something predicated in common (τῶν κατὰ κοινότητα προσαγορευομένων), something that is not one of the individuals”<sup>22</sup>. Similarly, to say that animal is a genus is the same as to distinguish it as something predicated in common of many subjects different in species.

On the other hand, Porphyry claims that individuals participate in the universal (ἐν τῷ καθόλου) as in a genus<sup>23</sup>. What is more, according to the *Isagoge*, a destruction of a genus brings about a destruction of things that are under this genus<sup>24</sup>. Actually, we deal here rather with a different type of genera. These genera possess some kind of real existence and may be interpreted as corresponding to the transcendent Platonic forms<sup>25</sup>.

The Porphyrian distinction of the two types of genera is confirmed by a testimony of Simplicius:

Porphyry says that the concept of ‘animal’ is twofold: one ‘concept’ is of the integrated (τοῦ κατατεταγμένου) [animal], and the other of the non-integrated (τοῦ ἀκατατάκτου). Thus, the non-integrated is predicated of the integrated, thereby it is different (*In Cat.* 53, 6–9).

The integration of a genus is understood as referring to form, which is *in matter*<sup>26</sup>. Accordingly, the *animal* that *man* is, differs from the *animal* that is said of *man*. Thus, non-integrated ‘animal’ is predicated of a man as of a particular animal<sup>27</sup>. The integrated genus is identical with the universal, which is the genus or the species *as it is* “in” an individual<sup>28</sup>. In turn, the non-integrated genera correspond to a kind of predications<sup>29</sup>. Such interpretation of the non-integrated genera seems to differ from the one presented above, i.e. genera as corresponding to the Platonic transcendent forms. The view of Porphyry’s predecessors, such as Alcinous and Plotinus, suggests that genera should rather be treated as an equivalent of the Platonic forms or Ideas. However, there is no sufficient evidence to determine univocally whether the non-integrated genera correspond to the Platonic forms or to a kind of predications. Porphyry does not discuss the

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<sup>22</sup> Porph. *In Cat.* 80, 32–81, 22. See also Lloyd 1990: 39. According to Lloyd, genera in Porphyry’s teaching might be considered as a kind of terms of second imposition. This opinion is based on commentaries of Dexippus and Boethius (Dexip., *In Cat.* 26, 27–27, 2; Boeth. *In Cat.* 176D *ad fin.*), which appear to present Porphyry’s own view expressed in his lost commentary *ad Gedalium*. Following those texts, Lloyd claims that predicating *genera* or *species* of ‘animal’ or ‘man’ respectively indicates what type of word ‘animal’ or ‘man’ is. See Lloyd 1990: 40 ff.

<sup>23</sup> Porph. *In Cat.* 72, 24–29.

<sup>24</sup> Porph. *Isag.* 14, 10–12.

<sup>25</sup> See Hadot 1968: 409 ff.; De Haas 2001: 520 ff.

<sup>26</sup> Simpl. *In Cat.* 55, 32–56, 4.

<sup>27</sup> See also Dexip. *In Cat.* 26, 3–12.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. Dexip. *In Cat.* 51, 11–14; Simpl. *In Cat.* 104, 19–23.

<sup>29</sup> See Ebbesen 1981: 152; Lloyd 1990: 62 ff.

above types of genera, or the character of their existence, as well as the nature of participation in a genus, in his extant works in more detail. The reason for this is probably the fact that those subjects exceed the scope of such work as the *Categories*, which is, in Porphyry's opinion, intended for beginners (*In Cat.* 56, 28 f.; 134, 28 f.).

At the beginning of the *Commentary on Aristotle's Categories*, Porphyry claims that Aristotle's *Categories* definitely should not be given the titles *On the Genera of Being* (Περὶ τῶν γενῶν τοῦ ὄντος) or *On the Ten Genera* (Περὶ τῶν δέκα γενῶν). The reason, in his opinion, is that beings, their genera, species and differentiae are things, not words (πράγμα ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ φωναί; *In Cat.* 56, 31–35). Hence, it seems that the categories do not possess substantive existence.

This conclusion can be confirmed by a passage from Simplicius' *Commentary on Categories*, which probably contains the views of Porphyry from his work *Ad Gedalium*. Simplicius holds that Aristotle reduced the infinity of particulars to the ten genera, having collected all the substances into one highest substance (εἰς μίαν συνελὼν τὴν ἀνωτάτω οὐσίαν). The expression (ἡ λέξις) that signifies the highest substance is 'substance itself' (αὐτὴ ἡ οὐσία). This expression 'substance itself' is a symbol of the substance found within beings (σύμβολον οὗσα τῆς ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν οὐσίας). 'Substance itself' subsists in the mode of our conceptions (ἄχρι ἐπινοίας). According to Simplicius, it is not important for predication whether 'substance itself' exists substantially or not. The reason for it is that the categories are not considered as something having substantive existence, but as something conceivable, regardless whether they are beings or only appear as beings (καθὸ ἐπινοεῖται ἤτοι ὄντα ἢ ὡς ὄντα; *In Cat.* 11, 1–12). Consequently, the categories *as such* are not beings, rather they might be considered as a kind of concepts.

However, according to Porphyry's extant works, the categories cannot be interpreted as concepts. Porphyry speaks about the nature of the categories *as such* in his *Commentary on the Categories*. In this text, he follows Aristotle in claiming that none of the ten categories is said by itself in affirmation, but the combination of those produces affirmation (*Arist. Cat.* 2a 4–7). Affirmation, in turn, exists as a significant utterance (φωνὴ σημαντικὴ) and as a declarative sentence (λόγος ἀποφαντικός). On this basis, Porphyry concludes that the treatise cannot concern the genera of being or things *qua* things, but rather "is about the words used to signify things" (περὶ φωνῶν σημαντικῶν τῶν πραγμάτων; *In Cat.* 56, 35–57.6). As it has been said above, Porphyry maintains that linguistic expressions might occur according to first or second imposition, i.e. designate objects or words respectively.<sup>30</sup> The subject of the treatise is expressions of first imposition. In other words, it relates to the expressions that signify things.

<sup>30</sup> See n. 21 above.

Porphyry claims that what Aristotle named the *predications*<sup>31</sup> (κατηγορίαι) are the utterances, where significant expressions are applied to things. Thus, the categories *per se* constitute expressions, which are predicated of objects (*In Cat.* 56, 8 f.). Porphyry views the analysed expressions as related to things and expressions that “are said” without combination (ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς; *In Cat.* 71, 1–14). In other words, the categories refer to simple significant words insofar as they signify things (ἔστιν περὶ φωνῶν σημαντικῶν ἀπλῶν, καθὸ σημαντικά εἰσι τῶν πραγμάτων; *In Cat.* 58, 3–6; 70, 25–29).

Additionally, Dexippus' and Simplicius' testimonies allow us to conclude that, in Porphyry's view, significant expressions denote things by the mediation of concepts. Simplicius ascribes to Porphyry the opinion that the categories relate to expressions *qua* significant, to the signified realities (τὰ πράγματα) as well to notions (τὰ νοήματα), that come about in accordance with significations<sup>32</sup>. Similarly, Porphyry's disciple Dexippus states that the predications are expressions signifying concepts and things (*In Cat.* 10, 25–32).

Thus, a category as a predication of an object might be regarded either as the object together with the signifying expression, or as the signifying expression *qua* significant. Hence, the categories are to be considered in reference to things which are signified by them. In turn, in Porphyry's opinion, things are incomprehensible, since they are infinite in number<sup>33</sup>. Yet things that are many in number are one in species or genus. In other words, the infinity of beings is comprehended by generic differentiae (γενικὰς διαφοράς) and is contained in the list of the well-known ten genera. Things, thus, are considered not as they differ numerically, but as they differ in genus (κατὰ γένος). Significant expressions, in turn, receive their difference in genus from the generic differentiae of the things, which they report about<sup>34</sup>. Moreover, they are classified according to the ten genera of entities. Therefore, simple expressions that signify things have the same number of generic differences and are found in the list of ten genera (*In Cat.* 71, 19–26). As a result, the categories, in the meaning of significant expressions, also are ten in number according to the ten genera of things related to them (*In Cat.* 58, 3–16; 71, 11–14).

Nevertheless, Porphyry emphasizes that the categories “are neither about the genera of being” (περὶ τῶν γενῶν τῶν ὄντων) nor “about the expressions *qua*

<sup>31</sup> See n. 12 above.

<sup>32</sup> Simpl. *In Cat.* 13, 11–18. Simplicius claims that this opinion was also accepted by Alexander, Herminus, Boethius, Iamblichus, Syrianus and his teachers. By ‘teachers’ Ammonius and Damascius are probably meant.

<sup>33</sup> Porph. *Isag.* 6, 12–16. Here Porphyry refers to Plato, probable sources for reference: *Phlb.* 16c–18d; *Soph.* 266a–b; *Plt.* 262a–c. See also Moraux 1973: 130 ff. It was normally held that a *diarexis* could not result in innumerable members.

<sup>34</sup> See Porph. *In Cat.* 58, 6–15; 70, 29–33; 71, 11–14; Evangelidou 1988: 23 ff.

expressions” (περὶ τῶν λέξεων καθὸ λέξεις; *In Cat.* 59, 5–14). Despite the fact that the categories *qua* categories are listed according to the generic differences of things, they are not the genera by themselves. A category *as such* is only a kind of predication that is properly said of a subject according to each of the genera of entities (καθ’ ἕκαστον γένος; *In Cat.* 59, 20–33). Indeed, when claiming that the mentioned tenfold set is not a division of a genus into species, but an enumeration (καταρίθμησις), Porphyry makes a distinction between the set of the primary genera (τῶν πρώτων γενῶν) and the ten types of predication corresponding to the primary genera (τῶν κατὰ τὰ πρώτα γένη δέκα κατηγοριῶν; *In Cat.* 86, 10–13). The above distinction probably derives from *Topics* I 7, 103b 20–27, where Aristotle defines the ten kinds of predication (τὰ γένη τῶν κατηγοριῶν), which differ from the categories of being introduced in the *Categories*<sup>35</sup>. Moreover, Simplicius, when presenting Porphyry’s view on the purpose of the *Categories*, claims that Aristotle uses the same division in the *Categories*, which primarily concern significant expressions, and in the *Metaphysics*, where he teaches about beings *qua* beings. Similarly, Aristotle uses the same division of the primary genera into ten in his logical works as well as in other writings. According to the text of Simplicius, the reason for it is that neither are significant expressions wholly separated from the entities, nor are entities detached from the names which signify them. Therefore, the division of genera is the same everywhere. Yet, in the *Categories* Aristotle applies the mentioned division to the significant expressions, in the appropriate manner to the study of logic. On the contrary, in other works this division refers to the substantial existence of beings, as appropriate to the theory of beings (*In Cat.* 12, 1–16).

However, the problem still remains: what is the difference, according to Simplicius’ testimony, between categories and so-called ‘non-integrated genera’, understood as a kind of predication? In my opinion, the non-integrated genus directly refers to the subsisting object, due to the presence of the common form, i.e. of the integrated genus in this object. By contrast, a category *as such* (e.g. ‘substance’, ‘quality’, etc.) is only an expression, which denotes an entity *according to its genus*. This means that a signifying expression is applied to a thing by some mediation. The mediator seems to be the non-integrated genus that might be treated as a generic concept (in the meaning of ἔννοια or *notio* in Latin) of this thing. The non-integrated genus, thus, appears to be a kind of concept of realities, while a category is a predication that is used to designate a given particular. In the Porphyrian interpretation of sensible genera and categories, there can be found the resonance of a three-fold division of intelligibles, which, as it has been shown, appears in the teaching of Alcinous and Plotinus<sup>36</sup>. Yet, according to Simplicius’ testimony, and in contrast to Alcinous’ intelligibles, the

<sup>35</sup> Frede 1987: 29–48.

<sup>36</sup> See also Lloyd 1956: 151 ff.

non-integrated genera of Porphyry are not equivalent to Platonic Ideas. They correspond rather to the intellectual forms of Antiochus of Ascalon and the natural concepts of Alcinoüs commenting Plato.

Nonetheless, it should be stressed that the categories cannot be limited to the status of significant expressions only<sup>37</sup>. It is obvious that not every significant expression is a category, but only those which relate to the ten genera of things. The categories, since they receive their difference from the generic differentiae of things and are classified according to the ten genera, cannot be ultimately separated from those genera. To be sure, the categories are not genera *sensu stricto*. Yet, insofar as non-integrated genera are treated as 'generic concepts' of entities, the categories might be regarded as 'generic predications' of the genera<sup>38</sup>.

Porphyry rejects, thus, the interpretation of the Aristotelian categories as the ontological categories of being. Following Middle-Platonists, he applies the categories to the Sensible Realm<sup>39</sup>, although not as the genera of this world. Porphyry, in fact, by considering the Aristotelian categories, continues and develops Plotinus' interpretation of sensible genera. The ten categories designate the sensible things and receive their difference in genus from the generic differentiae of the designated things. However, the categories *as such* are not regarded as genera, neither integrated nor non-integrated, but rather as generic predications related to the sensible genera. The Aristotelian categories, for Porphyry, are linguistic expressions, which we need in order to indicate and signify the things around us according to their genera (*In Cat.* 57, 20–29).

#### A STEP TO CLASSIFY PORPHYRY'S DOCTRINE

Porphyry's treatment of the categories ostensibly shows some similarities to the Stoic doctrine of the so-called τὰ λεκτά, that is 'sayables' or 'things meant'. The mentioned type of entities belongs to the classes of incorporeals and, thus, cannot be said to exist properly. However, it possesses some kind of subsistence and constitute an irremovable part of the objective structure of the world. The 'sayables' convey the impressions of material objects through the meanings

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<sup>37</sup> My attention has been drawn to this problem thanks to my discussion with Steven K. Strange. In fact, the categories are to be regarded only as significant expressions rather in Plotinus' doctrine, because of his concept of individual. See pp. 256–258 and n. 15 of the present paper.

<sup>38</sup> By contrast, De Haas on the basis of *Isag.* 1, 18–2, 15; 4, 21 f.; and 6, 6 f., 11 f. claims that, according to Porphyry, genus is a principle and the class of which the principle is the origin, and the categories are regarded as such genera. See De Haas 2001: 520 ff. In general, I agree with the interpretation presented by De Haas in the above article as well as with his thesis that Porphyry continues Plotinus' treatment of categories. But this particular point on the relation of genera and categories seems to be ill-founded.

<sup>39</sup> Porph. *In Cat.* 91, 7–9. According to Strange, the same relates to Plotinus' treatment of the categories. See Strange 1987: 969 ff.; contrast Chiaradonna 1996: 72 ff.

and concepts<sup>40</sup>. The Stoic genera *as such* denote predicates, which come to be true of a body, or belong to it as attributes. Therefore, the genera have a quasi existence as incorporeal and *as such* are conceived of as a species of sayables (τὰ λεκτά). Particularly, as predicates, genera are “incomplete *lekta*” (Diog. Laert. VII 63). I infer from the above that they need to be combined with subjects to form propositions<sup>41</sup>. Consequently, it follows that the study of genera, as significant expressions, belongs not to physics, in the Stoic meaning of this part of philosophy, but to dialectic. To be precise, it belongs to that part of dialectic which is meant to study the utterance as meaningful (language as what is said). In contrast, the other part of dialectic concerns, according to the Stoics, the study of the utterance as uttered (language as sound)<sup>42</sup>.

On the one hand, comparing Porphyry’s teaching as related by Dexippus and Simplicius<sup>43</sup> with the above doctrine, it seems that Porphyry applied the Stoic conception of genera as kind of *lekta* to Aristotle’s categories<sup>44</sup>. On the other hand, Porphyry himself defines the categories as significant expressions (φωνῆ σημαντικῆ), which means that they are not equivalent with the Stoic conception of *lekta* that are ‘mental’ constructs, not physical words<sup>45</sup>. However, his treatment of the subject and the purpose of Aristotle’s work seems to be influenced by the Stoic division of dialectic. As stated above, according to Porphyry, the book of *Categories* is neither about the ontological issues nor about expressions *qua* lexis. Instead, the subject of this work concerns predications insofar as they signify things. But does it mean that on this basis Porphyry’s doctrine can be regarded as a type of nominalism?

The categories, to be sure, are only linguistic expressions, by which we indicate and signify things around us. On this basis, indeed, Porphyry can be regarded as a nominalist. However, the categories, according to Porphyry, correspond to and derive from the genera of entities, which Porphyry classifies as ‘things, not words’. In Porphyry there occur the two types of genera, i.e. so-called non-integrated and integrated genera. The genera of the first type may either correspond to Platonic transcendent forms, or comprise the generic concepts of things. The genera of the second type constitute universals, or in other words common forms. Those genera subsist in things and possess real existence. Moreover, we should notice that for Porphyry, while primary objects of signification are sensibles (τὰ αἰσθητά), the intelligibles (τὰ νοητά) are substances in the primary

<sup>40</sup> Sext. Emp. *Math.* VIII 11 f.; 70. See Long 1971a: 82–84; Watson 1966: 41–43.

<sup>41</sup> Long, Sedley 1987: 163 ff.; 179 ff.; 195 ff.; Rist 1971: 40; Watson 1966: 49 ff.

<sup>42</sup> Lloyd 1971: 61.

<sup>43</sup> See p. 261 and n. 32 above.

<sup>44</sup> Ebbesen 1990: 456. On the role of Stoic doctrine in Porphyry see also Libéra, *Segonds* 1998: XLV–LXI.

<sup>45</sup> This opinion is based on Diog. Laert. VII 55–57 and supported by Watson 1966: 42.

sense (*In Cat.* 91, 10–17). It might be strongly presumed that Porphyry, being the disciple of Plotinus, shares the view of his teacher on the existence of pure intelligible genera that are real genera of being.

In fact, Porphyry's views approach rather a kind of realism. However, his version of realism incorporates elements of various philosophical systems, which are considered to be nominalistic or conceptualist<sup>46</sup>. This realism concedes the conventional character of human speech. And what is of even greater importance, it distinguishes and separates the function of predication, which is proper to language, from the matter of predication, i.e. from the non-integrated genera. The above is also distinguished from the objects of predication and from what is common for them, i.e. from the integrated genera or common forms. Thanks to this subtle distinction, Porphyry's doctrine eludes the contemporary classification of positions adopted in the debate over universals.

To conclude: ostensibly, Porphyry's treatment of the categories *as such* seems to be fairly different from the Middle-Platonic conceptions as well as from the philosophy of Plotinus. But in fact, he consequently continues and develops the above traditions. On the one hand, Porphyry re-establishes the Aristotelian set of the ten genera to the Sensible realm. However, the similarity between those genera and the categories is only nominal. Porphyry, in his treatment of categories, rather develops the conceptions of significant words and of the three kinds of intelligibles. Those conceptions, as it has been stated above, can be found in the Middle-Platonic tradition. On the other hand, thanks to Plotinus' critique, Porphyry degrades the ontological status of the genera ascribed to the sensibles. The sensible genera are not real genera *sensu stricto*. They are either integrated in the sensible subjects or they constitute generic concepts of things. Then, the categories are interpreted by Porphyry as distinct from the genera. Indeed, they are predications, or in other words linguistic significant expressions, which signify existing entities according to their genus. Such an interpretation of categories bears witness to the influence of the Stoic doctrine of the *lekta*. There is no need to mention that, in general, the Stoic influence is noticeable in many areas of the Middle-Platonic and Plotinus' doctrines. A certain trace of the Stoic *lekta* might be discerned already in the theory of categories of some Middle Platonists, for instance in the above mentioned works of Clement and Alcinous, and of course in Plotinus.

Certainly, Porphyry's treatment of the categories can hardly be regarded as nominalistic. Rather it is a version of realism that allows Porphyry the formulation of an alternative interpretation according to which the Aristotelian categorical doctrine is totally compatible with the Plotinian ontology<sup>47</sup>. Therefore,

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<sup>46</sup> Lloyd 1990: 68 f.

<sup>47</sup> See Evangelidou 1992: 10.

his philosophical achievement is to be viewed as an important development in philosophical thought.

*Tel Aviv University*

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## SOME TECHNICAL TERMS FROM GREEK CUISINE IN CLASSICAL AND BYZANTINE LITERATURE

By

MACIEJ KOKOSZKO

**ABSTRACT:** This article discusses different meanings of select terms which originated from the name of a Greek delicacy called *karyke* (καρύκη). Those are καρκεύω, καρκοποιέω, ἐκκαρκεύω, ἐπικαρκεύομαι, καρκεία and καρύκευμα. The author finds the nouns only loosely connected with the delicacy itself and used mainly to denote the process of spicing dishes. As for the analyzed verbs, they were employed mainly in a figurative meaning and thereby lost their direct connection with Greek cuisine.

It would appear that to the majority of both historians and laymen, the history of Classical cuisine and its terminology is a topic of rather low importance. I have the impression that scholars of history and society sometimes treat it, say, condescendingly. For this reason, a great many technical terms from this field have not received due clarification to date. Quite obviously, this is detrimental to the proper understanding of the passages of Classical and Byzantine sources in which these words and terms occur<sup>1</sup>.

The subject of the present study concerns a few terms, the origins of which date back to a certain dish that arrived, most probably at the turn of the sixth century BC<sup>2</sup>, in Greece from Lydia<sup>3</sup>, and – as we should surmise from Classical and Byzantine literature – became a firm favourite with the rich and powerful.

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<sup>1</sup> I would like to express my gratitude to Professors Krystyna Bartol and Waldemar Ceran (whose premature death in June 2009 was a painful blow to Byzantine studies) for their insightful comments on the first version of the present article.

<sup>2</sup> Dalby has determined only the period of its popularity. According to him, this was the fourth century BC (Dalby 2003: 293). However, since the first person to write about *karyke* was Mithaicus of Sicily, who was active towards the end of the fifth century BC, we should assume that *karyke* had appeared in the Greek world before this time, maybe at the turn of the sixth century BC. I would suggest that this delicacy arrived as a result of processes connected with the Great Colonisation, which facilitated the movement not only of material resources, but also ideas. As regards Mithaicus, cf. Bilabel 1921: 935 f.; Dalby 1996: 109 f.; Dalby 2003: 220; Wilkins 1996: 144–148.

<sup>3</sup> Regarding various dishes borrowed by the Greeks, cf. Greenewalt 1976: 53, n. 59; Harvey 1995: 273–285.

The delicacy in question is the *karyke* (καρύκη), i.e. a sauce or a kind of cured meat (χορδή)<sup>4</sup>, which due to its type and quality (and therefore the price of the recipe's ingredients) became a symbol of luxury.

No detailed recipe for *karyke* has survived. We know that the basic ingredient of this dish was blood. In all probability, however, it did not determine the uniqueness of the dish. Source materials indicate that a host of different ingredients were added. It is probable (we shall touch upon this issue later on) that these included garum (γάρος)<sup>5</sup>, pepper (πέπερι)<sup>6</sup>, malabathron (φύλλον Ἰνδικόν)<sup>7</sup>, cinnamon (κασσία)<sup>8</sup>, kostos (κόστος)<sup>9</sup>, and maybe also cumin (κύμινον)<sup>10</sup>. Since the abovementioned ingredients<sup>11</sup> had very high prices, the final product was very expensive, too. Therefore, only a select few were able to know its real taste. It should be added that this delicacy also became a topic of professional and literary discussion. This is emphatically testified by Athenaeus of Naucratis in book XII of his *Deipnosophists*, where he presents a long list of Classical culinary writers who wrote about this delicacy<sup>12</sup>.

On the basis of information contained in sources, one may form the impression that – in all probability – towards the end of the fifth century BC *karyke* became in a way fashionable, and that this fashion evolved (maybe in the fourth century BC) into a certain phenomenon – which I myself would call “culinary and sociological”. John Wilkins and Shaun Hill compared this to “a frisson [...]”

<sup>4</sup> The second identification (cured meat) may be made on the basis of data provided by Athenaeus of Naucratis, Pollux, Hesychius and the *Liber Suda*. I have tried to prove this in my article concerning *karyke* (Kokoszko, forthcoming). The texts upon which I based my conclusions are Athen. IV 160 b (50, 28 f. Kaibel); Poll. *Onom.* VI 56; Hesych. s.v. καρύκη, 915, 1–3; *Suda* s.vv. Καρύκη, 437, 5 f.; Μιμάρης, 1073, 1–3. For a similar interpretation, cf. Koukoules 1952: 56.

<sup>5</sup> The topic of the role of garum and its usage in the preparation: Kokoszko 2006: 288–298. As regards this delicacy, cf. Kokoszko 2005: 373 f. The latter contains a selection of the most important literature on this subject.

<sup>6</sup> In all probability black pepper, *Piper nigrum*. A typical Byzantine description: Aetius Amidenus, *Iatricorum libri* I 316, 1–5. Selected modern literature: André 1961: 209; Bremness 1991: 272; Dalby 2000a: 43, 89–94; 2004: 254 f; Dalby, Grainger 2000: 137, 250; Stobart 1998: 140–150. The spice was so expensive, that it was profitable to falsify it. Cf. Gal. *De san.* 268, 13–270, 1.

<sup>7</sup> *Cinnamon Tamala* or *Pogestemon Cablin*. A typical Byzantine description: Aetius Amidenus, *Iatricorum libri* I 266, 1; Dalby 2000a: 198 f.; Dalby 2003: 206; Laufer 1918: 5–49.

<sup>8</sup> A Classical description: Dioscurides Pedanius, *De materia medica* I 13, 1, 1–2, 4. A typical Byzantine description: Paulus Aegineta, *Epitoma* VII 3, 10, 93–96. Cf. Dalby 2000a: 198; 2003: 87.

<sup>9</sup> *Kostos – Saussurea Lappa*. A typical Byzantine description: Aetius Amidenus, *Iatricorum libri* I 219, 1–12. Cf. Dalby 2000a: 197; 2000b: 85 f.; 2003: 105.

<sup>10</sup> *Cuminum cyminum*. A typical Byzantine description of this plant: Aetius Amidenus, *Iatricorum libri* I 235, 1–3. Selected modern literature: André 1961: 203; Bremness 1991: 62; Brothwell 1988: 252, 260; Dalby 2003: 74, 108 f.; Dalby, Grainger 2000: 139; Stobart 1998: 67 f.; Zohary, Hopf 1993: 189.

<sup>11</sup> With the exception of cumin (see below).

<sup>12</sup> Cf. the long list of Greek authors who wrote about *karyke*: Athen. XII 516 c (12, 1–10 Kaibel).

similar to that aroused by hollandaise in an old fashioned Briton”<sup>13</sup>. In my opinion, Wilkins and Hill did not so much make an exaggeration as failed to appreciate the influence that this dish exerted on the consciousness of the ancient Greeks. For if the role of *karyke* amongst the latter was the same as that of hollandaise amongst the British, its traces in the body of English vocabulary would be similar to those left by *karyke* in the existing Greek vocabulary. However, “hollandaise” was and continues to be no more than a designatum, and – very importantly, in my opinion – there are no derivative terms indicating a scope of usage outside the field of gastronomy<sup>14</sup>. The Greeks – as opposed to the Britons – not only kept the initial term in memory for thousands of years, but also started to use a great number of words derived from *karyke*, the meaning of which considerably exceeded the subject of interest of the culinary art. Such was the origin of the verbs *καρυκεύω*, *καρυκοποιέω*, *ἐκκαρυκεύω* and *ἐπικαρυκεύομαι*, and of the nouns *καρυκεία* and *καρύκευμα*. All of these words appear at least a number of times in Classical and Byzantine literature.

I would like to stress that the present study is not concerned with concepts which, although also derived from *karyke*, are translated in literature in a manner that does not raise my objections<sup>15</sup>. In addition, I would like to add that I have not made use of all Classical and Byzantine sources. Instead, I concentrated on those which I considered important for determining the proper meaning, or constituting a good illustration of typical usages, of the terms in question.

Since I have already analysed the issue of *karyke* in a separate study dedicated to this topic (Kokoszko 2008), I will not discuss this specific dish at great lengths. Nevertheless, I would add some new findings<sup>16</sup> and propose a few practical conclusions that, in my opinion, should be taken into consideration during the elaboration of successive studies on culinary topics and translations of Greek texts.

Due to the fact that collective data regarding *karyke* and terms derived therefrom come from Byzantine sources<sup>17</sup>, I always prefer to start the discussion from these works. It should be added that we owe the present state of knowledge to two lexicographic works, namely the sixth century lexicon of Hesychius and the tenth century encyclopaedical work called *Liber Suda* (cf. Kokoszko 2005: 13 and 16, respectively). I will supplement this data with materials obtained from other sources, which I have ordered chronologically and, insofar as possible,

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<sup>13</sup> Wilkins, Hill 1995: 437, n. 4.

<sup>14</sup> L. Brown 1993: 1248.

<sup>15</sup> For example *καρυκοειδής*; *ές*, *καρυκάζω*, etc.

<sup>16</sup> I am referring to the above-mentioned findings concerning the time of introduction, ingredients and role of *karyke* in Greek gastronomy and culture.

<sup>17</sup> I have omitted a discussion of the sources of lexicons, which in my opinion is not important for the final findings which I have made. Specific issues have been touched upon in my work on fish at the points referred to below.

thematically. I think that this allows a better presentation of the continuity and evolution of individual concepts.

I shall start from the noun *καρυκεία*, which is a relatively common derivative of *καρύκη*. Hesychius uses it in the plural dative (*καρυκείαις*), translating it with the words *μαγείρευμα*, in all probability meaning ‘a means or technique of the culinary art’<sup>18</sup>, *ἄρτυμα*, that is ‘herb, spice’, and *ταραχή*. The latter expression, in turn, seems to suggest that the term *καρυκεία* was understood by the author of the lexicon as meaning ‘unrest; a disturbance of normal order; an anomaly’<sup>19</sup>.

The very fact that Hesychius provides this term in the plural implies that *karykeia* was a collective noun/description, used with respect to various products that were connected in one group by way of a certain distinguishing feature. In all likelihood, the latter was their strong aroma, for the word *artyma* clearly indicates that they belonged to the category of spices. We should conclude that, if the word *mageireuma* was semantically equivalent (or related) to *artyma*, Hesychius wanted to state that *karykeiai* were ingredients (herbs/spices or other constituents of dishes), which were used in order to add to the appropriate aroma of individual dishes. It appears that this instrumental usage of *karykeiai* is also borne out by the case in which the lexicographer cited the word, i.e. the dative.

In the end, the word *tarache* not only suggests the figurative usage of the term *karykeia*, but also reflects the extraordinariness (passing beyond the commonly accepted norm) of the designatum. We may therefore conclude that in the culinary meaning, the *tarache* emphasised the exoticness and expensiveness of the aforementioned *karykeiai*.

The *Liber Suda* defines *karykeia* as ἡδύτης τῶν ζωμῶν (*Suda* s.v. *Καρυκεία*, 436, 1). This term is not clear. For in all truth there are no data indicating how to translate the word ἡδύτης appearing in the lexicon. There exist at least three basic possibilities of translation. The first is ‘sweetness, good taste’, while the second is ‘a herb/spice; that which gives the dish an appropriate taste’. I would also consider the third possibility, namely that the word ἡδύτης refers to ‘a specific characteristic of a dish, which contributes to the delight felt by the palate’<sup>20</sup>.

<sup>18</sup> The interpretations of the Greek terms come from the author of the present article. Also cf. Kriaras 1980: 376.

<sup>19</sup> Hesych. s.v. *καρυκείαις*, 917, 1. The present phrase may also be translated as ‘mishmash’. Then maybe it would be a reference to the nature of *karyke* as a mix of many ingredients. There are no hints as to whether the author intended a pejorative meaning of the word *tarache*, although this interpretation may be justified by the semantic value of the verb *ταράσσω* and the noun *ταραχή*.

<sup>20</sup> It may be that the author used the word ἡδύτης to refer to the proportions of ingredients used, their appropriate processing, and the masterly skills of the cook – in other words, to all those elements which contribute to the sensual pleasure felt by the consumer. This meaning was also not foreign to the *Liber Suda*. Cf. *Suda* s.v. Ἡδυπαθής, 113, 1 f. It is also possible the term was associated with the idea of a delicacy, a titbit etc., and that is why the term *καρυκίον* developed to mean a typical Greek relish, notably a nut. Cf. Andriotis 1974: 299.

Although in my opinion all three meanings are equally probable in the cited context, the data provided by Hesychius and the remainder of the analysed material seem to suggest that the second translation renders the meaning of ἡδύτης in the *Suda* passage in question the best. The exact meaning of the word ζωμός is also difficult to pinpoint, for ζωμός could be used by the author to mean either ‘soup’ or ‘sauce’. This was a general term used to describe a liquid dish without any precise definition of its nature<sup>21</sup>.

And what do other sources have to say on this topic? Athenaeus of Naucratis (XIV 646e [55, 44 Kaibel]) mentioned a certain baked product known as *nastos* (ναστός), which was made with additives called *karykeiai* (πλακοῦντος εἶδος, ἔχων ἔνδον καρυκείας). These were put inside, maybe as a filling. This at least is Andrew Dalby’s supposition<sup>22</sup>. The truth could, however, have been different, for the preposition ἔνδον does not have to suggest that the said *karykeiai* were concentrated in one place – it could easily indicate that they were mixed equally with the entire volume of the dough. If so, then the additives mentioned in the *Deipnosophists* were nothing more than various ingredients put into the dough during kneading<sup>23</sup>.

The term in question was known to the Fathers of the Church. The passage of Basil of Caesarea also indicates that *karykeia* was not a separate dish, but an ingredient used in various dishes. The meaning differs slightly from that encountered in the *Deipnosophists*. Namely, in one of Basil’s works this additive is mentioned as an ingredient used for therapeutic purposes. According to the author, physicians added it to foodstuffs in order to attain a specific medicinal effect, i.e. to stimulate the appetite (πρὸς τὸ πλεῖον ἐπιτείνεσθαι τὰς ὀρέξεις)<sup>24</sup>.

In the works of Gregory of Nazianzus, in turn, *karykeia* is taken to mean a ‘delicacy’ or an unspecified costly additive, which makes dishes exceptional. This follows clearly from the juxtaposition of *karykeia* with the simplicity of an ordinary meal of bread and salt (ὁ ἄρτος καὶ οἱ ἄλλες, ἡ καινὴ καρυκεία)<sup>25</sup>.

John Chrysostom used the word *karykeia* a few dozen times in those passages of his speeches in which he condemned lavishness and excessive wealth. This is a symptomatic usage, fully concordant with the general body of information available on the luxuriousness of everything connected with *karyke*. Thus, the term appeared in John Chrysostom’s writings in the context of a criticism of the Sybaritism of those who live in luxury and think only of food (οἱ τὰς Συβαριτικὰς

<sup>21</sup> Dalby 2003: 54, 99, 103, 214, 307.

<sup>22</sup> “...with a filling”, Dalby 2003: 61.

<sup>23</sup> Selected literature on breads in antiquity: T. Brown 1995: 55–68; Frayn 1978: 28–33; Cubberley 1995: 55–68; Hill, Bryer 1995: 44–54; Jasny 1942: 747–764; 1950: 227–253; White 1995: 38–43; Whitehouse 1978: 146 f. The work of Athenaeus of Naucratis and the abovequoted medical treatises are abundant in the pertaining data.

<sup>24</sup> Basilus Caesariensis, *Homiliae super Psalmos* 365, 8–13.

<sup>25</sup> For example Gregorius Nazianzenus, *Oratio funebris in laudem Basili Magni* LXI 3, 4 f.

ἔχοντες τραπέζας, καὶ τὰ ἐδέσματα, καὶ πᾶν εἶδος καρυκείας ἐπινοοῦντες)<sup>26</sup>. In the statement in question, *karykeia* appears immediately after the noun ἐδέσματα, and thus the position of this word suggests that the author had in mind all sorts of additives to the basic elements of the diet – and not the diet staples themselves. What is more, John Chrysostom referred to a whole assortment (πᾶν εἶδος) of *karykeia*, which constitutes yet another argument supporting the above line of thought<sup>27</sup>.

In accordance with the aforementioned thesis propounded by the author, we also encounter the noun *karykeia* as meaning an additive used in the preparation of sophisticated beverages (πόματα [...] μετὰ πολλῆς κατεσκευασμένα τῆς καρυκείας)<sup>28</sup>. This means that the word *karykeia* could not refer to the *karyke* sauce, for this belonged to the group of *opsa* (ὄψα), i.e. additives to the basic part of the diet (bread, or a thick soup, not to beverages), while in view of the fact that one of its ingredients was boiled blood, it could not have been used in beverages. In any case, the history of Greek cuisine does not provide us with even the most distant analogy to such usage<sup>29</sup>.

John of Damascus used the term in question in a metaphorical way, speaking about the spiritual *karykeia* (πνευματικὴ καρυκεία) when referring to prayer. In all probability, he wanted to suggest that contact with God endows life with taste in the same way as exclusive spices food<sup>30</sup>.

An important testimony for our discussion are the medical treatises which when dealing with dietetics perforce also analyse culinary aspects. In the *De sanitate tuenda*, Galen used the term *karykeia* to refer to a spice or ingredient of a dish. It follows from the context that the physician always endowed *karykeia* with certain therapeutic properties (Gal. *De san.* 298, 8–11). In addition, Galen's materials enable a partial reconstruction of the missing recipe for *karyke* itself – the physician considered *garum* as belonging to the category of *karykeiai* (ἄνευ γάρου τε καὶ πολὺ δὴ μᾶλλον ἔτι τῆς ἄλλης καρυκείαςσκευασθῆ). If we take into consideration the fact that this fish sauce entered culinary usage at more or less the same time as *karyke*<sup>31</sup>, was expensive, and also known in Asia Minor<sup>32</sup> (where

<sup>26</sup> Iohannes Chrysostomus, *Expositiones in Psalmos* 278, 34–42.

<sup>27</sup> In connection with the interpretation of Hesychius' gloss.

<sup>28</sup> Iohannes Chrysostomus, *Sermo de Anna* 673, 42–44.

<sup>29</sup> The only beverage known to me which could have functioned as a substitute for a regular meal is the *kykeon* (κυκέων). However, this too was not prepared with blood. It was wine mixed with milk, water and barley flour. Other ingredients could have been added optionally, in order to modify the taste and dietetic properties of the beverage. Cf. Dalby 2003: 46; Dalby, Grainger 2000: 40; Grant 2002: 81; Roscher 1888: 522–524.

<sup>30</sup> Iohannes Damascenus, *Vita Baarlam et Joasaph* 577, 22–25.

<sup>31</sup> Dalby 2003: 156.

<sup>32</sup> We know this very well from, for example, *Geoponica* XX 46. For an interesting interpretation of recipes contained in this work, see Grant 2002: 29.



Lydia, the homeland of *karyke*, is located), it should be concluded that garum constituted *karykeia* in the initial meaning of the word, and therefore that it was treated as an essential ingredient of *karyke*.

Aetius of Amida used the word *karykeia* to designate a dish or, and this appears decidedly more probable, a mixture of spices, both made up of a great many ingredients (φάρμακα [...] ἐν ταῖς καρκεῖαις μισγόμενα). It appears from the context that these additives were endowed with therapeutic properties, which follows from the fact that Aetius considered the *karykeiai* category to include the so-called ἀπλᾶ φάρμακα, i.e. substances of varied (though usually plant) origin, used (independently or as an ingredient of complex medications) for therapeutic purposes<sup>33</sup>. Many of the enumerated *pharmaka*<sup>34</sup> are known in modern languages under the term ‘spices’, and their usage was the same in antiquity and Byzantium as in present times.

In his *Therapeutica*, Alexander of Tralles used *karykeia* as a collective term that refers to all additives used to make other dishes (ἢ κυμίνου ἢ ὀρύζης ἢ ἄλλης τινὸς καρκεῖας), and endow them with specific dietetic properties<sup>35</sup>. For example, Alexander of Tralles used this term to refer to cumin and rice (ὀρύζη). The first was widely used as a herb, while rice was a less common and therefore more expensive product, used as a substitute for cereals typically used in Mediterranean cuisine<sup>36</sup>. While cumin was popular in the Mediterranean world when *karyke* first appeared and functioned as a popular spice, rice became known to the Greeks somewhat later, not until the times of Alexander the Great<sup>37</sup>. We should therefore conclude that of these two terms, only the first could potentially refer to a *karyke* ingredient. Only one problem remains. Namely, cumin was so cheap<sup>38</sup> that it did not really suit a mix of “extravagant” spices such as *karyke*.

A significant argument for our discussion may be found in the *De legationibus* (488, 21–24). This contains a reference to a group of exotic spices which in the text are named *karykeiai* (Ἰνδικὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ Πρίσκου λαβεῖν ἀξιῶν καρκεῖας).

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<sup>33</sup> Aetius advised mixing medications with substances of this type ἐν ταῖς καρκεῖαις; Aetius Amidenus, *Iatricorum libri* III 57, 15–20.

<sup>34</sup> Aetius also used this term when referring to pepper, malabathron, cinnamon, kostos and caraway. Fish sauce was a complex substance, but also had therapeutic properties. Regarding the therapeutic properties of garum, cf. for example Dioscurides Pedanius, *De materia medica* II 32, 1, 1–4; Gal. *De simplicium* 377, 1–15; Aetius Amidenus, *Iatricorum libri* II 150, 1–3; Paulus Aegineta, *Epitoma* VII 3, 3, 21–23.

<sup>35</sup> Alexander Trallianus, *Therapeutica* II, 403, 11–15.

<sup>36</sup> Dalby 2003: 279–281; Forbes, Foxhall 1995: 73; Hill, Bryer 1995: 51 f.; Zohary, Hopf 1993: 84 f.

<sup>37</sup> Dalby 2003: 281.

<sup>38</sup> Dalby 2003: 108 f. In my opinion, however, this is not an argument against cumin, for not all of the ingredients of a luxurious dish had to be equally expensive and sophisticated. For example, blood (the main ingredient of *karyke*) most certainly was not exclusive.

This short list is headed by pepper, followed by malabathron, cinnamon and kostos. In my opinion, Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus kept the fullest list of *karyke* ingredients. All of the ingredients mentioned in the *De legationibus* functioned as spices, and were also sufficiently expensive as well as exotic to contribute to the fame of this delicacy.

The term *karykeia* was also known to Anna Comnena, who wrote about dishes seasoned in a sophisticated way (ὄψον μάλα καλὸν [...] καὶ καρυκείας οὐκ ἄτερον). In his translation of the *Alexias*, Oktawiusz Jurewicz has rendered<sup>39</sup> this noun as ‘przyprawa’ (spice)<sup>40</sup>. I think that this translation ideally expresses the intentions of the author.

As regards the word *karykeuma*, Hesychius suggests that it was used to mean τράγημα, that is a ‘delicacy’, and/or ἄρτυμα, i.e. ‘spice’ (Hesych. s.v. καρυκευμάτων, 914, 1). It is also worth emphasising that the author used this word in the plural. This seems to be a direct analogy to identical usages (also in the plural) of the word *karykeia*, and thus conclusions drawn from such usages should be analogous to those presented above.

The *Liber Suda* does not depart from this interpretation. Its author explains the term in question as a ‘spice’, and gives a more precise clarification by means of the nouns ἥδυσμα and ἄρτυμα (*Suda* s.v. Καρύκη, 437, 4 f.). He writes in the same tone when referring to the making of a certain type of baked product known as ἐπίπαστα, which was formed in the shape of bread loaves or cake, sprinkled with a sort of *karykeumata*<sup>41</sup>.

It is worth confronting these data with the lexicographic information provided by Pollux. The latter indicates that the term *karykeuma* could have been used with respect to liquid dishes known as *dzomoi*. If so, then we should conclude that the noun in question also referred to sauces (Poll. *Onom.* VI 56). However, we must also stress that this is the only lexicographic material which directly indicates that *karykeuma* referred to a dish of this type.

The definition given by Hesychius and the *Liber Suda* seems to find support in the material provided by other authors. In the *De Lazaro* homily, John Chrysostom enumerates various luxury goods and makes a reference to τὸν πολὺν ἄκρατον, τῶν ἐδεσμάτων τὰς ποικιλίας, τὰ καρυκεύματα, i.e. he differentiates between food and the additives with which it is enriched. From the structure of the expression we should conclude that *karykeumata* were used with regard to the latter. However, the usage of this term by John Chrysostom is so general

<sup>39</sup> Anna Comnena, *Alexias* II 6, 5, 1–6.

<sup>40</sup> “‘My’, mówiła ona, ‘przygotowaliśmy wyśmienity posiłek nie bez przyprawy. Jeśli ty chcesz uczestniczyć w naszej uczcie, przybądź jak najszybciej dzielić ją z nami’” (“‘We’, she stated, ‘have prepared a delicious meal not devoid of some spices. If you want to take part in our feast, come as quick as you can to share it with us’”), Anna Komnena, *Aleksjada* II 6, 5, p. 59.

<sup>41</sup> *Suda* s.v. Ἐπίπαστα, 2507, 1–6. Cf. *Scholia in Ar. Eq.* 103a, 1–5. Cf. Dalby 2003: 100.

and imprecise that, depending on the context, *karykeumata* can be translated as ‘various *opsa*’ (since these were a supplementation of staples), ‘sauces’ (for these were additives to *edesmata* and formed a subcategory of *opsa*), and also ‘spices’ (for the latter determined the extraordinary qualities of the dish)<sup>42</sup>. Elsewhere he enumerates *karykeumata* directly after wine, and before the skills of cooks (τὴν περιττὴν τοῦ οἴνου δαπάνην, τῶν καρυκευμάτων τὴν περιεργίαν, τραπεζοποιῶν καὶ σιτοποιῶν καὶ μαγείρων τέχνας)<sup>43</sup>. From the context we should conclude that the author was referring either to luxury dishes, or to exotic additives. The nature of neither, however, can be determined.

In the homily *In hexaemeron*, Basil of Caesarea distinguishes *opsa* from *karykeumata* (ἀντὶ παντὸς ὄψου πολυτελοῦς καὶ τῶν ποικίλων καρυκευμάτων)<sup>44</sup>. If so, then we should conclude that he was referring to the ingredients of dishes, and not to the dishes themselves.

The historian of the Church, Socrates Scholasticus, knew *karykeumata* from a phrase of Menander and translated this term by means of the word ὑπόστασις, which the Polish translator, Stefan Józef Kazikowski, excellently rendered as ‘przyprawa’ (spice)<sup>45</sup>.

John Philoponus, in turn, uses the term in question to mean ‘an additive to the food proper’, which only exceptionally (κατὰ συμβεβηκός) contributes to the nourishment of the human organism (οἱ γὰρ χυμοὶ καρυκεύματος δίκηνη [...] κατὰ συμβεβηκός τρέφοντες). He thus confirms the uniqueness of the designatum, but without making any specific mention of its nature<sup>46</sup>.

The verb καρυκοποιέω is attested only twice and, in my opinion, there is insufficient material to ascertain its semantic scope with any certainty. There seems to be no doubt that it originated from the words καρύκη and ποιέω, and thus we should conclude that initially it referred to the activity of preparing *karyke*. However, one may get the impression that it soon gained a metaphorical usage, referring to a beautiful manner of expressing oneself. It appears in such a context quite early, in the *Knights* of Aristophanes (Ar. Eq. 343). That the tendency to change the semantic scope was strong and long-standing is brought out by the fact that only the latter usage was known to the author of the *Liber Suda* and, according to him, the verb καρυκοποιέω meant ‘to make an expression beautiful through the floweriness of style’ (*Suda* s.v. Καρύκη, 437, 3 f.).

<sup>42</sup> Iohannes Chrysostomus, *De Lazaro* 985, 49–57.

<sup>43</sup> Iohannes Chrysostomus, *De virginitate* 69, 1–7.

<sup>44</sup> Basilus Caesariensis, *Homilia IX in hexaemeron* 6, 104–107.

<sup>45</sup> “U Menandra – przyprawa, jakby ktoś np. określił męty w beczce wina jako ‘hipostazę’” (“In Menander’s works – spice, as for example someone would call dregs in a wine barrel ‘hypostasis’”), Sokrates Scholastyk, *Historia Kościola* III 7.

<sup>46</sup> Iohannes Philoponus, *In Aristotelis libros de anima commentaria* XV, 601, 15–20.

As in the case of *καρυκοποιέω*, the verb *καρυκεύω* also originates from the noun *καρύκη*. Although there is no clear testimony regarding the initial semantic scope of this word, it is highly probable that it first referred to the activity of preparing *karyke*. The premise for such an assumption is based not only on the general principles of creating verbs from nouns in Greek, but also on Hesychius' interpretation of the meaning of the compound verb made from the preposition *ἐκ* and the verb *καρυκεύω*. In Hesychius' *Lexicon* we find that *ἐκκαρυκεύω* was then defined as 'preparing a dish by combining many ground ingredients' (Hesych. s.v. *ἐξεκαρυκεύθη*, 3669, 1 f.). This interpretation not only gives a clear pointer to the initial gastronomic usage of the verb *καρυκεύω*, but also excellently presents the process of preparing *karyke*. For this was always described as a dish composed of many ingredients.

Hesychius also testifies that, just as *καρυκοποιέω*, the verb *καρυκεύω* must have undergone a change of semantic scope, after which it referred to the general activity of seasoning dishes, and not only to the preparation of one specific sauce, i.e. *karyke*. This is supported by another statement made by the same lexicographer. According to him, the meaning of this verb was identical to that of *ἀρτύνω* and *ἡδύνω* (Hesych. s.v. *καρυκεύει*, 913, 1). The final semantic scope is also attested to for yet another compound verb, namely *ἐπικαρυκεύομαι*, which was interpreted by Hesychius as meaning 'to spice, season' (Hesych. s.v. *ἐπικαρυκεύεται*, 4834, 1).

According to the *Liber Suda* (s.v. *Καρύκη*, 437, 1–4), *καρυκεύω* had in practice the same semantic scope as Hesychius' *ἐκκαρυκεύω*, although the author broadened the meaning and stated that the term also referred to the activity of 'wetting, saturating' (*ἀναδεύειν*). What is more, the *Lexicon* also contains a reference to the verb *ἐκκαρυκεύω*, and the explanation given by the author of the *Liber Suda* does not differ in any significant way from that provided by Hesychius (*Suda* s.v. *Ἐξεκαρυκεύθη*, 1603, 1).

If we supplement this data with other source information, we shall find as follows. Athenaeus of Naucratis (IV 172b [72, 12 Kaibel]) preserved a fragment of a comedy by Menander, where the verb *καρυκεύω* was used in a general meaning, namely to indicate the action of seasoning (the action of sweetening with honey). In my opinion, an analogous instance may be found in the works of the same author, when he described seasoned dishes as *τὰ κεκαρυκευμένα* (Athen. IV 132b [9, 26 Kaibel]). I am convinced of the correctness of my argumentation by the fact that in excerpts from the *De sententiis* dishes of this type are juxtaposed with food prepared hastily, without due care, i.e. *ἐσχεδιασμένη τροφή* (*De virtutibus et vitiis* I 130, 24 f.). Menander's usage of this verb is similar to that of Julian the Apostate, who writes about seasoning or "strengthening the intensity of taste" (*κἄν ὑποτρίμμασι μυρίοις τις αὐτὰς καρυκεύσῃ*). The latter, however, has on his mind neither *karyke* nor honey, but a certain category of sauces known as *ὑπότριμμα* (Julian. *Or.* 6, 192b).

A good example of the metaphorical usage of *καρυκεύω* may be found in the work of Theophylact Simocatta. He wrote about the “Homeric way of beautifying speech” (τινι ἔπει τῆς Ὀμηρικῆς τραγωδίας *καρυκεύσω* τὸν λόγον), with the word *καρυκεύω* being used to mean ‘embellish expressions’<sup>47</sup>. The semantic scope of the verb in question is analogical in another passage of the *De sententiis* by Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus (10, 1–11).

The verb *ἐκκαρυκεύω* was also used by Michael Psellus<sup>48</sup>. In the excellent Polish translation of the *Chronography*, Oktawiusz Jurewicz rendered this word as ‘umiejętność przyrządzania znakomitych sosów’ (the skill of preparing delicious sauces) (*καρυκεῦσαι δὲ δεινότατος ἐγεγόνει*). This, of course, is just one of the options, but the data presented hereabove prove that the verb *καρυκεύω* in the Psellus passage could have a slightly different semantic value and refer either to the activity of preparing *karyke* or to the skill of ‘sophisticated seasoning of dishes’. Since I have shown that the first usage is in essence hypothetical, while *ἐκκαρυκεύω* in Byzantine Greek meant first and foremost ‘to season’, I consider that in this specific instance the second option is decidedly closer to the intentions of the author. It is all the more probable, as Psellus in his narrative more or less explains what he had in mind using the infinitive *καρυκεῦσαι*. Personally, I would opt for the interpretation that the term *καρυκεύω* referred to Constantine VIII’s ability to endow dishes with colour and aroma in such a way as to stimulate the appetite (*χρῳαῖς τε καὶ ὀσμαῖς [...] πᾶσαν φύσιν πρὸς ὄρεξιν ἐκκαλούμενος*), and not to the knowledge of/skill in preparing any sauces.

We may now sum up the deliberations set forward in the present study. They show that only the term *καρύκη* is rather precise semantically. We may conclude that it usually referred to a sophisticated delicacy of Lydian origin, that this dish was liquid, and that in topical literature it is known as a sauce.

Sometimes, however, the term *καρύκη* also referred to a type of liver sausage made from blood and herbs. The second meaning is decidedly less common.

From Pollux’s work we may further conclude that in order to name the two aforementioned dishes it was possible to replace the noun *καρύκη* with the term *καρύκευμα*.

Nominal terms related to *karyke*, namely *καρυκεία* and *καρύκευμα*, are most probably general expressions and usually refer in a general manner to luxurious dishes or their constituents. I think, however, that the authors had in mind primarily the latter, with the word ‘ingredients’ meaning more or less the same as ‘herbs’ or ‘spices’ today.

*Καρύκη* and *καρύκευμα* were also used in a metaphorical way, with their semantic value depending on the context in which they were used.

<sup>47</sup> Theophylactus Simocatta, *Historiae* VIII 7, 3, 1–4.

<sup>48</sup> Psellus, *Chronographia* II 7, 2–12.

The verb *καρυκοποιέω* referred to the activity of preparing *karyke* only initially, and from a certain time it was used first and foremost metaphorically. As Byzantine lexicons show, the latter usage prevailed.

The verb *καρυκεύω* was in all certainty derived from the term *καρύκη*, initially meaning the activity of preparing the *karyke* sauce. However, still in antiquity its meaning was broadened to include the art of seasoning dishes. It also started to be used metaphorically.

There is no evidence to suggest that the abovementioned verbs were used in the initial meanings in Byzantine times.

*Ἐκκαρυκεύω* and *ἐπικαρυκεύομαι* also refer to the action of seasoning.

The above findings have their practical implications. A good example would be the modifications in the abovementioned passage of Michael Psellus' *Chronography*, suggested by myself. First of all, it is possible to translate the Psellus passage with the verb *καρυκεύω* being taken to mean 'to prepare *karyke*', or at least replacing the adjective 'excellent' with 'luxury' or 'expensive'. Second, and this option is preferred by myself, one can eliminate references to sauces from the translation and render the verb *καρυκεύω* as meaning 'to season'. Then, we would maintain coherence with the remainder of Psellus' passage, i.e. with the part concerning the endowment of dishes with colour and aroma so as to stimulate the appetite.

I would also like to stress that the interpretations of other texts circulating in scholarly circles should be adapted to the findings of my research. For example, in his excellent study on the various Lydian delicacies, David Harvey<sup>49</sup> translates the verb *καρυκεύω* (in the fragment of a comedy authored by Achaeus of Eretria and preserved by Athenaeus of Naucratis) as 'pour *karyke* over the sacrificial meat'. However, in the light of my research it is highly probable that Achaeus of Eretria (Athen. IV 173c–d [74, 1–6 Kaibel]) was not referring to any such action, but simply to the (sophisticated) seasoning of the meat.

And one more example. A. Dalby cites the aforementioned Achaeus and calls the inhabitants of Delphi 'sauce-makers', that is *karykopoioi*<sup>50</sup>. The residents of Delphi were in all probability proficient in the culinary art, but Achaeus' fragment gives no direct indication that they were skilled at preparing the *karyke* sauce. It should be added that it is also necessary to revise the term 'a loaf with a filling', which the same scholar gave as the definition of the term *nastos*. *Nastoi* were not loaves of bread stuffed with *karyke*, but baked products aromatised with sophisticated herbs and spices<sup>51</sup>.

If the arguments presented above are correct, then I shall have to verify my own earlier findings, presented in the abovementioned article on *karyke*. In the

<sup>49</sup> Harvey 1995: 277.

<sup>50</sup> Dalby 2003: 293.

<sup>51</sup> Dalby 2003: 61.

light of the present analysis, there is no proof of any particular popularity of *karyke* in Delphi. What is more, nothing seems to indicate that it was used as an additive to meats, or that it was poured on baked products known as ἐπίπαστα.

University of Łódź

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## C E N S U R A E L I B R O R U M

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**Glenn R. Bugh (ed.),** *The Cambridge Companion to the Hellenistic World*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. XXIX, 371.

*The Cambridge Companion to the Hellenistic World* contains fifteen essays on different aspects of Hellenistic history. G.R. Bugh, the book editor, is a historian, with particular interests in Hellenistic Athens and in the Byzantine Empire. He invited sixteen historians and archaeologists from Europe, USA and Australia to contribute to this volume.

In the preface Bugh says that he decided not to set a precise time frame for the book, and it spans the period from Alexander the Great until the Roman conquest of the Hellenistic world. A less advanced reader will appreciate a handy Hellenistic Timeline in the beginning of the book (pp. XIX–XXII). The book is appended with three maps which feature Alexander's track, the Seleucid Empire and Hellenistic Greece. 21 black and white figures illustrate various aspects of Hellenistic art, architecture, economy. All fifteen chapters are accompanied by short bibliographies, while a comprehensive bibliography can be found at the end of this volume (pp. 331–359).

In the preface the editor presents the difficulties he encountered while studying the Hellenistic history, such as indicating the time frames, diversity of Eastern or fragmentary Greek sources. He relates key publications for the period; however, he does not cite any important Babylonian or Jewish sources, such as the Books of the Maccabees, or Babylonian Chronicles.

The chapters are not related to each other and the first one, *Alexander the Great and the Creation of the Hellenistic Age* by A.B. Bosworth, is a good introduction into the subject and an outline of Alexander's empire history. Bosworth criticizes the traditional view of Alexander, created by J.G. Droysen. The author presents how the empire grew, but he focuses on showing Alexander's ability to establish and exercise his power in the conquered lands. We learn about methods of governing the huge and diverse empire, how new cities were built or how Alexander recruited mercenaries to serve in his army. It might seem that Alexander exercised control over his domain through dictatorship. But, in fact, he usually upheld the local customs and governments to prevent treason and uprisings, albeit he protected his property well and awaited respect. Finally Bosworth contrasts the unity of Alexander's empire with chaos which occurred after his death, and which was caused by inability of his successors to rule the vast empire.

Next chapter, *Hellenistic Kingdoms* by W.L. Adams, briefly presents each kingdom with emphasis on the factors which made maintaining the equilibrium impossible, such as diversity of natural resources, size of governed lands or their military strength. This thread is continued by D.G.J. Shipley and M.G. Hansen in the chapter *Polis and Federalism*. It shows how polis, itself a creation of the classical age, was functioning under the new regime. In particular, they emphasize the characteristics which remained the same and those which evolved. The authors use Hellenistic Athens and Alexandria as models.

The economy of new lands, the exploitation of natural resources and administration are subject of J.K. Davis' essay *Hellenistic Economies*. Davies presents arguments that Ptolemaic Egypt is the best example of a prospering Hellenistic kingdom. He shows the well organized local government which restructured sea ports in order to stimulate commerce and to allow subjects of the Ptolemies to prosper despite the comparative lack of natural resources.

The later part of the book is dominated by art, science, religion, philosophy and literature. One of the most interesting essays is *The Hellenistic Family* by D.J. Thompson, which begins with a quotation from a marriage contract of some Herakleides and Demetria preserved on a papyrus from Elephantine. It defines the content of the article, describing not only the Hellenistic family,

be it noble or common, but also the phenomenon of ethnically mixed families, caused by constant expansion of the Hellenistic world.

G.J. Olivier (*History and Rhetoric*) shows the influence of historiography and rhetoric on the development of philosophy and literature. The essay *Language and Literature* (N. Krevans, A. Sens) deals with the variety of languages existing in conquered lands, describes how the Greeks inhabiting Hellenistic empires kept their identity, and how the Macedonian monarchy seized the tradition of Athens, converting the prestigious Attic dialect into official language of the empire.

Other interesting chapters cover the basic aspects of contemporary life (*Material Culture* by S.I. Rotroff; *Science, Medicine and Technology* by P.T. Keyser and G. Irby-Massie). The second essay shows the world of philosophical schools, of research in the fields of mathematics, geography, astronomy and physics, and of discoveries in medicine and technology. The Hellenistic scholars debated how the blood circulated in the body or what was the origin of human nature. The author presents also the development of technology: harbours, fleet, war machines and the innovations in everyday life.

G.R. Bugh continues the military thread in the *Hellenistic Military Developments*. The author details all the formations of the Hellenistic army and describes the military advancements such as a new method of siege warfare, usage of siege towers and catapults. A considerable portion of the chapter deals with the use of elephants in the Hellenistic army and the increasing importance of cavalry.

In the last essay of the book, *Recent Trends and New Directions*, D.G.J. Shipley debates the meaning of the Hellenistic period. He claims that the Hellenistic period was indeed the time of flowering of political institutions and culture and has to be studied as deeply as the classical period. In the last subsection the author indicates the issues which beg for more study like the functioning of the Greek cities after Alexander or the Greek Peninsula itself, which seem to be largely forgotten in modern scholarship.

Essays contained in this book aim at presenting the current state of research of the Hellenistic world. Diversity of discussed subjects is a considerable advantage and the topics selected for the book are for the most part well documented. Bibliographies contain the most recent literature and the most important publications of the earlier scholarship alike. The most obvious reader of this volume is a student of history or classics and his/her purpose is served well, as the book provides the reader with a good, clear overview of the Hellenistic times. For scholars working in the field, the book may be interesting mainly as the source of reference to the most recent studies; however, it will not enrich their knowledge substantially.

It is important to underline that the volume does not deal with all the lands of the Hellenistic world, omitting such areas as Sicily or Greek kingdoms in India, while Bactria for instance is presented in a rather cursory way. The authors do not discuss in depth any of non-Greek nationalities inhabiting the empire. Hence the question arises if it is indeed a companion to the entire Hellenistic world.

*Aleksandra Szalc*  
*University of Wrocław*

**Burkhard Scherer, *Mythos, Katalog und Prophezeiung. Studien zu den Argonautika des Apollonios Rhodios*, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2006 (Palingenesia Band 87), 232 S.**

Das Streben, etwas Neues zu schaffen, bedeutet manchmal nur, etwas anders zu machen, manchmal sogar, etwas zu kompliziert oder umgekehrt, zu vereinfachend darzustellen. Einen solchen Eindruck kann man bei der Lektüre der Arbeit Burkhard Scherers [= S.] gewinnen. Zugleich bedeutet das selbstverständlich nicht, dass wir dabei nur Zeit verlieren müssen.

Das Buch besteht hauptsächlich aus „drei Einzelstudien, die unabhängig von einander gelesen werden können“ (S. 3). Es geht also um die Darstellung des Argonautenmythos (S. 9–56), des Argonautenkataloges (S. 57–134) und eine Analyse der Weissagung des Phineus (S. 135–198). Dazu kommt noch die Einleitung (S. 3–8; und Vorrede), ein Anhang (der einen Auswahlkommentar [*sic!*] zu den Versen 307–425 aus dem 2. Buch der *Argonautika* enthält) und ein nicht geringes Literaturverzeichnis (S. 223–232).

Bei dem Buch handelt es sich um die „leicht korrigierte Fassung der Doktorarbeit“ (Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, 2002; Vorwort). In der Einleitung präzisiert der Verfasser das Thema der Arbeit und gibt uns knappe terminologische Hinweise. Es zeigt sich aber dabei, dass das Buch als ein Ganzes aus zwei Komponenten besteht, nämlich aus der Dissertation und teilweise auch aus der Staatsarbeit (Münster, 1997), deren Ergebnisse von S. selbstverständlich, wie er das selbst betont, „modifiziert, revidiert und beträchtlich erweitert“ wurden (S. 3, Anm. 2). Während der Lektüre der folgenden 50 Seiten brauchen wir uns glücklicherweise nicht an die erwähnten terminologischen Feststellungen des Verfassers zu erinnern, da sie im Text nicht vorkommen. Dieser Teil der Arbeit bildet nämlich eine Zusammenstellung antiker Quellen (dabei wird ganz kurz auch die frühe Ikonographie erwähnt, S. 17 f.), die sich mit dem Argonautenmythos und mit den Argonauten selbst verbinden (auch Ktesias ist hier genannt, obwohl „unsicher ist“, wie das von S. bemerkt wird, „inwieweit er Verbindungen mit dem Argonautenmythos zog“, S. 34). Man sollte anerkennen, dass wir hier eine bequeme Übersicht der entsprechenden Autoren und Texte erhalten. Außerdem weisen uns fast 190 Anmerkungen auf Stellenangaben und auf die weitere Fachliteratur hin, in der wir höchstwahrscheinlich (in einigen Arbeiten sicher) eine vertiefte Interpretation der einzelnen Quellen finden können. Der erste Hauptteil des Buches endet mit einer Tabelle (sie umfasst fast genau 100 Helden), in der „die Namen und Vatersnamen aller Argonauten“, die wir aus der antiken Literatur kennen, mit gewissen zusätzlichen Informationen aufgelistet werden (S. 49–56).

Der zweite Teil des Buches wurde von S. einem sehr wichtigen Element der epischen Poetik gewidmet, nämlich dem Katalog, der seit der Homerischen Dichtung einen festen Platz in der europäischen epischen Literatur einnimmt. In diesem Fall geht es natürlich um den Argonautenkatalog; am Anfang dieses Kapitels aber erwägt S. eine allgemeine Problematik, nämlich die sehr schwierige Frage nach der Definition des (poetischen) Kataloges und einer Distinktion zwischen ihm und einer Liste oder einer Aufzählung. S. versucht, eine Neudefinition anzubieten, die auch „katalogisierte Erzählpartien“ (d. h. „Katalogerzählungen“, z. B. die Teichoskopie) und „Kataloge“ (z. B. der Schiffskatalog aus der *Ilias*) abzugrenzen ermöglicht. Ein Fazit finden wir auf Seite 72. Nach der Feststellung von S. ist die „Liste“: „Beschreibung in Form einer Aufreihung von Begriffen desselben Kontextes bzw. Expansion eines Pantonyms durch Aufreihung seiner Meronyme“; der „Katalog“ ist: „Beschreibung in Form einer (formal) überstrukturierter Liste (poly-syntaktisch)“; eine „Listenerzählung“ ist: „Erzählung in Form einer Aufreihung von Begriffen desselben Kontextes“; und eine „Katalogerzählung“ ist: „Erzählung in Form einer formal überstrukturierter Liste“. *Sapienti sat!* Zum Glück verwendet S. den Termin „Katalog“ weiter auch traditionellerweise. Eins kann ich dabei nicht verschweigen. Obwohl sich der Verfasser gerade mit den Fragen des epischen Kataloges besonders intensiv beschäftigt, hat er die Untersuchungen von T. Krischer

(*Formale Konventionen der Homerischen Epik*, München 1971, S. 131–158: *Der katalogische Stil*) überhaupt nicht berücksichtigt.

Ich verzichte hier auf eine Einzeldiskussion. Es genügt festzustellen, dass man in diesem Teile des Buches sicher auch ganz wertvolle Beobachtungen des Verfassers finden kann. Wenn ich aber z. B. über „semantische Formeln“ lese, dass wir unter dieser Formulierung verstehen sollten: „Angliederungssignale, die als solche nicht isoliert generisch oder semantisch erkennbar, sondern aufgrund der semantischen Wiederholungen Lemmatisierung erzeugen“ (S. 107), und: „das Gliederungssemem wird dabei strikt lemmatisierend eingesetzt, d. h. jedes Lemma des Schiffskataloges enthält exakt ein  $V_{NP}$ , es supplementiert die makrosyntaktische Lemmatisierung durch  $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$ “ (S. 108), dann klingt das in meinen Ohren als eine Warnung, dass man auf diese Weise Dichtung auch einfach ermorden kann.

Der dritte Kapitel der Arbeit von S. bringt uns eine Darlegung und eine Analyse der Phineus-Episode aus dem 2. Buch der *Argonautika*. Die Weissagung des unglücklichen Sehers ist im Allgemeinen sehr interessant und auch für die künftigen Ereignisse und für die Komposition des nachstehenden Teiles des Epos von Apollonios Rhodios von großer Bedeutung. Außerdem stellt der Dichter, wie das richtig bemerkt wird, die ganze Episode „unter das Leitmotiv der Vermeidung von ὕβρις und Respektierung der θεῖμις“ (S. 135, mit Anm. 457). Nach einer Konstitution des Textes (Vv. 307–425) und seiner Übersetzung (S. 142–146; ähnlich auch zuvor im Falle des Argonautenkatalogs, Vv. 23–233, vor, vgl. S. 80–91) geht S. zu einer detaillierten Interpretation (die teilweise wirklich beachtenswert ist) einzelner Abschnitte der Erzählung über. Der Verfasser führt hier verhältnismässig viele kleine Tabellen (über dreißig) in den Text ein, die seine Beobachtungen verdeutlichen oder verständlicher machen sollen. Er nimmt dabei ständigen Bezug auf homerische (oder apollonianische) Parallelen, intertextuelle Allusionen, strukturelle Abhängigkeiten, Kohärenzen und Korrespondenzen, verschiedene Übereinstimmungen, Wiederaufnahmen, wörtliche Bezugnahmen, Vorbilder oder Vorbildfunktionen, intertextuelle Befunde, etc., etc., um u. a. festzustellen, dass „Apollonios geschickt die verschiedenen homerischen Vorbilder kontaminiert“ (S. 171). Außerdem finden wir ebenda auch so köstliche Formulierungen wie z. B.: „es handelt sich hier um generische Intertextualität, der konkrete Kontext fügt nichts zur Interpretation des Kontextes Zieltexes hinzu“ (S. 185).

*Pro domo nostra* ist es mir angenehm, noch erwähnen zu können, dass S. zwei auf polnisch geschriebene Bücher verwendet hat (man kann auch andere *Polonica* finden). Der Titel der Arbeit von K. Głombowski (auch sein Name) ist leider nicht ohne kleine orthographische Fehler zitiert, s. Anm. 174; warum er aber, und T. Zieliński, s. Anm. 705, aus dem Literaturverzeichnis verschwunden sind, weiß ich nicht. Die Arbeiten von J. Rostropowicz sind dort hingegen berücksichtigt worden.

**अलमतिविस्तरेण** – das Buch ist von S. allen gewidmet worden, „die wissen, warum“ (aus dem Vorwort). Hoffentlich entdecken sie also bei dieser Arbeit einen besonderen Reiz; leider gehört der Rezensent zum Kreis einfacher Klassischer Philologen, die nur etwas von der griechischen epischen Dichtung verstehen.

Włodzimierz Appel  
Nicolaus-Copernicus-Universität, Toruń

**Carin M.C. Green, *Roman Religion and the Cult of Diana at Aricia*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2007, 347 S., 8 Abb.**

Jedem, der *The Golden Bough* von James G. Frazer gelesen hat<sup>1</sup>, prägte sich sicher die am Anfang dargestellte Beschreibung des Schicksals von *rex nemorensis*, des Diana-Priesters von der in der Nähe Roms gelegenen Aricia ein. Daher kann nicht verwundern, dass eben diese plastische Vision – und nicht die kompakte Darlegung von Georg Wissowa<sup>2</sup> – in hohem Maße die Vorstellungen vom Kult der Göttin gestaltet haben. Nach fast hundert Jahren bedürfen jedoch die Auffassungen beider Gelehrten einer grundlegenden Revision. Einen derartigen Versuch unternahm eben C.M.C. Green [= G.], die vor der rezensierten Monographie einige Interesse weckende Artikel veröffentlicht hat<sup>3</sup>. Die neue Interpretation war aus zumindest drei Gründen erforderlich: Erstens haben archäologische Untersuchungen in den letzten dreißig Jahren sowohl das Bild der frühesten Geschichte Roms überhaupt als auch insbesondere Latiums wesentlich verändert<sup>4</sup>; zweitens sind Arbeiten entstanden, die nicht nur archäologische Funde präsentieren<sup>5</sup>, sondern auch die wichtigsten Quellen betreffend die Göttin und ihren Kult kommentieren<sup>6</sup>; drittens wird bei den Beschreibungen der Religionen Roms immer öfter postuliert, dass der Verschiedenheit der römischen religiösen Traditionen eine größere Beachtung geschenkt werden soll<sup>7</sup>, und der Kult der Diana von Aricia eignet sich sehr gut für die Anwendung solcher Forschungsperspektive.

G. unternahm in ihrer Arbeit einen Versuch die chronologische Auffassung mit der problemorientierten Ordnung zu verknüpfen und baute die Arbeit auf drei Teilen auf. Der erste Teil (Kap. I–VI) präsentiert nicht nur die Geschichte des Kults Dianas und ihres Sanktuariums, sondern auch die sich verändernden Vorstellungen der Göttin in Kunst und Literatur. Im zweiten Teil (Kap. VII–IX) interpretiert G. die Prozedur der Funktionsübernahme durch *rex nemorensis* und die Beschreibung der mit dem Kult verbundenen mythischen Gestalten. Der dritte Teil (Kap. X–XII)

<sup>1</sup> J.G. Frazer, *The Golden Bough. A Study in Magic and Religion*, vols. 1–12, London 1911–1915.

<sup>2</sup> G. Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus der Römer*, München<sup>3</sup> 1912, S. 247–252.

<sup>3</sup> Z. B. *The Slayer and the King: Rex Nemorensis and the Sanctuary of Diana?*, Arion VII 2000, S. 24–63; *Claudius, Kingship, and Incest (Annales 12, 8)*, Latomus LVII 1998, S. 766–791; *Did the Romans Hunt?*, CIA XV 1996, S. 222–260.

<sup>4</sup> Z. B. G. Forsythe, *A Critical History of Early Rome: From Prehistory to the First Punic War*, Berkeley 2005; F. Hinard (éd.), *Histoire romaine: Des origines à Auguste*, Paris 2000; C.J. Smith, *Early Rome and Latium: Economy and Society c. 1000 to 500 B.C.*, Oxford 1996; T.J. Cornell, *The Beginnings of Rome: Italy and Rome from Bronze Age to the Punic War (c. 1000–264 B.C.)*, London–New York 1995.

<sup>5</sup> M. Lilli, *Ariccia: carta archeologica*, Roma 2002; P. Gulldgar Bilde, M. Molteson, *A Catalogue of Sculptures from the Sanctuary of Diana Nemorensis in the University of Pennsylvania Museum, Philadelphia*, Rome 2002 (Analecta Romana Instituti Danici, Suppl. 29); J.R. Brandt, A.-M.L. Toutai, J. Zahle, *Nemi – Status Quo: Resent Research at Nemi and the Sanctuary of Diana*, Rome 2000 (Occasional Papers of the Nordic Institutes in Rome I).

<sup>6</sup> S. z. B. J. Dyson, *King of the Wood: The Sacrificial Victor in Vergil's Aeneid*, Norman, OK 2001; L.L. Holland, *Worshipping Diana: The Cult of a Roman Goddess in Republican Italy*, PhD Diss., University of North Carolina 2003; M. Jentoft-Nilsen, *Diana on Roman Coins*, PhD Diss., University of Southern California 1985.

<sup>7</sup> S. z. B. C. Smith, *The Religion of Archaic Rome*, in: J. Rüpke (ed.), *A Companion to Roman Religion*, Malden 2007, S. 31–42.

präsentiert hingegen den Kult der Diana in Aricia im Kontext der Kultpraktiken ihrer Verehrer. Die gesamte Arbeit wird durch einen Anhang (*Appendix*) ergänzt, in dem G. eine neue Übersetzung und Interpretation eines Textabschnittes von Servius (ad *Aen.* VI 136), der ausgewählten Bibliographie sowie des Quellenverzeichnisses und des allgemeinen Verzeichnisses vorschlägt.

Im ersten Teil wurde die archäologische Evidenz betreffend den Kult im Zusammenhang mit der Geschichte Latiums und Roms von der neolithischen Zeit bis hin zum 2. Jahrhundert n. Chr. dargestellt. G. zeigt den Prozess, dem zufolge ein kleines Sanktuarium, das die Rolle des Sitzes des Latinischen Verbundes spielte, sich im Laufe des 1. und 2. Jahrhunderts v. Chr. in ein „internationales“ Religionszentrum mit hellenistischer architektonischer Umrahmung (u. a. Portikus, kleines Theater, Bad und Schwimmbecken) verwandelte. Die Prachtjahre der Aricia sind in der Zeit der Antoninen zu Ende gegangen (vielleicht infolge einer Naturkatastrophe). Das tatsächliche Ende kommt jedoch erst mit der Versetzung des Priesters nach Sparta (wahrscheinlich Ende des 2. Jahrhunderts n. Chr.). Die Jahrhunderte alte Geschichte des Sanktuariums zeigt Diana als eine Göttin mit vielen Gesichtern. Zunächst verband man sie mit dem Mond und sie war vor allem – was durch die Übernahme der Ikonografie von Artemis noch verstärkt wurde – Jagdschützerin, die in der Zeit des Wettstreits um die Hegemonie in Latium als Göttin mit einer die Führerschaft garantierenden Autorität galt. Bezüge auf andere Aspekte der göttlichen Kräfte und der Götter (Trivia, Hacate, (Juno) Lucina, Victrix, Opifer, Conservatrix) konstruierten ihre mehrgestaltige Identität als Göttin der Kultur und der Zivilisation, der Straßen und Pfade, der Jugend und ihrer Ausbildung, des Lebens und des Todes, des Wachstums und der Zersetzung, der Frauen im Kindbett sowie als Beschützerin und Erlöserin der Frauen und Männer vor verschiedenen Unglücksfällen usw.

Im zweiten Teil nimmt G. eine Diskussion mit klassischen Interpretationen (d. h. denen von Wissowa und Frazer) der Person des *rex nemorensis* auf und stellt die Prozedur seines Eintrittes in die Funktion des Priesters als ein Ritual dar, das folgendes umfasst: Abnehmen der Mistelzweige, Kampf im Wald zwischen dem sich im Dienst befindlichen Diana-Priester und demjenigen, der diese Funktion übernehmen will, Beerdigung des Besiegten und eine symbolische Reise ins Innere der Höhle am Fuße eines Vulkankraters. G. sieht in diesem Verfahren eine Verbindung des Jagdmystizismus, der Philosophie und der Politik in Bezug auf die unter den Latinen bekannte ursprüngliche Idee eines Königreichs, d. h. eines Zusammenschlusses von marginalisierten Männern (Flüchtlinge, Verbrecher, Vertriebene oder Fremde) mit der königlichen Macht. Somit könnte der Status des *rex nemorensis* mit der Position des mythischen Orestes verglichen werden. Daher war es erforderlich, dass der Diana-Priester ein entflohener Sklave ist, d. h. ein Mensch von außerhalb der Gemeinschaft, oder anders gesagt ein für die Gemeinschaft, die er verlassen hat, „toter“ Mensch. G. bespricht auch Relationen der Diana mit den in der Nähe des Sanktuariums wohnenden *numina*: Virbius (dem Hippolyt gleichgestellt) und Egeria, deren Kult zweifelsohne einen Teil der zu den Augustiden stattfindenden Festlichkeiten zu Ehren Dianas darstellte.

Im dritten Teil analysiert G. die Relationen zwischen Diana und ihren Verehrern im Kontext der Praxis der Heilung, die im Sanktuarium zustande kam. Neben Maßnahmen aus dem religiösen Bereich nutzte sie auch die rationale, empirische Medizin, stützte sich also auf Fähigkeiten und Kenntnisse, über die heutzutage Therapeuten, Psychiater und Ärzte verfügen. Die „religiöse“ Heilung stellte keinesfalls eine Opposition zur Praxis der Hippokrates-Ärzte dar, da beide Schulen z. B. Träume als Werkzeug für die Diagnose und Prognosen über den Verlauf der Krankheit, Diät und verschiedenartige Spezifika nutzten. Auch die Gottesgaben stellten einen integralen Bestandteil der so verstandenen Medizinpraxis dar, ähnlich wie diverse theatralische und musikalische *performances*. G. beweist auch, dass es einen deutlichen Zusammenhang zwischen der Theorie der Stimmungen der rationalen Medizin, den Kosmogonien der süditalienischen Mystiker-Philosophen und der Nutzung von *maniae* (aus Teig gefertigten Menschengestalten) im „Heilungsprozess“ gab. Er ist im Kontext einer Metapher des Kochens – die oft in Beschreibungen der Heilungen vorkommt – zu interpretieren, also eines Handels, das sich auf ein entsprechend ausgewähltes Verhältnis einzelner Bestandteile stützt. Das Vernichten der Teigfiguren stellte einen Teil des Rituals und das Äquivalent des Todes *manes* dar, das erneute Zusammenkleben der Figuren symbolisierte die Geburt des neuen „ich“.



Bei dem Versuch eine moderne Monographie der Diana von Aricia zu schreiben, stellte sich G. zweifelsohne eine sehr schwere Aufgabe, da wir bei den Studien über die römische Religion auf Quellen angewiesen sind, die uns keine einzelnen Kulte in Form eines kompakten, kontinuierlichen Prozesses, sondern eher in Form zufälliger Spuren in der Unermesslichkeit der Diskontinuität präsentieren. Da wir diese Lücken nur sehr schwer füllen können, ist die Anzahl an Monographien römischer Götter und Göttinnen gar nicht imposant<sup>8</sup>. G. versucht die Mängel der Quellenbasis oft mit eigener Initiative und mit eigenem Vorstellungsvermögen auszufüllen, wie z. B. dann, wenn sie sich als Befürwortung ihrer Ausführungen über soziale Empfindungen nach den Bürgerkriegen in Rom auf das Phänomen der Traumata nach dem 1. Weltkrieg und nach dem Vietnamkrieg bezieht (S. 206), oder ein anderes mal, wenn sie sich bei Ausführungen über die Erfolge der Medizinpraktiken in Aricia auf das Ritual *séance* bei den Kaluli in Neuguinea bezieht (S. 287 f.), oder auch wenn sie für die Interpretation der religiösen Erscheinungen die Theorie von Tonio Hölscher über die römische Kunst heranzieht (S. 82). Derartige Bezüge verstärken mit Sicherheit die Attraktivität der Ausführungen von G. und führen dazu, dass diese überzeugender wirken. Ihr Vorhandensein darf jedoch die bestehenden Zeugnisse des Diana-Kultes aus dem Zentrum des Interesses nicht vertreiben.

Ein wesentlicher Mangel der Arbeit von G. scheint nämlich die fehlende, solide Besprechung der Quellen, der Zeit und des Kontextes ihrer Entstehung zu sein. Im Text treffen wir oft auf Anmerkungen, die jedoch keine Bedeutung für allgemeine Schlussfolgerungen haben. Und die Theorien von Frazer und Wissowa, mit denen G. diskutiert, wurden eben auf deren Grundlage geschaffen. Die Tatsache, dass G. eine größere Bedeutung der Interpretation als den Quellen beimisst, zeigt sich auch z. B. darin, dass sie in der Zerstörung der Cäsar-Villa in Aricia politische Gründe sieht (S. 27–29), obwohl der über dieses Ereignis berichtende Sueton (*Div. Iul.* 46) weder *expressis verbis* noch auf eine andere Weise eine derartige Denkweise zulässt. In der Arbeit von G. überrascht auch, dass obwohl die meisten Quellen zum Diana-Kult in den Zeiten des Römischen Reiches entstanden sind, diese Tatsache im Text nicht wiedergegeben wird. Auch die Frage der Verlegung der sterblichen Überreste des Orestes von Aricia nach Rom, die bei der Inauguration des goldenen Zeitalters durch Augustus durchgeführt wurde, wurde in keiner ausgefeilten Form weiter behandelt.

Abgesehen von den polemischen Anmerkungen ermöglichte jedoch eine derartige Auffassung des Kultes der Diana von Aricia G. sich mit enormer Erudition auf Elemente der Rituale, Mythen, Philosophie aus verschiedenen Zeiten und kulturellen Kontexten zu beziehen und in die Ausführungen Abschweifungen über Medizin und Politik einzuflechten. Manchmal verdecken sie zwar einige religiösen Fragen, und ein interessierter und anspruchsvoller Leser will sicher mehr über die Relation zwischen dem Kult der Diana in Aricia und dem Kult der Göttin in dem durch Servius Tullius auf dem Aventin gestifteten Tempel, oder auch allgemein über Zusammenhänge zwischen den Kulturen Latiums und den Kulturen Roms erfahren. Es bleibt ihm nur noch die Hoffnung, dass diese Fragen zum Thema weiterer Forschungen der Autorin werden.

*Lechosław Olszewski*  
*Poznań*

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<sup>8</sup> Z. B. B.S. Spaeth, *The Roman Goddess Ceres*, Austin 1996; G. Capdeville, *Volcanus. Recherches comparatistes sur les origines du culte de Vulcain*, Roma 1995; H.H. Brouwer, *Bona Dea. The Source and Description of the Cult*, Leiden 1989.

**James B. Rives, *Religion in the Roman Empire***, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007 (Blackwell Ancient Religions), 237 S., 11 Abb., 4 Karten.

In der neuen Reihe „Blackwell Ancient Religions“, die die moderne Erfassung ausgewählter religiöser Ereignisse präsentiert<sup>1</sup>, erschien soeben eine weitere Arbeit, die diesmal der Religion zu Zeiten des Römischen Reichs gewidmet ist. Der Autor, James B. Rives [= R.], ist nicht nur Kenner der römischen Religion in den Provinzen, sondern auch Kommentator, Übersetzer und Redakteur von Arbeiten über die Kultur des Prinzipats<sup>2</sup>.

Die rezensierte Arbeit besteht aus sieben Kapiteln und einem Epilog. Im Vorwort (*Introduction*) erklärt R., warum er sich nicht mit Religionen („the religions of the Roman Empire“), sondern mit der Religion im Römischen Reich („religion in the Roman Empire“) befasst. Nach Meinung des Autors teilte die Elite der römischen Gesellschaft, trotz einiger wesentlicher Differenzen zwischen einzelnen Regionen des Imperiums und den sie bewohnenden sozialen Gruppen, gemeinsame Ansichten und religiöse Praktiken. R. will diese Ansichten und Praktiken im sozialen und intellektuellen Kontext des Römischen Reichs präsentieren.

Im Kapitel I (*Identifying “Religion” in the Graeco-Roman World*) befasst sich R. mit den wichtigsten mit der Religion verbundenen Begriffen (u. a. *religio*) und zeigt diverse Methoden, wie die Gottheit durch Kultpraxis, Mythen, Kunst und Philosophie konstruiert wurde. Weiters weist R. auf die Frage der religiösen Autorität, des Glaubens und auf die Quellen der Moral vor dem Hintergrund der römischen Religion hin. Der Autor betont zurecht, dass einerseits unterschiedliche Vorstellungen von Gottheit nebeneinander funktionierten, die man nicht zu vereinheitlichen und monopolisieren versuchte, andererseits jedoch auch ein ganzheitliches Model der religiösen Praxis existierte, das durch die Elite der römischen Gesellschaft reproduziert wurde.

Unterschiedliche religiöse Traditionen stellen den Analyse im Kapitel II (*Regional Religious Traditions of the Empire*) dar. R. stellt fest, dass die römische Herrschaft diese Vielfalt nicht nur tolerierte, sondern diese sogar förderte. Obwohl viele Kulte im Römischen Reich von den griechisch-römischen Normen wesentlich abwichen (z. B. eine andere Kultpraxis, andersartige Organisation), stützten sie sich jedoch auf ähnliche Vorstellungen (z. B. sie setzten die Existenz mehrerer Götter voraus, die das Leben der Menschen beeinflussen und deren Gunst man durch Opfer und Rituale erlangen kann). Zwischen diesen Traditionen fanden zwei widersprüchliche und zu Spannungen führende Prozesse statt: Auf der einen Seite schritt die Partikularisierung (*particularization*) voran, die auf der Identifizierung der Götter mit der lokalen Welt beruhte, auf der anderen Seite die Generalisierung (*generalization*), infolge welcher lokale Gottheiten in verschiedenen Regionen mit denselben Namen benannt wurden.

Im weiteren Kapitel (*The Presence of the Gods*) zeigt R., auf welche Weise römische Götter in der Welt präsent waren. Die Gottheit war nämlich keine abstrakte Idee oder etwas, das „anderswo“ existiert, vielmehr war sie tief verwurzelt und mit dem menschlichen Empfinden der Welt verbunden. Die Anwesenheit des göttlichen Elements in der Welt der Natur war genauso selbstverständlich, wie die Ansicht, dass Götter das alltägliche Leben beeinflussen können. Daher kann nicht verwundern, dass sich Menschen an die Götter nicht nur dann gewandt hatten, wenn die Situation ihrer Kontrolle zu entgleiten drohte (z. B. Reisen) oder in Krise- und Gefahrensituationen, sondern

<sup>1</sup> J.D. Mikalson, *Ancient Greek Religion*, Oxford 2005; in Vorbereitung z. B.: D. Collins, *Magic in the Ancient Greek World* und S. Johnston, *Ancient Greek Divination*.

<sup>2</sup> *Religion and Authority in Roman Carthage*, Oxford 1995; *Tacitus: Germania*, Oxford 1999; J. Edmondson, S. Mason, J. Rives (eds.), *Flavius Josephus and Flavian Rome*, Oxford 2005.

auch, wenn es sich um andere wichtige Angelegenheiten handelte (z. B. gute Ernte, Gesundheit, Freiheit).

Im Kapitel IV (*Religion and Community*) zeigt R., dass die Religion keineswegs eine ausschließlich persönliche Erfahrung war, sondern vor allem ein soziales Phänomen darstellte, durch welches die Identität der Gruppen und die geltenden sozialen Hierarchien definiert wurden. Den wichtigsten Typ einer Religionsgemeinschaft stellte die Stadt dar, in deren Rahmen Religion im Netz des Euergetismus, Patronats und der lokalen Politik eingeflochten war. Eine wichtige Rolle einer Religionsgemeinschaft spielten weiters das Haus und diverse Vereine. Obwohl man, um der griechisch-römischen Welt angehören zu können, die Götter der Gemeinschaft verehren und sich an den Ritualen beteiligen musste, existierten auch Gruppen, in denen mehr als eine Beteiligung der individuelle Aufbau besonderer Relationen mit Gott geschätzt wurde (z. B. Juden und Christen).

R. betont, dass die allgemeine Anerkennung der Existenz mehrerer Götter ein Fundament der religiösen Integration darstellte, die im Kapitel V (*Religion and Empire*) analysiert wird. Die Schaffung enger Relationen zwischen unterschiedlichen lokalen Gemeinschaften begünstigte die Mobilität der „Pilgern“, die einflussreiche Orakelstätten, berühmte Sanktuarien oder Stätte größter religiöser Festspiele besuchten. Die Götter selbst wanderten auch, indem römische Legionäre, Kaufleute und Künstler ihre Kulte verbreiteten. Zur Integration trug darüber hinaus eine unkontrollierte und unterschiedliche Identifizierung der Götter untereinander und die allgemeine Verehrung des Kaisers bei.

Im weiteren Kapitel (*Religious Options*) setzt sich R. mit dem Spektrum religiöser Möglichkeiten auseinander. Der Autor beschreibt die Attraktivität „fremder“ oder „altertümlicher“ Traditionen (z. B. Pythagoreismus, Judentum, Mithraismus), die sich auf unterschiedliche Sammlung von Bedeutungen berufen. Einige von ihnen grenzten sich überhaupt nicht von traditionellen Kulturen ab, boten jedoch tiefere und mehr emotionale Erlebnisse und Empfindungen, manchmal das Versprechen des Lebens nach dem Tod, oder sogar die „Erlösung“, an. Wenn man diese überhaupt als eine Alternative betrachten kann, so beruhte sie auf einer neuen Verstehensweise des Kosmos und der Stelle des Menschen im Kosmos.

Im Kapitel VII (*Roman Religious Policy*) stellt R. bei der Charakterisierung der Politik des Staates gegenüber lokalen Religionstraditionen fest, dass es keinen Druck auf einen Glaubenswechsel gab, da keine „Religion“ existierte, zu der man die unterworfenen Völker hätte bekehren können. Der Staat beschränkte seine Interventionen in das lokale Religionsleben auf ein Minimum. Sogar der negativ bewertete Atheismus, verstanden als Nicht-Teilnahme an Kulturen der Gemeinschaft und Aberglaube (*superstitio*), fand kein Interesse, solange er die öffentliche Ordnung nicht beeinträchtigte. Obwohl eine auf einen konkreten Plan gestützte Politik nicht existierte, bedeutet dies nicht, dass der Staat (meistens aus persönlichen Aspirationen des Kaisers) keine Maßnahmen traf. Den Gegenstand einer so verstandenen „Politik“ bildeten Magie, Judentum und Christentum.

Im Epilog (*Religious Change in the Roman Empire*) weist R. darauf hin, dass der meist imperiale Aspekt der römischen Religion die Verehrung des Kaisers war. „Der Kaiserkult“ und auch die „Mysterienkulte“ oder „orientalischen Kulte“, die doch griechisch-römische Kulte waren, ersetzten nie den Kult der traditionellen Götter. Ebenso ersetzten Hauskulte und Vereinskulte nie die öffentlichen Kulte. Die Elite des Römischen Reiches übernahm allmählich, obwohl sie diverse Interessen hatte, die griechisch-römische Tradition. Die Situation änderte sich erst im 4. Jahrhundert n. Ch., als sich das Christentum als ein kohärentes, zusammenhängendes Religionssystem enthüllte, das Philosophie und Kult in sich vereint.

Die Arbeit von R. erfüllt zweifelsohne die Anforderungen einer modernen, allgemeinen Einleitung in die Problematik der Religion im Römischen Reich gut. Für alle, die sich mit dieser Thematik zum ersten mal auseinander setzen, stellt die kleine Auswahl von Quellentexten (*text boxes*), Karten, Zeichnungen und ein Verzeichnis wichtigster Götter, Autoren und Texte eine große Hilfe dar. Ihre Aufgabe erfüllen auch Hinweise auf weitere Literatur in Bezug auf jedes Thema sowie die Bibliographie der Texte in englischer Sprache. Die wenigen Fußnoten im Text (S. 69, 129, 134, 139) scheinen eher Ergebnis einer ungenauen Korrektur zu sein.

In seiner synthetischen Aussage berücksichtigte der Autor viele gegenwärtige Interpretationen und Ergebnisse eigener Untersuchungen. Große Aufmerksamkeit erzielten insbesondere jene Teile, die sich auf Probleme der provinziellen Religion beziehen (Partikularisierung und Generalisierung, religiöser Pluralismus usw.). Genauere und interessiertere Leser müssen jedoch gewisse Inkonsequenzen bemerken. Gemäß den Annahmen sollte sich R. auf die Zeit des römischen Reiches konzentrieren. Die Kapitel I und III könnten genauso gut einen Teil eines allgemeinen Werkes über die römische Religion darstellen. Wenn der Autor wenigstens Überlegungen über die Position des Kaisers im Religionssystem des Reiches und seinen Status in dem damals populärsten Kult, dem sog. Kaiserkult, in die Narration eingebracht hätte, hätten wir eine zwar weniger universelle, statt dessen aber innerlich kohärentere Aussage erhalten.

Weiters kam R. dem Versprechen bezüglich der Präsentation des sozialen Kontextes, welcher auf ein Minimum eingeschränkt wurde, nicht ordnungsgemäß nach. Der Autor konzentrierte sich zu sehr auf die Darstellung des Zusammenhaltes der römischen Elite, dass man den Eindruck gewinnen kann, dass diese zum Zeitpunkt der Machtübernahme durch Augustus bereits voll ausgebildet war und in ihren Rahmen in den nächsten Jahren keine Änderungen aufgetreten sind. Außerdem beschränkte R. die Elite – mit Nachteilen vor allem für das Bild der Provinz – ausschließlich auf Männer. Der intellektuelle Kontext wird im selben Maße durch Ansichten von Plutarch und Tacitus, wie Hesiod (z. B. S. 89, 91), Aristoteles (z. B. S. 105–108) oder Cicero (z. B. S. 35–40) geschaffen. Die Betonung der Unifizierung des Römischen Reichs und der Vorstellungen der Elite eliminierte viele andere soziale Aspekte der Religion und ihre Veränderungen in der Zeit vom Prinzipat des Augustus bis zur Herrschaft von Konstantin. Infolge dessen können viele Leser vom allgemeinen Niveau der Aussage enttäuscht werden. Der Hervorhebung ausführlicher Fragen dient keinesfalls der Verzicht auf diachronische Erfassung zugunsten der Synchronie. R. entschloss sich für diese Form, obwohl die letzten Versuche diese Perspektiven zu verbinden, interessante Effekte gebracht haben. In einem den römischen Religionen gewidmeten Sammelwerk englischer Historiker wurden die wichtigsten Probleme der jeweiligen Periode zum Interpretationsschlüssel für einzelne Teile. Eine derartige Erfassung entschied darüber, dass eine dem Anschein nach chronologische Anordnung im Endeffekt eine Problemanordnung wurde<sup>3</sup>. Auch John North versuchte in den Analysen der römischen Religionen die historische Betrachtung mit der Analyse ausgewählter Fragen zu verbinden<sup>4</sup>.

Jedoch unabhängig von den hier auftretenden Zweifeln muss zugegeben werden, dass der Autor einen ersten Versuch unternommen hat, das Bild der Religion des Römischen Reiches darzustellen, ohne die generellen Konzepte zu wiederholen, die in letzter Zeit auf ausgezeichnete Weise durch John Scheid<sup>5</sup>, Robert Turcan<sup>6</sup> und Jorg Rüpke<sup>7</sup> zusammengefasst wurden.

R. präsentierte ein ganzheitliches und überzeugendes Bild der Religion des größten Imperiums und schilderte die wichtigsten in seinem Rahmen verlaufenden Prozesse. Einfluss auf die Gestalt des Bildes hatten zweifellos auch gegenwärtige Diskussionen über die Religion und die Überzeugung, dass die „Religion“ nicht nur eine konzeptuelle Kategorie ist, dank welcher wir die Welt zu begreifen versuchen, sondern auch ein Resultat eines spezifischen historisch-kulturellen Kontextes.

*Lechosław Olszewski  
Poznań*

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<sup>3</sup> M. Beard, J. North, S. Price, *Religions of Rome*, vol. I, *A History*, Cambridge 1998.

<sup>4</sup> J. North, *Roman Religion*, Oxford 2000.

<sup>5</sup> J. Scheid, *An Introduction to Roman Religion*, trans. J. Lloyd, Edinburgh 2003 [Paris 1998].

<sup>6</sup> R. Turcan, *The Gods of Ancient Rome*, trans. A. Nevill, Edinburgh 2000 [Paris 1998].

<sup>7</sup> J. Rüpke, *Die Religion der Römer. Eine Einführung*, München 2001.

**Eckart Schäfer (hrsg.), *Sarbiewski: Der polnische Horaz***, Tübingen: Gunter Narr Verlag, 2006 (NeoLatina 11), 322 pp.

There is no doubt that any book on Polish literature published in a foreign language should receive a warm welcome as a useful tool of promoting our culture abroad. So I should start with expressing my joy at the volume entitled *Sarbiewski: Der polnische Horaz*. The situation of studies on Neo-Latin writing is different from that of studies on vernacular literatures. It is impossible to neglect secondary sources published in any language for this simple reason that Neo-Latin writing is interesting for scholars from many countries. In the case of Maciej Kazimierz Sarbiewski the most important books are published in Polish. Consequently, anybody who intends to conduct studies on this poet is obliged to be able to consult Polish texts. Unfortunately, the first objection against the reviewed book is that bibliography is extremely incomplete. The authors ignored for example books and articles by Elwira Buszewicz, Aleksander W. Mikołajczak, as well as my own *Theologia fabulosa: Commentationes Sarbievianae* (Szczecin 2000). Many Polish names are printed with terrible spelling mistakes and sometimes I have the impression that references in the footnotes are only ornamental and not a real source and partners of discussion.

As a result the eighteen articles published in the *Sarbiewski: Der polnische Horaz* (in German and in French) are situated in a kind of vacuum. Some of them are really interesting and stimulating yet it is highly difficult to put them in the broadest context of research tradition. Moreover, the book is a collection of papers presented at the 7<sup>th</sup> Freiburg Neo-Latin Symposium held in June 2005 and for this reason it would be quite wrong to expect it to be a kind of companion to Sarbiewski (I do believe that such a book in English is very much wanted).

From my point of view the most interesting are two articles on the reception of Sarbiewski's poetry in Germany. The first one, *Die deutsche Sarbiewski-Rezeption in 18. und 19. Jahrhundert* by Peter Drews shows the presence of Sarbiewski's poetry in German works from 1720 until the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. In comparison with the English reception it starts almost one century later and is the effect of a different kind of poetical sensibility and literary movements. It is similar to English reception inasmuch as some of Sarbiewski's poems were translated by gymnasium professors. It is also an important evidence of Sarbiewski's presence in German speaking countries that the first monograph of his life and work was published in Dresden by Lebrecht Gotthelf Langbein in 1753 (*Commentatio de Mathiae Casimiri Sarbievi S.I. Poloni vita studiis et scriptis*) as well as the Wrocław (Breslau) edition of Sarbiewski's poetry was published in the same year, carefully examined in the reviewed volume by Karl August Neuhausen.

The second and most comprehensive section of the book is a collection of commentaries and interpretative articles. In this case lack of knowledge of Polish research may have positive results as in some cases the authors offer very fresh outlook on the poems. However, there is also the fact that it has not been possible to read the analyzed poems as a part of a whole carefully elaborated by the poet which has its own tradition of reading and commenting.

I really appreciate the paper by Beate Czaplá *Petrarkistischer Diskurs, christliche Mystik und die Umsetzungen der eigenen acutum-Lehre in Sarbiewskis Aloysius-Epigrammen*. Petrarch is a very important author both for ideology and language of Baroque poetry. Unfortunately, his impact on Sarbiewski's poetry has not been described sufficiently. Czaplá comments upon a group of twenty two epigrams spread in the whole *Liber epigrammatum* and shows some of the most important Petrarchian features: outstanding beauty of Aloysius, the contrast between red and white, mistake with God's nature, opposition between fire and ice, comparison of the eyes of the Beloved with fragmentation of the body. Czaplá very clearly describes the combination of Petrarchian language and convention with Christian mysticism, as exemplified by the *Spiritual exercises* by Ignatius Loyola and the *Sermones super Cantica Canticatorum* by St. Bernard of Clairvaux, using

Sarbiewski's own theory of epigram to explain the texts. It should be said that Czaplá does not intend to interpret the analyzed epigrams as a realization of homoerotic sensibility and discourse in Neo-Latin poetry (she could find more similar texts in *Epigrammatum liber*) despite very clear perspective of such interpretation.

The article by Jolanta Wiendlocha ("*Ad divam Elisabetham*". Maciej Kazimierz Sarbiewski, Urban VIII. und die Brevierreform) is also very interesting. The author is a specialist in, and an editor of, Urban VIII's poetry. So her return to a well-known topic seems very intriguing. The contribution of Sarbiewski to the reform of the Breviary was a well-established legend which was started by a statement in the Paris edition of Sarbiewski by J. Barbou in 1759. However, the common opinion in last decades was that it is impossible that Sarbiewski was a member of the committee because he had left Rome before its establishing (Gładysz, Warszawski). In her article Wiendlocha analyzes poems on St. Elisabeth by Sarbiewski and Urban VIII and concludes:

Hätte Sarbiewski die Ode für das Brevier geschrieben, hätte er von solcher Ausschmückung – wie Urban VIII. in seinen beiden Hymnen – Abstand nehmen müssen. Sarbiewski weicht aber in seinem Stück stark von den Vorgaben für die Reform des Breviers ab. *Ad divam Elisabetham* kann also nicht in diesem Zusammenhang geschrieben worden sein und bringt deshalb auch keinen neuen Hinweis für die Mitarbeit Sarbiewskis an der Brevierreform (p. 18).

If I understand Wiendlocha's argumentation correctly Sarbiewski's cooperation in the reform of the Breviary remains a legend.

I tried to read the reviewed book as a material for a monograph and editorial commentary. So among valuable analytical articles the following should be listed: *Fürstenlob und Dichterwettbewerb: Zu Sarbiewskis Maecenas-Figur Papst Urban VIII.* by Gesine Manuwald; *La "Carmen Seculare" de Sarbiewski comparé au "Carmen Saeculare" et à l'ode I, 35 d'Horace: imitatio, aemulatio, contaminatio* by Gérald Freyburger; *Vollendete (neu)lateinische Lyrik: Sarbiewskis Ode Lyr. 4, 35* by Florian Hurka; *Parodien des Horaz: Lyr. 3, 2; 2, 18 und 2, 26* by Thomas Baier; *Sarbiewski und das Hohelied* by Stefanie Grewe.

Comparative articles are also interesting. I should start by mentioning two articles by Eckard Lefèvre: *Die joniker-Gedichte von Alkaios (Fr. 10 V), Horaz (Carm. 3, 12), Celtis (Od. 3, 18), Sarbiewski (Lyr. 2, 28) und Balde (Lyr. 2, 12). Ein literarischer Dialog durch über zwei Jahrtausende* as well as *Die wandernden Musen: Jakobs Baldes Huldigung an Sarbiewski (Sylv. 5, 19)*. The next two articles compare Sarbiewski's poems with the poems by "Polish Horace" Jan Kochanowski. Aleksandra Olszynka writes about the motive of flying in both authors and Horace (unfortunately she does not know the excellent commentary on Kochanowski's *Pieśń II 24* by Jerzy Ziomek and his comments on its relation to Plato's *Phaedo*) and Eckart Schäfer writes on patriotic poems.

Two articles must be judged as just presentation of Sarbiewski's works in German, i.e. Thorsten Burkard's contribution on *Characteres lyrici, seu Horatius et Pindarus* (unfortunately, the author is not able to read Polish studies on this topic) and Mariusz Zagórski on the mythographic treatise *Dii gentium* (alas, the author omits basic Polish bibliography). I cannot understand the main idea of the paper by Lore Benz on the *Silviludia* also for the reason that he ignores Italian works on Bettini, an author of the text re-worked by Sarbiewski (I do not mention my own study on this topic).

After a careful reading of the *Sarbiewski: Der polnische Horaz*, it seems a very valuable volume despite some objections raised in the beginning of this review. Many papers cannot be omitted by anybody working on a commentary or a comprehensive study on Sarbiewski. Especially interesting are the papers which describe relations between Sarbiewski's poetry and other poets, especially Jacob Balde; they are important as material to establish *similia* as well as to promote intertextual reading of Neo-Latin poetry. Everybody should appreciate many German translations of the poems of Sarbiewski which are a kind of commentary. I should also say that the title can

be a little bit confusing because the expression “Polish Horace” is traditionally reserved for Jan Kochanowski whereas Sarbiewski is rather called “Sarmatian Horace”.

*Piotr Urbański*  
*University of Szczecin*

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