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JERZY AXER  
MAŁGORZATA BOROWSKA

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PL-50-139 WROCLAW, UL. SZEWSKA 49  
INSTYTUT FILOLOGII KLASYCZNEJ I KULTURY ANTYCZNEJ  
UNIwersYTETU WROCLAWSKIEGO  
e-mail: eos@uni.wroc.pl

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## ON HERACLITUS' ANTHROPOLOGY

By

ADAM DROZDEK

ABSTRACT: For Heraclitus, immortal life is possible if physical (fiery) integrity of the soul can be maintained during its life in the body. However, although he stated, "I investigated myself", investigating oneself was to Heraclitus only a means to the goal which is the knowledge of Logos. Self-knowledge has a positive character if man concentrates not on knowing himself but on investigating himself.

Heraclitus' anthropology is only infrequently discussed by historians of philosophy who usually concentrate on his ontology although "Heraclitus was the first to give serious thought to human soul and had a great deal to tell about it"<sup>1</sup>. He is often considered to be a philosopher of change, thereby becoming an opposite pole to Eleatic philosophy, which is summarized in the saying attributed to him, "everything flows" (Simpl. *in Phys.* 1313, 11; all translations are mine). He is considered to continue Milesian philosophy since he claimed fire to be the *arche*. He was also considered an heir of Xenophanes because of his critique of religion, and finally, the precursor of the Stoics because of his discussion of Logos. But very seldom is his anthropology mentioned, although in the extant fragments his statements about philosophy of man are not at all the smallest in volume.

## 1. THE DELPHIC MAXIM

Heraclitus stated, "I investigated myself" (DK 22, B101). What is the meaning of investigating oneself if truth can be found in Logos? "Not after listening to me but to the Logos one does wisely in agreeing that everything is one" (B50)<sup>2</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1931: vol. I, 375.

<sup>2</sup> Sometimes the essence of Heraclitus' philosophy is seen in the statement, "everything is one", Held 1980: 180; Hammer 1991: 41; Wesoły 1989: 37.

About Logos he said at the beginning of his book that is lost to us: “But of Logos that always exists, people are uncomprehending before listening [to what I have to say] and afterwards, for although all things happen according to the Logos, they are like people with no experience when they experience words and deeds such as I expound distinguishing each thing according to its nature and pointing to how it is” (B1). “That is why one must follow what is common; but although the Logos is common, many live as though they had their own understanding” (B2).

After quoting Heraclitus’ statement about investigating himself, Plutarch gave the maxim from the wall of Apollo’s temple in Delphi, “know yourself” (Plut. *Adv. Col.* 20, 1118c)<sup>3</sup>. This Delphic maxim was accepted not only by Heraclitus, but also by Socrates. However, the maxim meant different things to the two philosophers. For Socrates, it was important to know himself, to concentrate on himself, on his own inner life. On the other hand, Heraclitus “was not concerned about knowing himself, but about investigating himself”, where this investigation was not of psychological nature<sup>4</sup>. For Heraclitus, it was important that man is an organic part of the world and thus because of this integral union with the world investigating oneself leads to knowing the world. This becomes clear when we take into account Heraclitus’ concept of soul and its relation to fire and Logos.

The substrate of the world is fire. The cosmos was not created by any deity, but it is in essence the ever-living fire (B30). Everything is a form of existence of fire. During the process of transformation, fire becomes the sea, i.e., water, and the sea becomes earth and fiery mass (B31). Fire constitutes an exchange for all things and all things for fire (B90), which Simplicius understood as the statement that the existing things are out of fire, the first principle, and then turn back into fire (*in Phys.* 23, 33–24, 4 = A5). Plutarch, who quoted B90, made a similar comment on B90 (*De E* 8, 388d). It has to be emphasized that Heraclitus spoke about two kinds of fire, about the fire-substrate and about perceptible fire. An essential difference between these two kinds lies in the fact that fire-substrate is intelligible. After quoting Heraclitus statement that “thunderbolt governs all things”, Hippolytus stated that, for Heraclitus, “fire is intelligent (φρόνιμον [...] τὸ πῦρ) and the cause of management of the whole [universe]” (*Haer.* IX 10, 7 = B64).

Heraclitus also spoke about Logos. Giving a definition of Logos is not a simple matter and the statement that this is “one of the most discussed research problems in philosophy of Presocratics”<sup>5</sup> is fully justified. Already in antiquity, Logos was understood as cosmic reason and that is why in their discussions, the Stoics drew on Heraclitus. Heraclitus’ Logos seems to be the rationality or intelligibility

<sup>3</sup> For a history of this maxim, see Dempsey 1972: 141 f.

<sup>4</sup> Axelos 1962: 176.

<sup>5</sup> Voigtländer 1980: 33.



of fire-substrate<sup>6</sup>. This is rationality of the cosmic principle and thus rationality as such. Because Logos is eternal and it governs the changes in the cosmos, it can be identified with God, about whom Heraclitus also had something to say (B67, B102). Logos is the divine, intelligible principle that is immanent in the world.

It should be noted that fire-substrate is called *phronimon*, intelligible. Also, about Logos Heraclitus said that “although the Logos is common, many live as though they had their own understanding (φρόνησις)” (B2) where Heraclitus did not contrast Logos with *phronesis*, but “common” with “their own”, and thus the phrase “own understanding” becomes oxymoronic: “by necessity, *phronesis* is always associated with what is common”<sup>7</sup>. Therefore, the identification of *phronesis* of fire-substrate with Logos is possible<sup>8</sup>. And if we agree with the statement that “*phronesis* is knowledge related to action”<sup>9</sup>, then Logos can be considered as rationality of intelligent fire where this rationality includes *phronesis*, theoretical reasoning, and memory.

## 2. IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL

Fire’s rationality finds its fullest expression in the soul (ψυχή). The soul has always been associated with life and humans have been considered alive because of the presence of the soul in them. Death was tantamount to the soul’s leaving the body and going to Hades. For Heraclitus, life of the ever-living fire is passed to each individual soul, whereby the soul can become a life-force in humans.

Aristotle said that for Heraclitus, the soul was “an exhalation of which everything else is composed” (*De an.* 405a 25 f. = A15). Aristotle claimed the existence of two kinds of exhalation, moist and dry (*Meteor.* 340b 26, 341b 7, 344a 10), thus the exhalation attributed to Heraclitus must have been dry. Also, because Aristotle saw fire as the *arche* in Heraclitus’ doctrine (*Metaph.* 984a 6 f.) – and, importantly, so he did the soul (*De an.* 405a 25 f.) – the dry exhalation “of which everything else is composed” must be fire. Heraclitus himself stated that one of the cosmic transformations is the transformation of water into fire (B30) which – Heraclitus would agree – takes place through exhalation. In this sense the soul comes into being out of water (B36, B12) in the process of exhalation. Coming out of water does not thus mean that the soul has to be all watery, although it may; in Heraclitus’ system, coming from water makes it possible that the soul is all fire since it emerges during the process of transformation of water

<sup>6</sup> Fire is a vehicle of Logos, as stated by Jeannière 1959: 78.

<sup>7</sup> Held 1980: 134.

<sup>8</sup> “The κοινὸς λόγος [...] is φρόνησις”, said Adam 1911: 85; Logos is the real identity of intelligibility and intelligence of fire, according to Lahaye 1966: 111.

<sup>9</sup> Jaeger 1946: vol. I, 460, nn. 158 and 161.

into fire. And this is the way it should be; this is a natural or rather desirable state for the soul – to be all fire at least in its most rectified state: “dry soul is wisest and best” (Stobaeus III 5, 8 = B118)<sup>10</sup>. Any admixture of water impedes the soul, so that, for example, a drunk man “not knowing where he goes, having his soul moist”, must be guided by a boy (Stobaeus III 5, 7 = B117). In this, Heraclitus gave a new status to the soul. The soul is no longer only a life-force and the center of personality. For the first time, Heraclitus linked the soul with rationality:<sup>11</sup> drunkenness causes dampness of the soul, and therefore man does not *know* where he is going. The soul is thus a rational principle and its rational faculties can be debilitated by moisture.

The soul can turn completely into its opposite, water, which is lethal: “for souls it is death to become water” (Clem. Al. *Strom.* VI 17, 2 = B36)<sup>12</sup>. Since fire can turn into water – and it must, otherwise water would not exist since everything eventually can be traced back to fire (B31) – it is possible for the soul to be transformed into water. In this way, immortality of the soul becomes questionable, although the soul can long outlive the body<sup>13</sup>.

Heraclitus makes oblique references to the possibility of immortality (B62), and if he means immortality of the soul, how can that be reconciled with the supposition that the soul is mortal? This conviction is based on the fact that “for souls it is death to become water” (B36) and that fire-substrate becomes water in the cycle of transformations. It can be claimed that the transformation of the soul into water is only a hypothetical statement and that when fire-substrate becomes the soul, it remains the soul forever. However, the statement that the soul can become moist and thus lose its cognitive abilities is not of a hypothetical nature. Therefore, immortality would require passing some level of moisture so that the spiritual, i.e., fiery element could be always present in the human soul. Such interpretation is possible since in Heraclitus’ doctrine inviolable limits exist which – it has to be assumed – are known to Logos from eternity. We read that “the sun does not go beyond its limits (or measures, μέτρα), otherwise vengeful Furies, Dike’s assistants, will find it” (B94). It happened that Phaethon guided with his inexperienced hand the sun chariot and strove from its path, thereby setting the earth on fire, for which Zeus struck him with thunderbolt. Dike, spoken of by Heraclitus, a daughter of Zeus, is responsible for the harmonious course

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<sup>10</sup> “The soul in its true and effective state is made of fire”, Kirk, Raven, Schofield 1995: 204; “the soul [...] becomes [...] a formation of fire”, Axelos 1962: 180; see also Held 1980: 430; Wilcox 1994: 79, 81, 86.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Hussey 1982: 45.

<sup>12</sup> “The soul has the capacity to pass through the whole series of transformations until it issues in the fire of intelligence, but that to raise the soul to its highest refinement is a difficult task at best, and that the process of voluntary degradation of the soul is psychological suicide”, English 1913: 175.

<sup>13</sup> In traditional mold, Heraclitus seems to have believed that the soul can live in Hades (Plut., *De fac.* 28, 943e = B98).

of events in the world. The existence of constant changes in the world does not mean that any change is possible. The world is the cosmos, i.e., the ordered, harmonious whole ruled by laws which reside in Logos, since the cosmos is the ever-living fire “kindling in measures (μέτρα) and extinguishing in measures” (B30). Therefore, just as the sun cannot abandon its orb, so – Heraclitus could argue – the soul will never lose its fiery character and will always remain the soul. Should it so happen – after all, the sun did stray from its path – then the soul will lose its immortality, although such a possibility would be very rare.

There is another possibility. The soul is assumed to be immortal since it stems from the fire-substrate even if it exists in the form of water since this water is only a form of fire-substrate. However, when transformed into water, the soul becomes mortal in the sense that it loses its individuality. Immortality is a spiritual element which is fire-substrate, but the individual element is mortal. What is common is eternal, but the temporary, individual manifestation of this commonality in a concrete form is transitory. Such an interpretation is confirmed by Aetius, who said that according to Heraclitus, the soul leaves the body to return to the world soul, i.e., to the same kind as itself (IV 7, 2 = A17). It is also possible that this is what Heraclitus meant when he cryptically stated that “immortals [are/become] mortals, mortals immortals, living their death, dying their life” (B62). An interpretation has been offered which saw in B62 an expression of Heraclitus' belief in reincarnation<sup>14</sup>. He also said, “the same are living and dead and the walking and the sleeping and young and dead, for these, having turned around, are those, and those, turned back again, are these” (B88). Immortal souls become, in a sense, mortal when they are joined with mortal bodies and they live the death of these mortal bodies; that is, because human life eventually meets with death, human life is life unto death, human life is death. Clement rhetorically asked, “Does not Heraclitus [...] call birth death?” (*Strom.* III 21, 1). He apparently does, since “descending to a body is for the soul a dream and death” (V 105, 2). Worse yet, the soul can itself become mortal when polluted with wetness, becoming too watery, and its life in the mortal body can only exacerbate this process. On the other hand, through the souls, immortal elements of human life, humans are immortal; they become immortal during or in the life of immortal souls after they are dead. Immortality is possible if physical (fiery) integrity of the soul can be maintained during life in the body. What is immortal, then – immortal soul – can become mortal when it is turned into water; the soul, which can be mortal can also remain immortal when its fiery character is maintained, when its watery parts are turned back into fire. In this way, mortality and immortality are the same; they are subject to the same physical laws that determine transformation of substances in the cosmos.

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<sup>14</sup> His belief in reincarnation was also detected in B26 and B63, see also Robinson 1987: 94, 126, 137; Bollack, Wismann 1972: 210.

## 3. SOUL AND LOGOS

In what consists the rationality of the soul? “Those speaking rationally (ξὺν νόῳ) have firmly rely on what is common (ξὺν ᾧ) to all,” just as particular laws are based on one divine law (B114). The pun used by Heraclitus stresses the fact that rationality is associated with commonality, with basing judgments on what is common, and this can only be Logos that is pronounced in B2 as common. That which is common is here the counterpart of one divine law; therefore, what is common is of divine character. Thus, it can only be Logos, to which there are ascribed the divine attributes of eternity and of control over events in the world. Therefore, rationality cannot be reached through one’s own private knowledge, through one’s own pool of information. Logos has to be the foundation of knowledge, otherwise the information does not constitute a meaningful whole and there is no unity behind particular facts. Thus, according to Heraclitus, “a lot of information (πολυμαθίη) does not teach the mind (νόος)” – Pythagoras and others were not taught by it (B40), and for those who through accumulation of a lot of information created their own knowledge *polymathia* is of little worth (B129). These statements indicate that *noos* does not refer to reasoning; this is rather intuition, insight, seeing the essence of things, which was the meaning to be found already in Homer<sup>15</sup>. Only very few people possess such intuition, but everyone is able to have it, although this requires making special efforts. Such approach will later be found in Plato, who will delineate the entire educational system necessary to bring up the ruling caste.

Heraclitus also said that “eyes and ears of those who have barbarian souls are poor witnesses for people” (B107). For the Greeks, barbarism meant inability to understand the Greek language. Sensory impressions are thus of little value when the soul cannot interpret them properly with the means of language and, more broadly, of appropriate theory. Sextus, who quoted B107, said that according to Heraclitus the error lied in “trusting irrational (ἄλογα) senses” (*Math.* VII 126 = A16). Sextus discussed further the theory of Democritus who distinguished purely sensory (“bastardly”) cognition from rational cognition (VII 139 = DK 68, B11). Sensory cognition is worth as much as *polymathia* in DK 22, B40, as accumulation of a lot of information. Just as understanding language presumes the existence of reason, of an ability of comprehension, of an ability of holistic vision, so real cognition assumes the ability of seeing harmony behind apparently unconnected facts, of seeing that contradictions in nature and society are manifestations of hidden regularities and of Logos who steers all things. Just as a listening barbarian does not hear, because when listening to the sounds he does not comprehend their meaning (cf. B34), so the barbaric soul does not see when

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<sup>15</sup> Von Fritz 1974: 26, 40, 41.

watching, because it is incapable of seeing harmony that lies at the foundation of perception that reaches its senses.

What is the relation of the soul to Logos? "The soul has logos that increases itself" (B115). Rationality of the soul is thus proportional to Logos that fills it. Logos is rationality of the world and it manifests itself best in rationality of the soul. When the soul is moist, its rationality decreases, i.e., the presence of Logos is less clearly seen. Thus, about Bias, one of the seven sages, Heraclitus said that his "Logos is greater than that of the others" (B39)<sup>16</sup>. Therefore, investigating oneself is justified by the fact that the soul is filled with Logos.

This investigation is a never ending task. "One would never discover the limits of soul should one traverse every road; so deep is Logos it possesses" (B45). Investigating oneself is in reality investigating Logos that permeates a person. Therefore, knowing the essence of the world is not far away. It is enough to see inside oneself. Logos is common, thus it has to be in a person and since Logos is rationality, where better to look for it if not in what constitutes rationality of man, i.e., in the soul? Therefore, "investigation of the profound logos of the soul is tantamount to investigating the logos of the universe"<sup>17</sup>. Investigating oneself is only a means to the goal which is the knowledge of Logos and in that sense it is true that man is a microcosm analogous to macrocosm<sup>18</sup>.

The Delphic maxim not only has no psychological meaning for Heraclitus, but the meaning is even anti-psychological. To him, self-knowledge has a positive character if man concentrates not on knowing himself but on investigating himself. True knowledge of oneself can be gained by going beyond oneself in the sense that one's position in the world is discovered along with harmony of the world and the force which is behind it, the divine Logos<sup>19</sup>. For Socrates, knowledge of the human individual was the goal of philosophical investigations; for Heraclitus this type of investigation was counterproductive. In philosophical anthropology then, Socrates stands on the opposite pole from Heraclitus. Heraclitus would say that Socratic investigation leads man astray to forming

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<sup>16</sup> "Heraclitus simply says that Bias had more Logos – the universal and eternal Logos – in himself than other teachers", Adam 1911: 86. If "logos" is translated as "fame", then B39 is transformed into a trivial statement, which, of course, is possible; but it seems that Heraclitus here used a pun which points not as much to the fact of Bias' fame, but to its source, which is Logos. The possibility of using a pun is indicated by Kahn 2001: 176.

<sup>17</sup> Axelos 1962: 177.

<sup>18</sup> See, for example, Wheelwright 1964: 75, n. 17; Dilcher 1995: 54, 69; Marcovich 1967: 303; Nussbaum 1972: 155, 169. According to Aall (1896: 36), human soul is the Logos of the world in miniature; "Heraclitus' cosmos corresponds to the structure discovered by introspection", Hussey 1982: 58.

<sup>19</sup> "Man investigates himself and he can truly find himself only going beyond narrow limits of his private world", Axelos 1962: 177. Man would be like in sleep since it is in sleep when people confine themselves to their private worlds (B89; Sext. Emp. *Math.* VII 129–131).

one's own, private views about oneself and about the universe. Self-knowledge should lead to the knowledge of the world, which is possible by recognizing in oneself commonality and the action of Logos through seeing oneself from the perspective of the universal harmony. People do not comprehend Logos, not because this is impossible, but because their own claims for originality, their own individuality and an attempt to separate from what is common becomes for them more important than knowledge of truth. Knowledge of truth is possible not only because Logos is common (B2) but also because this privilege is not reserved only for the chosen few. "All people can know themselves and think correctly" (B116). Since all people should know themselves, all people can know Logos, which is an expression of "epistemic optimism"<sup>20</sup>. The task is not easy since "people are deceived in recognizing the obvious" (B56). To know the truth, it is necessary to be persistent and have faith, i.e., the proper attitude since "most of things divine [...] escape notice because of unbelief" (B86). Truth is hidden, obviousness is misleading, but with proper attitude and with sufficient effort it is possible to reach the truth: "if one does not expect the unexpected, he will not find it" (B18).

All of it is not contradicted by the statement that "for a man, his character is his δαίμων" (B119). If *daimon* means fate, then this fragment conveys the conviction that man's fate does not depend on him, but rather that his character determines his fate<sup>21</sup>. Since Logos guides everything, it also determines human fate and his character<sup>22</sup>. It remains a difficult problem why people act against Logos if it stands behind all events. Heraclitus does not discuss this problem. It will be analyzed beginning with the Stoics by nearly all philosophers and theologians. This is a philosophically difficult problem of determinism vs. freedom, the problem of omniscience vs. free will. For Heraclitus it was not yet a philosophical problem, and he probably would assent to the opinion that "only in subordination to order and in the last instance to cosmic law, can man win that serenity which constitutes his happiness"<sup>23</sup>.

To return to B119: *daimon* can also be an allusion to Hesiod who spoke about *daimones* or spirits of golden generation who are guardians of mortals (*Op.* 121–123). In this sense, human character becomes a guardian to a man and – which reinforces the previous meaning – is guarding human fate. In any

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<sup>20</sup> Robinson 1987: 157.

<sup>21</sup> A contemporary version of this view is offered by "the acorn theory" according to which "each person bears a uniqueness that asks to be lived and is already present before it can be lived"; Hillman 1996: 6. Hillman uses Heraclitus as one of his authorities, pp. 256–259.

<sup>22</sup> In this spirit, Held (1970: 191) suggested that in spite of difference of opinions, human views have a common element which is Logos and, unbeknown to people, these differences of opinion lead to unity.

<sup>23</sup> Windelband 1956: 57.

event, this fate is determined by what man is, not by decisions of the Olympian gods. The latter statement is obvious in Heraclitus since, for him, the gods are only manifestations of God-Logos. And because human character is the work of Logos, thus investigation of oneself leads to the knowledge of truth. The effort is in human hands and, as the result, humans come to know that not all depends on them, that their constitution, just as the constitution of the world, depends on Logos<sup>24</sup>.

Although potentially each man can have knowledge about Logos, and thus about the world, he will never have full knowledge. "Human nature does not have insight, divine, however, does" (B78); "the wisest man is like a monkey in comparison to God in the matter of wisdom, beauty and all the rest" (B83). Thus, Bias is one of the seven sages since his soul is filled with Logos, but his knowledge is small in comparison to the divine knowledge of Logos itself. Knowledge brings man closer to God. By acquiring knowledge man saturates himself more and more with divine elements<sup>25</sup>, but he will never become fully divine since the limits of soul are unfathomable because Logos is unfathomable.

#### 4. BEGINNINGS OF ANTHROPOLOGICAL REFLECTION

In discussion of Milesian philosophers, ontology and cosmology were of central importance; in Xenophanes, theology moves to the centre, and to some extent, epistemology. In Heraclitus, the two threads are joined. Heraclitus concentrated on the universe, its structure and the causes of changes in it, and only tangentially was he interested in matters of philosophy of man. Man is for him an integral part of the cosmos and the point of departure for knowledge about it. Man thus is important to Heraclitus, but more from the point of view of ontology than anthropology. In a way, in spite of himself, or rather in spite of the spirit of his philosophy, Heraclitus entered the area of philosophical anthropology, and in this sense it is true that "in Heraclitus we find the beginnings of anthropological reflection"<sup>26</sup>. This anthropology cannot be separated from ontology to which anthropology is subordinated, which to a large extent is not the case in Socrates. Both philosophers began with the Delphic maxim, but they imbued it with different meanings. Investigation of oneself is not designed for Heraclitus as the way

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<sup>24</sup> In this sense probably can be understood a somewhat puzzling interpretation that "being of man is what he is not – the god", Bollack, Weismann 1972: 329.

<sup>25</sup> "Human being can acquire divine character through his efforts and knowledge", said Barling 1985: 86. Verdenius (1996: 110) spoke here about "epistemological mysticism". According to Held (1980: 448), "human nature" means here "the average character of pre-philosophical life", but this limitation seems to be unjustified since it is the matter of nature of all people on any stage of life.

<sup>26</sup> Axelos 1962: 177.

to self-knowledge because for him an individual is – from the cosmic perspective – of little importance. Heraclitus – to use Kant’s adage – was interested in the starry sky; Socrates – in the moral law in man. Therefore, Socrates was the real father of philosophical anthropology. He reached that level by turning away from extra-anthropological problems and it required a great effort to make anthropology an integral but relatively independent area of a philosophical system. Interestingly, such first efforts, except for Plato and Aristotle, were undertaken by Heraclitus’ philosophical heirs, the Stoics.

*Duquesne University, Pittsburgh*

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## PLATO'S AMBIVALENCE ABOUT RHETORIC IN THE *GORGIAS*

By

MIKOŁAJ DOMARADZKI

**ABSTRACT:** The main thesis of the present paper is that Plato's attitude towards rhetoric appears to have been complex to the point of ambivalent, for as one reads the *Gorgias*, one cannot avoid getting the impression that in spite of his *overt* castigation of rhetoric, the philosopher did *covertly* resort to it in the very dialogue. Thus, the article will seek to demonstrate that even though Platonic Socrates repudiated rhetoric understood as political demagoguery and cynical adulation, he did employ some sort of art of persuasion designed to inveigle his interlocutors into accepting a worldview that must have appeared extremely paradoxical for the then mentality.

In the course of his discussion with Callicles, Socrates differentiates (503a) between rhetoric understood as “flattery” (κολακεία) or “shameful oratory” (αἰσχρὰ δημηγορία) on the one hand and “some other” (ἕτερον) which is characterized as “noble” or “fine” (καλόν) and whose task consists, according to the philosopher (503b), in:

trying to perfect the souls of the citizens and struggling to ensure that the best things are said, whether they be more pleasant or more unpleasant for the hearers (τὸ παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ὡς βέλτισται ἔσονται τῶν πολιτῶν αἰ ψυχαί, καὶ διαμάχεσθαι λέγοντα τὰ βέλτιστα, εἴτε ἡδίω εἴτε ἀηδέστερα ἔσται τοῖς ἀκούουσιν)<sup>1</sup>.

While Socrates points out (ibid.) to Callicles that “he has never seen such rhetoric”, the paper will argue that in the *Gorgias* Platonic Socrates applies this mysterious and noble rhetoric with the view to making his interlocutors accept a given axiology. It has to be emphasized that the rhetoric that Socrates employs is a philosophical one, as it is ancillary to his dialectic. Yet, even though the

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<sup>1</sup> In the present article, the Greek text of the *Gorgias* was consulted with the editions of E.R. Dodds (London 1959) and M. Wohlrab (Lipsiae 1887), while the English with the translations made by J.A. Arieti and R.M. Barrus (Newburyport 2007), R. Waterfield (Oxford 1994), D.J. Zeyl (Indianapolis 1987) and T. Irwin (Oxford 1979). Occasionally, F. Schleiermacher's (Frankfurt/M. 1991) translation has also been consulted.

objective of this dialectical rhetoric is far more lofty than the objective of the rhetoric applied at public assemblies, the method of the former – as we will show – does not differ that much from the method of the latter.

The *Leitmotiv* of Plato's *Gorgias* is a conflict (ἄγών) of two, mutually exclusive, axiologies. According to the first one, there does exist objective good and morality which can be reached through rational cognition and, therefore, serve as the very foundations of ethics. According to the other, the existence of such imponderables is – to say the least – disputable. Whereas the former view is represented by Platonic Socrates and the latter by the sophists, it is worth accentuating that the conflict which is to be found in the dialogue could, arguably, be seen as a reflection of Plato's own internal struggle. Hence, one might purport that Plato's suggestive portrayals of rhetoricians – presumably – testify to the philosopher's wavering between making use of rhetoric *in commune bonum*, on the one hand, and discarding it, on the other. Consequently, the purpose of our paper is to investigate the aforementioned eventuality and to ascertain whether and, if so, to what extent, it would be justifiable to maintain that contrary to his declarations one does in fact encounter clandestine rhetoric in Platonic Socrates<sup>2</sup>.

We believe that the entire dialogue can be characterized as a reflection of Platonic Socrates' vacillation with regard to two positions. On the one hand, the philosopher aptly asks (453d) whether it is not so that “whoever teaches anything, persuades about what he teaches” (ὅστις διδάσκει ὅτιοῦν πρᾶγμα, πότερον ὁ διδάσκει πείθει ἢ οὐ) and, on the other, he boldly asserts (473 b) that “the truth can never be refuted” (τὸ γὰρ ἀληθὲς οὐδέποτε ἐλέγχεται). Arguably, the *Gorgias* pivots, then, on this acute tension between a “realistic” plea for rhetorical effectiveness and sober pragmatism, on the one hand, and an “idealistic” plea for objectivity and axiological neutrality, on the other. Naturally, one is immediately prompted to ask the question whether rhetoric can be true in the first place, but apart from that, it has to be observed that insofar as Platonic Socrates seems to be identifying διδάσκει with πείθει, one might profess the identification to be a token of his awareness of the indispensability of rhetoric.

Consequently, Socrates' profound insight could be interpreted as revealing the fact that in order to make somebody acknowledge that the only proper mode of acting is that which follows the λόγος, one has to apply a non-rational strategy, for choosing rationality, like choosing any worldview, revolves around appeals to emotions and, therefore, remains a matter of believing in the validity of given values rather than of providing some rational justification. Accordingly, when

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<sup>2</sup> Our investigation will make no sharp distinction between Platonic Socrates and the “authentic” one due to our fundamental assumption that one of Plato's rhetorical strategies consists in fabricating *all* of his *dramatis personae*. The issue of the extent to which Plato's dialogue represents Socratic philosophy accurately has received a great deal of scholarly attention, but it is neither possible nor necessary to enumerate all diverse approaches. The reader is referred to the following works: Field 1969; Guthrie 1975; Hare 1982; Irwin 1989; Santas 1979 and Vlastos 1991.

Platonic Socrates endeavours to inveigle his interlocutors into abiding by his “rational” worldview, he stoops to the noble rhetoric, which – as earlier observed – “perfects the souls of the citizens”. In other words, the philosopher applies various tools of rhetorical persuasion, for in the long run one becomes *persuaded* and, thus, *resolves* to *believe* in the intellect and the value of rational argumentation. This interpretation might help to explain why Platonic Socrates purports to be persuaded solely by reason, whereas the preponderance of his arguments – as we will demonstrate – must be seen as rhetorical appeals to his interlocutors’ passions rather than to their reason.

Platonic Socrates is determined to rationally prove two paradoxical theses: (1) that it is worse to perpetrate evil than suffer it and (2) that it is better for a man who has perpetrated evil to be punished. Needless to say, the view that doing injustice is worse than suffering it was entirely incomprehensible for the then mentality and for this reason Polus describes (473a) Platonic Socrates’ views as ἄτοπα, which means “extraordinary to the point of being absurd”. What is important for our considerations is that inasmuch as the position of Platonic Socrates sounded absurd not only to Polus, but to almost every Greek who came to listen to the Greek thinker, it was precisely this “absurdity” of his stance that compelled Platonic Socrates to resort to rhetoric<sup>3</sup>.

In the light of the above, it becomes understandable why the attempts to establish what rhetoric is result in discussing issues as lofty as the nature of good and evil or the question of universal morality. If, in the final analysis, the Greek thinker acquiesces in the impossibility of *proving* that a moral life is *better* in the sense that it guarantees *happiness*, then it is – as we believe – due to Plato’s not being oblivious to the fact that there is just no irrefutable logical explanation why a moral life should be preferred to an immoral one. In other words, Plato was perfectly aware of the fact that when it comes to such axiological issues as morality, no rational demonstration can substantiate the validity of a moral choice. That is why although Platonic Socrates does seek to highlight the contrast between the art of persuasion, on the one hand, and the rational dialectic, on the other, he ultimately ends up obfuscating it and finally turns himself a rhetorician.

We wish to underscore that the rhetorical stratagems of Platonic Socrates do remain subordinate to his dialectical method, inasmuch as the philosopher observes (458a) that he ‘gladly’ (ἡδέως) not only refutes those who say something not true but also himself becomes refuted when he says something not true.

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<sup>3</sup> It goes without saying that from the perspective of a person raised in Christian culture, the paradoxicalness of Socrates’ position is less obvious, for the thesis that it is a greater evil to do wrong than to suffer it anticipates the very core of Christ’s message. Suffice it to quote the teaching (1 Pet. 3, 17) that it is better to suffer for well doing than for evil doing (κρεῖττον γὰρ ἀγαθοποιούνας [...] πάσχειν ἢ κακοποιούνας).

Whenever Socrates insists (506a) that he solely “seeks in common with his interlocutors” (ζητῶ κοινῇ μεθ’ ὑμῶν), whenever he actually encourages (506b) Callicles to ‘attack’ (ἐπιλαμβάνου) him, then the “rhetoric” of Platonic Socrates does remain dialectical and can by no means be identified with the elocutionary displays of the sophists. A rhetorical discourse is *monologic*, while a philosophical one – at least in the way that Socrates conceived of it (448d) – is *dialogic*, inasmuch as his διαλέγεσθαι connotes a *rational discussion*. Hence, when we say that Platonic Socrates supports his dialectic with some sort of art of persuasion, we hardly equate the Socratic discourse strategy with the sophistic one. We solely wish to demonstrate that Platonic Socrates is perfectly aware of the fact that it is simply unfeasible to settle an axiological dispute by means of rational argumentation alone. It is only in this sense that we purport that Platonic Socrates turns himself a rhetorician. Let us see how this happens<sup>4</sup>.

During his discussion with Polus, Socrates identifies (463b) rhetoric with some sort of “flattery” or “adulation” (κολακεία) and seems to suggest that rhetoric is somewhat base and despicable. Nonetheless, throughout the dialogue, Platonic Socrates himself “flatters” his interlocutors. He appeals, for instance, to Polus’ aesthetic taste when he asks (474d) the sophist whether doing injustice is not “worse” (κάκιον) and “uglier” (αἴσχιον) than suffering it<sup>5</sup>. As a matter of fact, it is already the antonymous pair κακός – καλός that stresses the obvious axiological dimension, since the former means not only “bad”, but also “ugly” and “unsightly”, whereas the latter – not only “good”, but also “pretty” and “beautiful”. Still, αἰσχροός makes things even more obvious, as it implies disgraceful ugliness<sup>6</sup>. If Platonic Socrates equates (ibid.) “beautiful” with “good” and “bad” with “ugly” (καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθόν καὶ κακὸν καὶ αἰσχροόν), then he subsequently identifies (476b, e) “all that is just with the beautiful” (τὰ δίκαια πάντα καλά), so as to conclude (477a) that “if beautiful, then good” (εἴπερ καλά, ἀγαθά). It needs to be accentuated here that Platonic Socrates exceeds thereby the rigid frames of a rational discourse, for by suggesting that *morality* is something *beautiful*, he appeals not so much to his interlocutors’ reason, but rather to their *emotions*. It seems that the philosopher does realize that identifying morality

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<sup>4</sup> As our exposition is organized in accordance with the heart of the matter, we deliberately reverse the chronological order and address Socrates’ dispute with Gorgias at the end of our considerations.

<sup>5</sup> Conceivably, the term “aesthetic” can sound slightly unfortunate due to its modern connotations. Undoubtedly, it is only from our present perspective that beauty can be seen as an aesthetic value, since for a Greek it had first of all a moral and practical sense. Throughout the article, we use the term “axiological” to capture the broad understanding of beauty that was characteristic of the antiquity.

<sup>6</sup> Indisputably, a language as rich as Greek offers numerous translation possibilities for both κάκιον and αἴσχιον. Schleiermacher’s decision to render them as “schlimmer” and “hässlicher”, respectively, seems to corroborate our interpretation.

with beauty is tantamount to appealing to Polus' aesthetic taste, for he openly states (473a) that he seeks to "make" (ποιῆσαι) Polus "say the same things that he says" (ταὐτὰ ἐμοὶ λέγειν). But then again, in order to make Polus say what Platonic Socrates says, i.e., to make the sophist agree with him, the philosopher must have recourse to the noble rhetoric (ancillary to dialectic), whose high goal is to talk the adversary into Platonic Socrates' rational ethic.

The same strategy is employed by Platonic Socrates during his "clash" with Callicles. When the philosopher resorts (523b) to his famous myth of "the prison of retribution and justice" (τὸ τῆς τίσεως τε καὶ δίκης δεσμωτήριον), one can hardly maintain that he remains within the rules of a purely rational discourse. One should rather say that he appeals to fear of severe punishment, when he talks (525b) of being an "example for the others" (παραδείγματι τοῖς ἄλλοις) and of suffering which makes people "fear and improve" (φοβούμενοι βελτίους γίγνωνται). No matter how noble the ends and how lofty the ideals that guide Platonic Socrates were, arguments such as fear of punishment have little to do with morality.

Furthermore, inasmuch as Platonic Socrates resorts to myths, he employs scarcely a dialectical strategy, but rather a rhetorical one, since he appeals to the listener's emotions and beliefs and not to his reason. Although rhetoric is here subordinate to dialectic its indispensability is due to the fact that hardly anybody can rationally be made to accept Socrates' paradoxical ethic and, therefore, they have to be inveigled into doing it. Where reasoning bears no fruit, other arguments must be put forward and that is why in the *Gorgias*, Socrates' entire polemic with Callicles pivots on a quasi-Orphic myth. Nevertheless, the recourse to such a myth is clearly a rhetorical measure.

Plato's proclivity for supporting his philosophical ideas with myths can be observed not only in the *Gorgias*, but also in dialogues as various as *Meno*, *Republic*, *Phaedo* or *Timaeus*. In view of this, we should note that Plato's attitude towards myths is just as complicated and ambivalent as his attitude towards rhetoric. On the one hand, he severely criticizes the traditional mythology, repudiating for example the Greek anthropomorphism, and on the other – he exploits miscellaneous myths so as to "reinforce" his epistemology (*Meno*), ethic (*Gorgias*) or cosmology (*Timaeus*). It is crucial to understand Plato's dialectic of myth, for there is a certain significant parallel between myth and rhetoric in Plato, who at the same time condemns and uses them both. On the one hand, the philosopher seeks to rationalize myths, as in the *Republic*, and, on the other, he illustrates some of his theses by means of myth, as in the *Gorgias*. The apparent ambivalence can be explained as Plato's reluctance to disregard the irrational component of the human soul. This helps to explain why Platonic Socrates resorts not only to rhetoric, but to myths as well, taking both with sober criticism: even though he remains suspicious of them, Plato employs in his works rhetoric and myths, as these appeal mainly to the extra- or trans-rational in man. The *Phaedo* provides us with a prime

testimony to this strategy, when Platonic Socrates, having presented a mythological justification of his eschatology, entreats (114d) every “man endowed with some intellect” (νοῦν ἔχοντι ἀνδρὶ) not to “insist stubbornly” (δυσχυρίσασθαι) on literal interpretation of myths told the by philosopher. A similar approach is to be found in the *Gorgias*, where Platonic Socrates appears to perceive myths and rhetoric as *mala necessaria*, the former being useful heuristic and rhetorical fictions, whose purpose is to illustrate and, in the long run, persuade the reader into accepting the worldview of Platonic Socrates.

With regard to the myth that concludes Socrates’ discussion with Callicles, two things need to be stressed. Firstly, Socrates explicitly says that he expects (523a) Callicles to regard his tale as nothing more than μῦθος, even though he treats it as λόγος, i.e. a parable not utterly devoid of an intellectual element. And secondly, having suggested that myths can and should be rationalized so that they could serve useful purposes, Platonic Socrates states (ibid.) that “he will present as truth what he intends to say” (ὡς ἀληθῆ γὰρ ὄντα σοι λέξω ἃ μέλλω λέγειν). We may ask why the philosopher asserts that he will present his tale “as truth” (ὡς ἀληθῆ)? Socrates makes it clear (527a) that although Callicles is bound to “despise” (καταφρονεῖν) the myth, there is nothing “better and truer” (βελτίω καὶ ἀληθέστερα) that could “demonstrate” (ἀποδείξει) what kind of life one ought to live. This astonishing statement makes the philosopher’s parable somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, the verb ἀποδείξει suggests the idea of *proof* in the sense of the Latin *demonstratio*, since Platonic Socrates aims to *prove* the value of a moral life. On the other hand, this candid admission can be taken as Socrates’ consciousness of the impossibility to rationally prove the superiority of a moral life over an immoral one. Inasmuch as Socrates acquiesces in the fact that there is simply no irrefutable logical proof that morality guarantees earthly *happiness*, the philosopher has no other option but in order to make his interlocutor live a moral life he is forced to deceive them into morality by dint of a rhetorical reference to the fable of the afterlife. The fact that Platonic Socrates appeals to such incentives as fear of punishment, shows not only his determination to induce his interlocutors to live morally, but, at the same time, his helplessness with regard to the task. In the end, it does not matter how hard Platonic Socrates endeavours to refute Callicles position, since he succeeds only seemingly and at the end of the day offers no proof or reason, but rather silences the opponent by spinning his yarn about the afterlife. It is hardly possible to speak of any rebuttal here, and the reader is left with the impression that Platonic Socrates manages to talk his adversary down only due to the fact that it was Plato who authored the dialogue.

It is crucial to note that Plato does not attempt to reinterpret traditional myths so as to find some hidden and deeper meaning in them. If there is no allegorical interpretation of myths in Plato, it is because the philosopher uses them exclusively for a very special purpose: to persuade the interlocutor to succumb to



a given view. Hence, myths can be seen in Plato as heuristic instruments of rhetorical persuasion. The fact that Platonic Socrates eventually has recourse to rhetoric reflects not only the inner conflict between reason and passion that Plato must have experienced, but also his awareness of the impossibility of rationally proving the necessity to live morally. Thus, the *Gorgias* can be perceived as a result of Plato's dilemma whether to attribute the highest value to rational cognition or accept the vital role of non-rational factors in the process of adopting a given set of values. Yet, even if Plato saw clearly that it is not viable to rationally demonstrate the superiority of a moral life, the obvious question that we must pose now is whether the fact that Platonic Socrates does apply some sort of rhetoric is not – at least to some extent – a sort of its justification? To this Platonic Socrates could naturally reply that he does not employ rhetoric with a view to dominating and subjugating his interlocutor politically, i.e. that he applies it justly, but then again, “justly” is a matter of one's perspective and Callicles would point out that Socrates begs the question, as the task of the dispute was only to establish what justice is at all.

All things considered, the Platonic conviction about the indispensability of rhetoric stems from his anthropology: the philosopher divides (*Resp.* 441a sqq.) human soul into the rational (λογιστικόν) and the irrational (ἐπιθυμητικόν and θυμοειδές in his terminology) and it is precisely for this reason that adequate, i.e. rational and irrational strategies must be applied, these being dialectic and rhetoric (together with the appropriate myths). Plato was, thus, perfectly aware of the fact that human beings cannot be reduced to reason alone, since we have also been endowed with passions and that is why λόγος is accompanied in the *Gorgias* by πάθος and dialectic is assisted by rhetoric<sup>7</sup>. Now, if the philosopher does not appeal to the intellect alone, then we must not overestimate the so-called rationalism or intellectualism of Platonic Socrates, who himself at times enchants his listener rhetorically. As it is plainly impossible to persuade somebody intellectually to do good, and as the emotional and passionate in human require a different approach, myth becomes a matter of the utmost importance in the *Gorgias*, for Platonic metaphysics serves there the very rhetorical purpose to persuade to the worldview that Socrates advocates. In the light of the fact that Platonic Socrates has recourse to myths, it seems advisable to revise the trite cliché of Socrates' intellectualism. Now, we must turn to Socrates debate with Gorgias, where the philosopher also seems to employ the noble and refined rhetoric.

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<sup>7</sup> Plato awareness of it is testified by his remark (*Resp.* 607b) about “an ancient controversy between philosophy and poetry” (παλαιὰ μὲν τις διαφορὰ φιλοσοφία τε καὶ ποιητικῆ). Inasmuch as philosophy (being oriented towards Intellect) is in Plato identical with dialectic and inasmuch as poetry (being oriented towards emotions) is for him – at least to some extent – affined with rhetoric, then the *Gorgias* is a classical presentation of the perennial conflict between the rational, i.e. philosophy and dialectic, on the one hand and the “irrational”, i.e. poetry and rhetoric, on the other.

When Gorgias praises highly (452e) the ability – or power – (δύναμις) “to speak and persuade the masses” (λέγειν καὶ πείθειν τὰ πλήθη), Socrates, accordingly, defines (453a) rhetoric as the “craftsman” or “agent of persuasion” (πειθοῦς δημιουργός). Socrates and Gorgias agree (454e) that rhetoric produces persuasion from which “conviction without knowing” (πιστεύειν ἄνευ τοῦ εἰδέναι) comes. However, Socrates’ conclusion (455a) that the rhetorician cannot teach about the just and unjust seems to be rather hasty, if not downright erroneous, and his contempt for rhetoricians who “solely produce conviction” appears to be unwarranted. When Socrates maintains (ibid.) that rhetoric is “designed to produce conviction, but not to educate about the just and unjust” (πιστευτικῆς ἄλλ’ οὐ διδασκαλικῆς περὶ τὸ δίκαιόν τε καὶ ἄδικον), he disregards the fact that every axiology is founded on conviction and faith (πίστις) – rather than on knowing and that, consequently, it is hardly possible to *know* what is just or unjust, since it is only possible to *believe* that. The view that one can actually possess objective knowledge with regard to values is naturally Platonic to the core. Nevertheless, the question remains open whether it is possible at all to avoid any persuasion in a discussion that concerns values.

It follows from what has been said so far that it is only on the surface that Platonic Socrates rejects all art of persuasion, as beneath the veneer of an avowed enemy of rhetoric (understood as “flattery”, “adulation” and political demagoguery), the philosopher does resort in the course of his discussion with the sophists to some sort of rhetoric (understood as an art of persuasion indispensable in every axiological debate). Just as Plato’s dialogues are literary works of an astounding persuasiveness, so contrary to the philosopher’s intransigent insistence that philosophy and dialectic be distinguished from rhetoric, significant *rhetorical* ruses do appear throughout the dialogue on both sides of the dispute. Inasmuch as Plato in his *Gorgias* seeks through Socrates to inveigle the listener into accepting an ethic whose rationalism leads to theses that sound paradoxical, the philosopher very often appeals to faith and emotions rather than to reason and in the long run talks of (506a) “agreeing” (ὁμολογεῖν) rather than “proving” (ἀποδείξει).

In order to persuade the interlocutors into accepting his paradoxical ethical intellectualism, Platonic Socrates also employs a rhetorical strategy which consists in fabricating all *dramatis personae* of the dialogue in such a manner that they are supposed to propagate consensus with regard to Socrates’ paradoxical life-view. This may seem *prima facie* rather farfetched, but if one considers this carefully, one is bound to reach the following conclusion: just as there reigns general consent with regard to the fact that the Socrates which is to be found in Plato’s dialogues is – at least to some extent – a creation of Plato, so all other characters of the *Gorgias* should also be perceived as concocted by Plato. Let us begin with Gorgias.

It is common knowledge that in his treaty *On What is Not, or About Nature*, Gorgias repudiated any concept of truth whatsoever. Now, when the sophist in

Plato's dialogue eagerly accepts Socrates' distinction between "persuasion from which conviction comes without knowing" and "persuasion from which knowing comes", one is tempted to say that this Gorgias is simply a Platonic mystification, for the "genuine" Gorgias, for whom there was no knowing at all, would never have accepted such a dubious distinction. The "authentic" Gorgias repudiated any cognition in Plato's sense of the word, as for him no legitimate rational knowledge could ever be obtained in the first place. The sophist questioned the possibility of any rational, disinterested and objective knowing, as for him no knowledge could be anything more than just an opinion (δόξα). Philosophy and rhetoric did not differ that much from his perspective (let alone be opposite), as they both presuppose conviction and faith with regard to the values that underlie every worldview and every discourse. While the Gorgias in his treaty rejected any attempts to define Truth or Being, the Gorgias in the dialogue is a construct of Plato and for this reason he becomes easily "defeated" by Platonic Socrates. It has to be emphasized here that by creating – or fabricating – such Gorgias, Plato seems to be resorting through his Socrates to some sort of rhetorical subterfuge. If the Gorgias concocted in the dialogue is a product of Plato's rhetorical strategy, then just as we speak of Platonic Socrates we should also speak of Platonic Gorgias, since both are Plato's rhetorical mystifications, produced with a view to persuading the reader into accepting a given axiology.

If by constructing his protagonists (Socrates) and antagonists (Gorgias et al.), Plato proves to be not only a dramaturge but a rhetorician as well, then he actually applies the very sophist strategy against the sophists, for by concocting his Gorgias Plato combats rhetoric by means of rhetoric. Let us remind it here that rhetoric that is "flattery" and "shameful oratory" is to be superseded by another, "noble" one, which is "to perfect the souls of the citizens". This lofty objective helps to explain why the fabricated Gorgias falls into some glaring contradictions during his debate with Socrates. Whenever this happens it has to be borne in mind that it is always *Platonic* Gorgias that falls into contradictions that are deliberately created by Plato. Let us consider the following charge that the Platonic Socrates levels (459d) against the rhetorician who:

doesn't know the things themselves, what is good or bad, what is fine or shameful or just or unjust, but he has devised persuasion about them so that though he doesn't know among those who don't know he appears to know, rather than the man who knows<sup>8</sup>.

αὐτὰ μὲν οὐκ εἰδώς, τί ἀγαθὸν ἢ τί κακὸν ἔστιν ἢ τί καλὸν ἢ τί αἰσχρὸν ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, πειθῶ δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν μεμηχανημένος ὥστε δοκεῖν εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδώς ἐν οὐκ εἰδόσιν μᾶλλον τοῦ εἰδότος.

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<sup>8</sup> Quoted after T. Irwin's translation.

Platonic Socrates assumes here that unlike the rational dialectic (and the aforementioned “refined” variety of rhetoric), the rhetoric that is tantamount to “pandering” appeals (like poetry) exclusively to the emotions of the listeners and, therefore, exempts from the obligation to possess any genuine learning whatsoever. It is for this reason that Platonic Socrates states (502b) that “composing tragedies” (ἡ τῆς τραγωδίας ποίησις), being also oriented “solely toward pleasing the audience” (χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς θεαταῖς μόνον) can be identified (502c) with “flattery” or “pandering” (κολακεία), while both poetry and rhetoric deserve (502d) to be named as a sort of “popular oratory” – or in modern term: “demagoguery” (δημηγορία). Naturally, it is only the adulatory and demagogical rhetoric that becomes equated with poetry, while its noble and ancillary to dialectic variety remains the constant element of Socrates’ discourse.

Still, it is evident that from the “authentic” Gorgias’ perspective such a differentiation together with Socrates’ censure could be dismissed as preposterous. When Socrates distinguishes between a “noble” and a “vile” rhetoric or when he castigates the rhetorician who has “devised” (μεμηχανημένος) persuasion, the philosopher suggests that there is another way to make somebody accept a set of values, yet, in fact, there is not<sup>9</sup>. There is no knowing when it comes to axiology and morality is not an epistemological issue, for no value can be classified as “true” or “false”. The hackneyed *de gustibus non est disputandum* is valid with regard to every axiology: not only aesthetics but ethics, too. Surely, Gorgias accepts all of Platonic Socrates’ dubious presuppositions, but – as already noted – it is a rhetorical mystification on Plato’s side, for if we agree that it is actually *Platonic* Gorgias that heartily accepts the premises of Socrates’ intellectualism and is easily defeated by it, then we must also agree that we do not encounter here an “authentic” Gorgias, but rather a fabricated one. Consequently, as it is *Platonic* Gorgias that is “vanquished” by equally Platonic Socrates, one might argue that ultimately it is Plato that defeats Plato<sup>10</sup>.

Similar rhetorical manoeuvres are employed by Platonic Socrates during his discussion with the remaining sophists: just as in the case of Gorgias, Socrates’ ethical intellectualism serves very often as an instrument of rhetorical persuasion, so in the case of Polus and Callicles appropriate means of rhetorical persuasion

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<sup>9</sup> Let us note again that Platonic Socrates does realize this when he enquires: whether it is not so that “whoever teaches anything, persuades about what he teaches” and when he frankly confesses that he endeavours to “make” Polus “say the same things that he says”. Both quotations confirm his consciousness that it is not feasible to persuade to a given axiological option, unless a certain art of persuasion and appropriate rhetorical stratagems are employed.

<sup>10</sup> Incidentally, there is even a testimony that corroborates the assumption that we are dealing here with Platonic fabrication of Gorgias and not the “genuine” sophist. According to Athenaeus (XI 505d–e [A 15a DK]), Gorgias, having read Plato’s dialogue, was supposed to have said that Plato could “deride” (ἰαμβίζειν) magnificently and added that he neither said nor heard any of those things that are to be found in Plato’s dialogue.

are also applied. For our considerations, it is of minor importance whether Polus and Callicles existed or whether they are fictitious characters, created for the purpose of Plato's drama and with a view to advancing Socrates' stance. What is of major importance is the manner in which they were presented by Plato: even though we know for a fact that Polus existed, whereas Callicles' existence remains only probable, it seems advisable to focus on the reasonable premise that neither Polus nor Callicles can be described as entirely "genuine" and "authentic", for they, too, must have been – at least to some extent – concocted by Plato. Unfortunately, a thorough presentation of the whole of the discussion is impossible due to the necessary limitations of the present article. Hence, we cannot enumerate all the ambiguities and equivocations which Platonic Socrates produces in order to ensnare his interlocutors. Suffice it to say that what has been said about Plato's fabricating Gorgias seems also valid with regard to the remaining sophists: they, too, are Plato's rhetorical mystifications, designed to persuade the reader into accepting Socrates' ethical intellectualism. We have concentrated on Gorgias, but – needless to say – Polus and Callicles are equally significant. Altogether, the thinkers, as they appear, reflect not only an escalation of the conflict between philosophy and rhetoric, but also a subtle coalescence of the two.

Finally, we wish to draw attention to a striking inconsistency in Platonic Socrates, which, in our opinion, illustrates perfectly the thesis about the rhetorical mystification on Plato's part. The Greek philosopher claims (515d–517c) that great men such as Pericles, Cimon, Miltiades, Themistocles did deserve the treatment they received from the people they had ruled over "for not a single leader of a city can ever be destroyed unjustly by the very city he leads" (προστάτης γὰρ πόλεως οὐδ' ἄν εἷς ποτε ἀδίκως ἀπόλοιτο ὑπ' αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως ἧς προστατεῖ) (519c). Likewise, Socrates maintains (ibid.) that the sophists make themselves ridiculous when "they claim to be teachers of virtue" (ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλοι) and at the same time often accuse their pupils of "doing injustice" (ἀδικοῦσι) to them. The charge is obvious: both politicians and rhetoricians aspire to certain authority and, consequently, must bear responsibility for the actions of people they want to guide. Immoral actions of the guided testify to the worthlessness of the guidance. Nevertheless, Socrates is supposed to be some curious exception to the rule, as he boldly asserts (521d) that if he is ever brought to court, his prosecutor will be a "base man" (πονηρός). The assertion that anyone who tries to indict Socrates will be ignoble raises the obvious question why Socrates should be exempt from the very responsibility that politicians and rhetoricians must shoulder. Callicles could have answered that Socrates' death would only testify to the poverty of his teaching. We discover here a glaring discrepancy between the sweeping condemnation of the politicians or rhetoricians, on the one hand, and the touching eulogy of Socrates, on the other. As it is scarcely possible that Plato would have failed to see this inconsistency, we must ask what its purpose is.

One of the possible answers could be that such inconsistencies, contradictions and paradoxes, as the one delivered above, serve a very specific purpose in Plato: they are certain rhetorical devices whose function is to stimulate to reflection and very often to persuade the reader into accepting the view that Platonic Socrates advocates. Plato makes use of various contradictions and paradoxes for purposes that could be labeled as “therapeutic”: in the spirit of his moral teacher, Plato expects philosophy to bring about a certain ethical revival and the “therapy” of his literal production aims to cure both the individual and the entire community of the ancient πόλις. That is why Plato portrays in his dialogues characters that represent so diverse life-views. By depicting various axiologies, frequently mutually exclusive, Plato seeks to convince the reader that he should follow the path of Socrates rather than of the sophists.

All in all, the clash between rhetoric and dialectic philosophy in the *Gorgias* is a clash of not only two different discourse strategies, but also of two different worldviews. Inasmuch as Plato realized that the normative postulate that one ought to lead a moral life cannot be proved in a rational and logical manner, he deliberately filled the dialogue with paradoxes, myths and appeals to emotions so as to encourage his readers to abide the universal morality that Socrates gave his life for. With the situation being as it is, one should not be surprised that Platonic Socrates repudiates rhetoric only on the surface, while beneath the philosophical veneer, he proves to be a rhetorician – so to say – κατ’ ἐξοχήν, who combats the sophists by means of their own strategies. By using the “refined” and “noble” rhetoric against the teachers of a “shameful” and “demagogical” one, Platonic Socrates appears to transcend the limited view that rationality is the sole legitimate discourse strategy. If we agree that some of those strategies employed by Platonic Socrates can reasonably be characterized as substantially rhetorical, then the *Gorgias* transpires to be of paramount importance, since when read between the lines, the dialogue can be perceived as Plato’s challenge to the view that dialectic is the only justifiable philosophical strategy.

In conclusion, this has to be accentuated: whenever Plato resorts to myths, whenever he “fabricates” his protagonists and antagonists, whenever he presents us with various inconsistencies and contradictions, he does, in the final analysis, have recourse to rhetoric (albeit ancillary to dialectic), because he is perfectly aware of the fact that it is simply impossible to teach and communicate with man only in a rational way, let alone prove rationally the value of moral life. That is why Plato does use some “irrational” – or even better: “para-rational” – strategies, proving thereby to be not only one of the greatest philosophers of all times, but also one of the greatest rhetoricians.

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## THE DEMISE (AND SUBSEQUENT RESURRECTION) OF JEWISH HISTORIOGRAPHY IN THE SECOND TEMPLE PERIOD<sup>1</sup>

By

AVI AVIDOV

ABSTRACT: Jewish historiography ceased to exist as a distinct genre during the Second Temple period, a time otherwise marked by rather prolific Jewish cultural production. The process whereby this has come about has been described by Yerushalmi as that of the displacement of history by memory. The present article seeks to identify the social context within which this displacement took place, namely, that of the gradual socio-political marginalization of the Jews in the course of the Hellenistic and Roman periods.

The topic figuring in the title of this article may be considered one of the most neglected great mysteries of antiquity. By an ironic quirk of history Jewish historiography started dwindling away at about the same time that Greek historiography was beginning to take shape in the 5<sup>th</sup>–4<sup>th</sup> centuries BC. By Roman times it was practically defunct, not to be revived again before the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Although the Jews had once been among the pioneers of historical writing, the contemporaries of Josephus and Philo – even some of the most learned amongst them, as rabbinic literature makes quite plain – were historically illiterate, profoundly unacquainted and uninterested in their own history, or in any other history for that matter<sup>2</sup>. How did this come about? What makes a people lose interest in its own past – and that at a time marked by an extremely prolific cultural production?

Jewish literature, moreover, written in Hebrew in spite of the surfacing of Aramaic as the language of daily exchange, legal documents and administration, has been shown to have served as a prime vehicle of ethnogenesis in the Second

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<sup>1</sup> This is a revised and expanded version of a paper initially presented at the 5<sup>th</sup> international conference on European history of the Athens Institute for Education and Research, Athens, under the title “The Demise of Jewish Historiography in the Second Temple Period”, and subsequently published in the proceedings of the conference under the same title.

<sup>2</sup> Tropper 2004: 186–190.

Temple period<sup>3</sup>. The absence of historiography – elsewhere a significant means of identity formation – from the rich literature of the time is indeed conspicuous.

To begin with, however, two points need to be addressed in order to establish the very terms in which the problem has been stated, universal agreement on neither of which may be taken for granted. First, what is it that I have just been referring to as ‘Jewish historiography’? Second Temple Judaism – to whose historiographical production this term would certainly aptly apply, being distinctly monotheistic and exclusivist in outlook<sup>4</sup> – was the product of a long process of development spanning two centuries at least, counting from the Deuteronomistic revolution. The historiography embedded in the Bible is, of course, much older than that<sup>5</sup>. Consequently, not all contributors to the Bible were ‘Jewish’ in this strict sense of the word; some, being henotheists, if not outright polytheists, would be better described as Yahwist<sup>6</sup>, or Hebrew, or Israelite<sup>7</sup>.

However, if we concentrate on the genre instead of the people, we may notice an interesting fact: what we casually refer to as ‘Jewish historiography’ had originated in a pagan society and was eventually taken over by a Christian one. The genre whose course of development we are tracing was born pagan, reached maturity and then died Jewish, only to be subsequently resurrected as Christian<sup>8</sup>. One could call it Israelite after its origins, thus evading the issue of religious creed; if I adhere to ‘Jewish historiography’ here it is because it was during its Jewish phase that it came to a halt, the occurrence which constitutes the problem to be addressed in what follows.

Second, do we really know that it died out in the period under consideration? Is this not an *argumentum ex silentio*? No, because some remains of the writings of Jewish historians of the Hellenistic and Roman periods are extant and available to us for perusal<sup>9</sup>, and paradoxically enough, they lend further evidence to the non-existence of Jewish historiography at the time. All extant Jewish sources from the Hellenistic period onwards, however related to the recording of the past, belong to either one of two categories: they were either produced within

<sup>3</sup> Goodblatt 2006: 65–67.

<sup>4</sup> But cf. Niehr 1999: 237–241.

<sup>5</sup> Assuming that the Bible in its entirety is not the product of ideologically motivated post-exilic mythopoeia as postulated by some scholars of the ultra-critical complexion discussed by Japhet 1999.

<sup>6</sup> Smith 1989: 188–190; E. Stern 2006: 201, who interprets the remains of material culture as pointing unequivocally to “the practice of a local ‘national Judean paganism’”.

<sup>7</sup> See Berquist 2006 on the elusiveness of religious, linguistic, geographical, and indeed several other reductionist indicators of identity pertinent to the issue at hand.

<sup>8</sup> Hengel 1979: 40–58; Marguerat 2002. I return to the issue of early Christian historiography and its relation to Jewish historiography in the concluding paragraphs of this article.

<sup>9</sup> Conveniently assembled in Holladay 1983.

the framework of Greek historiography – and so cannot be considered ‘Jewish historiography’ any more than Einstein’s theory of relativity can be considered ‘Jewish physics’ – or they demonstrate meagre acquaintance with the relevant data, or an antiquarian, i.e., an ahistorical orientation.

Of the first category the most obvious, and by far the most completely extant, is Josephus, whose prose falls indubitably well within the fold of Hellenistic historiography<sup>10</sup>. Josephus wrote his account of the “Jewish War” in Greek for the benefit of “the subjects of the Roman Empire”, a record of the war designed to meet the highest standard of “historical accuracy” by avoiding the common pitfalls of invective and encomium<sup>11</sup>. He understood the Jewish canon, on which he relied for his *Antiquities*, as *sui generis*, superior and different fundamentally from the works of pagan historians because of its divine authorization, but nevertheless made the conscious choice of addressing a gentile readership in its own idiom<sup>12</sup>. His was neither the first nor the only account of the war, and of the others engaged in similar projects and mentioned by him with condescension in his opening remarks, the only history produced by a Jew and whose fragments remain for us to judge by, namely that of Justus of Tiberias, was equally meant to comply by the conventions of the Greek genre.

In all, the fragments of at most ten Jewish authors engaged in one way or another with matters related to the nation’s past are extant; of these four only qualify as historians, Eupolemus, Ps.-Eupolemus, Ps.-Hecataeus and Justus of Tiberias, to whom should be added the elusive figure of Jason of Cyrene, whose lost five-volume history of the Maccabean period was the source of *II Maccabees*. They all wrote in Greek in conformity with Greek conventions of the genre, and so may have rightfully been described by Holladay as “representative of the tradition later to be embodied by Josephus”<sup>13</sup>, as long as what we understand by this description is a tradition of Jewish apologetics within Greek historiography rather than Jewish historiography *tout court*<sup>14</sup>.

Of the six others four, namely, Demetrius, Artapanus, Cleodemus Malchus and Aristeas, are exegetes or antiquarians whose concerns lie in reconciling internal inconsistencies and contradictions in the Bible, in ordering the chronological or genealogical sequences thereof or in correlating the account of the Bible with the traditions of the surrounding gentiles. What they hold in common with the contemporary Jewish historians is the apologetic or propagandistic

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<sup>10</sup> Schwartz 1990: 23–57; Avidov 2008.

<sup>11</sup> Joseph. *BJ* I 2 f., and cf. *AJ* XX 262: “no one else, either Jew or gentile, would have been equal to the task [...] of issuing so accurate a treatise as this for the Greek world”.

<sup>12</sup> Hengel 1979: 31 on *C. Ap.* I 37.

<sup>13</sup> Holladay 1983: 97.

<sup>14</sup> Sterling 1992: 16 has aptly described “apologetic history” as “a host genre for natives who wrote the story of their own people in the form of Hellenistic historiography”.

objective and tone and the Greek garb. Two others, finally, included by Holladay in his collection, are doubtfully Jewish and most certainly not historians, namely, Theophilus<sup>15</sup> and Thallus.

Turning from apparent contenders to the title of historians to rabbinic literature, the only exception to the general indifference of the rabbis to history, the quasi-historical literary genre of the rabbinic chain of transmission<sup>16</sup>, has recently been shown to have been modelled upon a Hellenistic prototype of the Second Sophistic<sup>17</sup>. There is thus every reason to conclude that we do have the pertinent evidence to positively assert that genuine historiography was not part of Jewish literary production of the time.

Neglected indeed as the causes for the demise of Jewish historiography generally are in modern research, they have, however been addressed with monograph-scale studies by two great scholars of the previous generation, Arnaldo Momigliano<sup>18</sup> and Yoseph Haim Yerushalmi<sup>19</sup>. Both accord primacy of cause to the canonization of the Holy Scriptures, a process starting in the 5<sup>th</sup> century BC and culminating in the late 1<sup>st</sup> century AD. History, which for the Jews had always been the unfolding drama of Jehovah's troubled relationship with his chosen people<sup>20</sup>, had, it was felt, arrived at its final act. The present was perceived as but an interim period between the biblical past – “known, hallowed and sealed” – and the messianic future – “assured, but contingent on diligent cultivation of Jewish mores”<sup>21</sup>. It was not in itself the stuff of history. In the vigorous language of Momigliano: “...super-valuation of a certain type of history implied under-valuation of all other events. [...] The significance which the Jews came to attach to the Torah killed their interest in general historiography”<sup>22</sup>.

Yerushalmi's special added contribution to this reconstruction is in his distinction between history and memory, the latter being “encapsulated” in ritual and liturgy rather than embedded in scholarly enquiry. Generations upon generations of Jews could thus satisfy their universally human need for historic identity by means of a canonized script without seeking recourse in rational enquiry of the past.

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<sup>15</sup> Stern 1974–1984, No. XXII.

<sup>16</sup> The prime example is *Avot* 1, 1, which presents the (largely fictive) chain of transmission of the Torah from Sinai to the rabbis of the Tannaitic period.

<sup>17</sup> Tropper 2004: 191–197, who, in spite of its obvious shortcomings, considers it “historiography of a lesser sort”.

<sup>18</sup> Momigliano 1990: 5–28.

<sup>19</sup> Yerushalmi 1982.

<sup>20</sup> Bohrmann 1989.

<sup>21</sup> Yerushalmi 1982: 24.

<sup>22</sup> Momigliano 1990: 23.

Following Yerushalmi, in commenting on the un-historicity of the vast corpus of Talmudic literature produced in the aftermath of the cataclysmic events which had derailed Jewish history for millennia to come, M. Hadas-Label writes:

L'apport du Talmud et du Midrash relève en effet de la mémoire et non de l'histoire. Les faits historiques connus seulement par tradition orale, transmis dans la conscience collective du peuple à quelques générations de distance y sont soumis aux traitements les plus divers. La plupart se perdent, un petit nombre surnage erratiquement et se charge d'enjolivements et de significations nouvelles. Telle est bien l'œuvre lacunaire et sélective de la mémoire sur laquelle vient se greffer la réflexion du moraliste et de l'exégète<sup>23</sup>.

All this begs the question, whence these marks of orality in one of the most literate societies ever? As we have just seen, both Momigliano and Yerushalmi respond by explaining the displacement of historiography by memory in Israel in terms of the internal dialectics of Jewish culture and literature.

A different explanation, couched in the socio-political realities of the time, has recently been proffered by the Biblical scholar Alexander Rofé, who identifies the decisive cause in the loss of sovereignty<sup>24</sup>. Historiography, according to Rofé, thrived in the vicinity of the ruler's court, which provided both qualified writers and an involved readership. When sovereignty came to an end with the fall of the kingdom of Judah, historiography went down with it. This is a very persuasive argument, to which the momentary revival of Jewish historiography during the Hasmonean monarchy lends added weight<sup>25</sup>.

It is not my purpose to add an entirely new explanation to the existing ones, but rather to offer a new theoretical context within which to incorporate them. The context, I submit, is one of a protracted process of the marginalization of the Jews, beginning in the neo-Babylonian and Persian periods and reaching its culmination in Roman times. Perceiving themselves as deprived of the power to shape their own destinies, marginals habitually take little interest in the concerns of surrounding society, on which they have given up<sup>26</sup>. Characteristically, rosy and often vindictive visions of a future disjointed from linear time come to replace

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<sup>23</sup> Hadas-Label 1990: 127.

<sup>24</sup> Rofé 2006: 186 f.

<sup>25</sup> Note that this is a different argument from the one advanced by some 19<sup>th</sup> century historians referred to by Tropper 2004: 187 f., who dated the end of Jewish historiography to the period following the failed revolt against Rome and the destruction of the second temple in 70 AD and as a result thereof.

<sup>26</sup> See Mancini Bilson 2005: 34 f., n. 4 for a discussion of different degrees and manifestations of marginality-related personal maladjustment.

rational planning for the future<sup>27</sup>; occasional fits of exasperated action substitute for constructive interaction with impinging agents<sup>28</sup>; and, most significantly for the issue at hand, a self-absorbed, hazy, plaintive memory of a heroized past comes to replace a sustained effort to maintain an impassionate record of past events<sup>29</sup>. It should, therefore, come as no surprise that this, more or less, is what had indeed occurred in Israel as memory, embedded in, and transmitted by ritual and liturgy had come to replace history for the nation turned in upon itself.

Marginality, then, goes to explain the waning of Jewish historiography as one among several aspects of a phenomenon well-known from a rich and rapidly growing post-colonial literature<sup>30</sup>. Social marginality, strictly speaking, applies to segments of society which for whatever reason are unable or unwilling to fully play out their expected social roles within it. Marginality theory locates such populations both within and yet not fully integrated into a given society<sup>31</sup>. Although one may possibly conceive of marginal elements within a political system such as the Persian empire had been, this terminology gains full force only within an identifiable society into which one may, or may not, be socially integrated. Marginality is basically social integration gone amiss, and therefore applies to societies in which some measure of ongoing integration may be identified<sup>32</sup>. Consequently, the following argument makes no claim to identify marginality of the Jews prior to their incorporation in Roman imperial society, which was highly integrative<sup>33</sup>, but rather to trace the course of accumulation of marginalizing factors leading to that outcome in the preceding phases of the process.

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<sup>27</sup> See Hadas-Lebel 1990: 112 on *II Baruch* and *IV Esdras* as examples of the consolatory effect of the apocalyptic literature of the turn of the first century AD.

<sup>28</sup> See Hadas-Lebel 1990: 164 on Messianic feelings and aspirations leading to the revolt of Bar-Kochba in spite of the grave consequences of the revolts of 66–73 and 115–117.

<sup>29</sup> See Ben Zvi 2003 on the “discursive emphasis on a constructed ‘classical’ monarchic and pre-monarchic past and on an ideal future, which resulted in a discursive marginalization of the present”.

<sup>30</sup> Loomba 2005; Barklay 2005; Smith 1989: 8–63.

<sup>31</sup> Marginality has been defined by Germani 1980: 49 as “lack of participation of individuals and groups in those spheres in which, according to determined criteria, they might be expected to participate”. Three implicit points merit emphasis: (1) “lack of participation” implies that the individuals and groups referred to are taken to be included in a given society; they are not total outsiders; (2) marginality is closely bound up with expectations concerning the nature, scope or terms of participation in social life, viz., the viability of social roles; and (3) by “determined criteria” some socially sanctioned model of society is implied against which the reality of failed expectations may be measured.

<sup>32</sup> I have provided a detailed outline of the process leading to the marginalization of the Jews in my 1995 Cambridge Ph.D. thesis *Processes of Marginalization in the Roman Empire*. For a brief summary see Avidov 2008.

<sup>33</sup> Consider the role of manumission, e.g., coupled with patronage, as a mechanism of integration, on which see Millar 1995.

An ahistorical, viz., non-referential attitude to the past – it should be noted in passing – is not in itself necessarily a sign of marginality; archaic Greece and Rome provide us with well known examples of societies whose recollection of the past had once been mythical rather than historical. However, loss of historical consciousness where it previously had existed is indeed a rare and remarkable occurrence calling for special attention. The extraordinary aspect of such an event may be easier to grasp by a not altogether unrelated analogy to loss of literacy and reversion to orality, as had once occurred in Greece with the transition from the Bronze Age to the Dark Age. It is a cultural upheaval of such an order of magnitude as to be accounted for only by some cataclysmic factor, in this case the total dislocation of the Mycenaean civilization as a result of foreign invasion and destruction on a massive scale.

Although the marginalization of the Jews too was related to a trauma of similar magnitude – the destruction of the First Temple, loss of independence, exile – it was not in itself a singular event which can be located at a precise moment in history, but rather a protracted process both preceding the aforementioned trauma, and then progressing through centuries of accumulation of marginalizing factors on top of each other. Full blown social marginality can be identified only in Roman times; the process leading to it may be broken down to the following phases:

1) The Deuteronomistic revolution in the last quarter of the 7<sup>th</sup> century BC introduced an exclusivist tendency of unprecedented force into the cultural life of the Judean polity, in the form of strict monotheism<sup>34</sup>.

2) Loss of sovereignty and exile in the early 6<sup>th</sup> century transformed this tendency into the overriding unifying principle for the Babylonian community to construct its identity upon<sup>35</sup>.

3) Following Cyrus' celebrated declaration of 538 BC, under the auspices of the new Persian sovereign, the returnees took upon themselves to reconstruct communal life in Israel. They found themselves confronted with a whole host of contenders for inclusion and position within the emergent polity<sup>36</sup>. The ensuing conflicts pushed them further on to ever increased exclusivism<sup>37</sup>. Our chief literary sources for the 5<sup>th</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> centuries are preoccupied with the issues of exogamy and ethnic purity<sup>38</sup>.

4) A brief period of sovereignty in the Hellenistic period – the Hasmonean state of 142–3 BC – generated the only substantial piece of historiography since

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<sup>34</sup> Becking 1999: 5–7.

<sup>35</sup> Smith 1989: 58–63, 190–197.

<sup>36</sup> Knoppers 2006; Kessler 2006.

<sup>37</sup> Bedford 2002; Kessler 2006, esp. pp. 107–112.

<sup>38</sup> Fried 2002; Smith 1989: 144–151.

Chronicles (5<sup>th</sup> century). It was the exception that proves the rule. Significantly, this was also a time marked by the secularization, by way of Hellenization, of the state. This was the time that the Jews came within the orbit of Hellenistic culture. Contact generated acculturation – but also polarization<sup>39</sup>. The history of the period was composed in Hebrew and in accordance with the canons of Biblical historiography. This is surely to be accounted for by conscious archaism, rather than any supposed tenacity of local tradition surviving a three century gap. *I Maccabees*, most probably written in the late 2<sup>nd</sup> century BC, may be regarded as the last flicker of a long defunct art. *I Macc.* 9, 22, which closes the account of Judas Maccabaeus' leadership of the revolt, in fact reads like an ironic comment by way of archaizing paraphrase on the spirit of the age: "Now the rest of the acts of Judas, and his wars and the brave deeds that he did, and his greatness, *have not* been recorded, but they are very many".

5) Roman occupation drew a final curtain on sovereignty. Henceforth, all local authority was to be vicarious and conditional on Roman concession. As a result, all local government – from Herod to the High-priestly class and the ruling elite, invested with authority by the occupying power but lacking a genuine legitimacy anchoring in society – was culturally, socially, and eventually politically as well, marginal to the society dominated by it. Judea, as noted by Martin Goodman twenty years ago, was a society ruled from its margins<sup>40</sup>. This fact alone need not have caused society itself to be marginalized in relation to the greater society of the empire. However, two further factors conspired to bring that eventuality about: the twin engines of integration, which elsewhere had generated social cohesion between the disparate peoples of the empire, did not operate in Judea: the imperial cult and the patronage network, from both of which the Jews were cut off. The marginality of the Jews of the Roman Empire was thus an accomplished fact even before the launching of the Vespasianic policy of conscious marginalization following the failed attempt at revolt in the 60s of the first century of our era. One cultural consequence was the demise of Jewish historiography.

Some Jews, however, still engaged themselves in writing history in Roman times, both in Judea and the Diaspora, but by now the fact that they had come within the orbit of Hellenistic culture was decisive: whatever historiography was produced towed the line of Greek historiography: Josephus and Justus of Tiberias naturally spring to mind. Genuine Jewish historiography, written in the vernacular, with an interested local readership in mind, was long defunct by that time. Whoever chose to invest their energies in pursuance of the now alien genre were impelled by forces external to Jewish society and did so outside its cultural confines.

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<sup>39</sup> Hengel 1974: vol. I, 308–313.

<sup>40</sup> Goodman 1987: 29–49.



To recapitulate then, there is no single overriding cause for the demise of Jewish historiography. Rather, it was a concatenation of causes and circumstances best understood within the overarching theory of marginalization, a protracted process which gradually brought about a transformation of the cultural conditions pertinent to the production of history. Yerushalmi, as I see it, was right in describing the process as one of the gradual displacement of history by memory. Postulating the underlying dynamics of marginality not only provides the context within which to identify this process, but also enables us to see that this displacement was not just one among several results of the closure of Jewish society, but also a causal factor in its own right in further propelling it along its course of marginalization.

There remains an unsettling afterthought. If the demise of Jewish historiography is indeed to be explained at least partly as the consequence of social marginality, how then are we to account for its resurgence at the hands of the earliest Christians, seemingly members of an equally, if not exceedingly marginal group? Martin Hengel, in a solitary, unelaborated comment, even goes further to hint at a possible causal connection between the two occurrences<sup>41</sup>:

After the destruction of the sanctuary [...] the events of the present were no longer worth writing down. [...] In effect the consciousness of a history of salvation which had produced the Old Testament and Jewish historiography, passed over to earliest Christianity. We might ask whether this development under the rabbis was not, among other things, a reaction to the rise of the gospels.

Engaging as this proposition may seem at first sight, it should be rejected on two counts. First, because, as we have seen, Jewish historiography had run its term centuries before Christian historiography arrived on the scene for the rabbis to react to; and second, because there is no reason to expect – conceding, for the sake of argument, that they were otherwise historically oriented – that the rabbis should react to the appearance of a Christian historiography by courteously making way for it to the point of abandoning the field entirely. A causal link may, however, still be lurking here, though, I venture to say, the argument has to be turned on its head for us to see it: historiography was one among several manifestations of the breaking away of the budding movement from its Jewish roots. On this view, early Christian historiography may be seen, partly at least, as the expression of a reaction to the increasingly inward looking stance of the rabbis. The key text is Luke–Acts whose author has recently been hailed as “the first Christian historian”<sup>42</sup>.

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<sup>41</sup> Hengel 1979: 33 f.

<sup>42</sup> Marguerat 2002. Following Paul Ricoeur, Marguerat distinguishes (pp. 8 f.) between three types of historiography, documentary, explicative and poetic. Of the third he writes that “its truth lies in the interpretation it gives to the past and the possibility it offers to a community to understand itself in the present. In other words, what historiography in the strong sense recognizes as trustworthy

Luke–Acts presents us with an intriguing duality in its relation to Christianity’s Jewish origins: on the one hand it harks back to a biblical theology and worldview; on the other hand it endorses a markedly open stance towards the surrounding gentile society which is strikingly alien to contemporary Judaism. A close reading of the text of Luke–Acts has led Marguerat to define the author’s underlying program as one of “theological integration”, since it insinuates, throughout the diptych – semantically, thematically and by its descriptive art – an integration of the universality of the Roman empire with the particularity of Jewish salvation<sup>43</sup>:

...the author seeks to define Christian identity by a double demonstration, which creates strong tensions in his narrative: on the one hand, he seeks the roots of the Church in Jerusalem, that is, in the continuation of a history of salvation that began with Israel; and on the other hand, God opens up to universality, where the Roman Empire represents the framework for geographical and political expansion. The two sides of the amphibology go back to the two points of reference for the identity of nascent Christianity. Luke’s theological ambition even permeates his choices of writing, which hold open the continuity with Israel as well as the expansion to the nations. The phenomenon of double signification serves this theological programme, since it presents Christianity as both the fulfillment of the promises of the Scriptures and as the answer to the religious quest of the Graeco-Roman world.

Earlier he has explained the seemingly triumphalist emphasis laid by Luke on the expansion of the Christian mission by ascribing it to his “theology of providence”<sup>44</sup>. Not triumphalism but providence. In terms of marginality theory, what is significant here is that the view advanced by the author is not overwhelmed by the structural aspects of the condition of marginality because it superimposes on them his theory of providence. The Christian church is not only, as the true Israel, in possession of the ultimate truth and the pledge of a distant future salvation: the future is here, and the world is opening up to the unfolding fulfillment of the divine promise. The addressee has evolved, however, in the meantime, and Israel is now poised to embrace any and every true believer. A huge leap is involved in terms of the issue at hand, from extreme exclusivism to the other extreme of an integrationist religion.

But we are interested in the social circumstances of the individual whose historiography has given enduring expression to this theological vision – which brings us back to the issue of marginality. Social marginality is a hybrid concept in that it purports to signify a phenomenon identified and explained through its two rather loosely interrelated dimensions, the structural and the cultural. Although this is by

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is the self-consciousness that it offers to the group of readers”. *Acts* belongs, of course, with this last category of historiography.

<sup>43</sup> Marguerat 2002: 75 f.

<sup>44</sup> Marguerat 2002: 38–40.

no means the current consensus<sup>45</sup>, the cultural dimension should, I submit, take precedence over the structural. Structurally, marginality refers to the location of actors in relation to each other, in terms of their social, economic and ecological relations, within a conceptually engendered graphic representation of an analytically delimited section of a given population. Culturally, it refers to the inter-subjectively perceived definientia, whose presence qualifies actors as pertaining to those structurally defined sections of society. It is these definientia to which I was referring earlier when defining marginality as the condition of those actors within society who are prevented, for whatever reason, from performing their social roles.

Social roles are essentially sets of expectations, that is, inter-subjective notions of social location and function: given one's social location, how is one to comport oneself in each of one's socially sanctioned roles? These notions are inter-subjective because they are perceived as simultaneously both collective (and thus part of culture) and intensely personal. When these two aspects coalesce (when no difference is perceived to exist between an actor's understanding of his/her role-set and the way it is perceived by society at large), we may infer that the social actor in question is well-integrated.

Social roles are vital for the preservation of society and for the well-being of its constituent members, as their free implementation is essential for the integration of society. To be integrated into society means to be able to freely play out one's social roles. For marginality to arise actors need to be prevented from playing out their roles; but this is only a necessary condition, not a sufficient one. Frustrated role expectations may just as likely lead to the attempt to negotiate the roles in question, and, in the process, to defiance, resistance, conflict or rebellion, according to whatever specific circumstances pertaining to any particular case<sup>46</sup>. It is only when the frustration of one's roles is subjectively accepted as a permanent state to be reconciled with that one's social condition may be described as that of marginality. None of the structural characteristics of marginality or any combination thereof, regardless of their centrality in its aetiology<sup>47</sup>, is in itself sufficient for

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<sup>45</sup> Cf. Mancini Billson 2005.

<sup>46</sup> A good example is the apostle Paul of *Acts*; discussed by Marguerat 2002: 66 f. Paul could be the quintessential "marginal man" since he is located exactly "at the crossroads of two worlds". He defies, however, that role in that he is most energetically engaged in a project of self re-definition.

<sup>47</sup> Dunne 2005: 14 f. for the aetiology of marginality understood through Shils' theory of centre/periphery relations, refined in several ways as follows: first and foremost, social distance is understood in terms of the quality and volume of flow of resources, and marginality is understood as the condition of those social actors to, and from whom resource flow is restricted; second, multiple local centres are allowed for in place of the one centre postulated by Shils; and third, allowance is made for voluntary restriction of resources flow, i.e., voluntary marginality; finally, since multiple centres are postulated, marginality is understood as a multi-dimensional phenomenon "in that a given person may be simultaneously integrated with one or more centers while being marginal from one or other centers". This is a very bold attempt to describe marginality in strictly structural terms. Although it captures the most salient structural elements of marginality it fails to distinguish aetiology from consequences and falls

its identification<sup>48</sup>. The linchpin of marginality is this particular mental condition of resignation. In the crudest of terms it is quite simply the acceptance – whether conscious and articulated or not – of one’s defeat in a power struggle; and this is what makes marginality primarily a political phenomenon<sup>49</sup>.

The earliest Christians may have borne many of the structural marks of marginality, but unlike the Jewish society from which they had sprung, far from being reconciled to their predicament of exclusion, they conceived themselves as engaged in a struggle over the terms of inclusion into the society of the Roman empire. In this endeavour, quite predictably, historiography served them well as a prime vehicle of expression and identity-formation.

*Beit-Berl College, Israel*  
avidovav@netvision.net.il

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short of giving due weight to cultural factors such as group identity and political consciousness, for which reason I am not surprised by Dunne’s conclusion (32) that “pure forms of marginality are hard to find”, by which he presumably means forms conforming to his pure structural categories.

<sup>48</sup> See Germani 1980: 7 for marginality distinguished from poverty. Germani understands marginality as conceptually located on a different level than social stratification, related as it is to political consciousness as well as to pertinent aspects of lifestyle.

<sup>49</sup> Germani 1980: 13.

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PYTHAGORIZOUSA IN PLAUTUS' POENULUS?

By

DOROTA DUTSCH

In the last hundred years, correlations between New Comedy and Hellenistic ethical doctrine, especially that of the Peripatos, have received much scholarly attention<sup>1</sup>. Pythagoreanism in Greek comedy was mentioned relatively recently in this context by Geoffrey Arnott in his commentary on the fragments of Alexis's *Tarantinoi* and *Pythagorizousa* (Arnott 1996). So far, however, little attention has been paid to this ideology – which was native to Italy – as a potential intellectual partner to Roman comedy<sup>2</sup>. In the present essay I argue that Pythagorean echoes can be detected in one particular comedy, Plautus' *Poenulus*, and ask whether Plautus' audience might indeed have recognized them as such. Should the answer to the latter question be affirmative, we would be calling attention to a hitherto neglected nuance of the intellectual background of the *fabula palliata*.

1. PUDOR MERETRICIUS

My case study is the discourse of *pudor* put in the mouth of the prostitute Adelphasium in the *Poenulus*, which I will compare to pseudo-Pythagorean letters and treatises circulating under the names of 6<sup>th</sup>- or 5<sup>th</sup>-century female philosophers of that school. These texts ascribed to Melissa, Phyntis, and Theano contain primarily advice to women; they are almost certainly pseudonymous and have been dated between the fourth and third centuries BCE by Thesleff (1961)<sup>3</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> Peripatetic (e.g. Webster 1950: 195–219; Gaiser 1967: 8–38; Wehrli 1970: 147–152) and Stoic (e.g. Pohlenz 1940: 270).

<sup>2</sup> Arcellaschi's discussion (1982) of the original performance of the *Amphitruo* is, to the best of my knowledge, the only exception.

<sup>3</sup> This dating has been challenged by several studies, both of particular authors of Pseudopythagorica and of groups of texts (cf. Macris 2002: 79–85), but no such challenge has been set regarding the date of the texts (allegedly) authored by women; for example Plant 2001 accepts

Adelphasium (“Little Sister”) and her sister enter the stage splendidly attired (210). They are on their way to the festival of Aphrodisia, and tell the audience that, in the hope of finding solvent clients at the festival, they have worked extremely hard on their appearances. Little Sister feels that their efforts were too much and launches into a critique of women’s excessive grooming, eventually advocating her unique brand of moral excellence: *pudor meretricius*, or whorish virtue. Her program calls for shorter bath time, modest attire, and chastity, prescriptions in obvious conflict with her professional aspirations. For the purposes of this paper, I am not interested in Adelphasium’s identity crisis and its implications (though they are fascinating), but will instead focus exclusively on the pedigree of the wisdom she preaches.

Her lecture begins with a joke. A man who wishes to take on loads of work (*uim negoti*) should buy himself either a woman or a ship. Why? Both must be outfitted countless times<sup>4</sup>. To explain what she means, Adelphasium describes the bathing, scrubbing, washing, and rinsing that kept both sisters and six other people busy from dawn till broad day<sup>5</sup>. The length of women’s baths and the extent of women’s spending are frequent objects of Plautine jokes, so this aspect of Little Sister’s speech is in itself not particularly remarkable<sup>6</sup>. What is remarkable is the conclusion of her speech, which seems to refer to a specific ideal of purity (*Poen.* 228–232):

Postremo modus muliebris nullus est.  
Neque umquam lauando et fricando  
scimus facere neniam.  
Nam quae lauta est nisi perculta est, meo  
quidem animo quasi inluta est.

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Thesleff’s dating. As for the dates of the Pseudopythagorica in general, the opinion currently prevailing among scholars is that this type of writing flourished between third and second centuries BCE (so Centrone 1996: 148–150 and Kahn 2001: 74) but began in the fourth (Riedweg 2005: 122).

<sup>4</sup> 214 f.: “Neque umquam sat istae duae res ornantur/ neque is ulla ornandi satis satietas est” (“These two things are never sufficiently outfitted, nor is there an end to outfitting them sufficiently”). For *sat* as a part of philosophical vocabulary in the second century, see Turpilus (fr. 144 Ribbeck): “Ut philosophi aiunt isti quibus quidvis sat est” (“As those philosophers say for whom anything is sufficient”).

<sup>5</sup> It may be worth noting that the morning toilette is both described in eight verses and requires eight people – two girls + four maidservants + two slaves – and that the number eight was considered by the Pythagoreans “feminine”; cf. Burkert 1972: 469, esp. n. 18. Maurach (1975, *ad loc.*) notes another numeric peculiarity in the passage: the lines 210–253 form a harmonious sequence, with 210–232 falling into three sections of 5, 8, and 8 verses, and 233–253 into a sequence of four sections of 7, 7, 7, 6 lines respectively.

<sup>6</sup> Dinarchus, for example, claims that Phronesium has spent more time in the water than any fish (*Truc.* 322–325).



After all, there is no such thing as feminine *modus*.  
 And we are never able to stop  
 Washing and scrubbing,  
 Indeed, a woman who is washed seems dirty to me, unless she is *perculata*.

The word *per-culta* is quite puzzling (cf. Maurach 1975) because, when taken to mean ‘well-groomed’, it directly contradicts the spirit of Adelphasium’s diatribe against excessive grooming. This logical conundrum disappears if we notice that Little Sister says that the *perculata* is a woman who applies the abstract principle of *modus*, the right measure, to her appearance. In other words, her physical *cultus* reflects a meta-physical one. Adelphasium’s point is thus that a woman, no matter how well she washes, remains dirty unless she is also decorous. In this context, the Latin adjective *per-culta* would thus seem to render the Greek term εὐ-κοσμία, ‘decorous’. The ideal of εὐκοσμία is associated, in the most general sense, with orderly behavior in public<sup>7</sup>. Female εὐκοσμία in Athens and other Greek cities was the concern of male officials, the *gunaikonomoi*, who were in charge of curtailing luxury and supervising women’s behaviour at feasts and funerals<sup>8</sup>. Εὐκοσμία was also a subject considered by male lawgivers (Aeschines, *In Tim.* 183) and philosophers (Aristotle, *Polit.* 1322b 39). What we witness in Plautus’ *Poenulus*, however, is a woman voicing concern for women’s εὐ-κοσμία. This is by no means a common literary device, and the only parallel to it is found in the *Letter to Cleareta*, attributed to the Pythagorean philosopher Melissa, to which I will soon return<sup>9</sup>.

For now, let us go back to Little Sister and her discussion of *modus*. As she continues her sermon, the Plautine *meretrix* insists that moderation is the best attitude to adopt in all matters: “Modus in omnibus rebus, soror, optimum est habitu” (“moderation is the best attitude to take in all matters”, 238). The idea of moderation was a common element of Greek popular morality<sup>10</sup>. But Plautus’ “Modus in omnibus rebus optimum est habitu” looks like a translation of the

<sup>7</sup> Gold (1977: 3–5) offers an insightful history of the concept up to the fourth century BCE, stressing its political and military connotations.

<sup>8</sup> On the *gunaikonomoi*, see O’ Sullivan 2001 and her references.

<sup>9</sup> Thesleff (1965: 115–121): Αὐτομάτως ἐμὴν φαίνη πλέονα τῶν καλῶν ἔχεν· τὸ γὰρ ἐσπουδασμένως ἐθέλειν τὴν ἀκοῦσαι περὶ γυναικὸς εὐκοσμίας καλὰν ἐλπίδα διδοῖ ὅτι μέλλεις πολιοῦσθαι κατ’ ἀρετὴν (“You seem to be naturally filled with noble qualities. The fact that you so zealously desire to hear about proper conduct for women provides the noble hope that you will grow old in righteousness”). My Pandora search revealed twenty-four instances of εὐκοσμία of women discussed in Greek texts; the letter attributed to Melissa is the only example that features a female speaker discussing this notion.

<sup>10</sup> Apparently, the seven sages offered to Delphic Apollo the concept of μηδὲν ἄγαν as the fruit of their collective wisdom; cf. Pausanias X 24, 1. The gnomon appears in Theognis (e.g. I 335; 401), Plato (e.g. 228e 3; 45e 1), and Euripides (*Hip.* 265); Plutarch (116D 11) cites a fragment from Pindar containing this proverb.

gnomon μέτρον δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἄριστον, which occurs in the corpus of Greek texts six times, each time associated with the Pythagoreans. Most importantly for our purposes, this proverb appears in the Pythagorean *Golden Verses*<sup>11</sup>, a fourth-century poem in hexameter, whose Latin translation might have been in circulation in the second-century; the proverb also appears in Theano's *Letter to Callisto*, another pseudonymous Pythagorean text addressed to women<sup>12</sup>.

Adelphasium's speech concludes with her own curious proposal of *pudor meretricius*, or "whorish modesty" (304–307):

Meretricem pudorem gerere magi' decet quam purpuram  
 magi'que id meretricem pudorem quam aurum gerere, concedet.  
 Pulchrum ornatum turpes mores peius caeno conlinunt,  
 lepidi mores turpem ornatum facile factis comprobant.

For a prostitute it is more fitting to deck herself with modesty than a purple robe.  
 And indeed to wear modesty rather than gold is more befitting a prostitute.  
 An ugly disposition stains a pretty dress worse than mud.  
 A beautiful disposition will easily earn approval for an ugly dress.

The very idea of a prostitute preaching chastity is of course hilarious, but Adelphasium's attitude, in addition to being a paradox, also appears to be a parody of Pythagorean advice for women. Melissa's *Letter to Cleareta* – which, as we saw, features a woman advising another woman on εὐκοσμία asserts precisely the opposite, namely, that purple and gold are fitting *only* for prostitutes. Wives – unlike prostitutes – do not need them because they are already adorned by modesty:

χρῆ ὧν τὰν σώφρονα καὶ ἐλευθέραν [...] ἤμεν δὲ τᾶ ἐσθᾶτι λευκοεῖμονα καὶ καθάριον καὶ ἀφελῆ [...] παραιτητέον γὰρ αὐτᾶ τὰν διαυγῆ καὶ διαπόρφυρον καὶ τὰ χρυσόπαστα τῶν ἐνδυμάτων. ταῖς ἐταίραις γὰρ τάδε χρήσιμα ποττὰν τῶν πλεόνων θήραν, τᾶς δὲ ποθ' ἕνα τὸν ἴδιον εὐαρεστούσας γυναικὸς κόσμος ὁ τρόπος πέλει καὶ οὐχ αἰ στολαί.

A modest and elegant woman [...] must wear a clean, white, and simple dress [...]. She must banish genuine purple dresses and those decorated with purple or gilded from her wardrobe. These things are useful for prostitutes [...]; character, not

<sup>11</sup> See *GV* (38b–39): μηδ' ἀνελεύθερος ἴσθι. μέτρον δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἄριστον./ πρᾶσσε δὲ ταυθ', ἃ σε μὴ βλάψει, λόγισαι δὲ πρὸ ἔργου ("But don't be stingy. Measure is best in all things./ Do the things that will not harm you, always think before the deed"). Thom (1995: 162, n. 299) lists other references to this maxim in Greek literature.

<sup>12</sup> Thesleff (1965: 197 f.): καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν θεραπαινῶν ταυτόν· ἢ μὲν ἄγαν ἄνεσις διαφωνίαν ἐμποιεῖ τῆς πειθαρχίας, ἢ δὲ ἐπίτασις τῆς ἀνάγκης διάλυσιν τῆς φύσεως, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτου δεῖ νοεῖν, μέτρον δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἄριστον. ἔρρωσο ("...and the same holds true about your maidservants. An excessively lax discipline makes [your] authority inconsistent, while an increase [in discipline] inevitably undoes [their] strength. You must keep in mind the proverb 'moderation is best in all things'. Farewell").

clothing, is a fitting ornament for a woman who seeks to please only her own husband.

Both passages indicate that gold and purple are inappropriate for women who are already bedecked with decency. However, whereas Melissa gives this advice to wives, Little Sister appropriates it for her perverse discourse of *pudor meretricius*. Incidentally, her slogan, “Decency (*pudor*), not clothing, is a fitting ornament for a woman”, echoes a motto found in yet another of the pseudo-Pythagorean texts addressed to women mentioned above, *Περὶ γυναικὸς σωφροσύνας* (*On Woman's Self-control*), attributed to Phyntis<sup>13</sup>.

The similarities between advice to women found in pseudo-Pythagorean texts and the Plautine lesson of whorish morality are so persistent that one is tempted to postulate that the *Poenulus* deliberately pokes fun at the virtues proposed in these texts. First, however, we need to ask if it is historically feasible for Pythagorean concepts to have found their way into the *Poenulus*.

## 2. PYTHAGORA, CIVIS ROMANUS

The Pythagorizing woman is a figure attested to in several fragments and titles of Greek comedies, including those by Alexis<sup>14</sup>. Since Alexis happens to be the author of the *Karchedonios*, the main model for Plautus' *Poenulus*<sup>15</sup>, it seems perfectly reasonable to conjecture that his play mocked some pseudo-Pythagorean instructions for women, such as those from the texts that came down to us under the names of Theano, Phyntis, and Melissa, and that some of that humour found its way into the Latin comedy.

While this may be an interesting piece of trivia, the real question for a historian of Roman theater is what Plautus' audience would have made of such reminiscences, if, indeed, they are such. Needless to say, it would be naive to pretend that pseudo-Pythagorean texts attributed to women were widely read in early second-century Rome. But it would be equally naive to claim that Pythagorean lore was unknown to Plautus' audience. In the third century BCE, the Romans

<sup>13</sup> Thesleff (1965: 153): χρώματι δὲ φαιδρύνεσθαι τὸν ποτῶπα μὴ ἔπακτῶ καὶ ἀλλοτρίῳ, τῷ δ' οἰκίῳ τῷ σώματος δι' αὐτῷ τῷ ὕδατος ἀπολουέμενα, κοσμέν δὲ μᾶλλον αὐτὰν αἰσχύνῃα (“And she should brighten her face not with an imported and foreign colour but with the natural colour of her own body; having washed with water, she should adorn herself with modesty”). Cf. also Iamblichus' rendition of Pythagoras' address to women (*VP* 11, 56).

<sup>14</sup> See fr. 201 and 202 Kassel and Austin (= K–A); cf. also Cratinus, fr. 6 and 7 K–A, Antiphanes, fr. 133 and 225 K–A, and Aristophon, fr. 223 K–A.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Arnott 1996: 284–287; Alexis was a native of Magna Graecia known for exploiting Pythagorean motifs in at least two of his plays, *Pythagorizousa* and *Tarantinoi* (see above). The fragments of the *Tarantinoi* show the playwright's conscious irony towards Pythagorean views, which is comparable with the ridicule of the discourses of virtue and abstinence in the *Poenulus*.

honoured Pythagoras by erecting his statue in their Forum (Pliny, *NH* XXXIV 26). A spurious, but tenacious, tradition associated Pythagoras with Rome's legendary king Numa. In 181 BCE, someone tried to capitalize on this connection, orchestrating a "discovery" of Pythagorean books allegedly authored by the king, which the senate immediately ordered to be burned<sup>16</sup>. The attempted forgery would seem to indicate that not only Pythagorean ideas, but also pseudo-Pythagorean writings, were a phenomenon well-known in early second-century Rome. Another potential medium for disseminating Pythagorean ideas – especially among women – could have been the Bacchanalian cult suppressed in 196 BCE, which, as Walter Burkert argues, could have contained elements of both Orphism and Pythagoreanism<sup>17</sup>.

Cicero's references to an eclectic Pythagorean poem authored by Appius Claudius Caecus and to the Elder Cato's familiarity with memory exercises, which he knew from the *Golden Verses*, corroborate the impression that Pythagoreanism would indeed have been popular among the Roman elite in the third and second centuries BCE<sup>18</sup>. In fact, Cato not only demonstrates knowledge of the Pythagorean literature on diet in *De agri cultura*<sup>19</sup>, but is also believed to have brought Ennius, whose *Annales* and *Epicharmus* reflect Pythagorean beliefs, to Rome<sup>20</sup>. Ennius was a poet who relied on patronage and accepted commissions to write works for specific benefactors, including *Ambracia*, which was written for Fulvius Nobilior, and *Scipio*, written for Scipio Africanus<sup>21</sup>. The Pythagorist philosophizing present in Ennius' works thus gives testimony to something more than his own predilections – the interests of his elite Roman contemporaries. One of his patrons, Fulvius Nobilior, the author of *De fastis* and founder of the temple of "Hercules the leader of the Muses"<sup>22</sup>, almost certainly shared the poet's interest

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<sup>16</sup> For an authoritative discussion of the affair, see Gruen 1990: 163–168.

<sup>17</sup> On Orphic, Bacchic, and Pythagorean syncretism, see Burkert 1972: 125–135.

<sup>18</sup> *Tusc.* IV 4: "Mihi quidem Appii Caeci carmen [...] Pythagoreum videtur".

<sup>19</sup> See Boscherini 1970: 9–91 on the influences of Greek letters and sciences in *De agri cultura*. According to Pliny (*NH* XXXV 160), Cato's *De agri cultura* frequently draws upon the Pythagorist text *Liber Plantarum*, attributed to Sulpicius Gallus (2<sup>nd</sup> cent. BCE). Dietetics was, according to Iamblichus (*VP* 29), the most important part of Pythagorean medicine. According to Diog. Laert. VIII 47, Pythagoras himself was a physician.

<sup>20</sup> The initial lines of the *Annales* tell of Ennius' dream (fr. 2), which involves his meeting with a weeping Homer (fr. 3) and his recollection of a former life as a peacock (fr. 11); cf. *somnia Pythagorea* in Hor. *Epist.* II 1, 50–52 and Porphy. *ad loc.* See also Lucr. I 124–126; Pers. 6, 9–11. Skutsch offers a balanced discussion of the Pythagorean themes in Ennius' dream, concluding that they would have been inspired both by Hellenistic literature and local legend (Skutsch 1985: 148–150).

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Plin. *NH* VII 114 and Claud. *Stil.* III 23.

<sup>22</sup> Fulvius' *De fastis* apparently influenced Ovid's *Fasti*, as well as the Pythagorean excerpt in the *Metamorphoses*; cf. Kahn 2001: 87.

in Pythagorean symbolism<sup>23</sup>, Needless to say, as the famous *autodafé* of “Numa’s books” attests, not everyone in Rome would have approved the mingling of Pythagorean concepts with Roman morality. Yet, advocated by some, rejected by others, Pythagoreanism was *the* philosophical doctrine most likely to be familiar to Plautus’ educated contemporaries.

### CONCLUSION

Let us now go back to the *Poenulus* and ask what, if anything, can be gained through reading Plautus alongside pseudo-Pythagorean texts. On the one hand, the humor of the scene featuring a prostitute preaching chastity stands on its own. The spectators could have laughed at Adelphasium’s ambition to be chaste, whether or not they could detect any Pythagorizing allusions. On the other hand, however, Plautus’ ideology of whorish chastity seems to subvert the discourse of εὐκοσμία, and includes a translation of a proverb from the *Golden Verses*. These features were probably derived from Alexis’ *Karchedonios*, but Pythagorean concepts were also in vogue in second-century Rome<sup>24</sup>. Could this be a mere coincidence, or are we entitled to postulate that some cognoscenti in the audience – perhaps not numerous, but possibly influential – might have appreciated Adelphasium’s lecture as a parody of Pythagorean discussions of women’s virtue? If so, by reading the *Poenulus* with pseudo-Pythagorean texts, we gain a glimpse at a figure we did not expect to find among the stereotypes of Roman comedy – a Plautine version of the *précieuse ridicule*. We do not know how the *perculata puella* and her fashionable pythagorizing related to the intellectual pursuits of women in early second century Rome, but it is a pleasure to be able to ask such a question.

*University of California, Santa Barbara*

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<sup>23</sup> Cf. Cic. *Arch.* 27; to the Pythagoreans, Heracles was the personification of highest wisdom, cf. Martina 1981: 64 f.; on the Pythagorean nature of the temple of *Hercules mousagetes*, see also Boyancé 1955: 180–183.

<sup>24</sup> As Gruen (1990: 171–176) has demonstrated, the Roman mistrust of philosophy in the third and second centuries BCE has been somewhat overstated.

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## ÜBERLEGUNGEN ZUM PROOEMIUM DER *ARGONAUTICA* DES VALERIUS FLACCUS

Von

THOMAS GÄRTNER

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG: Unter Voraussetzung einer Datierung zu Lebzeiten Vespasians werden die Kernaussagen des Prooemiums der *Argonautica* (1. Entsprechung zwischen Argonautenfahrt und „nautischer“ Leistung Vespasians, 2. versteckte *recusatio* durch einen Hinweis auf eine von Domitian bereits begonnene Dichtung, 3. spezifische Adaptation der traditionellen Vorstellung einer postmortalen Existenz des Princeps) in Auseinandersetzung mit der bisherigen Forschung deutlicher herausgestellt und insbesondere zu einer konsequenten Textkonstitution herangezogen. Dabei wird insbesondere im Gegensatz zu den modernen Ausgaben eine starke Interpunktion nach Vers 9 empfohlen.

Die folgenden Bemerkungen dienen dem Zweck, den Gedankengang des Prooemiums der *Argonautica* des Valerius Flaccus deutlicher zu machen – insbesondere vor dem Hintergrund der konventionellen dichterischen Prooemialtechnik – und diese Beobachtungen für die problematische Textkonstitution nutzbar zu machen, was sich insbesondere in einer neuen Interpunktion nach V. 9 und in einer veränderten Textgestalt in Vv. 16–19 niederschlagen wird.

Viele der zu diesem Zweck gemachten Beobachtungen können keine Originalität mehr beanspruchen, sondern sind so oder so ähnlich bereits in der monographischen Behandlung des *Argonautica*-Prooemiums von Eckard Lefèvre (1971) antizipiert worden. In dieser Arbeit werden teilweise sehr wichtige Beobachtungen leider nicht zu einer konsequenten Neugestaltung des Textes herangezogen, sondern hauptsächlich, um eine metaphorisch-poetologische Deutung des Tempelheiligtums in V. 15 im Sinne einer weiteren angekündigten panegyrischen Dichtung Domitians zu unterfüttern. Diese Deutung, welche impliziert, daß der anerkanntermaßen in V. 12–14 erwähnten, gegenwärtig von Domitian produzierten Dichtung über den Aufstand von Judaea in V. 15 in metaphorischer Form eine weitere, für die Zukunft angekündigte komplexere über das *bellum Capitolinum* hinzugefügt wird, hat sich in der weiteren Forschungsliteratur zu VF, etwa in den ausführlichen Kommentaren von Kleywegt (2005) und Zissos (2008) zu Buch I, nicht durchsetzen können.

Die folgenden Ausführungen verbleiben demnach bezüglich der großen Probleme des *Argonautica*-Prooemiums ganz auf dem Boden der *communis opinio*, daß nämlich (1) mit dem Tempelheiligtum in V. 15 eine lokal nicht zu identifizierende, aber für VF absehbare künftige Konsekration Vespasians gemeint ist (die sich natürlicherweise auf die gesamte *gens Flavia* ausweitet) und daß (2) das ganze Prooemium zu Lebzeiten Vespasians verfaßt ist<sup>1</sup>.

Zunächst der Text des Prooemiums in der wohl am breitesten rezipierten Fassung der Teubneriana von W.-W. Ehlers (Stuttgart 1980):

Prima deum magnis canimus freta pervia natis  
fatidicamque ratem, Scythici quae Phasidis oras  
ausa sequi mediosque inter iuga concita cursus  
rumpere flammifero tandem consedit Olympo.

- 5 Phoebe, mone, si Cumaeae mihi conscia vatis  
stat casta cortina domo, si laurea digna  
fronte viret, tuque o pelagi cui maior aperti  
fama, Caledonius postquam tua carbasa vexit  
Oceanus, Phrygios prius indignatus Iulos,  
10 eripe me populis et habenti nubila terrae,  
sancte pater, veterumque fave veneranda canenti  
facta virum: versam proles tua pandit Idumen,  
namque potest, Solymo nigrantem pulvere fratrem  
spargentemque faces et in omni turre furentem.  
15 Ille tibi cultusque deum delubraque genti  
instituet, cum iam, genitor, lucebis ab omni  
parte poli neque erit Tyriae Cynosura carinae  
certior aut Graeis Helice servanda magistris.  
Seu tu signa dabis seu te duce Graecia mittet  
20 et Sidon Nilusque rates: nunc nostra serenus  
orsa iuves, haec ut Latias vox impleat urbes.

13 potest X<sup>c</sup>T : potes ω || 16 iam L : tu S : om. V || 17 erit Heinsius : in ω | Tyriae ...  
carinae Heinsius : Tyrias ... carinas ω

Die in den ersten vier Versen erfolgende Themenangabe knüpft schon durch die bloße Vierzahl der Verse deutlich am Prooemium des Apollonius Rhodius an:

ἀρχόμενος σέο Φοῖβε παλαιγενέων κλέα φωτῶν  
μνήσομαι οἱ Πόντοιο κατὰ στόμα καὶ διὰ πέτρας  
Κυανέας βασιλῆος ἐφημοσύνη Πελῖαιο  
χρῦσειον μετὰ κῶας ἐύζυγον ἤλασαν Ἄργῳ.

<sup>1</sup> Diese beiden Thesen bezüglich des Prooemiums werden geteilt von Taylor 1994: 213–216.



Auffälligerweise fehlt in den ersten vier Versen bei VF ein dem griechischen ἀρχόμενος σέο Φοῖβε entsprechender Verweis auf eine Inspirationsgottheit; dieser Aspekt ist bei VF in das nächste Textsegment verschoben und zu einem separaten Abschnitt (5–21) verbreitert.

Erhebliche Differenzen finden sich schon in dieser eigentlichen Themenangabe: VF betont gegenüber AR das Übernatürlich-Göttliche des Geschehens: Die Argonauten sind bedeutende Göttersöhne („deum magnis [...] natis“, was genealogisch nur auf wenige zutrifft), das Schiff, die Argo, ist „weissagungsverkündend“ (*fatidicam*), also ebenfalls übernatürlich begabt, und insbesondere wird der schließliche Katasterismus der Argo hervorgehoben („flammiifero tandem cedit Olympo“). Dagegen wird bei AR die Leistung der Argonauten in herkömmlicher epischer Terminologie dargestellt wie die Leistung menschlicher Kriegshelden aus dem Heroenzeitalter (παλαιγενέων κλέα φωτῶν); κλέος ist ein üblicher Ausdruck für menschliche Ruhmestaten.

Demgegenüber sind die Gemeinsamkeiten der Sachschilderung recht beschränkt: „Scythici [...] Phasidis oras“ entspricht als Ortsangabe grob dem griechischen Πόντιοι κατὰ στόμα. Im übrigen besteht die einzige faktische Gemeinsamkeit in der Durchfahrt durch die Symplegaden (διὰ πέτρας/Κυανέας bzw. „inter iuga concita“).

AR nennt über VF hinaus den kausalen Grund der Unternehmung (βασιλῆος ἐφημοσύνη Πελοπονησιακῆ) und ihr finales Ziel (die Einholung des Goldenen Vlieses: χρύσειον μετὰ κῶας)<sup>2</sup>. VF interessiert dagegen im Programmsatz weder der kausale noch der finale Grund der Unternehmung.

Dagegen betont VF die Leistung, die in der Zurücklegung des Weges über das Meer liegt; die Seefahrt als solche scheint für ihn (abgesehen von ihren Motiven) von Interesse zu sein: AR beschreibt die Fahrt nur mit den Worten ἐύζυγον ἤλασαν Ἀργῶ (griech. ἐλάσσειν ist der Standardausdruck für das rudende Bewegen eines Schiffes). Dagegen umschreibt VF den Vorgang der Fahrt dreifach mit exquisiten dichterischen Ausdrücken als besondere Leistung: zunächst mit „freta pervia“ (das Meer wurde durchlässig gemacht), dann mit „ausa sequi“ (die Aufsuchung der Kolcher war ein besonderes Wagnis) und dann schließlich (im Zusammenhang mit der Durchquerung der Symplegaden) mit der recht grellen Metapher „cursus/ rumpere“ (die Argo „brach“ sich ihren Weg).

Wichtig ist auch der Aspekt, daß diese Leistung hier zum ersten Mal erbracht wird: „Prima [...] freta pervia“; auch *rumpere cursus* hebt hervor (wenn man *cursus* als ein effizientes Objekt versteht), daß der Weg bzw. Lauf erst mit der

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<sup>2</sup> Zur Weglassung des Goldenen Vlieses als Ziel der Unternehmung bei VF und der Parallelierung zwischen der Argonautenfahrt und der Leistung Vespasians als „Meereseröffner“ vgl. auch Taylor 1994: 216–218. Fraglich ist jedoch, ob man aus den im Prooemium zweifellos gegebenen Entsprechungen mit Taylor die Konsequenz ziehen darf, im Rest des Epos nach „typologischen“ Entsprechungen zwischen mythologischem Geschehen und historischen Zeitumständen des VF zu suchen.

Aktion der Argonauten geschaffen wurde. Die Argonauten sind gewissermaßen die *πρωτοὶ εὐρεταί* der Überseefahrt<sup>3</sup>.

Also scheint es VF im Vergleich zu AR weniger auf die Umstände der Unternehmung der Argonauten anzukommen; dafür fokussiert er mehr auf die Seefahrt als solche, die gemäß seiner Schilderung eine Leistung für sich darstellt und von den Argonauten inauguriert wurde. Die Gründe für diese Gestaltung werden noch deutlich werden.

Jetzt aber zum „Anrufungsabschnitt“ (5–21): Hierhin „verschiebt“ VF, wie gesagt, die Anrufung des Dichtergotts Apoll aus dem ersten Vers bei AR. Tendenziell entspricht er mit dieser Vorgehensweise den Homerimitationen Vergils am Anfang der *Aeneis*: Auch in den Prooemien von *Ilias* (Θεά) und *Odyssee* (Μοῦσα) werden gleich im ersten Satz Inspirationsgottheiten angerufen, aber Vergil singt wie VF (*canimus*) in eigenem Namen („*arma virumque cano*“) und verlegt den Topos der Musenanrufung hinter das eigentliche Prooemium in den sogenannten Ursachenabschnitt (*Aen.* I 8: „*Musa mihi causas memora*“, vgl. Lefèvre 1971: 12).

Der Anrufungsabschnitt bei VF nimmt nun die Anrufung an Phoebus aus AR auf (5–7a), setzt aber eine zweite, wesentlich umfanglichere Anrufung an Vespasian daneben (7b–21). Es ergibt sich auf den ersten Blick der Eindruck, daß die Anrufung an Phoebus quantitativ überwogen wird von derjenigen an Vespasian.

Der Relativsatz „*tuque o pelagi cui maior aperti/Fama...*“ bezieht sich sachlich, wenn man an einer Datierung des Prooemiums zur Lebenszeit Vespasians festhält, wohl auf eine Exkursion Vespasians lange vor seinem Prinzipat im Jahre 43 (vgl. Lefèvre 1971: 50 ff.); ein Bezug auf die (weitaus bedeutendere) Ausweitung des römischen Einflußgebiets in Britannien bis nach Schottland, die im Jahr 77 unter dem neuen römischen Statthalter Gnaeus Iulius Agricola (dem Schwiegervater des Geschichtsschreibers Tacitus) begann, ist unter Voraussetzung einer Datierung des Prooemiums auf die Lebenszeit Vespasians zeitlich kaum möglich. Zudem ermöglicht der Bezug auf eine Exkursion, an welcher Vespasian persönlich anwesend war, eine weitaus engere Korrespondenz zur Argonautenfahrt als die bloße Aussendung eines dritten.

Die herkömmliche Interpunktion (bei Ehlers wie in allen modernen Ausgaben) nimmt die Anrede „*tuque o pelagi cui...*“ zusammen mit *eripe* (10) und koordiniert mit diesem *eripe* wiederum *fave* (11). Eine Folge dieser herkömmlichen Interpunktion, die später näher zu hinterfragen sein wird, besteht darin, daß dem Imperativ *eripe* zwei Anreden zugeordnet werden, nämlich sowohl „*tuque o pelagi cui...*“ (7–9) als auch auch „*sancte pater*“ (11). Diese Doppelung bestimmt (neben anderen Motiven) einen erheblichen Teil der VF-Editoren dazu, die Anrede „*sancte pater*“ durch eine von Samuelsson vorgeschlagene konjekturale

<sup>3</sup> Vgl. Lefèvre 1971: 13 mit der Parallele Catull. 64, 11.

Vertauschung mit dem Textsegment „namque potes“ (13) in die nächste Periode abzuschleppen.

Sachlich wird mit dem Imperativ „eripe me populis et habenti nubila terrae“ in dichterisch konventioneller Weise der Wunsch nach Verewigung des Dichters durch die Dichtung ausgesprochen. Als Parallele für einen solchen durch Dichtung bewirkten „Flug“ sei etwa Theogn. 237–239 zitiert (wo sich das Motiv nicht auf den Dichter, sondern auf den Adressaten Kyrnos bezieht):

σοὶ μὲν ἐγὼ πτέρ' ἔδωκα, σὺν οἷς ἐπ' ἀπείρονα πόντον  
 πωτήσημι καὶ γῆν πᾶσαν ἀειρόμενος  
 ῥηιδίως...

Zur Beziehung auf den Dichter selbst vgl. besonders Ennius fr. var. 18: „*volito vivos per ora virum*“.

Dieser konventionelle Topos vermischt sich hier bei VF mit einem alexandrinisch-elitären Gedanken, insofern in der Formulierung „eripe me populis“ das abwertende *populis* sicherlich auch als Ausdruck für Dichter minderer Qualität zu verstehen ist<sup>4</sup>.

Die Folge der herkömmlichen Konstruktionsweise „tuque [...] eripe“ ist die Aussage: „Du, dessen Ruhm infolge der Öffnung des Ozeans größer ist als derjenige der Argonauten, entreiße mich der irdischen Sphäre und begünstige meine begonnene Dichtung“. Damit werden zwei Umstände, die wenig miteinander zu tun haben, einerseits die Leistung Vespasians als „Eröffner“ des Ozeans und andererseits seine wohlwollende Protektion des VF, in eine Verbindung zueinander gebracht.

Gegenüber dieser allgemein üblichen, nicht besonders sinnförderlichen Konstruktion scheint eine alternative Auffassung erwägenswert: Der Relativsatz „tuque o pelagi cui...“ beschließt in Wirklichkeit die Periode, und *tuque* gehört noch zu *monē*. Dann ist nach V. 9 stark zu interpungieren. Vespasian tritt als zweite inspirierende bzw. „erinnernde“ Instanz neben Phoebus. Eine exakte Parallele hierzu liefert die von Zissos (der freilich in seinem Text auch an der üblichen Interpunktion festhält) zu I 7–12 zitierte Parallele Stat. *Silv.* V 1, 13–15: „modo dexter Apollo/ quique venit iuncto mihi semper Apolline Caesar/ annuat“.

Die Wahl beider Inspirationsinstanzen wird separat begründet, zunächst durch einen zweifachen *si*-Satz, dann durch einen Relativsatz. Auf beide Instanzen entfallen in der ersten Periode des Anrufungsabschnitts (wenn man nach V. 9 stark interpungiert) etwa zweieinhalb Hexameter, mit einem leichten Übergewicht für

<sup>4</sup> Lefèvre 1971: 58 verweist für die Kombination der Motive „Dichterflug“ und „Distanzierung vom Volk“ auf Hor. *Carm.* I 1, 30 ff., allerdings ist dort die Erhebung in den Himmel nicht allgemein poetologisch-topisch zu verstehen, sondern wird mit den Worten „quodsi me lyricis vatibus inseres“ an eine bestimmte Bedingung geknüpft.

Vespasian, dessen Anrede durch den folgenden Imperativ (*eripe*) auch fortgesetzt wird.

Betrachten wir nun unter Voraussetzung dieser neuen Interpunktion den Aufbau des Anrufungsabschnitts im einzelnen:

Die Heranziehung von Phoebus und Vespasian als Inspirationsgottheit wird charakteristisch verschieden begründet: Phoebus' Heranziehung wird von VF autobiographisch erklärt durch ein Priesteramt, in dem er mit der mit Phoebus eng verbundenen Sibylle von Cumae zu tun hatte (ob er einer der *quindecim viri*, eines Priesterkollegiums, welches mit den sibyllinischen Büchern zu tun hatte, war, ist ungewiß); die Heranziehung des Phoebus wird also durchaus herkömmlich im Sinne der antiken Auffassung eines *do-ut-des*-Verhältnisses zwischen Mensch und Gott begründet.

Weitaus weniger konventionell ist dagegen die Art, wie die Heranziehung von Vespasian als Inspirationsgottheit begründet wird: Seine Kompetenz als Inspirationsgottheit ergibt sich daraus, daß er im Vergleich zu den Argonauten größeren Ruhm infolge der „Öffnung des Meeres“, d. h. der Eroberung Britanniens, erworben hat („*tuque o pelagi cui maior aperti/ fama*“).

Kleywegt (2005 z. St.) versucht sich gegen die m. E. unabweisbare Deutung zu wehren, *maior* vergleiche die Leistung Vespasians als „Meereseröffner“ mit derjenigen der Argonauten. Kleywegt erwägt als Alternativen die Deutungen „*greater than before*“, „*greater than his other claims to glory*“ (dann der Komparativ im Sinne eines Superlativs *maxima* zu deuten), glaubt aber doch, daß „*the implied superiority is to Caesar's former, less successful attempts*“. Bereits Caesar hatte nämlich in den Jahren 55 und 54 v. Chr. zwei Feldzüge nach Britannien unternommen, die jedoch jeweils mit dem Rückzug der Römer am Ende des jeweiligen Sommers endeten.

Diese Caesar-Feldzüge als Bezugspunkt des Komparativs *maior* zu nehmen, erscheint an den Haaren herbeigezogen, zumal das Versagen der Julier ja erst im übernächsten Vers beschrieben wird (9); da es dort heißt „*Oceanus [...] indignatus*“, so erscheint zweifelhaft, ob VF in diesen Bemühungen der Julier überhaupt ein Ruhmesblatt, eine *fama*, gesehen hätte.

Der einzige Grund, warum Kleywegt den naheliegenden Bezug von *maior* auf die Argonautenexpedition ablehnt, besteht darin, daß VF mit einer solchen Hyperbel die Bedeutung seines eigenen Werks unterminieren würde („*This would indeed be flattering to Vespasian, but would impair the significance of VF's work; moreover, his flattery of the emperor is relatively sparing*“).

Mit diesem Argument wird aber übersehen, daß römische epische Dichter häufiger ihr jeweiliges Werk dem jeweiligen Potentaten in solch devoter Weise unterordnen; die *Aeneis* Vergils kann man als eine mythische Genealogie des Augustus verstehen, Lucan ordnet seine Darstellung der Bürgerkriege ganz dem amtierenden Kaiser Nero unter, in dem Sinne, daß alles Leiden der Bürgerkriege seinen Sinn gehabt hätte, wenn es zur Herrschaft Neros hingeführt hätte; in diese

Tradition fügt sich also VF ganz unauffällig, wenn er die Argonauten mit ihrer „Meereseröffnung“ nur als relativ unbedeutende Vorstufe zu Vespasians Erfolgen in Britannien betrachtet.

Genaugenommen scheint die Schwerpunktsetzung im Themensatz des VF vor dem Hintergrund des AR gerade darauf hinauszulaufen, die Leistung der „Meereseröffnung“ ins Licht zu setzen, und damit die Argonautenfahrt als einen Vorläufer zu Vespasians „Meereseröffnung“ zu stilisieren; VF interessiert ja im Themensatz weder die Vorgeschichte der Argonautenfahrt noch ihr Zweck, die Rückholung des Golden Vließes; betont wird nur der Aspekt der „Meereseröffnung“ („deum magnis [...] *freta pervia natis*“ korrespondiert mit „*pelagi [...] aperti*“ in V. 7). Wie die Argonauten einen zuvor verschlossenen „Weg“ bzw. „Kurs“ „aufbrechen“ (3 f.: „*cursus/ rumpere*“), so „eröffnet“ Vespasian den caledonischen Ozean, der zuvor den Juliern verschlossen blieb (9); am Schluß wird er in Anbetracht dieser Leistung nicht nur vergöttlicht, sondern auch verstirnt wie die Argo. Wie die Argonauten („*deum magnis [...] natis*“) entstammt er einer „göttlichen“ Familie, die als solche anerkannt wird (15: „*de-lubraque genti*“).

So ergibt also auch die Betonung des Aspekts der „Göttlichkeit“ der Argonautenfahrt bei VF unter diesem Gesichtspunkt Sinn, weil ja auch der „historische“ Meereseröffner Vespasians göttlichen Rang erhalten wird (15 ff.). Die Verstirnung der Argo wird nicht deshalb von VF erwähnt, weil er sie am (fehlenden) Ende seines Epos darstellen will (Lefèvre 1971: 15), sondern weil sie der angekündigten Verstirnung Vespasians entspricht<sup>5</sup>. Insofern also Göttlichkeit und Verstirnung dem Princeps Vespasian gleichermaßen wie den Argonauten bzw. der Argo eignen, sollte man das Motiv der Konsekrierung Vespasians in V. 15 auch unter diesem Gesichtspunkt nicht durch eine metaphorisch-poetologische Deutung abschwächen. Offenbar hat VF alles getan, um die Argonautenfahrt im Prooemium als eine stimmige mythologische Praefiguration der „historischen Meereseröffnung“ Vespasians darzustellen: Die göttlichen Argonauten praefigurieren den neuen göttlichen „Meereseröffner“.

Diese evidenten Parallelen zwischen dem Bild der Argonauten in Vv. 1–4 und dem des Vespasian im Anrufungsabschnitt (Vv. 5–21) protestieren fast schreiend gegen die zuletzt von Ehlers (1991: 22) wiederbelebte These, der „Anrufungsabschnitt“ sei dem Prooemium nachträglich hinzugesetzt werden. Etwa das Motiv der Verstirnung der Argo (V. 4), welches im Epos selbst kaum eine große Rolle spielen konnte, ist offenkundig nur als Parallele zur entsprechenden Verstirnung Vespasians am Ende des „Anrufungsabschnitts“ bedeutsam. Wenn man auch mit Ehlers (1991: 21) konstatieren kann, daß das Motiv der nautischen Leistungen Vespasians nur im Prooemium der *Argonautica*, nicht

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<sup>5</sup> Zur Entsprechung der beiden Verstirnungen vgl. auch das Aufbauschema bei Ehlers 1971/72: 116.

aber im restlichen Werk bedeutsam ist, so wird man doch dieser Behandlung des Themas an exponierter Stelle seine Stimmigkeit mit dem unmittelbaren Kontext (der eigentlichen Themenangabe in Vv. 1–4) nicht abstreiten dürfen.

Demnach ist *maior scil.* „größer als bei den Argonauten“ (die Deutung, welche Kleywegt nicht wahrhaben will) also die entscheidende Scharnierstelle im logischen Gefüge des Prooemiums.

Konkret wird die Kompetenz von Vespasian als Inspirationsgott dadurch nachgewiesen, daß er den Ruhm einer im Vergleich zu den Argonauten bedeutenderen Überseeunternehmung aufzuweisen hat; durch diese Betätigung ist er als Inspirationsgottheit *a maiore* kompetent.

Die Logik dieser Argumentation ist dem Prooemium der ovidischen *Metamorphosen* vergleichbar:

In nova fert animus mutatas dicere formas  
 corpora; di, coeptis (nam vos mutastis et illas)<sup>6</sup>  
 aspirate meis primaque ab origine mundi  
 ad mea perpetuum deducite tempora carmen.

Die Bitte um den Beistand der Götter (*aspirate*) wird begründet durch „nam vos mutastis et illas“, d. h. durch die Tatsache, daß die Götter selbst *Metamorphosen* bewirken, also gerade für das verantwortlich sind, was im Epos beschrieben wird; daher sind sie als inspirierende Instanz geeignet.

Entsprechend ist hier Vespasian als inspirierende Instanz für ein Seefahrerepos geeignet, weil er selbst etwas den Argonauten Vergleichbares und sogar Größeres geleistet hat; Phoebus ist als Dichtergott immer geeignet, Vespasian speziell durch seine persönliche Erfahrung in Bezug auf Überseeunternehmungen.

Sachliche Kompetenz in einer Unternehmung ist eine qualifizierende Voraussetzung für entsprechende Dichtung. Man vergleiche den Kommentar Quintilians über die Dichtungen Domitians (X 1, 91):

quis enim caneret bella melius quam qui sic gerit? quem praesidentes studiis deae  
 propius audirent? cui magis suas artis aperiret familiare numen Minerva?

Ähnlich wird bei VF die Kompetenz des Vespasian begründet, allerdings nicht als Dichter, sondern als inspirierende Instanz – ganz wie im *Metamorphosen*-Prooemium die Kompetenz der Götter als Inspirationsinstanzen einer *Metamorphosendichtung* durch deren Verursachung von *Metamorphosen* begründet wird.

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<sup>6</sup> Gegen die Variante *illa* am Ende von V. 2 und die sich an diese heftenden Versuche einer poetologischen Ausdeutung von *mutastis* vgl. Gärtner 2004: 32 f.

Die Implikation des disproportional gestalteten Anrufungsabschnitts ist also folgende: Phoebus ist die konventionelle (und durch die spezielle Biographie des VF gerechtfertigte) Inspirationsgottheit, Vespasian die eigentlich kompetente und somit bedeutendere. Die Anrufung des Phoebus ist also traditionell und topisch (wie der Vergleich mit AR zeigt), die des Vespasian dagegen individuell von VF gestaltet, der die ganze Themenangabe auf diesen (überhöhenden) Vergleich mit Vespasian abgestimmt hat.

Solche Ausspielung eines Kaisers gegen eine herkömmliche Inspirationsgottheit ist bereits bei Lucan vorgegeben (*Phars.* I 63–66):

Sed mihi iam numen, nec, si te pectore vates  
accipio, Cirrhaea velim secreta moventem  
sollicitare deum Bacchumque avertere Nysa:  
tu satis ad vires Romana in carmina dandas.

VF aber geht nicht so weit wie Lucan, auf die herkömmliche Anrufung des Phoebus zu verzichten, macht aber deutlich, daß die Anrufung des Phoebus bei ihm rein konventionell ist und Vespasian andererseits die eigentlich kompetente Inspirationsinstanz bildet. Bezeichnenderweise ist die Haltung des VF gegenüber der poetischen Tradition vermittelnder und weniger schroff als bei Lucan. Bei ihm bleibt die Phoebus-Anrufung zumindest als *Topos* stehen.

Vor dem Hintergrund Lucans kann man sich jetzt dem weiteren Verlauf des „Anrufungsabschnitts“ zuwenden. Vespasian wird aufgefordert, den Dichter der gemeinen terrestrischen Sphäre zu entreißen (10 f.) und insbesondere seiner Themenwahl günstig zu sein: VF beschäftigt sich mit einem antiquarischen Thema: „veterum [...] veneranda canenti/ facta virum“ (11 f.). Dieser Partizipialausdruck entspricht genau dem griechischen *παλαιγενέων κλέα φωτῶν/ μνήσομαι*. Aber bei VF ist der gedankliche Zusammenhang wesentlich komplexer als bei AR. Hier geht es nicht nur um die Wahl eines antiquarischen Themas, sondern auch um den Verzicht auf ein alternatives zeitgeschichtliches: VF entscheidet sich für sein Argonautenepos und überläßt die Darstellung der Eroberung Jerusalems (durch Vespasians Sohn Titus, der als *frater* bezeichnet wird) Vespasians anderem Sohn Domitian (*proles tua*), dessen dichterische Interessen auch anderwärts bezeugt sind (allerdings nicht seine Dichtung über die Eroberung Jerusalems), vgl. etwa Stat. *Achill.* I 14–16: „At tu, quem longe primum stupet Itala virtus/ Graiaque, cui geminae florent vatumque ducumque/ certatim laurus (olim dolet altera vinci)/ ...“ (vgl. auch Quint. X 1, 91; kritischere Bewertungen finden sich bei Suet. *Dom.* 2, 2 und bei Tac. *Hist.* IV 86, 2).

Eine solche Deutung legt der Zusammenhang bei VF zwingend nah: Der Dichter bittet Vespasian um Begünstigung seiner antiquarischen Themenwahl und verweist zugleich darauf, daß das alternative zeitgeschichtliche Thema in die Hand eines kompetenten Dichters gelangt ist. Es handelt sich um eine ungemein geschickte, weil verdeckte, *recusatio* (typischerweise wird ein zeitgeschichtlicher

Stoff zugunsten eines antiquarischen abgelehnt): VF will kein zeitgeschichtliches Epos über die Eroberung Jerusalems schreiben und kann darauf verweisen, daß sich bereits ein anderer dieses Stoffs angenommen hat<sup>7</sup>.

Nach der hier empfohlenen Neuinterpunktion beginnt mit V. 10 (*eripe*) eine neue Periode: In dieser neuen Periode kann man an einem neuen Vokativ (V. 11: „sancte pater“) keinen Anstoß nehmen; anders wäre es, wie gesagt, wenn *eripe* noch zu „tuque, o pelagi cui...“ gehörte; dann wäre „sancte pater“ in derselben Periode überschüssig.

Ein großer Teil der Herausgeber und Kommentatoren des VF, darunter Courtney (Leipzig 1970) und auch der holländische Kommentator Kleywegt, schließt sich einer konjekturalen Textveränderung an, die als erster Samuelsson vorgeschlagen hat: einer Vertauschung der Textsegmente „sancte pater“ in V. 11 und „namque potes“ in V. 13. Der von Ehlers (1971/72: 115) gegen diese Versetzung gerichtete Hinweis darauf, daß „sancte pater“ nach der Überlieferung genau im arithmetischen Mittel des Gesamtprooemiums (Vv. 1–21) steht, reicht allein zur Verteidigung der Überlieferung schwerlich aus.

Zunächst einmal ist unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Entstehungsweise der Korruptel diese Konjektur nicht besonders plausibel: Daß ein Textsegment am Anfang von V. 13 durch ein sehr ähnliches am Anfang von V. 11 verdrängt würde, wäre ein ziemlich trivialer Influenzfehler; dann müßte aber einfach in V. 13 noch einmal *Sancte pater* überliefert sein; eine *Austauschung* dieser Textsegmente ist dagegen nicht besonders einleuchtend.

Diejenigen Herausgeber, die sich dieser Versetzung widersetzen (u. a. Ehlers), ändern das in V. 13 überlieferte „namque potes“ einfach in „namque potes<t>“. Kleywegt (2005 z. St.) hält die Transposition von Samuelsson dagegen für nötig (ebenso Zissos 2008 z. St.); er glaubt, „namque potes“ passe besonders gut im Sinne der herkömmlichen Gebetstopik zu der Aufforderung an Vespasian, den Dichter der irdischen Sphäre zu entreißen: Er verweist auf verschiedene Parallelen, um die Fügung „eripe [...] / namque potes“ zu rechtfertigen:

- (1) VF *Arg.* II 489 f. (Bitte der gefesselten Andromeda an Hercules):

Adnue meque, precor, defectaque Pergama monstria  
eripe, namque potes...

- (2) VII 241 f. (Bitte der Medea an die vermeintliche Circe, sie von ihrem Liebeskummer bez. Jasons zu befreien):

Sed magis his miseram, quando potes, eripe curis  
unde metus aestusque mihi quaeque aspera, mater.

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<sup>7</sup> Daß bei *proles tua* ein „nicht ich“ impliziert ist, hat Lefèvre 1971: 24 richtig gesehen (vgl. auch ebd. 26 ff. zur versteckten *recusatio*); fragwürdig ist aber seine Annahme, daß dieses „nicht ich“ auch noch bei dem umstrittenen *ille* in V. 15 mitschwingt und den Bezug dieses Pronomens ebenfalls auf Domitian erzwingt.



- (3) Verg. *Aen.* VI 365 f. (Bitte des unbestatteten Palinurus an Aeneas in der Unterwelt):  
 Eripe me his, invicte, malis: aut tu mihi terram  
 inice, namque potes, portusque require Velinos.

An allen drei von Kleywegt (nach Früheren) angeführten Parallelstellen bittet der Sprecher eine mächtige Person um Befreiung aus einer akuten Notlage und verweist flehentlich darauf, daß der Gebetene die Mittel in der Hand hat, ihn aus dieser Notlage zu befreien.

Aber VF befindet sich in der Sprechsituation des Prooemiums in überhaupt keiner Notlage, sondern äußert nur die topische Bitte eines Dichters, mit Hilfe einer inspirierenden Gottheit, der terrestrischen Sphäre der Normalsterblichen entrissen zu werden; in bezug auf diese rein topische Bitte, die keine konkrete Notlage voraussetzt, erscheint ein an den gebetenen Vespasian gerichtetes „namque potes“ im Vergleich zu den Parallelstellen ziemlich hohl und inhaltsleer.

Andererseits wendet sich Kleywegt gegen die überlieferte Wortfolge „versam proles tua pandit Idumen/ (namque potes<t>)“ mit folgenden Argumenten: „The expression *he sings of ... for he is able to do so* sounds almost ridiculous“; Kleywegt glaubt, wenn „namque potes<t>“ an dieser Stelle richtig sei, müsse man das Präsens *pandit* abändern in ein Futur *pandet* („er wird besingen“)<sup>8</sup> oder einen Konjunktiv *pandat* („er soll besingen“).

Dieser Argumentation wird jedoch der Boden entzogen, wenn es sich bei dem Verweis auf die Dichtung Domitians über die Eroberung von Jerusalem um eine versteckte *recusatio* handelt, wie oben argumentiert: Die Entscheidung des VF für ein antiquarisches Thema wird erst dann implizit gerechtfertigt, wenn das (bedeutendere) zeitgeschichtliche bereits einen anderen Dichter gefunden hat, der sich zum gegenwärtigen Zeitpunkt schon mit diesem Thema befaßt: Insofern ist das Praesens *pandit* unbedingt erfordert.

Das Besondere in der *recusatio* des VF besteht darin, daß der angeredete Potentat nicht mit einem vage angekündigten zukünftigen Werk getröstet wird, sondern auf ein bereits begonnenes dichterisches „Projekt“ (das sich in diesem Fall in seinem unmittelbaren genealogischen Umfeld befindet) verwiesen wird. Insofern wird ausschließlich das Praesens *pandit* der speziellen Ausprägung der *recusatio* bei VF gerecht, während die herkömmliche Form der *recusatio* natürlich üblicherweise mit futurischen Ausdrucksformen operiert (vgl. etwa Hor. *Carm.* I 6, 1: „scriberis“; II 12, 10: „dices“; IV 2, 33: „concines“; Prop. III 1, 15 f.: „ad-dent/ [...] canent“; Verg. *Buc.* 6, 6: „super tibi erunt“; Ov. *Fast.* I 13: „canant“).

Ferner erklärt sich unter der Voraussetzung einer versteckten *recusatio* auch die Formel „namque potes<t>“ auf das beste: Denn es ist nicht nur wichtig, daß das zeitgeschichtliche Thema (die Eroberung Jerusalems) bereits einen Dichter gefunden hat, sondern auch und vor allem, daß dieser die seinem Stoff entsprechende

<sup>8</sup> Für das Futur *pandet* spricht sich ebenfalls aus Strand 1972: 14 f.

Kompetenz mitbringt; diese Kompetenz wird man aber Domitian, dem Sohn des amtierenden Princeps Vespasian, ohne weiteres zutrauen dürfen; ja man wird (vom Standpunkt des VF) sogar sagen können, daß er der einzige ist, der die Fähigkeit mitbringt, die Eroberung Jerusalems und insbesondere die Taten seines Bruders zu besingen. Insofern darf „namque potes<t>“ nirgendwo anders als hinter „versam proles tua pandit Idumen“ stehen<sup>9</sup>; in diesem „namque potes<t>“ ist zugleich auch impliziert, daß einem anderen als Domitian (vor allem dem VF selbst) die dichterische Kraft für ein solches zeitgeschichtliches Epos eben nicht zu Gebot stünde; die eigene Unfähigkeit ist eine topische Begründung der *recusatio*. Nur erfolgt diese *recusatio* hier eben nicht schroff und unmittelbar („ich besinge die Eroberung Jerusalems nicht, weil ich dazu nicht die dichterische Kraft habe“), sondern subtil und indirekt („ich behandle ein antiquarisches Thema, da die Eroberung Jerusalems mit dem Bruder des wichtigsten Kämpfers Titus, nämlich Domitian, ja ihren einzig kompetenten Dichter gefunden hat“). VF verfährt eben nicht schroff und ablehnend, sondern nur in schmeichelhafter Weise andeutend. Wozu soll er seine eigene Inkompetenz zu einem ungeliebten Thema explizit aussprechen, wenn er auf die einzigartige Kompetenz eines anderen Dichters verweisen kann?

Zur Parenthese „namque potes<t>“ zu vergleichen ist der Auftakt von Vergils sechster Ekloge:

Prima Syracosio dignata est ludere versu  
 nostra neque erubuit siluas habitare Thalea.  
 Cum canerem reges et proelia, Cynthus aurem  
 vellit et admonuit: „pastorem, Tityre, pinguis  
 pascere oportet ovis, deductum dicere carmen“.  
 Nunc ego (namque super tibi erunt qui dicere laudes,  
 Vare, tuas cupiant et tristia condere bella)  
 agrestem tenui meditabor harundine Musam.

Hier wird in parenthetischer Form (begründet mit *namque*) die Rechtfertigung dafür gegeben, daß sich Vergil der *agrestis Musa* widmen kann: es gibt eben genug Leute, die sich mit kriegerischen Stoffen befassen; hier ist die gesamte *recusatio* in eine *namque*-Parenthese hineinverlegt. Die Vv. 12–14 bei VF entsprechen sachlich der Parenthese in V. 6 f. bei Vergil. VF konkretisiert gegenüber dem vagen vergilischen „super tibi erunt“ mit seinem Verweis auf Vespasians Sohn Domitian das Formular der *recusatio* erheblich.

Zur Begründung einer *recusatio* durch mangelnde Fähigkeit des Dichters sei verwiesen auf Stat. *Theb.* I 17 f.:

...quando Itala *nondum*  
 signa *nec* Arctoois ausim *spirare* triumphos

<sup>9</sup> Vgl. Lefèvre 1971: 28, der sich hier allerdings nicht mit der Versetzung auseinandersetzt (gegen diese vgl. Lefèvre 1971: 58 f., Anm. 3), und Strand 1972: 14.

oder *Achill.* I 18 f.:

...te (*sicl.* Domitianum) longo *necdum fidente* paratu  
molimur magnusque tibi praeludit Achilles.

Und noch ein abschließendes Argument gegen die Austauschung der beiden Textsegmente: Wenn mit *eripe* (10) eine neue Periode beginnt, so steht der Imperativ „sancte pater“ natürlicherweise beim ersten Glied (*eripe*) und nicht beim zweiten (*fave*); neben *fave* suchen Verfechter der herkömmlichen Interpunktion teilweise einen neuen Vokativ mit der Konjektur *venerande* statt *veneranda* (Baehrens, aufgenommen bei Courtney und jetzt bei Zissos) zu gewinnen; aber „veterum [...] *veneranda canenti/ facta virum*“ entspricht genau dem griechischen *παλαιγενέων κλέα φωτῶν/ μνήσομαι*; dagegen würde griech. *κλέα* mit nacktem *facta* unzureichend wiedergegeben<sup>10</sup>.

Demnach ist bei der überlieferten Stellung der Worte zu bleiben und nur in V. 13 „namque potes<τ>“ zu lesen.

In V. 15 wird die eigentliche imperativische Anrufung an Vespasian (*mone, eripe, fave*) abgelöst durch eine an Vespasian gerichtete Zukunftsprophezeiung: Dem Princeps wird prophezeit, sein Sohn Titus werde ihm und der ganzen *gens Flavia* ein Heiligtum und einen göttlichen Kult einrichten.

*Ille* in V. 15 wird man (in Übereinstimmung mit Kleywegt) auf Titus als unmittelbaren Nachfolger, nicht auf Domitian beziehen. Eine Wiederaufnahme des Subjekts von *pandit* (12) in *instituet* (16) sollte nicht durch bloßes *ille* markiert werden, sondern durch eine zeitlich koordinierende Formulierung abgeschlossen werden („später aber wird er dann auch...“). Außerdem ist diejenige Person, die eine Konsekrierung vornehmen wird, natürlicherweise der unmittelbare Nachfolger. Versuche, den Tempel zu lokalisieren oder als Metapher für ein weiteres dichterisches Werk Domitians zu verstehen (Lefèvre), haben, wie bereits anfangs erwähnt, zu keinem Erfolg geführt.

Die Prophezeiung der Konsekrierung wird an einen künftigen Zeitpunkt fixiert, der durch *cum*-Satz mit Indikativ Futur ausgedrückt wird (Vv. 16 ff.).

Die genaue Lesung innerhalb dieses Temporalsatzes ist äußerst umstritten. Die Versuche, die Partikelfolge in V. 19 f. zu korrigieren, lassen sich kaum mehr aufzählen<sup>11</sup>. Eine Beibehaltung des überlieferten *seu ... seu ...* in V. 19, wie sie Ehlers versucht (1971/72: 115, mit Hinweis auf den „traditionellen Hymnenstil“)<sup>12</sup>, scheidet an der mangelnden Antithese zwischen „signa dabis“ und „te duce“. Kleywegt entscheidet sich (wie auch Lefèvre) dafür, durch die Partikelverbindung *seu ... seu ...* die Ortssubstantive in V. 19 f. zu strukturieren

<sup>10</sup> Vgl. Strand 1972: 15. Anders jetzt wieder Zissos 2008 z. St.

<sup>11</sup> Doxographie bei Lefèvre 1971: 8 bzw. 46, Strand 1972: 19 und Kleywegt 2005 z. St.

<sup>12</sup> Gebilligt bei Taylor 1994: 213.

(„*seu te duce Graecia mittet/ seu Sidon Nilusque rates*“); am Anfang von V. 19 praefertiert Kleywegt ein *sed*, Lefèvre 46 ein *si*. Aber die Aussage „sei es daß Griechenland, sei es daß Phoenizien und Aegypten unter Deiner Führung seine Schiffe sendet“ wirkt seltsam kompliziert im Vergleich zu dem einfachen „sowohl G. als auch Ph. und Ae. sendet unter Deiner Führung seine Schiffe“, was ja mit „et Sidon“ bereits überliefert ist. Zissos schreibt jetzt im Anschluß an Bury „.../ tu si signa dabis, sed te duce...“.

Die Verdoppelung der Kompetenz der neuen Seefahrtsgottheit sowohl für griechische als auch für phoenizische Seefahrer läßt sich motivisch ungefähr mit dem neuen Epigramm Poseid. (?) 39 = col. VI 30–37 in Verbindung bringen, wo die Kompetenz der Arsinoe Euploia etwas anders sowohl für Seefahrer als auch für Landreisende betont wird. In beiden Fällen erfolgt eine Steigerung der Kompetenz dadurch, daß die gleichzeitige Zuständigkeit für zwei polare Gruppen betont wird.

Offenbar läuft die Aussage bei VF hinaus auf die folgende einfache Aussage: „nicht Cynosura für die Phoenizier oder Helice für die Griechen wird maßgebend sein, sondern Du für alle Völker“. Dann ist *et* am Anfang von V. 20 zu halten, und für *seu ... seu ...* ist ein anaphorisches, die Person des verstirnten Kaisers im Gegensatz zu den herkömmlichen Sternbildern betonendes anaphorisches *sed ... sed ...* (Lemaire/Caussin [Paris 1824/25], jetzt auch Galli 2007 z. St., die jedoch ebenfalls am Anfang von V. 20 *seu* statt des überlieferten *et* praefertiert) herzustellen. Eine Alternative hierzu wäre am ehesten noch das von Gronovius in V. 19 hergestellte *si ... si ...*, welches jedoch die Person Vespasians weniger energisch den konventionellen Gottheiten entgegensetzt und zudem in das *cum*-Gefüge eine komplizierte Subordination einführt.

Die einfache Antithese zwischen den herkömmlichen Sternbildern und dem verstirnten Kaiser bietet auch das beste Kriterium, um die Schwierigkeiten in den vorigen Versen zu lösen: *Certior* (18) im Sinne astrologischer Vorbilder mit Kleywegt auf einen Vergleich zwischen Cynosura und Helice zu beziehen verbietet sich schon in Anbetracht der sich dann ergebenden Kompliziertheit des Gedankengangs (Kleywegt paraphrasiert: „neither Cynosura, more trustworthy (sc. than Helice) for the ships from Tyre, nor Helice, which must (until now) be observed by Greek sailors, but you will guide seafarers“). Bereits mit den bloßen Worten „neque [...] Tyriae Cynosura carinae/ certior aut Graia Helice servanda magistra (scil. erit)“ wird die Relevanz der herkömmlichen Sternzeichen zurückgewiesen<sup>13</sup>; nur mit einem solchen negierten Hauptsatz wird der die Person des Angeredeten hervorhebende anaphorische Ausdruck *sed tu ... sed te ...* (Lemaire/Caussin) optimal praepariert<sup>14</sup>.

<sup>13</sup> Grundsätzlich richtig zur Umdeutung des astronomischen *certior*-Motivs auf den verstirnten Vespasian Lefèvre 1971: 42 ff.

<sup>14</sup> Für diese Lesart spricht sich auch Strand 1972: 19 aus.

Es bleibt die Schwierigkeit in dem in V. 17 überlieferten (unmetrischen) „neque in Tyrias [...] carinas“. Am nächsten läge es, das Ende des bisherigen Zustands mit einem *neque iam* einzuleiten (Sudhaus/Kramer [Leipzig 1913]); dann wäre *in* eine einleuchtende Verschreibung aus abgekürztem *iam* (*ia* mit Abkürzungsstrich), und die Korruptel von ursprünglichem „Tyriis [...] carinis“ in „Tyrias [...] carinas“ erklärte sich als Folgefehler der Praeposition *in*. Zugleich könnte man so die Variante *cum iam* in V. 16 als einen Influenzfehler aus ursprünglichem *iam* in V. 17 erklären; präferieren wird man hier in jedem Falle *cum tu*, da erst so der Gedanke „Du, Vespasian, wirst (anstelle eines herkömmlichen Gestirns) leuchten“ richtig hervortritt<sup>15</sup>. Die von Ehlers in den Text gesetzte Variante *cum iam* wird von Ehlers selbst (1991: 21) folgendermaßen kommentiert: „Dieses *iam* kann man kaum anders verstehen, als daß es einen deutlichen Hinweis auf das baldige Ableben des Princeps enthält“. Wenn dies zuträfe, könnte man aus diesem Befund wohl eher die Konsequenz ziehen, *iam* aus dem Text zu verbannen, anstatt den von Ehlers betretenen komplizierten Weg zu gehen, die Anspielung auf den nahe bevorstehenden Tod Vespasians als ein *vaticinium ex eventu* zu deuten und so das Prooemium nach Vespasians Tod zu datieren. Denn ein solcher „Hinweis auf das baldige Ableben des Princeps“ könnte nicht nur zu dessen Lebzeiten unangebracht erscheinen, sondern auch nach seinem Tod in einem die Flavierdynastie panegyrisch verherrlichenden Text, der fingiert, vor Vespasians Tod geschrieben worden zu sein (nach Ehlers' These). Man vergleiche etwa die Art, wie Lucan den Tod Neros als etwas zeitlich noch weit Entferntes darstellt mit den Worten „astra petes serus“ (*Phars.* I 46).

Dagegen spricht für *cum tu* entschieden, daß der so gegebene nachdrückliche Hinweis auf die Person („wenn *Du* anstelle der herkömmlichen Gestirne leuchten wirst“) vom Kontext eindeutig gefordert wird.

Nach diesen Überlegungen ergibt sich folgende Textgestalt:

...cum tu, genitor, lucebis ab omni  
 parte poli, neque iam Tyriis Cynosura carinis<sup>16</sup>  
 certior (*scil. erit* quam tu) aut Graia Helice servanda (*scil. erit*)<sup>17</sup> magistris,  
 sed tu signa dabis, sed te duce Graecia mittet  
 20 et Sidon Nilusque rates...

Die einleuchtende Struktur „positiv (*cum tu...*) – negativ (*neque iam*) – emphatisch positiv (*sed tu ... sed te*)“ schützt den Text wohl gegen den Einwand

<sup>15</sup> Vgl. Strand 1972: 17. Anders jetzt Zissos 2008 z. St.

<sup>16</sup> Mit der Versklausel „Cynosura carinis“ vergleicht Strand 1972: 18 f. Luc. *Phars.* III 219 „certior haud ullis duxit Cynosura carinis“.

<sup>17</sup> Zur Ellipse vgl. Strand 1972: 17 f.

bei Lefèvre (1971: 46), ein solcher *cum*-Satz sei „in seiner Schwerfälligkeit bedenklich“.

Der so konstituierte *cum*-Satz fixiert also den Zeitpunkt, wenn Vespasian nicht mehr auf der Erde sein wird.

Die ganze Partie ist naturgemäß von großer Bedeutung für die Datierung des Prooemiums und der *Argonautica* des VF überhaupt: Es wird hier von einem zukünftigen Zeitpunkt gesprochenen, zu dem Vespasian persönlich nicht mehr auf der Erde weilt, sondern statt seiner sein Sohn Titus agiert (15 f.). Dagegen ist Titus zu demjenigen Zeitpunkt, als diese Worte geschrieben werden, eben nur der entscheidende Kämpfer bei der Eroberung Jerusalems und Domitian der Dichter von dessen Taten. D. h. es spricht alles dafür, daß dieses Prooemium zu einem Zeitpunkt geschrieben ist, als Vespasian noch lebte, als man also von seiner Vergöttlichung bzw. Verstirnung als etwas Zukünftigem sprechen mußte und als andererseits Titus nur Kämpfer in Jerusalem und Domitian nur Dichter war; wenn das Prooemium zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt publiziert worden wäre, als bereits Titus oder gar Domitian Kaiser war, hätte man sicher nicht den amtierenden Kaiser in dieser Rolle des Jerusalem-Kämpfers bzw. des Dichters über den Aufstand von Jerusalem stehen lassen können.

Das Prooemium ist also offenbar (entgegen anderen Meinungen, die glauben, VF könne sich im Anrufungsabschnitt an einen bereits toten Vespasian richten) geschrieben zu einem Zeitpunkt als Vespasian noch lebte (so überzeugend Lefèvre und Kleywegt).

Die Annahme, daß das Prooemium noch zu Lebzeiten Vespasians verfaßt ist, läßt sich aber nun wiederum erhärten durch einen Vergleich mit Lucans Prooemium<sup>18</sup>; dort wird auf die Zeit nach dem Ableben Neros (der zur Abfassungszeit des *Pharsalia*-Prooemiums mit Sicherheit noch lebt) mit einem sehr ähnlichen futurischen *cum*-Satz rekuriert (*Phars.* I 45–59):

...te, cum statione peracta  
 astra petes serus, praelati regia caeli  
 excipiet gaudente polo: seu scepra tenere,  
 seu te flammigeros Phoebi conscendere currus,  
 telluremque nihil mutato sole timentem  
 50 igne vago lustrare iuuet, tibi numine ab omni  
 cedetur, iurisque tui natura relinquet,  
 quis deus esse velis, ubi regnum ponere mundi.  
 Sed neque in Arctoo sedem tibi legeris orbe  
 nec polus aversi calidus qua vergitur Austri,  
 55 unde tuam videas obliquo sidere Romam.  
 Aetheris immensi partem si presseris unam,  
 sentiet axis onus. librati pondera caeli

<sup>18</sup> Zu Verg. *Georg.* und Luc. *Phars.* als Vorbilder des VF vgl. auch Lefèvre 1971: 18 f. bzw. 47 ff.

orbe tene medio; pars aetheris illa sereni  
tota vacet nullaeque obstat a Caesare nubes.

Hier werden dem Princeps nach seinem Ableben verschiedene Existenzformen zur Wahl gestellt, zunächst die Herrschaft als Götterkönig (47) und die Stellung des Sonnengotts (48–50); dann verschiedene Himmelspositionen als Gestirn entweder im Norden (53) oder im Süden (54); diese Alternative wird durch den schmeichlerischen Gedanken beschlossen, Nero könne durch sein Gewicht, wenn er eine dieser Positionen einnehme, den Himmel aus dem Gleichgewicht bringen.

Diese Zurwahlstellung verschiedener göttlicher bzw. verstirnter künftiger Existenzformen eines noch lebenden Princeps hat ihr Vorbild bereits bei Vergil im *Georgica*-Prooemium (I 24–40):

25 Tuque adeo, quem mox quae sint habitura deorum  
concordia incertum est, urbisne invisere, Caesar,  
terrarumque velis curam, et te maximus orbis  
auctorem frugum tempestatumque potentem  
accipiat cingens materna tempora myrto;  
30 an deus immensi venias maris ac tua nautae  
numina sola colant, tibi serviat ultima Thule,  
teque sibi generum Tethys emat omnibus undis;  
anne novum tardis sidus te mensibus addas,  
qua locus Erigonen inter Chelasque sequentis  
panditur (ipse tibi iam bracchia contrahit ardens  
35 Scorpios et caeli iusta plus parte reliquit);  
quidquid eris (nam te nec sperant Tartara regem,  
nec tibi regnandi veniat tam dira cupido,  
quamvis Elysios miretur Graecia campos  
nec repetita sequi curet Proserpina matrem)  
40 da facilem cursum, atque audacibus adnue coeptis/ ...

Hier wird Augustus Folgendes zur Auswahl gestellt: Herrscher über die Erde (25 f.) bzw. Agrikulturgottheit (26–28), Meeresgott (29–31) oder Gestirn an einer bestimmten Stelle am Himmel (32–35) oder – in Form einer *reductio ad absurdum* – Unterweltsgott (36–39).

Fortgeführt wird die Motivik von Statius in der *Thebais*, der Domitian – in dezidiertem Gegensatz besonders zu Lucans „praelati regia caeli“ – auf die himmlische Sphäre verzichten und mit der irdischen Menschenwelt zufrieden sein läßt, *Theb.* I 24–31:

...licet artior omnis  
limes agat stellas et te plaga lucida caeli,  
Pleiadum Boreaeque et hiulci fulminis expers,  
solicitet, licet ignipedum frenator equorum  
ipse tuis alte radiantem crinibus arcum  
imprimat aut magni cedat tibi Iuppiter aequa

parte poli, maneat hominum contentus habentis,  
undarum terraeque potens, et sidera dones.

Genaugenommen rekurriert Statius unter betonter Ablehnung Lucans auf die erste vergilische Alternative (Herrschaft über die Erde), VF mit Berücksichtigung Lucans auf die zweite (Seefahrtsgottheit), Lucan auf die dritte (Gestirn in selbstgewählter Position). VF verzichtet als einziger der vier Dichter auf das Motiv der Zurwahlstellung verschiedener Möglichkeiten, was sich durch die funktionelle Verbindung der künftigen Rolle Vespasians mit dem epischen Thema des VF erklärt.

VF bietet seinem Vespasian im Vergleich zum lucanischen Nero und zum vergilischen Augustus ein vergleichsweise weniger breites Spektrum von Betätigungsmöglichkeiten nach seinem Tod. Aber dennoch nimmt VF die Alternativen seiner Vorgänger in sein Bild des vergöttlichten Vespasian mit auf:

Vergil wie Lucan unterscheiden als Alternativen (a) eine Tätigkeit als eine bestimmte Funktionsgottheit und (b) eine Fortexistenz als Gestirn. Der Vespasian des VF ist beides zugleich: Er ist Gottheit der Seefahrer (vgl. die Vorstellung von Augustus als Meeresherr bei Vergil), aber ist zugleich auch Gestirn, und er tritt – wenn auch nicht lokal, sondern funktional – an die Stelle bestimmter anderer Gestirne, nämlich derjenigen, an welchen sich herkömmlicherweise griechische bzw. phönizische Seefahrer orientieren, nämlich Kleiner (*Cynosura*) bzw. Großer Wagen (*Helice*); diese konkrete astronomische Funktion entspricht den konkreten astronomischen Positionen, die Vergil bzw. Lucan für ihre Potentaten erwägen.

Zugleich ist Vespasian aber als Gestirn nicht auf eine Seite des Himmels beschränkt wie Nero, der durch eine solche Einzelposition sogar das Gleichgewicht des Himmels gefährden könnte (*Phars.* I 56 f.: „*aetheris immensi partem si presseris unam, / sentiet axis onus*“), sondern er übernimmt seine heilsbringende Funktion für alle Seiten (16 f.: „*lucebis ab omni / parte poli*“)<sup>19</sup>. Man könnte sagen: Während Lucans Nero durch sein „Gewicht“ die Himmelsseiten polarisiert, hebt der Vespasian des VF durch die Vereinigung der Funktion mehrerer Gestirne die Polarisierung gerade auf.

VF bietet also dem vergöttlichten Vespasian wesentlich weniger Wahlfreiheit bezüglich seiner künftigen Existenz als Vergil bzw. Lucan ihren Potentaten, aber die künftige Existenzform, die VF seinem Vespasian beilegt, schließt in ihrer Konkretheit intertextuell durchaus die vagen Alternativen bei Vergil bzw. Lucan in sich ein. Indem VF diese vagen Alternativen zugunsten eines bestimmten einheitlichen Konzepts ersetzt (neue Seefahrtsgottheit und Ersatz für die Sternzeichen *Cynosura* bzw. *Helice*), verknüpft er die proponierte neue Rolle des Vespasian wesentlich enger mit der Thematik seines Seefahrerepos als es Vergil und Lucan mit Augustus bzw. Nero gelingt (Vergil erwägt immerhin Augustus als Agrikulturgottheit, wohl in Entsprechung zum Thema seiner *Georgica*): Die Topik

<sup>19</sup> Vgl. Lefèvre 1971: 45 und Strand 1972: 20.



im Prooemium des VF ist gegenüber seinen Vorgängern quantitativ deutlich beschnitten, aber zugleich auch funktionell zugespitzt: Sein Vespasian ist nicht eine beliebige Inspirationsgottheit, die nur in vage Beziehung zum vorliegenden Werk gebracht werden kann, sondern das epische Thema und die kaiserliche Inspirationsgottheit sind äußerst konkret aufeinander zugeschnitten<sup>20</sup>: Die Argonauten praefigurieren mit ihrer „Meereserschließung“ die Leistung Vespasians als „Meereseröffner“ bzw. Eroberer Britanniens, und auch Vespasians künftige Existenzform ist auf die „Meereserschließung“ ausgerichtet, insofern er als Meeresherr und als Gestirn die Sicherheit der künftigen Seefahrt sichern soll. VF setzt an die Stelle exuberierenden panegyrischen Motivreichtums eine strikte funktionale Beschränkung der von ihm eingesetzten Motive. Er erweitert die panegyrischen Motive seiner Vorgänger nicht durch weitere Alternativen, sondern er sucht die ihm vorliegenden Alternativen zu einer geschlossenen funktionalen Synthese zu führen.

Universität zu Köln

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<sup>20</sup> Vgl. hierzu allgemein auch Lefèvre 1971: 56 f.



## ROMAN EMPEROR AS THE WORLD RULER, AD 235–284

By

AGATA A. KLUCZEK

**ABSTRACT:** Viewing the notions of *orbis* and *genus humanum* as ideological and political categories allowed to launch the idea of the Roman emperor's rule over the world in the imperial propaganda. The idea was never fully developed and it was subjected to various alterations. The motif of the barbarian showed the dynamism of the myth. In the propaganda the emperor was sometimes viewed as the ruler of the whole world and not only the sovereign of the Roman Empire.

The ancient Romans claimed that their rule extended over the whole of the *orbis terrarum*. The idea was stated as early as the late Republic: “imperium orbis terrae cui imperio omnes gentes, reges, nationes partim vi, partim voluntate consenserunt” (*Rhet. Her.* IV 13). In that respect the examples, drawn by Joseph Vogt from the writings of various ancient authors and quoted in his study of 1929, are quite typical. It appears from them that the notions of *orbis*, *orbis terrarum*, *totus orbis*, viewed as equivalent to the Roman world and state, served to express a deep-rooted conviction that the Romans had established their rule over the world<sup>1</sup>. Nonetheless, such a conclusion involves contradictions. No political formation could dominate the terrestrial sphere, the greatest part of which was still unexplored, and the ancients were well-aware of this fact:

Orbis terrarum qui sub caelo est quattuor regionibus incolitur. Una pars eius est in qua nos habitamus; altera huic contraria, quam qui incolunt vocantur antichthones; quarum inferiores duae ex contrario harum sitae, quas qui [eo] incolunt vocantur antipodes (Ampelius, *Lib. mem.* 6, 1).

The term *orbis* in its narrower meaning, in the sense of the Greek *oikoumene*<sup>2</sup>, comprises the representation of the whole inhabited world, though the Imperium Romanum covered that geographical space in part only. The Romans

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<sup>1</sup> Vogt 1929: 5–7. See also Christ 1938: 115–120; Rösger 1983: 255–273; Mastino 1986: 63–162.

<sup>2</sup> Compare the definition of *oikoumene* in Kaerst 1903: 15 f. (in the geographical sense), 22–24 (the Roman civilisation which unites its inhabitants). See also Romm 1992: 37.

were obviously aware of the fact that the inhabited world was divided and that beyond the Roman state there existed other states and nations. Pliny the Elder confirms this by his use of such phrases as *adversus orbis* (*NH* X 19) and *alter orbis* (*NH* IV 96). Similarly, an anonymous author of the *Historia Augusta* shares the conviction that the world is inhabited by both the Romans and barbarians: “qui [*scil.* Probus] si diutius fuisset, orbis terrae barbaros non haberet” (*HA Tac.* 16, 6). Moreover, the opening words of Augustus’ autobiography, “Rerum gestarum divi Augusti, quibus orbem terrarum imperio populi Romani subiecit” (*RGDA, praef.*) stand in contrast with the passage from Tacitus’ *Annals* where it is stated about this emperor that “addideratque consilium coercendi intra terminos imperii” (I 11, 8). Also the works of ancient geographers support the conviction that *Imperium Romanum* covers only a part of the *oikoumene*. On the maps the Roman *mare nostrum* was set in the centre of the whole world. At the same time the ocean surrounded the distant northern, eastern and southern lands which never belonged to the Roman state. The geographical material in the *Tabula Peutingeriana* testifies that the ancient Romans admitted their existence.

Therefore, the notion of *orbis* which functioned in those days was broad as opposed to the term’s narrower, so to say practical meaning which was defined according to the ideological and political categories. In that meaning *orbis* was equivalent to the area subject to the Roman domination. J. Vogt attempted to explain the basis of such a way of perceiving the geographical extensiveness and the essence of the Roman rule in the world. According to him, the Romans believed that they possessed the most important and valuable parts of the known world. They also thought that by means of political measures and goodwill, or if necessary by wars, they would expand their rule. On the other hand, however, they disregarded all that lay beyond the reach of the Roman arms and treaties, as for example the Germanic world and the state of Parthia (or, later, Persia)<sup>3</sup>. That was enough for the Romans to call themselves the rulers of the world. As Ovid once said: “Gentibus est aliis tellus data limine certo, / Romanae spatium est urbis et orbis idem” (*Fast.* II 683 f.). The awareness of the fact that there were states and regions which had never been submitted to the Roman supremacy did not interfere with the conviction of the global character of the Roman rule.

In the official propaganda of the times of the Roman Empire the idea of “universalism” was associated with the ruler. He personified the mission of the Romans as the rulers of the inhabitable space<sup>4</sup>. That idea pervaded, to a greater or smaller extent, the ideology of the emperor’s rule. It could also stimulate certain political decisions or, on the other hand, certain events could either strengthen or weaken it; in that sense it concerned the political activity of the rulers, that is

<sup>3</sup> Vogt 1929: 12 f.

<sup>4</sup> The idea can already be found in *RGDA*. See Dion 1966: 249–269; Nicolet 1988: 28–40; Vanotti 1987: 234–249.

to say, the sphere of their real doings. In the propaganda the idea could be explained, justified and interpreted in various ways, depending on a given period's predominant ideology, its nature and needs as well as the means and forms of transmission. It seems interesting to explore the emperor's image as the ruler of the world in the times of the third century AD crisis (235–284) – the period of disturbance in the functioning of the central authority and the failures or even disasters suffered by the Romans in their wars with barbarians<sup>5</sup>. Yet, the aim of the present study is neither to explore the vast complexity of these themes nor even to exhaustively examine any of them. It rather seeks to demonstrate how the spatial range of the Roman emperor's supremacy was reflected in the propaganda, in the context of the aforementioned double meaning of *orbis*. In the approach to comprehend the idea of the Roman sway over the world in the imperial propaganda of the third century crisis the emperors' coins and medallions provide the basic research material. They make up quite a rich collection and have the quality of an immediate, official source so they render exactly the essence and contents of the imperial propaganda.

In the coin representations the idea of the Roman emperor's rule over the world gained the most comprehensible presentation by placing first of all the emperor's deeds and achievements in the context of the notion of *orbis* and its equivalent notion of *genus humanum*<sup>6</sup>. Along with other notions, they are interwoven into the legends on the reverses of coins, which in consequence assume many forms, conveying various substantial contents; on the other hand, the monetary iconography provides the opportunity to interpret, to further develop or to modify the message (see table 1)<sup>7</sup>.

In the coin legends the notions of *orbis* and *genus humanum* do not appear independently; they always merely complement other terms, whose meaning gains greater importance and supplies the essential meaning to the whole formula. The coin legends make up two different groups: a number of them refer directly to the emperor and have the form of qualifying epithets; the others point to abstract

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<sup>5</sup> The period of the 3<sup>rd</sup> century crisis brought also positive changes, owing particularly to the reforms introduced in the second half of that century. The negative phenomena were spread over a long stretch of time, and varied in intensity, so it would be more accurate to speak of a number of crises followed by periods of relative prosperity, see e.g. Kotula 1992: 11–65; Le Glay 1992: 253–269; Christol 1997: 85–190.

<sup>6</sup> For the meaning of the notions, see Christ 1938: 4–18, 28; Vogt 1929: 24–27; Lessing 1964: 413, s.v. *orbis*, 222, s.v. *genus*. The equivalence of the notions *orbis (terrarum)* and *genus humanum* is best rendered by Florus, *Ep. I praef.*: “Ita late per orbem terrarum arma circumtulit, ut qui res illius legunt non unius populi, sed generis humani facta condiscant”; II 14, 8: “Romanae dominationis, id est humani generis”.

<sup>7</sup> The table was filled in with the data included in the studies of: Gneccchi 1912; A. Alföldi 1931; *RIC*; Schulte 1983; Bastien 1976; Bastien, Amandry, Gautier 1989; Göbl 1993 and 2000; Schulzki 1996; Estiot 2004; and the articles complementing them like: Pink 1955; Brenot 1964; Pflaum 1965; Estiot 1990; Gysen 1995; Estiot, Bonté 1997.

ideas brought to life by the emperor's deeds. *Orbis* and *genus humanum* define the space where the emperor performs his deeds and where positive values exist. However, as a result of that attributive character of *orbis* and *genus humanum*, the legends including them do not give the most prominent position to the world as such or generally the space; they rather praise the Roman emperor by pointing out his actions and the benefits accruing from them. The important, central role of the emperor will always be the nucleus of the image of the world.

THEME OF LEGEND	ICONOGRAPHY	EMPEROR
<i>conservator orbis</i> (obverse)	bust of the emperor	Gallienus
<i>defensor orbis</i>	emperor, military man and barbarians	Victorinus
<i>gloria orbis</i>	emperor and goddess Victoria in <i>sexiga</i> , the military men beside	Probus
<i>pacator orbis</i>	emperor emperor and barbarian(s) Jupiter Sol	Aurelian Probus, Numerianus Valerian I, Gallienus Aurelian, Florian, Postumus, Tetricus I
<i>rector orbis</i>	emperor	Gallienus
<i>restitutor generis humani</i>	emperor	Valerian I, Gallienus
<i>restitutor orbis</i>	emperor emperor and Jupiter emperor, Sol and barbarians emperor and goddess Victoria Roma emperor and Orbis  emperor, Orbis and barbarian	Valerian I, Gallienus, Claudius II Probus Aurelian Aurelian, Tacitus, Probus Tacitus Valerian I, Gallienus, Aurelian, Tacitus, Carus, Postumus Aurelian
<i>securitas orbis</i>	Securitas	Philip the Arab, Gallienus, Probus
<i>spes felicitatis orbis</i>	Spes	Philip the Arab
<i>vota orbis</i>	two goddesses Victorias	Valerian I, Gallienus, Claudius II

Table 1: *Orbis* and *genus humanum* in the imperial coinage in the times of the 3<sup>rd</sup> century crisis

The meanings of *orbis* are revealed on three planes: a legal and territorial plane – which refers to the territory of the state, an institutional plane – which covers the state and the authority, and an abstract plane – which refers to the

symbol of the state's vastness. The semantic structures identified in the coin representations refer, in general, to the Roman world and state. The source material being so abundant, it is by no means possible to discuss the subject comprehensively within the limits of the present study. I will rather apply exemplification as a method of demonstrating the most significant issues and their substantial contents.

The example of the emperor Tacitus' propaganda is very illustrative here. On his coins there is only one theme involving the notion of *orbis*, namely *restitutor orbis* placed on the reverses of *antoniniani* from Lugdunum, Siscia and Antioch. On most of them the emperor is represented as being granted the wreath from Orbis or from the goddess Victoria<sup>8</sup>. On some *antoniniani*, from Siscia, the goddess Roma is sitting on a shield, a spear and a globe in her hand<sup>9</sup>. That innovative and original complementing of the slogan *RESTITVTOR ORBIS* confirms the connection of *orbis* with what is Roman and what Roma stands for. There are also the bronze medallions of Tacitus, from Rome, of the *RESTITVT(or) REI PVBLICAE* type<sup>10</sup>. As for their iconography, they depict the gesture of the emperor, in his military dress, a spear (or a sceptre) in his hand, who is raising a kneeling woman with *corona muralis* on her head. The image is typical of the coins of the *restitutor* group and may be found earlier in the coinage of Hadrian, Postumus and Gallienus, who called themselves *restitutores orbis (terrarum)*. The ideological and propagandistic aspects of Tacitus' coinage are well recognized<sup>11</sup>. The coins' message was that for this ruler *res publica* and its renovation was the priority. In his propaganda many times the common and general aspect of the numerous aforesaid ideas could be seen, all of them bearing the epithet *publica*, yet their commonness was limited to the Roman world. In that case the matter seems univocal. The figure on the bronze medallions is undoubtedly the personification of Orbis Romanus. In this case it becomes equivalent to the notion of *res publica*. In that sense *orbis* in Tacitus' propaganda is Roman and assumes its basic, although limited, institutional and spatial connotation.

One may consider another possible understanding of coin legends which make some reference to *orbis* as the term can take figurative meaning and, when used in the epithets applied to the Roman emperor, it may emphasize, in such a figurative sense, the magnitude of both himself and his deeds. However, the measure and the point of reference for that magnitude is not the sphere of reality but that of symbols. Such metaphorical representations of the extensiveness of the Roman rule appear in the ancient literature in various contexts. In the

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<sup>8</sup> *RIC* 5/1 *Tac.*, no. 55; Brenot 1964; Gysen 2000: 43–45; Estiot 2004: 280, 436 f.; Bastien 1976: 147, no. 52, 148, no. 60.

<sup>9</sup> Estiot 2004: 368.

<sup>10</sup> Gneccchi 1912, 2: *Tac.*, no. 7; Estiot 2004: 31, 68.

<sup>11</sup> Weder 1981: 35–47; Kaczanowicz 1990: 91–102.

*Historia Augusta*, for instance, there appears some kind of prophetic dream of an emperor:

qui det iudices Parthis ac Persis, qui Francos et Alamannos sub Romanis legibus habeat, qui per omnem Africam barbarum non relinquat, qui Taprobanis praesidem imponat, qui ad Iuverniam insulam proconsulem mittat, qui Sarmatis omnibus iudicet, qui terram omnem, qua Oceano ambitur, captis omnibus gentibus, suam faciat... (*HA Tac.* 15, 2–4)<sup>12</sup>.

In this case, the deeds of that ruler of the world would make the benefits of the Roman civilization spread out beyond the Roman world and his power would reach the confines of the known earth, if only the dream in question came true. Other ancient authors, as for example Pliny the Younger (*Pan.* 14, 1) and Strabo (I 1, 16), maintain that a ruler's splendour and majesty depend on the size of the scene on which he performs his actions; the more imposing it is the greater glory he is covered with; setting one's deeds and their effects in *theatrum mundi* provides maximum glory and splendour. So, staying in the sphere of pure symbolism, one can say that what brings absolute grandeur upon a Roman ruler is transferring the dimension of his deeds into the whole *oikoumene* and not confining them to the realm of Roman civilization. The same propagandistic aims may be achieved by implying, according to the Roman and imperial point of view, the equivalence between the world as such and the Roman world, even against the objective political reality. It seems that such an understanding of the extensiveness of the Roman emperor's supremacy, in broader, symbolic categories, was not restricted to literary texts. Attilio Mastino points to a similar understanding of *orbis* and *genus humanum* in the inscriptions dating from the end of the third and the beginning of the fourth centuries. In some cases they gained complements which suggest that the person the inscriptions refer to wields authority not only over the Romans but also over the barbarians, thus over all the inhabitants of the whole *oikoumene*. The epithets used in those unofficial inscriptions such as *pacatores orbis*, *gentium nationumque omnium* and *propagator totius generis humani nominisque Romani*, testify to the well-established myth of the Roman ruler as the sovereign of the whole world<sup>13</sup>. The words *totus* and *omnes* extend and additionally reinforce the impression of the world supremacy.

So it is also possible that the notion of *orbis* as used in the coin legends refers, without losing its fundamental meaning, to the territory broader than the Roman state and not clearly defined. The numismatic propaganda generally lacks the possibility of furnishing the ideas evoked on the coins with various shades of meaning. The verbal formulas are less elaborate or vivid here than the appropriate passages

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Rösger 1983: 270; Paschoud 1996: 305–308.

<sup>13</sup> *AE* 1923, 16; *CIL* VIII 7004, cf. 19419. See Mastino 1986: 126.



from the ancient literature and also briefer than those in epigraphical texts. That quality limits, to some extent, the range of their possible interpretations. It does not mean, however, that they are less evocative. The legends being very concise, the only source directly available for exploring the multilevel structure of the connotations beyond *orbis* in minting is the design of the coins, distinguished for its originality and innovative character, as compared with other coinage types, and its semantic connection with the legend. It seems that new possibilities of interpretation will open with those coin issues in the iconography of which there appears the motif of a barbarian. However, the presence of this element not always allows so broad an interpretation. Moreover, the significance of the issue must be perceived in the broader context of the ideology of a given emperor.

In the iconography of Aurelian's *antoniniani*, from Cyzicus, of *RESTITVTOR ORBIS* type, a barbarian appears as a kneeling orant between the figures of the emperor and that of *Orbis*<sup>14</sup>. He is a representative of the barbarian world which is to some extent already pacified, so it would seem that in the propaganda the emperor is shown as the restorer of the whole world. In the *Historia Augusta* his biographer credits Aurelian with the splendour victory over the whole world when, describing his triumph, he mentions the conducting of captives from different lands and tribes, *captivos gentium barbararum*, and the representatives of fauna from various parts of the globe (*HA Aurel.* 33, 4–34, 1). The literary text highlights the superiority and supremacy of Rome over alien nations, which, however, as researchers indicate, is highly fictitious and inauthentic<sup>15</sup>. It is a subjective view and judgment of Aurelian's reign made by the author of the *Historia Augusta*. It seems however that in the propaganda of that emperor *orbis* meant the very same as *orbis Romanus*. On his coins the reference to *orbis* appears only after his defeating Zenobia and Vaballathus, the rulers of Palmyra, the success which allowed the emperor to regain supremacy over the eastern provinces of the Roman state<sup>16</sup>. Therefore, *orbis* embodies all that is Roman. Besides, in the epigraphical evidence Aurelian appears as *restitutor totius orbis sui*<sup>17</sup>. The formula sounds all the more interesting because it refers to the emperor who

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<sup>14</sup> *RIC* 5/1 *Aurel.*, no. 349; Göbl 1993, no. 337.

<sup>15</sup> For the elements of triumph creating the vision of the rule over the world, see Dauge 1981: 354; Paschoud 1996: 160–169 (they comment on the triumph pointing out the fictional character of the passage in question); Merten 1968: 101–140; Kotula 1997: 152–158; Balbuza 2005: 149–154.

<sup>16</sup> Compare the chronology of the issues, Estiot 2004: 18, 23, 56, 73 f., 88, 96 f., 100–102, 109–111, 120–122, 126. For the epithet *restitutor orbis* in epigraphical sources, see e.g. *CIL*; VI 1112; VIII 10217; 20537; 22361; 22449; XII 5456; *AE* 1981, 917; Sotgiu 1975: 1043; Mastino 1986: 100 f.; Estiot 1998: 101–104. *CIL* XII 5549 (= XVII 160); 5561 (= XVII 172); they give Aurelian the two names (*restitutor orbis*, *pacator orbis*), though each refers to different historical context.

<sup>17</sup> *CIL* XI 1214. See also *conservator orbis*: *CIL* V 4319 (= *AE* 1995, 31).

eventually decided to withdraw the Roman forces from the part of Dacia beyond the Danube River, thus diminishing the borders of the Roman Empire<sup>18</sup>. He also erected the walls around the city of Rome, which was undeniably an undertaking of a defensive nature<sup>19</sup>. Aurelian restored the unity and cohesion to the Roman state and cared about its security. The Roman world continued to exist within its newly delineated, abridged boundaries. In the same manner, in the third century, Victorinus' coins seem to identify *orbis* with the Roman world, where the ruler, fighting against his enemies, becomes *defensor orbis*<sup>20</sup>. He is the defender of the world threatened by the barbarians, so he is the defender of the Roman world.

Things look a little different in the case of the Probus *aurei* from Rome and Siscia, of *PACATOR ORBIS* type. In their iconography the emperor is standing beside the four barbarians<sup>21</sup> whose gestures express paying tribute to the Roman – they are kneeling or stretching out their hands towards him – and most probably testify that the intention of the propagandistic message was to represent him as the one whose supremacy extends all over the world and who brings peace not only to the Roman world but to the barbarians as well. It is a repetition in numismatic language and even extension of the idea which an ancient author expressed, with reference to Probus, in the words: “orbem terrarum pacatissimum gubernavit” (*HA Tac.* 16, 6) and: “cuius imperio oriens, occidens, meridi<e>, septentrio omnesque orbis partes in totam securitatem redactae sunt” (*HA Prob.* 1, 3). In the representations on Probus' gold coins the two metaphors – of a word and of an image – cooperate to create the same semantic structure which is not set in the reality but exclusively in the sphere of symbol and ideology. Numerianus' coins appeared in a similar ideological climate, although the two emperors represent a completely different style of government. The *antoniniani* representations, issued in his name in the Roman mint, of *VND(I)QVE VICTORES* type<sup>22</sup>, depict a similar moment of the emperor's crossing the boundaries of the Roman world and thus gaining the authority that exceeds territorially the Roman state. Here again the emperor is standing high over the captives; the defeated barbarians “from all sides” visualize, in the simplest manner, the “infinite” magnitude

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<sup>18</sup> Cf. e.g. Molin 1999: 349. Augustus was a model for Aurelian, leaving Dacia is to some extent a return to the natural borders.

<sup>19</sup> Homo 1904: 214–306; Cassanelli, Delfini, Fonti 1974: 34–40; Quercioli 1993: 93–126.

<sup>20</sup> Schulte 1983, *Vict.*, nos. 54 f. See another description: two soldiers facing three women, *RIC* 5/2 *Vict.*, no. 90; *HCC* 4 *Vict.*, no. 25; Cohen 1995, 6 *Vict. père*, no. 29. Cf. Lafaurie 1975: 960. Such an understanding of *orbis* may be found in the inscriptions: “Gallienus universum orbem suum defendit ac protegit”, *CIL* VI 31378a, and Licinius (4<sup>th</sup> cent.) is *defensor totius orbis*, *AE* 1975, 881.

<sup>21</sup> *RIC* 5/2 *Pr.*, nos. 136, 591.

<sup>22</sup> *RIC* 5/2 *Num.*, nos. 422 f.; cf. Caló Levi 1952: 45; Gricourt 2000: 35–37. Compare a similar significance of the fourth-century coins, proclaiming the ideas of *victor omnium gentium*, *ubique victores* – M.R. Alföldi 1963, nos. 512–525, 652–661.

and power of the state. The image results from raising the ideology of authority to the level on which the emperor is defined as the ruler of the world. On the other hand, it seems, the message of Numerianus' *antoniniani*, from Lugdunum, brings some dissonance into his propaganda. On these coins *pacator orbis* assails the enemy with a spear<sup>23</sup> so as to defend "his (Roman) world" from the external danger. The dissonance may be explained by the argument that these representations convey messages referring to two semantic levels. So, there are two planes to be considered on which the emperor performs his deeds. When performed on the real plane they concern *orbis Romanus*; when performed on the symbolic one the emperor's rule extends "over the whole world". In the latter case *orbis* functions quite separately from the real space; it remains a symbol and refers to a certain system of values, defining metaphorically the magnitude of the Roman emperor as the ruler of the world. This abstract value operates along with the basic, limited meaning which materializes itself in the Roman world.

A positive verification may be to set the idea, where *orbis* assumes its broad and abstract meaning, against the background of the ideological trends on which the position of the ruling sovereigns or pretenders to the purple in the period of the third century crisis grew, the trends which show the Roman emperors to approximate and become similar to gods. Different models of that assimilation, analyzed thoroughly by Robert Turcan and formulated synthetically by Jean-Pierre Martin, led to raising the emperor over the mortals and attributing to him – following the example of the divinities – the qualities of the ruler of the world<sup>24</sup>. In the period of the third century crisis the emperor's assimilation with the divinities reached a high stage of development. Everything concerning the ruler becomes great and eternal, he is *perpetuus* and *aeternus*, often the epithets referring to him assume the superlative form and thus he becomes *clementissimus*, *providentissimus*, *felicissimus*, *fortissimus*, *victoriosissimus*, *invictissimus*<sup>25</sup>. The apotheosis of the emperor may also be traced in portraiture and in the coin representations he sometimes has divine attributes or resembles a god. The assimilation is so strong that one should sometimes ask whether what the iconography depicts is still a man or perhaps a being that exceeds human dimensions. The motif of the divine investiture, connected with Jupiter or Sol Invictus, often manifests itself in the propaganda. It is from these gods, as the coin representations depict, that the Roman emperors, among others Gallienus, Aurelian, Tacitus, Probus, Carus, Carinus and Numerianus, receive the globe. A good opportunity to symbolically expand the emperor's rule and to strengthen its foundations was at that time to emphasize the links between the ruler and the

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<sup>23</sup> *RIC* 5/2 *Num.*, no. 390. Cf. Gricourt 2000: 65.

<sup>24</sup> Turcan 1978: 1022–1056; Martin 1998: 45–78. See also Nock 1947: 102–108; Cerfaux, Tondriau 1957: 367–377; L'Orange 1947: 54–90; idem 1953: 28–36, 139–170.

<sup>25</sup> See e.g. Turcan 1978: 1051–1054; Daguet 1992; Vita-Evrard 1992.

god Sol Invictus, in particular the notion, reflected in the coin propaganda, of the latter being *comes Augusti*<sup>26</sup>. This formula is used in reference to Sol on the coins of Gallienus and Probus<sup>27</sup>. On some *antoniniani* of Probus there appeared, along with the legend *SOL COMES PROBI AVG(usti)*, a portrait of the emperor and an image of the god<sup>28</sup>. A step forward is made with Aurelian calling himself *deus et dominus (natus)* on the obverses of his *antoniniani* issued in Serdica<sup>29</sup>. A similar title will be subsequently used on Probus' coins<sup>30</sup> as well as on those of Carus<sup>31</sup>. In the iconography of their obverses some Carus' coins, of *FELICITAS REIPUBLICAE* type, showed the emperor and the god Sol facing each other, which accentuated their belonging to one world and cooperating to establish *felicitas*. In that symbolical space, created by epithets and ways of portraying emperors in the coinage of the third century, many elements coexist, without excluding one another. Taken together, they create around the Roman emperor an illusion of divinity of both his person and his authority; at the same time it is not the question of a dogma but merely of the sublimation of a living sovereign to divinity<sup>32</sup>, which is a manifestation and an effect of the transformation of the Principate into the Dominate in the course of the third century.

Most epithets describing the emperor as the ruler of the world and its benefactor come from the latter part of the third century crisis. They are completely absent in the first part of that period and appear as late as the end of the 40's; by the 50's/60's, they become quite common in the coin propaganda. As regards the quantity and variety of the references to *orbis* in the imperial coinage, the culmination falls on

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<sup>26</sup> The advancement of Sol proceeded gradually, cf. Halsberghe 1972; Martin 2000: 297–307; Berrens 2004. The official initiatives of the rulers, reflected best in coinage, are associated with the period commencing with the rule of Gallienus. Aurelian's reforms raised *Deus Sol Invictus* to the peak of the pantheon. See e.g. Kotula 1997: 162–164; Watson 1999: 188–198, 201 f.; Dario 2002: 62–105; Cizek 2006: 108–113.

<sup>27</sup> *RIC 5/1 Gall.*, *SR*, nos. 283, 583; *RIC 5/2 Pr.*, nos. 138, 209, 829; Gneccchi 1912, 2: *Pr.*, no. 41; Pink 1955: no. 34.

<sup>28</sup> *RIC 5/2 Pr.*, no. 835.

<sup>29</sup> *RIC 5/1 Aurel.*, nos. 305 and 306; Göbl 1993, nos. 260 and 261. Cf. *CIL* II 3832; VIII 4877.

<sup>30</sup> *RIC 5/2 Pr.*, nos. 841, 885. Cf. *AE* 1903, 243. See Kaczanowicz 1990: 105 f.; idem 2003: 69.

<sup>31</sup> *RIC 5/2 Car.*, nos. 96, 99 and 100. Cf. Meloni 1948: 105; Gricourt 2000: 46 f.

<sup>32</sup> In this context compare the interpretations of *deus et dominus (natus)* on the aforementioned Aurelian's *antoniniani*. Kubitschek 1915: 170–175: undoubtedly Aurelian did not consider himself a god; Seston 1946: 212: the coins issued with the emperor's knowledge prove that it cannot be denied that he identified himself with Sol; Kotula 1997: 159–161: the war with Persia being prepared, it was an action aiming to raise the emperor to the level of sacral loftiness corresponding to that of the king of Persia, the title of *deus* and *dominus natus* reminds of the titles borne by eastern rulers; Kaczanowicz 1990: 87 f.: it was a very cautious attempt to create a charisma of a Roman ruler; Estiot 2004: 102: only three such items are known, their value should not be overestimated and some caution should be exercised in this matter; Cizek 2006: 111, n. 21: they may have been post-mortem coins.

the 260s, the 270s, and the 280s. Also the intensity of issuing the coins bearing the notions of *orbis* and *genus humanum* is at that time, as A. Mastino indicates, the highest<sup>33</sup>. Bearing this in mind, it seems that the references to *orbis/genus humanum* in the imperial coinage of the third century crisis develop parallel to the evolution of the ideology of the emperor's rule. In the latter part of the century these terms are widely used in the coin legends. Sometimes individual, quite original representations, especially those minted for the short-ruling emperors, may result from the fact that the formula of their propaganda was founded on the already developed forms rather than from their being exceptional as individuals. Every so often, the legends including *orbis* and *genus humanum* characterize the emperors by bringing out their most specific traits.

The fact that Gallienus, the very emperor who after the year 260 lost his supremacy over almost a half of the Roman state, remains in propaganda the ruler of the world, can be explained on the ideological grounds rather than by actual facts. It was reported that Gallienus intended to erect an enormous statue representing him *Solis habitu* in a quadriga (*HA Gall.* 18, 2–4). Generally speaking, the authority of the one who was *deo simillimus* could not have actual barriers in the real world. Considering the quantity and diversity of the *orbis* and *genus humanum* legends, Gallienus' coinage deserves notice. His reign brought a sudden increase in the number of references to *orbis/genus humanum*, and their diversity is exceptional in the imperial coinage. As many as seven different legends indicating the “universal” character of the emperor's rule appeared on his coins, a number greater than in the case of other emperors (see data in table 1). There appeared the slogan of *pacator orbis*, the idea of *securitas orbis* and the innovative theme of *vota orbis*. The title *restitutor orbis*, known in the epigraphical and numismatic sources, having its so remote prototype in the Hadrian issues, was introduced in the imperial coinage. Other designations as *restitutor generis humani*, *conservator orbis* as well as *rector orbis* were also used. The last concept deserves particular notice. The *RECTOR ORBIS* legend appeared on the *antoniniani* from Siscia in the days of Gallienus' sole reign. It was accompanied by the image of the emperor as a naked hero, holding a globe and a sceptre<sup>34</sup>. Earlier the representation was rarely used in the imperial coinage<sup>35</sup>, though in epigraphical texts it was already recorded in connection with Augustus, who was the *rector orbis terrarum*<sup>36</sup>. In the case of Gallienus' *antoniniani*, in their iconography the emperor does not

<sup>33</sup> Mastino 1986: 120.

<sup>34</sup> A. Alföldi 1931: 12, no. 17; Göbl 2000, no. 1400. Compare in the fourth-century coinage the emperor as *rector totius orbis*: M.R. Alföldi 1963, no. 427; in the inscriptions of 3<sup>rd</sup>/4<sup>th</sup> century: *rector orbis terrae*: *AE* 1966, 166; *rector orbis ac dominus*: *CIL* III 5810.

<sup>35</sup> In the iconography the emperor or Sol: *RIC* 4/1 *Did. Jul.*, nos. 3, 13, 16–17; *RIC* 4/1 *Sept. Sev.*, no. 287; *RIC* 4/1 *Carac.*, nos. 39–40, 141, 410, 412, 474; *RIC* 4/2 *El.*, nos. 192–193.

<sup>36</sup> *CIL* XII 4333; *AE* 1894, 117. Cf. Vogt 1929: 20 f.; Christ 1938: 118 f.

differ at all from Jupiter – the highest divinity. Such a representation may be interpreted as a way of “heroising” Gallienus, which, as Jean-Marc Doyen notices, increased gradually during his sole reign<sup>37</sup>. The issuing of the *antoniniani* may be treated as an element of the propagandistic action which was to emphasize the universal character of the rule of Gallienus, spreading – just like Jupiter’s rule – all over *orbis*<sup>38</sup>. The significance of the representations, also those dating from the latter part of the third century crisis, in which the images of Jupiter or Sol Invictus were used to proclaim the Roman emperor’s rule over the world, could be similar. On Probus’ *antoniniani* from Serdica, the images propagating the idea of *restitutor orbis* picture Jupiter handing the globe over to the emperor<sup>39</sup>. Then on Aurelian’s *antoniniani* from Cyzicus the ruler is standing beside Sol Invictus and they are both holding the globe<sup>40</sup>. The images of Jupiter or Sol Invictus are more often used on the coins of *PACATOR ORBIS* type. The figures are used as an autonomous iconographic theme. In this way Jupiter portrayed on the issues of Valerian I and Gallienus and Sol portrayed on the issues of Aurelian, Florian, Tetricus I and Postumus, act as divinities supporting the emperors who appear as *pacatores orbis*<sup>41</sup>.

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The notions of *orbis* and *genus humanum* are an interpretation of *oikoumene* or of space as such. They go into an extensive yet homogeneous semantic field. They do not designate a definite area and a real territory, but they make a political or abstract category. *Orbis* and *genus humanum* may be interpreted, depending on circumstances, as the Roman world or as the whole world. In the imperial coinage they generally refer to the authority wielded over the Roman world. The emperors act as its defenders, benefactors, protectors or renovators. Both the decisions they make and the deeds they perform secure them honorary epithets such as *conservator*, *defensor* and *restitutor* and bear fruits of peace, welfare and safety. It is implied that their actions and contributions concern solely the Roman

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<sup>37</sup> Doyen 1987: 85–97. Cf. L’Orange 1947: 86–90; Turcan 1978: 1047.

<sup>38</sup> Jupiter as *rector, caeli terrarumque rector, divinarum humanarumque rerum rector*: *CIL* III 13718; VIII 18219; III 1090; Jupiter as *praeses orbis*: *RIC* 4/1 *Pesc. Niger*, no. 43; *RIC* 4/1 *Sept. Sev.*, no. 396, p. 139, no. 6. See also Gallienus’ epithet: *rector orbis et dominus terrarum*: *CIL* VI 1109 (= *AE* 1979, 217b); XI 3089 f.

<sup>39</sup> *RIC* 5/2 *Pr.*, nos. 856–859.

<sup>40</sup> *RIC* 5/1 *Aurel.*, no. 367; Göbl 1993, no. 343; Gysen 1995: 27, no. 3; Estiot 2004: 420 f.

<sup>41</sup> *RIC* 5/1 *Val.*, no. 218; *RIC* 5/1 *Gall., JR*, no. 294; Göbl 2000, no. 1562; *RIC* 5/2 *Post.*, no. 317; Schulzki 1996, *Post.*, no. 50; *RIC* 5/2 *Tetr. I*, no. 183; *RIC* 5/1 *Aurel.*, nos. 6–7; Göbl 1993, nos. 3, 5, 7; *RIC* 5/1 *Fl.*, nos. 7–9; Estiot 2004: 277 f., 284.

state and the Roman world. In that sense *orbis* is Roman – *orbis Romanus*. What exists beyond it is regarded as *res nullius*<sup>42</sup>.

However, in the latter part of the third century crisis, in the notion of *orbis*, as appearing on coins, the equivalent of “the whole world” can be recognized; the ideological arguments speak for this. Some coin issues bear the figures of gods, holding a spacially unlimited authority. The representations in which the ruler of the world appears side by side with the barbarians impart dynamism to the interpretations of *orbis* in the monetary propaganda. In the coin representations the figure of the emperor is modelled on that of the highest divinity and named *rector orbis*. His authority reaches even beyond the known world. Here we find ourselves already in the sphere of abstract values, independent of the real space or the institution of the state – *orbis* becomes a symbol of a designation abstracted from the real context. One can therefore speak of the cumulation of the meanings of *orbis* in the monetary propaganda of the third century. It is, however, difficult to recognize the nuances of the overlapping territorial, state and abstract connotations of this term. It is impossible to arrange the occurrences of this notion into an unequivocal evolutionary sequence which would exhibit the broadening of its meanings from the territorial to the abstract or from the real to the symbolic. The relations between them are obviously more complex. One may presume that various other representations could convey such an implication and assume that this fundamental, “real” sense of *orbis*, as it appeared in the imperial propaganda, overlapped with its being treated as a symbolic quality. Both these interpretations – the narrower and the broader one – seem of equal value especially in the latter part of the of the third century crisis.

These two main currents showing up in the coin legends are a consequence and manifestation of the antinomy which contrasted the actual state of the Roman possession, limited to the area within the reach of *limes* and by the ability to keep the border tribes and states in dependence, with an ideal of *imperium sine fine*, assuming an unlimited expansion of *orbis Romanus* till its identification with *orbis terrarum*, in a broad sense of the term. In the third century the Roman Empire was forced to conduct a defensive foreign policy, which did not provide much opportunity to propagate an idea of the Roman emperor’s rule over the world. In that context, as Nicole Méthy states, because of the barbarian incursions, the Roman supremacy over the world became only an outdated illusion of the departed glory<sup>43</sup>. At the same time manifesting the range of the rule seemed the logical consequence of the struggle for the emperor’s purple and the reaction to a multitude of the rivals as well as the sense of threat to their own political position where the source of the emperor’s authority was to be the supremacy

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<sup>42</sup> Cf. Mommsen 1887: 826 f.

<sup>43</sup> Méthy 1997: 352, 357: the references to *orbis/genus humanum* on the coins of the Early Empire (69–235) serve polemical function at the moments of the struggle for the imperial throne.

over the world. The slogan of the rule synonymous to that over *orbis terrarum* gained a great popularity. The same ideological tendency brought the possibility of the new, broader interpretations of the notion of *orbis*. In that approach, the changes occurring in the field of the verbal and pictorial messages on the coins of the *orbis/genus humanum* types were an artistically reflected phenomenon of the evolution of imperial rule and its ideological justifications.

*University of Silesia, Katowice*

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SHIP OR DRINKING-CUP?

THE MEANING OF *KANTHAROS* IN PHRYNICHUS, 15 KASSEL–  
AUSTIN (= ATHEN. XI 474B)

By

KRYSTYNA BARTOL

ABSTRACT: It has been argued – against other scholars’ opinion – that the noun *kantharos* in Phrynichus’ fr. 15 K.–A. could simply mean ‘ship’, as Athenaeus assumes while providing (*Deip.* XI 474b) a list of four quotations from comedy where this word is used, as he says, *epi ploiou*. Within the article the textual problem concerning the verb used in v. 2 has also been discussed, and the reading ἔπλησεν has been tentatively proposed.

In the section 473d–474e of Book XI of the *Deipnosophists* Athenaeus remarks on the *kantharos*. His comments are placed within the catalogue of drinking-cups. Under the heading *kantharos* Athenaeus assembles occurrences of this name in the literary sources and much of the material quoted is drawn from comedy. Although the author of the *Deipnosophists* devotes his attention to the drinking-cup here, at the beginning of the entry he says that the term *kantharos* is commonly used for ship (πλοίου ὄνομα κοινόν)<sup>1</sup>. In his treatment of *kantharos* he extends the theme and lists four examples from comic sources where the word *kantharos* is used in the sense of ship (ἐπὶ πλοίου)<sup>2</sup>. Although the details of the dramatic contexts of all passages quoted here are now obscure, in the three instances<sup>3</sup> the name *kantharos* clearly denotes a ship.<sup>4</sup> The passage from Phrynichus’ *Comastae* (15 Kassel–Austin), which succeeds the quotation from Sosicrates and precedes

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<sup>1</sup> At the end of the entry Athenaeus mentions the third meaning of the *kantharos*, namely a broach worn by women, and points to Antiphanes’ *The Boeotian Woman* (62 K.–A.). On this word’s ambiguity, see Elderkin 1924: 101–103 and Radici Colace 1985.

<sup>2</sup> MS A omits this phrase.

<sup>3</sup> Sosicrates, 2 K.–A.; Nicostratus, 9 K.–A.; Menander, 246 K.–A.

<sup>4</sup> From among other places in Comedy, not quoted here by Athenaeus, where the noun *kantharos* undoubtedly denotes the ship, Aristophanes’ *Peace* 143 must be mentioned.

citations from plays by Nicostratus and Menander, poses, however, some problems. The two verses quoted here (as printed by Kassel–Austin<sup>5</sup>) are:

εἶτα κεραμεύων ἄν οἴκοι σωφρόνως Χαίρέστρατος  
ἐκατὸν <ἄν> τῆς ἡμέρας †ἔκλαιεν† οἴνου κανθάρους.

The editors<sup>6</sup> of Athenaeus, modern authors<sup>7</sup> and scholars commenting on Greek playwrights' extant texts<sup>8</sup> generally agree that the quotation of Phrynichus is incompatible with other items in the list of examples, and that Athenaeus' decision to illustrate the use of the noun *kantharos* in the meaning of ship with Phrynichus' words is to be explained as his misreading of the dramatic context of the play<sup>9</sup>.

Although the accuracy of Athenaeus' quotations and his ways of understanding his originals' point is not verifiable in most of the instances known to us only through the *Deipnosophists*, it would be prudent in diagnosing his choices not to forget that in the case of Greek comedy he builds his text on the scholarly Hellenistic tradition, which gave a detailed analysis of the comic material<sup>10</sup>. It seems that in the case of Phrynichus' comedy the mention of Chaerestratus the potter could hardly be considered the decisive argument in support of the assumption that the *kantharos* must mean a drinking-cup here. Moreover, the transmitted text itself presents difficulties and is too insecure at the crucial point for certainty on the interpretation of the passage. The problem of the meaning of the *kantharos* within Phrynichus' fragment as well as the point of the joke made here by the comic poet seems then worth reconsidering.

The text in line 2 is uncertain and the verb which occurs here has been obelised by Kassel and Austin. Marcianus' reading (ἔκλαιεν) gives rise to suspicion and Dindorf restores the Attic form ἔκλαεν; others conjecturally – without a word of palaeographical justification – restore the verb in various ways: Casaubon<sup>11</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Kassel, Austin 1989: 402.

<sup>6</sup> Kaibel 1966: 41; Cherubina 2001: 1170, n. 4: "Il frammento sembra però fuori posto in un contesto di citazioni in cui il termine κάνθαρος indica la nave"; Gulick 1995: 92.

<sup>7</sup> Stephanus 1841: 933: "Κάνθαρος [...] poculi genus [de quo copiose exposuit Athen. 11, p. 473, 474, allatis Phrynichi, Eubuli, Alexidis aliorumque Comicorum locis]".

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Olson 1998: 96.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Arnott's general remarks on Athenaeus' inaccuracy in the interpretation of the dramatic contexts of quoted comic passages, 1996: 53: "...his interpretations of subject matter and dramatic context are frequently unsatisfactory". Arnott's evidence for this opinion are, however, Alexis' fragments only. Cf. *ibid.*, 236 f.

<sup>10</sup> On this problem, see Wilkins 2000: XXI f. Although Athenaeus' reliability cannot be checked in the case of a good number of instances, his dependence on Hellenistic scholarship is undoubtful. Cf. Olson 2006: XV and 2007: 29 f.

<sup>11</sup> See Schweighäuser 1804: 122.

suggests εἴλκεν (later accepted also by Dobree<sup>12</sup>), Letronne's correction<sup>13</sup> is ἔκκεν. Herwerden<sup>14</sup> prefers ἐπλαττεν, whereas Kock<sup>15</sup> proposes ἔλαπτεν. The *lectio* given by MSS as well as conjectures imply that the *kantharoi* mentioned in the passage should be identified as pieces of pottery (large drinking-cups<sup>16</sup>) manufactured by Chaerestratus or used by him. Εἴλκεν and ἔλαπτεν, advanced respectively by Casaubon and Kock, make Chaerestratus a drunkard enjoying guzzling an enormous amount of goblets: the mention of a hundred<sup>17</sup> *kantharoi* daily drunk up by him hyperbolically exemplifies his bibulous character<sup>18</sup>. A similar interpretation of the possible meaning of the fragment has been recently advanced by John Wilkins<sup>19</sup> who ingeniously suggests ἐκέλσεν or ὄκειλεν and argues that that verb would introduce the nautical metaphor of the symposium<sup>20</sup> – a commonplace going back to archaic poetry<sup>21</sup>. Letronne's solution, accepted by Meineke<sup>22</sup> but dismissed by Kaibel<sup>23</sup>, calls attention to Chaerestratus' overproductivity: having daily fired a hundred earthenware *kantharoi* in the kiln, he could go down in the book of records. Herwerden's ἐπλαττεν produces similar implications. If we follow the *lectio* given by MSS, the preserved fragment is a portion of the description of wretched Chaerestratus the potter who – for reasons unknown to us – desperately cries bitter tears; the strength of his despair is indicated by the mention of a hundred *kantharoi* filled up with his tears<sup>24</sup>.

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<sup>12</sup> Dobree 1832: 332.

<sup>13</sup> I quote it after Kassel, Austin 1989: 402.

<sup>14</sup> Herwerden 1855: 28.

<sup>15</sup> Kock 1880.

<sup>16</sup> On the shape of the *kantharos*, see Kanowski 1984, s.v. *Kantharos*.

<sup>17</sup> Dobree blows the punch line of the joke exchanging ἑκατὸν <ἀν> τῆς ἡμέρας for πένθ' ἐκάστης ἡμέρας.

<sup>18</sup> See Schweighäuser 1804: 122, who enumerates scholars' proposals how to understand the joke: "Bonus Chaerestratus [...] plus vini biberat, quam vasculis faciendis lucri fecerat".

<sup>19</sup> He proposed his emendation when commenting (private discussion) on the first draft of my paper. I would like to thank him warmly for the permission to mention his suggestions and for all helpful commentary on my text.

<sup>20</sup> It is known also from other comic sources, cf. Xenarchus, fr. 10 K.–A.

<sup>21</sup> Wilkins proposes to translate: "Then at home Chaerestratus the potter used prudently to steer on to the shore a hundred schooners of wine a day". He comments: "Whether the ships landed safely or were wrecked ('run aground', the more likely, cf. Athenaeus 2.37b–e), only the full text of the passage would reveal".

<sup>22</sup> Meineke 1839: 486.

<sup>23</sup> Kaibel 1966: 41: "sententiae acumen non perspicio".

<sup>24</sup> Gulick (1995: 93) hesitates over the meaning of the *kantharoi*. Friedrich (2000: 33) seems to understand it 'drinking-cup' when translating "Darauf würde wohl Chairestratos zu Hause töpfernd mit Bedacht/ hundert *kantharoi* für Wein am Tag mit Tränen füllen". The same applies to the newest translation by Olson (2009: 301): "Then Chaerestratus, modestly producing pots at home, would be †waiting† 100 *kantharoi* of wine per day".

The point of the joke, based on Letronne's and Herwerden's conjectures, seems to score over its rivals because it directly relates Chaerestratus' doings to his profession, which appears to be an important element in his presentation here (v. 1: κεραιεύων). Other conjectures, although have their merits, depart from the wit played on Chaerestratus' occupation. And the relevance of individuals' occupation to the jokes made of them has been acknowledged as one of the important comic devices in Attic comedy<sup>25</sup>. Although the general idea of Chaerestratus' being ridiculed here as an overzealous potter, an eager beaver who for some reasons (for money?) produces an infinite number<sup>26</sup> of vessels (probably of poor quality) may be defended, the form of the expressions proposed by scholars seems, however, highly unlikely. Verbs such as ἔπλαττεν or ἔκαεν make the adnominal genitive οἴνου objectionable<sup>27</sup> and could hardly be assigned to Phrynichus. I suggest that he is perhaps more likely to have written ἔπλησεν οἴνου κανθάρους. This phrase seems to be stylistically more attractive<sup>28</sup>: the aorist indicative with ἄν<sup>29</sup> may have a frequentative sense<sup>30</sup> here, implying that Chaerestratus "used to fill up a hundred (= very many) merchant-ships (*kantharoi*) with wine", i.e. used to produce daily so many jars for transporting wine that a hundred (= very many) ships might have been loaded with this cargo. The phrase πιμπλάναι with a substantive designating a thing holding ingredients as a direct object + adnominal genitive denoting the content, attested at Herodotus I 194 (καλάμης πλήσαντες πᾶν τὸ πλοῖον τοῦτο [...] φορτίων πλήσαντες) in the sense of 'loading the cargo onto the ship', argues that it was in use at least in the fifth century BCE. The similar use of the phrase – pertaining not to loading a ship with a cargo but to filling the table with food and drink – occurs also in Homer (*Od.* V 93: τράπεζαν ἀμβροσίης πλήσσασα; XVII 410 f.: πλήσαν [...] πῆρην σίτου καὶ κρείων). Phrynichus seems to employ a kind of metonymy, saying that Chaerestratus filled merchant-ships<sup>31</sup> (*kantharoi*) with

<sup>25</sup> See Sommerstein 1996: 330: "The idols of the market are a group whose significance for comedy has not always been realised. [...] Most of them are leading figures in one or another trade or profession. [...] It is as if each occupation had an acknowledged star figure who was as it were synonymous with the occupation in the public mind". See also *ibid.*, 350 f. The verb κεραιεύειν on which the joke of a certain Cephalus is built has been attested by Aristophanes, *Eccl.* 252 f. See also the scholium *ad loc.* The jesting attitude adopted by Comedy towards the traders and craftsmen is attested by the extant material from comic poets. Cf. Olson's enumeration of the professions mocked in comic plays (2007: 473).

<sup>26</sup> For ἑκατόν as a word denoting generally a large number, cf. *Il.* II 448; XIV 181.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. Kock (as quoted by Kassel and Austin): "pocula enim multi, vini pocula nemo umquam figulus fecit".

<sup>28</sup> The error of the scribe is, however, hard to explain palaeographically.

<sup>29</sup> Aptly added by Erfurdt 1812: 467.

<sup>30</sup> For the iterative use of aorist with ἄν denoting customary action see Kühner 1898: 211. See also Goodwin 1998: 56 (§ 162), 86 (§ 246). Cf. *Ar. Pl.* 982 f.: ἀργυρίου δραχμᾶς ἄν ἦτησ' εἴκοσι.

<sup>31</sup> For the ship *kantharos*, see Torr 1964: 107 and Casson 1971: 343.

wine. He substituted containers (jars for transporting wine) for content itself<sup>32</sup> (wine), intending the phrase to mean: “he loaded a hundred ships with jars filled with wine”. The strong hyperbolic colouring of jokes made by Attic playwrights belongs to the domain of comic stylistics<sup>33</sup>. Pherecrates’ nautical hyperbole (1 K.–A.) could be a good comparison in this place, since it explores the same idea which has been used by Phrynichus in building the metaphor<sup>34</sup>. Here Phrynichus’ hyperbolic imagery is comicized not only through the ambiguous ἑκατόν (on the one hand it can be understood as the pedantic – though unrealistic – concretisation of the number of merchant-ships<sup>35</sup>, on the other – as vaguely denoting a huge quantity of them<sup>36</sup>), but also through the sarcastic and ironic<sup>37</sup> σωφρόνως, which – by seemingly exposing Chaerestratus’ moderation in making pottery – cleverly emphasises his enthusiasm for dizzying pace of work.

In view of what has been said above, it seems safe to assume that Athenaeus’ way of understanding Phrynichus’ use of the word *kantharos* (in the meaning of ship) – though it did not satisfy many scholars – is evidently right. Moreover, if I am correct in suggesting that in the passage in question Chaerestratus is an object of ridicule because of his unacceptable and absurdly deviant massive production of jars for transporting wine by sea or river, the point of the joke concerning Chaerestratus, one of the *Phrynichokomodomenoi*, does not appear unclear<sup>38</sup>, although the serious distortion of the text will ever prevent us from forming a definitive judgment on this matter.

*Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań*  
*kbartol@mail.icpnet.pl*

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Xen. *Hell.* I 1, 35: πλοῖα πολλὰ σίτου. See also Krüger, Cooper 1998: 186 (§ 47.8.4).

<sup>33</sup> Cf. e.g. hyperbolic illustration of the effects of heroes’ abandoning themselves to homosexual pleasures (Eubulus, 80 K.–A.), or that of dangers of meeting fishmongers (Antiphanes, 16 K.–A.). Cf. also the end of the cook’s monologue in Archedicus, 2. K.–A. (a one-time action of the clever cook guarantees continuity of his hiring), or the comic descriptions of a utopian abundance of eating (Telesicles, 1 K.–A., Pherecrates, 113 K.–A.).

<sup>34</sup> (A): ἐγὼ κατεσθίω μόλις τῆς ἡμέρας  
πένθ’ ἡμιμέδιμν’, ἐὰν βιάζωμαι. (B): μόλις;  
ὡς ὀλιγόσιτος ἦσθ’ ἄρ. ὅς κατεσθίω  
τῆς ἡμέρας μακρῶς τριήρους σιτία.

<sup>35</sup> We do not know what the carrying capacity of the *kantharos* was. But even if we accept for it the lower limit established by Casson (1956: 234) for the ships of the smallest size (what seems impossible since Nicostratus, 9 K.–A. calls the *kantharos* εἰκόσορος, which usually refers to a large merchant-ships, see Torr 1964: 107 and Casson 1971: 343; cf. also Pherecrates, 152 K.–A., who suggests the considerable size of ships transporting wine) as 80 tons (3000 talents), it emerges that the mention of a hundred *kantharoi* loaded with containers made by one man within a day must have been intended to produce a distinct hyperbolic effect.

<sup>36</sup> As in Ar. *Pax* 756: ἑκατόν [...] κεφαλαὶ κολάκων.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. Cherubina 2001: 1170, n. 4: “‘sobriamente’ ha chiaro senso ironico”. See also Gulick 1995: 93.

<sup>38</sup> As Harvey 2000: 98 assumes.

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## SEVEN LUCRETIAN EMENDATIONS

By

DAVID BUTTERFIELD

ABSTRACT: Seven emendations are offered upon the text of Lucretius' *De rerum natura*, with particular focus upon Book IV (II 250; IV 284; IV 418 f.; IV 638; IV 790; IV 791; IV 845).

II 246-250:

namque hoc in promptu manifestumque esse uidemus,  
pondera, quantum in sest, non posse obliqua meare,  
ex supero quom praecipitant, quod cernere possis;  
sed nil omnino <recta> regione uiai

250 declinare quis est qui possit cernere sese?

**249** *recta recte suppl.* LF : *om.* OQG : *nulla Lachmann* || **250** *possit* OQ : *praestet Lachmann* : *poscat Winckelmann* : *uas sit Bockemüller* | *sese* OQG : *sensus Bernays* : *de se olim Munro* : *sensu Giussani* : *suesse Nencini* : *recte Romanes* : *posse MacKay* : *sensim Orth* : *se e se García Calvo* : *uaria ci. Fowler*<sup>1</sup> | *dicere uere Merrill* : *consciis esse Richter*

The close of 250 presents a well-known crux about which few editors have reached agreement, although there is almost universal acceptance of the Italic supplement<sup>2</sup> *recta* in the previous verse<sup>3</sup>. A persistent group over the centuries have continued to defend the paradosis of 250, taking *sese* as the reflexive object of *declinare*: “but who is there who could discern that they [= *pondera* as in 246–248] in no way at all swerve themselves from their vertical path”? Three

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<sup>1</sup> *aut clare uel coram uel certe uel quicum post cernere, aut corpora uel pondera ante possit, aut confirmare uel declinare potissit pro possit cenere sese.*

<sup>2</sup> It should be made clear at the outset of this article that I am among those convinced that the Italic mss of Lucretius are not witnesses to the tradition independent from OQGVU, and I therefore treat them primarily as a repertory for Renaissance conjectures. Nevertheless, the clear and painstaking contribution to the field made by Szymański 2006 served to show that, even with acceptance of this critical standpoint, the Italic mss still repay close collation.

<sup>3</sup> It is therefore most surprising that, in the most recent critical edition of the work (Flores 2002–2004), no critical note at all is offered upon 250.

difficulties are immediately evident with this strategy: (i) *sese*, an oddly emphatic pronominal form in itself, is placed at some remove from *declinare* and in a position that is potentially ambiguous after *possit cernere*; (ii) in discussing inanimate weights and the spontaneous atomic *clinamen* they experience, the suggestion of active deflection of their movements is unwelcome; (iii) the evidence for *declinare* employed transitively with regard to such motion is scanty.

To take the last objection first, our focus should lie on Lucretius' practice elsewhere: at II 221 and II 253, both passages concerning atomic motion, he employs *declinare* intransitively; in the third and final instance, at II 259, the manuscripts present a transitive use of the verb: "declinamus item motus nec tempore certo/ nec regione loci certa, sed ubi ipsa tulit mens". In this particular context, however, Lucretius could have chosen to use *declinare* transitively in order to express humans' active power to move according to their will; nonetheless, it is also possible that the reverse of the corruption at II 251 (where *motu* is transmitted for *motus*) has occurred here, and that we should read *declinamus item motu*, "we likewise swerve in our motions"<sup>4</sup>. More forceful than this potential grammatical obstacle, however, is the second, that of sense. At the close of the section II 216–250, it is completely unwelcome for Lucretius to imply that inanimate *pondera* "swerve themselves" rather than suffer random minimal shifts in their vertical line of travel. The intransitive usage leaves the awkward issue of agency unresolved; a transitive construction, by contrast, unduly implies that the atoms can move themselves in a manner akin to active agents, i.e. at will. For a Roman poet the difference between, say, *amnis declinat* and *amnis se declinat* is potentially one of real significance. Finally, to come to the first objection, the placing of *sese* is not perhaps fatal but the resultant text is undeniably clumsy, for the pronoun could theoretically be taken as the subject of *declinare*: "who is there who can discern that he does not himself swerve at all from the vertical line of his path?"<sup>5</sup>. If Lucretius did indeed wish to write *se(se)*, I find it difficult to accept that he would not have written "sese [or haec se] declinare quis est qui cernere possit", availing himself of a not unlucretian rhythm<sup>6</sup>.

I therefore believe that most editors are right to conclude that the transmitted *sese* cannot stand. Of the many emendations heretofore suggested, I am of the opinion that any which alters *possit cernere* is misguided. These words are an intentional repetition of *cernere possis* in 248 to drive home Lucretius' point and

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<sup>4</sup> Similarly weak instances of bare *motu* can be seen at IV 136 and V 551. I also follow the emendation of Davies *ad Cic. De fato* 46, where *qua declinet atomus* should be read for *quae d. atomum*. For further discussion of transitive and intransitive *declinare* with regard to this crux, see Richter 1974: 23 f.

<sup>5</sup> This reading, although certainly not attractive in sense, was suggested by Bollack 1976: 173 f.

<sup>6</sup> For a word occupying the first foot followed by a word that terminates at the weak caesura in the third foot, see in Book II, e.g. 86, 407, 619, 830, 1110 (of which 619 and 1110 further lack any fourth-foot caesura).

they perfectly satisfy the required meaning. As regards 250, word order strongly suggests that the final foot of the line should be taken with the immediately preceding relative clause. Of emendations with these restrictions, Giussani's *sensu* is passable in sense but undeniably otiose and Fowler's *clare* or *certe* present the unwelcome suggestion of our perhaps discerning such a change of movement "almost clearly" or "almost for certain". I propose that we should read *per se*, "for themselves", i.e. with their own sensory capabilities: there is no human who with their own visual powers can discern this minimal motion (although it can be apprehended, as Lucretius has shown, by logical thought)<sup>8</sup>. Either *perse* was corrupted to *sese* by dittography or anticipation of *se*, or *per*, perhaps written *p*, was lost and a second *se* added to repair metre<sup>9</sup>.

## IV 279–288:

- 280 sic ubi se primum speculi proiecit imago,  
dum uenit ad nostros acies, protrudit agitque  
aera qui inter se quomquest oculosque locatus,  
et facit ut prius hunc omnem sentire queamus  
quam speculum; sed ubi [in] speculum quoque sensimus ipsum,  
continuo a nobis in eum quae fertur imago  
285 peruenit et nostros oculos reiecta reuisit  
atque alium prae se propellens aera uoluit  
et facit ut prius hunc quam se uideamus, eoque  
distare ab speculo tantum semota uidetur.

283 in OQ : *del. Marullus* || 284 in eum OQ : in id haec (*olim c. haec in id a n.*) *Lambinus* : iterum *Lachmann* : in idem *Munro* : itidem *Bockemüller* (*quod sibi trib. C.L. Howard*) : in tum *Merrill* : illuc *Watt* : in eo *García Calvo* | quae fertur in illud *K. Müller*

The removal in 283 of the unmeaning and unmetrical *in* is an assured correction. In the following verse, however, less certainty surrounds the transmitted *in eum*. If

<sup>7</sup> Orth wished to take *sensim* with *declinare*. Such an ambiguous placing of the adverb would, however, fail to satisfy the important canon of Townend (1969: 338): "nowhere in Lucretius is there a sentence whose meaning is determined by the presence of a comma".

<sup>8</sup> It has been kindly suggested to me by the anonymous referee for "Eos" that *per se* could modify *declinare* rather than *possit cernere* but I am not convinced. Firstly, the word order is such that, even with the collocation *quod cernere possis* two lines above, there is no indication to the reader that *per se* modifies something outside the relative clause and Townend's canon (see the preceding note) is violated. Secondly, the emphasis in the passage is upon the minimal motion (cf. *nil omnino*) of these atoms from their straight path: it is irrelevant for Lucretius to add to his question the stipulation that this motion is self-motivated, as if this fact could affect one's ability to see it. Thirdly, as a development of the last objection, were *per se* to refer to *declinare*, the close of the question becomes strangely marked rhetorically to emphasise something of no real importance.

<sup>9</sup> I argue elsewhere (Butterfield 2009: 311 f.) that *cernere per se* should be read for *cernere posse* at III 359.

the text is correct, *eum* (with antecedent *speculum*)<sup>10</sup> would be the sole example in Latin literature of a masculine form *speculus*<sup>11</sup> before its appearance in the pseudo-Cyprianic *Liber de montibus Sina et Sion*<sup>12</sup>, a tract written in vulgar Latin around the turn of the third century AD which can bear little comparative value, since the work's Latinity is widely regarded as "barbarisch schlechtes"<sup>13</sup>. It would be folly to defend Lucretian practice by reference to such a work<sup>14</sup>. Nonetheless, Christ, Merrill (*olim*), Diels, Orth and Valentí, among a few others, have indeed granted this licence to Lucretius, with Diels (1922: 52) asserting "dass neben *hoc speculum* [...] ihm aus der Volkssprache auch ein *speculus* bekannt war" (Diels 1922: 52). Yet this unique change of gender would here be entirely unmotivated (metrical convenience could hardly be cited) and we have clear testimony elsewhere in the work (III 974 and IV 151) that Lucretius, like all other Latin literary authors, did employ neuter *speculum*. Therefore, it seems as good as certain that if Lucretius did wish to employ a prepositional construction, *in id* or *in illud* was necessarily required.

Unfortunately, among the suggested emendations, Lambinus' *in id haec* is clumsy (though neater than his first offering) and Müller's transposition *quae fertur in illud* comparatively violent; Munro's tidier *in idem*, by contrast, presents a useless emphasis on the identity of the mirror under discussion. In short, there seems no means of retaining a suitable prepositional phrase with *in*<sup>15</sup>. I believe therefore that Watt took the right tack in searching for a spatial adverb and his *illuc* may be correct. Nonetheless, *eo*, "to there" (as at IV 1055: *eo tendit*), seems more natural and could be preceded by the appropriate *item*, "likewise", emphasising that the journey of the image from us to the mirror is identical to that of

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<sup>10</sup> The idea of Romanes (1935: 40) that *in eum* = *in aera* has unsurprisingly not won scholars' approval.

<sup>11</sup> I only note in passing the perverse theory of Wakefield (1813, *ad. loc.*), who reaches the following remarkable conclusion on the basis of the transmitted reading: "tuto nobis videtur colligendum, antiquos *eum* in neutro adhibuisse pro *id*"! Such wild decrees deserve the charge of Lachmann (1850, *ad loc.*) that Wakefield is "Latinitatis auctor mirificus". No argument is given by the first modern commentator Pius (1514, *ad loc.*), where he simply states "In eum. In id speculum"!

<sup>12</sup> "Quis est speculus immaculatus patris?" (13).

<sup>13</sup> The words are those of Lampe 1987: 119, n. 382.

<sup>14</sup> As is rightly stated by Ernout (1925, *ad loc.*), "si l'on rencontre dans notre auteur des façons de parler qui appartiennent à la langue familière, on n'a pas le droit de lui prêter des barbarismes qu'on trouve seulement dans la bouche des affranchis illettrés et barbares du banquet de Trimalcion".

<sup>15</sup> Lachmann's *iterum* is untrue in sense and demands that *peruenit* be taken absolutely, a usage which has no close Lucretian parallel (for, at IV 554 and VI 87 = VI 383, the verb is used with *unde* and with the implication of 'coming'). I do not understand García Calvo's *in eo* (abl.), even with the help of his Spanish translation. Merrill's horrific *in tum* (demanding tmesis of *in... fertur*) does not require discussion.

the image of the mirror to us (279 f.), but in the reverse direction<sup>16</sup>. If either *item* was wrongly contracted to *im/in* or *eo* corrupted to *eum* (via *eo* taken as *eū*), “correction” to *in eum* could easily have followed<sup>17</sup>. To translate 283–285: “But when we have seen the mirror itself also, at once the image which is likewise carried from us reaches it and, once reflected, returns to our eyes”<sup>18</sup>.

## IV 414–419:

415 at conlectus aquae digitum non altior unum,  
qui lapides inter sistit per strata uiarum,  
despectum praebet sub terras impete tanto,  
a terris quantum caeli patet altus hiatus,  
nubila despicere et caelum ut uideare uidere  
corpora mirande sub terras abdita caelo.

**414** conlectus *Lambinus* : coniectus OQ || **418** despicere OQ : dispicere *Lachmann* | caelum ut O : caelum Q : caeli ut *Goebel* (*et Bergk suo Marte*) : uolucrum (*nisi* (atque) auium) *Munro* : uiua ut *Palmer* : rerum ut *Nettleship* : astra uel solem ut *Brieger* (*lac. post 418 stat.*) : clare *Everett* : caeno *Bignone* : mole ut *Housman* | uidere OQ : et aperta *M.F. Smith* | et post uidere olim *add. Lambinus* (*quod sibi trib. Bernays*) || **419** corpora OQ : ut prope *Lachmann* : caerula *Polle* : cetera *primum Munro* (*418 intacto et mirando in 419 lecto*) | mirande O : mirandae Q : miranda *Itali plerique* : mirando F : mirandi *Lambinus* : mirandum *Bentley* : mirandum est *Birt* : miraclo *Lachmann* : mirantes *Purmann* | terras abdita OQ : terris abdita *Purmann* : terras addita *Palmer* : terra subdita *Cartault* | caelo OQ : caeli *Lambinus* : pacto *Faber* : retro *Bentley* : signa *Goebel* : caeno *Bergk* : ludo *Polle* : cernas *M.F. Smith* | *419 ante 418 transp. Lachmann*

As the size of the above apparatus suggests, verses 418 f. have been much discussed over the last five centuries<sup>19</sup>. The two lines as transmitted simply cannot stand: *caelum* [...] *corpora* cannot be construed and *caelo* closing 419 is most difficult indeed<sup>20</sup>. In view of the sheer number of suggested emendations it

<sup>16</sup> Bockemüller and Howard would presumably have introduced *item* instead of the rarer *itidem*, had they thought it possible.

<sup>17</sup> It has been plausibly suggested to me as an alternative explanation by the anonymous referee for “Eos” that *eo* was misunderstood as a pronoun not a verb, and the standard construction of *fertur + in + acc.* was introduced, without due heed paid to the gender of the referent.

<sup>18</sup> *item* is also elided at VI 537, VI 711 and VI 1192. For the elision of a pyrrhic word ending in *-m* in the arsis of the hexameter, cf. III 339 (*enim*), III 906 (*quidem*) and VI 80 (*quidem*). The comparative metrical rarity introduced by my emendation is, I concede, not ideal and to avoid it one could tentatively suggest *et* (‘also’) *eo*. *et* is corrupted to *in* at II 749.

<sup>19</sup> Writing to W.H.D. Rouse, the editor of the first Lucretius *Loeb* (London 1924), on 21 Jan., 1921, A.E. Housman confessed “IV 418–9 is a passage I have often broken my head over without avail” (Trinity College Dublin MS 2287; see Housman 2007: vol. I, 462).

<sup>20</sup> The rendering of Merrill 1916: 55, who believes (like Martin) that the transmitted text is defensible, is pure fantasy: “that to look down on the clouds and to behold heaven you seem, bodies in wondrous fashion put down under the earth, withdrawn from the sky”.

is a relief that the overall sense of the two verses is clear: when looking down into the reflective surfaces of puddles one is able to see the sky and its contents apparently beneath the surface. I believe that most critics are right to retain the transmitted *despicere* in 418 (cf. *despectum* 416), notwithstanding Lachmann's objections that it typically has a tone of disapproval, and *mirande* in 419, an adverb employed again shortly after this passage<sup>21</sup>. I also think it certain that O's *ut* should be kept in 418, the particle having easily been omitted by either Q or its exemplar.

In an attempt to bring sense to the passage, Lambinus, Bernays and others have sought to add *et* at the close of 418, thereby taking *corpora* of 419 as referring in general terms to physical bodies. Not only is such a vague use of bare *corpora* improbable but it remains a serious objection that Lucretius nowhere else in the work avails himself of the metrically most useful expedient of placing *et* at the close of the hexameter<sup>22</sup>. Such an unparalleled licence should not therefore be assumed by the Lucretian critic<sup>23</sup>. The greater changes made by M.F. Smith are skilful but, I think, excessively interventive for the problem at hand. Since Howard's attempt to take *uidere* as appositional to *despicere*, with a comma placed after *uideare*, is too convoluted to have been understood in a text without punctuation (cf. n. 7 above), it seems to me certain that *uidere* must be the second infinitive dependent upon *uideare*. Finally, *sub terras* (n.b. not *sub terris*) must be taken closely with *abdita*; as a result, *caelo* closing the line cannot be construed: something cannot be "buried down beneath the earth in the sky"<sup>24</sup>. The word is presumably a mistaken reminiscence of its appearance in 418 and 417, as Faber first suggested.

With all of this said in preface, we can now turn to the adoption of two palmary conjectures. Firstly, Goebel's *caeli* (which later occurred, apparently independently, to Bergk) for *caelum* is excellent in 418, since it allows the genitive to be dependent upon *corpora*: these "objects of the sky" are predominantly the sun, the moon and the stars but can include whatever happens to be in the sky at the

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<sup>21</sup> IV 462: "cetera de genere hoc mirande multa uidemus", where recent editors are certainly right to retain the adverb.

<sup>22</sup> The attempt of Faber and (independently) the great Madvig to insert *et* at the close of I 557 is likewise to be rejected. Similarly, Lucretius does not place the equally proclitic *ac* or *atque* at the close of the verse. I have argued elsewhere (Butterfield 2008: 123–125) that *atque* transmitted at the close of VI 1108 is a metrical stopgap resulting from the interpolation of the following verse.

<sup>23</sup> Dionigi (1994, *ad loc.*) takes the curious step of defending *et* for its leonine rhyme with *et* in the middle of the verse: "L'integrazione *et* alla fine del v. 418 [...] oltre a formare la rima leonina [...], consente anche una perfetta specularità e addirittura equivalenza strutturale e semantica dei due emistichi".

<sup>24</sup> In his recent critical edition (2002–2004, *ad loc.*), Flores says of *abdita*: "est amphibologia, cum referatur et ad *sub terras* et ad *caelo*". This assertion merely describes the difficulty without resolving it.

time of observation (clouds, birds etc.). Secondly, since *caelo* cannot stand at the close of 419, I adopt Bentley's most apt conjecture *retro*<sup>25</sup>. The collocation *abdita retro* is used by Lucretius at IV 607: "ergo replentur loca uocibus abdita retro"<sup>26</sup>.

Konrad Müller, in his bold and beautiful (but regrettably hard-to-come-by) edition of 1975, was the first and only scholar to adopt (without argument) these two emendations. A significant point of difference arises, however, in his also adopting Polle's alteration of *corpora* to *caerula*. Although *corpora caeli* (or *mundi*) is not attested as a collocation until Latin of the late antique and early mediaeval periods, and Bailey (comm. *ad loc.*) dismisses it as "a strange expression", I see no particular problem with the phrase. For the expression is suitably general, with *corpora* being simply "objects" and *caeli* providing the specified location; of course, the "heavenly bodies" are primarily meant<sup>27</sup> but Lucretius leaves the image open for wider interpretation, by day or by night (about which, *pace* the commentators, the passage is inspecific). By contrast, Polle's *caerula*, which introduces a collocation also found at I 1090 and VI 96, cannot be dismissed as impossible but it limits the picture to the daytime and replaces the imagery of diverse reflected objects (astral and otherwise) with the general, and certainly less striking, reflection of the sky's colour. There is no obvious need to reject a fully defensible paradosis for a less compelling emendation. Instead, this note has sought to defend two attractive but often-overlooked emendations and to recommend to future editors that this pair of conjectures be adopted alone for the first time. Finally, I append a translation of verses 418 f., once the emendations of Goebel and Bentley are taken together: "and you seem to look down on the clouds and to see the heavenly bodies wondrously buried deep beneath the earth".

#### IV 636–639:

tantaque <in> his rebus distantia differitasquest,  
 ut quod alis cibus est aliis fuit acre uenenum;  
 †est itaque ut† serpens, hominis quae tacta salius  
 disperit ac sese mandendo conficit ipsa.

636 in *Non. 136, 29 L.* ABFC : om OQ || 637 fuit O<sup>1</sup>L AFC : fruat O : fiat Q || 638 est itaque ut OQ : est utique ut *Marullus* : saepe etenim *olim Lambinus* : est aliquae *Lachmann* : dedicat ut *Bernays* : esse ita quit *uel* extetque ut *Munro* : est itaque et *N.P. Howard* : mutuaque ut *Albert* : haesitat ut *Bockemüller* : est ut quae *Brieger* : excetra ut est *Ellis* : bestia ut est *Cartault* : uescitur ut *Merrill* : fontis aquae ut *Meurig-Davies* : est scytale *Bailey* : pestifera

<sup>25</sup> If the first *r* were transcribed as *c*, or the second as *l*, *cetro* or *retlo* could have subsequently been altered to *c<a>elo*.

<sup>26</sup> Bentley also compares I 1058 f.: "et quae pondera sunt sub terris omnia sursum/ nitier in terraque retro requiescere posta".

<sup>27</sup> It is worth noting Lucretius' choice of words when he states at V 476 that the sun and moon move as if they were alive: "ut corpora uiua".

ut Richter (*lac. post 637 stat.*) : dira uelut *K. Müller* : est in aquis *Watt* | est ita ut in serpente *dub. Büchner* | quae tacta OQ : contacta *Lambinus* : quom tacta *Nencini* (est itaque ut *retentis*) : quae est tacta *K. Müller*

The text of 638 presents a remarkably stubborn crux and, some 430 years after the first printed edition of the poem (Brescia 1473), a Lucretian commentator could declare without qualification that “[t]he line still needs medicine” (Merrill 1907, *ad loc.*). The three transmitted words *est itaque ut* cannot stand: *itaque* serves no purpose (for these verses do not express a consequence)<sup>28</sup> and *ut* is unexpected (and without an exact Lucretian parallel in its temporal sense)<sup>29</sup>. The preceding two lines have stated that foodstuffs can have such widely differing effects on different creatures that one’s food can be another’s poison. The following two verses treat the case of a snake which, on being touched by human saliva, chews itself to death. Comparison of passages discussing the matter (e.g. Plin. *NH* VII 15; XXVIII 38; Nic. *Ther.* 86; Ael. *NA* II 24) suggests that this was thought to be a general reaction of snakes to the substance<sup>30</sup>. Accordingly, the attempts to introduce specific serpents by Ellis (*excetra*) and Bailey (*scytale*) seem to be instances of misplaced learning on the scholars’ part.

I can see no need to remove *est ita*<sup>31</sup>; the only question is what should precede *serpens*. I think that the required general sense is “so it is when a snake” and, since *est ita uti* would be contrary to Lucretian usage, I conjecture *est ita quom*, also adopting Müller’s insertion of *est* after *quae* (neater than Lambinus’ *contacta*; for *quae est* cf. V 900). If *itaqu(o)* were mistakenly transcribed as *itaque*, it is not impossible that the remaining letter(s) were “corrected” to *ut* or, if no letters survived, that the apparently harmless particle was added to repair metre. The loss of *est* is well paralleled in the Lucretian tradition: cf. III 203; IV 799; V 587; VI 208; VI 890.

#### IV 788–791:

quid porro, in numerum procedere quom simulacra  
cernimus in somnis et mollia membra mouere,

<sup>28</sup> Critics have rightly rejected the interpretation of *itaque* as *ita + que* proposed by Everett 1896: 32. Even stranger is the supposition of Merrill 1911: 125, that *est itaque ut* is “merely a tautological expression for *sic*”; mercifully, Merrill later came to see (1916: 61) that “[t]he text cannot stand”.

<sup>29</sup> It has been asserted by Lachmann, Munro and others that Lucretius did not employ temporal *ut*. Two examples are, however, typically retained by editors (I 1030 and IV 610) but in both of these instances *ut* is supported by the necessarily temporal *semel*. It therefore does seem to be true that Lucretius did not allow *ut* unbolstered to bear the role of temporal *ubi*.

<sup>30</sup> Arist. *HA* 607a 29 f. states that saliva is deadly to venomous creatures in general.

<sup>31</sup> For if *ita* is retained, *est* can be taken impersonally and the objection of Richter (1974: 76) that “es hängt beziehungslos in der Luft” loses its force; cf. I 684: “uerum, ut opinor, ita est” and IV 489: “non, ut opinor, ita est”.



790 mollia mobiliter quom alternis brachia mittunt  
et repetunt †oculis† gestum pede conuenienti?

790 mollia OQ : callida Richter || 791 repetunt OQ : referunt Lachmann | oculis OQ : manibus dub. Lambinus : ollis Creech : rotulis Orth : agilis Richter : docili Watt | conuenienti codd. : conuenienter Bockemüller

There are two awkward words in the passage above. The first is the repeated *mollia* in 790, the other the surprising *oculis* in 791. The latter *mollia* has been retained by all editors of the text. Early editors, and in the nineteenth century Lachmann and Bernays, placed a comma after *mollia*, evidently understanding it as an instance of a favourite repetition of the poet, whereby a word or phrase from the preceding verse also opens that which immediately follows<sup>32</sup>. Yet *mollia* is far more naturally to be taken with *brachia* than *membra*. Bailey is clear on the point, stating that the adjective is “with *brachia*, not a Lucretian repetition of *mollia* in 790 though certainly intended to recall it”. The reappearance of *mollia* therefore strikes me as strange: having stated *mollia membra mouere*, would Lucretius have chosen to modify *brachia mittunt* also with *mollia*? The mobility of a subset of the limbs hardly needs “recalling” immediately after it has been stated. Perhaps Lucretius did repeat the adjective, but there seems sufficient scope for doubt. The alliterative *mollia membra mouere* and the following *mobiliter* could have led a scribe to repeat the word at the beginning of 790 as a *Perseverationsfehler*, thus ousting a different adjective.

If this hypothesis is sound, there is no palaeographical guidance for restoring the word opening 790 and there is no obvious need to carry over the alliteration into this verse. Richter (1974: 82–86), the only other scholar I know to have rejected the veracity of the adjective, was convinced that these lines depicted a boxer, and therefore offered *callida*: since I rather follow the majority view that a form of elegant, rhythmical dance is here being depicted, *callida* (used elsewhere by Lucretius only of Calliope, for evident wordplay)<sup>33</sup> does not seem a particularly attractive suggestion. Instead, I conjecture *candida*, a word commonly associated with arms and limbs in general<sup>34</sup> and which would well suit the picture of elegant (and presumably female) dancers.

<sup>32</sup> For instances of such epizeuxis (sometimes true anadiplosis), cf. I 872–874; II 159 f.; II 955 f.; III 12 f.; V 298 f.; V 950 f.; V 1189 f. (s.v.l.); V 1327 f. (s.v.l.); VI 528 f. This list is an expansion of that given by Bailey (Prol. VII.21(a)).

<sup>33</sup> “Callida Musa/ Calliope” (VI 93 f.).

<sup>34</sup> With *brachia*: Prop. II 16, 24; II 22a, 5; Ov. *Am.* III 7, 8; *Her.* 20, 140; *Eleg. Maec.* 162; Sil. *Pun.* III 414; Stat. *Silv.* III 5, 65 (“candida seu molli diducit brachia motu”); with *membra*: Ov. *Met.* II 607 and Sil. *Pun.* IV 204; of other possible adjectives, *splendida*, *leuia* and *lubrica* are potential alternatives.

Moving to 791, the presence of *oculis* is puzzling. It is most naturally taken as a dative: these figures “repeat their motion to our eyes, their feet in time”. Yet since we are in the strict context of dreams, *oculis* cannot denote the eyes. Instead, it would have to represent the “mind’s eye”. Such a use of the word, however, would be clumsy, for Lucretius stresses that all the senses are inactive during sleep (cf. IV 762 f.) and implies that images then enter the mind from all quarters, not through the eyes alone (*cernimus* in 789 cannot be regarded as specific). Lachmann’s weak *referunt* of course does nothing to mitigate the problem presented by the word. An even more troublesome reading is to take *oculis* as ablative, referring to those of the dancing figures: Giussani, who first espoused this view, claimed that *oculis* stands for *capite*, i.e. “with their head”<sup>35</sup>. Few will find this suggestion at all credible, not least because focus on the dancing figures’ eyes is wholly unwarranted. If an emendation in this field is desired, Lambinus’ *manibus* is far superior in sense but evidently removed from the paradox.

Of other emendations, Creech’s *ollis* (*scil. brachiis*, dependent upon *conuenienti*) is regrettably superfluous and, to use the just phrase of Godwin (1986, *ad loc.*), “unbearably dull”: in context there is no scope for confusion concerning with what the movement of the foot/feet harmonises. Orth’s *rotulis*, intended in the sense “*motiones circulares; homines enim saltantes in circulo videntur*” (Orth 1960: 319), is inherently improbable, as is Richter’s introduction of *agilis* as a genitive singular substantive. More attractive is an adjective modifying *pede* and Watt’s *docili*, though a word not otherwise attested in Lucretius, is deserving of consideration<sup>36</sup>. As a possible alternative, I suggest that the missing word is a simple dative relating to us, the audience of this sleeping spectacle: *nobis*. The word modifies the pair *mittunt/ et repetunt* and merely serves to emphasise (after *cernimus* of 789) that this image does occur in our very own minds. With or without the loss of *n-* after *-nt*, if *obis* were taken as *olcis* or *oclis* (cursive *b* in Lucretius’ day having its bowl to the left), the introduction of *oculis* would have soon followed<sup>37</sup>.

#### IV 843–847:

at contra conferre manu certamina pugnae  
et lacerare artus foedareque membra cruore

<sup>35</sup> Giussani 1896–1898, *ad loc.*: “e cogli occhi [colla testa: nel quale movimento della testa la direzione e l’espressione dello sguardo ha una gran parte; tanto più se si tratta di ballerine] vanno dietro alle movenze (*gestum*), accordandosi anche il movimento dei piedi”.

<sup>36</sup> Watt very tentatively suggested that *conuenienter* (a conjecture that he was unaware Bockemüller had already made) could perhaps be read, so as to avoid a second epithet modifying *pede*. However, since *conuenienti* here has verbal force, this further alteration is unnecessary.

<sup>37</sup> Although Deufert (1996: 282 ff.) provides thorough and thought-provoking discussion of the problems of IV 788–793, I believe that, with the emendations offered above, these verses represent the unpolished work of Lucretius himself rather than the substandard verses of an interpolating hand.

845 ante fuit multo quam lucida tela uolarent,  
 et uolnus uitare prius natura coegit  
 quam daret obiectum parmai laeua per artem.

The use of the phrase *lucida tela* here has rarely occasioned comment. The pairing is otherwise only found in a verse repeated four times in the work (I 147 = II 60 = III 92 = VI 40), where it refers metaphorically to the shining rays of the sun, stands in juxtaposition with praise of the enlightening power of philosophical reasoning and is qualified by *diei*. Although it is perfectly possible that Lucretius here chose to modify *tela* ‘weapons’ with *lucida* ‘shining’, it strikes me as possible that this is a mistaken scribal reminiscence of the important phrase prominent elsewhere in the prooemia of the work. Only one other critic, to my knowledge, has suspected the adjective. Orth, in his elusive edition of the poem<sup>38</sup>, suggested *lurida*, which is a fine example of the horrific results that the palaeographical method can bring: even with his irrelevant comparison of IV 332 (307) (concerning the vision of those suffering from jaundice!), Lucretius could never have qualified weaponry with the adjective *luridus*. If, however, Lucretius had originally written *duellica tela*, ‘weapons of war’, the unfamiliarity of this archaic form of *bellicus* may have encouraged the introduction of *lucida* (all of which letters it contains). For *duellicus* in Lucretius, see II 661; outside Lucretius see Pl. *Epid.* 450<sup>39</sup>.

*Christ's College, Cambridge*

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<sup>38</sup> Orth 1961. To my knowledge, there is no copy of the edition in public institutions, as opposed to private hands, in Britain.

<sup>39</sup> I am most grateful to the editorial board of “Eos”, and in particular to the journal’s anonymous referee, for improving my discussion in many places.

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DER KONSUL Q. POMPEIUS SOSIUS FALCO –  
EIN NACHFOLGER VON COMMODUS?

Von

DANUTA OKOŃ

Der Mord am Kaiser Commodus, dem Sohn von Marcus Aurelius, und seine Substituierung durch P. Helvius Pertinax, den Sohn eines Freigelassenen, gehört zu den **mysteriösten Ereignissen in der Geschichte Roms, obgleich es drei ziemlich eingehende Berichte der antiken Schriftsteller zu diesem Thema vorhanden sind** (Herodian I 16–II 5; Cassius Dio LXXII 22, 1–LXXIII 1, 5; *HA Comm.* 15–17, *Pert.* 4 f.). Die modernen Historiker akzeptieren in der Regel antike Überlieferungen, welche den Verlauf der antikaiserlichen Verschwörung und die an ihr beteiligten Personen beschreiben und nehmen demnach die von diesen Überlieferungen vertretene Version der Ereignisse an. Die bekannte Hypothese von A.R. Birley **lässt sich auch in dieses Modell einschreiben, obwohl der britische Forscher eine durch die Quellen bestätigte Gruppe der Palastverschwörer um einige Provinzstatthalter erweitert, die aus Afrika herkamen und von ihrem Landsmann, der Vertrauensperson von Commodus – Q. Aemilius Laetus (*PIR*<sup>2</sup> A 358) regiert wurden** (Theorie der afrikanischen Verschwörung, Birley 1969 und 1971: 131 ff.). Es ist E. Champlins Verdienst, die Rolle hervorgehoben zu haben, die in den nach Commodus' Tod eingetretenen Ereignissen M'. Acilius Glabrio (*PIR*<sup>2</sup> A 69), Tib. Claudius Pompeianus (*PIR*<sup>2</sup> C 973) und Q. Pompeius Sossius Falco (*PIR*<sup>2</sup> P 655) spielten, die bedeutenden Senatoren dieser Zeit, die außer der oben genannten Gruppe standen (Champlin 1979). Dennoch scheint die Frage, ob es gerade Pertinax **von den Verschwörern zum Nachfolger des ermordeten Kaisers vorgesehen war, immer noch recht begründet zu sein.**

Um diese Frage zu beantworten, soll man in erster Linie darauf hinweisen, dass es damals unter der Senatsaristokratie viele Vertreter der alten *gentes* gab, die des kaiserlichen Purpurs würdig waren. Dies lässt annehmen, dass die Verkettung mehrerer Umstände, die zur Machtübergabe an eine Person außer dieses Kreises herbeiführte, sich viel mehr komplizierter zeigte, als dies antike Geschichtsschreiber darstellten, und auch mehrere Personen engagierte, als es allgemein bekannt war.

Die historiographischen Quellen, die die Verschwörung beschreiben, geben einstimmig folgende Personen an, die an ihr beteiligt waren: der Prätorianerpräfekt Q. Aemilius Laetus, der Kammerherr Eclectus (*PIR*<sup>2</sup> E 3), die kaiserliche Konkubine Marcia und der Athlet Narcissus (*PIR*<sup>2</sup> N 26). Die genannten Überlieferungen nennen dasselbe Datum der Ermordung des Kaisers (31. Dezember 192) und geben einen ähnlichen Verlauf an, dennoch weichen sie von der Angabe möglicher Beweggründe ab, nach denen sich die Verschwörer richteten.

Nach Herodian und dem *HA*-Biographen gab es einen wesentlichen Beweggrund für das Handeln der Verschwörer und zwar die Angst vor Commodus, der die Illoyalität der oben erwähnten Personen beargwöhnte und es vorhatte, sie mit dem Tod zu bestrafen. Eine andere Version der Ereignisse liefert der Bericht des zeitgenössischen, also sicherlich besser informierten Cassius Dion. Er nennt folgende Motive der Verschwörer: Vermeidung vom Skandal, welchen der Kaiser hätte hervorrufen können, indem er das neue Jahr in der Gladiatorenkaserne feiern wollte, vor allem aber die Errettung einer Gruppe von Senatoren, darunter der beiden für das Jahr 193 designierten Konsule – Q. Pompeius Sossius Falco und Iulius Erucius Clarus Vibianus (*PIR*<sup>2</sup> E 97), die auf Commodus' Befehl getötet werden sollten (Cass. Dio LXXII 22, 2). Angesichts der vorstehenden Erwägungen kann man feststellen, dass die von Cassius Dion genannten Beweggründe der Verschwörer einen viel mehr edleren Charakter aufweisen, als die bei Herodian und in der *HA*-Überlieferung angeführten. Im Bericht des Cassius Dio wurde Commodus als ein echter Tyrann dargestellt, den man von seinen Plänen abzuhalten hatte. Die Tatsache, dass die zeitgenössische Überlieferung die Mörder des Kaisers glorifizierte, weist deutlich darauf hin, dass im Kreis der Senatsaristokratie das Ideal einer Mitregierung funktionierte, das sich bei den früher regierenden *principes optimi* herausgebildet hat. Nimmt man diese Konzeption an, scheint kaum logisch erklärbar die Information, dass der Herrscher es vorhatte, die Staatsbeamten wie zum Beispiel die beiden Konsule zu beseitigen, und dies zur Zeit der Feste, bei denen sie eine wesentliche Rolle spielten. Die mit dem geplanten Verlauf des Festes verbundenen Unstimmigkeiten zwischen dem *princeps* und dessen nächster Umgebung rechtfertigen keinesfalls das kaiserliche Vorhaben, die genannten Senatoren zum Tode zu verurteilen. Ein solches Benehmen des Kaisers wäre auf seine eventuelle psychische Krankheit zurückzuführen, dennoch hat bisher keiner der Althistoriker eine solche Hypothese aufgestellt. Zur Entscheidung der strittigen Frage nach den Motiven des Kaisers und dessen Mörder sollte man vielleicht zuerst festlegen, wer der eigentliche Anstifter des Staatsstreiches, und vor allem – wer zum Commodus' Nachfolger vorgesehen war. Einige Hinweise könnte die Analyse des Personenkreises liefern, der sich die Beseitigung des Kaisers zunutze machte (nach dem Motto: *cui prodest*).

Der Tod des Herrschers rettete das Leben des Laetus, des Eclectus und der Marcia, sowie der beiden Konsule und der Gruppe der nicht genauer bekannten Senatoren, die seine ersten Benefizianten gewesen sein mögen, der nächste (und zugleich der wichtigste) war der zum Kaiser ernannte P. Helvius Pertinax. Dennoch kann man mit letzter Sicherheit nicht feststellen, ob er von Anfang an für diesen Posten bestimmt worden war, weil es anhand unterschiedlicher Quellenüberlieferungen mitgeteilt wird, dass Pertinax mit der Wahl seiner Person recht überrascht war und mit solcher ihm zugedachter Ehre gar nicht rechnete, und dass er sogar anfangs vorhatte, die kaiserliche Würde an Tib. Claudius Pompeianus (*HA Pert.* 4, 6–10) oder an M'. Acilius Glabrio (*Herodian* II 3, 3 f.) überzugeben. Demzufolge lässt sich annehmen, dass die Verschwörer aus dem Kreis um Commodus anfänglich einen anderen Kandidaten aus der Senatorengruppe hatten, auf den sie aber während des Staatsstriches verzichteten. Eine solche Person konnte beispielsweise ein von der durch Cassius Dion genannten Konsulen des Jahres 193 gewesen sein.

Der erste von ihnen, Q. Pompeius Sossius Falco, war ein Sohn des polyonymen ordentlichen Konsuls des Jahres 169, Q. Pompeius Senecio Sossius Priscus<sup>1</sup>, und Fabia (Ceionia Fabia?) aus der Familie des Kaisers Verus<sup>2</sup>; der zweite – C. Iulius Erucius Clarus Vibianus – war ein Sohn des ordentlichen Konsuls des Jahres 170, C. Erucius Clarus<sup>3</sup>. Die beiden konnten als Patrizier und Mitglieder der alten Konsulargeschlechter auf die Staatsmacht präbendieren. Eine Gruppe von Senatoren samt designierten Konsulen auf der Spitze, die durch Ausschreitungen des Commodus abgeschreckt worden war, hat sich aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach dazu entschieden, den Herrscher zu beseitigen, indem sie bei ihrem Vorhaben dessen vertraute Hausgenossen benutzte. Der Kaiser hätte vom Plan der Senatoren erfahren können und fasste demnach den Entschluss, zur Zeit des Festes, wenn es also niemand vorahnte und das Volk sich an Feierlichkeiten ergötzte, die Unzufriedenen gleichzeitig zu beseitigen. Commodus' Einfall sollte in diesem Falle nicht als Anzeichen seines Wahnsinns betrachtet werden, sondern eher als Beweis für eine nüchterne Berechnung, und die von den Verschwörern voreilig verübte Attentat als Vorwegnahme der kaiserlichen Vergeltung.

Es ist wahrscheinlich, dass dem Vorhaben der Verschwörer nach Q. Pompeius Sossius Falco zum Kaiser vorgesehen war, der Vetter von Commodus, der mütterlicherseits der Familie der Antonier angehörte und breite Konnexionen hatte.

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<sup>1</sup> Das vollständige *nomen* des Konsuls lautete: Q. Pompeius Senecio Roscius Murena Coelius Sex. Iulius Frontinus Silius Decianus C. Iulius Eurycles Herculeanus L. Vibullius Pius Augustanus Alpinus Bellicius Sollers Iulius Acer Ducenius Proculus Rutilianus Rufinus Silius Valens Valerius Niger Cl. Fuscus Saxa Amyntianus Sossius Priscus.

<sup>2</sup> Barbieri 1952, Nr. 481; Leunissen 1989: 133, 372, 400. Zur Ehe seiner Eltern siehe z. B. Champlin 1979: 301 ff.; Raepsaet-Charlier 1987: 191 f.; Settapani 2000: 281 f.; zur Herkunft der Familie von Pompeiern Falcones: Halfmann 1979: 211.

<sup>3</sup> Barbieri 1952, Nr. 291; Leunissen 1989: 133, 142, 365, 372, 402.

Nach der Vollziehung ihrer Attentat haben dennoch die unmittelbaren Ausführer des Mordes mit dem allgemein angesehenen Pertinax und nicht mit Falco und Vibianus den Kontakt aufgenommen. Dies könnte auch den Wutausbruch des Konsuls Falco während der ersten Senatssitzung nach Commodus' Tod erklären, mit dem er seine Enttäuschung demonstrierte. Er warf dem neuen Kaiser vor, dass dieser auf seiner Seite Marcia und Laetus hat, Commodus' Gemeinheit unterstützt, ohne es zu beachten, dass gerade diese Verschwörer mit ihrer Tat ihm das Leben retteten.

Es kam bald ans Tageslicht, dass sich Falco mit der Prätorianergarde um die Verbindung bemühte. Der Senat hat ihn dafür zum Tode verurteilt, Pertinax aber, der die Verschärfung der ganzen Situation vermeiden wollte, hat für ihn den Straferlass erlangt (Cass. Dio LXXIII 8; *HA Pert.* 10, 6). Falco, der beinahe Prinzeps geworden wäre, hat sich in die Häuslichkeit zurückgezogen und ist schon nicht mehr in die politische Arena getreten<sup>4</sup>.

Die Rolle des zweiten Konsuls, C. Iulius Erucius Clarus Vibianus, in den oben erwähnten Ereignissen scheint gegenüber seiner geringen politischen Aktivität nach Commodus' Tod zweitrangig zu sein. Er hat Pertinax' und Didius Iulianus' Herrschaft überlebt und ist nach dem Sieg des Septimius Severus über Clodius Albinus samt vielen anderen Senatoren zum Tode verurteilt worden (Cass. Dio LXXIV 9, 5 f.; *HA Sev.* 13).

Die anderen Teilnehmer an der Verschwörung gegen Commodus haben auch die Zeit der Kämpfe um die Macht nicht überstanden. Eiectus ist gefallen bei der mutigen Verteidigung des Pertinax vor den rebellierenden Prätorianern (Cass. Dio LXXIII 10, 1 f.; *HA Pert.* 11, 11). Marcia und Laetus sind auf Befehl des Didius Iulianus getötet worden (Cass. Dio LXXIII 16, 5; *HA Did. Iul.* 6, 2), und Narcissus auf Befehl des Septimius Severus (Cass. Dio LXXIII 16, 5; *HA Sev.* 14, 1).

Bei der Berücksichtigung der vorstehenden Quellenangaben, könnte man folgende Schlussfolgerung für meine Erwägungen annehmen: Commodus hätte im Verlauf der Verschwörung beseitigt werden können, die von Q. Pompeius Sossius Falco geleitet wurde, der aber *post factum* von den Mitverschwörern im Stich gelassen worden ist. Die merkliche Unzufriedenheit, welche in den Überlieferungen erwähnt wird, bestätigt die politische Enttäuschung, die die Hoffnungen dieses ehrgeizigen Senators vereitelte. Die Gründe, für die man auf seine Kandidatur endgültig verzichtete, bleiben dennoch aus mangelnden Quellenangaben unerklärt.

*Universität Szczecin*

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<sup>4</sup> Sein Sohn Q. Pompeius Falco Sossius Priscus (*PIR*<sup>2</sup> P 603) ist in seiner Laufbahn zum Amt des Prätors gelangen, das er wahrscheinlich während der Herrschaft des Caracalla bekleidete.



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# SUMMARIA DISSERTATIONUM INAUGURALIUM

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## BETWEEN PERSIA AND MACEDONIA: EGYPT IN THE FOURTH CENTURY BC<sup>1</sup>

By

AGNIESZKA WOJCIECHOWSKA

The dissertation covers the period between 404 BC and 305 BC. In 404 BC Persia lost control of Egypt and the period of the last Independence of Egypt began with native rulers in power. The second date is marked by the coronation of Ptolemy I, the beginning of a new dynasty and the symbolic end of the Empire of Alexander the Great. Many publications about the Ptolemaic Period are readily available, as opposed to the earlier times. Surprising as it may sound, no monographic publication of the history of Egypt in the fourth century BC has been written in any language so far and in other publications only selected issues concerning internal policy, religion, art or numismatic are covered.

History of Egypt in the fourth century BC can be divided into three distinct parts: the last Independence of Egypt with native rulers in power, the Second Persian Domination, and the Macedonian Rule. History of the Mediterranean in the fourth century BC, including Egypt, is known from a vast array of sources. Nevertheless, modern articles and books are based, in most cases, only on selected historical records. In my dissertation I undertook to peruse all surviving historical records. First of all there are works of Greek and Latin authors. Leaving aside Aristotle, few come from the fourth century BC; most of them are much later, but ultimately based on fourth century BC records. Fragments of earlier works survive in quotations by Byzantine and Christian authors. None of these historical records originates from Egypt, as opposed to the second group of

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<sup>1</sup> What follows is a summary of the doctoral dissertation successfully presented at the Institute of History of the University of Wrocław on 1 July 2008. It was written under the supervision of Professor Krzysztof Nawotka (University of Wrocław); the reviewers appointed by the University were Professor Adam Łukaszewicz (University of Warsaw) and Dr. Gościwit Malinowski (University of Wrocław). I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Professor Nawotka for his guidance and support, and to the reviewers for their friendly criticism and perceptive remarks on my work.

sources, papyri. We have three types of papyri: Egyptian (demotic and hieratic), Aramaic and Greek. The first group is by far the biggest and contains about 120 demotic and about 20 hieratic papyri. Having examined all kinds of sources we can see the difference between Greek and Egyptian records. Works of Greek and Latin authors are concentrated on foreign policy, warfare, frequently glorifying Greek mercenaries and their generals. Classical authors assumed that neither side was able to win a war unassisted by Greek mercenary force. Greek literature of the fourth century BC circulates the *topoi* of Greek courage and manliness and Persian effeminacy and weakness caused by living in debilitating luxury, thus creating an unreal picture of the Persian Empire. In my dissertation I follow these modern scholars who have shown that Greek mercenaries were but a part of Persian and Egyptian armies. In the first case the main fighting force was Iranian cavalry, while fourth century pharaohs fielded, beside Greek mercenaries, numerous native contingents called *machimoi*. Sources show that the reign of the XXX dynasty was the time of the most active foreign policy in fourth century history of Egypt.

Egyptian papyri and a few inscriptions tell us about Egyptian economy and everyday life almost undisturbed by warfare. More than a half of all papyri of this period are administrative documents like sale or marriage contracts, tax documents and so on. We have also religious, medical and literary papyri. Although they originate from many places in Egypt, the greatest concentration of papyri from the first half of the fourth century BC is in some Upper Egyptian places, like Edfu and Elephantine. We can assume that the South of Egypt was at that time developing more intensively than the North which was constantly exposed to Persian attacks. On the other hand, we always have to remember that more papyri might survive in Upper Egypt because of better natural conditions.

An important part of my dissertation is the study of coins minted and used in Egypt. In my Numismatic Annex I collect all coins minted and found in Egypt or coins originating in Egypt but found in other countries. Many publications about Egyptian coinage refer to the times of Ptolemy I and to the third century BC, while fourth century BC coinage is barely mentioned. Even if far less coins are attested in Egypt than in contemporaneous Greece, we still know quite a lot about coinage in fourth century BC Egypt. First of all quite numerous coin hoards have been uncovered hidden across the land in the fifth and fourth centuries BC. They contain Egyptian, Greek and other coins. The number of hoards deposited under Alexander the Great and his successors increased markedly as compared to preceding periods. A very large category of fourth century Egyptian coins are local imitations of Athenian drachms minted in Memphis and in Syene where also dies have been found. In all probability these coins were minted to satisfy the needs of Greek mercenaries hired by the thousand by the pharaohs of the XXX dynasty. Comparatively rare coins bearing the names and/or hieroglyphic inscriptions of Tachos and Nectanebo II attest to Egyptian coinage produced for

native users. Coins minted during the Second Persian Domination take special place in Egyptian coinage. In this period not only satraps produced coins with their names, but also the Great King (Artaxerxes III) had his name and the title “pharaoh” inscribed in coins in demotic scripture. At that time this scripture was commonly employed in papyri, so a demotic coin inscription was certainly meant to make them, and the minting power, more palpable to the Egyptians. It is also evidence that these coins were minted for the local market and hence they indirectly testify to the increasing monetisation of Egyptian economy. Different types of silver and bronze coins of the last Persian satraps of Egypt Sabaces and Mazaces bear their names in Aramaic scripture. For all this archeologically attested growth in number of coins in circulation, fourth century Egyptian papyri give a much different picture of Egyptian economy, as in commercial transactions Egyptians still used local units of weight of metal (measure of Ptah, deben, kite, shekel) or barter.

In the period of its last independence Egypt became one of the richest and most influential countries in the eastern Mediterranean, especially during the reigns of Nectanebo I and Nectanebo II. Archeological records collected in two catalogues (of fourth century buildings and of objects found in Egypt) show that Nectanebo I and Nectanebo II built, rebuilt or restored a stunning number of temples and commissioned innumerable objects such as statues and steles. Location, size and quality of their building projects testify to the wish of the pharaohs of the XXX dynasty to rekindle the splendor of the XXVI (Sais) dynasty. XXX dynasty pharaohs conducted vigorous internal and foreign policy, while profuse coinage and substantial investment in monumental architecture (mostly in temples) attest to booming economy. This in turn allowed them to assist other countries in their fight with the Persian Empire. Kings of Persia wanted to restore their power over Egypt and turn it again into a satrapy. Egyptian rulers succeeded on more than one occasion to force the enemy back not because of insufficient Persian military resources, but mostly thanks to remarkable economic and military strength of fourth century Egypt.

Nectanebo II, the last pharaoh of the XXX dynasty was defeated in 343 BC by Artaxerxes III. This time Artaxerxes III did not want to repeat the Persian mistakes of the past: the war was prepared in utmost detail and the Great King led his troops in person. Good knowledge of topography of Egypt exhibited by the Persian staff and skilful selection of the most appropriate troops resulted in re-conquest of Egypt. Unfortunately we do not have many historical records from the years following the invasion of Artaxerxes III, but a few preserved papyri suggest a comparative stabilization and undisturbed life in Egypt during the Second Persian Rule. The best know political event of this period is a revolt of Khababash, a native ruler who reigned in parts of Egypt in 338–336 BC.

In 332 BC Alexander the Great conquered Egypt. Classical authors tell us only about the sojourn of Alexander in Egypt with virtually no information about

next years of his and his successors' reign in Egypt in the fourth century BC. Fortunately we have many (mostly) Egyptian documents and quite a few monuments dated to the Macedonian Period. Almost all documents come from Tehna and Thebes where two big archives were found. Archives are quite important for us, because they contain papyri belonging to one family, so we can follow their lives and businesses. In this period first Greek papyri are attested, although only a few of them survive from the last decades of the fourth century BC. Most fourth century papyri of the Macedonian times were written under Alexander IV which testifies to prosperity and political stability of this period. Since the conquest of 332 the Macedonian rulers tried to accommodate to the Egyptian tradition and in local sources they are always called "pharaohs of Egypt" with most elements of traditional royal titlature. The same applies to the ideological aspect of their building policy which begins with Alexander the Great who endeavoured to build and rebuild the same amount of temples as pharaohs of the XXIX dynasty, Nephertites I and Tachos.

*University of Wrocław*

**Gary S. Meltzer**, *Euripides and the Poetics of Nostalgia*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, XII, 266 pp., ISBN 978-0-521-85873-1.

When tracing the defining traits of modern Euripidean scholarship, a mention of the sophistic issue seems inescapable. Was Euripides a sophist? And in the case we assume he was, yet another question: was he a Protagorean or a Gorgianic type of sophist? Or, to put it differently: was he a relativist and unbeliever (unless a believer in relativism), was he a perspectivist, was he a rhetorician *par excellence*, or, a solution distancing him from the movement, was he, deep at heart, a conservative who used the elaborate methods of sophistic rhetoric to unmask the possible nihilism of relativist position? These and similar questions have been tormenting the Euripideans for over a century, influencing and spawning legions of interpretations, firing new controversies and quite often leading to radically different readings of a single text<sup>1</sup>. Additionally, they are inextricably linked to other issues: the alleged misogyny, the theodicy, indeed, the religiosity problem, just to mention these most prominent. It is to this lively debate that Meltzer's [= M.] recent book contributes.

The basic stand taken by the author of *Euripides and the Poetics of Nostalgia* is as follows: by concentrating on the issue of "the lost voice of truth", M. aims at characterizing Euripides as a conservative comparable with Aristophanes, a man particularly sensitive to the rapidly widening gap between the signifier and signified, the emergence of which was linked to the conventional-ity idea promoted by the sophists. His argument is built on an analysis of four plays: *Hippolytus*, *Hecuba*, *Ion* and *Helen*. Yet, one should add to this list the *Phoenissae* and the *Medea*, from which some important insights are drawn in the opening chapter. It is noteworthy that the analyzed plays are varied, representing different stages of Euripides' career, and, at least for some, vastly differing in the ideological stratum. This latter would certainly facilitate the diachronic analysis of 'nostalgia' as an evolving feature of Euripidean tragic cosmos. Yet, quite strikingly, M. makes his start (pp. 2–32) with the famous *agon* of the *Phoenissae* 469–637, the highly charged (both emotionally and ideologically) moment where words prove unable to solve the conflict doomed to culminate in bloodshed, a scene that basically prefigures the reality to come. What makes this *agon* of particular importance for his interpretation is Eteocles' implicit claim that words are words only (*Phoen.* 501 f.), and one would be a fool not to use them for his own gain. This, M. stresses, marks the rejection of the traditional word/thing correspondence, and, implicitly, the distancing of the signifier from the signified to the point where the 'usual' signified is lost or forgotten<sup>2</sup>. As another instantiation of this tendency to abandon the original meaning of words M. invokes the *Medea*, where Jason feels quite safe in renegeing on the sworn promises, while the heroine insists on the validity

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<sup>1</sup> The most influential work is certainly K. Reinhardt's *Die Sinneskrise bei Euripides*, in: idem, *Tradition und Geist: Gesammelte Essays zur Dichtung*, ed. by C. Becker, Göttingen 1960. Among the more recent studies dealing with Euripides' relationship with the sophistic movement one should number D.J. Conacher, *Euripides and the Sophists*, London 1998; W. Allan, *Euripides and the Sophists: Society and the Theatre of War*, in: M. Cropp, K. Lee, D. Sansone (eds.), *Euripides and the Tragic Theatre in the Late Fifth Century*, Champaign, Il. 2000 [= ICS XXIV–XXV 1999–2000], pp. 145–156, and M. Wright, *Euripides' Escape Tragedies*, Oxford 2005 (particularly pp. 226–337).

<sup>2</sup> While M.'s debt is to J. Derrida himself, one may wonder whether G. Manetti's *Le teorie del segno nell' antichità classica*, Milano 1987 (English translation by Ch. Richardson: *Theories of the Sign in Classical Antiquity*, Bloomington 1993) would not add to his argument.

of spoken oath. The reversal of traditional male and female roles, the transferral of the capability for duplicitous language to the male (Jason), all rightly stressed by M. (pp. 61–67), appear as the consequences of the oath-breaking: the remark seems particularly valuable given the other signs of gender confusion present in the play<sup>3</sup>.

As mentioned above, the central chapters of M.'s work deal respectively with *Hippolytus*, *Hecuba*, *Ion* and, finally, *Helen*. When discussing the *Hippolytus* (pp. 71–103), M. seems to focus on the great *agon* (*Hip.* 902–1101): his choice is well justified given that the scene reflects all the complexities related to the perception vs. reality or representation vs. reality problems so prominent in the play. Indeed, for the large part of this play the silent sign constituted by Phaedra's body and the frozen voice of the letter seem to provide a truth stronger than any speech coming from a living being (only at the end will they be invalidated by the divine). The impressive rhetorical skill of the young hero (in spite of his protestations to the contrary, Theseus' son speaks with the ability of one well-versed in the Athenian court of law<sup>4</sup>) achieves nothing. The truth, even assisted by skill, proves insufficient against the silent witness, even as Theseus voices his wish for "the voice of truth" that would give lie to any attempt at prevarication. Interpreted along the Derridean terms of *signifié* and *signifiant* the scene is profoundly disturbing, for it seems to abuse any link that exists between the two, or, at another level, to belie any use debate and dialogue may have. Yet, simultaneously, it asserts the effective power of human voice: after all, the *agon* comes only after the death-sentence has been pronounced, Theseus' wish voiced and Hippolytus' end decided. Even at the moment when the essential link between the word and the denoted object collapses, human speech, as represented by Theseus, retains the frightening performative power, as the silence of Phaedra works upon reality through the speech act of her husband.

In the analysis of the *Hecuba* (pp. 104–145) the author focuses on the famous plea the beleaguered queen addresses to Agamemnon (*Hec.* 786–845), a plea he rightly perceives as a culminating phase of rhetorical intended aimed to alleviate the suffering of the Trojan women. M. seems quite justified in maintaining that the plea only makes sense when considered together with the earlier, failed address to Odysseus (*Hec.* 251–295), and when set against the background of the more general collapse of values traditionally linked to the heroic age. The weakness of human voice, particularly when this voice stands for justice and protests against the violence which threatens the sacred norms ensuring the survival of society, becomes for M. particularly manifest at the point when Hecuba deplors the fact her limbs are not endowed with an ability to speak... (*Hec.* 836 f.). While he does certainly have a point, one may wonder whether the very impossibility of Hecuba's wish coming true does not highlight her own powerlessness in a particularly distressing manner – she is a speaking creature, and by the very right of her ability to think/speak, a member of human society. Yet, her words repeatedly fall on deaf ears, thereby complicating her position: she speaks, but her words remain unheard. In wishing for another voice (or, rather, for a chorus of voices) she may not only be wishing for the voice of truth and power, but, perhaps even more importantly, she may be lamenting the loss of the constitutive ability of a human. This, quite strikingly, would anticipate the later promise of her animal transformation, a metamorphosis which will, effectively, render her voiceless *and* mark her banishment from the humankind. The interesting point of M.'s approach is that he seems to stress both Hecuba's powerlessness to defend the justice of her claims and, at the same moment, her ability as a speaker, an ability one may clearly mark as sophistic. What seems by contrast obscured is the fact that Hecuba's commendable skill becomes effective

<sup>3</sup> While M. focuses on the reversal of the traditional gender paradigm, one could also refer Medea's insistence on the validity of the oath and on the maintenance of the 'old ways' to those traits of her persona which denote her clear preference for the 'older' gods (cf. e.g. K.J. Newman, *Euripides' Medea: Structures of Estrangement*, ICS XXVI 2001, pp. 53–76).

<sup>4</sup> On the subject cf. M. Lloyd, *The Agon in Euripides*, Oxford 1992, pp. 43–51 (surprisingly, the title never appears in M.'s work).



only after the total destruction of her family, and that her transition from wailing wretch to shifty sophist invoking the bed of daughter as an argument in her plea for Agamemnon's good will seems markedly prolonged<sup>5</sup>. In short, one may wonder about Euripides' intentions in portraying human speech as unable to defend justice yet proving its deadly efficacy when aimed at twisting the reality to fit one's own ends. In such a context, it would be also interesting to consider whether Polyxene's acceptance of her own death, indeed, her very resolve to die, manifested in her final gesture at the altar, should not be viewed as a rejection of this growing gap between the object and its name, between what we are and how we are perceived.

In interpreting the *Ion* (pp. 146–187), M. stresses the basic ambiguity of all the figures appearing in the play, most particularly that of the ever absent, yet omnipresent Apollo. The oracular voice, the voice of truth proves capable of prevarication, but also of enlightenment, a circumstance quite in line with Phoebus' behaviour throughout the expository phase of the play. Forcing himself on Creusa, he fathers a son, who is afterwards reared in total ignorance of his provenance, while his desolate mother mourns her abandoned and apparently dead child. Apollo's benevolence remains hidden and, for the long time, unknown to the beneficiaries. Indeed, one may think that some of his benefits come rather expensive: in giving Xuthus his long-awaited successor, Apollo stresses the limits of oracular ambiguity to their very utmost, thereby casting doubt on his own temple. Still, M. is quite right in emphasizing the importance of the act of naming (pp. 169 ff.) and the importance of the name itself, for it is in the very act that Xuthus claims the hero as his own son and confirms his place in the Athenian society. Similarly, the name is anticipated in the oracle itself (*I.* 535), thus hinting at Apollo's paternity – after all, the young man is divine gift to the royal family (*I.* 536), a visible sign of his favour and care, to be protected by the divine in his hour of need, when in danger from his own mother.

Admittedly, little truth (or at least little immediate truth) pervades the world of the *Ion*, as everybody (possibly most strikingly, Apollo himself) seems to hide behind some useful mask or intermediary. Yet, the feelings and emotions aroused by what is not necessarily true are real enough: the sadness of the childless but not childless Athenian queen and, correspondingly, her rage when she deems herself and her bloodline cheated of the throne are very authentic, as is the joy of Xuthus or the murderous fury of Ion<sup>6</sup>. Possibly, this is the most worrying aspect of the *Ion*, an aspect that should prevent us from viewing the work as tragicomedy or whatever generic classification we want to impose on the work: in its word the false tends to raise terrifyingly strong emotions, leading the characters to a behaviour strikingly at odds with their social and generic roles.

In his analysis of the *Helen* (pp. 188–222)<sup>7</sup>, M. returns once more to the already mentioned chasm between the signifier and the signified: Helen's body, the living reason for the cruelties of the Trojan war, is not Helen's at all, instead, the duplicitous double provides the *casus belli*, while Menelaus' chaste wife dwells in Egypt. Yet, Helen's fatal beauty once again (but is it again?) ignites human passions, leading to bloodshed and slaughter, thus proving to be what it seemed (or seemed not) to be. What's more, while not a traitor to her Spartan husband, she is a deceiver and will be perceived as traitorous by Theoclymenus (hardly a laudable character himself). True enough, in no other play the emphasis on appearances and their compatibility (or incompatibility)

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<sup>5</sup> For the contrast between the effectiveness of Hecuba's second address and its moral ambivalence, cf. e.g. G.M. Kirkwood, *Hecuba and the Nomos*, TAPhA LXXVIII 1947, pp. 61–68. For the link between the annihilation of personality and moral collapse, cf. D.J. Conacher, *Euripides' Hecuba*, AJPh LXXXII 1961, pp. 1–26.

<sup>6</sup> M. is quite right to stress the impact intrinsic in his behaviour toward the suppliant, as the boy usurps the position of divinity in claiming the right to distribute the right of protection (pp. 173 f.).

<sup>7</sup> The chapter was originally published as "Where is the glory of Troy?" *Kleos in Euripides' Helen*, ClAnt XIII 1994, pp. 234–255.

with the real is so patent, though one may detect some indications of the rift in the *Electra* or the *Orestes*, with their stress on failed promises and expectations belied by the reality<sup>8</sup>.

The weaknesses of the book should be mentioned at this point: almost too often, the author's attention turns to the contemporary world, drawing parallels that may easily be seen as downward simplifying or superficial, though some truth may be seen in the observation that words and indeed speech are being increasingly distanced from facts. More troubling are political analogies and the Americanocentrism manifest in the work: fortunately, I did not see my entire world change radically after September 11 hence the parallels between the damages wrought by the Peloponnesian war and the terrorist attack on New York evade me. Additionally, one may wonder whether the repeated allusions to the modern US politics will not prove too much for a non-American reader. On the other hand, the justified stress on the affinities between the Thucydidean account of the atrocities on Melos, Corcyra etc. and the Euripidean portrayal of war leaves the reader with a convincing image of the poet as deeply troubled by the political extravagancies of his *polis*.

Next, owing to his focus on the language, M. often forgoes a wider reflection, which may occasionally leave his observations disappointingly limited. Thus, one could pay more attention to the fact that Theseus' wish for the voice of truth comes at the point he refuses to listen to any voice but his own, itself being prompted by the incidentally false evidence – the fact is paid its due by Artemis. Second, as mentioned above, Medea's wish for a way to distinguish the true from the false, and then her assumption of heroic standard, which she upholds against Jason's opportunism, leads to a profound disturbance of Corinthian world – the rift between speech and matter seems to spread to different levels of the social network. The body belies the nature, the outward form no longer corresponds to the content, the familiar sign is given to the foreign meaning. Indeed, Medea offers one of the more interesting study matters for a 'nostalgia' reading, as one may observe that the heroine masks as a helpless victim of male violence, as a strictly female creature, when she is harbouring deadly plans vastly at odds with her deceptive words and appearance. Moreover, she is both the deceived and a deceiver herself, hence a double creature *par excellence*. Further, almost no mention is ever made of possibly the greatest 'nostalgia' argument, the *Electra* with the famous interchange concerning the veracity of Apollo's oracle<sup>9</sup>. Should/can the oracle be doubted? The passage has long been employed as an argument for the 'atheism' theory, yet, there might be more to it: if we remove the ring of the truth from the voice of the god as he speaks through the mouth of his Delphic priestess, what is there to be trusted? Many signs are rejected in the play by *Electra*, yet it is *Orestes* that undermines the validity of this particular one. Interpreted in the context of the division between the signifier and the signified, this is a chilling scene.

There is, however, something even more troubling in M.'s book: certain equivocation seems to attach to the very notion of the lost voice of truth. At some point, e.g. when considering the *Hippolytus*, M. seems to concentrate on the veridical aspect of human speech, the very compatibility of *res* and *verba* that constituted the ancient definition of truth. Then, he turns to the occasional loss of performative value: words seem unable to transform reality, to influence it in a manner intended by the speaker (Hecuba provides the best example of the fact), but prove terrifyingly effective when misused, when distanced from their traditional signified. Not only the criterion is at

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<sup>8</sup> In the *Electra*, Orestes' timid stance stands in vivid contrast with the heroic expectations of his sister (a fact stressed e.g. in K.C. King, *The Force of Tradition: The Achilles Ode in Euripides' Electra*, TAPhA CX 1980, pp. 195–212. In the *Orestes* Menelaus appears particularly ill-suited to fulfill the role of saviour in which he had been cast throughout the opening scenes (cf. e.g. P. Kyriakou, *Menelaus and Pelops in Euripides' Orestes*, Mnemosyne LI 1998, pp. 282–301).

<sup>9</sup> Strikingly, M. mentions the scene in passing only, when discussing the *Ion*, the drama he considers much more to the point in the discussion of the Delphic oracle (p. 146, n. 1). The mention comes in a footnote, together with similarly anti-Delphic passages of the *Orestes* and *Iphigenia among the Taurians*.

stake here... Then, sometimes, M. seems to concern himself not so much with the speech and the signifier, but with the content (or the lack of the latter), i.e. with the signified itself: is it absent? Is it a mere figure of speech? Is it simply a matter of social agreement? Or is there something objectively existent that once upon a time corresponded to the words of our language? The way of presentation tends to increase the resulting confusion. Moreover, the human voice (and the human speech) seems particularly multifaceted in Euripides: the prayers usually go answered (even when their effect differs, often quite radically, from the expected one<sup>10</sup>), some wishes are granted (still, one wonders at the argumentation employed) which would seem to reassert the performative power of human voice, though would also point to the limitedness of human expressive ability.

To summarize: though not a masterwork, M.'s book deserves to be read. If not exactly satisfying and abounding with inconsistencies, it is certainly thought-inspiring and occasionally insightful – or at least I found it so. In a way, it emphasizes a quality of Euripides' reflection that too often escapes a reader: the profound anxiety concerning the price one pays for the right to doubt and question both the world and his own perception of this latter, an anxiety concerning the dialogic power of language and the effective power of human voice.

Joanna Komorowska  
Paedagogical University, Kraków

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<sup>10</sup> For the prayer issue cf. J.D. Mikalson, *Unanswered Prayers in Greek Tragedy*, JHS CIX 1989, pp. 81–97, a work which, in spite of its apparent relevance, is never mentioned in M.'s study.

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**Oliver Overwien, *Die Sprüche des Kynikers Diogenes in der griechischen und arabischen Überlieferung***, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag 2005 (Hermes Einzelschriften XCII), 500 S.

Das Buch Overwiens [= Ov.] ist eine überarbeitete und (um das Unterkapitel 7.2) erweiterte Fassung seiner Dissertation, die der klassische Philologe Bernd Effe wissenschaftlich betreut und bei der der Arabist Gerhard Endreß als Korreferent fungiert hat. Die Studie wurde 2002 von der Ruhr-Universität Bochum mit einem der „Preise an Studierende“ ausgezeichnet. Sie besteht aus einer umfangreichen Einführung (S. 13–38), sieben Kapiteln unterschiedlicher Länge (S. 39–446), einem Quellen- und Literaturverzeichnis (S. 447–457) sowie einigen Indizes (S. 458–500).

Ov. hat lediglich diejenigen Sprüche zum Gegenstand seiner Untersuchung gemacht, die sich in griechischen Gnomologien und Florilegien finden<sup>1</sup>, und zahlreiche andere, u. a. in den Schriften des Plutarch und Dion Chrysostomos überlieferte Sprüche aus seiner Betrachtung ausgeklammert. Dies betrifft auch die Scheinsprüche, die in Wirklichkeit Textexzerpte sind, also erst sekundär in die Spruchüberlieferung eingegangen und nicht primär als Sprüche entstanden sind. Die in den *Vitae philosophorum* (VI 24–69) des Diogenes Laertios enthaltenen Dicta werden nur als Parallelstellen behandelt. Ov. analysiert „etwas weniger als 140 Dicta“ (S. 20), von denen die meisten der von

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<sup>1</sup> Ov. erinnert daran (S. 27), dass als Gnomologien (es ist übrigens ein erst in der Neuzeit geprägter Begriff) Sammlungen bezeichnet werden, „die fast ausschließlich aus Sprüchen bestehen“. Als Florilegien hingegen gelten diejenigen Sammlungen, „die sowohl literarische Kleinformen jeglicher Art (z. B. Sprüche, Fabeln, Verse) als auch Schriftexzerpte umfassen“.

Gabriele Giannantoni (1932–1998) herausgegebenen Sammlung von Testimonien des Diogenes entnommen worden sind<sup>2</sup>.

Zwar hatten bereits früher einige Forscher darauf aufmerksam gemacht, dass es Diogenes' Dicta auch in der arabischen Tradition gäbe, doch erst Dimitri Gutas recherchierte hier gründlicher<sup>3</sup>. Er vermochte nicht weniger als 428 Dicta zu identifizieren, allerdings stellte mehr als die Hälfte von ihnen Doppel- oder Mehrfachbelegungen dar, sodass sich ihre Zahl schließlich auf 194 reduzierte. Letzten Endes fand er heraus, dass die arabische Tradition 126 authentische Sprüche des Diogenes überliefert hatte, die in den griechischen Quellen nicht vorkommen<sup>4</sup>. Die Berücksichtigung der arabischen Tradition ist durchaus berechtigt, denn sie stützt sich zum großen Teil auf die griechischen Gnomologien und Florilegien. Ov. erklärt überzeugend die Gründe für die Rezeption griechischer Sprüche in der arabischen Welt (S. 193–209)<sup>5</sup>. Die Gnomon lassen sich in der arabischen Poesie bereits in der vorislamischen Zeit nachweisen, und mit der Einführung des Islam erlangten die Sprüche des Propheten Mohammed besondere Bedeutung. Die Gnomon und Apothegmen spielten bei den Griechen (z. B. in der *Varia historia* des Älian) und den Arabern (in der Adabliteratur) eine didaktisch-moralisierende und eine reich unterhaltende Rolle. Die Inhalte zahlreicher Sprüche drückten zumeist allgemeinverbindliche Wahrheiten (z. B. Freundschaftswert, Elternverehrung, Lebensgefahren) aus, die in den beiden Kulturkreisen Anerkennung genossen. Zwar schockierten einige Dicta des Diogenes die Araber, doch seine asketische Grundhaltung stieß bei ihnen auf Zustimmung. Die kynische Genügsamkeit und Selbstbeherrschung erinnerte sie an die im Sufismus praktizierte Askese, und einige kynische Sprüche fanden sogar Eingang in die sufische Literatur.

Hinzuzufügen ist, dass die meisten Erforscher der antiken Philosophie lange Zeit dem Nachleben der griechischen Philosophie in der arabischen Kultur so gut wie kein Interesse entgegenbrachten<sup>6</sup>. Daher umfassten die Ausgaben der griechischen philosophischen Schriften keine von arabischen Autoren überlieferten Testimonien. Es hat den Anschein, als hätte die Veröffentlichung der nur fragmentarisch erhaltenen Werke des Theophrast aus Eresos, in der D. Gutas arabische Testimonien in englischer Übersetzung untergebracht hat, hier neue Wege gewiesen<sup>7</sup>.

Natürlich greift Ov. auf die Spruchsammlungen Giannantonis und Gutas' zurück, doch ergänzt er sie auch um neue Dicta. Darüber hinaus liegen rund 360 von ihm angefertigte Spruchübersetzungen

<sup>2</sup> G. Giannantoni, *Socraticorum reliquiae. Collegit, disposuit, apparatus notisque instruxit*, vol. II, Roma–Napoli 1983, S. 409–691; idem, *Socratis et Socraticorum reliquiae* (...), vol. II, Napoli 1990 (Elenchos. Collana di testi e studi sul pensiero antico XVIII), S. 227–509.

<sup>3</sup> D. Gutas, *Sayings by Diogenes Preserved in Arabic*, in: M.-O. Goulet-Cazé, R. Goulet (Hrsgg.), *Le cynisme ancien et ses prolongements. Actes du Colloque International du CNRS (Paris, 22–25 juillet 1991)*, Paris 1993, S. 475–518. Es lohnt hinzuzufügen, dass er die Dissertation *Greek Wisdom Literature in Arabic Translation*, New Haven, CT 1975 (American Oriental Series LX) verfasst hat und seine Aufsätze zu den Graeco-Arabica als Sammlung unter dem Titel *Greek Philosophers in the Arabic Tradition*, Aldershot 2000 (Variorum Collected Studies Series: CS 698) erschienen sind.

<sup>4</sup> Gutas, *Sayings*... (Anm. 3), S. 479 f.

<sup>5</sup> Über die gesellschaftspolitischen Gründe für die Übertragung der griechischen Werke ins Arabische im 8.–10. Jh. schreibt D. Gutas, *Greek Thought, Arabic Culture. The Graeco-Arabic Translation Movement in Baghdad and Early 'Abbāsīd Society (2<sup>nd</sup>–4<sup>th</sup>/8<sup>th</sup>–10<sup>th</sup> Centuries)*, London–New York 1998. Siehe meine Besprechung in: *Eos* XCI 2004, S. 177–184.

<sup>6</sup> Zu der sich wandelnden Einstellung der Altertumsforscher zum Nachleben der Antike in der arabischen Welt siehe F. Klein-Franke, *Die klassische Antike in der Tradition des Islam*, Darmstadt 1980 (Erträge der Forschung CXXXVI), bes. S. 17–52. Siehe meine Rezension in: *Eos* LXXI 1983, S. 182–184.

<sup>7</sup> *Theophrastus of Eresos. Sources for His Life, Writings, Thought and Influence*. Edited and Translated by W. W. Fortenbaugh et al., vol. I–II, Leiden 1992 (Philosophia Antiqua LIV).

ins Deutsche vor, da er damit klassischen Philologen, die kein Arabisch verstehen, und Orientalisten, die Griechisch nicht ausreichend beherrschen, Zugang zu seinem Buch ermöglichen will. Es ist hervorzuheben, dass sich Ov. keineswegs lediglich mit einer bloßen Übernahme von Sprüchen aus verschiedenen griechischen und arabischen Quellen begnügt, sondern sich auch mit gnomologischen Quellen beschäftigt und versucht, ihre gegenseitigen Abhängigkeiten und Bezüge zu bestimmen. Eine Orientierung in der komplizierten gnomologischen Tradition erleichtern vier Tafeln (S. 54: G[nomologium] V[aticanum]-W[iener] A[pophthegmensammlung]-Tradition), S. 76: Corpus Parisinum<sup>8</sup>, S. 88: Maximus-Tradition, S. 166: Die arabischen Sammlungen).

Ov. hat in seinem Buch die größte, einem Philosophen gewidmete Spruchsammlung untergebracht<sup>9</sup>. Aus diesem Grund vertritt er die Auffassung, dass dieser umfangreiche Material-Grundstock ihn in den Stand setzen werde, nicht nur „die literarische Funktionsweise der kynischen Sprüchewelt zu erläutern“, sondern auch „aussagekräftige Ergebnisse über die Sprüchewelt zu erzielen“ (S. 210). Er ist sich allerdings dessen sehr wohl bewusst, dass das Korpus der Sprüche des Diogenes in der Antike viel größer gewesen sein muss, wovon z. B. die Worte des Diogenes Laertios (VI 69: ἀναφέρεται δὲ καὶ ἄλλα εἰς αὐτόν, ἃ μακρὸν ἂν εἴη καταλέγειν πολλὰ ὄντα) wie auch die Tatsache zeugen, dass uns die griechischen Fassungen zahlreicher von sich ohne Zweifel auf die griechischen Quellen stützenden arabischen Autoren überlieferter Sprüche unbekannt bleiben.

Es ist daran zu erinnern, dass Gotthard Strohmaier die Anwendung der modernen Computertechnik bei der Erforschung der Spruchsammlung schon früher postuliert hat. Er hat nämlich vorgeschlagen, „alles edierte griechische Material über den Scanner [...] und die weiteren handschriftlich vorliegenden griechischen Sammlungen [...] über die Tastatur ein[zuspeichern“<sup>10</sup>. „Auf die gleiche Weise wäre die gedruckte und ungedruckte arabische Parallelüberlieferung einzugeben, schließlich auch die in den anderen Sprachen“ (ibidem). Dieses Unternehmen würde jedoch viele Beteiligte und erhebliche Kosten erfordern. Aus diesem Grund hege ich den Zweifel, ob sich dieser Vorschlag in absehbarer Zeit realisieren lässt.

Ov. übernimmt die weitverbreitete Überzeugung (S. 28, 210–213), dass eine Gnome ausschließlich eine Äußerung des Diogenes enthalte. „Apophtagma“ und „Chreia“, die bedeutungsgleich seien, würden sich von der „Gnome“ durch ihre zweiteilige Struktur unterscheiden. Auf eine kurz umrissene Eingangssituation folge dann eine Antwort bzw. ein Kommentar (= χρεῖα λογική)

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<sup>8</sup> Siehe D.M. Searby, *The Corpus Parisinum. A Critical Edition of the Greek Text with Commentary and English Translation (A Medieval Anthology of Greek Texts from the Pre-Socratics to the Church Fathers, 600 B.C.–700 A.D.)*. Book 1–2, Lewiston 2007. Vgl. die Besprechung von T. Dorandi in: *Elenchos* XXVIII 2007, S. 482–487.

<sup>9</sup> Viel kleinere Sammlungen der Sprüche anderer Persönlichkeiten veröffentlichten vorher J.F. Kindstrand, *Bion of Borysthenes. A Collection of the Fragments with Introduction and Commentary*, Uppsala 1976 (Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis. Studia Graeca Upsaliensia XI); idem, *Anacharsis. The Legend and the Apophthegmata*, Uppsala 1981 (Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis. Studia Graeca Upsaliensia XVI); K.-H. Stanzel, *Dicta Platonica. Die unter Platons Namen überlieferten Aussprüche*, Diss. Würzburg, Darmstadt 1987; D.M. Searby, *Aristotle in the Greek Gnomological Tradition*, Uppsala 1998 (Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis. Studia Graeca Upsaliensia XIX); J. Gerlach, *Gnomica Democritea. Studien zur gnomologischen Überlieferung der Ethik Demokrits und zum Corpus Parisinum mit einer Edition der Democritea des Corpus Parisinum*, Wiesbaden 2008 (Serta Graeca XXVI).

<sup>10</sup> G. Strohmaier, *Das Gnomologium als Forschungsaufgabe*, in: *Dissertationunculae criticae. Festschrift für G.Ch.Hansen*. Herausgegeben von Ch.-F. Collatz et al., Würzburg 1998, S. 461–471, bes. S. 471, [Nachdruck in:] idem, *Hellas im Islam. Interdisziplinäre Studien zur Ikonographie, Wissenschaft und Religionsgeschichte*, Wiesbaden 2003 (Diskurse der Arabistik VI), S. 43–49, bes. S. 49.

oder aber eine Handlung des Diogenes (= *χρεία πρακτική*). Nur selten (*Gnom. Vat.* 185) verknüpfe Diogenes seine Worte und seine Handlungen miteinander (= *χρεία μικτή*). In der Antike hat es jedoch keine Theorie des Apophthegmas (der Begriff tritt zum ersten Mal in den *Hellenika* II 3, 56 des Xenophon in Erscheinung), dafür aber theoretische Überlegungen antiker Rhetoren hinsichtlich der Chreia gegeben. Aus diesem Grund sind einige Forscher der Meinung, dass es einen Unterschied zwischen dem Apophthegma und der Chreia geben müsse<sup>11</sup>.

Ov. steht auf dem Standpunkt, dass die Gnomen und Apophthegmen bereits zu Lebzeiten des Diogenes entstanden seien, behauptet aber zu Recht, dass es nicht möglich sei, „diesen Kern aus der Spruchmasse herauszufiltern“ (S. 243, vgl. S. 440). Für diesen Sachverhalt führt er drei Gründe an:

#### 1. Die zeitliche Dimension

Einige Sprüche des Diogenes könne man in den Schriften der im 3. Jh. v. Chr. lebenden Verfasser (z. B. in den Diatriben des Teles und in der *Διογένους πράσις* des Monimos) nachlesen. Doch auf die meisten Dicta stoße man in Schriften oder Spruchsammlungen, die mindestens 200 Jahre nach Diogenes' Tod die Welt erblickt haben werden. „Somit sind alle Überlieferungsstufen für uns verloren, die zwischen dem möglichen Spruchurheber Diogenes und den uns erhaltenen Sammlungen und Autoren liegen, so dass es sich unserer Kenntnis entzieht, ob diese Zwischenstufen möglicherweise Erfindungen aus späterer Zeit widerspiegeln“ (S. 243)<sup>12</sup>.

#### 2. Die Überlieferungssituation

Zwischen den im 4. Jh. v. Chr. entstandenen Diogenessprüchen und der GV-WA-Tradition, also der wohl ältesten Spruchsammlung, „liegen mindestens 400 Jahre, wahrscheinlich sogar noch mehr“ (ibidem). Es sei daher evident, dass es innerhalb einer so langen Zeitperiode zu „Fehlzuschreibungen, sei es durch Lemmaausfall, sei es durch willkürliche Eingriffe“ (ibidem), gekommen sein müsse.

#### 3. Die inhaltliche Dimension

Es ließen sich in den Sprüchen zahlreiche inhaltliche Widersprüche konstatieren, was auf vielerlei Ursachen zurückgeführt werden könne: (a) Diogenes seien durch Überlieferungsfehler Gedanken anderer Menschen zugeschrieben worden, (b) man habe ihm einen Spruch absichtlich in den Mund gelegt, weil der Philosoph aus Sinope ihn habe tatsächlich formulieren können, (c) die hellenistischen Biographen hätten einfach selber verschiedene Dicta erfunden, (d) die kynische Philosophie habe sich schrittweise vom Rigorismus zum Hedonismus bzw. von einer gemäßigten zur strengen Askese entwickelt. Gegenüber diesem Argument bezieht Ov. zu Recht eine skeptische Position (S. 244 mit Anm. 25).

Ich teile die Ansicht von Ov., dass sich die Gnomen und Apophthegmen des Diogenes nicht dafür eignen, eine Originallehre des Kynismus zu rekonstruieren (S. 245). Dagegen kann ich ihm nicht zustimmen, wenn er meint, dass man Kenntnisse über die kynische Lehre im 4. Jh. anhand der fragmentarisch erhaltenen Schriften des Diogenes erlangen könne. Es scheint, als hätte Ov. das Problem der Authentizität der Schriften dieses Autors nur allzu oberflächlich behandelt und es vorschnell für selbstverständlich befunden, dass aus Diogenes' Feder Tragödien und verschiedene

<sup>11</sup> So K. Berger, *Hellenistische Gattungen im Neuen Testament*, ANRW II 25, 2 (1984), S. 1093 und J. Stenger, *Apophthegma, Gnome und Chrie. Zum Verhältnis dreier literarischer Kleinformen*, Philologus CL 2006, S. 203–221, bes. S. 215–219, dessen einschlägige Reflexionen meiner Meinung nach besondere Aufmerksamkeit verdienen.

<sup>12</sup> Nach Ov. (S. 440) gäbe es nur eine einzige authentische Diogenesgnome vom 4. Jh., die Arist. *Rhet.* III 10 p. 1411a 24 f. (= *SSR* V B 184) überliefert habe. Die Mehrheit der Wissenschaftler vertritt zwar die Meinung, dass sich der von Aristoteles erwähnte *ὁ κύων* eben auf Diogenes beziehe, doch M.-O. Goulet-Cazé, *Who Was the First Dog?*, in: R.B. Branham, M.-O. Goulet-Cazé (eds.), *The Cynics. The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and Its Legacy*, Berkeley 1996 (*Hellenistic Culture and Society* XXIII), S. 414 f., versuchte den Nachweis dafür zu erbringen, dass der Begründer des Peripatos damit Antisthenes im Sinn gehabt habe.

philosophische Schriften, darunter die *Politeia* geflossen seien (S. 240 f., 322, 329, Anm. 293). Zwar sind einige Forscher ebenfalls dieser Ansicht, doch eine genauere Analyse des Problems, die ich unlängst unternommen habe, bekräftigt die Annahme, dass hinter die zur Legitimierung der Behauptung von der Authentizität der Schriften des Philosophen aus Sinope herangezogenen Argumente ein großes Fragezeichen zu setzen ist<sup>13</sup>. Wahrscheinlicher mutet schon die Hypothese an, derzufolge die Schriften erst nach Diogenes' Tod, entweder noch gegen Ende des 4. Jhs oder Anfang des 3. Jhs v. Chr. entstanden seien. Ich vermute, dass sie einem „kynisierenden“ Literaten zugeschrieben werden müssen. Es verdient in diesem Kontext noch erwähnt zu werden, dass die Diogenesschriften betreffenden Testimonien erst in der zweiten Hälfte des 3. Jhs v. Chr. in Erscheinung getreten sind.

Im Kapitel 3 (Spruchinhalt, S. 235–390) erörtert Ov. drei wichtige Fragen: Rollen (S. 245–271), Themen (S. 271–361) und Gegner des Diogenes (S. 361–390). In den Sprüchen kommt Diogenes als Hund, Ratgeber/Lehrer, Steuermann, Arzt, Menschensucher, göttlicher Mensch, Sklave, Bettler, Parasit/Schmeichler (?) vor. Bekanntlich nannte sich der Philosoph aus Sinope gern Hund und hielt diese Bezeichnung für schmeichelhaft. Ov. weist darauf hin, dass es sich hier um verschiedene Aspekte des Hundebenehmens handle: (a) Manchmal ahme Diogenes die negativen Eigenschaften des Hundes im Sinne der kynischen Schamlosigkeit nach. (b) Häufiger werde auf die Wach- und Schutzfunktion des Hundes angespielt. Der Hund wache und verteidige seine Freunde. An dieser Stelle sollte man hinzufügen, dass die Scheinkyniker keine Gnade vor Lukians Augen finden, die sich schamlos verhielten und die Wach- und Schutzfunktion nicht wie Diogenes wahrnehmen würden (*Fugitivi* 16 [III 212 Macleod]). (c) Als Hund könne er gute Menschen von bösen Menschen unterscheiden. Ov. vermutet (S. 249), dass Diogenes an Platons *Politeia* angeknüpft habe, in der die Wächter als edle Hunde bezeichnet werden (II 375e: τῶν γενναίων κυνῶν), die den ihnen bekannten Personen gegenüber freundliches Benehmen an den Tag legten, wohingegen sie den Fremden gegenüber Feindlichkeit demonstrierten. Ov. erinnert daran, dass die Bezeichnung „Hund“ im 4. Jh. weit verbreitet war und mit ihr auch andere Philosophen, Redner und Politiker betraut wurden<sup>14</sup>. Ich bin auf eine der Rollen Diogenes' deswegen etwas genauer eingegangen, um zu veranschaulichen, wie akribisch Ov. die diskutierte Problematik studiert.

Viel Platz hat Ov. der Erforschung der unterschiedlichen, in den Sprüchen angesprochenen Themen gewidmet. Ich nenne nur einige von ihnen, damit man sich ein Bild davon machen kann, wie viele Probleme er hat unter die Lupe nehmen müssen: geistige Selbstbeherrschung, körperliche Enthaltsamkeit, Reichtum, Bildung, Religion, Staat-Gesellschaft, Gewissen, Hoffnung, Dank, Ruhm/Ruhmsucht, Maß in der Rede, Prahlerei, Arroganz, Neugier, Verhalten in der Familie, Freund-Feind, Alter, Tod. Deswegen ist es nur verständlich, dass so manche Problemanalyse ohne gebührenden Tiefgang ausfällt. Zwar zitiert er die grundlegende Fachliteratur, aber sie lässt sich in vielen Fällen um relevante Sonderstudien ergänzen. Ich bin mir allerdings im Klaren, dass eine einzelne Person nicht in der Lage ist, sich mit so vielen denkbar unterschiedlichen Problemen im Alleingang eingehend zu befassen. Dementsprechend hat es keinen Zweck, Ov. den Vorwurf zu machen, er habe in seinem Buch nicht die gesamte vorhandene Fachliteratur zu Rate gezogen.

Im letzten Teil des Kapitels 3 stehen die Gegner des Diogenes, also Personen, mit denen der Philosoph gesprochen oder sie kritisiert hat, im Vordergrund. Selbstverständlich misst Ov. hier der Begegnung des Kynikers mit Alexander dem Großen die größte Bedeutung bei, doch den Rezensenten verlangt's nach mehr, wahrscheinlich deswegen, weil er selber vor nicht so langer

<sup>13</sup> M. Winiarczyk, *Zur Frage der Autorschaft der Schriften des Diogenes von Sinope*, Eos XCII 2005, S. 29–43.

<sup>14</sup> Menedemos von Eretria (Diog. Laert. II 140 = SSR III F 16); Zoilos von Amphipolis (Ael. VH XI 10); Aristogeiton der Redner (Ps.-Demosth. Or. XXV 40); Demosthenes (Plut. Dem. 23, 5). Diogenes selbst nannte Aristipp βασιλικὸς κύων (Diog. Laert. II 66). Vgl. Antisthenes als ἀπλοκῶων (Diog. Laert. VI 13 = SSR V A 22)

Zeit einige von Ov. zur Sprache gebrachte Fragen genauer untersucht hat<sup>15</sup>. Außerdem werden Diadochen, Perserkönig, König, Anaximenes aus Lampsakos, Platon, Speusipp, Aristipp, Polyxenos und Spartaner ebenfalls behandelt.

Sehr interessant ist das Kapitel 4 (S. 391–401), in dem Ov. den Versuch unternimmt, die Genese der Sprüche zu eruieren. Er geht davon aus, dass der „Spruchkonstrukteur“ sich des Baukastenprinzips bedient und die Gnomen bzw. Apophthegmen aus „Steinchen“ zusammengesetzt habe: „Es sind die ‚Steinchen‘ Motive bzw. Personen und Spruchstruktur (Eingangssituation + Anspruch), die in ganz unterschiedlicher Weise ausgetauscht und vor allem miteinander kombiniert werden können“ (S. 391). Ich bin jedoch der Auffassung, dass diese Erkenntnis nicht verabsolutiert werden darf. Es ist nicht auszuschließen, dass neue Sprüche auch auf andere Art und Weise zu Stande gekommen sein können<sup>16</sup>.

Das Kapitel 5 (S. 402–419) wendet sich dem Spruchtypus zu. Ov. behauptet hier Folgendes: „Austauschbarkeit und Wechselspiel der vier Komponenten Eingangssituation, Ausspruch (bzw. Handlung), Thema und Motiv sind nicht nur auf die Sprüche einer einzigen Person beschränkt, sondern lassen sich auch lemmaübergreifend ausmachen“ (S. 402). Deshalb weise der „Diogenesspruch“ eklatante Ähnlichkeiten mit den Spruchtypen anderer Personen auf. Eine besondere Parallelität trete zwischen Diogenes und Sokrates zu Tage (S. 403–408), aber Ov. berücksichtigt in diesem Kontext auch Demosthenes, Platon, Stratonikos, Theokrit von Chios und Zosimos.

Das nächste Kapitel (S. 420–436) erörtert die formale und inhaltliche Ähnlichkeit des Spruchs mit dem medizinischen Aphorismus, dem Witz, der Neuen Komödie und der Fabel. Ov. mutmaßt, dass der Peripatos für die gegenseitige Beeinflussung der kynischen Sprüche und der Fabel verantwortlich gewesen sei. Er verweist darauf, dass Demetrios von Phaleron (gest. nach 283) eine Sammlung von Äsops Fabeln zusammengestellt habe (Diog. Laert. V 81 = Wehrli IV, fr. 112), und setzt den Fall, dieser Peripatetiker sei „ein wichtiges Bindeglied für die literarisch-inhaltliche Angleichung von (Diogenes-)Spruch und (Äsop-)Fabel“ (S. 430) gewesen.

Ov.s Studie stellt die Belesenheit ihres Autors unter Beweis, dennoch wartet sie gelegentlich mit verschiedenartigen Fehlern, insbesondere in den Anmerkungen und der Bibliographie auf, auf die ich als Rezensent noch zu sprechen kommen muss:

1. Falsche Namensschreibung, fehlende Vornamen, falsche Vornamen oder lückenhafte Aufzählung von Forschervornamen<sup>17</sup>.

2. Falsche oder unvollständige Titel wissenschaftlicher Arbeiten, falsche Erscheinungsortangaben, manchmal fehlende Reihen-, Nachdruck- oder Neuausgaben-Angaben<sup>18</sup>.

<sup>15</sup> M. Winiarczyk, *Das Werk „Die Erziehung Alexanders“ des Onesikritos von Astypalaia (FGrHist 134 F 1–39). Forschungsstand (1832–2005) und Interpretationsversuch*, Eos XCIV 2007, S. 197–250, bes. S. 234 f.

<sup>16</sup> Siehe G. Strohmaier, Rez. Overwien, Gnomon LXXIX 2007, S. 402: „Hier würde ich eher daran denken, dass jemand, um eine ethische Abhandlung kurzweiliger zu gestalten oder einen Lesetext für die Schule zusammenzustellen, ungenau aus dem Gedächtnis zitiert hat, wobei es ihm nur auf die Pointe und auf die Autorität irgendeines bekannten Mannes ankam, dies wieder als Material für die Sammler der Gnomologien“.

<sup>17</sup> Bihlölaweck *pro* Bielohlaweck (S. 29, 30), Bihlölaweck *pro* Bielohlaweck (S. 451); Fraenkel *adde* Eduard (S. 288, Anm. 166); S. Crönert *pro* W. Crönert (S. 182, Anm. 308); H. Betz *pro* H.D. Betz (S. 260, Anm. 73); R. Branham *pro* R.B. Branham; D. Dudley *pro* D.R. Dudley; W. Fortenbaugh *pro* W.W. Fortenbaugh; P. Fuentes González *pro* P.P. Fuentes González (S. 433, Anm. 43); G. Hansen *pro* G.Ch. Hansen (S. 457 s.v. Strohmaier 1998); C. Hase *pro* C.B. Hase (S. 63, Anm. 40); W. Tarn *pro* W.W. Tarn.

<sup>18</sup> J. Moles, *The Cynic's Attitude to Moral Corruption pro Honestius quam Ambitiosius? An Exploration of the Cynic's Attitude to Moral Corruption in his Fellow Men*. Unvollständige Titelangaben: z. B. Anderson, Bielohlaweck, Branham 1996, Döring 1972, Goulet-Cazé 1986,



3. Fehlende Information darüber, dass ein Buch eine Dissertation (Höistad, Merkle, Packmohr) ist. Manchmal gibt es zwar den Hinweis darauf, dass es sich um eine Dissertation handelt, doch statt der jeweiligen Universitätsstadt taucht nur der Erscheinungsort auf (Stanzel: Darmstadt *pro* Würzburg, Weber: Borna–Leipzig *pro* Gießen).

4. Gelegentliches Fehlen von Seitenangaben bei Sammelbänden (van Esbroeck, Fischer, Strohmaier 1998, cod. Bar., ed. Kindstrand).

5. Unprofessionelle Zitierweise im Falle der Vorsokratiker (korrekt z. B. Heraklit DK 22 B 97)<sup>19</sup>, der Historiker (keine Verweise auf die *FGrHist*, z. B. Ion von Chios, Onesikritos), der patristischen Literatur (oft keine Verweise auf *PG*, *PL* und *CSEL*)<sup>20</sup> und der Peripatetiker (bei Demetrios fehlende Verweise auf *Die Schule des Aristoteles* von F. Wehrli oder auf die neue Ausgabe von P. Stork, J.M. Ophuijsen, T. Dorandi, New Brunswick–London 2000; und die fragmentarisch erhaltenen Werke des Theophrast werden nicht nach der Ausgabe von W.W. Fortenbaugh *et al.*, Leiden 1992 [*Megarikos* ist unter T 511 zu finden], sondern nach der veralteten Edition von F. Wimmer zitiert). Ov.s Bezüge auf die Suda lassen jegliche Band- und Seitenangaben der Edition von A. Adler vermissen, wodurch die Stichwörter in diesem Lexikon viel schneller gefunden werden könnten.

6. Es kommt oft vor, dass im Index die Herausgebernamen fehlen. Der Benutzer möchte aber wissen, ob Ov. tatsächlich die beste Ausgabe des Textes des jeweiligen Autors verwendet. Besonders schmerzlich empfindet man das Fehlen des Herausgebernamens bei den Diatriben des Teles. Liegt hier die alte Ausgabe von O. Hense (Tübingen 1909) oder die neue Edition von P.P. Fuentes González (Paris 1998) zu Grunde?

7. Stichprobenartig habe ich die von Ov. verwendeten Zitate kontrolliert und festgestellt, dass die meisten von ihnen stimmen. Aufgefallen ist mir allerdings ein größerer Fehler. Wenn er von Demosthenes schreibt, dieser habe sich „Wach-Hund des Staates“ genannt, zitiert Ov. auf S. 250 Plut. *Dem.* 13, 4 und auf Seite 363, Anm. 393 Plut. *Dem.* 23, 4. In Wirklichkeit handelt es sich um 23, 5. Was noch schwerer wiegt, ist die Tatsache, dass die beiden falschen Zitate in den Index aufgenommen worden sind.

8. Ov.s Arbeit ist sehr umfangreich, und daher haben sich in sie zahlreiche redaktionelle Unzulänglichkeiten eingeschlichen:

a) Zweimalige Anführung von ein und derselben Anekdote im Griechischen: Cod. V 15 – S. 350, Anm. 359 und S. 353, Anm. 368 (über 4 Textzeilen); Stob. IV 52, 17 – S. 361, Anm. 390 und S. 383, Anm. 453; Cod. V 12 – S. 399, Anm. 6 und S. 413, Anm. 25.

b) Mehrmalige Wiederholung derselben Anmerkung (5 Zeilen lang): S. 212, Anm. 5, S. 238, Anm. 7, S. 392, Anm. 2, S. 405, Anm. 6, S. 421, Anm. 4.

c) Mehrmalige Wiederholung von langen Titeln in den Anmerkungen, die in „Texte und Quellen“ und „Sekundärliteratur“ bereits in voller Länge ausgeschrieben sind: „Die Wiener Apophthegmensammlung...“ gleich drei Mal auf ein und derselben Seite (S. 48, Anm. 12, 13 und

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Kindstrand 1976 und 1981, Winiarczyk (S. 325, Anm. 275). München 1906 *pro* Leipzig 1906 (S. 182, Anm. 308). Goulet-Cazé, Paris 1986 *pro* Paris 2001 (Deuxième édition revue et augmentée); *Die Philosophie der Antike*, Bd. III, Basel u.a. 1983 *pro* Basel 2004 (2. durchgesehene und erweiterte Auflage); Euripides, Nauck<sup>2</sup> *pro* *TrGF* ed. R. Kannicht, Göttingen 2004.

<sup>19</sup> Vermutlich ist sich Ov. dessen nicht bewusst, dass sich die *Dissoi logoi* in DK unter Nr. 90 befinden. Jüngere Ausgabe: Th.M. Robinson, New York 1979. Ov. schweigt sich zu der von ihm herangezogenen Ausgabe aus.

<sup>20</sup> Ov. nennt lediglich den Titel *Homiliae in I Cor.* 35, 4 von Johannes Chrysostomos, doch er erwähnt es nicht mehr, dass sie sich in *PG* befinden. Auch wenn ein Benutzer nach *PG* greifen sollte, dann wird er zu diesem Schluss kommen müssen, dass der Nachlass dieses Kirchenvaters 18 große Bände (*PG* 47–64) umfasse, und beträchtliche Schwierigkeiten haben, die Homilien ausfindig zu machen. Unbedingt ist die Band- und Spaltenangabe der Edition von J.P. Migne mitzuliefern. Leider wird man mit diesem Mangel im Buch von Ov. ziemlich häufig konfrontiert.

15); die Ausgabe von Ps.-Maximus – S. 39, Anm. 1, S. 66, Anm. 42, S. 88, Anm. 71, S. 185, Anm. 313; Tartaglias Aufsatz – S. 84, Anm. 69 und S. 92, Anm. 76; Bergers Arbeit – S. 212, Anm. 6 und S. 236, Anm. 3. Diese Fehleraufzählung ließe sich fortsetzen.

Dass ich auf diese Defekte aufmerksam mache, geschieht aus der Rezensentenpflicht, der ich nachzukommen habe, und nicht etwa aus der Absicht, den Wert des Buches von Ov. in Frage zu stellen. Es sei mir an dieser Stelle erlaubt, seine Worte in die Erinnerung zurückzurufen, mit deren Hilfe er den kritischen Ton der eigenen Besprechung der Dissertation von D.M. Searby abzuschwächen versucht hat: „Es sei bereitwillig angemerkt, dass ich seine Mängel im Detail jetzt weniger stark gewichten würde. Angesichts der Arbeit, die der Autor in vielen Bereichen zu leisten hatte und auch geleistet hat, sind sie mehr als verzeihlich“ (S. 17, Anm. 9).

Zwar sind nicht alle Thesen von Ov. im Stande, mich zu überzeugen, einige detaillierte Fragen provozieren gar zur Diskussion und einige andere Probleme gehören auf jeden Fall genauer untersucht, so will ich mit Nachdruck feststellen, dass Ov.s Studie als ein wichtiger Forschungsbeitrag zu bewerten ist. Obwohl Diogenes' Sprüche schon früher Untersuchungsgegenstand waren<sup>21</sup>, so gebührt Ov. die Anerkennung für eine gründliche Erörterung ihrer verschiedenen Aspekte. Für besonders wichtig halte ich die Tatsache, dass er:

1. ca. 360 einem Philosophen gewidmete Sprüche, die nicht nur aus griechischen, sondern auch arabischen Gnomologien und Florilegien stammen, analysiert hat;

2. den Mechanismus der Entstehung der Sprüche (das Prinzip des „Baukastens“) und ihre Struktur dargestellt sowie den Grund für unterschiedliche Zuschreibungen von ein und demselben Spruch verschiedenen Personen und die Existenz von Fehlzuschreibungen erläutert hat;

3. verschiedene inhaltliche und formale Aspekte der Sprüche und ihre Verbindungen mit anderen literarischen Gattungen einer detaillierten Untersuchung unterzogen hat;

4. die offensichtliche Parallelität des Spruchtypus des Diogenes und anderer Personen auf den Punkt gebracht und deutlich gemacht hat, dass die Verbindungsmöglichkeiten von Spruchkonstanten nicht allein auf die Personen des Kynikers begrenzt bleiben;

5. die Erkenntnis ausformuliert hat, dass die Sprüche sich nicht dafür eignen, die Originallehre der älteren Kyniker zu rekonstruieren, weil die meisten Sprüche erst nach Diogenes' Tod entstanden sind. Darüber hinaus verfügen wir über keine Kriterien, die uns es ermöglichen würden, „das Echte von der Diogenesdichtung“ (S. 240) zu trennen.

Abschließend möchte ich das Buch von Ov. allen Forschern, die griechische und arabische Gnomologien, die kynische Philosophie und die griechische Literatur studieren, wärmstens empfehlen.

Marek Winiarczyk  
Universität Wrocław

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<sup>21</sup> A. Packmohr, *De Diogenis Sinopensis apophthegmatis quaestiones selectae*, Diss. Münster 1913; G. Rudberg, *Zur Diogenes-Tradition*, SO XIV 1935, S. 22–43; idem, *Zum Diogenes-Typus*, SO XV 1936, S. 1–18. Diese Aufsätze wurden nachgedruckt in: M. Billerbeck (Hrsg.), *Die Kyniker in der modernen Forschung*, Amsterdam 1991 (Bochumer Studien zur Philosophie XV), S. 107–138. G. Strohmaier, *Diogenesanekdoten auf Papyrus und in arabischen Gnomologien*, APF XXII 1973, S. 285–288; idem, *Diogenes im Wirthaus zu Herculanum*, in: *Pompeji 79–1979. Beiträge zum Vesuvausbruch und seiner Nachwirkung*, Stendal 1982 (Beiträge der Winckelmann-Gesellschaft XI), S. 85–89. Diese Aufsätze wurden nachgedruckt in: idem, *Von Demokrit zu Dante. Die Bewahrung antiken Erbes in der arabischen Kultur*, Hildesheim 1996 (Olms Studien XLIII), S. 53–61. Ov. dürfte aus zeitlichen Gründen nicht mehr die Möglichkeit gehabt haben, sich mit der Arbeit M. Serena Funghi, *Su alcuni testimoni di, chreiai' di Diogene e di ‚Detti dei Sette Sapienti‘*, in: eadem, *Aspetti di letteratura gnomica nel mondo antico*, Bd. II, Firenze 2004 (Accademia Toscana di Scienze e Lettere ‚La Colombaria‘. Studi CCXXV), S. 369–401, bes. S. 369–380 vertraut zu machen.

IN THE QUEST FOR “ROMAN FACTS”: LINDERSKI’S *RQ II*

**Jerzy Linderski, *Roman Questions II. Selected Papers***, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2007 (Heidelberger Althistorische Beiträge und Epigraphische Studien [HABES], Bd. 44), XI, 726 pp., ISBN 987-3-515-08134-4.

It is a formidable, even intimidating, task to write a review of a collection of 50 papers and a score of other items (with additions and corrections of earlier works) in a volume of 726 pages, and one not to be undertaken lightly. That is certainly the case before the book is opened, and fears may well often turn out to be justified, but after reading the first page or two any reader will feel that s/he is going to find an alluring path through it.

That is due in the first place to the excellence of the writing throughout the volume (one article is in German, one in Latin) from an author whose native language is not English and who at some time had to learn it. (Perhaps that helped: we live in times when bare correctness cannot be taken for granted among native speakers, even in works offered by the best-known publishing houses, when clarity is sometimes avoided and elegance is taken for affectation.) His mastery of language helps in part to explain how Linderski [= L.] carries his reader on with him, a reader eager to reach conclusions that s/he is confident will be revealing – but relishing the byways as s/he goes. When the conclusion of one paper is reached s/he turns the page, eagerly again, to explore the next. This is only a partial explanation; it is a necessary and not a sufficient condition for enjoying the book. Other reasons will emerge.

Before that there is another difficulty for the reviewer beyond the mere size of the volume: a disparity between the importance of each item and that of the whole. Other scholars who have worked in the same way for one reason or another might be cited: C. Cichorius and L. Robert, the former lauded by L. as “an acute student of *res Romanae* and of Latin texts” – before having a view summarily and justifiably dismissed (p. 237, n. 26), the latter taken as a paradigm – see below. In the musical sphere the brief, even slight, keyboard works of Domenico Scarlatti or Chopin would be a parallel, making (even without the latter’s large-scale concertos) not only a rich and varied *œuvre* but one comparable with that of their greatest contemporaries. The output is extraordinary – and would be even coming from someone now an *emeritus*. The reading is even more prodigious, as L. apparently effortlessly passes in review the literature and what his predecessors have done with it.

Read these brief papers and you will learn big things. “Romulus the Founder” teaches us that the Roman gods do not speak: “only a few utterances in Latin are on record” (p. 512, cf. p. 6). How different they are from Jehovah, who has given Christians as well as Jews the Word of God and at some periods seemed never to stop talking. So the Romans, dealing with their gods, set to, constructing their own language in four dimensions, livers and the flight of birds. Incidentally Roman gods do seem to speak in dreams: Alfius, *Bellum Carthaginiense* 1 in T. Cornell et al., *FRH* (Oxford, forthcoming) 069, F1 (= Peter vol. 1<sup>2</sup>, pp. 316 f., Festus 150), where Apollo in a dream prescribes a *uer sacrum* on Sthennius Mettius to enable escape from a plague.

History, Law, and Religion have elicited most of the contributions, and those that stand out in one reader’s mind are indeed the most substantial. Let us go straight to *The Pontiff and the Tribune: The Death of Tiberius Gracchus* (2002; pp. 88–114), which exemplifies all the qualities that are best in L.’s repertoire. It examines the notorious problem of the headgear that Scipio Nasica was wearing when Gracchus was killed and his followers inexplicably put to flight, a detail in those events that has immense implications.

First of all L. presents the event as a cosmic clash, whose “upheavals ceased when Augustus united in his person the sacrosanct power of the tribunate, the *imperium* of the magistrates and the dignity of the pontiff, thus emasculating at once both the people and the gods”. Narrating the

episode, L. finds that the sudden collapse of the Gracchan supporters defies rational explication. “The secret lies in the toga of Nasica”. He analyses ancient and scholarly interpretations of the distorted garb, gallantly rescuing *en route* a long-neglected work, that of G.G.C. Bijvanck, *Studia in Ti. Gracchi historiam*, Diss. Leiden 1879. Bijvanck and others interpreted the action of Nasica as that of the Pontifex Maximus sacrificing an animal. But evidently he had left his appropriate head-covering, the *pilleus* or *apex*, at home. L. examines the regular attire of the sacrificing priest and finds it quite normal to cover the head with the toga, although Nasica had to don the *praetexta* before he left the temple of Fides. But Tiberius was not a sacrifice, for the body was thrown into the Tiber. Just over half way through the paper L., citing Badian’s despairing claim that we are on ground that is wholly non-rational, cheerily invokes his own particular strengths (“The historian cannot abdicate half of his patrimony”) and proceeds. Of the two other rites that demanded that the priest act *capite velato*, he selects *consecratio* – the consecration of a miscreant to be destroyed by the gods. “We are at the crossroads of politics, religion and law”. At this point knowledge of art history comes into play to establish the position of the all-important *clauus* on the upper or lower border of the *praetexta*: it was not (irreligiously) moved in the time of Augustus. Nasica removed his toga, as Cicero did when he was presiding over the trial of Licinius Macer, and put it back on upside down (*toga perversa*). Not running up the hill against Gracchus, but emerging from the temple behind him with the *clauus* over his head and uttering the curse “Iovi sacer esto”, Nasica confounded the tribune’s supporters. Here we have a brilliant array of techniques, guileful twists in the plot, and a thrilling *peripeteia* in an episode that the reader (originally, we note, the audience!) knows to be of first class importance.

Then there is the sad figure of Pompey’s father-in-law and Julius Caesar’s opponent in Africa *Q. Scipio Imperator* (1996; pp. 130–173), a prosopographical study that takes its origin from a gem inscribed with his name and title (in abbreviated form). What follows are scrupulous and critical assemblages of evidence for the precious title and for the nomenclature of the Caecilii Metelli and Cornelii Scipiones, with legal expertise deployed to put another nail in the coffin of “testamentary adoption”, although wooden nails and a stake through the heart seem to be the only devices that will suffice to keep that vampire in its grave. The wily Octavian, dissatisfied with the terms of Caesar’s will, which made him the chief heir on condition that he took Caesar’s name, went through formal procedures that were appropriate only for the regular form of adoption by a living *paterfamilias*, *adrogatio*, so becoming *Divi filius*, and he has continued to take in generations of scholars. Next L. tackles Caesar’s complaints against the legitimacy of the *imperium* of Pompeian generals, uncovering malleable half-truths (what an asset he would have been to the augural college!). Section V of the paper concerns the resonances of the name Scipio, the literary sources telling only part of the story, while Scipio’s coins tell the other side. So L. proceeds to a new idiom, with its own grammar, the coins. The objects they feature give his learning free play: elephant, *sella curulis*, most controversially the augural jug and *lituus* (Scipio was not an augur but a *pontifex*, but the symbols allude to his claim to possess *iustum imperium*), and trophy. L. has done something judiciously to rescue Caesar’s ill-starred opponent and restore his *dignitas*.

L. has gathered the papers in this volume, in their wide variety of subjects, under the headings *Historia et Ius*, *Historia et Philologia*, *Historia et Epigraphica* (including three substantial items updating the *CIL* for Italy), *Historia et Religio*, and *Antiqua et Recentiora* (five essays on modern scholars). We have already seen how important a role expertise in Roman religion plays in the author’s work. The review of M. Beard, J. North, and S. Price, *Religions of Rome*, vol. 1: *A History*; vol. 2: *A Sourcebook*, Cambridge 1998, entitled *Religio et Cultus Deorum* (pp. 501–514), is indispensable for an understanding of his perspective: it allows a high authority to set out his position in a leisurely and systematic way. And in a commemorative article on Agnes Kirsopp Michels (pp. 584–602), L. rebukes scholars such as W. Warde Fowler and K. Latte, obsessed with purity and corruption, who found Roman religion wanting. He emphatically endorses Michels’ rejection of this view: Roman religion responded to or was created by Rome’s needs. “No student of religion can ultimately avoid or evade choosing between Varro and Augustine” (p. 596). It is thanks to

such efforts that it would be hard now to find Roman religion dismissed for its lack of interest in personal salvation.

This is not to ignore the solidity of L.'s contributions to *Historia et Epigraphica*, but they are in large part densely packed commentaries on inscriptions and topography, supplementing the Italian volumes of *CIL* (1998–2001) and to be saved and used in connexion with them. It is remarkable though how many smaller but entertaining points are made as the author winds his way through the complex trains of thought that lead to the conclusions of his longer papers in this section too, such as *Games in Patavium* (pp. 463–491). Each reader will turn to a number of pieces that involve topics in which s/he has taken a particular interest. Besides “testamentary adoption” I also savoured the little supplement on the *professio* of Pompey and the notion that his candidacy for the consular elections of 70 BC was made *in absentia* (pp. 611 f.): “I can only restate the obvious”. It is often necessary and salutary.

This is of course the second such volume that L. has sanctioned, making his *Roman Questions* of 1995 *Roman Questions (RQ) I*. Volume 1 covered work published between 1958, when the writer had his twenty-fourth birthday, and 1993. The two volumes are naturally alike in appearance and size, the first comprising 64 items in 746 pages. There are advances, however. The papers in *RQ I* had not been reset as they have in its successor. This is a great improvement. It avoids disconcerting changes of type face and the shift of pagination from top to bottom and back again with no inconvenience apart from the uncertainty where in a precise line the original turnover came (the pagination of original publications is recorded in the margins). A second and consequent improvement is that the author has been able to introduce any corrections, additional thoughts, and updated bibliographical material into the text at the appropriate place instead of adding them at the end of the volume (with such a meticulous scholar this was likely to be copious: 49 pages in *RQ I!*). The curly brackets that signal such additions prove neither intrusive nor misleading. One convenience that is not always granted as a result of this is that of having notes at the foot of the page; it depends on the format of the original publication. A third improvement is that there are indexes of ancient persons as well as of ancient authors and documents and of general topics and a list of scholars mentioned; the importance of indexes in such a work was stressed by O. Salomies in his review of *RQ I* in *Arctos* XXX 1996, p. 264.

The two volumes overlap, in that there is a section in II devoted to further thought, additions, and corrections to items in I, and this volume does contain a compositions from before 1993. Four of the papers on the other hand are new and unpublished, and that means that there is a quicker rate of striking in II than in I, most of the papers produced within the last two decades. These newly published pieces include *Augustales and Sodales Augustales* (pp. 179–183), which should short-circuit many a potential confusion, and a contribution to military history, *Orbilus, Scaurus, and the award of Corniculum* (pp. 184–215), not the author's first (see Latomus LX 2001, pp. 3–15, next in the volume, on *armillae* and *torques*), but, like the pages devoted to individual legions, such as *Legio V in Messana*, it is another “original” contribution, first class evidence of the effectiveness of the author's approach to a diversity of contexts. L. comes up with a remarkable paragraph that arises from updating *CIL* (inscriptions from the Augusteum at Rusellae, on the peregrinations of *Legio IV* (pp. 429–431).

The high striking rate is hardly surprising when a scholar reaches the height of his powers and the fullness of his knowledge – and may be able to command the leisure that s/he has earned. Besides, there has been no emigration this time to interrupt the flow of work, such as G. Alföldy noted in *RQ I*, p. XI. All this leads the reader to ask whether the papers omitted from I but now selected for this volume are less good in quality than the others not omitted. The answer must be in the negative; they are simply shorter, and gathered into the single item number 19 (pp. 282–296). The consistency of L.'s work will be a repeated theme of this review.

Two distinguished reviewers of *RQ I*, O. Salomies (see above) and E. Gabba, *Athenaeum* LXXXIV 1996, p. 666, noted that the focus was on the later Republic. The same is true of the present volume: Cicero and Livy predominate in the index of ancient authors, along with *CIL*,

though p. 385, on the epigraphy of Albingaunum, carries us forward to the fifth century poet Rutilius Claudius Namatianus. Another original contribution (pp. 262–276) starts from a silver dish from Georgia presented to a King Flavius Dades by a Publicius Agrippa and enquires how they came by their Roman names. That takes us to the north-east corner of the Empire in the second century, but L. has an amused glance at their spear-heading of current Georgian efforts to join NATO and the EU: in one scholarly and patriotic essay Agrippa has been made to lead a Georgian contingent to help Rome put down rebellion in Judaea (p. 276, n. 50).

Inherent and justifiable scepticism keeps the author from lingering very long on the (hi)story of Rome's earliest years, though he opens the volume with it: *Ennius and Romulus on the Site of Rome*. In this scepticism he is in line with another great scholar, P.A. Brunt, who would declare that nothing could be known of the early history except what could be deduced from institutions that survived into the later Republic, such as that of the *rex sacrorum*. On *religio* the author is correspondingly sceptical: "It has to be stressed again and again that the only Roman religion of which we can say anything with any authority is the religion of the developed Republic and the Empire; of the early stages we have little, and the less we know the more fertile is the ground for scholarly fantasy" (p. 596).

Matter and content aside, the way is now free to enquire further how it is that this heavy (approximately 1.3 kg) volume, a handful to read, comes to be so irresistible to the reader. The answer lies in the author's own enthusiasm and drive, evident from his sixties onwards as it was in the earlier volume. Tone is important. There is something exuberant, even joyful, in L.'s learning and exposition, which makes turning the page for each new turn of the argument or to each new subject exciting and refreshing. Very illuminating are the adjectives of praise that he selects: marvellous, exemplary, erudite – and impish (p. 457). It was no surprise to find, quite late on in the volume (p. 586), the sentence that exactly fits the case: "A true scholar is engaged in discovering things like a child".

But L. is no child. Would it infringe his dignity to compare him with a detective, a Poirot or an Adam Dalgliesh? There are procedures that irresistibly suggest the detective story (as at 254). These of course are fictional characters, the puppets of their creators. But L. has over the years created his own character and techniques. Another comparison is implicitly made by the author himself (p. 464): "There appears to exist one avenue that has not yet been traversed. This temptation an explorer cannot resist".

Nor is the reader's journey through the book, as he follows L.'s explorations, much marred by the sight of the bodies of wounded scholars grimly knocked down on the way. (L. resembles R. Syme in that respect.) How one scholar writes about others gives an indication of his own views and capabilities, as well as of his manners. There is no sneer or snarl, even in unfavourable reviews (forbearing comments may be found on A. Alföldi at p. 161, n. 102 and on E.D. Rawson at p. 303), though L. is not mealy-mouthed in criticism whether in passing footnotes or in full-scale reviews; "deficiencies" are straightforwardly pointed out.

Throughout, however, L. is severely critical of certain scholarly trends, and it is here that many recent writers would part company with him. His journey of discovery has been made, especially in the last generation, in a changing landscape that on one side of him has produced novel and even exotic scholarly crops. On the other side of the path stands tradition, still strong in the universities of some European countries, but less fruitful than it once was. Although L. is hard on the "supreme disregard for clarity and the reader characteristic of the German *ordinarius*" (p. 559), and there is an attack on German historiography (p. 178), his fire is regularly directed elsewhere, at "vulgar sociology and other aberrations" (p. 289, n. 3).

Even well-established prosopography receives a sidelong blow (admittedly there have been excesses) for "reducing the blood, suffering and emotion of history to a parade of names" (p. 586), but when he wishes L. himself can make adroit use of it, as we have seen with Q. Scipio and when he deals with Cato's opponent L. Thermus (p. 65) or discusses a relative of the Emperor Pertinax (p. 454). As an observer, but one exercising judgment, he traces the fortunes of the citizen of Bergomum C. Cornelius Minicianus (*CIL* V 5126) at the hands of E. and A. Birley, R. Syme, A.N. Sherwin-White,

B. Dobson, and H. Devijver (pp. 439 f.): correspondent of Pliny or not? Judgment has to be reserved after all, but L. has an original proposal for Minicianus' *praefectura fabrum*.

The accused are all guilty of the same offences, obscurity and lack of precision, but the worst cases have emerged from France: in particular there is the *thèse*. L. assigns blame, in one case (p. 39), not to the writer of the book, but to "the absurd academic system that rewards effuse scribbling and frowns upon concise lucidity. It is no accident that Louis Robert never wrote a *thèse*". This would be akin to the "impressionistic literary musings" published by the students' elders. Thus "much nonsense has been written about gladiatorial games", and it would indeed be tedious to count the number of books on gladiators that have been published even since L. made his complaints in a review of 1985, printed here on pp. 458–462, which has an annotated list of publications in n. 1, of G. Ville, *La gladiature en Occident des origines à la mort de Domitien*, Rome 1981 (BÉFAR 245). American scholarship does not escape criticism, for the same familiar disease "thrives in American graduate programs, together with another pest, the scholarly oligoglottism" (p. 522). "The pest has spread far and wide" (p. 285), and L. rails at the "shallowness of American politography" (in combination with "the ponderous weight of German idiom", p. 515). "Anthropology is now the fad [...] classical erudition now appears quaint and superfluous" (p. 555). Hence L.'s denunciation of "voguish (and amateurish) incursions into the sphere of the Roman *religio*". In one volume he reviews these are combined with a bibliography "infested by the belief 'the newer the better', a tendency as pernicious as it is ahistorical: for it consigns to neglect great minds of the previous generations, and loses sight of the historical progression of our investigations" (p. 522). Sometimes there have been direct ideological confrontations: L.R. Taylor's lesson that "where there is obfuscation there is no true scholarship" is brought out in contrast with R.P. Saller's criticism of her "limited appreciation of ancient Rome", which is illustrative of the "modish sociological morass" (p. 582 f.). The castigation is unrelenting and the ancient language enlisted in the campaign: "'verba volant, scripta manent', unfortunately" (p. 561). Thanks and offerings may be made to celebrities such as J. Habermas (p. 519), but "the reader whose bent is toward 'liturgy' would prefer more Roman facts and less modern talk" (p. 503). These passages came from papers already published, but L. now inserts a remark that shows his stern adherence to them: an account of an exchange with H.S. Versnel when L. reviewed his edited work *Faith, Hope, and Worship: Aspects of Religious Mentality in the Ancient World*, Leiden 1981 (Studies in the Greek and Roman Religion 2) and admitted that the words of the title "aroused the worst suspicions of the skeptic who dreads a torrent of semi-profound banalities in the fashion of the Parisian gurus" (p. 556, n. 1). L.'s response to Versnel's protest at this comment ends: "Somebody has to call juvenile fancies by the name they deserve".

L.'s own approach is essentially 'scientific'; he seeks scientific analysis and what can be tested, putting the case starkly in his review, already mentioned, of Beard, North, and Price, which enables him to set out his views on the gulf between Roman religion and Christianity with great lucidity: "Scientific are only such views the falsifiability of which is admitted by the very proponents of those views" (p. 505; cf. pp. 512 f.), and the result will be "a just appreciation of what can be known". At least, when he admits that "after our disquisition we do not necessarily know more about the Games in Patavium" (p. 491), "it is an informed *aporia*". I should prefer to speak of "uncompromising scholarship", for "science" and "scientific" in English are narrower than their equivalents in German and French. Besides, when L. comes to set down his view of what history is he explicitly rejects a course that can be tamed and explained: "This is a serious misunderstanding. History is not a preordained and reproducible chemical reaction; it is a dynamic and chaotic process, with many possible options and outcomes" (p. 177, n. 1). What he means, and what his principles are, can be gauged from remarks scattered throughout the book (apart from sidelong observations, as on the danger of using snippets of writing as evidence, p. 330, n. 18). There is praise for exact scholarship undertaken far from the purlieu of the gurus and their transatlantic ashrams: "Still another marvelous contribution [...] from Helsinki", he writes of M. Kajava's article on *visceratio* (Arctos XXXII 1998, pp. 109–131): it is "a rich blend of epigraphy, philology

and social history”; with characteristic candour he now adds a reference to J. Scheid’s *Quand faire, c’est croire. Les rites sacrificiels des Romains*, Paris 2005, pp. 213–254, written in direct polemic with Kajava (p. 326 with n. 1). In general terms, however, he holds that “no speculation can replace a careful reading of every line and every word, a procedure nowadays too often forgotten or disdained” (p. 183). The historian’s craft is “a painstaking analysis of the sources” (p. 633). There is a nice illustration at p. 154 of the claim that the work is all about reading texts: L. is able to show how Cicero was appointed governor *praeter opinionem*, unpicking the method of appointment. One late twentieth century development has provided the careful reader with additional weaponry: the computer. L., honouring his own computer (p. 194, n. 34), explicitly tells how electronics are useful and what they can add to the learning that he is championing (pp. 248, 419, with an engaging discussion of Nursia); he frequently alludes to them and (p. 405) looks forward to an enhancement of their role, indeed calls out for it.

This is where the candid reviewer, as part of her brief, must say something about the intellectual (and social) developments that L. has so effectively, if intermittently, castigated. (A substantial, argued, piece of prose from him on the subject would be worth having, and perhaps salutary, though the worse tendencies are probably too strong to be reversed.) Ironically, they have arisen in part from the same hankering to be “scientific”. Sociologists and anthropologists, and so on, have sought to approach recognized scientific disciplines, physics, chemistry and the like, in their prestige, power, and command of funds. That wish has largely been fulfilled because the new disciplines have provided a new subject of study (human kind in the mass) and made it available for study by the mass, who after all are funding centres of learning through the taxes they pay. Instructors in the new disciplines need to be able to deploy the vocabulary that will set them too apart as *cognoscenti*, to be looked up to in the scholarly world and perhaps also to mark them out from the mass of people to which we all belong. All this came about while Classics – Literature, History, and Philosophy – was entrenched and moving at its own slow pace. Lacking both the stature of the exact sciences and the glamour of the new disciplines, and combining those disadvantages with that of being thoroughly difficult as well as “irrelevant”, they have been “rescued” by being hauled on board (or at least taken in tow) by anthropology and sociology, acquiring the jargon of those disciplines as a part of their new orientation – or perhaps it would be better to say of their new uniform. Thus disguised, sometimes even subsumed into Faculties with all-embracing humanistic names, they enjoy protection and, with aid from tangible, glamorous, non-verbal, archaeology (not mentioned by L.), which relies heavily on scientific methods and processes, fresh prestige. At the same time they have apparently become accessible to all. A warning drawn from ancient classical culture was uttered by M. Rostovtzeff at the end of *The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire* (2<sup>nd</sup> edn., rev. by P. Fraser, Oxford 1957), a work that came into being in the aftermath of the Bolshevik revolution (1926), and, as L. remarks (p. 572) “soars into the realm of *idea*”. Rostovtzeff wrote (vol. 1, p. 541): “Our civilization will not last unless it be a civilization not of one class, but of the masses”. But he went on to ask, “Is it possible to extend a higher civilization [...] without debasing its standards?”.

The costs of the rescue of Classics are painfully obvious: students of Classics who have not even any Latin, and books apparently made both erudite and fashionable through being kitted out with the appropriate jargon. That unfairly suggests charlatanism on the part of authors. On the contrary, they are faithful adherents, occasionally the victims, of the particular doctrines they have taken from their tutors and embraced. A tiny, and wilful, example comes from L.’s reviews, that of M. Dettenhofer, *Perdita Iuventus: Zwischen den Generationen von Caesar und Augustus*, München 1992 (Vestigia 40). As the content of her books shows, this author is thoroughly familiar with Latin, but she chooses to use the word *perdita* (‘lost’) to apply to the “lost” generation between Caesar and Augustus. L. berates this, for the author, though aware of the connotations of moral decadence that belong to *perditus*, applies it to a whole generation, without moral implications. L. uses this example to illustrate the divorce of history from philology, and the replacement of close attention to texts by sociological commonplaces (pp. 175–178).



I have to draw back from the root and branch condemnation that L. implies through his remarks cited above. That is not because I have reservations about his condemnation of the precise failings he mentions, still less about his own methods (the rest of this review shows that); only about the language he uses to describe them. The means by which the Classics has come in some aspects to combine obscurantism with superficiality are regrettable, but that does not mean that the exploitation of the techniques of sociology and anthropology is fruitless in itself. "In my father's house are many mansions" is a salutary dictum; and those mansions include well-signalled speculation.

Besides, I am less confident of "Roman facts" than the author: they are all reported by some writer or interpreted by some archaeologist or numismatist. "Fact" gives too much credit; "Roman material" is a safer phrase. Each modern author needs to ask himself or herself whether the techniques or terms s/he is about to adopt, especially novel ones, are sound in themselves and appropriately named, and then whether it is safe and candid to apply them to his or her own study. (I will not communicate one such new-fangled Latinate term that I learned recently – for Latin still has its uses – and for which I discovered that "layering" would serve as well.) And each reviewer must ask the same questions. Only in this way, through the strenuous self-discipline of individuals and their resistance to impressive cant, can the integrity of the subject be recovered and maintained. Effusiveness is another matter.

Integrity is the word that is thoroughly suitable for L.'s own body of work. Not only his consistency suggests that; his ever-renewed emendations and additions to his papers demonstrate it: 64 items in *Addenda et corrigenda altera* (!) to *RQ I*. Within each paper he demonstrates prodigious and profitable reading and learning, and incidentally sometimes points the way to Polish scholarship that might otherwise have been missed; even we near-monoglots are likely to be given the help of a synopsis.

Integration is another theme that recurs in this review and must be mentioned explicitly. Yet the publicity material for this book puts it well enough: "[The papers] uphold the unity of *Altertumswissenschaft*: history cannot be understood without philology, and philology is blind without history; and history, law and literature are infused with ideology and religion. And the tool to knowledge is the painstaking linguistic dissection of texts". L. stands where these disciplines meet and intersect (as he notes, p. 302, of the articles of E. Rawson collected in her *Roman Culture and Society*, Oxford 1991). They are thus able to deal with Roman society in all its dimensions. This quality has emerged several times in this review. Each perspective that the scholar can command adds to his power and reinforces the strengths of the others. (He explicitly deplores the legal incompetence of classical historians, p. 282). Of their tools prosopography has already been mentioned, and so has numismatics. Not far from prosopography is the quite specialized study of the army. The interplay of geography and history is on show too, in L.'s discussion of Forum Iulii Iriensium (p. 434).

With integrity goes loyalty. It is only a few years since L. published *Imperium sine fine: T.R.S. Broughton and the Roman Republic*, Stuttgart 1996 (Historia Einzelschriften 105). Now he offers the obituary notice, along with commemorations of Lily Ross Taylor and Agnes Kirsopp Michels, mentioning the qualities that he most admires in them. It is not surprising that Broughton and Taylor are scholars most frequently mentioned in the index of authors after Th. Mommsen, "our previous supreme deity" (p. 405), and alongside F. Münzer, who receives a special tribute (p. 352, n. 34), D.R. Shackleton Bailey, H. Solin, and R. Syme. These obituaries and encyclopaedia articles are other instances, along with the dedication of the present volume, of the care and attention that he has bestowed on the great American scholars with whom he has worked, men and women who were untouched by the malaises of which he complains. (The comprehensive uptake of French sociology in the United States came after them or after their scholarly habits were formed.) And he takes pleasure at the end of his paper on *Q. Scipio Imperator* in honouring his First Master and Teacher, Ludwik Piotrowicz (p. 174, n. 154). Where rationality is so much in evidence is humanity distant? These tributes show that that is not the case; so do references to scholars lost in great

and useless wars (p. 352, n. 34; p. 357, n. 53), and the warning for Europe that L. finds (p. 287) at the end of his review of E. Gruen's *The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome*, Berkeley–Los Angeles 1984, in Gruen's conclusion (p. 730) that "Hellas ultimately fell under Roman authority not because the Romans exported their structure to the East but because the Greeks persistently drew the westerner into their own structure – until it was theirs no longer". Then there is the throwaway general remark (or was it made tongue in cheek?) that endeavours end in death and sorrow. However that may be, fun can be had on the way.

It is a necessary and dreary part of a reviewer's brief to find slips and misprints, even in the largest haystacks. I shall relegate my meagre collection to a footnote and not allow them the dignity of a place in what cannot be anything else than a celebratory text<sup>1</sup>. The author has been honoured with a *Festschrift*: C.F. Konrad (ed.), *Augusto augurio: Rerum humanarum et diuinarum commentationes in honorem Jerzy Linderski*, Stuttgart 2004. That year he was only at the biblical marker of threescore years and ten; seventy-five not out, which he is to achieve in 2009, is a score even more fit for celebration. It is good to know that another volume is planned (p. 633).

Barbara M. Levick  
Oxford

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<sup>1</sup> P. 36: "The reforms of Marius and the introduction of a professional army". This sounds sharp and precise. The process may have been slower and more uneven than that: so A. Keaveney, *The Army in the Roman Revolution*, London–New York 2007, pp. 93 f.

P. 37: "Long after the public assemblies [...] ceased to exist, the senate endured under the imperial autocracy". When did popular assemblies cease to exist? Not before Nerva's *lex agraria*, in *Dig.* XLVII 21, 3, 1, with P.A. Brunt, *JRS* LXVII 1977, p. 107. They still endured in Cassius Dio's day, as he reports XXXVII 28, 1–3, writing of the centuriate assembly. Their functions were formal, not political.

Pp. 342–361: It is not only because the name of the subject reveals her gender that I object to the derogatory word "paintress" in the title of *The Paintress Calypso and other Painters in Pliny*, for all the clarification that the article brings, and the usefulness of its bibliographical references. This is "old school" in a regrettable way. It may be argued that the comparable formation "actress" continues unabated, but there has never been such depreciation of actresses (except for their morals); since the seventeenth century they have performed on the English stage in full equality with their male colleagues and could never, like poets, authors, and even painters, be relegated to the boudoir.

*Minima:*

P. 69: "Amynander, a small fry" should have no article.

P. 242: The reproduction of *CIL* XI 6053 has suffered in the printing.

P. 267: With "rather very summary" a choice of adverbs should be made.

P. 305: Are the much debated *quattuor ordines* the first fourteen rows in the theatre reserved for equestrians?

P. 309, n. 7: T. Ñaso del Hoyo should be T. Ñaco.

P. 323, n. 23: *existement* in Colum. I *Praef.* 1-2 should be *existent*.

Pp. 343 and 545, n.6: "Alternative" is to be preferred to "alternate".

P. 468, n. 19: "C. Barret" is "A. Barrett".

P. 556, n. 1: "Preset" takes the place of "present" (in a quotation).

Index, p. 706: Antiochia ("in" Pisidia), for "towards".

**Rhiannon Ash (ed.), *Tacitus, Histories Book II***, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007 (Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics), IX, 415 pp., ISBN 978-0-521-89135-6.

New commentaries on Tacitus' *Histories*, especially for the English speaking world, were long a desideratum in Tacitean studies. Fortunately things seem to be changing. Four years after Cynthia Damon's recent commentary on Book I (2003) for Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics, Rhiannon Ash [= A.], another eminent Tacitean scholar, contributed to the same respectable series an elegant commentary on Book II, which will replace those of Irvine (1952) and Chilver (1979) and the German one of Heubner (1968).

The volume follows the usual structure for the "Green and Yellow" series. The introduction (pp. 1–36) contains 11 sections ("Tacitus", "Ancient historiography", "*Quo quo scelesti ruitis?* Civil war and Roman identity", "*Histories 2*", "Dramatis personae", "Style", "*Sententiae* and moralising allusions", "The sources", "The parallel tradition", "Pro-Flavian historiography", "The text"), which provide the reader with helpful and interesting information before engaging in the text. The text printed is that of Heubner's Teubner edition (1978) with some departures in spelling, punctuation, paragraphing and in some readings. The 10 most important departures, all of them persuasive, are given in p. 36. Although there is no *apparatus criticus*, as is usual in this series (A. recommends the *apparatus criticus* of Wellesley's Teubner edition (1989) in p. 35, n. 98), information on alternative readings is frequently provided in the commentary. The commentary offers both a general introduction to the individual sections and an excellent detailed analysis of the text. The volume also includes two maps (the Roman Empire and Italy), a select bibliography and two indices (a general index and an index of Latin words) which cover the commentary (but not the introduction).

In her preface, A. modestly states that "it is the aim of this commentary to enrich students' understanding of Tacitus *Histories 2* at whatever point they encounter the text" (p. VII). While this goal is fully achieved, without doubt the particular book is a valuable resource not only for undergraduate students but also for teachers and scholars.

Despite the wealth of material available, A. has succeeded in providing a commentary that is rich in information and at the same time appropriately dense and concise. The reader will find in it a wide variety of comments that help him/her understand many aspects both of Tacitus' language, style, narrative and historiographical techniques as well as of the historical events described. In particular, A. takes care to make Tacitus' work accessible to students by translating or paraphrasing difficult phrases, supplying what was omitted from the Latin text due to Tacitus' well-known brachylogy (*breuitas*), explaining grammatical and stylistic difficulties of his Latin, providing biographical details for the persons referred to and underlining the general character traits of the protagonists. There is also useful information about military matters and practices or stratagems (cf. e.g. the comments on *dilectus* in p. 120 or the various comments on the components of the ideal general) and A. appears very sensitive to matters of chronology (cf. e.g. p. 150 or p. 231). Tacitus' thought and his narrative and historiographical techniques are often presented in connection with those of his Latin predecessors (especially Sallust and Livy) and highlighted by references to the relevant parallel tradition (Josephus, Plutarch, Suetonius, Cassius Dio), of which A. is well aware. Such a comparative analysis allows her not only to indicate similarities (which are frequently attributed to a common source) and differences, but also to interpret them and thus reveal Tacitus' historiographical perception.

A. knows Tacitus well, which is evident in many cases. There are comments on the words that occur hapax in Tacitus as well as on those that recur elsewhere in his works, while his famous pursuit of *uariatio* at all levels is fully explored. Poetic usages (cf. e.g. *firmitas* for *affirmo* in p. 100 or the hexameter ending of chapter 7 in p. 95) and archaisms (cf. e.g. p. 321) are frequently pointed

out, the *sententiae* are highlighted and it is worth noting that valuable comments are given on Tacitus' treatment of 'suggestive names' (cf. e.g. p. 120 on Certus, pp. 140 and 175 on Martius Macer or p. 255 on Hilarus) or on puns, as for instance the puns on the names of Fuscus (p. 340) and Valens (p. 361). Very often an event is elucidated by comparison with similar ones, while interesting links between persons are investigated through verbal parallels; cf. e.g. the links between Berenice and Cleopatra or between Titus and Nero (p. 79). At the same time there are cases where A. adroitly highlights the way a "stylistic difference implicitly reflects the contrasted characters" of two men, as for example in the *synkrisis* between Vespasian and Mucianus in p. 88, or generally the way Tacitus' syntax mirrors the concept described, appears as a carrier of historical meaning and relates to his historical interpretation of events, as for example in her comments on "the interlaced word order" at 88, 1 (p. 345), on "the rapid-fire syntax (historic infinitives, asyndeton)" in p. 87 (cf. also p. 337) or on the emphatic word-order at 33, 1 (p. 167). This is one of the strongest aspects of this volume. Special emphasis is also given on the figures of speech and thought, the *topoi* and the motifs employed by the historian. There are many valuable comments here and A. is at her best especially when describing *peripeteia*, metaphors, or the role of alliteration. Very often she impresses the reader with her wide range of scholarship which extends not only to philological and historical, but even to archaeological (cf. e.g. the comments on Titus' visit to Cyprus and the digression on the temple of Venus in Paphos (3) in pp. 80–83) and religious questions (cf. e.g. the comments on *Ceriales ludi* (55, 1) in p. 226). Her erudition is especially evident in the great number of parallels offered, which derive not only from Latin literature but also from Homer up to the twentieth century; cf. e.g. the references to Racine and Shakespeare (p. 79), Charlotte Corday's murder of Marat in 1793 (p. 121), Japanese soldiers of the Second World War (p. 213), George Orwell (p. 219). Furthermore, I cannot help but praise A. for her fruitful attempts to scrutinise cases in which Tacitus deliberately evokes different genres (cf. e.g. pp. 279–281).

A. has a good command of the relevant bibliography and this is another merit of her book. It is skilfully exploited both in the introductory comments to individual sections (the introductions to 2, 1–7 and 2, 46–51 are characteristic examples) and in the detailed analysis of the text, which in parallel with the previous knowledge also include insightful and sometimes original material that offers valuable food for thought.

I have noted some suggestions and corrections, many of them of minor importance, which, however, do not diminish the value of this volume.

The Latin text (pp. 37–72) is slightly marred by errors. There are some further departures from Heubner's edition, apart from those mentioned in p. 36, which seem to be misprints, as for example A.'s *tradita a Cinyra* (3, 1), instead of Heubner's *tradit a Cinyra*, or A.'s *Pacarius* (16, 2) and *Pacarium* (16, 3), instead of Heubner's *Picarius* and *Picarium*. Although *Pacarius* and *Pacarium* are supported by manuscripts, A. has already printed *Picarii* a few lines earlier (16, 1) and prefers "Picarius" in the commentary (pp. 120 f.) as well as in the introduction (p. 13). A.'s *Galli* (68, 2), instead of *Gallis*, another obvious misprint, is printed correctly in the commentary (p. 264).

Furthermore, the text commented on is not always the same with the text edited. The most serious departures concern adoption of different readings. Let me give two examples in which in her edition A. has abandoned readings favoured by Heubner (further departures, which are also not mentioned in p. 36), but adopts them in her commentary: at 51 A. has printed *digressus*, but in the commentary she prints *degressus* (p. 217), the reading adopted by Heubner; similarly, at 53, 2 A. has printed *percontarentur*, while in the commentary she prints *percunctarentur* (p. 222), the reading of M, adopted by Heubner. Besides, while A. has correctly printed *diductis* at 68, 2 (also in the commentary, p. 265), in p. 264 (line 31) she prefers the reading *deductis*. I have also noted some departures in punctuation (e.g. 54, 1: *...uictores; uersam...* and 54.2: *formidinem quod* in the edition of the text, but *...uictores, uersam...* (p. 224) and *formidinem, quod* (p. 225) in the commentary), as well as some misprints (e.g. *percrebu<er>it, necat ut, Vitelii, concilarent, Lugduni, a Lugduno* and *Asicaticos* in the commentary on 26, 2 (p. 148), 48, 1 (p. 208), 52, 1 (p. 220), 58, 2 (p. 236), 59, 3 (p. 239), 65, 1 (p. 255) and 95, 3 (p. 367) respectively, which are obvious misprints

of *percrebru<er>it, nec ut, Vitellii, conciliarent, Luguduni, a Luguduno* and *Asiaticos*, printed correctly in the edition of the text; cf. also cases of inconsistent spelling, as for instance 80, 2: *affluentia*, but in p. 312: *adfluentia*).

There are cases where A.'s statements, albeit suggestive, seem speculative; cf. e.g. "Agricola's prominent position suggests that he must have sensed T.'s promise" (p. 1) or "No doubt the closer he advanced to his own era in the missing books of the *Histories*, the more pervasive such references would have become" (p. 28). The fact that Macer is wounded by a lance thrown from a distance (36, 1: "uolneratum eminus lancea") does not necessarily mean that he is brave, as A. asserts in p. 140.

Tacitus ambivalent stance on pro-Flavian accounts (pp. 32–34) is attributed exclusively to his intention for objectivity: "What is at stake for T. is no less than the credibility of his historical narrative and ultimately, his own posthumous fame" (p. 32). However, his possible intention to disassociate himself from the previous regime, by which he was honoured and which he served, as well as his likely attempt to flatter Trajan should not be excluded; cf. *Agr.* 1–3 and see e.g. M. Griffin, *Pliny and Tacitus*, SCI XXVIII 1999, pp. 139–158, esp. at pp. 152–155; more generally for this practice, cf. E.S. Ramage, *Juvenal and the Establishment: Denigration of Predecessor in the Satires*, ANRW II 33, 1 (1989), pp. 640–707; K. Strobel, *Plinius und Domitian: Der willige Helfer eines Unrechtssystems? Zur Problematik historischer Aussagen in den Werken des jüngeren Plinius*, in: L. Castagna, E. Lefèvre (eds.), *Plinius der Jüngere und seine Zeit*, München–Leipzig 2003 (Beiträge zur Altertumskunde 187), pp. 303–314.

On *melioribus* at 17, 1 (p. 123) and *melioiorem...causam* at 77, 3 (p. 301) a reference to Lucan's treatment of the *causa melior* notion, also in the context of civil war, would be a welcome addition; see S. Tzounakas, *Echoes of Lucan in Tacitus: the Cohortationes of Pompey and Calgacus*, in: C. Deroux (ed.), *Studies in Latin Literature and Roman History*, vol. XII, Bruxelles 2005 (Collection Latomus 287), pp. 395–413, at p. 400.

Commenting on 1, 3: "sin Vespasianus rem publicam susciperet, obliuiscendum offensarum de bello agitantibus", A. notes (p. 78): "T. unusually uses a gerund, *obliuiscendum*, rather than an infinitive". However, *obliuiscendum* is not a gerund here but a gerundive, which in combination with the omitted infinitive of *sum* forms here the periphrastic conjugation of the passive (impersonal syntax, for which see e.g. E.C. Woodcock, *A New Latin Syntax*, London 1959, p. 163). On the other hand, in the phrase "qui ad spectandum conuenerant" (68, 2), *spectandum* is a gerund, not a gerundive, as A. mistakenly has written (p. 264: "ad + a gerundive of purpose").

In p. 134 (on 21, 2) A. notes: "*in leui habitum*: sc. *est*. This expression, the direct object of the verb *maerebant*, only recurs at *A.* 3.54.4 in Classical Latin (WM 395)". I cannot understand how the expression *in leui habitum est* could be the direct object of the verb *maerebant*.

A.'s comment in p. 211 "T. himself delivered his [*scil.* Verginius Rufus'] funeral oration, a *memorable...spectaculum* (Plin. *Ep.* 2.1.1)" is not absolutely accurate, since it gives the impression that Pliny has characterised the particular *laudatio funebris* as a *memorable spectaculum*. Although Pliny does extol Tacitus as a *laudator eloquentissimus* (Plin. *Ep.* II 1, 6: "Laudatus est a consule Cornelio Tacito; nam hic supremus felicitati eius cumulus accessit, laudator eloquentissimus"), his phrase *memorable...spectaculum* refers not to the funeral oration delivered by Tacitus, but to the public funeral (*publicum funus*) of Verginius Rufus: "Post aliquot annos insigne atque etiam memorabile populi Romani oculis spectaculum exhibuit publicum funus Vergini Rufi, maximi et clarissimi ciuis, perinde felicitis" (Plin. *Ep.* II 1, 1).

In p. 326 the *Declamationes maiores* is attributed to Quintilian, while this work is now regarded as spurious; see e.g. D.R. Shackleton Bailey, *More on Pseudo-Quintilian's Longer Declamations*, HSCPh LXXXVIII 1984, pp. 113–137.

The Greek technical term is κακέμφατον, not κατέμφατον (p. 376).

In p. 25 there is confusion in the references to Sallust's works; so read *Cat.* 10–11, instead of *Jug.* 10–11 (line 14), *Cat.* 6–9, instead of *Jug.* 6–9 (line 17), *Cat.* 10, 1, instead of *Jug.* 10, 1 (n. 70).

There are some inconsistencies in the *ars citandi*. Let me give some examples: while Tacitus' *Germania* is generally abbreviated *G.* (cf. p. IX), in p. 314 it appears as *Germ.*; similarly, his *Histories* are generally abbreviated *H.* (cf. e.g. p. 117), but in p. 99 we read *Hist.* References to Seneca's *Dialogues* would have been improved by better editing; cf. e.g. p. 330: "*De ira* 16.6" (instead of *De ira* I 16, 6), also in p. 375: "*Ira* 16.6", but in p. 241: "Sen. *Dial.* 3.2.1"; p. 326: "Sen. *Marc. Cons.* 6.9.3" (instead of Sen. *Marc. Cons.* 9, 3), but in p. 203: "Senecan innovation (*D.* 6.15.3)"; p. 327: "Sen. *Tranq.* 9.2.13" (instead of Sen. *Tranq.* 2, 13). In p. 308 we read "Cic. *Arch.* 4", but in p. 181 "Cic. *Arch.* 10.23", i.e. with double references (both chapter and section). While A. notes that "Journal titles are abbreviated in accordance with *L'année philologique*" (p. IX), in the case of Morgan (1993b) we read *Rh. Mus.* instead of *RhM*, which however is retained in the case of Townend (1962a). In the Bibliography (p. 385), the abbreviated first name of Connors (C. = Catherine) is omitted.

Generally speaking, A. uses modern terminology (e.g. p. 12: "internal focalisation", p. 166: "intertext", p. 185: "deconstructs", p. 231: "emblematic", p. 280: "metatheatrically", p. 294: "marginalising", p. 306: "subtext", p. 349: "metaliterary sense"), but the disparaging "Silver Latin" (p. 329) for the literature of the Imperial Age is now obsolete.

In sum, apart from these, sometimes trivial, details, A. has produced a learned, lucid and enjoyable volume with stimulating, even ingenious, interpretations and of much merit. I am sure that it will greatly promote Tacitean studies and I hope that A. finds worthy imitators.

Spyridon Tzounakas  
University of Cyprus

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**Jana Nechutová, *Die lateinische Literatur des Mittelalters in Böhmen*, Köln–Weimar–Wien: Böhlau Verlag, 2007, 371 S., ISBN 978-3-412-20070-1.**

Jana Nechutová [= N.] ist klassische Philologin von Beruf, und ihr besonderes Interessengebiet ist die Literatur des Mittelalters. Während ihrer Beschäftigung mit der lateinischen Literatur übersetzte sie Prosa und Lyrik, sowohl aus der Antike (Sueton, Claudian, Lucan), als auch aus dem Mittelalter (Fortunatus, Claretus, Canis). Sie arbeitet als Professorin an der Universität Brünn, wo ihre Forschung der Geschichte des lateinischen Mittelalters und der Literatur der böhmischen Reformation gewidmet ist. Langjährige genaue Untersuchungen auf diesem Feld trugen im Jahre 2000 Früchte in der Gestalt eines Buches über die Geschichte der lateinsprachigen Literatur des böhmischen Mittelalters (*Latinská literatura českého středověku do roku 1400*, Praha 2000).

Die Literatur und Kultur der mittelalterlichen Epoche erfreut sich großen Interesses seitens vieler Wissenschaftler, vor allem aus Westeuropa; ihren reichen Niederschlag zeigt N. in der benutzten Literatur des hier besprochenen Buches. Der Nachlass von Wissenschaftlern, die auf dem Gebiet des heutigen Italien, Frankreich, der Britischen Inseln oder Deutschlands leben, ist weithin bekannt und gehört zum gemeinsamen europäischen Erbe in der weitesten Bedeutung dieses Wortes. In Ostmitteleuropa gibt es viel weniger solcher Arbeiten, vor allem wenn es darum geht, das Problem aus der Perspektive von komplexen Forschungen darzustellen. Eine ruhmreiche Ausnahme bildet das Buch von Teresa Michałowska (*Średniowiecze*, Warszawa 1995), das die Geschichte der polnischen mittelalterlichen Literatur bis zum Ende des 15. Jahrhunderts umfasst. Arbeiten von mittelalterlichen Autoren aus dem slawischen Umfeld bleiben oft in der Form einer Handschrift, so wie sie vor Jahrhunderten geschrieben worden sind. Es ist also schwer, einzuschätzen, inwieweit die

westeuropäischen Autoren Einfluss auf ihr Schaffen ausgeübt haben und wie breit die Rezeption ihrer Werke außerhalb ihrer Entstehungsorte war.

Mit umso größerer Freude muss man die deutsche Ausgabe einer Geschichte lateinischen Literatur des böhmischen Mittelalters begrüßen, deren Autorin schon im Vorwort zu dieser Ausgabe den großen Einfluss von deutschen Autoren auf die Entwicklung böhmischer Literatur im Mittelalter unterstreicht. Das Buch besteht aus zwei großen Teilen. Der erste umfasst die Geschichte der lateinischen Literatur des böhmischen Mittelalters von ihren Anfängen (im 10. Jahrhundert) bis zum Ende des 13. Jahrhunderts. Er gliedert sich in fünf Abschnitte: Hagiographie (u. a. Wenzels- und Ludmila-, Kyrill- und Method-, Adalbert-, Prokop-Legenden), Historiographie (u. a. die Böhmisches Chronik des Cosmas, die Annalen Vincencius und Gerlachs, selbstständige Chroniken und Annalen des 12. und 13. Jahrhunderts), Lyrische Dichtung, Lieder und Drama, Homiletik sowie Gattungen aus dem Grenzraum zwischen Literatur und Diplomatie (Diplomatie und Rhetorik – Formulare und Dictamina). Der zweite Teil stellt die Literatur aus der Zeit der Luxemburger bis Jan Hus dar, d. h. etwa bis 1400. Dieser Teil des Buches wurde in elf Abschnitte gegliedert, die (dort, wo das möglich war) parallel zum ersten Teil verlaufen. Neben Hagiographie (*Vita Agnetis*, die Wenzels-hagiographie des 14. Jahrhunderts, legendistische Biographie) und Historiographie (z. B. Chroniken und Chronisten der Zeit Karls IV., Reisebeschreibungen) wird das literarische Schaffen Karls IV. beleuchtet; der Protohumanismus, der an seinem Hof seinen Anfang nahm, das Schaffen von Bartloměj von Chlumec, Claretus genannt, Werke aus dem Grenzraum zwischen Rhetorik und Diplomatie, weltliche Poesie (u. a. Betteldichtungen, Trinklieder und Gedichte aus dem Studentenleben), Unterhaltungsliteratur (u. a. *Summa recreatorum*, *Tripartitus moralium*, Exempel), geistliche Lyrik und – spezifisch für diese Stufe der Literaturentwicklung – das Schrifttum der böhmischen Spiritualität des 14. Jahrhunderts (klösterliche Frömmigkeit und orthodoxe Reform, „die Vorläufer von Hussitentum“) sowie das Schaffen der Theologen, Philosophen, Ärzte, Mathematiker, Astronomen und Juristen, die mit der Universität Karls IV. in Prag verbunden waren. Die Geschichte der mittelalterlichen Literatur wird also nach literarischen Gattungen präsentiert, und im Bereich dieser Abschnitte wird das Schaffen einzelner Autoren chronologisch dargestellt. Außerdem finden sich in den Anmerkungen zahlreiche Nachschlagewerke, wo die angesprochenen Probleme noch ausführlicher behandelt werden. Am Schluss befinden sich Zusammenfassungen. Die Geschichte wird begleitend dargestellt mittels chronologischer Tafeln, die nicht nur die Entstehungszeit einzelner lateinsprachiger Werke und ihre Autoren zeigen, sondern auch Werke der böhmischen Literatur in kirchenslawischer und deutscher Sprache. Dort sind auch die wichtigsten Ereignisse aus der politischen Geschichte Böhmens aufgeführt. Das Buch informiert über die Abkürzungen der zitierten Quellen und beinhaltet eine sehr umfangreiche Bibliographie und einen Index, in dem sich Eigennamen und Titel oder Incipits der im Buch beschriebenen Werke wiederfinden.

In der Einleitung hebt N. hervor, dass sich die Arbeit als ein Buch für Leser versteht, die sich für die böhmische mittelalterliche Literatur in der lateinischen Sprache interessieren, ebenso als Handbuch für Studenten der klassischen Philologie, Neolatinistik, Bohemistik und Geschichte. Die klare Gliederung der Arbeit erleichtert das Studium. Die Zusammenstellung einzelner Teile zeigt deutlich die Wandlung der böhmischen Literatur, die sich im 14. Jahrhundert vollzogen hat, sowohl in quantitativer, als auch in qualitativer Hinsicht. Alle Abschnitte und deren Teile sind mit Einleitungen versehen worden, die die jeweilige Epoche charakterisieren, mit geschichtlichem Hintergrund, Erklärung der literarischen Gattung sowie der kulturellen und religiösen Strömungen. An verschiedenen Stellen erklärt N. in Bezug auf die lateinische oder griechische Etymologie die Bedeutung literarischer Termini wie z. B. *Legende*, *Topos*, *Hagiographie* oder *loci communes*. Während sie das Schaffen einzelner Dichter beschreibt, gibt N. kurze biographische Notizen, erzählt hier und da den Inhalt ihrer jeweiligen Werke und gibt Informationen über die schon bestehenden oder für die nächste Zukunft geplanten Editionen dieser Quellen, was man als einen großen Vorteil des Buches loben muss.

Die Autorin berührt viele Probleme und Fragestellungen, die die Wissenschaftler und Leser bewegen, die sich mit mittelalterlichen Werken befassen. Das Hauptproblem bilden die zeitlichen

Rahmen, vor allem der *terminus ad quem*, also im Fall des hier besprochenen Buches, das Hinführen der Literaturgeschichte bis zur Zeit von Hus. N. begründet diese Grenzziehung auf zweifache Art und Weise. Erstens hat das Wirken von Jan Hus und seiner Anhänger für immer die Situation in Böhmen geändert, zweitens, muss man bedenken, dass die hussitische Zeit eine der am besten bearbeiteten Epochen ist, sowohl unter dem sich wechselnden religiösen, als auch unter dem literarischen Gesichtspunkt.

Das zweite Problem ist der Vorrang ausschließlich der böhmischen Literatur, die auf lateinisch geschrieben worden ist. Hier sind die Auswahlkriterien auch praktischer Natur, weil, wie N. meint, heutzutage die mittelalterliche böhmische Literatur gut bekannt ist und verstanden wird, außer dieser, die auf lateinisch verfasst worden ist. An dieser Stelle lesen wir ein überzeugendes Argument, dass es nur wenige gibt, die mit Begeisterung das *Stabat Mater* von Dvořak in Bezug auf den Text hören, weil die lateinische Sprache lediglich einer kleinen Zahl von Hörer geläufig ist, dass man das Werk getrost als unverständlich bezeichnen kann.

Ein anderes Problem bildet die Frage, was aus Mittelalter als ein literarischer Text angesehen werden kann. N. löst sie so, dass sie praktisch jeden Text, der mit Böhmen verbunden ist und in diesem zeitlichen Rahmen entstand, für einen literarischen Text erklärt. Das ermöglicht auch solche Texte aufzunehmen, die zum Teil literarisch sind, weil ihre Erstellung manche Kenntnisse über die Poetik und Rhetorik verlangt (vor allem Einleitungen und Ende), zum Teil sind sie aber Formulare zum Ausfüllen (*dictamina*), sowie historische Dokumente, rhetorische Traktate (*artes dictandi*), Texte aus dem Bereich Medizin und Astronomie, ja selbst Jurakodizes. Die Funktion des Buches als akademisches Handbuch scheint solche Kriterien für die Definition von Literatur zu rechtfertigen.

Eine andere, sehr wichtige Fragestellung ist das Aufstellen von Kriterien, welche Quellen man als „böhmische“ Literatur bezeichnen kann. Diese ist viel breiter und verbindet sich mit der Frage der Benutzung des Namens „Nation“ in Bezug auf das Mittelalter, vor allem, wenn von Literatur die Rede ist, die in einer übernationalen, paneuropäischen Sprache entstanden ist, welche damals das Latein war. Hier meint N., dass jeder Text, der sich auf irgendeine Art und Weise mit Böhmen verbinden lässt, erklärt die Tatsache, dass man ihn für einen Teil der tschechischen Literatur hält. Diese Zusammenhänge beziehen sich in zweifelhaften Situationen sowohl darauf, dass sich ein Autor zeit seines Lebens zeitlich in Böhmen aufhielt (wie Martinus Polonus), oder aus Böhmen stammte (wie St. Adalbert, deshalb werden die *vitae Adalberti* in verschiedenen Kapiteln besprochen), oder darauf, dass er einen großen Einfluss auf die böhmischen Dichter eingeübt hat (wie Peregrinus aus Oppeln, dessen Predigten sich einer großen Popularität erfreuten; ein Zeichen dafür ist der Bestand an Handschriften, die seine *sermones* beinhalten). Man muss der Autorin Recht geben, denn die damaligen Ländergrenzen stimmten nicht überein mit den Grenzen mancher Ordensprovinzen, etwa der Dominikaner, aus deren Mitte sowohl Martin als auch Peregrinus stammten. Auch brachte man die Kodizes an andere Orte, man überschrieb sie, womit man nicht selten ein „Plagiat“ herstellte (ein Wort, das das Mittelalter nicht kennt), man las sie schließlich, weil sie in einer Sprache geschrieben wurden, die alle Nicht-Analphabeten kannten. Solch weite Grenzen können aber unter Umständen auch ausufern. Als ein Beispiel kann hier der Fakt dienen, dass N. die *Vita quinque fratrum* des Bruno von Querfurt für einen immanenten Teil der böhmischen Literatur hält, und zwar aus zwei Gründen. Erstens, weil er der Autor der Adalbertsvita war, und zweitens, weil mit Adalberts Reliquien im Jahre 1039 auch die Überreste von fünf Brüdern in Polen geraubt wurden. Man kann natürlich auch anmerken, dass es im Mittelalter solche Autoren gab, deren literarisches Erbe mehreren Nationen gehört. Im Falle des Bruno von Querfurt wird das sowohl die polnische, als auch die deutsche oder böhmische Literatur sein. Am Rande muss man anmerken, dass die von N. angeführte Tradition, dass St. Adalbert der Autor der *Bogurodzica* (*Muttergottes*, mittelalterliches Marienlied, die erste polnische Hymne) gewesen sei, absolut nicht begründet ist und heute kaum mehr im Gespräch ist.

Sehr interessant ist der Teil des Buches, der über den spezifisch böhmischen Charakter der Literatur im 14. Jahrhundert erzählt. Das 15. Kapitel wird der Darstellung von Autoren und Texten aus dem Bereich der Mystik und Geistigkeit gewidmet, die Anhänger und z. T. Wegbereiter der



sog. *devotio moderna* waren und die auf individuelle Formen der Frömmigkeit Wert legten und die mit ihnen verbundenen Sakramente der Kommunion und der Beichte. Den zweiten Teil dieses Kapitels nimmt die Besprechung von Schaffen und Denken der Autoren ein, die N. „die Vorläufer des Hussitentums“ nennt, das eine gewisse Einleitung für die folgende Epoche bildet. Ebenso wichtig sind die Analysen zur Literatur, die an der Prager Universität entstanden ist, wo Wissenschaftler gelehrt haben, die größtenteils Lehrer von Jan Hus waren.

Im Teil, der die Literatur in der Zeit der Luxemburger beschreibt, gibt es keinen eigenen Teil zum Predigtschrifttum dieser Zeit, Erwägungen über die Homiletik treten lediglich bei der Beschreibung des Schaffens einzelner Autoren hervor. Beispielsweise wurde das *exemplum* im Teil „Unterhaltungsliteratur“, neben der *Summa recreatorum*, untergebracht. Dadurch verliert es, wie es scheint, seine ursprüngliche, paränetische Funktion. Wenn der Leser sich das Entstehen des Predigtschrifttums in dieser Zeit vorstellen will, wird er gezwungen, nach Informationen zu suchen, die über den gesamten Teil verstreut sind (fast 200 Seiten); das erscheint ja umso wichtiger, als dass in dieser Zeit die Kanzel immer noch zu den wichtigsten Medien gehörte. Diese Idee der Autorin kann man vielleicht so erklären, dass im 14. Jahrhundert fast alle Geistlichen Predigten gehalten haben, also auch (oder vor allem) Universitätslehrer. Damit sich die Namen nicht wiederholen, wurde ihres homiletischen Schaffens bei jedem Namen beschrieben.

Wir haben es hier mit einem Buch zu tun, das gut durchdacht ist, präzise gegliedert und mit neuesten Forschungsergebnissen (z. B. stammt die Information über den Fund des lateinischen Fragments der *Chronik* von Dalimil aus dem Jahr 2005) aufwartet. Eines seiner besonderen Vorteile ist die Komplexität des Themas. Das Buch von N. bietet Informationen über die gesamte böhmische Literatur des Mittelalters, die in Latein verfasst wurde. Es bleibt zwar die Frage nach den bis jetzt nicht entdeckten Schätzen in den Handschriftenabteilungen der Bibliotheken, aber auch bei diesem Thema bleibt die Arbeit von N. eine, die auf dem Büchermarkt nicht übersehen werden darf. Sie erlaubt nicht nur das tiefe Kennenlernen der böhmischen Literatur, sondern stellt auch eine vergleichende Studie zur Geschichte der mittelalterlichen Literaturen im östlichen Europa dar.

Teresa Szostek  
Universität Wrocław

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**Piotr Urbański (ed.), *Pietas Humanistica. Neo-Latin Religious Poetry in Poland in European Context*, Frankfurt/M.: Peter Lang, 2006, 310 pp., ISBN 978-3-631-55010-6.**

*Pietas Humanistica*, a collection of essays on Neo-Latin religious poetry in Poland, edited by Professor Piotr Urbański, is one of the most ambitious and most successful projects in Neo-Latin studies in recent years. This is a unique and exceptional project, the first book in English of this scope about Eastern European literature written in Latin in the Early Modern period.

The most important advantage of such a collective monograph is the opportunity to cover more topics than any one author can master. Such a collective work makes it possible to present a broad spectrum of views and discoveries. The diversity of this volume does not make it inconsistent: all contributions, regardless of the scholarly experience of their authors, are of remarkable quality. There are significant differences in style because some of the papers were written by native speakers of English, some were written in English by non-native speakers and some were translated into English by the language editor of the volume, Dr. Krzysztof Fordoński. Thanks to his effort, there are no stylistic incongruities in the book.

Although there is an exceptional variety of topics discussed, the volume was not divided into separate units. The chapters are placed in chronological order, from the synthetic overview of Latin religious poetry in Medieval Poland as a predecessor of Humanist poetry (a paper by Maciej Włodarski) to a short description of religious poetry in Szczecin (Stettin), published mostly in the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries (a contribution by the volume editor, Piotr Urbański).

Some papers have ambitions of presenting a synthetic overview of the selected problem, but most are case studies of the significant phenomena in Neo-Latin poetry in Poland. It is an unquestionable achievement of Professor Urbański that he managed to collect in a single volume papers devoted to all most significant Neo-Latin authors and works published in Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth from the end of the 15<sup>th</sup> to the beginning of the 18<sup>th</sup> centuries and invited so many highly qualified scholars – both distinguished Polish scholars, already well published in Neo-Latin studies (Maciej Włodarski, Elwira Buszewicz, Ewa J. Głębińska, Janusz S. Gruchała, Barbara Milewska-Ważbińska, Jakub Z. Lichański, Józef Budzyński), excellent scholars from outside Poland interested in Polish Neo-Latin poetry (Ann Moss, David Money, Elizabeth Klecker and Jeanine De Landtsheer) and younger Polish scholars who have already proved their mastery in Neo-Latin studies (e.g. Anna Kapuścińska, Hanna Szabelska, Agata Chrobot and many others). It can be said without exaggeration that all important Neo-Latin poets and all important Neo-Latin contemporary scholars are included in the volume which can be called the first and highly representative monograph of Latin religious poetry in Renaissance and Baroque Poland.

The volume is constructed in such a way that all significant Neo-Latin poets are included here: Paul of Krosno, Stanisław Hozjusz (Stanislaus Hosius), Andrzej Krzycki (Andreas Cricius), Jan Dantyszek (Ioannes Dantiscus), Andrzej Trzecieski (Andreas Tricesius), Szymon Szymonowicz (Simon Simonides), Maciej Kazimierz Sarbiewski (Matthias Casimirus Sarbievius – deservedly discussed in four articles), Albert Ines, Wespazjan Kochowski, and Stanisław Konarski (Stanislaus Konarscius). The only major author missing here is Klemens Janicki (Janitius). There are also articles about: Latin epigrams collected by Szymon Starowolski (published in *Monumenta Sarmatarum*); drama and poetry devoted to King Bolesław the Bold; minor poets important for other reasons (*Hypomnena Franciscanum* by Maurycy Kielkowski as an example of pattern poetry; school poetical prayer in Silesian grammar schools; parodies on religious themes of Horace in *Ipse faciet* by Jacob Monavius; and the final essay on Neo-Latin poetry in Szczecin/Stettin).

*Pietas Humanistica* is basically a collection of sophisticated case studies on particular poets and their works, written by authors whose erudition and learning is unquestionable and leads to fascinating observations. It is impossible to discuss in such a short review all valuable contributions published in the volume. Let me concentrate on a few articles which might be especially interesting for all students of literature in the Latin language.

In his article on Latin religious poetry in Medieval Poland, Maciej Włodarski characterizes a number of poems, most of them directly or indirectly connected with Roman Catholic liturgy. These poems are not expressions of humanistic piety and the only reason for including them in this volume might be an attempt to present the background of religious poetry during the age of Humanism. The author himself wrote in his conclusions that his “short overview of Latin religious poetry written in the Polish Middle Ages should allow the reader to see [not only the] formal richness of works created in this period but also the meticulous care the authors paid to proper choice, richness and variety of artistic devices [...]. It is difficult to state to what degree humanist poets relied upon the achievements of the Middle Ages. As far as religious works are concerned, these achievements might have been an important point of reference”. The author himself admits that there is not a direct link between typical Medieval religious poetry discussed in his essay and *pietas humanistica*.

The next article, by Rafał Wójcik, is devoted to an obscure poem *Conquesturus eram de te, Fortuna, miramque...* by Nicholas de Polonia. It was interesting to learn about the controversies of the motif of the *Fortuna* at the end of the Middle Ages and the beginning of the Renaissance, but the author concentrated in his article on pondering the authorship of the poem. Four possible

authors are taken into account but no solution to the problem of authorship of the poem was given and we could only admire the erudition of the author as a student of late Medieval literature and history.

The third article in the collection, about traditional Christian prayers in Polish Neo-Latin Poetry (from Paul of Krosno to Albert Ines) by Elwira Buszewicz, is the first paper in the volume devoted to humanist poetry and a brilliant piece of scholarship showing outstanding analytical skills. The metaphor of pouring new wine into old wineskin, taken from the Gospel of St. Luke, is used by the author to show “that the Neo-Latin poetry, also in the Christian piety domain, might have been a flexible medium for expressing complicated human thoughts and emotions”.

In her profound and thought-provoking study on *Paraphrasis in psalmum quinquagesimum*, another excellent Neo-Latin scholar of the younger generation, Anna Kapuścińska, provides very convincing evidence that “Hosius’ understanding of pagan and Christian sources is the main reason why his paraphrase can be called a Renaissance and humanistic poem as well as a propitiatory and penitential prayer. Doctrinal penetration, return *ad fontes* and open access to humanist intellectual culture produced this great and very early example of a new poetical method and language of psalmic poetry, probably the earliest in European Neo-Latin literature”.

The work of Hosius is one of the many examples discussed in the book which show that Neo-Latin poetry written in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth is a partner on equal terms with Latin poetry written in Western Europe. At that time there were no real borders for the humanists. People like Hosius, Dantiscus or Sarbievius, well travelled and well educated, were authors of works famous among intellectual circles of Western Europe.

*Carmina* written by Andreas Cricius is another example of a poetic work written by a Polish poet who was a citizen of the world with no inhibitions about his education or poetical skills. Although he would never consider himself to be a “professional poet” (if there were any “professional poets” at that time!) and he treated his artistic work as a form of entertainment (sometimes very controversial), his poems are considered to be excellent examples of humanistic literary output. In her article Agnieszka Dziuba concentrates on about 20 poems entitled in Cricius’s collection of poetry *Carmina sacra*. The conclusions of the article are not revealing, but emphasize the originality of Cricius on the background of the mainstream religious poetry of the period: “Andreas Cricius, a person full of passion, tried to avoid monotony in his prayers using interesting poetical concepts [...]. Some of Cricius’s verses take interesting forms: epitaph, votive offering or poetical letter of recommendation [...]. His religious poetry is fresh and uncommon, written in correct Latin, testifying to the rhetoric[al] education of its author”.

In her inventive article on *Hymni aliquot ecclesiastici* by Joannes Dantiscus, Ann Moss discusses his hymns in the context of the Prudentian tradition and of other humanist hymns by Zacharias Ferreri (Ferrerius), a papal nuncio to Poland, and a Lutheran poet, Georgius Fabricius (Georg Goldsmid), “perhaps the most accomplished hymn-writer of the period to compose within the liturgical framework”. Ann Moss aptly observes that “Dantiscus [...] was at some pains to signal the dual heritage from which he has generated his hymns: on the one hand, the erudite and devout *docta pietas humanistica* of Erasmus and of the pre-Reformation, and, on the other, the office hymns of the breviary. Connecting both, there was Prudentius. Dantiscus himself, however, wrote new hymns, not commentaries either on Prudentius or on the office cycle”. An unknown poem by Dantiscus (the epitaph for Alfonso de Valdes in St. Stephen’s cathedral in Vienna) is discussed in an article by Anna Skolimowska.

It is not a surprise that in such a volume there are four articles (72 pages in total) about Maciej Kazimierz Sarbiewski, undoubtedly the most interesting Polish Neo-Latin poet of the period. The authors discuss his poetry from various perspectives. In her sophisticated and erudite study on “poetical incarnations of dialectical *Via Docendi*” Hanna Szabelska discusses two authors educated in the Aristotelian tradition, Philip Melanchthon and Maciej Kazimierz Sarbiewski, “to show the methodological consequences of taking onboard the most basic linguistic level in research on poetry”. Her analysis of only two poems, *Ad hospites Hamburgenses* by Melanchthon and *Ad*

*Philidium Marabotinum* by Sarbiewski leads to very interesting conclusions. Most importantly, according to the author “it seems essential to integrate the interpretation of Sarbiewski’s poetry with the dialectical rudiments of his education”.

Two other interesting articles on the mystery of Incarnation in the works of Sarbiewski (by Maria Łukaszewicz-Chantry) and on Sarbiewski’s religious epigrams (by Justyna Zaborowska-Musiał) are followed by an extensive, large scale study by David Money on *Aspects of the Reception of Sarbiewski in England: From Hils, Vaughan, and Watts to Coleridge, Bowring, Walker, and Coxe*. Following numerous previous studies on selected aspects of the reception of Sarbiewski’s works (among them an important contribution by the volume editor Piotr Urbański published in his *Theologia Fabulosa. Commentationes Sarbievianae*), Money adds much new comparative criticism to the already published research results on this subject. He proves how important Sarbiewski was for many generations of poets of the English language, from the 17<sup>th</sup> to the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

A few other Neo-Latin religious poets are discussed in *Pietas Humanistica* and all essays published in the volume present new aspects of the issues discussed: Ewa J. Głębińska writes about Szymon Szymonowicz (she is the author of an excellent book about Latin poetry of Szymonowicz), Agnieszka Borysowska concentrates on *Marian Poetry by Albert Ines*, one of the most interesting Jesuit authors, and Ewa Szczepan discusses Marian poetry by an eighteenth century writer, Stanisław Konarski, who is much better known in Poland as an active participant in the process of political and educational reforms in the age of Enlightenment. The poems he wrote as a young Piarist monk are interesting examples of religious lyrics in a Baroque style. Jarosław Nowaszczuk discusses prayers included in an extremely interesting collection of Latin epigraphs – *Monumenta Sarmatarum* by Szymon Starowolski. Janusz S. Gruchała in a convincing way rehabilitates the Latin poem *Rubus Incombustus* by Wespazjan Kochowski, treated condescendingly by older scholars who were unable to appreciate its advantages value as an original example of a literary species called *elogium*. Barbara Milewska-Ważbińska devotes her article to an interesting example of religious pattern (visual) poetry, *Hypomnena Franciscanum* by Maurycy Kielkowski. It should be appreciated that the rich heritage of visual poetry written in Latin in Poland is represented in this volume.

Other essays included in the volume are devoted mainly to single and minor authors and works (Joseph Wallner, Virgilius Gleissenberg, Jacobus Monavius). Two more contributions should be highlighted here: essays on school poetical prayer in Silesian grammar schools (by Józef Budzyński) and on Neo-Latin religious poetry in Stettin (by Piotr Urbański). They are important as short overviews of Neo-Latin writing in two regions which were not parts of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth but for historical, cultural and economic reasons had close connections with the Polish lands. A lot of research still has to be done in order to present an objective and comprehensive overview of Pomeranian and Silesian Neo-Latin poetry and prose.

*Pietas humanistica* is a volume of exceptional value as the first such extensive survey of Neo-Latin poetry in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Most major authors and problems were covered in the book. The editor was successful in inviting a group of leading scholars involved in studying Neo-Latin literature in Eastern Europe. The result of this collective work can only be admired. This is undoubtedly one of the most important books in Neo-Latin studies published in recent decades and it deserves the attention of all students of literature written in Latin.

Piotr Wilczek

*Institute for Interdisciplinary Studies “Artes Liberales”, University of Warsaw*

**Craig W. Kallendorf (ed.),** *A Companion to the Classical Tradition*, advisory editors Ward Briggs, Julia Gaisser, Charles Martindale, Malden–Oxford–Carlton: Blackwell Publishing, 2007, XI, 491 pp., 27 figures, 4 maps.

*A Companion to the Classical Tradition* [= CCT] is part of the “Blackwell Companions to the Ancient World” series. Its aim is to present, in a very concise and clear way, the state of research of the most important problems referring to wide-ranging antiquity (history, culture, literature, classical tradition). Each volume consists of short essays by specialists in a particular discipline, whose topic is determined by general issues discussed by a given *Companion*. It ensures multilateral view on each subject. Naturally, such short texts can only outline issues; however, they encourage to further research. CCT is not an exception here.

CCT has three divisions: “Periods”, “Places” and “Contemporary Themes”, preceded by a chapter concerning the presence of the ancient tradition in the educational system (*Education*, pp. 5–14). Moreover, at the beginning of the volume there is a list of figures, maps and short notes on contributors; at the end there is an index of names that occur in the text and, most importantly, extensive bibliography (pp. 408–470). The latter is very useful for researchers of reception of antiquity. It is a review of the most important books concerning the issue of presence of the classical tradition on all levels discussed in the CCT. In addition, after each chapter, the reader will find a list of further reading on the subject concerned.

The *Introduction* (pp. 1–4) to the companion is an essay written by the editor of the book, Craig W. Kallendorf. The author gives the foundations of the volume and suggests that it is aimed at “nonspecialists, from advanced undergraduates and postgraduate students to general readers and professors in other fields” (p. 1). The main purpose of the book is to be a guide that gives readers a possibility to do their own further research. The author attempts to define the notion of the “classical tradition” referring to the established concept by Gilbert Highet, the author of *The Classical Tradition. Greek and Roman Influences on Western Literature* (Oxford 1949). Kallendorf takes a different view, which is the consequence of his different methodological approach. The “classical tradition” is not a complete and defined set of values and ancient texts, but rather an ever-changing concept, which is created anew by the readers. In comparison with Highet he assumes a different way of thinking and talking about classical tradition (“[t]he change is how we know what we know in this area”, p. 2), and also points out the increase in the factual knowledge of antiquity.

Next, Kallendorf presents a brief review of the content of the volume with the stress on particularly interesting or innovative chapters. The point of reference is still Highet’s monograph, however, the author indicates that it has some gaps to be filled. This mainly concerns the necessity of including geographical areas such as Central Europe, which are not discussed by Highet (his book was focused only on Western Europe), and also taking into account the presence of antiquity in new fields of culture e.g. film, psychology.

The introduction is followed by Christopher Stray’s chapter on classical tradition in the educational system (*Education*). It discusses the educational framework for learning about classics and presents changes in its place and importance at school and university. It considers the conditions that influenced those changes, taking into account also theoretical attempts at discussing this issue and the history of the term „classics”.

After this chapter, three main parts follow: “Periods”, “Places” and “Contemporary Themes”. The first one gives a chronological review of the subject. This review uses traditional periodization system and includes the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, the Baroque, the Neoclassicism, the Romanticism, the Victorian age and the Modernism. Despite the attempt to take a comprehensive approach to the issue, the Anglo-Saxon perspective is predominant in the periodization method (Norman Vance, *Victorian*, pp. 87–100) as well as in the content of the chapters. It could be seen

for example in Bruce Graver's text *Romanticism* (pp. 72–86), which relies only on the English sources.

It is worth noting that, while the composition of the content of "Periods" is a traditional one, the coherence of chapters is quite interesting, especially because of many points of view presented by different authors. On the one hand, there are short outlines that attempt to synthesize the material (e.g. *Neoclassicism* by Thomas Kaminski), on the other hand there are chapters that focus on demonstrating a particular problem which is characteristic for the period concerned (e.g. Bruce Graver's *Romanticism*). It gives the reader an opportunity to familiarize oneself with a variety of views and shows how the classical tradition changed over time. However, it has to be said, it happens at the expense of uniformity of disquisition and consistent criteria, which are important in synthesis.

A similar problem arises in the second part of the book – "Places". We should especially pay attention to a wide range of papers and widening of geographical range, in which the classical tradition was considered. The title of Highet's classic book is *The Classical Tradition. Greek and Roman Influences on Western Literature* (our emphasis) and generally its issue was limited to Western Europe only. *CCT* brings into consideration new geographical areas such as Africa, South America and Eastern Europe.

Jerzy Axer and Katarzyna Tomaszuk are the authors of the chapter *Central-Eastern Europe* (pp. 132–155), which should be assessed from two perspectives. Firstly, as establishing some new areas of research, complementary, which are a compliment, to Highet's work, and, secondly, in the context of Polish research on the classical tradition. This first one is decisive when it comes to the nature of the text, which was defined by the assumptions of the whole volume. That is the reason for brevity of the deliberations and their general character. It is worth giving some thought to the place that this issue takes in the area of interest undertaken by Polish researchers.

The point of reference for the paper *Central-Eastern Europe* was Tadeusz Bieńkowski's work entitled *Antyk w literaturze i kulturze staropolskiej (1450–1750). Główne problemy i kierunki recepcji* (Wrocław 1976). It seems worth pointing out the main differences between those two points of view. The first thing, which is noticeable at first sight, is the size of each text and, as a result, different aims of both works. The essay *Central-Eastern Europe* proposes a synoptic view, deprived of the ambition to exhaust the subject and rather suggesting some specific directions of research. On the other hand, Bieńkowski's book is a monograph that aspires to systematize and present the complete state of research. Secondly, as a consequence of choosing those different aims, the arrangement of each work is different. Bieńkowski's monograph is generally written in a chronological order, including the Renaissance and Baroque. Moreover, it is geographically narrowed to Poland, but each of the analyzed periods gave the author the opportunity to present some excursions into European reception of antiquity. Axer, widening the geographical frames outside one particular country, admittedly retains the chronological order (taking the deliberations up to our times), but in each of self-contained wholes there is a tendency to discuss the issues, which are presented in a very general way, in problematic categories and to use rather a small number of references to concrete texts. Thirdly, the arrangement of the considered essays was also influenced by the methods used in research. Axer specifies the problem by comparing (pp. 132 f.) traditional notions of the terms "heritage" and "reception". The aesthetic qualities of reception take the reader as a point of departure, that is the person who construes the text. This brought about, on the one hand, removing the oppositions between the centre and peripheries and, on the other hand, discussing the tradition in two directions.

The third part, "Contemporary Themes", brings a set of completely new issues in the research on the reception of antiquity, which are concerned with the contemporary point of view. Not only does it go beyond the domain of literature (e.g. film, architecture), but also enters the domain of the socio-political-cultural problems (e.g. fascism, psychology, gender studies). This chapter gives also a methodological metareflection (reception and postcolonial studies). Thus, it presents "non-orthodox" areas of research on the classical tradition. The example here could be the essay by

Alastair J.L. Blanshard *Gender and Sexuality* (pp. 328–341). The author discusses the role of the classical tradition in shaping the definitions of “masculinity” and “femininity” and social roles of men and women. Blanshard points out the ancient roots of the roles attributed in culture to men and women. These roles are still relevant today, despite the fact that the texts they were derived from are no longer widely read (for example Xenophon’s *Oeconomicus*). The situation looks similar when it comes to the model of beauty or the motif of a weak woman saved by a hero (Perseus and Andromeda). However, the antique models were used by sufragettes as prototypes of women fighting male domination, a notion also inherited from antiquity. That was, among other things, the role of Medea, who earlier used to be negative example of inappropriate behaviour.

*CCT* fills the gap in research on the presence of classical tradition in literature, not only on the Polish ground, but, first and foremost, on the European ground. As stated above, in Poland an obvious point of reference is Bieńkowski’s book, whereas in Europe the monumental work by Highet. This gap was caused by a natural passage of time (Highet’s book was published in 1949, Bieńkowski’s in 1976), and that is the reason why the need for filling it and collecting the results of conducted research became to be felt, but also because of the need to reconsider the methodology of studies of the classical tradition. To comprehend how urgent this need is, it is worth paying attention to the revolutionary approach of the last half century. Highet represents a traditional paradigm based on influences, after which there appeared a global, anthropological, semiotic theory of Bakhtin, who thought that dialogue is everything, then Konrad Górski’s theory of allusions, Jauss’s reception theory and Kristeva’s intertextuality. This list does not exhaust all the available methods of research on the presence of classical tradition. Postcolonialism, gender studies and feminism may be added, and even more.

It is necessary to remember that a new method makes the researcher face some new problems and leads to new areas of research, which have been never considered yet. That causes the many-sided view, hence the new geographical regions and, finally, the different point of view on the heritage of antiquity. This distinctness is based on a dialogical presentation of the tradition, in which the attention is focused on the reader and his reception of a literary text (Jauss’s reception theory), whereas the traditional point of view, based on influences is rather unidirectional and monological.

*CCT* is not a synthesizing monograph on the classical tradition (unlike very scrupulous work by Highet), but this should not be regarded as a fault. It is worth remembering that it is the reader that molds the tradition. “This, then, is the classical tradition as we find it in 2007, robust, widely dispersed in time and place, and continuing to be transformed anew as it is appropriated by new generations” (p. 4). The arrangement of the book and its form in themselves are the evidence of reception and present the picture of antiquity in 2007.

Magdalena Wolf,  
Patrik Czepanis  
University of Wrocław

