

issues such as the composition of the two dialogues is endowed with striking insight and subtlety. Operating on differing levels of structure and meaning, J. is able to weave the varied strands into a persuasive reconstruction of Plato's original intent that was to determine the flow of the discussion contained in the *Timaeus – Critias*. In demonstrating the high level of the subordination of the composition to the philosophical content, he attests to Plato's mastery of the literary medium he chose, simultaneously demonstrating how the features that seem to be of purely compositional character do actually stem from the underlying philosophical scheme. Indeed, on J.'s reading, the literary *demiourgos* Plato appears to come close to the perfect teleology of the Divine Demiourge of the dialogue.

*In summa*: J.'s is a good, extremely readable work, well worth attention of those carefully feeling their way through the intricacies of the pair and those for whom the *Timaeus – Critias*, in spite or possibly due to a long study, remains a mine-field, albeit a well mapped one. While it does not enter into a detailed philosophical analysis of the more complex issues intrinsic to the two dialogues, it provides an interesting picture of the overall pattern, thus displaying the scheme underlying their composition and possible meaning. And, as it may provide guidance and help to those beginning their studies of the philosopher, it may also be of use to the more advanced Plato scholars.

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**George E. Karamanolis, *Plato and Aristotle in Agreement? Platonists on Aristotle from Antiochus to Porphyry*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006, 419 + X pp., ISBN 0-19-926456-2 (978-0-19-926456-8).**

For those committed to the *agrapha dogmata* or Tübingen interpretation the question mark that stands so prominently in the title of George Karamanolis' [= K.'s] book may seem at the very least superfluous: they know (or so they claim) that the two were in general agreement, and they agree that Aristotle may be employed as a valuable source in the reconstruction of what they regard as the true (depending on the stance taken by a given individual read the only true or the truly advanced) teachings of Plato. Yet, it is neither Plato nor his actual teachings that form the principal subject of this fascinating book – instead, the account is dominated by his later heirs, starting with the prominent figure of Cicero's teacher, Antiochus of Ascalon. K.'s aim may seem simple enough, as he purposes to give an account of the part played by Aristotle's works in the thought and teachings of those who had effectively shaped the history of Platonism: yet, one should remember, the execution of this plan amounts to a comprehensive study of indirect tradition and fragmentary sources, to a careful analysis of the subtleties particular to the scarce remains of Numenius' and Atticus' writings. Even where dealing with what may appear to be the most innocuous subject, namely Plutarchus' philosophy, K.'s research is partially hampered by the loss of some of the Chaeronean's major writings.

The structure of the work being conditioned by its very subject, K.'s account traces the place and function of Aristotle's writings in the thought of major Platonists of the Roman era: consequently, each of his chapters can be read not only in reference to others but as an independent study into the method and thought of a given philosopher. Undoubtedly, this is a considerable merit, for the work is likely to be read not only as an inquiry into the reception of Aristotle's writings, but also as

a guidebook to the authors it discusses, becoming among others a welcome addition to the existing works on what we know as the Middle Platonism.

Thus, starting with a comprehensive introduction (pp. 1–43), where he highlights the unique character of Plato’s method and the problems related to the exegesis of his actual teachings, K. moves to what constituted Antiochus’ most important contributions to the development of Platonist thought, namely to the radical rejection of Carneadean scepticism, and to the origin of the idea that Academic does not necessarily imply Platonic. Relating to the monumental works of Dillon, Glücker, and Brittain<sup>1</sup>, the chapter on Antiochus (pp. 44–83) provides a reader with a coherent picture of the epistemological debate that underlies the composition of Cicero’s *Academica*, and may prove of immense help to anyone wishing to investigate the character and biases of philosophical discussion in the period; one may note, however, that at this point K.’s argument could have benefited from a reference to Boys-Stones’ inspiring study of the notion of antiquity as employed in the post-hellenistic philosophy<sup>2</sup>. Also, the overall scope of the work prevents its author from indulging a detailed survey of Cicero’s transmission of Antiochus’ teachings, yet it is worth noticing that many references of the kind are provided in the footnotes.

The chapter devoted to Plutarchus (pp. 85–126) gives a clear account of the relatively complex attitude the Chaeronean displayed toward the Aristotelian thought: acknowledging the latter’s dissension from Plato’s own doctrine (or, to be more precise, from what he considered to constitute this doctrine), Plutarchus nevertheless endows the Stagirite with considerable philosophical authority, believing him to be a veritable heir of Plato’s ethical teachings. This is certainly an intricate issue, particularly given the raging discussion concerning Plutarchus’ conaissance of his sources: indeed, it is to K.’s credit that he takes a decisive stand in this debate, arguing for the Chaeronean’s close and direct association with the Aristotelian thought (still, one may be worried with the argument from the in-dialogue pronouncement on the availability of Stagirite’s works)<sup>3</sup>. What needs additional emphasizing, K. notes that Plutarchus is highly likely to be acquainted with some of Aristotle’s writings that are lost to us (one may mention the dialogues), and thereby his assertions concerning the basic difference between Plato’s and his pupil’s metaphysics deserve to be treated with due attention<sup>4</sup>. Clearly, the issue of Plutarch’s attitude toward the Stagirite is complicated by the loss of several of his treatises, yet the formulations of the *Adv. Colotem* seem conclusive enough.

The three individuals whose philosophy is of foremost interest in the central chapters of K.’s work (chapters 3–5, pp. 127–215) are known to us only through scarce fragments and later accounts of their thought. Atticus, Numenius, and Ammonius Saccas – all the three, in spite of their apparent originality and importance for the later development of Platonist thought, seem to enjoy at best a very limited acclaim (thus Ammonius is principally known as Plotinus’ teacher). And as it is usual with a fragmentary source, they demand utmost interpretative skills: necessary provisions have to be made, any conclusions to be drawn with appropriate reservations. Laudably, K.’s work

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<sup>1</sup> J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists: a Study of Platonism 80 BC to 220 AD*, London 1977; J. Glucker, *Antiochus and the Late Academy*, Göttingen 1978 (Hypomnemata 56); Ch. Brittain, *Philo of Larissa*, Oxford 2001.

<sup>2</sup> G.R. Boys-Stones, *Post-Hellenistic Philosophy: a Study of its Development from the Stoics to Origen*, Oxford 2001.

<sup>3</sup> The argument runs as follows: “In *De sollertia animalium* Plutarch argues that animals are rational and criticizes the Stoics who denied this, making heavy use of Aristotle’s biological works. This becomes plain when Autoboulus, who responds to the Stoic objections, flatters Optatus by saying his expertise may save them from having to look at Aristotle’s volumes. This suggests that Aristotle’s volumes were available to them, and probably much had been drawn from them already, and that they were constantly employed in this Plutarchean argument against the Stoic position” (p. 90).

<sup>4</sup> Cf. pp. 92–100. For the further considerations, concerning Plutarch’s rendering of Plato’s natural philosophy, epistemology, and the doctrine of the soul see pp. 100–115.

reveals something of the personalities that are hiding beneath the surviving fragments: the zeal of Atticus, whose polemic with Aristotle and what he saw as Aristotelizing Platonism (and hence as a betrayal of the true Platonic doctrine) is charged with almost too personal biases, the imaginative and subtle mind of Numenius, and the thirst for the true so characteristic of Ammonius... Still, one may note that the Atticus who emerges from K.'s discussion appears to be hardly compatible with the fascinating thinker of Baltes' seminal study<sup>5</sup> – in his place stands an untiring and often simplifying polemist, whose strict adherence to what he perceives as Plato's doctrine (e.g. the thinking soul and not the thinking intellect) too often leads him to disregard the complexities of Aristotle's thought: as a result, his worth as a philosopher results as questionable. This poses an interesting problem: as the picture we find in K.'s work remains vastly different from that drawn by Dillon or Baltes<sup>6</sup>, Atticus' position in contemporary philosophy results as a worthy subject of further, detailed discussion, while taken at a more general level the discussion may give rise to the issue how to reconcile the polemical spirit of a work with a scholarly desire to uncover the more positive doctrine underlying the actual criticism.

The two final chapters are devoted respectively to the thought of Plotinus (pp. 216–242) and his most famous disciple, Porphyry (pp. 243–330). Highly demanding, they call for an extensive previous experience of the two (not to mention the above average knowledge of Aristotle's writings), yet they prove well worth the effort: K.'s discussion of Plotinus' evaluation of Aristotle's psychology is lucid and throws an interesting light on the obfuscatory techniques employed in the respective polemic (particularly the one contained in *Enn.* IV 2). He acknowledges the part played in the incorporation of Aristotle by the advancement of biological sciences: this, however, brings us to the issue of the delay – would Plotinus, a man of the third century AD, be the first to consider this particular advancement a reason sufficient to revise the teachings of Plato? And if he was not the first to pay attention to the Hellenistic discoveries (particularly to the advancement of medical lore that we owe to Herophilus)<sup>7</sup>, a fact that may be suggested by some passages of Alcinous' manual (which in turn would necessarily send us back to the sources of this particular compilation)<sup>8</sup>, was this advancement considered important by others? And how important it was? Who introduced these discoveries into the philosophical discussion? True enough, our knowledge is necessarily maimed by the lack of adequate source material, yet the question seems to deserve some scholarly attention.

Possibly the most manifest drawback of K.'s book is his failure to account more detailedly for either Apuleius or Alcinous – clearly, neither of the authors is an original or particularly imaginative thinker, yet their works may be regarded as bearing witness to a more low-key, or doxographic current of Platonist philosophy of the period – and both of them are famous for their acceptance of Aristotle's ethical teachings (particularly the doctrine on virtue)<sup>9</sup>. As a result, one may wonder

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<sup>5</sup> M. Baltes, *Zur Philosophie des Platonikers Attikos*, in: H.-D. Blume, F. Mann (hrsgg.), *Platonismus und Christentum: Festschrift für H. Dörrie*, Münster 1983 (Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum, Ergänzungsband 10), pp. 38–57 (repr. in M. Baltes, *ΔΙΑΝΟΗΜΑΤΑ. Kleine Schriften zu Platon und zum Platonismus*, Stuttgart 1999 [Beiträge zur Altertumskunde Bd. 123], pp. 81–112).

<sup>6</sup> Baltes, *o.c.* (n. 5); Dillon, *o.c.* (n. 1), pp. 247–258.

<sup>7</sup> For this particular subject cf. H. von Staden's monumental work, *Herophilus: The Art of Medicine in Early Alexandria*, Cambridge 1989; for a shorter yet comprehensive outline see e.g. L. Russo, *Zapomniana rewolucja*, Kraków 2005 (Polish translation of *La rivoluzione dimenticata*, Milano 2003, of which an English translation, by S. Levy, was published, under the title *The Forgotten Revolution*, by Springer Verlag in 2004), ch. 5, pp. 156–173.

<sup>8</sup> On the Herophilean reverberations in Alcinous cf. T. Göransson, *Albinus, Alcinous, Arius Didymus*, Göteborg 1995, p. 124.

<sup>9</sup> Most prominently in Alcinous *Did.* XXIX 182, 13–183, 14 H. and in Apuleius *De Platone* II 3, 222–225.

whether the presence of Aristotle in their respective writings, as indicative of a wider tendency to employ the works of this philosopher as supplementary to those of Plato, did not deserve something more than an occasional passing remark in the footnotes. Yet, to acknowledge an indubitable fact, the doxographers are somewhat off the particular subject, and the study of their works may rightly be viewed as secondary in a work aiming at the explanation of the process that led to Porphyry's embracing the teachings of Aristotle. One may also note that the scarce presence of "second-rate" thinkers is in a way paralleled by copious references to the philosophers, who in spite of their past eminence remain at best shadowy, such as Eudorus, Taurus and Severus<sup>10</sup>. Additionally, frequent references are made to the works of the best known Peripatetic of the imperial era, Alexander of Aphrodisias, while a brief appendix throws some light on the reciprocal interest i.e. the attention paid to the Platonic corpus by Aristotle as well as his more and less immediate successors (pp. 331–336). Finally, the list of the works written on the Stagirite himself by the philosophers of basically Platonist profession is given in the second appendix (pp. 337–339).

Paradoxically, it is to the radical supporters of the *agrapha* theory that K.'s work may well prove to be either an anathema or, at the very least, an unwelcome obstacle, a circumstance due to the very notion that the 'Plato and Aristotle in agreement' idea could have been employed (by none other but the famous Antiochus) as an effective ploy to reestablish Plato's philosophical authority. Yet, in portraying the historical quest to establish the latter as a systematic thinker, in relating the search to reconcile Plato and his most eminent student to the idea of Plato as *the philosopher*, K. has given us a welcome and fascinating account of the often ignored undercurrents that shaped the development of the ancient philosophy, finally leading Porphyry, Plotinus' pupil and biographer, to write extensive commentaries on some of Aristotle's works. This is a valuable book, a book that deserves both scholarly attention and a further discussion.

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<sup>10</sup> For Eudorus' part in the controversy cf. pp. 81–84, for Taurus and Severus pp. 179–189.

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**Geoffrey S. Sumi, *Ceremony and Power. Performing Politics in Rome between Republic and Empire*, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press 2005, 360 S., 4 Abb.**

Das Interesse an Analysen und Interpretationen der symbolischen Machtaspekte lässt, zumindest seit der Veröffentlichung der ausgezeichneten Studien von Marc Bloch und Ernst H. Kantorowicz, nicht nach<sup>1</sup>. Leider beziehen sich nicht viele von ihnen auf das alte Rom<sup>2</sup>, daher

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<sup>1</sup> M. Bloch, *Les rois thaumaturges*, Paris 1924; E. Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies: a Study in Medieval Political Theology*, Princeton 1957; .

<sup>2</sup> Jüngst z. B. M. MacCormick, *Eternal Victory. Triumphal Rulership in the Late Antiquity, Byzantium and the Early Medieval West*, Cambridge 1986; P. Zanker, *Augustus und die Macht der Bilder*, München 1987; M. Bergmann, *Die Strahlen der Herrscher. Theomorphes Herrscherbild und politische Symbolik im Hellenismus und der römischen Kaiserzeit*, Mainz 1998.